UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ANGELA RENEA GEER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C. A. PILGRIM, Anderson County

Deputy Sheriff; HARVEY C. BLACK,

Anderson County Deputy Sheriff;

No. 96-1635

GENE TAYLOR, Sheriff of Anderson

County; DOE I, Anderson County

Deputy Sheriff; DOE II, Anderson

County Deputy Sheriff; DOE III,

Anderson County Deputy Sheriff,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.

G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-95-3438-8-3)

Argued: October 3, 1997

Decided: November 18, 1997

Before RUSSELL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Herbert Shafer, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. James

Victor McDade, DOYLE & O'ROURKE, Anderson, South Carolina,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jack Horton Lynn, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

On February 24, 1995, several Anderson County deputy sheriffs

responded to a burglary report at an Anderson County residence.

Because the officers discovered a shattered glass door panel upon

their arrival, they searched the residence for intruders. During the

search, the officers discovered two kilograms of cocaine (on the floor)

in plain view. The officers eventually arrested the tenant of the residence, Michael Johnson, in July 1995, for conspiracy to traffic

cocaine.

Upon arrest, Johnson made a voluntary statement to the officers

implicating Darrell Lewis ("Lewis") in the sale and distribution of

cocaine. Johnson stated that Lewis purchased cars and stereo equipment with the proceeds from his drug sales in the names of others so

that the authorities would not detect his illegal earnings. Johnson also

told the officers that Lewis purchased a 1994 Honda Accord and stereo equipment in the name of Veronica McCullough ("McCullough"),

and a Honda Prelude in the name of his girlfriend, Angela Renea Geer

("Geer"), the appellant. Further investigation led to McCullough's

arrest for money laundering.1

When McCullough was arrested, she also gave a voluntary statement in which she indicated that Lewis sold drugs; had made all sub-

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1 During their investigation, the officers had obtained additional evidence indicating that McCullough had purchased the Accord with a

$9,000 cashier's check, which Lewis had funded.

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sequent loan payments on her Accord; dated Geer; and had given

Geer $9,000 to purchase the Prelude. McCullough also informed the

officers that Geer had direct access to Lewis' drug money. Pursuant

to these statements, the officers arrested Geer for money laundering.

Although Geer spoke with two attorneys who advised her not to

cooperate with the authorities, Geer made a voluntary statement

implicating Lewis' illegal drug trade. Geer told the officers that she

had a new set of tire rims at her house, which Lewis had purchased;

that Lewis gave her $9,000 to purchase the Prelude; and that on July

18, 1995, Lewis had instructed her to pick-up a safe containing

$30,000 in cash from a phone booth. After giving her statement, Geer

permitted the officers to search her house, where they confiscated the

safe, the $30,000 cash, and the tire rims.

The Anderson County Solicitor's Office has not tried Geer for

money laundering. Consequently, Geer filed a civil action in federal

district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 against the Sheriff of

Anderson County and five of his deputies (collectively the "Sheriffs"), alleging they violated her constitutional rights when they

arrested her and seized certain property in her possession. Geer

sought exemplary, punitive and actual damages, as well as attorneys's

fees. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Sheriffs, and the district court dismissed Geer's action on the merits. This appeal follows.

I.

Geer asserts the Sheriffs violated her Fourth Amendment right

against unreasonable seizure when they arrested her for money laundering. At trial Geer argued that the affidavit underlying the arrest

warrant was insufficient and that the Sheriff lacked probable cause for

her arrest.

An arrest warrant is valid if there was probable cause for its issuance.3

Probable cause requires enough evidence, which would enable the

magistrate judge to reasonably conclude that an offense has been

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2 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1997).

3 U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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committed and that the defendant has committed it. 4 Thus, the underlying affidavit must provide a substantial basis for determining that

probable cause exists. In the instant case, the affidavit for Geer's

arrest warrant stated:

That [Geer] did in the month of November take a cashier's

check to Piedmont Honda on Clemson Boulevard for

$9,000.00 to assist [McCullough] in the purchase of a vehicle to be placed in [McCullough's name] in order to hide the

asset from law enforcement for Darrel Lewis so that it

couldn't be traced to him, even though he exercised dominion and control over the vehicle after its purchase. This

offense occurred in Anderson County on 11/01/94.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4, the affidavit identified the date of the offense, the location of the offense, the amount

of money that Geer allegedly laundered, and the source of the laundered money. This information indisputably supported the arrest warrant's issuance and Geer's subsequent arrest. Because Geer failed to

establish a defect in the arrest warrant, a reasonable jury could not

have found that the Sheriffs violated Geer's constitutional rights.

Accordingly, we hold that she cannot prevail on her section 1983

claim and we affirm the judgment below as to this issue.

II.

Having carefully reviewed the record, briefs, and contentions of the

parties at oral argument, we hold Geer's remaining issues to be without any merit. Accordingly, we can find no error in the order and

judgment of the district court, and we, therefore affirm the judgment

below.

AFFIRMED

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4 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).

 4