INTEGRITY  INDEPENDENCE  EXCELLENCE

Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Defense

Report No. DODIG-2019-043

JANUARY 3, 2019

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Oversight of Temporary Emergency 

Power Contracts Awarded for 

Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

DODIG-2019-043 (Project No. D2018-D000CG-0066.000) │ i

Results in Brief

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Oversight of Temporary Emergency 

Power Contracts Awarded for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

Objective

We determined whether U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (USACE) Pittsburgh District 

properly monitored contractor performance 

on temporary emergency power contracts 

in accordance with applicable Federal and 

DoD contracting guidance for the disaster 

recovery response to Hurricanes Harvey 

and Irma.

Background

Three major hurricanes made landfall 

in Texas, Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, 

and the U.S. Virgin Islands during the 

2017 hurricane season: Harvey, Irma, 

and Maria. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma 

marked the first time that two Atlantic 

Category 4 hurricanes made landfall in 

the continental United States in the same 

season. These storms affected roughly 

19.8 million people and required USACE 

to provide temporary emergency power 

disaster relief assistance. USACE Pittsburgh 

District officials ordered temporary 

emergency power for recovery efforts for 

Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.1

For incidents that require a coordinated 

Federal response, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security activates Emergency Support 

Function #3, “Public Works and Engineering 

Annex.” This function facilitates the 

delivery of services, technical assistance, 

1 USACE Pittsburgh District officials also ordered 

temporary emergency power for recovery efforts 

for Hurricane Maria. This report discusses contracts 

awarded for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

January 3, 2019

engineering expertise, construction management, and other 

support to prepare for, respond to, or recover from disaster or 

an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. USACE 

is the primary agency responsible for coordinating activities 

involved in providing temporary emergency power to critical 

facilities under Emergency Support Function #3.

To expedite its response to emergencies and disasters, USACE 

developed and implemented Advanced Contracting Initiative 

contracts (ACI) for relief efforts. USACE officials award ACI 

contracts before disasters that allow USACE contracting 

personnel to respond when a disaster occurs by placing 

delivery orders at a negotiated rate for supplies and services. 

USACE used ACI contracts for temporary emergency power.

On October 1, 2013, and October 22, 2014, USACE Pittsburgh 

District contracting officials awarded three competitively bid 

firm-fixed-priced ACI contracts, two valued at $100 million 

and the other valued at $95 million, respectively, for 

temporary emergency power missions.

Finding

USACE oversight personnel did not properly monitor and 

assess contractor performance, in accordance with Federal 

and DoD contracting guidance, on three service contracts 

for temporary emergency power, valued at $19 million, for 

disaster recovery in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. 

We identified the following deficiencies.

• The contracting officer’s representative (COR) for 

all three ACI contracts did not properly monitor 

or document his assessments of the contractors’ 

performance and did not maintain required files 

documenting his oversight efforts. This occurred 

because, although the COR focused more on 

accomplishing the temporary emergency power mission, 

he did not verify that the contractors provided services 

according to contract requirements.

Background (cont’d)
ii │ DODIG-2019-043 (Project No. D2018-D000CG-0066.000)

Results in Brief

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Oversight of Temporary Emergency 

Power Contracts Awarded for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

• USACE Planning and Response Team personnel 

did not document that they performed quality 

assurance procedures sufficient to demonstrate 

that the contractor performed contracted services 

at the standard specified in the performance work 

statement. This occurred because USACE Planning 

and Response Team personnel did not follow 

the quality assurance surveillance plan when 

performing quality assurance of the contractors.

As a result, USACE oversight personnel did not know 

whether the contractors complied with contract 

requirements and whether the Government received 

the services it paid $19 million for from August to 

December 2017 to support temporary emergency power 

for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

Management Comments on the 

Finding and Our Response

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding 

General commented on the finding. He stated that 

the magnitude of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria 

is an important backdrop to understand the COR 

challenges in documenting oversight performed for 

three service contracts for temporary emergency 

power, valued at $19 million. In total, the U.S. was 

impacted by 16 separate billion-dollar disaster events 

including 3 tropical cyclones, 8 severe storms, 2 inland 

floods, a crop freeze, drought and wildfire as reported 

by National Center for Environmental Information. 

The damage from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria 

alone were responsible for approximately $265 billion 

of the $306 billion in 2017 weather and climate related 

disasters. However, as stated in this report, we discuss 

USACE personnel’s oversight of contractor performance 

in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, and 

not Maria.

Recommendations

We recommend that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Commanding General:

• Provide training to the COR responsible for 

temporary emergency power contracts on 

oversight responsibilities, emphasizing the 

importance of the responsibilities specified in the 

COR designation letter.

• Provide training to the procuring contracting 

officers of temporary emergency power contracts, 

emphasizing the importance of monitoring the 

performance of personnel assigned contracting 

officer’s representative responsibilities.

• Direct contracting officials responsible for 

temporary emergency power Advanced 

Contracting Initiative contracts to update the 

quality assurance surveillance plan to include 

specific means for documenting daily quality 

assurance inspections.

• Require all personnel performing the quality 

assurance responsibilities for the temporary 

emergency power mission to receive appropriate 

contract quality assurance training.

Management Comments 

and Our Response

The USACE Commanding General agreed with our 

recommendations. The Commanding General agreed 

to have two additional trained CORs dedicated to 

Task Force Temporary Power by April 1, 2019, and in 

the interim, use CORs from other offices to assist in 

managing the temporary ACI contracts. In addition, the 

Commanding General stated that the contracting office 

is hiring a technical expert to perform the contracting 

officer responsibilities for temporary power missions. 

Finding (cont’d)
DODIG-2019-043 (Project No. D2018-D000CG-0066.000) │ iii

Results in Brief

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Oversight of Temporary Emergency 

Power Contracts Awarded for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

The Commanding General also agreed to revise the 

quality assurance surveillance plan in February 2019, 

after the ACI contracts are awarded, to include 

specific means for documenting daily quality 

assurance assessments through contract modification 

by June 1, 2019. The Commanding General further 

agreed to develop both an online and on the job quality 

assurance curriculum and require all Quality Assurance 

personnel complete the training beginning in calendar 

year 2019.

The USACE Commanding General’s comments met the 

intent of the four recommendations. Therefore, the 

recommendations are resolved, but will remain open. 

We will close the recommendations when we verify 

the actions are fully implemented, and we review the 

support for the planned or already completed actions.

Management Comments (cont’d)
iv │ DODIG-2019-043 (Project No. D2018-D000CG-0066.000)

Recommendations Table

Management Recommendations 

Unresolved

Recommendations 

Resolved

Recommendations 

Closed

Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers None 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, and 1.d None

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to 

individual recommendations.

• Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has 

not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

• Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed 

actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

• Closed – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
DODIG-2019-043 │ v

January 3, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION

AND SUSTAINMENT

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Oversight of Temporary Emergency

Power Contracts Awarded for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

(Report No. DODIG-2019-043)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We conducted this audit in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We considered U.S. Army Corps of Engineers management comments on a draft of this report 

when preparing the final report. Comments from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Corp 

of Engineers conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.02; therefore, we do not 

require additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to 

Ms. Theresa Hull at (703) 604-9312 (DSN 664-9312).

Theresa Hull

Assistant Inspector General 

Acquisition, Contracting, and Sustainment

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500
vi │ DODIG-2019-043

Introduction

Objective...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................1

Background...................................................................................................................................................................................................................1

Review of Internal Controls.......................................................................................................................................................................9

Finding. USACE Oversight Officials Should 

Strengthen Efforts to Monitor ACI Contractors’ 

Performance for Temporary Emergency Power..................................10

Risks of the Government Paying for Services not Received............................................................................18

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response............................................................................18

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response.............................................................20

Appendixes

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology........................................................................................................................................23

Use of Computer-Processed Data..........................................................................................................................................25

Appendix B. Prior Coverage...................................................................................................................................................................26

Appendix C. Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks ......................................29

Appendix D. Quality Assurance Form.......................................................................................................................................34

Management Comments

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers..............................................................................................................................................................35

Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................38

Contents
Introduction

DODIG-2019-043 │ 1

Introduction

Objective

We determined whether U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Pittsburgh District 

properly monitored and assessed contractor performance, in accordance with 

applicable Federal and DoD guidance, on temporary emergency power contracts for 

disaster recovery, in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. See Appendix A for 

a discussion of scope and methodology, and Appendix B for prior audit coverage.

Background

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency is an independent 

entity established within the Executive branch to address integrity, economy, and 

effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies. The Council 

of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Disaster Assistance Working 

Group committed to review disaster relief efforts across the U.S. Government. 

The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) participated in this initiative.

USACE

For incidents that require a coordinated Federal response, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security activates Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3, “Public 

Works and Engineering Annex,” to facilitate the preparedness for public works 

and engineering requirements. USACE is the primary agency responsible for 

coordinating activities involved in temporary emergency power to critical 

facilities under ESF #3.2

To expedite its response to emergencies and disasters, USACE developed and 

implemented Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) contracts for relief efforts. 

USACE officials award ACI contracts before disasters that allow USACE contracting 

personnel to respond when a disaster occurs by placing delivery orders at a 

negotiated rate for supplies and services. USACE used ACI contracts for temporary 

emergency power.

USACE Pittsburgh District

USACE Pittsburgh District’s mission is to provide expertise to help the region 

and the nation meet water resources development, environmental, and other 

engineering needs.3 USACE Pittsburgh District is responsible for solicitation, 

2 The ESFs provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for a Federal response to an incident.

3 USACE Pittsburgh District’s boundaries are defined by the watershed basins for which it is responsible and 

include 26,000 square miles covering portions of western Pennsylvania, northern West Virginia, eastern Ohio, 

western Maryland and southwestern New York.
Introduction

2 │ DODIG-2019-043

evaluation, award, and annual maintenance of ACI contracts for temporary 

emergency power.4 USACE Pittsburgh District typically issues mobilization 

task orders to contractors in support of the district responsible for executing 

the emergency power mission. Headquarters USACE directs USACE Pittsburgh 

District as the lead to execute all pre-declaration and no-notice declaration 

temporary emergency power mission assignments. After the President declares 

a major disaster, the district commander of the impacted area will decide whether 

contractor performance will continue on the task order issued by the Pittsburgh 

District or the impacted district will issue a new order to assume responsibility. 

After the event, a team consisting of Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), state, and local government officials direct Emergency Power 

Planning and Response Teams (PRTs) to authorize the contractor to demobilize.

2017 Hurricane Season

Three major hurricanes made landfall in Texas, Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, 

and U.S. Virgin Islands during the 2017 hurricane season: Harvey, Irma, and 

Maria. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma marked the first time that two Atlantic 

Category 4 hurricanes made landfall in the continental United States in the same 

season. USACE Pittsburgh District officials stated that Hurricane Maria made 

landfall in Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, leaving all 3.4 million residents 

without electricity. USACE Pittsburgh District officials ordered temporary 

emergency power for recovery efforts for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.5

Hurricane Harvey

Hurricane Harvey made landfall on August 25, 2017, and set a record for the most 

rainfall from a U.S. tropical cyclone, with more than 50 inches of rain in some 

areas. The storm resulted in catastrophic flooding in Texas and western Louisiana, 

and caused an estimated $125 billion of damage in the United States, according 

to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. From August 27, 2017, 

through September 20, 2017, USACE personnel oversaw contractors’ installation of 

45 generators in response to Hurricane Harvey.

Hurricane Irma

On September 5, 2017, and September 10, 2017, within 2 weeks of 

Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma made landfall in Puerto Rico and Florida, 

respectively. Hurricane Irma became the strongest Atlantic Ocean hurricane on 

4 Temporary emergency power refers to the installation and use of generators to provide power.

5 USACE Pittsburgh District officials also ordered temporary emergency power for recovery efforts for Hurricane Maria. 

USACE Pittsburgh District officials stated that USACE personnel oversaw the contractors’ installation of generators 

at over 1,286 locations in response to Hurricane Maria for the temporary power mission assignment received on 

September 20, 2017. This report discusses the temporary emergency power contracts awarded for Hurricanes Harvey 

and Irma.
Introduction

DODIG-2019-043 │ 3

record, with winds peaking at 185 miles per hour, and remained a hurricane for 

11 days. Hurricane Irma was the longest-lived Atlantic hurricane since Hurricane 

Ivan in 2004. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 

Hurricane Irma caused at least $50 billion of damage in the United States. From 

September 4, 2017, through September 24, 2017, USACE personnel oversaw 

contractors’ installation of 42 generators in response to Hurricane Irma.6

Guidance

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Guidance

The “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act” 

(Stafford Act) and the 2016 National Response Framework (NRF) provide 

guidance for Government officials to use during emergencies. The Stafford Act 

authorizes the President to provide financial aid and other forms of assistance to 

support response, recovery, and mitigation efforts following declared disasters. 

Under the Stafford Act, USACE supports FEMA in carrying out the NRF, which 

calls on Federal departments and agencies to provide coordinated disaster 

relief and recovery operations to assist local agencies when local resources and 

capabilities are exceeded.

National Response Framework

The NRF guides the Nation’s response to all types of disasters and emergencies. 

The NRF is always in effect, and elements can be implemented at any time. 

The NRF describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents 

that range from local emergencies to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic 

natural disasters.7 The NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, 

and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required to 

respond to an incident and further describes how response efforts integrate with 

those of the other mission areas. The NRF provides structure for effective and 

efficient incident management among the Federal, state, and local emergency 

management agencies after a disaster. The NRF authorizes FEMA, part of the 

Department of Homeland Security, to issue mission assignments for executing ESFs. 

USACE is responsible for ESF #3.

6 The contractor installed 42 generators to facilities located in Lakeland and Homestead, Florida.

7 A catastrophic incident is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels 

of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, 

national morale, or Government functions.
Introduction

4 │ DODIG-2019-043

Emergency Support Function #3. USACE is the primary coordinator and agency 

responsible for ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering Annex.” ESF #3 assists 

the Department of Homeland Security by coordinating and organizing Federal 

capabilities and resources to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, 

engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prepare 

for, respond to, or recover from a disaster or an incident requiring a coordinated 

Federal response.

ESF #3 is structured to provide public works and engineering-related support 

for the changing requirements of domestic incident management, including 

preparedness, response, and recovery actions. Activities within the scope of this 

function include:

• conducting pre-incident and post-incident assessments of public works 

and infrastructure;

• executing emergency contract support for life-saving and 

life‐sustaining services;

• providing technical assistance to include engineering expertise, 

construction management, and contracting and real estate services;

• providing emergency repair of damaged public infrastructure and 

critical facilities; and

• executing emergency contracting support for infrastructure related to 

life-saving and life-sustaining services, such as providing potable water, 

emergency power, and other emergency commodities and services.

Advance Contracting Initiative Contracts

To expedite a response to emergencies and disasters, USACE developed and 

implemented ACI contracts for relief efforts. USACE officials award ACI contracts 

before disasters that allow USACE contracting personnel to respond when a 

disaster occurs by placing delivery orders at a negotiated rate for supplies and 

services. Each of the awarded contracts is specific to a state, geographical region, 

or territory of the United States, and contractors can begin mobilization within 

24 hours of notification. Agencies meet actual needs by placing delivery orders 

against the ACI contracts.

Temporary Emergency Power Mission

On October 1, 2013, USACE Pittsburgh District contracting officials awarded 

two competitively bid firm-fixed-priced ACI contracts, W911WN-13-D-0006 

and W911WN-13-D-0007, for temporary emergency power missions.8 The 

contractswere awarded for regions IV and V and regions VI, VII, and VIII, 

8 A firm-fixed-priced contract uses a price that does not fluctuate with the contractor’s cost in performing the contract.
Introduction

DODIG-2019-043 │ 5

respectively.9 The contracts had a base period of 1 year with four 1-year options, 

and expired on September 30, 2018. In addition, on October 22, 2014, USACE 

Pittsburgh District contracting officials awarded one competitively bid 

firm‐fixed priced ACI contract, W911WN-15-D-0001, for temporary emergency 

power missions. USACE awarded contract W911WN-15-D-0001 for areas outside 

the continental United States. This ACI contract had a base period of 1 year with 

four 1-year options, expiring October 21, 2019, if USACE contracting officials 

exercised all options. USACE Pittsburgh District issued task orders under the 

ACI firm-fixed-priced contracts for emergency temporary power following 

Hurricane Harvey, valued at $7.2 million, and for emergency temporary power 

following Hurricane Irma, valued at $12 million. Tables 1 and 2 show the ACI 

contract actions for temporary emergency power used in response to the 2017 

hurricane season.

Table 1. Temporary Emergency Power ACI Contract Information

Hurricane Contract No. Base Contract 

Award Value Obligated Value

Harvey W911WN-13-D-0007 $50,000,000 $7,198,225

Irma W911WN-13-D-0006 50,000,000 7,402,689

Irma W911WN-15-D-0001* 95,000,000 4,646,600

 Total $195,000,000 $19,247,514

*Contract W911WN-15-D-0001 was a contract for temporary emergency power for OCONUS locations.

Source: The DoD OIG.

Table 2. Temporary Emergency Power ACI Task Order Information

Hurricane-Mission 

Location Task Order No. Task Order Award Value

Task Order 

Ceiling 

Amount

Obligated 

Value

Harvey-Texas W911WN-17-F-3021 $805,927 $7,198,225 $7,198,225

Irma-Florida W911WN-17-F-3029 4,772,936 6,100,000 6,100,000

Irma-Georgia W911WN-17-F-3030 1,302,689 N/A* 1,302,689

Irma-Puerto Rico W911WN-17-F-3024 50,402 1,941,721 1,941,721

Irma-U.S. Virgin 

Islands W911WN-17-F-3025 50,561 2,704,879 2,704,879

 Total $6,982,515 $17,944,825 $19,247,514

*USACE issued modifications to task orders W911WN-17-F-3021, W911WN-17-F-3029, W911WN-17-F-3024, 

and W911WN-17-F-3025 to increase the ceiling amounts in response to mission requirements. USACE did 

not identify a ceiling amount for task order W911WN-17-F-3030 through modifications or on the task order. 

Source: The DoD OIG.

9 The Federal Emergency Management Agency divides the United States and its territories into regions. Regions IV 

and V include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Illinois, 

Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Regions VI, VII, and VIII include Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 

Oklahoma, Texas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, 

and Wyoming.
Introduction

6 │ DODIG-2019-043

Federal Acquisition Regulations

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (DFARS) identify procuring contracting officer (PCO) and 

contracting officer’s representative (COR) responsibilities for monitoring contractor 

performance. The FAR requires that contracting officers include appropriate 

quality requirements in the contract and that contracting officers should maintain 

complete and accurate Government contract files. Specifically, the FAR and DFARS 

require the following.

• FAR Subpart 1.602-2, “Responsibilities,” states that PCOs are responsible 

to ensure performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting 

and ensure compliance with the terms of the contracts. In addition, the 

DFARS requires that contracting officers designate a COR for all service 

contracts. The FAR states that PCOs must designate and authorize CORs 

in writing, CORs must be qualified in training and experience, and CORs 

must be certified and maintain certification.10

• FAR Subpart 4.8, “Government Contract Files,” requires contracting offices 

to establish files that contain the records of all contractual actions. 

The FAR states quality assurance (QA) records are normally contained 

in a contract file if applicable. The documents in the contract file should 

provide a complete history of the transaction to support the basis for 

making informed decisions and actions taken, and to support reviews 

and investigations.

• FAR Part 46, “Quality Assurance,” prescribes policies and procedures 

to ensure that supplies and services acquired under Government 

contract conform to the contract’s quality and quantity requirements. 

Contracting officers are required to include appropriate requirements 

from the contractor’s quality control plan and verify that the contractor 

fulfilled the contract quality requirements. For service contracts, the 

DFARS states that the contracting officer should prepare a quality 

assurance surveillance plan (QASP) to facilitate assessment of contractor 

performance.11 The plan should specify all work requiring surveillance 

and the method of surveillance.

10 DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information Subpart 201.602-2, “Responsibilities,” requires that contracting officers 

designate a COR for all service contracts. 

11 DFARS Part 246.401, “General.” 
Introduction

DODIG-2019-043 │ 7

DoD COR Handbook

The DoD COR Handbook, March 22, 2012, (COR Handbook) provides guidance to 

CORs to monitor contractor performance and provide the PCO with documentation 

that identifies the contractor’s compliance or noncompliance with the terms and 

conditions of the contract.12 The COR Handbook also states that the:

• COR must monitor contractor performance through the review of monthly 

reports, onsite visits, and surveillance review;

• COR can use the QASP as a guide to systematically and effectively monitor 

that the quality of services received comply with the terms and conditions 

of the contract;

• COR is required to maintain an individual COR file for each contract and 

document contractor performance; and

• PCO should review the COR reports for completeness and the COR file on 

a yearly basis and note any findings or recommended actions.13

USACE Acquisition Instruction

USACE Acquisition Instruction and Desk Guide, January 25, 2017, requires CORs to 

submit monthly status reports by the 15th of each month that cover the actions 

for the preceding 1-month period. The instruction further states that the PCO is 

required to ensure that the COR maintains contract documentation in the COR file 

and to conduct an annual review of the COR file.

Oversight Roles and Responsibilities

The PCO, the COR, the mission manager (MM), and the contract specialist were 

responsible for overseeing the contractor during the emergency temporary power 

mission for the three Hurricanes Harvey and Irma contracts.14 The contract 

QASP outlines the following roles and responsibilities of the Government 

surveillance team.

The contracting officer is responsible for:

• advising the Emergency Power Program Manager and MM on QASP 

development and use and appointing Power PRT personnel to serve 

as QA monitors;

12 The COR Handbook provides relevant and comprehensive guidance on performance of COR functions. Information 

in the handbook is extracted from other authoritative sources, including the FAR, the DFARS, and DoD directives, 

instructions, publications, and policies. DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information subpart 201.602-2 refers to the 

COR Handbook for guidance on COR duties.

13 Revised in October 2015, DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information subpart 201.602-2 requires a contracting officer 

to, at a minimum, annually review the COR’s files for accuracy and completeness.

14 The PCO performed the duties of an administrative contracting officer for all three contracts and the 

five associated task orders.
Introduction

8 │ DODIG-2019-043

• providing advice for developing incentives and remedies, as appropriate, 

tied to performance objectives and performance thresholds; and

• maintaining contract file documentation of training provided by 

contracting personnel and approving all deductions in contractor earnings 

due to failure to provide the contracted level of service for this contract.

The Power PRT MM responsibilities include:

• performing as the lead for QA and recommending QA personnel for task 

order supporting mission execution; notifying the contracting officer of 

the selection or of any changes in QA status that would require changes to 

QA appointment and designation letters;

• certifying that the individual appointed as the QA possesses the necessary 

qualifications to perform the QA duties;

• evaluating and documenting contractor performance in 

accordance with the QASP;

• documenting and recommending relief to the contractor for not 

meeting performance requirements, based on situations outside the 

contractor’s control;

• notifying the contracting officer of any significant performance 

deficiencies and providing recommendations to improve the QASP or 

performance work statement; and

• maintaining surveillance documentation and ensuring the completion of 

contractor performance assessment reports for all task orders.

The contract specialist assists the MM in issuing work orders, maintains 

contractual documents, and reviews the Daily Expenditure Report. 

The logistics specialist is responsible for all operations at the staging area, 

tracking the departure and arrival of all assets to and from the staging area, 

and all property accountability. The QA assists the MM and QA supervisor to 

monitor and surveil the contractor and complete documentation of the contractor’s 

performance. The QA supervisor organizes the QAs to ensure that all surveillance 

is accomplished during the rating period, coordinates with the MM on the 

recommendations for QA appointments, and maintains documentation of all 

surveillance done in a QA surveillance folder.

The QASP also states that the contractor is responsible for:

• complying fully with the terms and conditions of the contract;

• participating as a member of the Federal emergency power response team;

• maintaining and implementing a contractor quality control plan that 

complements the QASP;
Introduction

DODIG-2019-043 │ 9

• ensuring that nonconforming contract services are identified 

and corrected; 

• tendering to the Government for acceptance only those services that 

conform to contract requirements; and

• recommending any changes to the contract that will provide more 

effective operations or eliminate unnecessary costs and ensuring current 

copies of all contractor Standard Operating Procedures and Quality 

Control Plan are onsite.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive 

system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs 

are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.15 

We identified internal control weaknesses. USACE oversight officials did not 

properly monitor and assess contractor performance on temporary emergency 

power task orders services in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma to verify 

contractors complied with the contracts. We will provide a copy of the final report 

to the senior official responsible for internal controls at USACE.

15 DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013.
Finding

10 │ DODIG-2019-043

Finding

USACE Oversight Officials Should Strengthen Efforts to 

Monitor ACI Contractors’ Performance for Temporary 

Emergency Power

USACE oversight personnel did not properly monitor and assess contractor 

performance, in accordance with Federal and DoD contracting guidance, on 

three services contracts for temporary emergency power valued at $19 million 

for disaster recovery in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. USACE 

contracting and PRT personnel did not monitor contractor performance in 

accordance with Federal and DoD acquisition requirements. We identified the 

following deficiencies. 

• The COR for all three ACI contracts did not properly monitor or 

document his assessments of the contractors’ performance and did not 

maintain required files documenting his oversight efforts.16 This occurred 

because, although the COR focused more on accomplishing the temporary 

emergency power mission, he did not verify that the contractors provided 

services according to contract requirements.

• USACE PRT personnel did not document that they performed QA 

procedures sufficient to demonstrate that the contractors performed 

contracted services at the standard specified in the performance work 

statement. This occurred because USACE PRT personnel did not follow 

the QASP when performing QA of the contractors.

As a result, USACE oversight personnel did not know whether the contractors 

complied with contract requirements and whether the Government received 

the services it paid $19 million for from August to December 2017 to support 

temporary emergency power for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

Oversight Officials Did Not Adequately Monitor 

Contractor Performance

USACE personnel worked to accomplish the temporary emergency power mission 

following Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, overseeing contractors’ installation of 

42 temporary generators in 21 days after Hurricane Irma and the installation of 

45 temporary generators in 25 days after Hurricane Harvey. However, USACE 

16 We reviewed three service contracts and five associated task orders. Contract W911WN-13-D-0006 included 

task orders W911WN-17-F-3029 and W911WN-17-F-3030; contract W911WN-13-D-0007 included task 

order W911WN-17-F-3021; and contract W911WN-15-D-0001 included task orders W911WN-17-F-3024 and 

W911WN-17-F-3025. The COR’s monitoring and documentation was improper because it was not in accordance with 

Federal and DoD acquisition guidance.
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 11

oversight personnel did not provide sufficient oversight to demonstrate that the 

contractors provided services to the standard specified in the performance work 

statements. Specifically, the COR for all three ACI contracts did not properly 

monitor or document his assessments of the contractors’ performance and did not 

maintain required files documenting his oversight efforts. Additionally, USACE PRT 

personnel did not document that they performed QA procedures sufficient to 

demonstrate that the contractors performed contracted services as specified in the 

performance work statement.

The COR Did Not Monitor or Assess Contractor Performance

The COR did not adequately monitor the contractors’ performance. In March 2015, 

the USACE Pittsburgh District contracting officer and the COR signed letters 

designating the COR to perform actions on behalf of the contracting officer for 

the three ACI contracts for temporary emergency power. The designation letters 

authorized the COR to:

• ensure that the contractor performed contract requirements in accordance 

with the contract terms, conditions, and specifications;

• ensure that inspections necessary to assure performance were conducted;

• prepare monthly reports concerning performance of services rendered 

under the contract; and

• maintain adequate records sufficient to describe the duties he performed.

The COR did not perform the tasks he was designated to perform for the 

three ACI contracts.

The COR Did Not Verify Contractor Performance 

The COR did not verify that the contractors for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma 

performed technical requirements in accordance with the contract terms, 

conditions, and specifications. The COR stated that he communicated with 

the PRT MMs through e-mail and telephone on a daily basis to monitor contractor 

progress. However, the COR did not provide documentation demonstrating that 

the contractors performed contracted tasks at an acceptable level of performance. 

For example, the performance work statement required the contractor to depart 

the staging area to install generators within an hour of receiving a work order. 

However, the COR did not provide records or documentation to show that the 

contractors met this standard.
Finding

12 │ DODIG-2019-043

The COR Did Not Conduct Inspections

The COR did not visit the hurricane response sites to perform any direct oversight 

nor did he oversee PRT personnel to ensure that the inspections and oversight 

performed by the MMs and other PRT personnel were sufficient to ensure that 

the contractors met the standards specified in the contract. The COR stated 

that he relied on the PRT members to conduct QA inspections of the contractors’ 

performance using QA checklists. The COR stated that he quickly reviewed the 

QA checklists for potential deficiencies, but did not review the checklists for 

completeness or accuracy. The COR did not provide documentation of his review 

of the QA checklists.

The COR Did Not Prepare Monthly Reports

The COR did not prepare monthly reports in accordance with the COR designation 

letter requirements. The designation letter required the COR to submit to the 

PCO a monthly report on performance of services rendered. However, the COR 

did not submit reports monthly or at the end of any of the missions. Without this 

information, USACE does not know whether the contractor’s performance fulfilled 

the contract requirements and could overpay for services that the contractor 

provided that did not meet the contract terms.

The COR Did Not Maintain Required Documentation

The COR did not maintain required records to describe the duties he performed. 

The designation letter requires the COR to maintain records that sufficiently 

describe the duties he performed. The COR stated that he maintained direct 

liaison and communication with the PRT, the contractors, FEMA, and USACE 

through e-mails and daily phone calls known as Power Interagency Coordination 

Calls (PICC). The PICC served as a status report to discuss, among other topics, 

contractor movement, weather incidents, lodging arrangements, and generator 

status. The COR relied on the PICC and the PRT’s observations to ensure that 

the contractors performed in accordance with the contract terms. However, 

the PICC notes did not discuss inspections performed to support whether the 

contractor performed contract requirements in accordance with the contract 

terms, conditions, and specifications and as a result were insufficient to meet 

the COR’s responsibilities as identified in the COR designation letter.

The COR should document his oversight of the contractor because the 

documentation becomes the official record of the contractor’s performance. 

Without documented records of the contractor’s performance, contracting officials 

responsible for making future ACI contract awards will not have the details 

necessary to make an informed decision. Further, the PCO can use the oversight 
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 13

documentation to address contractor deficiencies and to provide the annual 

assessment of the contractor’s performance in the Contractor Performance 

Assessment Reporting System. The USACE PCO uses the Contractor Performance 

Assessment Reporting System ratings to determine whether a contractor should 

perform work on future task orders. In addition, Government personnel use 

the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System ratings to determine 

whether to award new contracts to that particular contractor.

The COR Did Not Use the Contracting Officers Representative Tracking Tool

The COR did not maintain the required documentation in the Contracting Officer 

Representative Tracking (CORT) Tool in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.72.17 

DoD Instruction 5000.72 and an Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics memorandum require CORs to maintain 

an electronic file in the CORT Tool for each assigned contract and include, at a 

minimum, completed surveillance documents.18 In 2015, USACE transitioned 

from the Virtual Contracting Enterprise–Contracting Officer’s Representative 

Module web-based application to implement the DoD Instruction 5000.72 

requirement for all DoD entities to use the CORT Tool. The Virtual Contracting 

Enterprise‐Contracting Officer’s Representative Module interfaced with the 

Standard Procurement System and other Army systems, adding the capability to 

notify contracting officials when the COR submitted COR Monthly Status Reports 

or when the reports were due. However, the CORT Tool did not interface with 

other Army electronic systems and did not identify missing COR status reports or 

notify the PCO or COR when COR monthly status reports are due.

The COR’s supervisor and the PCO are responsible to ensure that CORs file 

monthly status reports in the CORT Tool. The PCO could have used the CORT Tool 

to monitor the COR’s workload. The COR was assigned to multiple contracts and 

performed other duties. He stated that he was the emergency operations manager 

and delegated to be the COR for the contracts. Although DoD Instruction 5000.72 

does not prohibit a COR from working on more than one contract, the instruction 

requires the contracting officer to ensure that individuals designated as CORs 

are able to dedicate sufficient time to perform adequate oversight on each 

designated contract.

17 DoD Instruction 5000.72, “DoD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification,” March 26, 2015.

18 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics memorandum, “Update to the Department of 

Defense Contracting Officer Representative Tracking Tool,” February 10, 2014.
Finding

14 │ DODIG-2019-043

The COR Did Not Document Contractor Surveillance

The COR did not maintain documents that detailed contractor surveillance, 

such as onsite contractor inspections or the contractor’s quality control plan 

in his COR files, although he did maintain his designation letter, a QASP, and an 

annual file inspection checklist. The COR Handbook states, “It is important that 

the COR document everything related to the contract, contractor performance, 

and other related matters, including conversations and meetings with the 

contractor.” In addition, the COR Handbook states that it is important for the 

COR to document the status of ongoing work, issues identified by the contractor 

and QA personnel, and corrective actions because this documentation will show 

whether the contractor performance was timely, work was within scope, and 

contractor‐furnished materials and services complied with the contract terms 

and conditions.

The COR Did Not Perform Duties in Designation Letter

The COR did not properly monitor contractor performance to ensure that 

the contractor met contract standards because he was more concerned 

about accomplishing the emergency power mission and less concerned about 

accomplishing the duties assigned to him in the COR designation letters. 

On a daily basis, the COR communicated with PRT personnel and monitored 

the contractors’ progress towards the installation of generators. However, the 

COR did not accomplish the duties he was assigned in the designation letters. 

The COR incorrectly stated that the designation letters that he signed were not 

related to the temporary power mission. The COR signed a designation letter for 

each of the three contracts that specified his responsibilities as a COR. USACE 

accomplishes the temporary emergency power mission using ACI contracts. 

Contractors performed the tasks of unloading, installing, maintaining, and 

uninstalling the power generators. USACE contracted with the contractors to 

perform these tasks at a specified performance level. The COR was responsible to 

ensure that the contractors provided services according to the contract standards.

In addition, the PCO should have done a better job of overseeing the COR. The FAR 

and the Army Regulation 70-13 state that the PCO is responsible for ensuring 

performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, compliance with 

the terms of the contract, and safeguarding the interest of the United States in 

its contractual relationships.19 This includes, but is not limited to, maintaining 

the official contract file, appointing CORs, and conducting progress meetings 

with appointed oversight personnel. Army Regulation 70-13 states that the PCO 

19 FAR Subpart 1.6, “Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities,” and Army Regulation 70-13, 

“Management and Oversight of Services Acquisition,” July 2010, Chapters 2 through 4, “Contracting Officer.”
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 15

will monitor the COR’s performance during the contract to ensure that the COR’s 

responsibilities and duties are performed. Additionally, DFARS procedures and the 

USACE Acquisition Instruction require the PCO to, at a minimum, annually review 

the COR’s files for accuracy and completeness.20 However, the USACE Pittsburgh 

District office CORT Tool files were missing various COR surveillance results and 

COR monthly reports, and the PCO did not review the CORT Tool files for accuracy 

or completeness.

QA Personnel Did Not Perform Complete QA Procedures

USACE personnel did not perform QA procedures that demonstrated that the 

contractors performed contracted services at the standard specified in the 

performance work statement as required by the FAR.21 The PCO prepared a 

contract performance work statement that identified 20 tasks that the contractor 

was expected to perform and the acceptable level of performance for each task.22 

The FAR requires that Government personnel perform QA to determine whether 

the contractor provides services that conform to contract requirements and further 

states that QASPs should be prepared in conjunction with the statement of work. 

The FAR also requires contracting personnel to establish files that contain the 

records of all contractual actions, such as QA records, that will provide a complete 

history of the transaction to support the basis for making informed decisions, 

actions taken, and to support reviews and investigations.23 USACE personnel QA 

efforts did not meet the FAR requirements.

PRTs Did Not Validate the Contractors’ Performance

USACE PRT oversight personnel did not validate that the contractors provided 

services that met the standards specified in the performance work statement. 

The PRTs that oversaw the contractors’ performance included USACE personnel 

from various USACE districts. To monitor the contracts, PRT personnel used 

documentation, such as QA checklists, daily expenditure reports, installation and 

de-installation work orders, daily work orders and status reports, site condition 

reports, and daily meetings with the contractors. However, the QA personnel 

used documents that did not provide enough information to support whether the 

contractors’ performance met the performance work standards.

20 DFARS Part 201.6-2, “Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities.”

21 FAR Subpart 46.4, “Government Contract Quality Assurance.”

22 According to the QASP, the MM and PCO may adjust the standard based upon mission conditions.

23 FAR Subpart 4.8, “Government Contract Files.”
Finding

16 │ DODIG-2019-043

PRT personnel did not document that the contractors performed the 

20 tasks identified in the performance work statement at an acceptable level. 

(See Appendix C for the 20 tasks.) The tasks included preparing the generators 

for use, installing the generators, maintaining the generators, fueling, and 

de‐installing the generators. The tasks also included preparing accident reports, 

daily status reports, and customer complaints. However, USACE personnel 

did not demonstrate that PRT personnel documented QA supporting whether the 

contractors performed according to the contract requirements.24 The following 

are examples of USACE personnel providing insufficient documentation of QA.

• USACE personnel did not document that the contractor installed 

generators according to the performance work statement. One of the 

contract performance standards for generator installation was that 

the generator must be installed at the facility with a confirmed report 

back (verbal or written) to the PRT within 30 minutes of completing the 

installation and a completed installation work order to the PRT within 

6 hours of completing the installation. For the 46 generator installation 

work orders reviewed from task orders W911WN-17-F-3021 and 

W911WN‐17-F-3029, the documents did not indicate the time and 

date that the contractor site manager confirmed the installation was 

complete, nor did they indicate the receipt of completed installation. 

The documentation indicated when the contractor installed the 

generators; however, the documents did not indicate when the contractor 

notified the PRT.

• USACE personnel did not provide support showing that the contractor 

met the contract requirement for de-installation. The contract standard 

for generator de-installation was that the generator must be de-installed, 

the facility connected to commercial power, and the generator returned 

to the staging area within 48 hours of receipt of the de-installation work 

order. For the 37 generator de-installation work orders reviewed for task 

orders W911WN-17-F-3021 and W911WN-17-F-3029, the documents did 

not show the time and date the contractor returned the generators to 

the staging area.

• USACE personnel did not provide supporting documentation that the 

contractor met the contract requirement for preventive maintenance. 

The contract standard for preventive maintenance was that the 

contractor should submit all preventive maintenance sheets to the 

PRT by 10 a.m. the day after the contractor performed the preventive 

maintenance. However, for 22 preventive maintenance sheets reviewed 

24 For Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the contractors did not perform 5 of the 20 tasks because the conditions of the 

missions did not warrant a need for the tasks. For example, no accidents occurred, so the contractor did not prepare 

accident reports. In addition, the contractor did not perform some maintenance tasks because the generators were not 

onsite long enough to require maintenance.
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 17

for task order W911-WN-17-F-3029, the sheets did not indicate when the 

PRT received the preventive maintenance sheet. In addition, contracting 

personnel did not provide any preventive maintenance sheets for task 

order W911WN‐17-F03021. As a result, contracting personnel could 

not demonstrate that the contractor met the performance standard for 

preventive maintenance.

QA Personnel Did Not Use a Surveillance Plan

USACE PRT personnel did not document that they performed QA procedures that 

demonstrated that the contractors completed contracted services at the standard 

specified in the performance work statement because USACE PRT personnel did 

not use the QASP when performing QA of the contractors. The PCO prepared a 

QASP that identified the methods and procedures Government personnel would 

use to ensure receipt of the services identified in the performance work statement. 

The QASP stated that the QA personnel would verify contractor compliance with 

designated performance objectives on a daily basis and document their findings. 

The QASP further stated that each PRT must maintain a surveillance folder that 

should include QA appointment letters, an approved QASP, and surveillance logs. 

USACE personnel did not maintain the required documentation. In addition, 

although the QASP identified forms for QA personnel to use to document 

surveillance, the forms did not collect enough information that contracting 

personnel could use to document whether the contractor performed the 20 tasks 

at the standard specified in the performance work statement. (See Appendix D for 

Quality Assurance Form.)

USACE PRT personnel did not maintain documentation showing that they 

verified contractor performance of the 20 tasks on a daily basis. Six of the 

MMs we interviewed stated that they were aware of a QASP but did not 

remember signing the QASP acknowledging receipt and providing a copy for the 

contracting file. We asked the MMs how they monitored contractor compliance 

for each of the 20 tasks identified in the QASP and how they documented 

their reviews. The MMs stated that they monitored performance and that the 

documentation should have been in Engineers Link Interactive or on a SharePoint 

site. However, USACE personnel did not provide documentation showing that PRT 

personnel surveilled contractor performance to the standards established in the 

contract performance work statement.

USACE PRT personnel did not use the QASP to ensure that the contractors 

accomplished the temporary emergency power mission according to contract 

specifications. Personnel from various USACE districts volunteered to be PRT 

members and several PRTs may perform oversight during a mission; however, the 
Finding

18 │ DODIG-2019-043

PRTs performing QA did not receive training to perform contract QA. In addition, 

PRT members did not always complete documentation of their contractor oversight 

before returning to their home districts or send their contract documentation to 

the USACE Pittsburgh District office. As a result, the Government does not have 

records of all contractual actions, such as QA records, that provide a complete 

history of the transaction to support the basis for making informed decisions, 

actions taken, and to support reviews and investigations.

Risks of the Government Paying for Services 

not Received

USACE and contractor personnel worked diligently to accomplish the temporary 

emergency power mission when responding to Hurricanes Harvey and 

Irma. Contractor personnel responded to FEMA and local requests to install 

87 temporary power generators. However, USACE personnel did not document 

that the contractors met contract performance standards while accomplishing 

the mission. As a result, the Government may have paid for a level of service that 

it did not receive. Better documentation of the contractor services provided in 

response to a major hurricane would benefit USACE and FEMA when establishing 

standards of performance and the associated costs on future ACI contracts.

Management Comments on the Finding 

and Our Response

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General commented on the 

finding. He stated that the magnitude of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria 

is an important backdrop to understand the COR challenges in documenting 

oversight performed for three service contracts for temporary emergency power, 

valued at $19 million.

The Commanding General stated that given the enormity of the nation’s historic 

year of weather and climate disasters, it is important to place this audit in proper 

context. In total, the U.S. was impacted by 16 separate billion-dollar disaster 

events including 3 tropical cyclones, 8 severe storms, 2 inland floods, a crop 

freeze, drought and wildfire as reported by National Center for Environmental 

Information. The damage from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria alone 

were responsible for approximately $265 billion of the $306 billion in 2017 

weather and climate related disasters. Each of these destructive hurricanes 

join Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, in the new top five costliest U.S hurricanes 

on record. USACE is funded to train an approximately 1,500 voluntary disaster 
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 19

response force. USACE responded to 32 events with nearly 6,000 deployments. 

USACE installed over 2,400 generators for Temporary Emergency Power in 

Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and United States Virgin Islands. To respond to 

this unprecedented demand for emergency response missions, USACE assumed 

calculated risk to mitigate shortfalls and provided just-in-time training to save lives 

and restore life-sustaining infrastructure.

The Commanding General stated he is proud of USACE’s extraordinary efforts in 

providing emergency power to critical facilities and to the 19.8 million people 

impacted by 2017 hurricanes. He also stated that he values the DoD OIG work 

as USACE improves how it better complies with Federal and DoD contracting 

guidance during unique disaster responses. USACE understands the importance 

of adequately documenting its monitoring to demonstrate accountability while it 

turns on the power for millions of people.

Our Response

We appreciate the Commanding General’s comments. The Commanding General 

cites the challenges in providing oversight for three service contracts in response 

to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in addition to the many other natural 

disasters that occurred during the year. However, this report discusses USACE 

personnel’s oversight of contractor performance in response to Hurricanes Harvey 

and Irma, and not Maria. During the audit, we learned that the effort to restore 

power to regions affected by Hurricane Maria was ongoing and decided to remove 

Hurricane Maria from our review to ensure that the audit did not disrupt USACE’s 

response efforts.

We agree that USACE executed a large response to the three hurricanes, 

installing 2,400 generators for Temporary Emergency Power in Texas, Florida, 

Puerto Rico, and United States Virgin Islands. However, the majority of 

that effort occurred in response to Hurricane Maria, which occurred after 

Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Fewer than 100 of the 2,400 generators were 

installed in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. USACE personnel oversaw 

contractors’ installation of 45 generators in response to Hurricane Harvey during 

the period August 27, 2017 through September 20, 2017, and 42 generators 

in response to Hurricane Irma during the period September 4, 2017, through 

September 24, 2017. Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on 

September 20, 2017.

The report acknowledges that USACE and contractor personnel worked diligently 

to accomplish the temporary emergency power mission when responding to 

Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. However, USACE personnel did not oversee the 

contractor to ensure that the contractors met contract performance standards 

while accomplishing the mission on three contracts valued at $19 million.
Finding

20 │ DODIG-2019-043

Recommendations, Management Comments, 

and Our Response

Recommendation 1

We recommend the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General:

a. Provide training for the contracting officer’s representative on 

performing the duties for contractor oversight on temporary emergency 

power contracts to include documenting contractor performance and 

contracting officer’s representative oversight efforts as specified in the 

contracting officer’s representative designation letter.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General, agreed with the 

recommendation and stated that during Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the 

Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) had insufficient time to complete 

each task associated with COR duties because of staffing limitations and the 

high demand for Task Force Temporary Emergency Power. The Commanding 

General stated that he recognizes the importance of the COR’s duties and that the 

Pittsburgh District will have two additional trained CORs dedicated to Task Force 

Temporary Emergency Power by April 1, 2019, and in the interim, the Pittsburgh 

District is using CORs from other offices to assist in managing the temporary 

Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) contracts.

Our Response

The USACE Commanding General’s comments met the intent of the 

recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

open. We will close this recommendation when we obtain evidence to verify 

that two additional CORs dedicated to the Task Force Temporary Emergency 

Power have been assigned to the Pittsburgh District and that all USACE personnel 

designated to perform COR duties on temporary power ACI contracts have 

completed training that includes oversight responsibilities emphasizing the 

responsibilities specified in the COR designation letter.
Finding

DODIG-2019-043 │ 21

b. Provide training to the procuring contracting officer on monitoring 

the performance of personnel designated for contracting officer’s 

representative responsibilities on emergency temporary power contracts.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General agreed with the 

recommendation and stated that the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) 

took immediate action and reviewed all necessary regulations related to COR 

appointment and training as an informal training method. In addition, the 

contracting office addressed this issue by initially obtaining assistance from 

another district and then hiring a technical expert to perform the contracting 

officer responsibilities for temporary power missions.

Our Response

The USACE Commanding General’s comments met the intent of the 

recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain 

open. We disagree that the PCOs informal training consisting of reviewing 

regulations related to COR appointment and training sufficiently addressed the 

recommendation. However, the additional action of hiring a GS-13 technical expert 

to take over contracting officer responsibilities for temporary power missions in 

addition to obtaining assistance from another district sufficiently satisfies the 

recommendation. We will close the recommendation after we obtain evidence to 

verify that a GS-13 technical expert was hired as the contracting officer for the 

temporary power missions.

c. Direct contracting officials responsible for emergency temporary power 

Advanced Contracting Initiative contracts to update the quality assurance 

surveillance plan to include specific means for documenting daily quality 

assurance assessments.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General agreed with the 

recommendation and stated that USACE plans to award temporary power ACI 

contracts in February 2019 and to revise the quality assurance surveillance plan 

post-award through contract modification by June 1, 2019.
Finding

22 │ DODIG-2019-043

Our Response

The USACE Commanding General’s comments met the intent of the 

recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. 

We will close this recommendation after we obtain evidence to verify that all 

ACI contracts awarded for temporary power include a revised quality assurance 

surveillance plan that includes specific means for documenting daily quality 

assurance assessments has been completed for all ACI contracts for emergency 

temporary power awarded by USACE.

d. Ensure that all personnel performing the quality assurance 

responsibilities for the temporary emergency power mission receive 

appropriate contract quality assurance training emphasizing the 

importance of properly documenting their quality assurance inspections. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General agreed with the 

recommendation and stated that USACE will develop both an online and on the job 

quality assurance curriculum and require all Quality Assurance (QA) personnel 

complete the training. Beginning in calendar year 2019, the curriculum will be 

included in the online USACE Level II Emergency Power Training. All Planning and 

Response Team (PRT) members are required to complete Level II training and by 

including the QA training, this will ensure that PRT members receive the training, 

which will further improve the PRT effectiveness. 

Our Response

The Commanding General’s comments addressed all of the specifics of the 

recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. 

We will close this recommendation when we obtain evidence to verify that the 

QA curriculum has been developed and implemented both on the job and online 

in the USACE Level II Emergency Power Training and all PRT members have 

completed the training.
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 23

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from January through October 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Revised Announced Audit Objective

We queried the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation, as of 

December 20, 2017, to determine the universe of contracts awarded for the 

three major hurricanes. Using this data, we selected a nonstatistical sample 

of contracts for temporary emergency power from USACE contracting offices 

that awarded the highest dollar value of contracts. USACE Pittsburgh awarded 

$196 million in contracts for temporary emergency power. During the audit, we 

learned that the effort to restore power to regions affected by Hurricane Maria 

was ongoing and decided to remove Hurricane Maria from our review to ensure 

that the audit did not disrupt USACE’s efforts. We reviewed contract oversight 

documentation and interviewed USACE officials about procedures to monitor 

contractor performance for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

Announced Audit Objective

The announced audit objective on January 10, 2018, was to determine whether 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers properly awarded and administered emergency 

power contracts for disaster recovery in response to the 2017 hurricane season.

Revised Audit Objective

Our revised objective is to determine whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Pittsburgh District properly monitored and assessed contractor performance in 

accordance with applicable Federal and DoD guidance on temporary emergency 

power contracts for disaster recovery, in response to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.

Criteria and Guidance Reviewed

We obtained and reviewed the following relevant criteria and guidance from the 

United States Code, and Federal, DoD, Army, and USACE regulations and policies.

• Public Law 93-288, “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act” (Stafford Act), as amended August 2016
Appendixes

24 │ DODIG-2019-043

• Public Law 115-56, “Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and 

Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017”

• FAR Subpart 1.602-2, “Responsibilities”

• FAR Subpart 4.8, “Government Contract Files”

• FAR Subpart 37.604, “Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans”

• FAR Subpart 46.4, “Government Contract Quality Assurance”

• “Department of Defense COR Handbook,” March 22, 2012

• DFARS Part 201.602, “Contracting Officers”

• Department of Homeland Security, “National Response 

Framework,” June 2016

• U.S. Army Regulation, 70-13, “Management and Oversight of Service 

Acquisitions,” July 30, 2010

• “USACE Acquisition Instruction and Desk Guide,” January 25, 2017

Review of Documentation and Interviews

We interviewed USACE QA and contracting personnel from the Pittsburgh, 

Walla Walla, Savannah, Tulsa, and Jacksonville District offices to obtain 

an understanding of USACE’s contracting process and contract oversight 

procedures, including the:

• PCO and COR for the temporary emergency power contracts;

• members of the PRT, including the MMs, a contract specialist, and a 

logistics specialist;

• emergency operations manager; and

• emergency management specialists.

On October 1, 2013, USACE Pittsburgh District contracting officials awarded 

two competitively bid firm-fixed-priced ACI contracts, W911WN-13-D-0006 

and W911WN-13-D-0007, for temporary emergency power missions. 

The contracts had a base period of 1 year with four 1-year options, which 

expired on September 30, 2018. In addition, on October 22, 2014, USACE 

Pittsburgh District contracting officials awarded one competitively bid firmfixed-priced ACI contract, W911WN‐15-D-0001, for temporary emergency power 

missions. USACE awarded contract W911WN-15-D-0001 for areas outside the 

continental United States. This ACI contract had a base period of 1 year with 

four 1-year options, expiring October 21, 2019, if USACE contracting officials 

exercised all options. USACE Pittsburgh District issued task orders under the 
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 25

ACI firm‐fixed priced contracts for emergency temporary power following 

Hurricane Harvey, valued at $7.2 million, and for emergency temporary power 

following Hurricane Irma, valued at $12 million.

We accessed the Paperless Contract File system to download the contract files for 

contracts W911WN-13-D-0006, W911WN-13-D-0007, and W911WN‐15-D-0001. 

Specifically, we reviewed task orders W911WN-17-F-3021, W911WN-17-F-3029, 

W911WN-17-F-3030, W911WN-17-F-3024, and W911WN-17-F-3025 totaling 

$19.2 million. In addition, through interviews with USACE personnel, we 

obtained various oversight documents that the COR and PRT used to monitor the 

contractors’ performance. We obtained and analyzed the following documentation. 

• QASP for contracts W911WN-13-D-0006, W911WN-13-D-0007, and 

W911WN-15-D-0001

• COR designation letters

• QA checklists

• Daily expenditure reports

• Installation and de-installation work orders

• Daily work order status reports

• Site condition reports

• Preventive maintenance reports

We visited USACE Headquarters, USACE Pittsburgh District office, and interviewed 

the contracting chief (PCO), emergency management specialist (COR), MM, and 

contract specialist to discuss their processes to monitor contractor performance. 

We also interviewed the emergency operations manager, Temporary Emergency 

Power project manager, Readiness Office chief, and internal review chief to discuss 

their processes to monitor contractors’ quality controls.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data that supported our findings, conclusions, 

and recommendations to perform the audit.
Appendixes

26 │ DODIG-2019-043

Appendix B

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 

the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued 11 reports discussing 

contracts for disaster relief efforts. Unrestricted GAO reports can be 

accessed at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be 

accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/. Unrestricted Army 

Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at 

https://www.aaa.army.mil/. Naval Audit Service reports are not available over 

the Internet. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from 

https://www.efoia.af.mil/palMain.aspx by clicking on Freedom of Information 

Act Reading Room and then selecting audit reports.

GAO

Report No. GAO-18-472, “2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on 

the Federal Response and Key Recovery Challenges,” September 2018

The GAO found that Federal and state preparedness and coordination efforts 

prior to and after the 2017 hurricane and wildfire disasters facilitated the 

response in Texas, Florida, and California. The U.S. Government provided 

significant support to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in response to 

Hurricanes Irma and Maria, but faced numerous challenges that complicated 

response efforts.

Report No. GAO-18-335, “2017 Disaster Contracting: Observations on Federal 

Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts,” February 2018

The GAO found that, as of December 31, 2017, 19 Federal agencies had entered 

into contracts and obligated over $5.6 billion on those contracts to support 

efforts related to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The Department of 

Homeland Security, including FEMA and DoD Components (including USACE), 

accounted for approximately 97 percent of those obligations.

Report No. GAO-17-20, “DOT Discretionary Grants: Problems with Hurricane 

Sandy Transit Grant Selection Process Highlight the Need for Additional 

Accountability,” December 2016

The GAO found that the Federal Transit Administration evaluated and selected 

Hurricane Sandy transit resilience projects for award based on a multi-step 

process, but did not take sufficient steps to ensure that the process was 

consistent or appropriately documented.
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 27

Report No. GAO-16-476, “Disaster Recovery: FEMA Needs to Assess 

Its Effectiveness in Implementing the National Disaster Recovery 

Framework,” May 2016

The GAO found that FEMA took action to promote state adoption of the National 

Disaster Recovery Framework. However, officials in four of the five states GAO 

the reviewed said that they did not understand aspects of the National Disaster 

Recovery Framework, including how it related to other FEMA disaster programs 

and the level of Federal technical assistance available.

Report No. GAO-16-87, “Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing 

Key Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist,” February 2016

The GAO found that FEMA had taken steps to implement, address, and improve 

select disaster programs, but the GAO identified opportunities to strengthen 

program management.

Report No. GAO-15-783, “Disaster Contracting: FEMA Needs to Cohesively Manage 

Its Workforce and Fully Address Post-Katrina Reforms,” September 2015

The GAO found that FEMA had not fully implemented the 2006 Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act contracting reforms due, in part, to 

incomplete guidance.

Report No. GAO-14- 512, “Emergency Transportation Relief: Agencies Could 

Improve Collaboration Begun during Hurricane Sandy Response,” May 2014

The GAO addressed the Department of Transportation’s progress in allocating, 

obligating, and disbursing Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 surface 

transportation funds; how the Federal Transit Administration’s new Public 

Transportation Emergency Relief program compares to the FEMA and the 

Federal Highway Administration’s emergency relief programs; and the extent 

to which Federal Transit Administration and FEMA have implemented their 

memorandum of agreement to coordinate their roles and responsibilities when 

providing assistance to transit agencies.

Report No. GAO-15-15, “Hurricane Sandy: FEMA Has Improved Disaster Aid 

Verification but Could Act to Further Limit Improper Assistance,” December 2014

The GAO found that FEMA improved its ability to detect improper and 

potentially fraudulent payments by implementing new controls, but there were 

continued weaknesses in the agency’s validation of Social Security numbers, 

among other things.
Appendixes

28 │ DODIG-2019-043

Report No. GAO-15-515, “Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the 

Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters,” July 2015

The GAO report addressed how agencies used Federal recovery funds to 

enhance resilience; the extent to which states and localities were able to 

maximize Federal funding to enhance resilience; and actions that could 

enhance resilience for future disasters.

Report No. GAO-14- 58, “Hurricane Sandy Relief: Improved Guidance on 

Designing Internal Control Plans Could Enhance Oversight of Disaster 

Funding,” November 2013

The GAO found that agencies prepared Hurricane Sandy disaster relief internal 

controls plans based on Office of Management and Budget guidance but did not 

consistently apply the guidance in preparing these plans in response to the 

Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013.

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG-2016-028, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New York District 

Monitoring of a Hurricane Sandy Contract Needs Improvement,” December 3, 2015

The DoD OIG found that CORs from USACE New York District effectively 

monitored two of the three contracts reviewed for Hurricane Sandy. 

The COR did not conduct the surveillance necessary to monitor and document 

the contractor’s performance for the remaining contract. The PCO did not 

review COR documentation or oversee the COR’s efforts to monitor contractor 

performance, as required by the FAR.

Report No. DODIG-2013-102, “Improved Oversight of Communications Capabilities 

Preparedness Needed for Domestic Emergencies,” July 1, 2013

The DoD OIG found that National Guard Bureau officials did not always ensure 

that interoperable communications equipment was available, maintained, 

staffed, or ready for use during a domestic emergency. These conditions 

occurred because National Guard Bureau officials did not have adequate 

oversight of Joint Incident Site Communications Capability systems provided 

to National Guard units.
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 29

Appendix C

Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks

Task Standard Verification Frequency of 

Surveillance

Result if Standard is 

Not Met

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Harvey

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Irma

Mobilization of 

Assets

All assets 

completed 

mobilization

All assets have 

reported to the 

Contractor Site 

Manager and PRT 

at the staging area

At time of 

mobilization

Any asset 

(personnel, 

equipment, and 

mobilization) will not 

be paid for that day

Yes Yes

Off-Loading 

Generators

Off-loading 

generators within 

30 minutes of 

receipt of a work 

order at a rate 

of 40 generators 

off-loaded and 

staged per shift

PRT and contract 

personnel verify 

start and status 

from contractor 

upon completion 

of work order

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT

Material handling 

equipment 

and associated 

operator(s) will not 

be paid for that day

No No

Preparing 

Generators

Start prepping 

generators within 

30 minutes of 

receipt of a work 

order at a rate 

of 30 generators 

prepped per shift 

PRT and contractor 

personnel verify 

start and status 

from contractor 

upon completion 

of the work order 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Assets required for 

prepping generators 

per the contractor’s 

Standard Operating 

Procedures will not 

be paid for that day 

No No

Pre-Installation 

Inspections

PII Team must 

depart for facility 

within 1 hour of 

receipt of a work 

order; PII results 

reported to PRT 

within 1 hour after 

completion of 

the PII 

PRT and contractor 

personnel verify 

departure of 

PII Team; PII 

documentation 

submitted to PRT 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

PII Team and 

associated vehicle 

not paid for that day 

Not Applicable Not Applicable

See final page of Appendix C for the table notes.
Appendixes

30 │ DODIG-2019-043

Task Standard Verification Frequency of 

Surveillance

Result if Standard is 

Not Met

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Harvey

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Irma

Site Condition 

Reports

Contractor 

must submit 

Site Condition 

Report (SCR) 

with completed 

installation and 

de-installation 

work orders 

Receipt of report 

by PRT 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

First discrepancy 

is memorandum 

of record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment of 

the Contractor Site 

Manager for that day 

No No

Installing 

Generators

Assigned generator 

must depart 

staging area within 

1 hour of receipt 

of an installation 

work order 

PRT and contractor 

personnel verify 

departure of 

generator from 

staging area 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Truck driver and 

hauling equipment 

associated with 

the generator 

installation will not 

be paid for that day

No No

Installing 

Generators

Generator must 

be installed at 

facility with a 

confirmed report 

back (verbal or 

written) to the PRT 

within 30 minutes 

of completing 

installation 

Contractor Site 

Manager confirms 

installation is 

complete and 

informs PRT 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Install team 

(electricians and 

trucks) will not be 

paid for that day 

No No

Installing 

Generators

Completed 

installation work 

order provided 

to PRT within 

6 hours completing 

installation 

Receipt of 

completed 

installation work 

order by PRT

Visit installed 

generator every 

other day 

First discrepancy 

is memorandum 

of record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment of 

the Contractor Site 

Manager for that day

No No

See final page of Appendix C for the table notes.

Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks (cont’d) 
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 31

Task Standard Verification Frequency of 

Surveillance

Result if Standard is 

Not Met

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Harvey

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Irma

Fueling Generators Generators must 

not run out of fuel 

Contractor Quality 

Control (QC), PRT 

Quality Assurance 

(QA), Preventive 

Maintenance 

(PM) Team and/or 

feedback from the 

facility operator 

Observe 

75 percent of 

all initial services, 

then verify each 

following service 

is completed one 

day afterwards 

Fuel truck driver and 

associated vehicle 

will not be paid for 

that day

No No

Servicing 

Generators

Generators must 

be serviced every 

240 operational 

hours (between 

216 and 264 

operational hours) 

Contractor QC, PRT 

QA, PM Team 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Servicing the 

generator, although 

ultimately done by 

the contractor, will 

not be paid 

Not Applicable Not Applicable

Repairing 

Generators

Contractor must 

mobilize a team to 

assess generator 

status within 

1 hour of receipt of 

a work order 

Contractor QC, 

PRT QA, PM Team 

and/or feedback 

from the facility 

operator 

QA verifies PM 

being performed 

at installed 

generators every 

third day during 

installation 

First discrepancy 

is memorandum 

of record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment 

of the electrician, 

mechanic and 

associated vehicles

Not Applicable Not Applicable

Replacing Not 

Mission Capable 

Generators at a 

Facility

Follow guidance 

for hauling and 

installing generator 

as listed above 

Contracts did 

not specify a 

verification 

method

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Contracts did not 

specify a result if 

standard was not 

met

Not Applicable Not Applicable

Preventive 

Maintenance

Each installed 

generator must 

be visited daily by 

the PM Team per 

the contractor’s 

submitted 

schedule 

Contractor QC, PRT 

QA and submittal 

of PM Sheet to 

PRT by 10 a.m. the 

following day 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Not completing PM 

will result in nonpayment of the PM 

team for that day

No No

See final page of Appendix C for the table notes.

Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks (cont’d) 
Appendixes

32 │ DODIG-2019-043

Task Standard Verification Frequency of 

Surveillance

Result if Standard is 

Not Met

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Harvey

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Irma

De-Installing 

Generators

Generator must 

be de-installed, 

facility connected 

to commercial 

power, and 

generator returned 

to the staging area 

within 48 hours 

of receipt of the 

de-installation 

work order 

PRT and contractor 

personnel verify 

arrival of the deinstalled generator 

from the facility to 

the staging area 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

Truck driver and 

hauling equipment 

associated with 

the generator deinstallation will not 

be paid for the day 

No No

Return to Storage RTS activities must 

start within 1 hour 

of receipt of a work 

order at a rate of 

20 generators per 

shift 

PRT and contractor 

personnel 

verify start and 

completion rate of 

RTS activities 

Daily receipt of 

reports 

Mechanic, laborer 

and associated 

vehicles will not be 

paid for that day 

No No

De-mobilization 

of assets

Identified 

Contractor 

assets shall be in 

de-mobilization 

status upon notice 

of a work order 

Contractor Site 

Manager verifies 

assets have begun 

demobilization 

Each daily Personnel and 

equipment will not 

be paid for days/

shifts beyond the 

one shift allotted for 

de-mobilization 

No No

Preventive 

Maintenance 

Sheets

All PM Sheets must 

be submitted to 

the PRT by 10 a.m. 

the following day 

Receipt of PM 

Sheets by the PRT 

As each work 

order is issued 

by PRT 

First discrepancy 

is memorandum 

of record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment of 

the Contractor Site 

Manager for that day 

No No

See final page of Appendix C for the table notes.

Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks (cont’d)
Appendixes

DODIG-2019-043 │ 33

Task Standard Verification Frequency of 

Surveillance

Result if Standard is 

Not Met

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Harvey

Documentation of 

Quality Review for 

Hurricane Irma

Daily Expenditure 

Report 

Contractor must 

submit the DER 

report to the PRT 

MM, CS, and KO by 

10 a.m. each day 

Receipt of report 

by PRT MM, CS 

and KO 

As any damage 

occurs 

First discrepancy 

is memorandum 

of record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment of 

the Contractor Site 

Manager for that day 

No No

Damage Report Contractor must 

provide initial 

report (verbal or 

written) of damage 

of generators, 

facilities, etc. to 

PRT MM and KO 

within 1 hour of 

incident 

Receipt of report 

by PRT MM, CS 

and KO 

As any accident 

occurs 

First discrepancy 

is memo of 

record; second 

and additional 

discrepancies result 

in non-payment of 

the Contractor Site 

Manager for that day 

Not Applicable Not Applicable

Accident Report Contractor must 

provide initial 

report (verbal or 

written) of any 

accident to the PRT 

MM and KO within 

1 hour of incident 

Receipt of report 

by PRT MM, CS 

and KO 

As any accident 

occurs 

Non-payment of 

Contractor Site 

Manager for that day

Not Applicable Not Applicable

Quality Assurance on Performance Work Statement Tasks (cont’d)

Acronyms

CS Contracting Specialist MM Mission Manager PRT Planning and Response Team RTS Return to Storage

DER Daily Expenditure Report PII Pre-Installation Inspections QA Quality Assurance SCR Site Condition Report

KO Contracting Officer PM Preventive Maintenance QC Quality Control
Appendixes

34 │ DODIG-2019-043

Appendix D

Quality Assurance Form

(Attachment 2)

GENERATOR QA CHECKLIST 

US Army Corps of Engineers

Power Response Team

Mission # _____________ Date ___________

 

_______________________________ GPS Location 

Facility Name 

______________________________ ____________________ N Address 

_______________________________ ____________________ W

City State Zip

_______________________________ Installed by POC 

_______________________ _____ PP_____ CONTRACTOR

POC/Facility Phone Number 

Generator Information

Bar Code # _____________________ Size ____ kW _____ Volts

Manufacturer _____________________ Meter Reading ___________ hours

Circuit Breaker Rating ________ AmpsConductor Size _____ Qty _____

Ground Wire Size __________ Engine Oil Level: _____ Ok _____ Check

Coolant Level: _____Ok _____ CheckFuel Absorption Mat _____ yes _____ no

Utility Power Conductors Disconnected _____ yes _____ no

Fuel leaks observed _____ yes _____no 

Generator properly grounded _____yes _____ no

________________________________________ 

Name of QA Performing Inspection 

Comments: (Use Back if needed)
Management Comments

DODIG-2019-043 │ 35

Management Comments 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Management Comments

36 │ DODIG-2019-043

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (cont’d)
Management Comments

DODIG-2019-043 │ 37

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (cont’d)
38 │ DODIG-2019-043

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym Definition

ACI Advanced Contracting Initiative

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative

CORT Contracting Officer’s Representative Tracking 

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

ESF Emergency Support Function

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

MM Mission Manager

NRF National Response Framework

PCO Procuring Contracting Officer

PICC Power Interagency Coordination Call 

PRT Planning and Response Team

QA Quality Assurance

QASP Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
Whistleblower Protection

U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against 

retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible waste, fraud, 

and abuse in government programs. For more information, please visit 

the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/

Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/

Whisteblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection 

Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG 

reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison 

703.604.8324

Media Contact

public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists 

www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter 

www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline 

www.dodig.mil/hotline
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE │ OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

www.dodig.mil

Defense Hotline 1.800.424.9098