WEBVTT

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(dramatic military music)

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- [Narrator] The campaigns that led

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to the fight for the Red October Factory

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begin with the German invasion
of Soviet Russia in 1941

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known as Operation Barbarossa.

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After initial successes,
the German advance

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was halted at the gates of Moscow.

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The next year, the German
high command developed

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a new plan called Case Blue,

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which had, as its goal,
the seizure of the valuable

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Russian oil fields in the Caucasus Region.

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Once again, the German campaign
began with great advances.

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However, the Caucasus offensive
soon ground to a halt.

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And, by mid-September,

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Stalingrad had become
the new major objective

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for the attacking German
forces in southern Russia.

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On 13 September, 1942,
the German Sixth Army

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under General Friedrich Paulus

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began its assault on the city itself,

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which was defended by

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Lieutenant General Vasily
Chuikov, 62nd Army.

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Within two weeks, the
Germans had cleared much of

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the south and central
portions of the city.

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Although the Soviets stubbornly clung

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to a few small enclaves.

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Nonetheless, Paulus considered

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the center and south fighting to be over

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and began the fight to take

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the northern factory district.

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After a surprisingly rapid and successful

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assault on the tractor
factory on 14 and 15 October,

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the Germans opened their attack

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on the Barricade factory
on the following day.

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The attack was more difficult.

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Taking almost a week for the Germans

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to clear most of the factory.

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By 23 October, the Germans
could now turn their attention

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to the Red October Factory.

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Stalingrad derived its value

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from the symbolic importance to both sides

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because of its name.

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It wasn't strategically
or operationally important

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except as a crossing
point for the Volga River.

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Nor was it easily defended,

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given that it was on the
west side of the river.

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The nature of operations in Stalingrad,

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and particularly the Red
October factory complex,

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shaped the environment extensively.

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Its terrain reduced unit
frontages and depths

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to the point that two divisions fought

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over a one square kilometer
area for over a month.

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The 100th Jager Division was the command

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originally assigned the objective

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of capturing the Red October Factory.

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By the time Seydlitz's 51st Army Corps

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was ready to make the attack

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in the third week of October, however,

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that division was too worn
down to accomplish the task.

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Anticipating the problem,

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Paulus had already ordered
General Richard von Schwerin's

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79th Infantry Division
to begin shifting forces

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from its positions near
Klatskaya on the Don River

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west of Stalingrad to an assembly area

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behind the 100th Jager Division.

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Schwerin's division was
to assume responsibility

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of the northern half of the
100th Division's sector.

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It also became the
designated assault force

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for the Red October Factory.

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In terms of land area,
the Red October Factory

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was only slightly smaller than

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the other two major industrial complexes

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in north Stalingrad.

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The area was roughly 1100
meters long by 800 meters wide.

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The buildings were also generally smaller

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in the Red October area,

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but they tended to be more densely packed.

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Key locations within or
near the complex included

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the Green Belt, the Bannyi Ravine,

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the Worker's Village,
the Strongpoint School,

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the Red October Fuel
Depot, the Volga River,

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the Finger Ravine, the Settlement,

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the Slag Heaps, and the Ladder Building,

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which was the factory main
administration building.

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The major industrial buildings or halls

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within the factory complex
were numbered by the Germans

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as depicted.

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As later events would reveal,

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the main Soviet defensive
position within the factory

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was hall four.

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Also known by the Soviets
as the Martenovskii Shop.

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Most of the fighting in
the Red October Factory

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would center around this building
for the next three weeks.

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By the time the 79th Infantry Division

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made its initial attack on
the Red October Factory,

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the structures and grounds
had already experienced

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a huge amount of destruction from

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artillery fire and aerial attacks.

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Almost all the buildings
were heavily damaged

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and rubble was everywhere.

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The twisted steel of elevated catwalks,

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piles of stone and
rubble, stacks of bricks,

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shell holes, and Soviet fighting positions

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were strewn throughout the grounds.

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The area was an ideal
location for defenders

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and a nightmare for
those attacking into it.

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The Soviet defense of
the Red October Factory

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illustrates aspects of current
United States Army doctrine

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which discuss the role of defensive tasks.

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According to FM 3-0,

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there are three primary defensive tasks.

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Area defense, mobile
defense, and retrograde.

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Major General Stepan S. Gur'ev's

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39th Guards Rifle Division
defended the Red October Factory

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using today's concept of the area defense

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to retain what was
considered decisive terrain

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and to deny that vital area to the enemy.

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Gur'ev defense was also an effort

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to attrit the German forces as a prelude

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to a later Soviet
counteroffensive in November.

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FM 3-0 states that units
in defensive positions

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accomplish their missions independently

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or in combination by defeating the enemy

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with fires, absorbing the
strength of the attack

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within the position,

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or destroying the enemy with a
local or major counterattack.

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Gur'ev's command would
employ all of these aspects

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at the Red October Factory.

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The division was composed of
three guards rifle regiments

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plus division troops.

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At the time of the initial
attack on 23 October,

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the division's artillery was located

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on the east bank of the Volga.

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The division strength in the city itself

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stood about 3,000 men.

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Initially, most elements of
the division were forward

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defending along the main rail
line west of the factory.

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If the Germans were successful

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in pushing Gur'ev's forces
back from that line,

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they would fall back to prepare defenses

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in the halls of the Red October Factory.

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There, the 112th Regiment was responsible

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for defending the Worker's Village

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where a school had been built
into a formidable strongpoint,

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as well as halls eight, 8a, nine, and 10.

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The 39th Division's 120th
Guards Rifle Regiment

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commanded by Major A.I. Goryachev

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was responsible for halls three
through seven and hall 12.

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The regiment's primary defense
position was hall four,

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the Martenovskii Shop,
which was typically defended

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by between 100 and 400 men

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depending on recent casualties.

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The 117th Regiment was
responsible for halls one and two

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and the small settlement east of there.

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It also formed the division reserve

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and primary counterattack force.

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Similar to guidance
provided in our own FM 3-0,

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Soviet commanders in the
39th Guards Rifle Division

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integrated obstacles,
counterattacks, and planned fires

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into the defense in order to

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isolate and overwhelm the enemy.

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In addition to the division's artillery

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on the other side of the river,

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the Soviet infantrymen
were equipped mainly with

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the Mosin-Nagant model rifle

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and the famous PPSh submachine gun.

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But possessed a liberal number

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of light and medium machine guns

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to support their fire plan, as well.

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They also possessed hand grenades

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and the ever present Molotov cocktail.

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Assigned to attach to the units
of the 39th Guards Division

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were a number of heavier
weapons integrated

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into Gur'ev's area of defense.

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These included a number of

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50, 82, and 120 millimeter mortars.

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7.62 millimeter, .303
caliber, and 51 millimeter

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light, medium, and heavy machine guns.

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And 45 and 57 millimeter antitank guns

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spread throughout the position.

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On arrival at Stalingrad,

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the 79th Infantry Division consisted

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of only two infantry regiments.

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Plus the standard complement
of other division troops.

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The division's 226th Infantry was detailed

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on a temporary mission elsewhere.

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So, Seydlitz attached the 100th Division's

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54th Jager Regiment to Schwerin's command

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for the initial assault on the factory.

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That regiment, however,
had been ground down

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in the earlier fighting in the city.

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Before the fight for hall
four concluded in November,

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several other German units,

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as well as the 369th
Croatian Infantry Regiment

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and a pioneer battalion,

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would later be attached to the division

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for operations in the Red October area.

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At the time of the initial attack,

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the division possessed
about 4,500 assault troops

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mostly concentrated in the battalions

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of the division's two infantry regiments.

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The 54th Jager Regiment
possessed, at best,

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about 1,000 assault troops.

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The 79th Division's infantrymen

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were originally equipped largely
with the Mauser 98 rifle.

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As the division came into
the line in Stalingrad,

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a large number of the assault troops

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were reequipped with
the MP 40 submachine gun

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based on the experience
of city fighting thus far.

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Generally speaking, the
older rifles were used

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by those troops employed in
an overwatch or support role.

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While the primary assault troops

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received the submachine guns.

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The attackers also possessed

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the excellent MG 42 machine gun.

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In addition to plentiful

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Potato Masher grenades and explosives.

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Furthermore, for the attack,

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the assault troops would be supported

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by Panzerkampfwagen Mark
III and Mark IV tanks

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from the 24th Panzer Division,

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as well as the Sturmgeschutz
III assault guns

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of the 244th and 245th
Assault Gun Battalions.

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The 51st Army Corps attack plan

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was for the 100th Jager Division

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to conduct holding attacks

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to the south of the 79th Division.

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To the north, the 14th Panzer Division

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would attack to seize the bread factory

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and the ravine south of
the Barricade Factory.

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While the 305th Infantry
Division would attack

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to seize the rest of the Barricade.

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The 79th Division's
attack plan for 23 October

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was to be conducted in three phases.

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The objective for the first phase

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was to attack and seize the railroad

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just to the east of the
main line of resistance.

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This was the Soviet's
initial defense line.

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There, the 79th Division would halt

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for a massive Stuka and artillery attack

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on the factory before
moving into the complex.

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The second objective was the
Red October factory itself.

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Specific halls were assigned
to each assault regiment.

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The final objective for the division

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was the banks of the Volga River.

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The division would attack with
all three regiments on line.

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The 212th Infantry Kampf Group

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would attack on the division's right.

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It was given the mission to capture halls

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eight, nine, and 10 within
the factory complex.

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On the left, the now battalion
sized 54th Jager Regiment

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was reinforced with seven tanks

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from the 24th Panzer Division
to bolster its strength.

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It was assigned the task of
seizing the Ladder Building

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and halls one and two at the
north end of the factory.

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In the center, the 208th
Infantry Kampf Group

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was the 79th Infantry
Division's main effort.

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Commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Wolf,

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the regiment was reinforced with

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a company from the 244th
Assault Gun Battalion,

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a pioneer company, and a heavy
rocket launcher battalion.

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It was assigned to capture halls
three through seven and 12.

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German and Soviet fires
created numerous obstacles

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to tactical movement in the
form of craters and rubble.

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The German 79th Division also faced

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significant dilemmas in terms of balancing

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tactical surprise against
effective fire support

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in relatively small, heavily damaged,

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and well fortified physical areas.

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US Army doctrine says that

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field artillery fires facilitate

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an attacking unit's maneuver by

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destroying, degrading, or neutralizing

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selected enemy forces and positions.

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Lacking precision munitions,
the German 79th Division

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relied upon massed fires

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to destroy, neutralize, and suppress

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Soviet forces in the area
of the Martenovskii Shop.

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However, neither it nor
the higher German echelons

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were ever able to effectively isolate

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the 39th Guards Rifle Division
from its own fire support

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or effectively interdict
the sustainment support

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concentrated on the
east bank of the Volga.

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For the attack, Wolf
reorganized the 208th Infantry

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into two attack wedges.

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Each based on the regiment's
first and second battalions.

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The first battalion
would attack on the left

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with the second on its right.

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Each wedge was further
divided into two waves.

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Each wave was further
organized into three groups.

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The assault group was
reinforced with engineers

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and armed largely with
MP 40 submachine guns,

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grenades, and satchel charges.

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Its mission was to attack
through the Soviet defenses

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and penetrate to unhinge enemy positions.

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The covering group was equipped
with light machine guns,

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rifles, grenades, and light mortars.

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Its mission was to provide
protective and covering fires

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for the assault group
and screen the flanks.

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The clearing group was equipped

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similarly to the covering group.

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Its mission was to reduce
bypassed resistance nests

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and bring up supplies.

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The organization of the second wave

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was identical to that of the first.

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The second wave would pass
through the first as needed

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to continue the attack.

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At which the first wave would
then assume the reserve role.

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When the 79th Infantry Division arrived

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in Stalingrad on 19 October,

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Schwerin was unaware of its new mission.

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Wolf himself later stated that...

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- [Richard] We only received
our new combat orders

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when we arrived in Stalingrad.

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The 79th Infantry Division
had been earmarked

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to take the gigantic Red
October metallurgical works

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from the Soviets, advance
down to the Volga,

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and assume defensive
positions at the riverbank.

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- [Narrator] When they
learned of the mission

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and the plan to attack the Red
October on the following day

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at a coordination meeting with Seydlitz,

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Schwerin and all his regimental commanders

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objected that there was not enough time

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to conduct an adequate reconnaissance

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and plan for a successful attack.

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The Luftwaffe representatives
at the meeting

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insisted that the ground attack go forward

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due to the preplanned airstrikes.

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But Seydlitz relented and
rescheduled the attack

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for 23 October.

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Gaining and refining combat
information about the enemy

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is critical to developing
the intelligence necessary

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for developing viable courses of action.

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Collecting information
is a continuous activity

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during the plan, prepare,
and execute cycle.

14:31.030 --> 14:33.024
The type of attack a commander can conduct

14:33.024 --> 14:34.450
is largely a function of

14:34.450 --> 14:36.323
the intelligence and time available.

14:37.420 --> 14:39.960
Lieutenant Colonel Wolf's
insistence on the delay

14:39.960 --> 14:41.620
so that he could conduct a reconnaissance

14:41.620 --> 14:44.170
before attacking the Red October factory

14:44.170 --> 14:46.090
changed the nature of his operation

14:46.090 --> 14:49.060
from a movement to
contact to a hasty attack

14:49.060 --> 14:51.310
and likely resulted in lower casualties

14:51.310 --> 14:52.934
and greater tactical success

14:52.934 --> 14:54.419
than his unit would have suffered

14:54.419 --> 14:57.163
if it had attacked on
the original timeline.

14:58.300 --> 15:01.510
Wolf did not waste the time
given to him for preparations.

15:01.510 --> 15:03.320
He immediately sent out
reconnaissance parties

15:03.320 --> 15:05.570
to figure out the best attack routes.

15:05.570 --> 15:07.370
The major shock to both he and Eikler

15:07.370 --> 15:09.730
was the presence of a long
train of railroad cars

15:09.730 --> 15:11.440
parked at the division front.

15:11.440 --> 15:13.952
Barring the way along the rail line.

15:13.952 --> 15:16.700
The German frontline was
too close to the railroad

15:16.700 --> 15:19.530
for aerial attacks against
the massive obstacle.

15:19.530 --> 15:22.960
Moreover, the 6th Army would
not allow a rearward movement

15:22.960 --> 15:25.108
so that the Luftwaffe
could pulverize the cars

15:25.108 --> 15:28.940
and make holes through
which the 244th Assault Guns

15:28.940 --> 15:31.950
and other heavy vehicles
could move through.

15:31.950 --> 15:34.410
Instead, Wolf developed
an alternative plan

15:34.410 --> 15:37.557
using his assault guns and
artillery in direct fire mode,

15:37.557 --> 15:40.220
along with engineer demolition teams,

15:40.220 --> 15:42.160
to blast a few holes through the obstacle

15:42.160 --> 15:43.803
at key street crossings.

15:44.750 --> 15:46.088
Another concern for Wolf developed

15:46.088 --> 15:49.320
when he discussed the attack
with Colonel Arman Weber,

15:49.320 --> 15:51.260
commander of the 54th Jager Regiment

15:51.260 --> 15:53.360
on his regiment's left.

15:53.360 --> 15:56.000
- [Richard] When I visited
the commander of this regiment

15:56.000 --> 15:58.519
in order to discuss
the situation with him,

15:58.519 --> 16:01.670
Weber said to me, "You can't expect much

16:01.670 --> 16:02.904
anymore from my troops.

16:02.904 --> 16:06.010
And these long days, we've
been completely exhausted

16:06.010 --> 16:07.048
and bled dry.

16:07.048 --> 16:09.240
The fighting spirit is gone.

16:09.240 --> 16:12.710
Just wait until your troops
have fought here for 14 days.

16:12.710 --> 16:14.600
You will be no different.

16:14.600 --> 16:15.860
- [Narrator] The Jager commander's comment

16:15.860 --> 16:17.800
about the lack of his
men's fighting spirit

16:17.800 --> 16:20.220
would begin to bear itself
out almost immediately

16:20.220 --> 16:21.363
when the attack began.

16:22.360 --> 16:25.420
Soviet and German forces each
face significant challenges

16:25.420 --> 16:27.330
with movement and maneuver
during the fighting

16:27.330 --> 16:29.230
in and around the Red October Factory.

16:30.200 --> 16:33.190
The heavily damaged
buildings, cratered landscape,

16:33.190 --> 16:36.310
and rubble obstacles hindered
movement for both sides,

16:36.310 --> 16:37.800
but favored the interior lines

16:37.800 --> 16:39.673
inherent in the Soviet positions.

16:40.700 --> 16:41.950
The effectiveness of fires

16:41.950 --> 16:44.010
in support of German tactical movement

16:44.010 --> 16:46.980
was ultimately less effective
facilitating maneuver,

16:46.980 --> 16:49.060
because it added to the
rubble and obstacles

16:49.060 --> 16:52.280
troops had to overcome while
closing with Soviet forces

16:52.280 --> 16:53.583
in the Martenovskii Shop.

16:54.780 --> 16:56.660
German Army and Luftwaffe fires

16:56.660 --> 16:58.360
were never sufficiently coordinated

16:58.360 --> 16:59.645
at appropriate echelons

16:59.645 --> 17:02.460
to interdict Russian
movement across the Volga.

17:02.460 --> 17:03.620
And, therefore, unable to

17:03.620 --> 17:06.543
effectively isolate the
39th Guards Rifle Division.

17:07.490 --> 17:09.210
While each side could achieve limited

17:09.210 --> 17:11.430
surprise and momentum during their attacks

17:11.430 --> 17:13.970
and counterattacks at the
lowest tactical levels,

17:13.970 --> 17:16.730
the difficult terrain and
advantages it provided

17:16.730 --> 17:20.070
benefited the defender in
terms of retaining areas

17:20.070 --> 17:22.253
occupied in the factory complex.

17:28.230 --> 17:31.975
As planned, the German assault
began at 0700 on 23 October

17:31.975 --> 17:34.992
with the usual wave of
Stuka divebombing attacks

17:34.992 --> 17:37.650
followed by an hour
long artillery, mortar,

17:37.650 --> 17:41.070
and naval warfare bombardment
against the Soviet defenses.

17:41.070 --> 17:43.700
The division's kampf
groups, or battle groups,

17:43.700 --> 17:46.050
attacked at 0810.

17:46.050 --> 17:47.790
The weakened 54th Jager Regiment

17:47.790 --> 17:49.530
immediately stalled against the positions

17:49.530 --> 17:51.690
of the Soviet 895th Rifle Regiment

17:51.690 --> 17:54.180
defending at a railroad bridge.

17:54.180 --> 17:55.900
On the Jager's immediate right, however,

17:55.900 --> 18:00.340
Wolf's 208th Kampf Group and
Eikler's 212th farther south

18:00.340 --> 18:02.190
assaulted the Soviet's
first line of defense

18:02.190 --> 18:03.500
along the rail line.

18:03.500 --> 18:06.160
Wolf's plan to penetrate
the long row of rail cars

18:06.160 --> 18:07.980
proceeded surprisingly well

18:07.980 --> 18:10.070
and, within an hour,
his infantry had overrun

18:10.070 --> 18:12.760
the Soviet positions and
the engineers were busy

18:12.760 --> 18:15.013
blasting holes through the cars.

18:15.013 --> 18:17.270
By 0930, both regiments had

18:17.270 --> 18:19.200
successfully crossed the railroad

18:19.200 --> 18:20.892
and continued in impressive drive against

18:20.892 --> 18:23.500
relatively light opposition.

18:23.500 --> 18:26.232
The attack had apparently
caught the Soviets by surprise,

18:26.232 --> 18:28.460
but they would soon recover.

18:28.460 --> 18:32.740
By 1030, elements of both the
208th and 212th Kampf Groups

18:32.740 --> 18:34.640
had made their way through
the communal gardens

18:34.640 --> 18:37.310
known as the Green Belt
west of the factory

18:37.310 --> 18:40.150
and had reached the
factory's internal rail line.

18:40.150 --> 18:43.730
Due to the rapid advance,
Schwerin approved Wolf's request

18:43.730 --> 18:44.840
to proceed into the factory

18:44.840 --> 18:49.050
without the preplanned airstrikes
and artillery preparation.

18:49.050 --> 18:51.036
Even so, Wolf had good communications

18:51.036 --> 18:54.060
with the Luftwaffe strike commander above.

18:54.060 --> 18:56.407
The kampf group commander
was able to direct the Stukas

18:56.407 --> 18:59.130
and the supporting artillery
to lay down blocking fires

18:59.130 --> 19:00.884
north and east of the factory

19:00.884 --> 19:03.003
to prevent Soviet reinforcement.

19:03.860 --> 19:06.090
The ground assault proceeded without pause

19:06.090 --> 19:07.360
and both regiments quickly

19:07.360 --> 19:09.690
gained access to the factory grounds.

19:09.690 --> 19:12.960
But, by then, the Soviet
resistance began to stiffen.

19:12.960 --> 19:14.988
To complicate matters
for the German attack,

19:14.988 --> 19:16.835
the Soviet defenders were able to bring

19:16.835 --> 19:18.900
significant direct fire to bear

19:18.900 --> 19:21.060
from the Bannyi Ravine to the south

19:21.060 --> 19:23.790
into the 212th Kampf Group's right flank.

19:23.790 --> 19:25.300
Colonel Eikler's Second Battalion

19:25.300 --> 19:26.620
ran into heavy resistance

19:26.620 --> 19:29.010
in the Worker's Village in the same area.

19:29.010 --> 19:30.900
Particularly from a school which had been

19:30.900 --> 19:33.190
turned into a strongpoint.

19:33.190 --> 19:35.910
Soviet forward observers
high up on Mamayev Kurgan

19:35.910 --> 19:37.600
brought in effective indirect fires

19:37.600 --> 19:39.433
onto the attacking troops, as well.

19:40.860 --> 19:44.034
By 1035, the Second
Battalion, 208th Infantry

19:44.034 --> 19:46.307
had seized hall 5a

19:46.307 --> 19:48.210
and the First Battalion was attacking

19:48.210 --> 19:50.263
halls three and four.

19:51.460 --> 19:53.610
Elements of the First
Battalion, 212th Infantry

19:53.610 --> 19:57.050
moved into hall 5a while
others prepared to attack

19:57.050 --> 19:58.860
hall eight.

19:58.860 --> 20:00.290
At the same time, the Second Battalion

20:00.290 --> 20:02.420
attacked the school strongpoint

20:02.420 --> 20:05.090
and the Worker's Village to the south.

20:05.090 --> 20:06.886
The attacks continued throughout the day

20:06.886 --> 20:09.210
and, one by one, the factory halls

20:09.210 --> 20:11.460
fell to the German assault troops.

20:11.460 --> 20:15.040
By 1600, the 212th had
captured halls five,

20:15.040 --> 20:17.083
part of eight, and nine.

20:18.010 --> 20:21.450
And the 208th had
captured halls three, 5a,

20:21.450 --> 20:23.980
six, and part of seven.

20:23.980 --> 20:26.050
And the element of Wolf's First Battalion

20:26.050 --> 20:27.986
had even penetrated into the northwest end

20:27.986 --> 20:31.330
of the Marenovskii Shop, hall four.

20:31.330 --> 20:34.130
About 1615, two assault companies

20:34.130 --> 20:36.480
of the Second Battalion, 208th Infantry

20:36.480 --> 20:38.640
were actually able to reach
the banks of the Volga

20:38.640 --> 20:42.383
east of hall seven as
fighting centered on hall 10.

20:43.380 --> 20:45.500
Elements of the 212th were also able

20:45.500 --> 20:47.420
to reach the same area.

20:47.420 --> 20:49.550
Wolf sent in his
regimental reserve company

20:49.550 --> 20:51.410
to bolster the troops at the Volga

20:51.410 --> 20:53.580
in order to widen the penetration there.

20:53.580 --> 20:56.440
But the company was unab;e
to reach the bluffs.

20:56.440 --> 20:57.530
After breaching the Soviet

20:57.530 --> 20:59.870
first echelon defense along the rail line

20:59.870 --> 21:02.600
and discovering that the
enemy resistance was light,

21:02.600 --> 21:04.780
Lieutenant Colonel Wolf
exercised initiative

21:04.780 --> 21:06.390
when he requested to shift the planned

21:06.390 --> 21:08.370
air and artillery bombardment

21:08.370 --> 21:10.910
so he could continue the
attack without pausing

21:10.910 --> 21:13.840
to take advantage of actual
conditions on the ground.

21:13.840 --> 21:16.860
Successful application of the
mission command philosophy

21:16.860 --> 21:18.410
requires commanders who are prepared

21:18.410 --> 21:21.060
to support the initiative
of their subordinates.

21:21.060 --> 21:23.350
The 79th Division and the Luftwaffe

21:23.350 --> 21:25.020
were able to change their scheme of fire

21:25.020 --> 21:27.070
and close air support to accommodate

21:27.070 --> 21:29.928
Wolf's quick advance
into the factory complex.

21:29.928 --> 21:32.360
Thus, Wolf's deviation from the plan

21:32.360 --> 21:35.010
allowed the attack to
maintain its momentum.

21:35.010 --> 21:36.050
The two assault companies

21:36.050 --> 21:38.186
of the 2nd Battalion, 208th Infantry

21:38.186 --> 21:40.200
also exercised initiative when

21:40.200 --> 21:42.330
they advanced to the Volga River.

21:42.330 --> 21:45.520
While most of their task force
was focused on building 10,

21:45.520 --> 21:47.410
both units exploited the opportunity,

21:47.410 --> 21:50.710
on their own initiative,
to advance to the river.

21:50.710 --> 21:52.180
Eventually, the troops at the river

21:52.180 --> 21:54.049
had to be pulled back to
the vicinity of hall seven

21:54.049 --> 21:56.330
because they were too few in number

21:56.330 --> 21:58.680
to hold the position against
the heavy flanking fire

21:58.680 --> 21:59.680
they were receiving.

22:00.710 --> 22:03.790
By dusk, the 79th Division
had driven a significant wedge

22:03.790 --> 22:06.120
into the Red October Factory.

22:06.120 --> 22:08.810
Soon after nightfall,
all key factory buildings

22:08.810 --> 22:12.610
were in German hands
except halls one, two,

22:12.610 --> 22:16.810
part of eight, 8a, and most of four.

22:16.810 --> 22:18.350
The fortress-like school was also

22:18.350 --> 22:20.340
still under Soviet control.

22:20.340 --> 22:22.790
As was much of the Worker's
Village to the south.

22:23.890 --> 22:26.650
On the division left,
the 54th Jager Regiment's

22:26.650 --> 22:29.887
failure to take even its
first objective, the bridge,

22:29.887 --> 22:33.100
ensured the development
of a long flank with gaps,

22:33.100 --> 22:34.730
which the 79th Infantry Division

22:34.730 --> 22:37.270
found difficult to
secure due to the losses

22:37.270 --> 22:39.530
sustained during the day's fighting.

22:39.530 --> 22:41.570
During the day, the 1st Battalion, 208th

22:41.570 --> 22:43.410
had succeeded in securing a foothold

22:43.410 --> 22:45.840
in the western portion of hall four.

22:45.840 --> 22:49.090
Because of the 54th Jager's
failure to advance, however,

22:49.090 --> 22:50.840
Wolf was forced to withdraw the battalion

22:50.840 --> 22:53.350
from the Martenovskii Shop that evening

22:53.350 --> 22:55.450
in order to help secure
the division's left flank

22:55.450 --> 22:57.640
between the factory and the Jagers.

22:57.640 --> 23:00.300
Therefore, the next
day, the 208th Infantry

23:00.300 --> 23:02.563
would have to attack into hall four again.

23:03.720 --> 23:06.030
During the day's fighting,
the 79th Infantry Division

23:06.030 --> 23:09.160
had suffered 83 men killed and 364 wounded

23:09.160 --> 23:12.450
for a total of 447 casualties that day.

23:12.450 --> 23:13.970
These were troops which could not be

23:13.970 --> 23:16.340
easily or quickly replaced.

23:16.340 --> 23:17.430
To bolster the division,

23:17.430 --> 23:20.390
Seydlitz attached 369th Croatian Regiment

23:20.390 --> 23:21.780
to Schwerin's command that night

23:21.780 --> 23:24.209
to help make up some of the losses.

23:24.209 --> 23:26.610
Like the 54th Jagers, however,

23:26.610 --> 23:29.130
the 369th was, at best, only a battalion

23:29.130 --> 23:30.780
in actual strength at this point.

23:31.860 --> 23:33.787
The fighting on 23
October heavily attrited

23:33.787 --> 23:37.060
the 39th Guards Rifle Division, as well.

23:37.060 --> 23:38.860
That division was in worse shape

23:38.860 --> 23:42.310
and had suffered 60%
losses, including Goryachev,

23:42.310 --> 23:44.910
the commander of the 120th
Guards Riflemen Regiment.

23:46.640 --> 23:48.810
The political importance of Stalingrad

23:48.810 --> 23:50.530
and the ideological determination

23:50.530 --> 23:52.517
by both the attackers and defenders

23:52.517 --> 23:55.060
played a significant
factor in their willingness

23:55.060 --> 23:56.980
to sustain heavy casualties

23:56.980 --> 24:00.120
during this large scale combat operation.

24:00.120 --> 24:02.700
The Germans, lacking room to maneuver,

24:02.700 --> 24:03.860
were often forced to conduct

24:03.860 --> 24:05.970
frontal assaults at close range.

24:05.970 --> 24:07.130
While the Soviets fighting in

24:07.130 --> 24:09.360
a relatively shallow area of operations

24:09.360 --> 24:10.750
with their backs to the river,

24:10.750 --> 24:12.573
suffered high casualties, as well.

24:15.060 --> 24:17.270
Chuikov, the 62nd Army commander,

24:17.270 --> 24:19.090
had no reserves available.

24:19.090 --> 24:21.040
And noted that his army
now faced the threat

24:21.040 --> 24:23.617
of enemy forces penetrating
through to the Volga

24:23.617 --> 24:25.783
and the sector north of the Bannyi Ravine.

24:26.660 --> 24:28.340
That night, Chuikov reprised

24:28.340 --> 24:31.560
Stalingrad front commander
Eremenko of the situation

24:31.560 --> 24:33.910
and asked for all available
indirect fire support

24:33.910 --> 24:35.680
for his command to help defeat

24:35.680 --> 24:37.110
the German follow on attack that

24:37.110 --> 24:38.860
was sure to come the following day.

24:45.340 --> 24:47.520
Hall four, the Martenovskii Shop,

24:47.520 --> 24:50.130
constituted the main
Soviet defense position

24:50.130 --> 24:51.610
within the Red October Factory.

24:51.610 --> 24:53.770
It was generally located

24:53.770 --> 24:55.130
about the center of the factory area

24:55.130 --> 24:59.110
and was the largest
structure within the complex.

24:59.110 --> 25:01.730
Actually several closely packed buildings,

25:01.730 --> 25:04.150
the structure was about 400 meters long

25:04.150 --> 25:07.283
and about 160 meters
wide at its widest part.

25:08.450 --> 25:10.750
The east end of the building
was about 300 meters

25:10.750 --> 25:12.600
from the Volga River.

25:12.600 --> 25:14.290
The key location and features

25:14.290 --> 25:16.610
outside the Martenovskii Shop included

25:16.610 --> 25:21.150
elevated frame catwalks, a large
number of tall smokestacks,

25:21.150 --> 25:23.840
the hall four administration building,

25:23.840 --> 25:28.190
a large stone and rubble
pile at the northeast corner,

25:28.190 --> 25:32.130
stacks of bricks between the
northwest entrance and hall 12,

25:32.130 --> 25:35.350
the locomotive repair shop, hall three,

25:35.350 --> 25:37.170
a large drainage culvert leading

25:37.170 --> 25:39.180
from the building to the Finger Ravine,

25:39.180 --> 25:40.810
and a huge slag heap between

25:40.810 --> 25:43.100
the hall and the Worker's Settlement.

25:43.100 --> 25:44.430
Although tactics had changed

25:44.430 --> 25:46.760
since the fighting at
the Red October Factory,

25:46.760 --> 25:48.420
the area provides an opportunity

25:48.420 --> 25:50.177
to analyze urban terrain
from the standpoint

25:50.177 --> 25:52.199
of current doctrine.

25:52.199 --> 25:54.820
Outside hall four, the ground was littered

25:54.820 --> 25:56.880
with the rubble and debris of buildings,

25:56.880 --> 26:00.390
shredded trees and bushes,
collapsed smokestacks,

26:00.390 --> 26:03.720
destroyed trucks, rail
cars, and factory equipment,

26:03.720 --> 26:06.250
and the metal products from the factory.

26:06.250 --> 26:09.083
The ground was pulverized
with shell and bomb craters.

26:10.210 --> 26:12.830
To the northwest, the
building was very narrow.

26:12.830 --> 26:14.810
Only about 40 meters across.

26:14.810 --> 26:17.410
And had one large entrance
and a collapsed corner

26:17.410 --> 26:19.050
on the very end of the building

26:19.050 --> 26:20.780
from which the defenders could shoot out

26:20.780 --> 26:23.810
towards the hall 12 warehouse complex.

26:23.810 --> 26:26.150
The openings were initially
used by the Germans

26:26.150 --> 26:28.996
as the primary entrances
into the structure.

26:28.996 --> 26:30.931
To the north and west of the hall,

26:30.931 --> 26:33.910
were stacks of brick
and a large stone pile.

26:33.910 --> 26:36.488
Both of which the Germans
would use as assault positions

26:36.488 --> 26:38.810
for attacking into the building.

26:38.810 --> 26:40.790
The massive structure
itself was constructed

26:40.790 --> 26:43.440
of a mixture of cream colored brick,

26:43.440 --> 26:46.513
steel girders, and sheet metal walls.

26:46.513 --> 26:48.780
There were relatively clear fields of fire

26:48.780 --> 26:50.120
toward the northeast,

26:50.120 --> 26:52.180
but initially few, if any, good positions

26:52.180 --> 26:54.200
for defenders on that side due to

26:54.200 --> 26:55.770
the hall's closed heat doors,

26:55.770 --> 26:57.840
which had been blocked off.

26:57.840 --> 27:00.380
Thus providing no
openings to fire through.

27:00.380 --> 27:02.100
The Soviets could and did, however,

27:02.100 --> 27:04.440
have a few defensive
positions outside the hall

27:04.440 --> 27:06.268
in the factory administration building

27:06.268 --> 27:08.660
and in the rubble and twisted metal frames

27:08.660 --> 27:11.600
of the partially collapsed
elevated catwalks.

27:11.600 --> 27:14.660
Soviet snipers would also
use the multiple smokestacks

27:14.660 --> 27:18.370
alongside the structure for
elevated shooting positions.

27:18.370 --> 27:20.740
There was another large
entrance on the southeast side

27:20.740 --> 27:24.390
through which an attacking force
could again entry, as well.

27:24.390 --> 27:26.650
As the building continued
to sustain damage

27:26.650 --> 27:29.510
from indirect fire and aerial attacks,

27:29.510 --> 27:31.770
other openings in the
walls appeared over time

27:31.770 --> 27:33.800
that provided additional access

27:33.800 --> 27:35.720
and also opened up better fields of fire

27:35.720 --> 27:37.770
for the defenders within.

27:37.770 --> 27:39.980
In the rear of the building
was a huge slag heap

27:39.980 --> 27:44.030
composed of the useless
afterwaste of the Marten furnaces.

27:44.030 --> 27:46.380
The mound was used as a fallback position

27:46.380 --> 27:49.070
and reserve assembly area by the Soviets,

27:49.070 --> 27:51.990
as was the burned out settlement nearby.

27:51.990 --> 27:53.550
All of these conditions made movement

27:53.550 --> 27:56.440
very difficult for attackers
and defenders both.

27:56.440 --> 27:59.820
But also provided cover and
concealment for both, as well.

27:59.820 --> 28:01.980
Key locations inside the Martenovskii Shop

28:01.980 --> 28:04.310
included a series of Marten furnaces

28:04.310 --> 28:06.330
alongside the northeast wall,

28:06.330 --> 28:07.770
a large water trough

28:07.770 --> 28:10.420
in the long northwestern
end of the building,

28:10.420 --> 28:14.230
concrete catwalks, a rolling mill,

28:14.230 --> 28:16.540
and an entrance into the
large drainage culvert

28:16.540 --> 28:18.190
at the south end of the building.

28:19.410 --> 28:21.740
Subsurface areas complicate fires,

28:21.740 --> 28:24.730
friendly control measures,
and force protection.

28:24.730 --> 28:26.738
They can be utilized
as avenues of approach

28:26.738 --> 28:29.510
as well as lines of communication.

28:29.510 --> 28:32.190
They can be used as
protective storage areas

28:32.190 --> 28:33.930
and they can be exploited by small units

28:33.930 --> 28:36.713
for attacks against the
enemy's rear and flanks.

28:38.390 --> 28:40.250
The Soviets approached
the Martenovskii Shop

28:40.250 --> 28:43.060
from the Volga River
via the Finger Ravine.

28:43.060 --> 28:45.320
Then through a smaller narrow gully

28:45.320 --> 28:47.660
and into a large
underground drainage culvert

28:47.660 --> 28:49.363
which emerged inside the building.

28:50.210 --> 28:51.840
The ravine and culvert provided

28:51.840 --> 28:53.550
a covered and concealed route

28:53.550 --> 28:56.140
for reinforcements moving into the hall.

28:56.140 --> 28:57.900
The interior areas of hall four

28:57.900 --> 28:59.514
were an attacker's nightmare.

28:59.514 --> 29:02.800
Large amount of brick, concrete, steel,

29:02.800 --> 29:05.050
and other rubble from the
repeated aerial bombings

29:05.050 --> 29:07.883
and artillery shells
littered the entire floor.

29:08.850 --> 29:11.600
Wrecked steel manufacturing machinery,

29:11.600 --> 29:14.020
parts of partially completed projects,

29:14.020 --> 29:15.882
and large steel ingots also served as

29:15.882 --> 29:17.734
obstacles to an attacker

29:17.734 --> 29:21.260
and as cover and concealment
for the defenders.

29:21.260 --> 29:23.480
Much of the large, twisted
steel framing, girders,

29:23.480 --> 29:26.360
and roofing from the building's rooftop

29:26.360 --> 29:29.210
lay collapsed into the
building's interior.

29:29.210 --> 29:31.860
Adding to an attacker's difficulty.

29:31.860 --> 29:33.990
The roof itself was almost
completely blown off

29:33.990 --> 29:36.340
or burned by the repeated
attacks of the Luftwaffe

29:36.340 --> 29:38.513
and German artillery barrages.

29:39.400 --> 29:41.982
Concrete catwalks and the
metal framing in the roof,

29:41.982 --> 29:44.190
at least were still in place,

29:44.190 --> 29:46.070
also served as platforms for

29:46.070 --> 29:47.913
the ever present Soviet snipers.

29:48.760 --> 29:50.470
The defenders could also climb inside

29:50.470 --> 29:53.280
the now called Marten
furnaces as hiding places

29:53.280 --> 29:54.881
and for protection.

29:54.881 --> 29:56.820
The ovens not only provided shelter

29:56.820 --> 29:58.770
from the attacking German troops.

29:58.770 --> 30:00.540
Their heavy steel construction provided

30:00.540 --> 30:03.491
protection from artillery
and aerial bombs.

30:03.491 --> 30:05.330
A direct hit was required

30:05.330 --> 30:07.640
to destroy these heavy steel ovens.

30:07.640 --> 30:08.960
It is likely, however, that

30:08.960 --> 30:11.640
the concussion from near
misses from large bombs

30:11.640 --> 30:13.225
or artillery rounds wounded

30:13.225 --> 30:17.450
or otherwise disabled many
of the defenders regardless.

30:17.450 --> 30:19.210
In addition to the furnaces,

30:19.210 --> 30:21.500
there was a large water drainage trough

30:21.500 --> 30:23.017
which ran the width of the building

30:23.017 --> 30:25.110
and provided the Soviets a ready made

30:25.110 --> 30:26.693
defensive position inside.

30:32.210 --> 30:35.094
At 1855 on the evening of 23 October,

30:35.094 --> 30:36.820
Seydlitz orders Schwerin

30:36.820 --> 30:39.430
to continue the attack the next day.

30:39.430 --> 30:42.430
The division plan was for
Eikler's 212th Infantry

30:42.430 --> 30:45.100
to hold what ground it
had gained the day before

30:45.100 --> 30:48.390
and clear out the rest
of hall eight and hall 8a

30:48.390 --> 30:51.480
and the Worker's Village to the south.

30:51.480 --> 30:53.020
Otherwise, the kampf group would assume

30:53.020 --> 30:55.050
a defensive posture to help defeat

30:55.050 --> 30:56.330
any Soviet counterattacks

30:56.330 --> 31:00.020
launched against the main
objective, the Martenovskii Shop,

31:00.020 --> 31:02.620
while it was under assault
by Wolf's 208th Infantry.

31:03.480 --> 31:05.180
Weber's 54th Jager Regiment

31:05.180 --> 31:07.860
was relieved from the
79th Division that evening

31:07.860 --> 31:11.220
and attached to the 14th
Panzer Division next door.

31:11.220 --> 31:12.460
Operating with that command,

31:12.460 --> 31:15.520
the 54th Jagers would attack
generally southeastward

31:15.520 --> 31:16.890
to help the Panzer division clear

31:16.890 --> 31:19.049
the worker's villages
between the Red October

31:19.049 --> 31:21.240
and the Barricade Factories

31:21.240 --> 31:24.480
and prevent Soviet reinforcement
from that direction.

31:24.480 --> 31:26.140
For the 24 October attack,

31:26.140 --> 31:29.341
Wolf's 208th Infantry,
once again the main effort,

31:29.341 --> 31:31.090
was reinforced by a company

31:31.090 --> 31:33.159
of the 179th Pioneer Battalion,

31:33.159 --> 31:34.765
which would hold hall three

31:34.765 --> 31:37.163
when the regiment attacked
to seize hall four.

31:38.040 --> 31:39.760
Wolf's plan for the 208th Infantry

31:39.760 --> 31:41.410
was for the 2nd Battalion to attack

31:41.410 --> 31:46.410
from halls three, six, and
seven to seize hall four.

31:46.800 --> 31:48.930
From there, it would
also provide fire support

31:48.930 --> 31:52.840
for the 1st Battalion's
attack on halls one and two.

31:52.840 --> 31:57.240
Once halls one, two, and four
were under German control,

31:57.240 --> 31:58.544
the division would push on to clear

31:58.544 --> 32:02.000
the rest of the factory
complex down to the Volga.

32:02.000 --> 32:05.340
Operations for 24 October begin at 0300

32:05.340 --> 32:07.050
when the 212th Infantry began efforts

32:07.050 --> 32:11.080
to clear out the resistance
remaining in halls eight and 8a.

32:11.080 --> 32:13.255
By mid-morning, the
buildings had been captured,

32:13.255 --> 32:15.700
but both were soon lost to counterattacks

32:15.700 --> 32:18.530
by the 112th Guards Rifle Regiment.

32:18.530 --> 32:20.820
At about the same time,
the 208th's assault

32:20.820 --> 32:23.100
began on the Martenovskii Shop.

32:23.100 --> 32:26.840
Advancing from halls
three, six, and seven,

32:26.840 --> 32:27.810
the 2nd Battalion,

32:27.810 --> 32:30.096
which was the 208th
Infantry's main effort,

32:30.096 --> 32:31.850
attempted to quickly advance

32:31.850 --> 32:33.950
into the huge Martenovskii Shop.

32:33.950 --> 32:36.387
But it was initially held
up by heavy small arms fire

32:36.387 --> 32:38.763
from the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment.

32:39.810 --> 32:41.880
Meanwhile, the 1st
Battalion began to advance

32:41.880 --> 32:46.650
on halls one and two against
surprisingly weak resistance.

32:46.650 --> 32:48.410
The troops of the 1st Battalion advanced

32:48.410 --> 32:50.380
from its line west of hall four

32:50.380 --> 32:51.930
and proceeded to clear a series

32:51.930 --> 32:53.860
of smaller buildings
in the northwest corner

32:53.860 --> 32:55.380
of the factory.

32:55.380 --> 32:58.422
Then, advancing from one
pile of rubble to another

32:58.422 --> 33:00.890
and through myriad shell craters,

33:00.890 --> 33:03.710
the battalion successfully
reached halls one and two

33:03.710 --> 33:05.720
after a moderately stiff fight.

33:05.720 --> 33:07.940
But were able to capture
only the southern half

33:07.940 --> 33:09.073
of both structures.

33:09.950 --> 33:11.530
Other elements of the 1st battalion

33:11.530 --> 33:14.570
continued the advance east
and briefly penetrated

33:14.570 --> 33:16.690
once again to the Volga River.

33:16.690 --> 33:19.780
But a counterattack by the
39th Division's reserve,

33:19.780 --> 33:22.210
the 117th Guards Rifle Regiment,

33:22.210 --> 33:24.883
successfully erased that
penetration by dusk.

33:26.080 --> 33:27.870
US Army doctrine emphasizes that

33:27.870 --> 33:29.950
defensive plan's retain and reserve,

33:29.950 --> 33:32.834
regardless of the defensive task assigned.

33:32.834 --> 33:34.860
The counterattack is one of

33:34.860 --> 33:37.240
the key actions of urban defense.

33:37.240 --> 33:40.300
As the attacker moves into
the depth of the urban area,

33:40.300 --> 33:42.810
the attacker's forces may become fatigued,

33:42.810 --> 33:47.110
suffer from attrition, and
become increasingly disorganized.

33:47.110 --> 33:49.400
As the offensive force
reaches the culmination point

33:49.400 --> 33:51.090
where it can no longer continue to attack

33:51.090 --> 33:53.060
with the available forces,

33:53.060 --> 33:54.560
the defensive commander executes

33:54.560 --> 33:56.603
a planned and coordinated counterattack.

33:57.590 --> 33:59.690
The counterattack regains the initiative

33:59.690 --> 34:02.930
and makes the enemy fight
in multiple directions.

34:02.930 --> 34:05.607
Infiltration using superior
knowledge of the terrain

34:05.607 --> 34:08.370
and the skillful use of stay behind forces

34:08.370 --> 34:09.920
permits attacking the enemy throughout

34:09.920 --> 34:11.433
the depth of its formations.

34:12.280 --> 34:15.150
In planning the defense,
commanders anticipate that

34:15.150 --> 34:17.786
the enemy will attempt to
isolate the urban area.

34:17.786 --> 34:20.390
Commanders defeat this
effort by allocating

34:20.390 --> 34:23.420
sufficient defending forces
outside the urban area

34:23.420 --> 34:25.480
to prevent its isolation.

34:25.480 --> 34:27.470
The Soviets maintained
lines of communications

34:27.470 --> 34:29.700
across the Volga to prevent isolation

34:29.700 --> 34:33.140
of the forces defending the
Red October Factory complex.

34:33.140 --> 34:34.890
They were also able to provide forces

34:34.890 --> 34:37.470
to repeatedly conduct
effective counterattacks

34:37.470 --> 34:40.070
to reverse German tactical
gains in the vicinity

34:40.070 --> 34:41.620
of the Martenovskii Shop.

34:41.620 --> 34:45.670
And prevent German isolation
of the Red October Factory.

34:45.670 --> 34:47.540
The main attack on the Martenovskii Shop

34:47.540 --> 34:49.989
initially ran into stiff resistance.

34:49.989 --> 34:51.770
Unable to enter hall four,

34:51.770 --> 34:54.290
the 2nd Battalion's assault
troops advanced positions

34:54.290 --> 34:58.000
near and against the northwest
wall of the structure.

34:58.000 --> 34:59.040
Eventually entering through

34:59.040 --> 35:01.120
the northwestern end of the building,

35:01.120 --> 35:04.530
the Germans fought their
way slowly into the hall.

35:04.530 --> 35:07.420
The battle inside was fierce and slow.

35:07.420 --> 35:09.910
Fighting at very close
range with submachine guns,

35:09.910 --> 35:11.920
grenades, and satchel charges,

35:11.920 --> 35:14.800
the German infantry and engineers
gradually force their way

35:14.800 --> 35:16.460
farther into the building.

35:16.460 --> 35:19.670
Moving from one pile of rubble
to another for protection.

35:19.670 --> 35:21.980
While the Soviet defenders
tenaciously fought back

35:21.980 --> 35:25.763
with submachine guns, hand
grenades, and Molotov cocktails.

35:26.710 --> 35:28.760
The lead combat group
eventually fought its way

35:28.760 --> 35:32.660
to about 50 meters short of
the drainage trough by sundown

35:32.660 --> 35:35.260
and made preparations to
defend there for the night.

35:36.250 --> 35:37.550
To the division's north,

35:37.550 --> 35:39.360
the 54th Jager Regiment advanced

35:39.360 --> 35:42.150
only about 100 meters on its front.

35:42.150 --> 35:44.536
But still failed to take
the railroad bridge.

35:44.536 --> 35:48.400
Once again that evening, the
79th Division's left flank

35:48.400 --> 35:51.270
facing the Soviet 193rd Rifle Division

35:51.270 --> 35:53.963
was thinly held and, in
some places, nonexistent.

35:54.880 --> 35:56.410
The Soviet defenders, however,

35:56.410 --> 35:58.970
were either too weak to exploit the gaps

35:58.970 --> 36:00.220
or failed to detect them.

36:06.530 --> 36:09.820
Seydlitz's plan for the 79th
Division's 25 October attack

36:09.820 --> 36:12.400
was essentially the
same as the day before.

36:12.400 --> 36:14.070
And Schwerin's focus was now on

36:14.070 --> 36:17.170
completing the seizure
of the Martenovskii Shop.

36:17.170 --> 36:20.000
That mission remained assigned
to Wolf's 208th Infantry,

36:20.000 --> 36:21.165
but, like the rest of the division,

36:21.165 --> 36:23.770
the casualties of the
last two days of combat

36:23.770 --> 36:26.120
had severely depleted the regiment.

36:26.120 --> 36:28.243
In order to help Wolf accomplish the task,

36:28.243 --> 36:30.883
Schwerin provided him a small kampf group

36:30.883 --> 36:33.707
assembled from the elements
of the 212th Infantry

36:33.707 --> 36:35.650
and attached it to the 208th

36:35.650 --> 36:38.520
to give it enough combat
power for the assault.

36:38.520 --> 36:40.660
When the 54th Jager
Regiment was transferred

36:40.660 --> 36:43.478
to the 14th Panzer Division on 24 October,

36:43.478 --> 36:46.200
the 369th Croatian Infantry Regiment

36:46.200 --> 36:49.920
replaced the jagers in the 79th
Division's order of battle.

36:49.920 --> 36:51.290
Schwerin assigned the Croatians

36:51.290 --> 36:54.590
the mission of defending
halls nine and 10.

36:54.590 --> 36:56.770
This action allowed Eikler's 212th

36:56.770 --> 36:59.490
to compress its defenses
in order to squeeze out

36:59.490 --> 37:02.243
enough troops to help man
the ad hoc combat group.

37:03.590 --> 37:05.160
Wolf's plan was simple.

37:05.160 --> 37:07.540
Continue to push men and
weapons into hall four

37:07.540 --> 37:10.180
to kill or capture the
remaining defenders inside

37:10.180 --> 37:12.930
or force them into retreat
from the structure.

37:12.930 --> 37:15.060
Moving more men into
the hall that morning,

37:15.060 --> 37:18.380
Wolf's 2nd Battalion attacked
and gradually forced its way

37:18.380 --> 37:20.304
almost to the middle of the building.

37:20.304 --> 37:23.180
Once there, however, a large
number of Soviet soldiers

37:23.180 --> 37:24.960
came pouring out of the drainage culvert

37:24.960 --> 37:28.440
and the Marten furnaces
where they had been hiding.

37:28.440 --> 37:30.780
Apparently, the 120th
Guards Rifle Regiment

37:30.780 --> 37:32.070
had been reinforced with men

37:32.070 --> 37:34.740
from the division
reserve during the night.

37:34.740 --> 37:36.960
The counterattack surprised
the German assault troops

37:36.960 --> 37:38.189
who desperately fought back against

37:38.189 --> 37:41.016
the now swelling tide of Russian soldiers.

37:41.016 --> 37:43.380
Grudgingly, the German
troops fought their way

37:43.380 --> 37:46.340
back to the portals at the
northwest end of the building

37:46.340 --> 37:48.090
through which they had come the day before

37:48.090 --> 37:50.337
and were eventually forced
back into hall three

37:50.337 --> 37:54.160
and to positions behind the
stacks of bricks to the west.

37:54.160 --> 37:55.770
By dark, the Russians held

37:55.770 --> 37:57.993
the entire Martenovskii Shop once again.

38:04.150 --> 38:06.400
Fighting continued on 26 October,

38:06.400 --> 38:10.070
but no significant attacks
were undertaken by either side.

38:10.070 --> 38:11.950
That evening, Schwerin's 3rd Regiment,

38:11.950 --> 38:14.640
the 226th infantry, arrived back

38:14.640 --> 38:16.350
under the division's control

38:16.350 --> 38:18.270
and relieved the 54th Jager Regiment

38:18.270 --> 38:20.258
of its positions near the bridge.

38:20.258 --> 38:22.690
The 79th Infantry Division once again

38:22.690 --> 38:25.406
assumed responsibility for that sector.

38:25.406 --> 38:27.300
Schwerin immediately
issued the new regiment

38:27.300 --> 38:30.520
orders for an attack on the
morning of the 27 of October.

38:30.520 --> 38:32.490
The 226th initial mission was to

38:32.490 --> 38:35.310
enhance the isolation
of the Martenovskii Shop

38:35.310 --> 38:38.480
by completing the capture
of halls one and two,

38:38.480 --> 38:39.830
as well as eliminate the bulge

38:39.830 --> 38:43.670
between the 79th Division
and the 14th Panzer Division.

38:43.670 --> 38:46.130
As planned, the 226th Infantry attacked

38:46.130 --> 38:47.785
at dawn on 27 October
and immediately ran into

38:47.785 --> 38:51.550
stiff opposition at both locations.

38:51.550 --> 38:54.440
Despite support from the
1st Battalion, 208th,

38:54.440 --> 38:55.840
it took the regiment all day

38:55.840 --> 38:57.980
to complete the capture of the two halls.

38:57.980 --> 38:59.730
However, it also successfully erased

38:59.730 --> 39:02.500
the bothersome salient in
the German lines, as well.

39:02.500 --> 39:04.470
In the process, the 226th Infantry

39:04.470 --> 39:08.182
suffered 23 killed in action
and 69 wounded in action.

39:08.182 --> 39:10.970
But it was now in position
to make the next attack

39:10.970 --> 39:12.483
against the Martenovskii Shop.

39:18.030 --> 39:20.320
On 28 October, the 226th Infantry

39:20.320 --> 39:23.248
relieved the 208th infantry
responsibility for hall one

39:23.248 --> 39:25.470
in preparation for the attack

39:25.470 --> 39:28.370
while Stuka divebombers,
rockets, and artillery

39:28.370 --> 39:30.780
hammered the Martenovskii Shop all day.

39:30.780 --> 39:33.022
That night, a battalion
of the 226th Infantry,

39:33.022 --> 39:37.670
advancing from hall two,
attacked into the main hall.

39:37.670 --> 39:40.504
This time, some of the troops
were armed with flamethrowers.

39:40.504 --> 39:42.800
The flame assault took
the Soviet defenders

39:42.800 --> 39:44.350
completely by surprise.

39:44.350 --> 39:46.450
And the German troops
were able to penetrate

39:46.450 --> 39:48.110
deep into hall four.

39:48.110 --> 39:50.090
However, the Soviet
guardsmen were able to use

39:50.090 --> 39:52.120
the rubble and knowledge of the interior

39:52.120 --> 39:55.249
to circle to the left and right
flanks of the assault force

39:55.249 --> 39:57.830
and eventually drove
the troops of the 226th

39:57.830 --> 39:59.280
out of the structure.

39:59.280 --> 40:02.087
This attack cost the Germans
an additional 12 killed

40:02.087 --> 40:05.443
and 52 wounded and no
advantage was gained.

40:06.350 --> 40:09.930
On the 29, Shwerin ordered
the entire 226th Infantry

40:09.930 --> 40:12.180
to attack hall four once again.

40:12.180 --> 40:14.080
This time, the battalions
approached the structure

40:14.080 --> 40:16.080
from halls one and two.

40:16.080 --> 40:17.240
The regiment was able to gain

40:17.240 --> 40:18.740
another foothold in the building,

40:18.740 --> 40:21.790
but this achievement, like
the others, was short lived.

40:21.790 --> 40:24.340
The troops were soon
driven out once again.

40:24.340 --> 40:27.123
This time with 19 killed and 96 wounded.

40:27.123 --> 40:29.960
This attack concluded efforts
against the Martenovskii Shop

40:29.960 --> 40:31.680
for the next five days.

40:31.680 --> 40:34.740
The 226th Infantry was
now already too weak

40:34.740 --> 40:37.510
to continue the attacks against the hall.

40:37.510 --> 40:39.200
The 39th Guards Rifle Division

40:39.200 --> 40:40.850
was not in good shape, either.

40:40.850 --> 40:43.710
According to Chuikov, all
three regiments of the division

40:43.710 --> 40:45.640
had been reduced to about 80 men each

40:45.640 --> 40:47.350
by the 30 of October.

40:47.350 --> 40:49.220
Therefore, Chuikov requested permission

40:49.220 --> 40:52.290
from Yeryomenko to bring
over the 45th Rifle Division

40:52.290 --> 40:55.250
from its island defense
mission in the Volga.

40:55.250 --> 40:57.380
It would take time to
assemble this fresh division

40:57.380 --> 40:59.290
from its disperse locations.

40:59.290 --> 41:01.660
So, the elements were sent over piecemeal.

41:01.660 --> 41:04.514
Still, these reinforcements
for the 39th Guards Division

41:04.514 --> 41:06.103
arrived just in time.

41:11.960 --> 41:15.100
From the 30 of October to three November,

41:15.100 --> 41:17.010
as the 45th Rifle Division made its way

41:17.010 --> 41:18.840
to the west bank of the Volga,

41:18.840 --> 41:21.680
the 79th Infantry Division
consolidated its positions

41:21.680 --> 41:22.980
and prepared for the next assault

41:22.980 --> 41:24.730
to take the Martenovskii Shop.

41:24.730 --> 41:27.240
That attack was scheduled to
take place on four November

41:27.240 --> 41:30.260
by Wolf's reinforced 208th Infantry.

41:30.260 --> 41:32.284
In the meantime, on one November,

41:32.284 --> 41:35.020
the remnants of the 24th Panzer Division

41:35.020 --> 41:38.190
went into the line on the 79th
Division's immediate right

41:38.190 --> 41:39.670
and took over the southern defenses

41:39.670 --> 41:41.270
of the Red October Factory

41:41.270 --> 41:43.860
to shorten the 79th's sector.

41:43.860 --> 41:46.270
Two days later, on three November,

41:46.270 --> 41:48.023
the 369th Croatian Regiment was moved

41:48.023 --> 41:51.200
to take over the defense
of halls one and two

41:51.200 --> 41:53.410
while the 208th Infantry was reinforced

41:53.410 --> 41:55.750
with troops from Schwerin's
other two regiments

41:55.750 --> 41:57.673
for the upcoming assault on hall four.

41:59.076 --> 42:01.280
This time, Wolf planned to have his men

42:01.280 --> 42:03.710
attack from hall three
into the Martenovskii Shop

42:03.710 --> 42:06.520
from the south, fight
their way through the hall,

42:06.520 --> 42:10.210
and make contact with German
elements on the north side.

42:10.210 --> 42:12.403
The attack was scheduled to begin at dusk.

42:13.390 --> 42:16.780
After additional heavy artillery
and aerial bombing attacks,

42:16.780 --> 42:18.650
Wolf's men jumped off on the assault,

42:18.650 --> 42:20.380
but quickly ran into fire.

42:20.380 --> 42:22.960
Nevertheless, the troops fought
their way into the building

42:22.960 --> 42:24.900
and conducted a very close quarters battle

42:24.900 --> 42:26.924
with the 120th Guards Rifle regiment.

42:26.924 --> 42:28.490
Now reinforced with men

42:28.490 --> 42:31.860
from the 45th Division's 253rd Regiment.

42:31.860 --> 42:34.750
Fighting in and near the
Martenovskii Shop all night,

42:34.750 --> 42:36.740
the Germans were able to
make their way, once again,

42:36.740 --> 42:38.920
deep into the hall, but, in the end,

42:38.920 --> 42:41.170
the reinforcements from
the 45th Rifle Division

42:41.170 --> 42:43.130
coming into the building from the tunnel

42:43.130 --> 42:44.223
tipped the scales.

42:45.090 --> 42:48.140
By dawn five November,
Wolf had ordered his men

42:48.140 --> 42:48.973
out of the hall.

42:49.810 --> 42:51.526
Even if his men had taken the structure,

42:51.526 --> 42:53.290
they likely could not have held it

42:53.290 --> 42:55.120
with the remaining force.

42:55.120 --> 42:58.120
The 79th Infantry Division
was now exhausted.

42:58.120 --> 43:01.000
It did not have the men
to mount another attack.

43:01.000 --> 43:03.010
The 39th Guards Division, in contrast,

43:03.010 --> 43:04.710
was in better shape now that the troops

43:04.710 --> 43:06.903
of the 45th Division were on hand.

43:08.250 --> 43:10.850
The high expenditure of
resources by both sides

43:10.850 --> 43:13.080
and the culmination of the German 6th Army

43:13.080 --> 43:15.000
before Stalingrad was captured

43:15.000 --> 43:17.266
highlights the importance of planning.

43:17.266 --> 43:19.722
Due to the complexity
of urban environments,

43:19.722 --> 43:22.180
commanders must carefully
arrange their forces

43:22.180 --> 43:25.750
and operations according
to purpose, time, and space

43:25.750 --> 43:27.820
to accomplish the mission.

43:27.820 --> 43:30.890
The application of the tenets
of unified land operations

43:30.890 --> 43:32.300
should inform both plans

43:32.300 --> 43:35.070
and the conduct of all
operations to include

43:35.070 --> 43:37.693
those conducted in and around urban areas.

43:38.570 --> 43:41.020
Successfully synchronizing
and converging effects

43:41.020 --> 43:42.510
across the breadth and depth of

43:42.510 --> 43:44.730
their assigned areas of operation

43:44.730 --> 43:47.190
during large scale combat operations

43:47.190 --> 43:49.860
requires that each echelon
has a shared understanding

43:49.860 --> 43:51.993
of their roles and responsibilities.

43:57.860 --> 43:59.120
What would be the final effort

43:59.120 --> 44:00.670
to seize the Martenovskii Shop

44:00.670 --> 44:03.060
would now take place on 11 November

44:03.060 --> 44:05.710
with the beginning of Operation HUBERTUS.

44:05.710 --> 44:07.930
HUBERTUS was what would amount to Paulus's

44:07.930 --> 44:10.010
final effort to seize the remaining areas

44:10.010 --> 44:12.046
of the Red October and Barricade Factories

44:12.046 --> 44:14.538
still under Soviet control.

44:14.538 --> 44:16.269
The operation would, in theory,

44:16.269 --> 44:18.810
finally enable the 6th
Army to wrest control

44:18.810 --> 44:22.220
of Stalingrad from Chuikov's 62nd Army.

44:22.220 --> 44:23.650
The main element of this effort

44:23.650 --> 44:25.878
was six understrength pioneer battalions

44:25.878 --> 44:29.260
detached from divisions
well outside of Stalingrad

44:29.260 --> 44:30.520
which had been ordered to the city

44:30.520 --> 44:32.600
to reinforce the 6th Army.

44:32.600 --> 44:35.388
Part of the 79th Infantry
Division's role in HUBERTUS

44:35.388 --> 44:37.190
would consist of a joint attack

44:37.190 --> 44:40.310
between the 24th Panzer
Division's kampf group shield

44:40.310 --> 44:42.540
and the 2nd Battalion, 208th Infantry

44:42.540 --> 44:44.170
against hall 10.

44:44.170 --> 44:45.640
Half of which had been recaptured

44:45.640 --> 44:49.070
by the 112th Guards Rifle
Regiment the day before.

44:49.070 --> 44:50.930
The main effort, however,
was the division's

44:50.930 --> 44:53.180
own 179th Pioneer Battalion,

44:53.180 --> 44:54.720
which was designated to spearhead

44:54.720 --> 44:56.063
the attack on hall four.

44:57.065 --> 44:58.481
To increase its manpower,

44:58.481 --> 45:00.100
the battalion was reinforced

45:00.100 --> 45:02.946
with the 3rd Company,
40th Pioneer Battalion

45:02.946 --> 45:05.780
from the 24th Panzer Division.

45:05.780 --> 45:07.190
The battalion would then be backed up

45:07.190 --> 45:09.270
by almost 1,000 or so remaining troops

45:09.270 --> 45:11.030
of Wolf's 208th Infantry

45:11.030 --> 45:13.325
and other troops that would
form the covering group

45:13.325 --> 45:18.325
and 191 men from the 369th
Croatian Regiment in support.

45:18.740 --> 45:22.760
The 179th Pioneers commander,
Captain Helmut Veltz,

45:22.760 --> 45:25.340
organized the assault group
into four combat wedges

45:25.340 --> 45:28.379
of about 30 men each or about 120 total

45:28.379 --> 45:31.120
divided into two waves.

45:31.120 --> 45:32.760
Wedges two and three would penetrate

45:32.760 --> 45:35.130
into the northwest end
of the Martenovskii Shop

45:35.130 --> 45:36.640
and advance inside the building.

45:36.640 --> 45:38.990
Clearing the long, narrow hall there.

45:38.990 --> 45:40.407
In addition to clearing the hall,

45:40.407 --> 45:43.055
those two wedges were to
hold the Soviets' attention

45:43.055 --> 45:45.220
while wedges one and four advanced

45:45.220 --> 45:46.553
along the outside of the hall

45:46.553 --> 45:49.124
in an effort to enter
the building farther down

45:49.124 --> 45:51.450
and get in behind the defenders.

45:51.450 --> 45:52.530
The wedges would be followed

45:52.530 --> 45:54.660
by the 208th Infantry's covering group,

45:54.660 --> 45:56.320
which would add weight to the attack

45:56.320 --> 45:59.000
and hold all ground
gained by the pioneers.

45:59.000 --> 46:00.775
The pioneers were armed
with submachine guns,

46:00.775 --> 46:04.050
grenades, satchel
charges, and flamethrowers

46:04.050 --> 46:05.810
to fight their way into the hall.

46:05.810 --> 46:08.208
The attack was to commence at 0355

46:08.208 --> 46:10.930
with a massive artillery barrage.

46:10.930 --> 46:12.610
The fight for the Red October Factory

46:12.610 --> 46:14.070
offers excellent examples

46:14.070 --> 46:16.840
of combined arms warfare in urban terrain.

46:16.840 --> 46:18.280
In this battle's early phase,

46:18.280 --> 46:20.900
the Germans used close
air support and artillery

46:20.900 --> 46:23.010
to suppress and neutralize
Soviet positions

46:23.010 --> 46:24.530
in the factory area.

46:24.530 --> 46:26.290
They also used armor to make breaches

46:26.290 --> 46:30.009
in the rail car obstacle forward
of the Red October Factory.

46:30.009 --> 46:32.650
In the following battles
for the factory's buildings,

46:32.650 --> 46:35.190
the German Army assaulted
Red Army positions

46:35.190 --> 46:37.337
with teams composed of
infantry and engineers

46:37.337 --> 46:40.120
formed into waves.

46:40.120 --> 46:42.040
US Army doctrine emphasizes the use of

46:42.040 --> 46:44.500
small tactical combined arms teams

46:44.500 --> 46:46.608
in urban offensive operations.

46:46.608 --> 46:48.786
These teams rely on a flexible mix

46:48.786 --> 46:52.860
of infantry, armor, aviation, engineers,

46:52.860 --> 46:54.910
and artillery capable of both

46:54.910 --> 46:57.440
precision fires and suppression.

46:57.440 --> 46:59.970
In the final assault on
the Martenovskii Shop,

46:59.970 --> 47:02.520
synchronized fires
suppressed Soviet positions

47:02.520 --> 47:05.260
after which waves of infantry and pioneers

47:05.260 --> 47:07.640
armed with satchel
charges and flamethrowers

47:07.640 --> 47:08.990
advanced into the building.

47:10.600 --> 47:11.937
German intelligence indicated

47:11.937 --> 47:13.880
the Martenovskii Shop was now manned

47:13.880 --> 47:17.780
by 130 men of the 120th
Guards Rifle Regiment,

47:17.780 --> 47:21.527
205 men from the 2nd Battalion,
253rd Rifle Regiment,

47:21.527 --> 47:24.880
and 60 men from the 39th
Guards Antitank Company

47:24.880 --> 47:27.003
for a total of about 400 defenders.

47:28.070 --> 47:30.310
Captain Veltz began moving
his troops into position

47:30.310 --> 47:31.450
before midnight.

47:31.450 --> 47:34.080
And, by about 0250, all four wedges

47:34.080 --> 47:36.150
were in their assault positions.

47:36.150 --> 47:39.130
Wedge one was located in hall three.

47:39.130 --> 47:42.060
Wedge two was at the south
end of the brick stacks.

47:42.060 --> 47:45.360
Wedge three was positioned at
the north end of the stacks.

47:45.360 --> 47:46.860
Wedge four was located at

47:46.860 --> 47:49.830
a stone pile near the brick stacks.

47:49.830 --> 47:52.170
At 0340, the assault positions

47:52.170 --> 47:55.980
unexpectedly came under heavy
Soviet artillery bombardment.

47:55.980 --> 47:58.110
Five men in the first wave of wedge three

47:58.110 --> 48:00.070
were killed or wounded by the fire,

48:00.070 --> 48:03.360
as was another five in the
second wave of wedge two.

48:03.360 --> 48:06.330
15 minutes later, the
German barrage began.

48:06.330 --> 48:08.800
The artillery bombardment was very short.

48:08.800 --> 48:12.630
The fire from a battery of
large 210 millimeter mortars

48:12.630 --> 48:14.560
designed to prevent the
Soviet reinforcement

48:14.560 --> 48:17.820
into the penetration
area lasted much longer.

48:17.820 --> 48:19.260
The mortar fire was linear

48:19.260 --> 48:22.060
and placed about the center
of the main hall area.

48:22.060 --> 48:24.090
Meanwhile, German antiaircraft guns

48:24.090 --> 48:26.320
raked the remaining
steel girders of the roof

48:26.320 --> 48:28.430
and the smokestacks to kill or distract

48:28.430 --> 48:32.040
the plethora of Russian
snipers in the complex.

48:32.040 --> 48:33.500
Jumping off from the stack of bricks

48:33.500 --> 48:35.672
to the west of the hall four entrances,

48:35.672 --> 48:38.670
wedge two was able to reach
the northwestern entrance

48:38.670 --> 48:41.250
and fight its way inside under heavy fire.

48:41.250 --> 48:42.910
It managed to advance into the structure

48:42.910 --> 48:44.188
for only about 30 yards

48:44.188 --> 48:46.740
before it was stopped by
the tangle of wreckage

48:46.740 --> 48:49.820
in the building and the
heavy Soviet small arms fire.

48:49.820 --> 48:51.826
To the left, the already
weakened wedge three

48:51.826 --> 48:54.410
also successfully bounded into the walls

48:54.410 --> 48:57.490
near the entrance at the narrow
western end of the building,

48:57.490 --> 48:59.080
but, there, the sergeant leading the group

48:59.080 --> 49:00.970
was struck by small arms fire.

49:00.970 --> 49:03.060
Nevertheless, that wedge
pushed into the hall

49:03.060 --> 49:05.300
and made it about as far as wedge two

49:05.300 --> 49:08.530
before it too was halted
by obstacles and fire.

49:08.530 --> 49:10.040
Advancing from hall three,

49:10.040 --> 49:12.330
wedge one moved past the locomotive shed

49:12.330 --> 49:14.960
and was about to turn east
towards its intended entrance

49:14.960 --> 49:16.370
before it was suddenly fired on

49:16.370 --> 49:18.770
by a dug in, well hidden machine gun nest

49:18.770 --> 49:19.860
near where the wedge commander

49:19.860 --> 49:21.350
planned to enter the building.

49:21.350 --> 49:23.740
Another gun opened up shortly thereafter

49:23.740 --> 49:25.640
and the wedge commander ordered his troops

49:25.640 --> 49:27.470
into a large shell hole.

49:27.470 --> 49:29.400
There, the wedge set up a defense position

49:29.400 --> 49:31.045
to provide covering and suppressive fire

49:31.045 --> 49:33.060
for the other wedges.

49:33.060 --> 49:34.837
Wedge four jumped off
from the pile of stones

49:34.837 --> 49:36.980
and was able to move
along the northwest face

49:36.980 --> 49:39.560
of the outside wall for about 100 meters

49:39.560 --> 49:40.450
before it was met with

49:40.450 --> 49:42.510
a hail of machine gun and small arms fire

49:42.510 --> 49:43.920
from holes in the building.

49:43.920 --> 49:46.450
The wedge was forced
back to the stone pile.

49:46.450 --> 49:47.936
Now stranded inside the building

49:47.936 --> 49:49.541
with no outside support coming into

49:49.541 --> 49:51.309
the enemy rear as planned,

49:51.309 --> 49:53.330
the commanders of wedges two and three

49:53.330 --> 49:55.930
decide to pull their troops
out of the Martenovskii Shop

49:55.930 --> 49:57.950
to prevent their annihilation.

49:57.950 --> 49:59.940
Within a few minutes,
wedge three had made it

49:59.940 --> 50:01.301
back to the stack of bricks

50:01.301 --> 50:03.791
while wedge two opted
to head for hall three

50:03.791 --> 50:07.680
closely followed by wedge
one as they passed by.

50:07.680 --> 50:09.142
Once again, the assault was a failure

50:09.142 --> 50:11.570
and cost the 179th Pioneers

50:11.570 --> 50:15.384
54 men of the 120 who began the mission.

50:15.384 --> 50:18.270
The 79th Division was no longer
able to seriously consider

50:18.270 --> 50:20.280
capturing the Martenovskii Shop.

50:20.280 --> 50:22.160
And no further attacks
against the building

50:22.160 --> 50:23.470
took place during the remainder

50:23.470 --> 50:24.920
of the battle for Stalingrad.

50:26.990 --> 50:30.886
Operation HUBERTUS concluded
on 18 November, 1942,

50:30.886 --> 50:34.870
but it was obvious before then
that the effort had failed.

50:34.870 --> 50:36.720
The 62nd Army still held parts

50:36.720 --> 50:40.280
of the Red October and
Barricade Factory complexes.

50:40.280 --> 50:42.926
Throughout the battle,
Choikov's tough Soviet soldiers

50:42.926 --> 50:44.810
had held out against everything that

50:44.810 --> 50:48.170
the 6th Army could send
against them, but just barely.

50:48.170 --> 50:50.445
Still, Choikov's efforts in the city

50:50.445 --> 50:52.680
provided enough time for the Stavka

50:52.680 --> 50:55.073
to resource and organize
a major counterattack

50:55.073 --> 50:57.340
against Army Group B.

50:57.340 --> 50:59.410
This operation, Codenamed Uranus,

50:59.410 --> 51:01.050
was launched in the early morning hours

51:01.050 --> 51:03.323
of 19 November, 1942.

51:04.190 --> 51:06.960
Within three days, the
6th Army was surrounded.

51:06.960 --> 51:09.400
Although there was a brief
effort by Army Group Dawn

51:09.400 --> 51:11.453
in December to rescue
Paulus and his command,

51:11.453 --> 51:14.030
that operation failed.

51:14.030 --> 51:17.850
On two February, 1943, Paulus
was forced to surrender

51:17.850 --> 51:20.770
about 250,000 troops.

51:20.770 --> 51:23.920
Additionally, numerous
tanks, artillery pieces,

51:23.920 --> 51:25.800
and other equipment were removed

51:25.800 --> 51:27.513
from the German order of battle.

51:28.450 --> 51:29.710
Stalingrad had begun as

51:29.710 --> 51:31.820
a secondary objective for the German Army

51:31.820 --> 51:33.870
as part of Case Blue.

51:33.870 --> 51:35.550
The 6th Army was to seize the city

51:35.550 --> 51:37.160
in order to secure the northern flank

51:37.160 --> 51:39.044
of the German forces while Army Group A

51:39.044 --> 51:41.120
conducted the main effort to capture

51:41.120 --> 51:43.920
the oil fields and the
refineries in the Caucasus.

51:43.920 --> 51:46.053
In fact, taking the oil rich Caucasus

51:46.053 --> 51:48.690
proved to be too difficult of a task.

51:48.690 --> 51:50.560
And Stalingrad began to evolve

51:50.560 --> 51:53.510
as a more important
objective for the Germans.

51:53.510 --> 51:55.730
Eventually, Hitler and
other German leaders

51:55.730 --> 51:59.390
became obsessed with capturing
the massive urban complex.

51:59.390 --> 52:02.430
The 6th Army strained every
effort to seize the city.

52:02.430 --> 52:03.670
Pouring troops into the fight

52:03.670 --> 52:05.320
and leaving its flanks vulnerable

52:05.320 --> 52:07.270
to the Soviet counterstroke.

52:07.270 --> 52:08.810
By hanging onto the last pieces

52:08.810 --> 52:11.520
of Soviet-controlled
terrain in Stalingrad,

52:11.520 --> 52:14.190
Chuikov's forces drew the
Wehrmacht and its allies

52:14.190 --> 52:15.400
into a trap.

52:15.400 --> 52:18.800
And one of the most decisive
Axis defeats of the war.

52:18.800 --> 52:19.840
When viewed through the lens

52:19.840 --> 52:21.670
of the current operating environment,

52:21.670 --> 52:23.300
the Battle of Stalingrad provides

52:23.300 --> 52:24.723
current military professionals

52:24.723 --> 52:27.010
a superb case study for analyzing

52:27.010 --> 52:29.870
military operations in urban terrain.

52:29.870 --> 52:31.380
Although technology and tactics

52:31.380 --> 52:33.267
have changed the contemporary battlefield,

52:33.267 --> 52:35.180
one can still learn a great deal

52:35.180 --> 52:37.630
by examining the operations
of the two opponents

52:37.630 --> 52:39.620
who contended in the city.

52:39.620 --> 52:41.280
Using current US Army doctrine to

52:41.280 --> 52:44.130
compare and contrast those operations,

52:44.130 --> 52:46.586
one can develop extremely useful insights

52:46.586 --> 52:48.070
and a greater understanding of

52:48.070 --> 52:50.970
the brutal and resource intensive
nature of city fighting.

52:54.199 --> 52:57.699
(dramatic military music)