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S. HRG. 114–796 

CORRUPTION, GLOBAL MAGNITSKY, AND MODERN 

SLAVERY: A REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

AROUND THE WORLD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 16, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER MUNSON, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland .................................... 3 

Hon. Tomasz P. Malinowski, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ........ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Sarah Margon, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC . 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17 

Mark Lagon, President, Freedom House, Washington, DC ................................. 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Dr. Mark Lagon to Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker 35 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Bob Corker ...................................................................... 36 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Rand Paul ....................................................................... 38 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Tomasz P. Malinowski to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez ............................................................ 39 

Letter Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez .................................................... 42 

Article Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez ................................................... 45 

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(1) 

CORRUPTION, GLOBAL MAGNITSKY, AND 

MODERN SLAVERY: A REVIEW OF HUMAN 

RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 

THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Gardner, Cardin, Menendez, and 

Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

I want to say in advance, we have got about seven votes that are 

coming up in about 40 minutes. And, with the approval of our 

ranking member and other members, I think what we may do, because that is probably too long of a period to have a recess, I would 

think, is that we just move back and forth and alternate chairmans 

and ranking members. We may have to substitute others to keep 

this going. But, we certainly know the importance of this hearing. 

I very much want to thank our ranking member, Senator Menendez, and others for their tremendous efforts in this regard, along 

with Senator McCain. I want to make sure I am in the right place, 

here. 

As Americans, we believe our government should secure and do— 

and not do harm to our rights. What this really means is that we 

believe in the rule of law. Where the rule of law is absent or weak, 

we know that we can expect to see governments, groups, and individuals violating the rights of others. Where societal norms have 

broken down, you are not all surprised to see the worst of human 

nature take over. And we do not have to look too far around the 

world to find examples of how corruption distorts economics and 

fuels social conflict, and how it robs citizens of opportunity and dignity. 

With similarly devastating effect for security and stability 

throughout the world, human rights abuses continue to manifest 

themselves in various forms, from disenfranchisement to unlawful 

imprisonment, torture, and even extermination. Yesterday, the 

ranking member and I were over at a presentation by the Holocaust Museum depicting a young man named Caesar who had basiFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

2 

cally chronicled what was happening in prisons in Syria. It offends 

even the most basic human sensibilities. And to know that that is 

happening right now as we are sitting here in this hearing, that 

people are being tortured in the most crass ways—ways that I 

think people never imagined could take place in this time. So, I 

very much, again, appreciate our ranking member’s pursuit and 

certainly his impassioned comments yesterday. 

The world continues to look at the United States to defend basic 

freedoms and the rule of law when attacked. Furthering the cause 

for democratic governance and rule-based economic systems also 

happens to benefit us here at home. Respect for individual rights 

not only defines us as Americans, but it is embedded in our foreign 

affairs laws by requiring the State Department’s annual human 

rights report and human rights vetting for military training and 

creating authority to support civil society and the rule of law 

through foreign assistance. 

That certainly does not mean that we do not struggle to find the 

right balance between our concerns over human rights and competing interests. There is an additional balance to be struck between what we would like to see happen on the human rights front 

and the reality of how much leverage or influence we actually have 

to achieve these goals. 

Arguably, the human rights landscape changed over the past few 

years. After the end of the cold war, our view of universal human 

rights and political freedom was dominant. But today, major international players simply do not accept these views and have not embraced the rule of law. Countries like Russia and China, for example. Instead, they have used law to criminalize dissent and isolate 

dissenters. Terrorists and criminal nonstate actors also carry out 

unspeakable human rights violations. 

In addition, modern slavery violates the most fundamental 

human rights. As many as 27 million men and women, especially 

women and children, are held in conditions of slavery. And I am 

proud that this committee passed out, on a unanimous vote, a bill 

that it appears may benefit from appropriations and begin a process where the United States takes an even stronger lead in this 

issue. These victims are overwhelmingly poor and vulnerable, living without the protections of the rule of law. This reality should 

call us to action to work to deepen our partnership with governments and civil society globally who are willing to work to eliminate modern slavery. 

I appreciate this committee for voting out the legislation on a 

unanimous basis, as I mentioned. I hope that our witnesses today 

will help us explore these issues. 

I would just point out, for the benefit of members, that questions 

about human trafficking and modern slavery are best directed at 

our second panel, since those issues are not directly within the purview of Assistant Secretary Malinowski at the State Department. 

And with that, I recognize our distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Cardin, for opening comments. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, first, thank you so much, 

not just for convening this hearing, but for championing human 

rights. This committee has a very proud record of advancing basic 

rights. The trafficking legislation that you referred to, your initiative, is very important. The United States has been the global leader in fighting modern-day slavery. And we thank you very much for 

your commitment to strengthen our position so that we can 

strengthen the resolve internationally against human trafficking. 

During the State Department reauthorization discussions that 

we had, we included many provisions that strengthen basic human 

rights as part of our foreign policy objectives, including requiring 

our State Department to assess the status of corruption globally. 

That is another area that this committee advanced. There have 

been many, many, many examples of this committee advancing 

human rights. Particularly—just recently, we passed legislation 

that says the State Department should accumulate the information 

on war crimes committed by the Assad regime so that we can hold 

them accountable. And the Senate agreed with our position on accountability for war crimes in Syria. 

So, we have a strong track record. I am particularly proud of the 

Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act that was passed by 

this committee and enacted into law in the last Congress, and that 

we have set up a way to hold those who were responsible for gross 

violations of human rights accountable. 

As I said yesterday, Sergei Magnitsky was not the first Russian 

to be incarcerated for no reason, tortured and killed, but he is one 

that we knew about. And due to the courage of Bill Browder, that 

information became public and we took action to let the world 

know that we will stand by those who stand up against corruption, 

and we will help. And we passed the Magnitsky Accountability Act. 

Many said, Why are we doing this? Why do we want to create this 

type of a challenge in our relationship with Russia? The United 

States is strongest when we not only get engaged, but we get engaged and stand by our principles. And we were successful in getting that legislation done. 

As a result, dozens of people have been sanctioned, many other 

countries have also taken action to say that they will join us in our 

crusade against the human rights violators, and we are seeing a 

different attitude. And, quite frankly, lives have been saved, and 

people have been encouraged, and change is taking place. 

So, this hearing, I think, gives us a chance to focus on what we 

can do to strengthen that. One effort will be to change the 

Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to the Global 

Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act so that it will apply 

to all countries, not just Russia. I will just remind the members of 

this committee, that the legislation was changed, in conference, to 

be restricted solely to Russia as an accommodation to the House, 

an accommodation to the administration, in order to get the bill enacted. I think now there is general consensus that this should be 

done globally. Quite frankly, the tools are being used by the administration today, beyond Russia, in other countries. What this does 

is legislate that, giving the administration—any administration— 

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the tools to use, but also allowing for congressional committees to 

initiate requests to the administration to review individuals. 

This is a strong bipartisan bill. You already acknowledged Senator McCain. Senator McCain has been a great leader on this crusade for human rights. I want to acknowledge other cosponsors: 

Senators Shaheen, Rubio, Durbin, Wicker, Markey, Kirk, 

Blumenthal, and Cruz. We have all sides of the political spectrums. 

We come together on fighting for human rights globally. 

And lastly, Mr. Chairman, let me just acknowledge Tom 

Malinowski and his incredible career, both in government and outside of government, crusading for human rights. He makes us all 

proud. He has taken on not only other governments and other people; he takes on, at times, the State Department, which we appreciate, and he is here to testify, which we very much appreciate. 

I also want to acknowledge Mark Lagon, from the Freedom 

House—Freedom House has done incredible work in regards to 

human rights—and Sarah Margon, from the Human Rights Watch. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. And again, thanks for your 

tremendous leadership on this issue. I know this is one that you 

spent a great part of your career working on, and I thank you for 

that. 

Our first witness of the first panel today is Assistant Secretary 

of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom 

Malinowski. Previously, he was Washington Director for Human 

Rights Watch from 1998 to 2001. He served as Senior Director on 

the National Security Council at the White House from 1994 to 

1998. He was a speechwriter for Secretaries Warren Christopher 

and Madeleine Albright, and a member of the Policy Planning Staff 

at the Department of State. 

It is good to have you before our committee. I first met Tom, having an adult beverage in Munich, I think, a few years ago. It is 

good to have you here. 

I also want to welcome our other witnesses. Professor Mark 

Lagon is the president of the Freedom House. Previously, he was 

Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of Science and 

Foreign Policy Program at Georgetown University. He was executive director and CEO of the leading anti-human-trafficking nonprofit Polaris Project until January 2009. He also directed the Office of Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at the U.S. Department of State. He is also a staff alumnus to the Foreign Relations Committee. 

We welcome you back, Mark, and thank you for your great service here. 

Ms. Sarah Margon is the Washington director at Human Rights 

Watch. Prior to joining Human Rights Watch, she was associate director of Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding at the Center for 

American Progress. She also served as senior foreign policy advisor 

to Senator Russ Feingold, and is also a staff alumni of the Foreign 

Relations Committee, where she was staff director to the Subcommittee on African Affairs. 

We also welcome you back, and know that both of you will be 

treated exceptionally well. We thank you for being here today. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

5 

I would remind all of you that, if you would—you all have done 

this before—keep your comments to about 5 minutes. Your written 

comments will be made part of the record. 

And we apologize for the votes that are getting ready to take 

place, but we thank you so much for being here to help us with this 

issue. 

And, with that, Tom, why do you not go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Cardin. Thanks for holding this hearing. Thanks for placing such 

a high priority on these important bipartisan issues. 

And let me also thank you for giving me such a small subject to 

try to summarize in 5 minutes. [Laughter.] 

I am going to—I will try. I may—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I will tell you what: Take 6, if you wish. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

So, let me give you a general overview of what I see as the big 

opportunities and challenges, and then you can have at me on 

whatever you like. 

So, you know, as you know, my work forces me to focus on the 

worst and most depressing things that are happening around the 

world. I often start, when I talk about these things, by trying to 

remind folks that there is a lot of good stuff happening in many 

parts of the world. A lot of people are still fighting the fight for 

human rights and for freedom, and they are winning. When I look 

back on the events of the last year, I think about the success of 

the Maidan movement in the Ukraine, and all the work those folks 

are still doing to try to hold their country to the path that they 

have chosen. I think about Afghanistan and Indonesia and the elections that took place there, where, amongst all the choices people 

had, they went for the candidates who had the most progressive 

human-rights-oriented visions for the future of their country. I 

think about this remarkable movement for term limits that has 

started and spread throughout Africa; the more recent elections in 

Nigeria and Sri Lanka, where people risked so much to assert the 

right to change their leaders; about the opportunities I think we 

still have in Burma, and the new opportunities that are emerging 

in Vietnam. And in all of these cases, the United States, we, have 

played, I think, a very, very central role in supporting people who 

are fighting for their rights. And that ought to give us, not just 

some hope for the future, but confidence in ourselves, a very, very 

important quality. 

Now, all that said, the global movement for human rights has 

run into some pretty significant headwinds, and there are days 

when it feels to me like the number and intensity of the crises we 

face is about as great as at any point in recent history. So, let me 

mention what I think are three of the biggest overarching challenges we face. 

The first is the—obviously, the brutality of nonstate actors like 

Daesh and Boko Haram and al-Shabaab and the Taliban groups 

that have launched systematically planned efforts to target whole 

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6 

groups of people because of their ethnicity or faith, and propagated 

an ideology that justifies, even celebrates, the killing and enslavement of people. We have to defeat these groups, and that necessarily involves coercive measures. But, at the same time, we have 

to remember what they came from. They did not come from nothing. Many cases—certainly true in Nigeria and Syria and Iraq—extremist groups came to the fore driven by atrocities and human 

rights abuses and corruption committed by governments. And so, 

our response to these groups also has to be consistent with the values of promoting human rights. 

And that leads me to the second overarching challenge that I 

think we face daily around the world, and that is the 

misapplication of counterterrorism and counterterrorism laws to 

stifle legitimate political dissent. When a Saudi counterterrorism 

court sentences a blogger to 1,000 lashes, when Egypt uses the 

threat of terrorism to justify the prosecution of nonviolent opposition, when China prosecutes Uighur scholars who promote moderation and reconciliation, it is not just a blow to human rights, it is 

a setback to effective counterterrorism. And so, a great part of our 

engagement with partners in our coalitions against terrorism is 

about delivering the message that, when the paths to nonviolent 

change are blocked, more and more people who have grievances are 

going to fall under the sway of extremist groups. 

Now, the third big challenge—and you mentioned this, Mr. 

Chairman—is that, for the first time in many, many years, we are 

facing a serious challenge to universal norms of human rights from 

two of the world’s great powers: Russia and China. I think it is important, in the case of Russia, for example, to recognize that the 

intervention in Ukraine that we have seen is profoundly related to 

President Putin’s increasingly harsh crackdown domestically, 

which has been building since 2011, when he faced those first effective protests against his rule. You have seen, of course, the progression, the laws labeling NGOs as foreign agents or undesirable foreign organizations, the complete lack of progress and accountability 

for cases like Sergei Magnitsky, the murder of opposition leaders, 

and so forth. 

And this insecurity at home has increasingly led the Kremlin to 

view the assertion of a universal norm of human rights and democracy by governments, by civil society groups all around the world, 

as a threat to its interests. And so, when a democratic experiment 

arose in Ukraine, Russia acted against a sovereign state to stop it, 

leading not just to a human rights crisis, but to a threat to global 

order. 

And in China, we are also seeing, in some ways, a very similar 

increasingly assertive set of measures to restrict civil society and 

to challenge the legitimacy of global norms that uphold the rights 

of civil society. In recent days, we have seen over 100 lawyers detained in China who are defending the rights of others. We have 

seen the passage or proposal of laws on NGOs, on national security, that will empower the government to round up, not just 

human rights groups, but to restrict the activities of everything 

from chambers of commerce to groups that do student exchanges, 

work on environmental issues, everything that is not controlled by 

the government, all justified by an increasingly assertive official 

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discourse of resisting what they call ‘‘cultural infiltration’’ from the 

United States and the international community. And, unfortunately, we see this trend in a lot of other smaller countries that 

are able to point to the example of Russia and China to justify 

what they are doing. 

Now, all of this is very bad news. I would suggest that the global 

crackdown on civil society that we are seeing is, in part, a response 

to the effectiveness and success of these movements over the last 

several years. So, in a way, it is no surprise that authoritarian regimes are pushing back. What it means for us is, we have to redouble our vigilance. So, how do we do that? We have a lot of tools. 

We have public and private diplomacy. We can mobilize other countries through the U.N. and other international organizations. We 

can put great emphasis on issues like corruption. And that is something we are doing, because we know, not only is corruption linked 

to bad governance, to human rights abuses everywhere in the 

world, it is also one of the most important political vulnerabilities 

of regimes like Putin’s, for example, and others, because it is the 

one thing they cannot justify at home or abroad. 

And finally, we have the option of imposing targeted sanctions, 

particularly targeted financial sanctions. And, as you both know, 

this is an option that I have supported in many cases, it is one that 

we have employed as a government in a number of cases, it can 

be effective, but it is not always the right answer. It is not something that we can uniformly do, from the standpoint of effectiveness, in every single country that faces human rights challenges. 

And that is why I think we need the flexibility to work with you 

to determine where that tool is likely to do more good than harm. 

So, Senator Cardin, you mentioned the Global Magnitsky Act. I 

want to, first of all, commend you and thank you for all of the work 

that you have done on the issues that we have been discussing over 

the years, including the work on the Act. And we very much appreciate your efforts to address some of our concerns in preserving 

that important flexibility to be able to impose sanctions where it 

is going to be effective and appropriate. And we very much look forward to working with you, with the committee, on this and other 

important legislation as you move forward. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, for holding this important hearing. You’ve given us a broad subject, so there are any number of issues I could touch 

on, but let me begin by giving you a general overview of the challenges and opportunities I see right now in our efforts to promote human rights around the world. 

As you know, we recently released our 2014 Human Rights Reports, which gave 

us a chance to take stock of human rights conditions worldwide. We focus in those 

reports on what is going wrong in all the countries they examine, and we must, 

since the whole point of our human rights diplomacy is to help right those wrongs. 

But we also recognized what is going right—the achievements that people working 

for democracy and human rights have made in the last year that give us hope, even 

in this difficult period. In Ukraine, peaceful protests helped citizens reclaim their 

country’s traditions of political choice and freedom of expression. In Afghanistan and 

Indonesia, millions of people went to the polls, and chose among all the candidates 

before them leaders with the most progressive, democratic vision for the future of 

their country. In Burkina Faso, people stood up to uphold their constitution, part 

of a larger movement for term limits in Africa and beyond. In Nigeria, voters braved 

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violence, and in Sri Lanka they were galvanized by corruption and nepotism, to 

affirm their ability to choose and change their leaders. In each of these cases, the 

United States stood up for those seeking human rights, often over many years in 

the face of significant setbacks. These examples, therefore, should give us not just 

hope for progress in the world but confidence in our ability to advance it. 

That said, the global movement for human rights has also run into powerful 

headwinds in many places, and on some days it feels like the number and intensity 

of crises we face are greater than at any time I can remember. 

The first challenge I want to highlight is the brutality of nonstate actors, from 

the Taliban and al-Shabaab to Boko Haram and Daesh. We are all too familiar with 

the litany of crimes these terrorists have committed: murder, torture, rape, religious 

persecution, slavery, and more. Daesh, in particular, stands out for having launched 

systematically planned and organized efforts to attack whole groups of people 

because of their ethnicity or faith, and for propagating an ideology that justifies, and 

even celebrates, the killing of civilians and enslavement of women. As Secretary 

Kerry has made clear, the international community must confront and to defeat 

these groups, and coercive measures are obviously an essential part of that effort. 

At the same time, we must remember that these groups did not emerge from 

nothing. Violent extremism in Nigeria was exacerbated by the actions—and in some 

ways the inaction—of the previous government. In Syria, Daesh’s rise was fueled 

by Assad’s horrific abuses against his own people. In Iraq, Daesh took hold because 

many in the Sunni community felt marginalized, felt that legitimate grievances 

were being ignored by the government in Baghdad. So these violent extremist 

groups are not only a primary cause of human rights abuses; they are also a product 

of human rights abuses. 

As President Obama noted in the 2015 National Security Strategy, many of our 

biggest national security challenges come from the biggest human rights failures. 

When governments violate the rights of their citizens and ignore calls for accountability, inclusivity, rule of law, decent work, and fundamental freedoms, they fuel 

instability and violence. 

So our response to terrorist groups must be consistent with human rights, too, 

which leads me to a second urgent challenge we face around the world today—the 

misapplication of counterterrorism laws to stifle criticism, crush dissent, and restrict 

the space for civil society. For example, in Saudi Arabia, peaceful Internet activist 

Raif Badawi was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes by the Ministry 

of Interior’s Specialized Criminal Court, a court originally set up to try terrorists. 

Egypt has used a real threat of terrorism to justify the prosecution of nonviolent 

opposition figures, human rights activists, and demonstrators. Bahrain has a legitimate interest in protecting its people against violent groups, yet its government has 

focused much of its energy on prosecuting peaceful critics, including this year, opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman. Last year in China, Ilham Tohti, a Uighur scholar 

who promoted moderation and reconciliation among ethnic groups, was sentenced to 

life in prison. 

Terrorism doesn’t give authorities a license to use violence indiscriminately, and 

it’s not a legitimate excuse to lock up political opponents, restrict civil society, or 

pin a false label on activists who are engaged in peaceful dissent. Such measures 

are not just wrong; they’re not just violations of human rights. They’re also counterproductive to our security goals; they play directly into the hands of terrorists. 

As President Obama said at the Countering Violent Extremism Summit in February, ‘‘When people are oppressed and human rights are denied . . . when dissent 

is silenced, it feeds violent extremism. When peaceful democratic change is impossible, it feeds into terrorist propaganda that violence is the only answer available.’’ 

That’s why a great part of our engagement with partners in the coalition against 

Daesh, and with countries facing this kind of threat is about delivering the message 

that when the paths to nonviolent change are shut down, more and more people 

who have grievances will fall under the sway of extremists and the false promises 

they offer. It’s why our security cooperation with these countries will remain bound 

by restrictions that promote respect for human rights and encourage a focus on violent extremism rather than peaceful dissent. We do this for our own security, as 

well as to advance the human rights and dignity of people around the world. 

The third challenge I want to put before you today is this—for the first time in 

many years, we are facing a serious challenge to universal norms of human rights 

from two of the world’s great powers. 

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine threatens to upend an international order that 

has kept the peace in Europe since World War II. We have responded accordingly, 

and appropriately. But we should also remember that Putin’s actions in Ukraine are 

profoundly related to his increasingly harsh crackdown on dissent within Russia 

since 2011, when he saw widespread overwhelmingly peaceful public protests as a 

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threat to his power. Seventy-six of the country’s most respected NGOs now are now 

listed as ‘‘foreign agents’’ and a new law banning ‘‘undesirable foreign organizations’’ 

will intensify the government’s suppression of Russian civil society. These laws have 

been used not just against human rights groups, but against any NGO that receives 

foreign funding, from organizations that finance high school science camps, to those 

supporting the mothers of soldiers; recently, organizations have been targeted simply because their staff spoke at conferences on foreign soil. At the same time, there 

has been no progress in identifying those responsible for the murders of journalists, 

human rights defenders, and with the killing of Boris Nemtsov, leaders of the political opposition. 

The Kremlin appears to see the assertion of a universal norm of human rights 

and democracy by governments and civil society groups around the world as a call 

to ‘‘color revolutions’’ and thus a threat to the regime. In Ukraine Russia has acted 

against a sovereign state where a successful democratic transition might set a positive example for others. The result has been an occupation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in which widespread human rights abuses have been committed. Meanwhile, Russia has used its veto in the U.N. Security Council to oppose 

the enforcement of human rights norms around the world, blocking everything from 

efforts to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities in Syria to a commemoration of the genocide at Srebrenica in Bosnia. 

Sadly, in China, we are seeing increasingly assertive measures to restrict civil 

society and to challenge the legitimacy of universal human rights norms. In recent 

days, the Chinese Government has detained a large group of lawyers who had done 

nothing more than defend, the rights of others brought before the criminal justice 

system. The timing of these arrests, shortly after China’s passage of a new National 

Security Law has heightened our concerns that China may seek to use legislation 

to commit human rights abuses and to restrict enjoyment of fundamental freedoms 

of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion. 

China’s draft NGO and counterterrorism laws are similarly disturbing. They are 

broad, vaguely phrased laws that give officials considerable latitude to police civil 

society and suppress views that they perceive as being in any way threatening to 

Communist Party rule. As in Russia, the Chinese NGO law will allow the government to go after any and all foreign, and foreign supported, organizations, including 

groups involved in work as benign as student exchanges or environmental issues. 

And the Chinese Government justifies it with a new and disturbing official discourse 

that paints ‘‘cultural infiltration’’ from the United States and the international community as a threat. These developments could restrict foreign trade and investment 

in China and obstruct the Chinese people’s interaction with the outside world, 

reversing a 36-year process of ‘‘reform and opening’’ to the outside world that has 

enriched both China and the international community. As we did during our recent 

Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China, we will continue to encourage China’s 

leaders to weigh the costs to its citizens’ well-being and productivity of blocking 

them from the ideas and information that spark and move the world forward. But 

that is what the Chinese Government appears to be determined to do. 

Unfortunately, other countries around the world, from Cambodia to Ethiopia to 

Azerbaijan, have sought to copy Russia and China’s repressive examples, passing 

laws to stifle NGOs and restrict what their people can access on the Internet and 

other media. You might recall Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s speech last 

summer, declaring his intention to build an ‘‘illiberal state’’ modeled on the likes of 

Russia and China. When authoritarian leaders are challenged at home and abroad 

by demands for more inclusive and transparent government—demands that cite universal values and international law—they find it convenient to point to an alternative model being displayed and promoted by influential world powers like Russia 

and China. 

I realize this is quite a dark outlook, but I do want to point out that one of the 

reasons for the recent wave of crackdowns on civil society is that civil society has 

become very effective. Crackdowns are a response to the success that global civil 

society has had in promoting human rights—success in raising the expectations of 

people in countries that have long resisted democratic change that they’re entitled 

to the same fundamental freedoms as everyone else around the world. And that success is profoundly threatening to authoritarian regimes. So it’s not a surprise to 

seem them pushing back. But the push back does, mean that we need to remain 

vigilant in our defense of universal values. 

There’s no single approach to doing this. Different tools, in different combinations, 

are appropriate depending on the circumstances. But let me lay out some of the 

tools at hand. 

First, we always strive to address our concerns in our public and private diplomacy—even with countries with which we must do business on other issues. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

10 

We work in the United Nations, in regional organizations, and other multilateral 

fora to strengthen and generate international support for compliance with human 

rights obligations. 

Related to this, one thing we increasingly have emphasized is the importance of 

fighting corruption in countries where there is clearly a confluence between graft 

and poor governance. Corruption is often the reason why authoritarian leaders seize 

and cling to power; but it is also often one of their greatest vulnerabilities—the 

abuse of power that generates the greatest domestic opposition and that they are 

least able to justify on the world stage. The United States is well-positioned to lead 

a redoubled global effort to confront corruption. We were the first country to criminalize bribery by our companies overseas. We have led the creation of global standards and binding legal frameworks to prevent and combat graft, and to foster the 

international legal cooperation that is increasingly necessary. In the last few years, 

we have forged a consensus in the G20 to strengthen safeguards against the flow 

of illicit funds, including by cracking down on the use of anonymous shell companies. We are helping emerging democracies like Sri Lanka and Ukraine recover stolen assets, and where possible prosecuting those with links to foreign corruption in 

our courts. We are partnering with a number of African countries to address corruption and other sources of illicit finance there. 

At the same time, we use our assistance to partners around the world, including 

security assistance, to leverage improved respect for human rights. And finally, we 

have the option of using targeted measures, including targeted financial sanctions 

in certain contexts. They are an important tool in many cases. They enable us to 

impose costs on individuals responsible for certain human rights abuses without 

punishing entire countries or economies. They can show how seriously the United 

States takes these issues, while giving the victims of human rights abuses a sense 

that someone is standing up for them. And America’s position in the international 

financial system gives us unique opportunities to employ such measures. But financial sanctions aren’t the right answer in every situation, and our ability to employ 

this tool effectively would diminish if we employed it indiscriminately. That’s why 

we believe we need the flexibility to determine, in consultation with Congress, when 

financial and other sanctions will do more good than harm. 

Senator Cardin, I want to commend you for all of the work you have done to 

combat global human rights violations, including your recent work on the Global 

Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which was reported out of this committee last year. We greatly appreciate your effort to address our concerns for preserving our flexibility in key areas and look forward to working with you and other 

members of the committee as this bill proceeds through the legislative process to 

ensure that it achieves common goals. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much for that testimony. 

And very much appreciate your efforts in all of the places that you 

have served. 

So, you talked about Russia—and let us just mention China, in 

particular—but also other countries. We had a situation come before us here recently, where we are dealing with China on a civil 

nuclear agreement, whereby we know that they are going to cheat 

and use that technology to help them in military activities. We 

know that is going to happen. And yet, you know, our country is 

entering into an agreement with them and—because of the commercial interest that exists relative to us working with China on 

commercial issues. So, when it comes to this particular issue, 

human rights, talk to me about how we deal with the balance. My 

guess is, your greatest challenge at the State Department is that 

the State Department has multiple interests that it is trying to accommodate, and issues that they are trying to achieve, or movement. So, how do we balance that? To me, that is one of the greatest rubs that we have, relative to human rights issues, is that we 

have other equities, if you will, with governments that sometimes 

compromise our abilities. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. First, I think it is important to be completely 

honest about that. Of course we have other interests. And I would 

be—it would be silly of me to suggest that this is the only set of 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

11 

interests that the United States has in the world. I tend to resist 

the notion that our interest in promoting human rights, and our interest in protecting our security, our prosperity, is—that those interests are fundamentally at odds. I think sometimes we face shortterm tradeoffs, where we may have to work with a particular country on something that is essential to our security right now. And, 

at times, that may lead us to calibrate our efforts on other important issues. 

In the long run—and this is the point I was making about 

counterterrorism—and not just the very long run, but in—medium 

term—it is—I do not think it is possible for us to secure the broad 

range of our interests in the world unless we are also working with 

and empowering ordinary people in countries like Russia and 

China and Afghanistan and Indonesia, and so on, and so on. Most 

of our—and President Obama has made this clear; it is stated very 

plainly in our national security strategy—most of the most fundamental challenges to our national security around the world come 

from places where people’s rights are not respected. And that is not 

a coincidence. 

So, that is the argument that I make. Even in the cases where 

we have short-term tradeoffs, there is no situation where we cannot stand up strongly and say what we think. In the case of China, 

we just had our strategic and economic dialogue here in Washington, and everybody involved, from Secretary Kerry on down, 

pressed extremely hard on issues like the NGO law, the arrest of 

lawyers, Tibet, Xinjiang—making the argument that I have just 

made, that these problems are related to many of our other concerns with China. And I think we find that, even if all we are doing 

is making statements, governments around the world are profoundly sensitive to what the United States says and does not say. 

That is been one of the interesting things that I have learned in 

this job, that even just what we say, what you say as a Congress, 

is heard very clearly around the world and is taken very, very seriously. 

So, there is always something that we can do, even in those situations. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if you would, just for our education, when 

you say ‘‘empower groups,’’ let us talk China for instance. One of 

our jobs is to empower groups. What are some of the most effective 

ways that we do that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There are—well, there are many different 

things that we can do. In some cases, we can provide direct support 

to civil society organizations that are advocating for universal 

human rights. 

The CHAIRMAN. And is that permissible under the leadership 

that exists in China right now? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In some places, it is harder; in some places, it 

is easier. In some places, we are very careful about how we talk 

about what we do, because of the difficulties. We take our cue, of 

course, from those brave activists, themselves. There are countries 

where, for their own safety, for their own interests, they feel like 

they cannot work with outside governments or groups. So, that is 

one way. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

12 

Speaking out on their behalf, frankly, is very, very important. I 

do not know how many times I have had conversations with activists in other countries who have simply said, ‘‘Just speak out on 

our behalf. Remind us that we exist, that we are important, that 

we are not forgotten.’’ Sometimes the targeted sanctions, where 

that is appropriate, are a good way of empowering people, because 

they feel, ‘‘Somebody did something, somebody imposed a degree of 

accountability for what is being done to us.’’ Wherever possible, we 

try to mobilize other countries. And increasingly, one of the things 

that my Bureau is doing is pooling funds with other countries that 

are dedicated to the same principles so that we are able to respond 

collectively to cries for help from civil society around the world. 

So, many different things that we can do. Are we doing enough? 

Never. We always face the challenge of doing more. And we will 

continue to do our best. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the way the Global Magnitsky bill 

is now drafted, the sanctions are permissive. They are not mandatory. Is that correct? 

?????Senator CARDIN.????? There is no required action by the administration to evaluate every human rights violator around the 

world, that is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know that is something that is going to be subject of debate. My guess is, the administration would prefer not to 

see this enacted. I do not think it has necessarily been fond of this. 

But, if there were mandatory sanctions, just give us practical implications of that. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. That would be a significant problem. And that 

is the administration’s position. It is my personal position. I do not 

think—first of all, I—as I mentioned, I do not think that targeted 

financial sanctions are the answer to every single human rights 

abuse and human rights abuser in the world. If we were mandated 

by law to do it, we would have to have the subjective process, 

where the lawyers would say, ‘‘If there is evidence, then we have 

to act.’’ 

Number two, the resource implications of that would be just extraordinary, particularly for countries that have very small embassies, small posts, to have to be able to look at every single case that 

rises to the level to potentially the evidentiary standard in the legislation. So, I think that would, in a sense, break the bank. 

I think—again, very much appreciate the efforts that you have 

made, Senator Cardin, to make this about creating an authority to 

be able to target individuals around the world. Obviously, the Congress would retain its authority to impose—to pass legislation that 

imposes sanctions on a variety of issues, variety of countries where 

you think it is appropriate. So, I think flexibility is preserved all 

around with that approach. 

We have not taken a position on the legislation, neither positive 

nor negative, but it is something that we very much look forward 

to working with you both on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say, we have always intended, when the bill was originally introduced, the 

Magnitsky law, that it would give authority to the executive branch 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

13 

to be able to use these tools and a mechanism where the legislative 

branch could ask the executive branch to investigate specific cases, 

but no mandatory aspect. And we thought that was the best way 

to go, because, quite frankly, if it becomes mandatory—we were 

concerned about resources and costs and whether you really are 

going to diminish the importance of these tools. We want to go 

after the cases where they can have the most impact, not only on 

the individual, but on the circumstances within a country and 

those who are fighting for human rights. So, it was intentionally 

designed that way. 

And I want to thank Mr. Malinowski, because during the considerations of the bill, there were some clarifications, and we very 

much appreciate the input in making it clear our intentions on the 

legislation. 

I also just really want to underscore your point about putting a 

spotlight on issues. I have been involved in the Helsinki Commission since my first days in the House of Representatives, many 

years ago, before the fall of the Soviet Union. And the Helsinki 

Commission by visiting a country and talking to the activists was 

incredibly valuable in changing the human rights records within 

many of the countries under the Soviet domination. And it was one 

of the most important steps we took in order to liberate people and 

give them hope. And I think it contributed to the change and the 

end of the dominance of the Soviet Union. So, that was an important step. 

Mr. Malinowski, I will urge you to carefully engage on the TransPacific Partnership. I say that because Congress has spoken. The 

TPA—Trade Promotional Authority—that we have given to the administration has as one of its principal negotiating objectives, 

which means the administration must act in this area—good governance and anticorruption. We recognize that there are times 

when you can make progress. And when countries want trade 

rights with the United States, they will change. And this is an opportunity for countries that have less than satisfactory progress on 

human rights to be able to do something positive. And we need 

champions. 

Secondly, let me point out that some of your colleagues in the 

State Department are working with the United Nations on the Sustainable Development Goals, the next set of goals that follow up on 

the Millennium Development Goals. There is a Sustainable Development Goal, Goal 16, that is being proposed that deals with good 

governance. This would be a major change. As you know, the Millennium Development Goals tried to deal with world poverty, with 

women’s education, with infant survival, and we made tremendous 

progress. But, as you pointed out in your testimony, if you have a 

corrupt society, you are not going to be able to do everything you 

need to keep babies alive or to deal with poverty or to deal with 

education. It is corrosive to those accomplishments. 

So, we are able to at least propose it. And I would urge you also 

to get involved with your colleagues to make sure that we are successful in getting a good governance, anticorruption focus in the 

Sustainable Development Goals. We have to use every tool available. And that also includes the Global Magnitsky. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

14 

And I just wanted to ask you a question. The administration did 

use targeted sanctions against seven individuals responsible for serious human rights violations in Venezuela. You were able to do 

that. What challenges did the administration face in the Venezuela 

case in being able to use targeted sanctions? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I would say there are—I would point to several 

challenges. One—and I think it is appropriate that we face this 

challenge—the evidentiary standard is quite high. And my colleagues at the Treasury Department insist that, when we propose 

the use of targeted sanctions for conduct, such as human rights 

abuses, that there be evidence, that we have solid evidence, so that, 

when we go to the banks, we are not—you know, we do not expose 

ourselves to potential legal action and other measures by those 

whom we sanction. So, that is always the case. 

In the case of Venezuela, there was some blowback, as I am sure 

you saw, from the region, including from some of our allies and 

partners in the region, and from the Government of Venezuela 

itself, because, under the current law that grants us authority to 

impose these sanctions, IEPA, we have to—when we target individuals, we have to issue—the President has to issue an executive 

order that declares a state of national emergency with respect to 

that country. And the language of the executive order, the mandatory language, can—and was, in the case of Venezuela—be exploited to suggest that the United States is, in effect, going to war 

against that country. And so, the Government of Venezuela pointed 

to some of that language and said, you know, ‘‘You see, the Americans are coming after us,’’ when, in fact, all we were doing was 

holding accountable a number of individuals for abuses of human 

rights and for corruption. 

Senator CARDIN. And that is one of the reasons why we would 

suggest that the Global Magnitsky bill could avoid those types of 

real problems, including statements that you have to make that are 

not necessarily productive to our relationship with other countries 

when we are going after human rights violators. So, you have already pointed out that targeted sanctions are valuable tools, so I 

will not reiterate that. 

But, let me just make one last point on this. We have the separation of branches of government. There are not many other countries 

in the world that have that. We need to use that to our advantage. 

You know, you cannot control what Congress does. Sometimes that 

gives you an ability to go places and do things that you otherwise 

could not do. So, I would just urge the administration to play that 

more aggressively than you have in the past. Congress, yes, can 

initiate laws with sanctions. We can do it. We have done it. We 

have done it successfully; at times, when the administration did 

not want us to do it—really did not want us to do it. We still did 

it. And the results, I would say, have been very, very positive, not 

only for the advancement of human rights, but for advancement of 

many of our other goals. 

So, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, is 

an effort to get that right, to give you the tools that you can use, 

but to also say there are going to be times when Congress wants 

an easier process so we do not have to declare an emergency, like 

you have to do today when using these tools. We do not have to 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

15 

pass a specific law; we can do it through our committees and direct 

you to take a look at an individual who we think deserves that type 

of attention. And I think it really does play to the strength of 

America’s independent branches of government, allowing you to do 

what you should, but also allowing Congress to carry out its role, 

either by passing specific laws or directing the administration to 

take action. 

And again, I thank you for your incredible record, both in government and out of government, for what you have done to advance 

human rights. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

There will be a number of questions, I think, from other Senators. And if you would answer those fairly promptly, this helps us 

establish a record to deal with this legislation that I know you support and Senator Cardin has championed. So, thank you so much 

for being here. Thank you for your service. 

And I think, in light of what is getting ready to happen with 

votes, it might be good to go ahead and bring the other witnesses 

up. Let us hear their testimony, and then we can alternate. Sorry 

this has been so brief. It is not out of disrespect for—well, I—with 

us questioning, I mean, it is probably okay. So—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Anyway. Thank you so much. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much. 

[Pause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for being here. And I know you 

have been introduced. Just because of the way the seating order is, 

Sarah, if you would like to start first, that would be great. 

STATEMENT OF SARAH MARGON, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, 

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. MARGON. Sure, I am happy to. 

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, other members of 

the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As a 

former Senate staffer and a liaison to this committee, it is a particular honor to be here. So, thank you. 

I would like to specifically thank Senator Cardin for his longstanding commitment to fighting corruption and addressing global 

human rights abuses, including, but certainly not limited to, the 

bill we are discussing today, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act. 

Now, the world is undergoing incredible turmoil with grave implications for millions of people. If you look at countries where the 

Arab Spring took root, it has been replaced, in many cases, by conflict and repression. ISIS and other Islamic extremists are committing mass atrocities and threatening civilians, not only in the Middle East, but in Asia, in Africa, and beyond. Even if we look past 

ISIS, many governments have sought to respond to the very real 

danger of armed militancy with a myopic security response. Legitimate counterterrorism measures are often coupled with an unprecedented crackdown on independent civil society and the media that 

receives, in many cases, little more than a passing criticism from 

the United States and other countries. Governments such as BahFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

16 

rain and Ethiopia have thrown peaceful activists and human rights 

defenders in jail for being outspoken, under the guise of fighting 

terrorism. Partnerships with security forces and governments 

known to be both corrupt and abusive, from Egypt to Afghanistan 

to Uganda, appear to be receiving less, rather than more, scrutiny 

from the United States. Around the world, we have documented 

how repressive government tactics often spark, or at least exacerbate, many of today’s most pressing security challenges. And yet, 

human rights defenders challenge these injustices, and risk harassment and attack, while those who threaten them generally do so 

with great impunity. 

It is within this framework that I would like to discuss three 

countries where I actually think the Global Magnitsky bill might 

be particularly valuable. 

Let us start with Iraq. More than 12 years after the United 

States-led forces invaded Iraq, it has become quite clear that the 

country’s transition to a functioning and stable democracy built on 

the rule of law is in tatters. Even before ISIS’s dramatic territorial 

gains more than a year ago, human rights conditions were deteriorating dramatically. Iraq grappled with a weak criminal justice system plagued by serious corruption and political interference. Courts 

frequently based convictions on coerced confessions and trial proceedings that fell far short of international standards. 

At that time, the Iraq Government was struggling to address 

bombings and attacks, and it employed draconian and abusive tactics by heavy-handed security forces increasingly under the political influence of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who also 

sponsored militias outside of regular security forces. ISIS’s takeover of massive swaths of territory in June 2014 was a testament 

to the alienation of Sunni communities as many welcomed ISIS 

fighters as liberators from the sectarian oppression of government 

authorities. To put it simply, former Prime Minister Maliki’s unchecked anti-Sunni policies created fertile ground for ISIS to escalate the conflict that has helped spawn today’s crisis. 

A sanctioned regime like the one the Global Magnitsky bill would 

create is certainly no panacea for what we are facing there, but, 

as a starting point, it sends a clear signal that the United States 

is not open for business to persons responsible for serious human 

rights abuses or large-scale corruption. It also has the potential to 

spur greater domestic accountability for such abuses, which is 

largely absent. 

On Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s human rights record is nothing 

short of atrocious. Thousands of people are imprisoned on politically motivated charges, torture is endemic, and the authorities 

regularly go after civil society activists, opposition members, and 

journalists in very barbaric ways. Muslims and Christians who 

practice their religion outside strict state controls are persecuted, 

and, despite some changes in 2013 due to outside pressure, the government still forces an estimated 2 million adults to harvest cotton 

every fall under draconian conditions. Now, Washington has some 

tools to encourage reform, but they have not been used, despite a 

much reduced need to rely on Tashkent for the transit of United 

States troop supplies out of Afghanistan. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

17 

When it comes to Uzbekistan, the Obama administration needs 

a fresh approach that leans more in the direction of strategic pressure instead of strategic patience, mainly because there is no evidence that officials who oversee or engage in torture, forced labor, 

or persecution of activists will change their behavior absent serious 

political or economic consequences. 

Very quickly on Bahrain: While the majority of Bahrainis are 

Shiite, the country is ruled by a Sunni-dominated autocratic monarchy that has shown no real intention to reform, despite a number 

of cosmetic initiatives. In 2011, the authorities used lethal force to 

suppress a largely peaceful pro-democracy movement which proved 

to be a turning point. King Hamad appointed an independent commission to look into human rights violations, and dutifully accepted 

all of its recommendations. But, little has been done to implement 

those recommendations. Efforts to restart a national dialogue have 

failed enough over the past year. Bahrain’s main opposition party 

has refused to participate in the national dialogue process to protest authorities prosecuting some of its senior members for exercising their right to free speech. 

More generally, Bahrain’s court convicts and imprisons peaceful 

dissenters. The trials we have been able to monitor have been exceptionally unfair. Here again, a global sanctioning regime like the 

Global Magnitsky bill—like the one the Global Magnitsky bill intends to authorize could help add general pressure for a more 

rights-respecting political environment, as it would provide the administration with the tools needed to show the opposition the 

United States has embraced their concerns, as well, beyond just 

the occasional release of a prisoner, which we saw last week and 

then again the re-arrest, despite the U.S. decision to lift arms restrictions. 

I think I will stop there. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Margon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SARAH MARGON

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, other members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify today. As a former Senate staffer—and a liaison 

to this committee in particular—it is a true honor to sit before you now. I would 

like to specifically thank Senator Cardin for his long-standing commitment to fighting corruption and addressing global human rights abuses—including but not limited to the introduction of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. 

Your support, Mr. Ranking Member, particularly in the face of such global tumult, 

is greatly appreciated. 

Indeed, the world is undergoing incredible turmoil, with grave implications for 

millions of people. In almost every country where the Arab Spring took root, it has 

been replaced by conflict and repression. ISIS and other lslamist extremists are 

committing mass atrocities and threatening civilians not only in the Middle East 

but also in Asia, Africa, and beyond. Even beyond ISIS, many governments have 

sought to respond to the very real danger of armed militancy with a myopic security 

response that ignores the importance of upholding fundamental rights. Legitimate 

counterterrorism measures are often coupled with an unprecedented crackdown on 

independent civil society and the media that receives little more than passing criticism from the United States and other democracies. Governments such as Bahrain 

and Ethiopia have thrown peaceful activists and human rights defenders in jail for 

being outspoken on human rights under the guise of fighting terrorism. Partnerships with security forces and governments known to be both corrupt and abusive— 

from Egypt to Afghanistan to Uganda—appear to be receiving less rather than more 

scrutiny from the United States. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

18 

Around the world, Human Rights Watch has documented how repressive government tactics often spark, or at least exacerbate, many of today’s most pressing security challenges. And yet, human rights defenders and others who expose and challenge these injustices risk harassment and attack while those who threaten them 

generally do so with impunity. It is with this framework in mind that today I would 

like to briefly discuss current human rights trends in three countries where a tool 

like the Global Magnitsky bill might be particularly valuable. 

IRAQ

More than 12 years after U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq, it has become quite clear 

that the country’s transition to a functioning and sustainable democracy built on the 

rule of law lies in tatters. Even before ISIS’ dramatic territorial gains more than 

a year ago, human rights conditions in the country were deteriorating. The rights 

of Iraq’s most vulnerable citizens, especially women, the Sunni minority, and detainees, have been regularly violated by the government with impunity. 

Before ISIS, Iraq grappled with a weak criminal justice system, plagued by corruption and political interference. Courts frequently based convictions on coerced 

confessions and trial proceedings that fell far short of international standards. 

Thousands of women, as well as many men, were detained without charge, and subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Even secret detention facilities in the government district came to light. 

At that time, the Iraqi Government was struggling to maintain security against 

terrorist bombings, and employed draconian and abusive tactics by heavy-handed 

security forces, increasingly under the political influence of former Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki, who also sponsored militias outside of the regular forces. Suicide 

attacks, car bombs, and assassinations increased again over the past few years, killing more than 12,000 people outside of combat zones in 2014 alone. The government 

responded with mass arbitrary arrests, torture of detainees, and convictions after 

unfair trials based on information provided by secret informers. 

ISIS’s takeover of massive swathes of Iraqi territory in June 2014 was a testament to the alienation of Sunni communities, as many welcomed ISIS fighters as 

‘‘liberators’’ from the sectarian oppression of government authorities. To put it simply, former Prime Minister Maliki’s unchecked anti-Sunni policies created fertile 

ground for ISIS to escalate the conflict, enlist several Sunni armed groups, and help 

spawn today’s crisis. 

Now, as ISIS seeks to expand its brutal control and the government responds with 

regular forces and abusive militias, civilians have become the targets of unlawful 

attacks and political repression by both sides. There is virtually no accountability 

for grave abuses. ISIS is abhorrently proud of its summary executions, systematic 

rape and subjugation of women. At the same time, the Iraqi criminal justice system 

has proved incapable of holding members of government forces and allied militias 

to account for extrajudicial executions, abductions, indiscriminate attacks and widespread and deliberate destruction of civilian property. 

A sanctions regime like the one the Global Magnitsky bill would create is certainly no panacea for the many challenges faced by Iraq but it would, as a starting 

point, send a clear signal that the United States is not open for business to persons 

responsible for serious human rights abuses or large-scale corruption. It also has the 

potential to spur greater domestic accountability for such abuses. If Prime Minister 

Al-Abadi is sincere about his commitment to create a more inclusive government, 

he should welcome the establishment of such a sanctions regime as a tool to help 

reinforce his goals. 

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan’s human rights record is nothing short of atrocious. Thousands of people are imprisoned on politically motivated charges, torture is endemic, and the 

authorities regularly go after civil society activists, opposition members, and journalists. Muslims and Christians who practice their religion outside strict state controls are persecuted and, despite some changes in 2013 due to outside pressure, the 

government still forces an estimated 2 million adults to harvest cotton every fall 

under draconian conditions. 

Now, Washington already has some of the tools it needs to encourage reform, but 

they have not been used in quite some time, despite a much-reduced need to rely 

on Tashkent for the transit of U.S. troop supplies out of Afghanistan. There is little 

factual evidence to support concerns that stronger criticism by the U.S. over rights 

will lead Uzbekistan to forge a stronger alliance with Russia. Some even argue that 

President Islam Karimov needs (and craves) Western support and legitimacy a great 

deal more than the West needs him. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

19 

When it comes to Uzbekistan, the Obama administration needs a fresh approach 

that leans more in the direction of ‘‘strategic pressure’’ instead of ‘‘strategic 

patience’’—mainly because there is no evidence that officials who oversee or engage 

in torture, forced labor, or the persecution of activists will change their behavior 

absent the prospect of serious political or economic consequences. Indeed, since 

2009—when the administration increased contacts and military cooperation with 

Tashkent—human rights concerns have gone from bad to worse. 

So the possibility of Uzbekistan officials facing a fair U.S.-based sanctions regime 

based on responsibility for human rights abuses and/or major graft presents an 

excellent, targeted opportunity to leverage change. With a new tool in the hands of 

U.S. diplomats and a greater potential for individual scrutiny, we might see the 

power of deterrence in action by stirring inaugural signs of change: just knowing 

that they could be banned from coming to the United States or from using its banking system could be enough to force an abusive official to think twice before acting. 

BAHRAIN

Over the last year, Bahrain’s main opposition party has refused to participate in 

the national dialogue process to protest authorities prosecuting some of its senior 

members for exercising their rights to free speech. In November the party also boycotted the elections to protest a manifestly unfair electoral system. This, along with 

the continued detention of 13 high-profile opposition leaders jailed solely on account 

of their exercise of their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, association, and 

expression has led to stalemate on the long-awaited national dialogue, which the 

authorities appear determined to undermine at every turn. More generally, Bahrain’s courts convict and imprison peaceful dissenters—the trials we have been able 

to monitor were without exception grossly unfair—and have yet to hold any senior 

officials accountable for torture and other serious rights violations. The high rate 

of conviction on vague terrorism charges and imposition of long prison sentences for 

peaceful criticism reflect the weakness of the justice system and its lack of independence. 

While the majority of Bahrainis are Shiite, the country is ruled by a Sunni-dominated, autocratic monarchy that has shown no real intention to reform, despite a 

number of cosmetic initiatives. In 2011, the authorities used lethal force to suppress 

a largely peaceful pro-democracy movement, which proved to be a turning point. 

While King Hamad appointed an independent commission to look into human rights 

violations and dutifully accepted all of its recommendations, little has been done to 

implement those recommendations. Efforts to restart a national dialogue between 

the government and opposition have failed, in large part because the key opposition 

leaders remain imprisoned. 

Notably, the last few weeks have seen a rather convulsive back and forth as the 

Bahraini authorities arrested, released, and then re-arrested some of these prominent detainees. At the same time, the Obama administration announced it was lifting arms restrictions to the Bahraini Defense Force—a change Bahraini authorities 

had long been pushing for—not only because of their participation in the anti-ISIS 

coalition but because they had ostensibly also taken ‘‘meaningful’’ steps at reform. 

There is little evidence to suggest that the Bahrain Government is committed to 

engaging in real reform, and the administration’s decision to restart military aid 

may well provide a disincentive and, in fact, encourage the Government of Bahrain 

to pursue the path of repression rather than that of accommodation. 

Once again, a global sanctioning regime like the one the Global Magnitsky bill 

intends to authorize could help add general pressure for a more rights-respecting 

political environment as it would provide the administration with the tools needed 

to show the opposition that the United States has embraced their concerns as well— 

beyond just the release of the occasional prisoner. Specifically, by denying visas and 

access to the U.S. banking system to members of the security forces and judicial system credibly linked to serious crimes such as torture, the United States would be 

reasserting its commitment to accountability and the rule of law in Bahrain—a key 

but very absent component of any meaningful path forward. 

CONCLUSION

As what feels like cataclysmic upheaval in nearly all corners of the world persists, 

it often seems like those who seek to uphold basic international norms and support 

fundamental freedoms are consistently at risk while autocratic governments get a 

free pass. Even as positive change seems increasingly hard to come by, such efforts 

are still worth pursuing. And that’s why passing the Global Magnitsky bill is so 

important. This bill does not sanction governments wholesale, cut off security 

assistance, or restrict economic cooperation. It is not designed to interrupt bilateral, 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

20 

government-to-government engagement—it is designed to take a tailored approach 

that creates a long overdue tool for the U.S. to easily go after abusive individuals. 

Honing in on corrupt and abusive officials makes it harder for authoritarian rulers, dictators, and kleptocrats to recruit and maintain a coterie of supporters. We 

have seen a return to this trend and so by removing the perks of crime, this bill— 

if it becomes law—would shine a light on those who commit such acts and hold 

them to account. In that, Mr. Chairman, there can be very little downside. 

I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Mark. Excuse me. Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF MARK LAGON, PRESIDENT, 

FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. LAGON. Mark is fine. 

Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin, thank you very much for inviting me back to testify. It is a pleasure. 

I would like to talk very simply about the two kinds of human 

rights questions that you have called upon us to look at, and a couple of canny sets of tools that could really deal with them: on the 

one hand, where governments do not protect the most vulnerable 

people, the scourge of human trafficking, and the area that Freedom House is more focused on, which is where repressive regimes 

repress and rob their citizens with corruption. There are canny 

tools that you have been working in the committee to advance Senator Corker’s legislation on an antitrafficking partnership fund, 

and Senator Cardin’s legislation on targeted sanctions. I think 

these are exactly the kind of canny tools we should use. 

I have a couple of overall messages. Human rights is not just 

about our values. But, corruption, repression, trafficking, these engage strategic and economic interests of the United States. We 

need American leadership globally, and not only as a beacon for 

human dignity, but to advance our economic and strategic interests 

in these areas. If you look at the way that General al-Sisi, since 

taking power, has instituted some of the harshest crackdowns that 

you have seen in modern Egyptian history, and the way that terrorism has actually spiked as a result, one sees that there are actually security interests bound up in urging changes for human 

rights—all the while, the United States giving massive military assistance to Egypt. 

And my second major message is, let us leverage the influence 

the United States has. Canny tools that maximize U.S. leverage do 

not cost much to the taxpayer and avoid harm to innocent people 

while putting pressure on those who need to change and to protect 

human rights are important. 

First, with respect to modern slavery, which the International 

Labor Organization, in a rather conservative estimate, says is at 

least 21 million people in the world, is a terrible problem for the 

most vulnerable groups. Labor trafficking victimizes the most people. Sex trafficking yields the most profits for traffickers on the 

backs of its victims. Let us not only look at human trafficking as 

a matter of dignity and freedom, although that is why I wake up 

in the morning and come to work. Businesses and economies are 

harmed by the very problems that human trafficking represents. 

Businesses’ value, their productivity, their reputations suffer when 

human trafficking is intermingled with their operations. Human 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

21 

trafficking is based on the antitheses of economic—the economic 

growth, prosperity, and entrepreneurship that we should be for. 

In particular, on the case of Malaysia, Freedom House supports 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to Senator Cardin and Senator Menendez, the administration has made some assurances that 

it will not go soft on countries that deserve a Tier 3 ranking. You 

really should watch, as a matter of oversight, Malaysia and Thailand in that respect. 

On human trafficking, Freedom House has endorsed Chairman 

Corker’s End Modern Slavery Initiative Act as exactly the kind of 

tool we should proceed with, leveraging taxpayer resources with 

the resources of other nations, corporations, and philanthropies to 

fight modern slavery. 

As for the larger questions of authoritarianism and corruption, 

they are intermingled. And, where people say that authoritarian 

rule brings about stability, they are wrong. Freedom House has 

documented that 90 percent of terrorist attacks in the world, and 

98 percent of terrorism fatalities, occur in not-free or partly free 

countries, as opposed to free democracies. We have an interest in 

more countries becoming democracies, for our counterterrorism policy. Corruption often fuels human rights abuses, because corrupt 

officials will go to greater and greater lengths to protect their own 

economic benefits and fight for staying in power. 

Freedom House has documented, in its Freedom in the World Report, two major trends, one that authoritarian rulers are using 

more and more harsh traditional tactics in places like Egypt, 

Rwanda, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, and Russia’s invasion of 

Crimea outside its borders. 

Secondly, our research at Freedom House indicates that there is 

a key relationship between human rights and terrorism. Repression 

breeds more terrorism, and counterterrorism is being used as an 

excuse by governments to impose their restrictions and repression 

on civil society for completely nonviolent, peaceful uses. A recent 

newly passed national security law in China is just such an act. 

Let me finish with a few brief further observations. 

In Iran and Cuba, the United States needs to leverage its diplomacy to look at human rights issues and not separate its diplomacy 

to either look, in the case of Iran, solely at the important issue of 

nuclear peace, or, in the case of Cuba, treating diplomacy as an end 

in itself. The United States decision to plow forward, full speed 

ahead, with a restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba just as 

100 peaceful activists were being detained sends troubling mixed 

messages. 

Let me end by an important word about an additional tool in the 

toolbox needed, besides diplomacy. The Global Magnitsky Human 

Rights Accountability Act is something that Freedom House has 

endorsed, strongly believes would be an important and effective 

tool by imposing visa bans and asset freezes on foreign officials responsible for either human rights abuses or corruption. 

Four reasons to back it. 

A visa ban would draw international attention to the individuals 

responsible and put authoritarian leaders in a no-win situation. 

They either protect the repugnant officials responsible for human 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

22 

rights abuses and corruption or they cut them loose and lose their 

own means for keeping power. 

Secondly, the act would impose tangible consequences so that 

perpetrators would be held to account. Those perpetrators might 

think twice if they are not able to leave their country for the 

United States or access funds in U.S. banks. 

Third, by targeting high-level corruption, the bill goes right after 

the Achilles heel of authoritarian regimes. If there are some days 

in which citizens of countries find human rights an abstraction, 

they will never find corruption abstraction. They always understand that, and they have widespread support for going after their 

leaders who are robbing them blind. 

And then, finally, the Global Magnitsky Act, by not targeting 

particular nations and allowing the executive branch and Congress 

with its referrals to have a targeted surgical approach, would allow 

sanctions to be applied to places like Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia so 

that you can deal with the larger economic and security interests 

and put pressure on those most responsible for corruption and 

human rights. 

So, in order to deal with the problem of human trafficking for the 

most vulnerable people not being protected by states, or the bigger 

problem that Freedom House focuses on, which is the repression of 

people and the robbery of people by autocratic governments, these 

kinds of tools, both Senator Corker’s bill on the Human Trafficking 

Fund and Senator Cardin’s bill on targeted sanctions, are exactly 

the kinds of lean, targeted tools that we should use. We should 

think of Sergei Magnitsky and how we ought to look out for those 

who are being squeezed by corruption and human-rights-offending 

officials, and put the squeeze on them. 

Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lagon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARK P. LAGON

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to testify before you on the current state of human rights 

around the world. 

Today, I will look at two kinds of human rights problems and two kinds of judicious policy tools to address them. The human rights problems are (1) human trafficking—when governments fail to protect the most vulnerable—and (2) a more central problem where unaccountable governments repress and rob their citizenry, the 

centerpiece of Freedom House’s research and programming. The prudent tools to 

leverage U.S. influence I want to talk about are (1) Senator Corker’s legislation for 

an antitrafficking partnership fund and (2) Senator Cardin’s legislation for targeted 

sanctions on corrupt and rights-abusing officials. 

I offer two simple messages: First, that addressing corruption, repression, and 

trafficking are about our tangible economic and strategic interests every bit as much 

as about our values. Unfortunately, the news is grim on repressive, unaccountable, 

corrupt governments around the world. The 2015 edition of ‘‘Freedom in the World,’’ 

Freedom House’s annual worldwide review of political and civil rights, found freedom in decline for the 9th straight year. The annual State Department Human 

Rights Reports—finally released after weeks of delay—bear this out. 

As President of Freedom House, I often hear objections that a multitude of human 

rights challenges globally are too ingrained for the United States to successfully 

affect or that there are already so many problems here at home we shouldn’t bother 

with the many challenges overseas. These arguments are short-sighted and illfounded. 

Decisive U.S. global leadership is still needed both to serve as a beacon for human 

dignity and freedom and to advance our interests. Especially given globalization, our 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

23 

strategic and economic interests are inextricably linked with the protection and promotion of human rights. Let’s take two of the toughest cases. It is estimated that $300 billion is lost per 

year in intellectual property theft, and China accounts for 70 percent of that loss.1

If Chinese authorities respected rule of law, nowhere near this level of IP theft, 

including from U.S. headquartered multinational corporations, would occur. Human 

rights has a direct bearing on U.S. security interests, too. In Egypt, terrorist attacks 

have soared since General al-Sisi took power, and he has instituted arguably the 

harshest crackdown in modern Egyptian history.2 Activists have been arbitrarily 

arrested, independent groups are being harassed and shut down, and dozens have 

disappeared over the last several months.3 That is while the U.S. continues to give 

massive military assistance to that regime. 

My second message is to encourage putting inexpensive, high-leverage, targeted 

tools in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox to advance those interests in human rights. 

There are tools that maximize U.S. leverage, will not cost the American taxpayer 

much, and avoid harm to innocent people and enterprises in the U.S. and globally. 

I’ll touch on ones the chairman and ranking member have been advocating. 

MODERN SLAVERY

In some countries, our foreign policy challenge is pushing governments to protect 

their most vulnerable populations. According to a conservative International Labor 

Organization estimate, human trafficking—aptly referred to as modern day slavery—victimizes some 21 million men, women, and children around the world 

through sexual and labor exploitation. While labor trafficking victimizes more people, sex trafficking yields more profits to the traffickers on the backs of its victims. 

Trafficking preys on the powerless and depends on corruption and weak rule of law 

in order to thrive. 

But it is not only human dignity and freedom that suffer from the impacts of trafficking. Businesses and economies are impacted, as well. Businesses’ value, productivity, and reputation suffer where gross exploitation of marginalized populations 

arise, so often facilitated by corruption. Economic growth, prosperity, entrepreneurship, and poverty alleviation benefit greatly from transparency, rule of law, predictability, and formal economic activity. Conversely, human trafficking is based on all 

the antitheses of these factors—not only dehumanizing its victims but undercutting 

the mutual interests of the U.S. and other nations in thriving markets grounded in 

access to justice for all. 

Freedom House supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the recent legislation to facilitate such trade deals. Senators Menendez and Cardin, among others, 

asked whether Tier 3 countries in the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report 

would be let into TPP. The executive branch must not send forward candidates for 

TPP who are in the lowest ranking in the TIP Report, about which it has given 

assurances to the Congress. In particular, Malaysia is a very problematic case with 

intermingled issues of corruption and lack of protections for marginalized and 

migrant populations, and should not be let off the hook of the intended ‘‘minimum 

standards’’ set out in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 

Freedom House has emphatically endorsed Chairman Corker’s End Modern Slavery Initiative Act (S. 553), which creates a grantmaking foundation to address global 

trafficking and is funded by leveraging taxpayer resources with those of other nations, corporations, and philanthropic foundations. If passed, this legislation will 

take a bold step forward in the fight against modern slavery and will enable U.S. 

foreign policy to more effectively pressure governments to protect their most vulnerable populations. It is exactly the kind of prudent, canny foreign policy tool we need, 

an idea I will return to. 

AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORRUPTION

Authoritarianism and the corruption that usually goes hand in hand with it also 

pose major challenges for human rights. Some erroneously believe authoritarian 

rule brings stability. In fact, the opposite is true. Repression breeds discontent, and 

a lack of democratic governance can create an enabling environment for terrorism. 

Freedom House analysis highlights how 90 percent of terrorist attacks and 98 percent of terrorism fatalities occur in Not Free and Partly Free countries, as opposed 

to Free democracies.4 Moreover, corruption often fuels human rights abuses, 

because corrupt officials will go to ever-greater lengths to hold onto power lest they 

lose their access to state resources. In addition to its well-known reports, much of 

what Freedom House does is civil-society capacity building partnerships. One important area of programming prepares journalists to uncover corruption and criminality, and withstand threats of violence, as Freedom House programs have done 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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in Ukraine, Moldova, and Mexico. And I know corruption in Moldova. In 2008, as 

antitrafficking ambassador, the office I directed saw and called out in the TIP 

Report how the head of a U.S.-funded antitrafficking interagency office in Moldova 

was complicit in trafficking. A Tier 3 ranking lit a fire under its leaders to clean 

up the problem. Freedom House research indicates Moldova still has a long way to 

go in fighting corruption and strengthening democratic governance.5

The 2015 ‘‘Freedom in the World’’ report has two overarching findings. First, 

Freedom House found a troubling increase in the use of aggressive tactics by 

authoritarian regimes worldwide and saw worrying backsliding in accountable governance of nations of regional and economic importance: Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, 

Thailand, Kenya, and Hungary. Our 2015 report found a more explicit rejection of 

democratic standards than previous years. Earlier, autocrats acknowledged international agreements and attempted to veil their undemocratic actions with quasidemocratic language—holding elections that were free but not fair, for example. 

Today, authoritarian rulers are turning to more aggressively antidemocratic behavior and harsher, more ‘‘traditional’’ tactics in places like Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 

and Vietnam; Azerbaijan’s crackdown on human rights defenders; and Russia’s 

invasion of Crimea. 

Second, the relationship of human rights to terrorism is crucial to an enlightened 

understanding of U.S. strategic interests. Again, repression amplifies the discontent 

fueling terrorism. And our annual report found a marked increase in authoritarian 

regimes using ‘‘counterterrorism’’ as an excuse to crack down on nonviolent dissent 

and repress minorities. In China, terrorism is invoked as an excuse to repress the 

Uighur ethnic minority, jailing anyone expressing dissent and bringing ethnically 

Han Chinese to populate Xinjiang. A newly passed ‘‘national security law’’ broadened the definition of what constitutes a threat to national security and has been 

used—as the State Department noted—‘‘as a legal facade to commit human rights 

abuses.’’ 6 Over the last week, more than 100 lawyers, activists, and other peaceful 

human rights defenders have been detained.7 So, too, even in strengthening a coalition of partners to fight ISIS as itself a threat to human rights, the U.S. Government should take care not to give such partners—like Bahrain and its big sibling 

Saudi Arabia—a pass to crack down on peaceful opposition and civil society. I wear 

a Freedom House wristband (purple like the Not Free nations on our Freedom in 

the World map) to recall Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, a journalist jailed in Bahrain since 

2011 in just such an overreach by an autocratic ‘‘partner.’’ 

Let me focus on cases Assistant Secretary Malinowski raised at the release of the 

annual Human Rights Report. In dealings with Iran, the United States should 

address the serious human rights concerns with at least the same energy as it did 

in negotiating a nuclear accord. The talks with Iran unfortunately coincided with 

a de-prioritization and de-linking of human rights from the global agenda, when 

they instead should have advanced the concerns that the Iranian people and the 

world share about the regime’s repression. Earlier this week, in spontaneous gatherings after the announcement of an agreement, Iranians reminded us of what those 

priorities were. They publicly chanted for the release of opposition leaders and declared that their next agreement should secure their civil rights. We must raise the 

cases of Americans detained in Iran and seek tangible progress on human rights 

and rule of law issues, including the hundreds of political prisoners, Iran’s staggeringly high execution rate, its repressive media and online environment, and its subjugation of women and religious minorities. 

In negotiations with Cuba, the United States must ensure that actual progress 

is made in moving the ball forward on human rights, civic space, and free elections. 

As in Iran, the yardstick of success for U.S.-Cuba policy is not merely the diplomacy 

in and of themselves—it is whether we use diplomatic relations to promote meaningful reforms and reduce cruel repression in Cuba. The United States decision to 

continue full speed ahead with the restoration of diplomatic relations—despite last 

week’s detention of more than 100 peaceful activists in Cuba 8—sends troublingly 

mixed messages about the importance of human rights and civil society for U.S. foreign policy. 

Diplomatic engagement, when leveraged rather than seen an end in itself, can 

serve as an important and powerful tool in our foreign policy tool box to address 

human rights. But, as the United States Senate well knows, there are times at 

which new tools are needed. 

Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act is just such a tool. The 

Global Magnitsky bill would build on current U.S. policy of condemning human 

rights abuses and supporting human rights defenders by imposing visa bans and 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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asset freezes on foreign officials responsible for gross human rights violations or 

large-scale corruption. 

Freedom House has endorsed the Global Magnitsky Act and believes it will be an 

important and effective foreign policy tool for several reasons: 

1. A visa ban would draw international attention to individuals responsible for 

human rights abuses and may constrain their ability to escape justice at home in 

the future by putting authoritarian rulers into a no-win situation: either they protect the most repugnant officials and thereby expose the cruelty of their regimes or 

they cut loose those officials who do their dirty work, undermining their ability to 

stay in power through any means. 

2. The Global Magntisky Act imposes tangible consequences—something that may 

deter future human rights abuses. Perpetrators of human rights abuses usually are 

shielded by their governments and expect to evade justice. Some foreign officials 

may think twice about cracking down on opposition or civil society activists if they 

are unable to leave their country for the United States or access funds in U.S. bank 

accounts. An escape route to the United States matters a great deal to officials in 

some countries, particularly in the Americas. 

3. It targets high-level corruption—the Achilles heel of authoritarian regimes. 

While human rights may seem to many ordinary citizens as a bit removed from 

their daily life, the injustice of high-level corruption is widely understood, and 

addressing it is widely supported by the public. 

4. No country would be singled out. While comprehensive sanctions serve as an 

important and appropriate foreign policy tool in acute cases, the Global Magnitsky 

Act would successfully target abusers without harming average citizens. It could 

apply to countries like Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia that tend to escape criticism for 

their human rights abuses because of U.S. economic or security interests (although 

it would depend to a significant degree on congressional referrals for effective implementation). 

CONCLUSION

To sum up, on the one hand, human trafficking victimizes the most vulnerable— 

particularly women, children, minorities, and innocent migrants. The End Modern 

Slavery Initiative Act leverages U.S. resources with partner funders and partner 

implementers to give those marginalized people basic access to justice. 

On the other hand, the way in which more and more governments are repressing 

civil society and robbing their citizens with systematic corruption is Freedom 

House’s major analytical finding. We document how those human rights abuses are 

more brazen and directly coercive; fuel terrorism; and use counterterrorism as the 

pretext to silence, detain, torture, and kill nonviolent dissenting voices. The State 

Department Human Rights Report offers copious additional evidence. The global 

targeted sanctions legislation named after a lawyer who was abused and killed in 

a Russia jail, Sergei Magnitsky, is just the kind of tool we need—maximizing pressure on those who repress and rob, and minimizing collateral damage to others. 

The U.S. has the smarts and more than the modest resources needed to apply 

these canny policy tools to move the needle back in the other direction, toward more 

global freedom. The U.S. Congress should swiftly pass both the End Modern Slavery 

Initiative Act and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to promote not just our values but our strategic and economic interests by bolstering 

human rights. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1 ‘‘The IP Commission Report,’’ The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, May 2013. 2Michele Dunne and Robert Kagan, ‘‘Obama Embraces the Nixon Doctrine in Egypt,’’ The 

Washington Post, April 3, 2015. 3Sarah El Deeb, ‘‘Egyptian security agencies increasingly detaining activists in secret, rights 

lawyers say,’’ U.S. News and World Report, June 17, 2015. 4 Bret Nelson and Tyler Roylance, ‘‘Terrorism Remains Rare in Democracies,’’ Freedom House 

(blog), January 9, 2015. 5 Vytis Jurkonis, ‘‘With Corrupt Elites at the Helm, Moldova Drifts Off Course,’’ Freedom 

House (blog), June 30, 2015. 6 ‘‘U.S. Condemns Detention of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ U.S. Department of State 

(press release), July 12, 2015. 7 Ivan Watson and Steven Jiang, ‘‘Scores of rights lawyers arrested after nationwide swoop 

in China,’’ CNN, July 14, 2015. 8 ‘‘U.S. raises concern over detention of 100 activists in Cuba,’’ Reuters, July 7, 2015. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both very much. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

26 

Just to not spend a great deal of time on this, Dr. Lagon, but you 

mentioned Iran and Cuba. I mean, do you have any sense, at 

present, that we have put aside human rights issues in Cuba or 

Iran in pursuing other agreements—or are you just raising that 

issue to ensure that we do not? 

Dr. LAGON. Well, you know, I have huge regard for Assistant 

Secretary Malinowski. He is a longtime friend. I am sure he is 

pushing these issues. But, it is quite clear that, on the Iran matter, 

there has been a complete de-linkage with human rights. When you 

look, this week, and people going into the streets and celebrating 

the comprehensive sanctions being removed with the nuclear deal, 

some of those people said, ‘‘Now we need an agreement for our civil 

rights.’’ But, the United States and the international community 

should be on the side of diplomacy applied to human rights as well 

as nuclear matters. 

On Cuba, we should just be careful that diplomacy does not become an end in itself. And it is clear the Cuban regime knew what 

it was doing in locking up 100 people at exactly the time the diplomatic relations were being put in place. Let us use the diplomacy 

to fight for reform. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to mention something about that, 

Miss Margon? 

Ms. MARGON. Sure. I was just going to say, in the case of Cuba, 

I think, actually, by changing and lifting the embargo, what the administration has done is opened up a real opportunity to work with 

the Latin American countries on human rights in Cuba, which has 

long been missing, given their stance on the embargo. 

In the case of Iran, there is obviously a lot to do, but there is 

potentially a new opening, if we can move forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you both. I wonder if you would 

elaborate a little bit on the issue of slavery—modern slavery and 

its connection to really increasing criminal justice systems’ ability 

to deal with that. What we have found and what we believe to be 

the case is that modern slavery is a crime of convenience, that, 

since no one is really pursuing—since the poor do not have access 

to criminal justice the way the elite do, in essence small-business 

people take advantage of it, and there is no price to pay. But, when 

there is a price to pay, when you actually have a system that fights 

against that and arrests people, all of a sudden it diminishes greatly. And I wonder if either of you might want to respond to that. 

Dr. LAGON. Well, if I might begin. 

I entirely agree with the premise, Senator Corker, that you laid 

out in your opening statement, that this about the absence of rule 

of law. There are two basic phenomena here. There are whole 

groups of people—women, minorities, Dalits in India, some innocent migrants who go and work as guest workers in places—that 

are not accorded access to justice. And so, what happens is that the 

reward is much higher than the risk for the traffickers. And so, 

both as a human rights matter and as a law enforcement matter, 

you need to have those rights count. You know, for the woman who 

is a domestic servant in Kuwait and who is abused both because 

she is a woman and because she is a foreign national from the 

Philippines or Nepal, she has to be treated like a real human 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

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being. And those who are responsible for holding her passport for— 

or for beating her, they need to be held to account. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you want to respond? Very good. 

I think, because of the timing, I am going to stop my questioning. 

I may interject later. I think the two of you have just voted. Is that 

correct? I am going to step and go vote, and, if it is okay, would 

you become chairman of the committee for a while? Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. All right, let me ask unanimous 

consent now. [Laughter.] 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your confidence. 

I regret—this is a footnote—that I missed Secretary Malinowski. 

I would like to get an answer from him about the TIP report. And 

I would also—would have asked him how 2,822 arbitrary politically 

motivated arrests in Cuba during the first 7 months of this year 

alone is an indicator that we are going to be headed in the right 

direction. Pretty amazing to me. It is pretty amazing to me that, 

when our colleagues in the Senate go to visit in Cuba, they do not 

visit with human rights activists, political dissidents, independent 

journalists, because, if they do, they get barred from a government 

meeting. We have got to break that idea, because, if, globally, the 

message we send is that, in order to meet the government officials 

of a country, that we cannot meet with human rights activists, political dissidents, independent journalists in China, in Malaysia, 

and any other place in the world, that will be a sad state of affairs 

for the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, let me start off by thanking Human Rights 

Watch, particularly your colleagues who do the hard work every 

day on behalf of trafficking victims around the world, for contributing your experience and expertise to our efforts. And before I proceed with some questions, I would like to enter a couple of documents for the record. And I am sure the chairman would not mind. 

The first is a letter I sent yesterday to Secretary of State Kerry, 

along with 18 of my colleagues—and I understand a similar letter 

in the House has nearly 130 signatures—expressing our concern 

about reports of a possible unwarranted upgrade of Malaysia in 

this year’s long-delayed Trafficking in Persons report. And the 

other document I would like to submit in the record is a piece from 

yesterday’s Hill by David Abramowitz, the vice president of Humanity United, on the same topic. 

And, without objection, it is so ordered. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The letter and Hill article mentioned above can 

be found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at the end of this hearing.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Ambassador, I am glad you are here 

today. Your experience as our lead diplomat on this issue can help 

us get some perspective on what is going on right now. The 2015 

TIP report, which we have still not seen, will have the latest release date ever. So, let me ask you. What is the normal reporting 

period covered by a TIP report? 

Dr. LAGON. The TIP report covers from March to March and 

comes out, typically, in June. When this committee confirmed me 

as the TIP Ambassador, I had to get on with the job 10 days later, 

because that is when it was supposed to come out, by mid-June. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

28 

It is unfortunate to leave an important job vacant, similar to what 

occurred with the Ambassador for International Religious Freedom 

for a while. I am very glad to finally see a nomination seems to be 

moving forward. But, in any case, the report really works. You 

know, it propels governments to try and change their laws. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes, well, I certainly appreciate your service 

in your previous iteration, and now, I am sure, with your present 

leadership. It will continue to be important. 

Now, I understand that it is not unprecedented for some latebreaking information after the closure of a reporting period that we 

just describe has been included, but, to your knowledge, have 

events or actions taken in June or July of a year ever affected a 

country’s ranking? 

Dr. LAGON. No. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Was it your personal experience, when it 

comes to external pressure—did you have external pressure to get 

to the right answer on a country’s ranking because of other diplomatic or security concerns? 

Dr. LAGON. There is always a pulling and hauling at the State 

Department between—typically, between the TIP office and the regional bureaus, where regional bureaus are raising other equities— 

security interests, counterterrorism issues, energy access, commercial concerns. In general, the Department has come out in the right 

place refereeing between those interests. I saw it during my tenure. 

But, I really commend you—and before you walked in the room, I 

commended you and Senator Cardin—for raising, in the context of 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, countries like Malaysia—and, for 

that matter, Thailand—who would be affected under the TPP. They 

should not be shielded from the basic minimum standards set out 

in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, as you know, my amendment prohibits 

fast track for Tier 3 human trafficking countries, signed into law 

by President Obama as part of the Trade Promotion Authority. In 

your view, is that type of action helpful in combating human trafficking? 

Dr. LAGON. Well, I think that you need to protect the integrity 

of the TIP report. It is clear that Tier 3 rankings, whether they involve sanctions or just the stigma of a Tier 3 ranking, work. And 

particularly where the United States has a relationship on other 

grounds, on strategic and economic grounds, countries have responded to that. Allies of the United States, like Israel and Turkey 

in earlier eras, before I even came into the trafficking position, 

Cambodia—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, if—— 

Dr. LAGON [continuing]. Facing the threat of Tier 3 or staying on 

Tier 3—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, if the possibility of being on Tier 3 of the 

TIP report was an incentivizing factor to change your actions and 

move into action, pass the appropriate laws, and whatnot, would it 

not even be a greater incentivizer that if, in addition to being on 

Tier 3 on the TIP report, you get—cannot get preferential access 

to U.S. markets? 

Dr. LAGON. Well, I think that, you know, it cuts against the idea 

of using the leverage. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

29 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. It’s—— 

Dr. LAGON. I think it is unfortunate that Tier 3 countries do not 

get the economic sanctions that are intended for them, and that is 

waived, oftentimes, but it is really important to put that—more 

stigma on—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I would ask you and Miss Margon, 

who—I do not want you to feel, like, left out, here, after complementing your organization’s great work—if, in fact—and I hope 

this is not the case, because I have seen nothing for Malaysia to 

move from Tier 3 to Tier 2—but, if, in fact, that was the case, what 

would you say about such an action? 

Ms. MARGON. Thank you, Senator Menendez. And thank you for 

your leadership on this. We have really enjoyed working with you. 

We also hope it is certainly not the case, but we understand a final, 

final decision may not have yet been made. We remain hopeful. 

But, if, in fact, a decision has been made, we would say that it 

seems very likely that it would be political interference to move it 

up. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And would it not have—my final question 

and then I will turn to Senator Kaine—would it not have the consequence—beyond Malaysia, that it would be political interference—would it not have the consequence of undermining the veracity of the TIP report in a way that other countries would say, 

‘‘Well, if it is—if I am important enough to the United States for 

trade or for some other reason, then I do not have to really live up 

to worrying about if I am on Tier 3 or not’’? 

Ms. MARGON. I think it certainly undermines the TIP report. It 

sends a poor message to other countries that may be sanctioned or 

on the Tier 3 list. It also undermines the presidentially stated goals 

of the TPP, in terms of moving those countries in Asia into a better 

place. And that is part of the longer term vision that we would like 

to see by having Malaysia make the required changes before it is 

moved up. 

Dr. LAGON. I would just—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. 

Dr. LAGON [continuing]. Add one thing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. 

Dr. LAGON. You know, the United States has been very comfortable putting security allies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—Kuwait, a country that we marshaled our military forces to liberate— 

on Tier 3, to call it like it is. I would like to see us even go farther 

on the broader human rights front and press those nations to reform. It is in their interests and in our security interests, as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I agree with you. 

And the last point I will make is that, beyond the TIP issue, if 

you start political maneuvering for the purposes of accomplishing 

a goal, then, in addition to the human rights and trafficking question, you would have to worry about labor rights and environmental issues that we are all concerned about in trade agreements, 

and saying, ‘‘Will you manipulate those in order to meet the standard?’’ 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

And thanks, to the witnesses. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

30 

Just a couple of items. First, Dr. Lagon, I want to ask about the 

Americas. Your Freedom in the World Report from 2015 lists two 

pretty important American partners, Mexico and Colombia, as partly free. And I am interested in having you elaborate on that and 

sort of give me the directional arrow, sort of partly free and improving, or partly free and degrading. 

Dr. LAGON. Well, you know, Freedom House is proud of trying to 

call it like it is. And, while it is not the State Department, it is 

great that the reports do get the attention of the officials of other 

governments, I have learned in my 6-months tenure from the number of diplomats and officials I have visited. It is almost as many 

as when I was the TIP Ambassador. 

Colombia is an important partner of the United States, and it 

has much to admire, but there are serious problems. Our colleagues at Transparency International indicate that it is number 

94 out of 175 on the—on its Corruption Perceptions Index. There 

is—you know, the military still operates with relatively limited civilian oversight. There have been soldiers, in the number of some 

700, who have been convicted for crimes, but very few high-ranking 

officers who have been. So, you know, even with our allies, we really need to look at the problems. They are right in the middle of the 

scale from 1 to 7 on both political rights and civil liberties. 

Now, Mexico, we are very invested in at Freedom House. It may 

not be widely known, but our reports are most famous, but our programmatic work with civil society partners and governments 

around the world is actually the bulk of what we do. And we have 

a program in Mexico. We work with authorities to try and protect 

journalists from violence. That really captures the problem in Mexico, where there is the structure of democracy, but criminality, corruption, violence are so suffusing the system that, for instance, 

journalists cannot be assured to have access to parts of the country 

to cover questions of criminality, drug trafficking, and so on. And 

we are working on that. 

Mexico is one of the top legislative priorities of Freedom House. 

It is—it perfectly captures the broad theme of my opening statement, which is that our interests and our values go together, and 

we need to work on the governance and human rights problems in 

Mexico, because, in fact, issues of immigration, drug trafficking, 

human trafficking, that are interests of the United States, are 

bound up in that. 

Senator KAINE. Is the violence that journalists experience in 

Mexico—is it pretty variable around the country, depending upon 

which state we are talking about? 

Dr. LAGON. Yes, it is. It is. 

Senator KAINE. So, different states have done a better job of trying to tackle some of these transparency and violence issues? 

Dr. LAGON. We had a retreat of Freedom House’s—all of Freedom 

House’s staff last week, and I had dinner late last week with the 

director of our Mexico office. She was telling me about that variation. It is not just where you would expect it to be, but, you know, 

certain areas where you see the maximum trafficking, border regions with Central America, particularly problematic. 

Senator KAINE. From Freedom House’s perspective, the President 

has made, in his budget proposal, a proposed investment in the 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

31 

three countries in the northern triangle in Central America—Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras. They all have very serious human 

rights challenges. As we contemplate an investment of that magnitude, what are some of the things that, you know, you would 

hope some of those dollars would be devoted to, to try to improve 

the human and civil rights situations in those countries? 

Dr. LAGON. Well, I think—you know, honestly, we—it is a bargain to invest in civil society to be able to speak up for their rights, 

to know how they can get access to the justice system. Creating a 

situation in which journalists feel safe to be able to cover corruption, cover violence—I mean, it is really striking how there are 

more people who are dying in Central America for criminal violence 

than one saw during the civil wars towards the end of the cold war. 

It—so, that investment would be a high priority. 

It is not as if the United States has not invested money in these 

countries, in its past. It is what we have been investing it in. 

Senator KAINE. I lived in Honduras during that, kind of, cold 

war, civil war period in the 1980s, and it really grieves me to see 

a nation that is actually more violent with a, quote, ‘‘democratic 

government’’ than it was under a military dictatorship, where the 

oppression was very widespread, but the murder rate was dramatically lower. Really grieve for folks living in the region for that. 

Ms. Margon, thank you for Human Rights Watch’s help. I recently did a CODEL to assess the war against ISIL in Iraq and 

also in northern Syria, visiting Gaziantep, Turkey. And you were 

helpful to my team, in terms of understanding some of the human 

rights issues in Turkey, Kuwait, Iraq, and Syria. Wanted to ask 

you one question dealing with that part of the world. Human 

Rights Watch has indicated that the Kurdish-armed group that 

controls much of northern Syria, they have achieved some significant battlefield success, with the United States help, against 

ISIL—that is a positive—but that they are having continuing challenges in not meeting their obligations to demobilize youth soldiers, 

those under age 18. How prevalent is this problem? Is it limited 

just to Kurdish forces in northern Syria? Does it flow over into the 

Kurdistan area in Iraq? Talk about that a little bit. 

Ms. MARGON. Thank you. I hope it was a good trip. It was certainly a significant undertaking during a short few days. 

The Kurdish troops in Syria have actually tried, from a lot of 

what my researchers have told me—in fact, one came back from a 

recent trip—they have acknowledged that they have this problem, 

and have tried to work with it. It is obviously a complicated issue 

to demobilize children. And when you are in the middle of a crisis, 

it is more difficult. But, I do think that there is some commitment 

to do it. We obviously found that they have not gone as far as they 

said they would. And so, we are continuing to press them. 

The problem of child soldiers in that region is, across the board, 

rampant. I was in Iraq last fall, and did not see any problem with 

the Kurdish troops from the KRG. That was not something—in 

fact, I saw—what I saw there was very well-behaved, very disciplined soldiers, and commanders who were deeply upset by what 

they are seeing with the Shia militias, and were not at all shy to 

talk about it. So, that I did not see in any way—— 

Senator KAINE. Good. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

32 

Ms. MARGON [continuing]. In the KRG. 

But, it is something we are working with. And we are pleased 

that the YPG is open go to working on it and trying to move to a 

better place. That is, for us, a very good sign, as opposed to immediately denying it and rejecting that there is a problem. 

Senator KAINE. Yes. 

And if I could ask one more question. I am right at the end of 

my time. 

Interested in each of your thoughts, or either of your thoughts, 

about the situation with the press in Egypt. You know, another relationship that has been a strong partnership, not without tension, 

not without challenges—I was in Egypt a little bit over a year ago 

with Senator King at a propitious moment, in terms of the trial of 

various al-Jazeera and other journalists, and tried to have a conversation with then-General Sisi, who was not yet President, but 

just about how difficult it is for the United States to understand 

trials and prosecutions and imprisonments of journalists. Our culture just makes that so hard to give any deference to. Talk a little 

bit about how that has gone. And is it trending the right way or 

the wrong way? Press freedom. 

Ms. MARGON. Do you want to start on that or—— 

Dr. LAGON. Sure. 

Ms. MARGON. Okay. 

Dr. LAGON. The wrong way. [Laughter.] 

And Freedom House is really concerned about the direction 

things are going, under al-Sisi. And, frankly, concerned about the 

continuation of U.S. military assistance and general assistance at 

the level it is at. Military authorities have shut down virtually all 

opposition media outlets following the coup. And it was a coup. And 

it leaves state media and those private outlets that are openly promilitary and pro-al-Sisi the ones that have a voice. So, it—you 

know, and part of our research is focused on freedom of the press. 

We have a dedicated report on that we have put out for 35 years. 

The situation—the arrow is going down. 

Ms. MARGON. I would echo that. I think what we are seeing is 

a crackdown, not just against Islamic extremists and the Muslim 

Brotherhood under the guise of stability and security, but a crackdown against activists, independent thinkers, dissent, and independent media in a way that is actually reversing what the stated 

goals of the Egyptian president are. We are seeing a rise in attacks 

in Egypt and a rise in repression. The two parallel tracks are not 

going to get that country where it needs to be. And I would say 

that the administration has not taken a strong enough stance on 

that government. They may be a purported important partner in 

the fight against ISIS, but pushing issues of independent press, activists, and independent thought to the side, and increasing their 

repressive legislation, including laws that crack down very severely 

on NGOs and independent groups, is an unacceptable way forward. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, to both of you. 

I will hand it back to you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Sure. 

Well, Senator Kaine, thank you for the question on Egypt. There 

is a scheduled, not yet date-specific, fall meeting, at the ministerial 

level, with Egypt, and we are weighing in that human rights be 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

33 

part of that strategic dialogue. So, I appreciate you raising the 

issue, and the response, because there is great concern as to the 

direction of Egypt. 

Let me thank both of you for your incredible work and support 

on bringing together workable strategies to advance human rights 

globally. And I thank you for your testimony. 

Let me just highlight an opportunity we have in regards to using 

a tool like the TIP report, but instead for corruption. This committee, in its work on the State Department Authorization Act, 

moved in the direction to require the State Department to assess 

the status of human rights and anticorruption issues in every country in the world, similar to what we do in the Trafficking in Persons report. It is a first step. The Trafficking in Persons report is 

well established, it has consequences depending which tier you are 

on. We are not there yet on corruption, and we need to work on 

that. 

So, I would just urge you all to work with us as we try to put 

greater emphasis in all of our foreign policy deliberations on the 

anticorruption agenda. We have done that with trafficking. We 

truly have. Witness the debate you had with Senator Menendez on 

whether we can move forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership 

with Malaysia. There should be consequences, and there should be 

consequences for countries that do not meet established standards 

for dealing with corruption and are not taking steps to counter 

that. And we should be able to develop that while working with 

groups such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. So, I 

just urge you to deal with that. 

Let me ask you one question, if I might, about China. China’s in 

the news a great deal. They are certainly watching what we are 

doing on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The maritime security 

issues are of great concern. They just participated with us on the 

Iranian negotiations. And we have regular strategic and economic 

dialogue with China where human rights concerns are raised. In 

fact, the seventh dialogue was just concluded. And, at just about 

the same time, the Chinese authorities detained and interrogated 

over 100 human rights lawyers and activists all across China. And 

the more and more reports that I am getting, it looks like China, 

that everyone says is on this great path of liberalization and great 

path of human rights, does not look like they are making too much 

progress today. 

Do we need to be more aggressive? Are the tools adequate for us 

to help the advancement of human rights in China? What else 

would you suggest? 

Dr. LAGON. You first. 

Ms. MARGON. Thanks, Mark. 

Thank you, Senator, for that question. We would agree with you, 

China is not moving in the right direction, in terms of liberalization on human rights issues and the rule of law. In fact, it is very 

concerning to see where China is going. 

We understand that human rights issues may have been raised 

at the recent dialogue. Assistant Secretary Malinowski said as 

much. But, the problem is, what we are seeing is that it is raised, 

there is no followup, and it is often not raised publicly. So, I have 

a couple of suggestions on China, but I also think that, if really imFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

34 

plemented, a tool like the Global Magnitsky bill could be a very effective tool. And ostensibly, the Chinese President should welcome 

a tool like that, given his commitment to root out corruption, as 

well. 

Briefly, I think the three things that would be helpful to see 

more of from the administration on China would include speaking 

publicly about the individual cases of detained and attacked activists at the very highest level and across the entire U.S. Government. This happens sometimes, but not consistently. And, from 

what we can tell, it is what most effectively challenges, and likely 

changes, the calculations of senior officials. It does not cost anything and it would go a long way. We hear it, time and time again, 

from activists and the families of activists and victims. 

The second is to visibly reach out to people outside the government. I think it was Senator Menendez who mentioned the importance of U.S. Government officials seeing civil society and others. 

And when the United States goes to China, this is particularly important as a show of solidarity. Obviously, their security would 

need to be checked to make sure it would not put them in any danger. But, that would also be very important to do regularly. 

And then, finally, given the horrific developments over the last 

week or so, we would also suggest that the human rights and 

counterterrorism dialogues—I think they are expected in August— 

be postponed. 

So, I will stop there. Thanks. 

Dr. LAGON. Well, I think, you know, the detention of 100 human 

rights leaders and activists shows exactly how much fear the Chinese leadership has and—when it is about to enter a dialogue—you 

know, strategic economic dialogue with the United States—none, 

and that we really do need to amp up that emphasis on human 

rights. And it does need to be public. 

We, at Freedom House, put out a report, at the beginning of the 

year, called the ‘‘Politburo’s Predicament,’’ that looks at the style 

and content of the leadership under Xi Jinping. It is getting markedly worse, let us be clear. There is more centralized power in an 

individual’s hands with Xi than anyone since Deng. And we look 

at 17 different groups, sectors, faith groups in Chinese society, and 

a good number of those are facing marked increased pressure. 

Anticorruption campaigns, which are seen as the sort of centerpiece of Xi’s rule, are perfect manifestation of ‘‘rule by law’’ rather 

than ‘‘rule of law.’’ Who is getting targeted for corruption? Those 

people who are convenient to Xi and his inner circle to eliminate. 

And people who are useful to him are being allowed to live high 

on the hog on the corruption they have. This is a perfect place to 

use a Global Magnitsky sanctions bill. It is sort of accepted, among 

legislators, executive branch officials, business leaders, that we will 

never have comprehensive sanctions on China. But, this would be 

a great way to highlight corruption and those who are responsible 

for the most heinous human rights abuses, and put the Chinese 

leadership in an even more precarious position in its high-wire act, 

as society would see what it is actually doing to them, in repressing 

and robbing them. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

35 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me thank you both for your testimonies and for those suggestions. And I know our committee is 

going to continue to be very aggressive. 

The record will remain open until the close of business on Monday. 

And, with that, the committee will stand adjourned. Thank you 

both. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DR. MARK LAGON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

GLOBAL MAGNITSKY

Question. What would the policy and practical implications of a mandatory Global 

Magnitsky sanctions regime be? 

Answer. The President would have an effective, targeted foreign policy tool at his 

disposal to constrain human rights abusers and grossly corrupt officials without the 

need to implement broad-based sanctions that can be difficult to pass and can at 

times unintentionally harm innocent civilians. We know these types of targeted 

sanctions work—whereby Russia and Belarus are good examples—and are an effective method of protecting and promoting human rights by holding those most 

responsible to account. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Question. Colombia: Colombia is our ally and has made real progress on human 

rights. A recent detailed report states that between 2002 and 2008, army brigades 

across Colombia routinely executed civilians under pressure from superiors to show 

‘‘positive’’ results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas. While rank 

and file have been prosecuted and convicted, the report asserts that senior officers 

knew about and condoned the killings through a system of monetary and other compensation to soldiers for verified killings. The report says that no senior officer has 

ever been investigated. 

♦ What can you tell the committee about this matter? 

Answer. In Colombia, preserving rule of law and prosecuting crimes remains a 

serious challenge, and the individuals responsible for these killings should be held 

accountable. It is fairly widely known that members of both the military and police 

carried out killings of civilians with near-complete impunity, rationalized by some 

authorities due to similar actions taken by FARC and by paramilitary groups. The 

Colombian Government must dedicate more resources to its victims unit to make 

the Victims Law and its accompanying commitments a reality. This effort should 

include reparations for victims of attacks carried out not only by nonstate actors but 

also by state officials. The government must also dedicate more resources to the 

public prosecutor’s office at the federal and state levels so that past and current 

crimes can be seriously investigated and prosecuted. 

ASIA

Question. Vietnam: I remain troubled by reports that the administration may consider fully lifting the lethal military equipment sales ban, amidst intense lobbying 

on the part of Vietnam, including during the General Secretary’s recent visit. 

♦ Can you comment on these reports? 

Answer. There is a renewed effort to fully lift the ban on arms sales to Vietnam 

after Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter visited the country to meet with government officials this summer. The administration partially lifted a 40-year ban on arm 

sales last year as a way to counteract China’s expansionist efforts in the South 

China Sea. Freedom House is second to none in its concern about China’s human 

rights abuses within its borders and the pernicious model of illiberal rule it offers 

regionally and globally. Moreover, U.S. efforts with partners to stem China’s aggressive moves beyond its borders in the South China Sea are very sound. Yet fully lifting the ban on arms sales sends the wrong message to the Communist Party of VietFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

36 

nam: that the U.S. is willing to overlook the increasing repression under a single 

party authoritarian regime. 

Question. What are the specific benchmarks Vietnam must achieve in order for 

the administration to fully lift the lethal military equipment sales ban? 

Answer. Both Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter noted that progress on 

human rights issues is important to expanding the military partnership between the 

two countries. State Department officials told reporters during Secretary Kerry’s 

recent trip that the ban would not be eased further without progress on human 

rights. Some steps have been made over the past year, but there still is significant 

room for improvement. The United States should push for reversal of the increased 

crackdown on freedom of expression and Internet, for lifting the restrictions on religious freedom, and for the release of all prisoners of conscience before agreeing to 

sell arms to Vietnam. 

Vietnam is rated ‘‘Not Free’’ in Freedom in the World 2015. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. What would the policy and practical implications of a mandatory Global 

Magnitsky sanctions regime be? 

Answer. First, I want to emphasize that we share the goals behind the Global 

Magnitsky legislation. Combating corruption and human rights violations worldwide 

are key priorities for the administration. 

With regard to policy implications, we believe the objectives of the visa provisions 

included in the Global Magnitsky legislation are already accomplished through 

other authorities. The administration enforces a global policy to deny entry to those 

who commit serious human rights violations through enforcement of the 2011 Presidential Proclamation 8697, and is working to implement section 7031(c) of the FY 

2015 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which renders ineligible those officials involved in gross violations of 

human rights. Additionally, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) already 

includes ineligibilities that apply to those who have engaged in torture, extrajudicial 

killings, genocide, particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and the use or 

recruitment of child soldiers, among others. 

The Global Magnitsky legislation also makes public corruption an independent 

ground for ineligibility, which means it also duplicates existing sanctions under the 

2004 President Proclamation 7750 and the anticorruption provisions of section 

7031(c) of the FY 2015 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, each of which is being actively utilized by the 

Department. 

On economic sanctions, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(IEEPA) provides broad authority to impose sanctions in situations where the President has declared a national emergency due to an unusual and extraordinary threat 

to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. 

The reporting requirements in section (4) of the Global Magnitsky legislation 

could detract from the multilateral frameworks we have set up around the world 

to carry forward our overall international anticorruption policy, including those multilateral frameworks through which we are seeking to convince other governments 

to adopt and apply similar visa restrictions. This successful policy has moved us 

over the past 15 years from unilateral accusations to meaningful peer review processes and increasing cooperation and coordination on law enforcement, asset recovery, and visa sanctions action. 

In terms of practical implications, the mandatory Global Magnitsky bill does not 

provide additional resources for implementation. We know from the enforcement of 

similar human rights grounds that the investigations and examinations of credibility required under such an act would be fact-intensive and take time to develop. 

Many of our embassies are small, with only one or two reporting officers. Their ability to advance U.S. Government priorities would be significantly reduced if they 

were required to research, investigate, analyze, and report on cases that may not 

meet significant thresholds. 

In terms of domestic staffing resources, based on the 2012 Senate version of the 

bill, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor alone previously estimated 

it would need seven additional full-time equivalent (FTE) employees (one FTE per 

region and one supervisor) to cover the additional workload related to a mandatory 

human rights prong. When last reviewed in March 2012, the cost of seven FTE positions at FY 2016 levels was $1,629,000 per fiscal year. While the Bureau for InterFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

37 

national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has not estimated the staffing required to cover the additional workload related to the bill’s corruption prong, it is 

likely to be substantial. Based on the additional workload, the Department anticipates that it would need significant additional staffing increases across the Department, including in regional bureaus, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Office of the Legal 

Advisor and other functional bureaus to meet the requirements of the bill adequately. 

The State Department notes that the Senate version provides flexibility for targeted implementation and more importantly that it provides a permissive authority 

to apply sanctions. This approach would significantly ameliorate the resource and 

staffing implications associated with a mandatory sanctions regime. We further note 

that the House version does not incorporate this needed provision. Were the House 

bill to be enacted, the impacts on resources and staffing within the Department 

would be far greater as set forth above. 

Question. Colombia.—Colombia is our ally and has made real progress on human 

rights. A recent detailed report states that between 2002 and 2008, army brigades 

across Colombia routinely executed civilians under pressure from superiors to show 

‘‘positive’’ results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas. While rank 

and file have been prosecuted and convicted, the report asserts that senior officers 

knew about and condoned the killings through a system of monetary and other compensation to soldiers for verified killings. The report says that no senior officer has 

ever been investigated. 

♦ What can you tell the committee about this matter? 

Answer. The Department is aware of the Human Rights Watch Report titled ‘‘On 

Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility for False Positive 

Killings in Colombia,’’ released in June 2015. Senior officials from our Embassy in 

Colombia and in the Department met with Human Rights Watch to discuss these 

issues. I personally met with Human Rights Watch Americas Director Jose Miguel 

Vivanco on July 10 to discuss the report, and the Department has asked both the 

Colombian authorities and Human Rights Watch for additional information. 

The report states Colombian prosecutors are investigating more than 3,000 

alleged ‘‘false positives’’ extra judicial killings by military personnel. Upward of 800 

army members have been convicted for extrajudicial killings committed between 

2002 and 2008, most of them low ranking soldiers. No officers at the brigadecommand level or above have been convicted for extrajudicial killings; Human 

Rights Watch notes that 16 active and retired army generals are under investigation. The Colombian Attorney General’s Office announced on April 13, 2015, it 

would be investigating 22 active and retired generals. 

In early June 2015, judicial hearings began against five colonels from the Pedro 

Nel Ospina Battalion of the 4th Brigade, including Colonels Edgar Emilio Avila 

Doria, Colonel Jose Zangun ̃ a Duarte, Colonel Diega Padilla, Colonel Raul Huertas 

Ceballos, and Colonel Carlos Cadena, for their alleged involvement with more than 

70 ‘‘false positives’’ killings. We will follow progress in these investigations very 

closely. 

We take all allegations of human rights violations in Colombia seriously, and will 

continue to work to support all efforts to bring justice for victims and perpetrators 

alike. 

Question. I remain troubled by reports that the administration may consider fully 

lifting the lethal military equipment sales ban, amidst intense lobbying on the part 

of Vietnam, including during the General Secretary’s recent visit. Can you comment 

on these reports? What are the specific benchmarks Vietnam must achieve in order 

for the administration to fully lift the lethal military equipment sales ban? 

Answer. We have consistently communicated to Vietnamese officials, including 

during General Secretary Trong’s visit, that further progress on human rights is 

integral to our bilateral relationship and is necessary for a further deepening of bilateral ties, including in security cooperation. Further progress on human rights 

would be a key factor for the United States to consider when determining whether 

a full lifting of the ban on the transfer of lethal defense articles is appropriate. 

Vietnam has taken positive steps on human rights, but there remains much room 

for improvement. During the Human Rights Dialogue, I urged the Vietnamese Government to make progress in three key areas: a more systematic release of political 

prisoners, including several of the priority cases such as Ta Phong Tan that we discussed with them during the Dialogue; a moratorium on new arrests and detentions 

of activists, bloggers, and others for peacefully expressing their views; and revising 

the disappointing first drafts of the Penal Code revisions and the Law on Religion. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

38 

Our message is clear: demonstrable progress on human rights is critical to the 

advancement of U.S.-Vietnam relations across the board, including in the security 

sphere. 

Ahead of the modification to our policy last fall to permit the transfer of maritime 

security-related defense articles to Vietnam, the State Department and Defense 

Department consulted with Congress. If we were to consider further policy changes, 

we would again consult with Congress before making any decision. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RAND PAUL

Question. With President Obama’s plan to lift sanctions that are part of Executive 

Order 13628 related to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 

2012, what is the State Department’s leverage to influence the horrible human 

rights record in Iran? 

Answer. Our commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA) will not result in the United States Government terminating Sections 2 

or 3 of Executive Order 13628, which are the sections that impose sanctions related 

to human rights abuses and freedom of expression consistent with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. Under the JCPOA, 

the United States commits to terminate select provisions of Executive Order 13628 

that relate to nuclear-related sanctions—specifically, Sections 5–7 and 15—on 

Implementation Day, i.e., after Iran has completed its key nuclear-related commitments. These sections provide for technical fixes or amendments to other sanctions 

pertaining to Iran’s petroleum sector that will be relieved under the deal and are 

unrelated to sanctions imposed in connection with Iran’s human rights abuses. 

We have enforced, and will continue to enforce, existing human rights sanctions. 

Since 2010, the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department, 

has sanctioned 12 Iranian entities and six Iranian individuals under Executive 

Order 13628 for restricting the freedoms of expression or peaceful assembly of Iranians. These designations will not go away under the JCPOA and neither will the 

designations of five Iranian entities and 14 Iranian individuals under Executive 

Order 13553 for their involvement or complicity in serious human rights abuses. 

Lastly, the four entities we have targeted pursuant to Executive Order 13606 for 

their provision of information technology that could be used by the Government of 

Iran to commit serious human rights abuses will remain designated. Iranian entities 

sanctioned pursuant to various human rights authorities include the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Basij, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security 

(MOIS), the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Committee to Determine 

Instances of Criminal Content, and the Iranian Cyber Police. We have also sanctioned top officials within some of these organizations. 

We will continue to press Iran to end its mistreatment of its citizens. We will continue to cosponsor and lobby for the U.N. General Assembly’s annual resolution 

expressing deep concern at human rights violations in Iran and to lead lobbying 

efforts to maintain the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights in 

Iran—a mandate we were instrumental in establishing through our leadership at 

the U.N. Human Rights Council. We will also continue to document reports of Iran’s 

human rights violations and abuses in our annual Human Rights and International 

Religious Freedom Reports. And we will continue to raise our voice in support of 

the Iranian people and their desire for greater respect for human rights and the 

rule of law. 

Question. Each year, often without seeing improvements, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development give millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to countries that have human rights and corruption records that are 

considered the worst of the worst. Why does the Department continue to aid and 

enable these regimes? 

Answer. U.S. assistance supports programs that are in the U.S. national interest, 

spanning a range of issues from fighting terrorism to humanitarian assistance to 

antipoverty and health promotion programs. It also includes programs and policies 

that strengthen good governance, protect human rights, strengthen the rule of law, 

and combat corruption. Sometimes, in order to protect or advance our national interests, we must work with governments that have poor human rights records. Congress regularly makes funds available for assistance to these types of governments. 

We also regularly withhold assistance from governments that abuse human 

rights. We often do so as a matter of policy. We also do so as a matter of law, specifically the State Leahy law (Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

39 

as amended), which provides that no assistance shall be furnished to any unit of 

the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. In every 

case, when an individual security force member is nominated for assistance, the 

Department vets that individual as well as his or her unit. In cases where an entire 

unit is designated to receive assistance, the Department vets the unit and the commander. All vetting results from U.S. embassies are evaluated by vetters within the 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), where we vigorously implement the State Leahy law and evaluate the human rights records of the unit and 

individuals against a full spectrum of open source and classified records. 

In many cases where a country has a problematic human rights record, U.S. 

assistance in those countries may be channeled through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including those that fight for greater respect for human rights and 

democratic principles. DRL focuses programmatic activities in countries where governments commit egregious human rights violations, are undemocratic or in transition, and where democracy and human rights advocates are under pressure. More 

than 90 percent of all DRL programs operate in restrictive or challenging environments. DRL grants and cooperative agreements are focused on supporting civil society organizations that work on the very problems you identified. DRL programming 

is intended to uphold democratic principles, promote human rights and fundamental 

freedoms, prevent atrocities, combat violent extremism, address gender-based violence, strengthen rule of law, increase access to justice and accountability, and target impunity and corruption. America is more secure in a world where governments 

protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In an era marked by increasing global economic integration characterized by the negotiation of trade agreements, such as the TPP, in the pipeline, and 

preference programs that according to the administration have a new emphasis on 

the observance of international labor rights and standards, I understand that for 

State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), labor 

funded programs have remained stagnant and represent only about 5 percent of its 

total Human Rights and Democracy Fund budget. 

♦ Why does that number remain so low? Will we not need more resources to 

match the rhetoric of labor rights in our negotiating objectives? 

Answer. DRL has supported labor programs since it began its democracy and 

human rights programs in 1998 and we agree that there is a need to continue 

emphasizing international labor rights and standards. DRL does so by dedicating 

at least 5 percent of Democracy Fund/Human Rights and Democracy Funds (DF/ 

HRDF) for labor programs. We also incorporate labor projects within global rapid 

response mechanisms as well as regional or country-specific portfolios also funded 

with DF/HRDF, and manage, on behalf of other Department bureaus, Economic 

Support Funds (ESF) transferred to DRL. Due to these other funding streams, the 

overall amount DRL program to advance labor rights is de facto greater than 5 percent. Over the past 5 years, we have allocated nearly $34 million for labor rights. 

DRL dedicates at least 5 percent of our DF/HRDF budget even in the constrained 

budget environment in which we are operating, and as mandates for DF/HRDF have 

increased substantially without corresponding increases in funding. The amount of 

funding we allocate for labor rights is greater than our entire regional democracypromotion portfolios for Europe and Eurasia, Middle East and North Africa, and 

South and Central Asia. 

Question. As you think about the regional trade and economic challenges and 

opportunities, are there areas—at State, at Treasury, at Commerce, at USTR, at 

USAID—where do you think additional resources are needed? 

Answer. Currently, U.S. foreign assistance programs support improving trade and 

investment climates in developing countries as a means to promote sustainable economic growth in countries that have the political will to carry out the needed 

reforms. Opening up new markets also supports U.S. jobs, eliminates barriers in foreign markets and establishes rules to stop unfair trade. President Obama’s FY 2016 

Request includes support for programs to be carried out by State and USAID that 

include technical assistance and training to build trade capacity, the establishment 

of bilateral and multilateral trade policy, and the negotiation of new trade agreements required to overcome regional trade barriers and economic challenges in 

developing nations. State and USAID work very closely together to identify and 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

40 

request the resources needed to achieve the U.S. Government’s foreign policy objectives and development goals for trade. State and USAID collaborate with the interagency (i.e., Treasury, Commerce, and USTR) on trade programming and transfer 

funds to these other agencies where they have a comparative advantage to provide 

assistance. 

Question. Mr. Assistant Secretary, in March, you led the first human rights discussion with the Castro regime on human rights. Would you please share with us 

your impression of those talks? Also, as there have now been more than 2,822 arbitrary, politically motivated arrests in Cuba during 2015, could you please provide 

impression of whether these talks with the Castro regime will lead to greater protections for human rights in Cuba? 

Answer. On March 31, I led the planning discussion with a 13-member Cuban 

delegation largely comprised of officials from the Ministry of Exterior Relations’ 

Directorate for Multilateral Affairs and International Law. The atmosphere of the 

meeting was professional and there was broad agreement on methodology for a 

substantive dialogue. We agreed that the basis for future discussions would be compliance with international human rights standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which will help us push back against the usual Cuban argument that Cuba has its own definition of human rights. We also agreed that each 

side would be open to discussing any topic. The Cuban side wished to leave the timing and location of the first substantive round of dialogue for future decision 

through diplomatic channels. We have proposed various dates, and we are awaiting 

the Cuban Government’s response. 

It is striking that the Cuban Government is so threatened by the peaceful activities of civil society activists that it continues to engage in the arbitrary, short-term 

detentions you have mentioned. As we have said, we did not expect the Cuban Government to immediately change its behavior toward its own people simply because 

it had reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States, and I would not 

expect them to change their behavior just because we have human rights discussions. But reestablishment of diplomatic relations and opening the Embassy in 

Havana not only allows us to better advocate for respect for universal human rights 

and fundamental freedoms it has changed the expectations of the Cuban people in 

ways the Cuban Government cannot possibly meet unless it changes its policies. 

Secretary Kerry and I were able to meet with several activists and other representatives of Cuban society during the Secretary’s visit to Havana on August 14, and it 

is clear that they are thinking through how they can take advantage of these new 

circumstances to press for real change. Change in Cuba will come from the Cuban 

people, and we will use our continued engagement to support their efforts to promote respect for human rights and to advance democratic reforms. 

Question. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports normally 

cover the reporting period from April 1 to March 31 in a given year. The 2015 TIP 

Report, which still has not yet been released, will have the latest release date ever 

for a TIP Report. 

♦ In prior TIP reports, have events or actions taken in June or July of a year ever 

before been used to affect a country’s tier ranking? 

Answer. The 2015 TIP Report, which was released on July 27, covers government 

antitrafficking efforts through March 31, 2015, with a few exceptions for notable 

developments that occurred in early April. This reporting period is consistent with 

those for past TIP Reports, which have—on limited occasions—included developments after March 31. 

Question. My amendment prohibiting fast track authority for Tier 3 human trafficking countries was recently signed into law by President Obama as part of the 

Trade Promotion Authority legislation. In your view, is that kind of sanction helpful 

in combating human trafficking? 

Answer. Following the internationally agreed tenets of the U.N. Palermo Protocol 

and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the U.S. Government’s efforts 

to combat trafficking in persons concentrate on the 3P approach: prosecution of 

human traffickers, protection of the victims of sex and labor trafficking, and prevention of the crime. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons engages 

in year-round diplomacy, working closely with foreign governments to encourage 

and assist their efforts to meet the minimum standards to combat trafficking in persons established in the TVPA. 

The Department welcomes dialogue and continued partnership with Congress on 

ways to better advance efforts to combat human trafficking. We will stay apprised 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

41 

of developments regarding the amendment and look forward to discussing this further with you. 

Question. John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch, recently 

stated that, with regards to human trafficking, ‘‘Malaysia has done very little to 

combat this scourge,’’ and that ‘‘this is not a gray area.’’ Do you agree with this 

analysis? Why or why not? 

Answer. The Department remains deeply concerned about human trafficking in 

Malaysia and continues to urge Malaysian Government officials to take bold steps 

to combat trafficking. Malaysia’s Tier 2 Watch List ranking clearly indicates the 

country does not meet the minimum standards established in the TVPA and there 

is much room for improvement in the government’s antitrafficking efforts. However, 

the Government of Malaysia made significant efforts to comply with the minimum 

standards for the elimination of trafficking. 

In 2014 and early 2015, government officials consulted with civil society to draft 

amendments to Malaysia’s antitrafficking law to address the country’s flawed victim 

protection regime, which were approved by the Cabinet. If implemented, these 

amendments would address a number of the recommendations in the TIP Report 

over the past several years—including allowing trafficking victims to move freely 

and work outside of government facilities and NGOs to run shelters for victims. We 

will continue to encourage the government to implement the amendments to the 

antitrafficking law and issue associated regulations in consultation with NGO partners and consistent with international standards in the Palermo Protocol. We will 

closely monitor the implementation and effectiveness of these amendments as we 

evaluate Malaysia’s efforts. 

Malaysian authorities also increased the number of trafficking investigations and 

prosecutions compared to 2013, adopted a pilot project to enable a limited number 

of trafficking victims to leave government facilities in order to work, trained government officials on human trafficking, and issued public service announcements highlighting the risks of human trafficking. Going forward, we will continue to press the 

government to increase its law enforcement efforts to convict traffickers. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

42 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER


Slavery1.eps

The Honorable John Kerry 

Secretary of State 

U.S. State Department 

220 1 C Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20520 

Dear Secretary Kerry: 

United ~tatts ~mate WASHINGTON, DC 20510 

July 15, 2015 

Fighting human trafficking is one of the great moral challenges of our time. It is therefore with 

grave concern that we now hear Malaysia may be upgraded in this year's Trafficking in Persons 

(flP) repon based on developments that occurred after the end of the review period. A premature 

upgrade of Malaysia would undermine the integrity of the TIP report process and compromise 

our international efTons to fight human trafficking. 

The 114"' Congress has undenaken a vigorous bipartisan agenda to address human trafficking. In 

February of this year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held two hearings on the subject 

of modem slavery and reported to the Senate the End Modem Slavery and Trafficking Initiative 

Act of20 15. On April 22, the House Subcomminee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human 

Rights, and International Organizations held a hearing examining the State Department's TIP 

Repon and the need to maintain the integrity of the tier ranking system. Also on April 22, the 

Senate voted 99-0 to pass the Justic-e for Victims Trafficking Act. Later that day, the Senate 

Finance Comminec passed an amendment to the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priori lies and 

Accounlability Act of2015 to prohibil expedited consideration of trade agreements with 

countries ranked Tier 3 on the TIP Repon. Thai amendment was ultimately included in H.R. 

2146, which was subsequently passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by 

President Obama on June 29. An additional provision, originally imroduced by Senators 

Menendez and Wyden, to establi.sh an exception process for countries that have taken concrete 

actions to implement the principal recommendations in the TIP repon was passed by the House 

during its consideration of H.R. 644, the Trade Facililation and Trade Enforcement Act of2015. 

The 2014 TIP report described the human trafficking crisis in Malaysia, noting that many 

migrant workers are exploited and subjected to practices indicative of forced labor, that the 

government made limited effort to improve its nawed victim protection regime, and that there 

were significant shoncomings in the Government's anti-trafficking law enforcement efTons. 

In light of those findings, it is difficult to fathom how the State Depanmcnt could jUS1ify 

upgrading Malaysia given that the country failed to address the problem in the year leading up to 

the June I, 2015 statutory deadline for the TIP repon's publication. Passage of legislation to 

amend Malaysia's anti-trafficking laws, while a step forward, occurred outside the 2015 review 

period and additional work remains to ensure that this legislation is implemented in a manner 

consistent with the recommendations in the 2014 repon. Such action should therefore not be 

included in the Department's evaluation of Malaysia's 2015 ranking. 
43 

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Slavery2.eps

State Depanment officials have already stated that Malaysia must do more to warrant removal 

from Tier 3 and suggested that recent effons to address the problem lie outside of the 2015 

reponing period. As recently as April 17. the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, Joseph Yun, said 

that the Malaysian government needs to show greater political will in prosecuting human 

traffickers and protecting their victims if the country hopes to improve its Tier 3 ranking. On 

June I, Assistant Secrewy of State for Population, Migration and Refugees Anne C. Richard 

reaffirmed that, "the 2015 [TIP) repon covers until March 2015, which mean Malaysia's 

handling of[ the Rohingya refugee) crisis will only be reflected in the 2016 repon.'' While we 

applaud the State Depanment's work to improve the human trafficking situation in Southeast 

Asia and welcome the Malaysian government's newfound interest in addressing the problem, an 

upgrade in the 2015 TIP repon would only be j ustified if Malaysia had made significant effons 

to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for eliminating trafficking within the 

relevant reponing timeframe. 

Sadly. the repon is already more than five weeks overdue; it is on pace to be the latest repon 

ever released. As the U.S. government's principal tool to engage foreign governments on human 

trafficking, the integrity of the TIP repon ranking process is a reflection of our country's 

principles and must be upheld. An unwarranted upgrade for Malaysia in the 2015 repon, 

especially if based on actions undenaken after the closing of the 2015 reponing period, would 

weaken the credibility of our TIP ranking system. Ultimat.ely, it would undermine the value of 

the TIP review process to obtaining meaningful international progress on human rights. 

We urge you not to prematurely upgrade Malaysia's 2015 TIP ranking based on evidence outside 

of the review period. 

Sincerely, 

United States Senator 

Sherrod Brown 

United States Senator 

United States Senat.or 
44 

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Slavery3.eps

United States Senator 

~.6ec..­ Bemard Sanders 

United States Senator 

.J~~ United States Senator 

~ 

Martin Heinrich 

United States Senator 

United States Senator 

~ 

United States Senator 

Elizabeth Warren 

United States Senator 

tfh1_ Robert P. 

t.~.~· Casey, k 

United States Senator 

Kirsten Gillibrand 

. United States Senator 

Ron ~dell United States Senator 

~~ United States Senator 
45 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

[From The Hill, July 14, 2015] 

UNDERMINING THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S TRAFFICKING REPORT

By David Abremowitz 

Recent press reports suggest that the State Department will recommend that 

Secretary John Kerry take a shameless and unprincipled stand in this year’s Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) by concluding that the government of 

Malaysia is making significant efforts to combat human trafficking in its country. 

Anti-trafficking groups, including the coalition I work with, are urging Kerry to reject this unnecessary capitulation to the government of Malaysia and U.S. government regional and trade experts. 

Malaysia has a serious human trafficking problem, which is why last year the 

State Department downgraded Malaysia to a Tier 3 country in the TIP Report, a 

level that includes the worst human trafficking offenders in the world. Malaysia— 

where we see forced labor in agriculture, construction, electronics and textile industries, as well as in domestic service in homes and women coerced into prostitution— 

deserves to be among them. Steps that might be considered progress have only come 

in recent days, months after the closure of this year’s reporting period (April 1, 2014 

to March 31, 2015), and do not yet demonstrate real resolve by the Malaysian 

government. 

The basis for this cynical and manipulative recommendation is simple: The State 

Department is trying to ensure that, come what may, Malaysia can stay part of the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a key trade agreement that is part of the White 

House’s legacy in the pivot to Asia. Recent fast-track trade legislation signed by the 

president provided that no trade agreement that includes a Tier 3 country can get 

fast-track consideration, effectively killing Malaysia’s participation in it. It appears 

that State Department regional bureaus and trade experts are overruling the trafficking concerns to make sure this doesn’t happen. 

These forces seem to be taking advantage of the absence of an Ambassador-atLarge for Trafficking in Persons, a position that has been vacant for more than nine 

months. This vacancy leaves no dedicated senior official to fight the battles on 

behalf of the trafficking office—and more importantly, on behalf of victims and 

survivors. 

Supporters for a Malaysia upgrade point to provisions in a recent Malaysian law. 

These provisions, for example, permit the government to provide assistance to trafficking victims, but unfortunately they leave it to the discretion of Malaysian 

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46 

gram a reality. This is of particular concern because in Malaysia, as with many 

countries, the promise of already existing laws that could make a real impact on 

human trafficking falters because of poor or nonexistent implementation. What’s 

more, some press reports suggest that the State Department will discount the mass 

graves on the Malaysian border because they were discovered after the reporting 

period, but may now count these even more recent changes because it better serves 

their interest. 

Unfortunately, prioritizing trade over trafficking will undermine the integrity of 

the TIP Report and will make it more difficult to free the estimated 21 million people who are suffering from human trafficking and modern slavery. And it may 

undermine the U.S. ability to ensure that Malaysia follows through with its commitments. 

What is particularly bewildering about the State Department’s action is that it 

is wholly unnecessary. Several human rights groups that work to end modern slavery worked with the administration to create an exception to allow Malaysia to stay 

in the TPP, provided the country takes concrete actions to implement the principal 

recommendations in the TIP Report. This exception will likely be adopted before the 

end of the month, giving flexibility to the president and providing additional time 

for Malaysia to follow through with its commitment to, for example, actually fund 

new programs for victims under the new law and to pursue traffickers who confiscate documents. 

Kerry has a decision to make: undermine global U.S. leadership efforts to combat 

human trafficking and let Malaysia off the hook, or stand up for not only thousands 

of victims of human trafficking in Malaysia but millions of people who suffer from 

modern slavery around the world. The former unprincipled capitulation will tarnish 

this administration’s many efforts to combat human trafficking around the world, 

as well as Kerry’s own reputation as a champion In the fight against human trafficking. The latter courageous truth-telling will confirm that the U.S. continues to 

be a champion in freeing those who are exploited by the more powerful. The choice 

is simple, Mr. Secretary. 

Æ 

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