This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 NORBERT A. SCHUELLER, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 34,598 4 REVEREND STEPHEN SCHULTZ, 5 NORBERT MOYA, and ROMAN 6 CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF 7 SANTA FE, 8 Defendants-Appellees. 9 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 10 John F. Davis, District Judge 11 Norbert A. Schueller 12 Belen, NM 13 Pro Se Appellant 14 Brown Law Firm 15 Brown & Gurulé 16 Daniel J. Macke 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellees 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 VANZI, Judge. 211 Defendant Norbert Moya was dismissed w ithout prejudice in the district court, 18 and he is not part of this appeal. 19 2 {1} Norbert Schueller (Plaintiff), a self-represented litigant, appeals the district 1 court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to 2 Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint against 3 Defendants Reverend Stephen Schultz and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Santa 4 Fe. 1 5 BACKGROUND 6 {2} On March 15, 2014, Plaintiff, a registered parishioner of Our Lady of Belen 7 Roman Catholic Church in Valencia County, hand-delivered a letter to Defendant 8 Schultz in his capacity as a Catholic priest . Plaintiff delivered the letter to Defendant 9 Schultz just outside the confessional in the church. The three-page letter accused 10 Defendant Schultz of being “the most self-absorbed, without-a-clue, insensitive, 11 materialistic priest [that Plaintiff had] ever met” and stated that “[Defendant Schultz] 12 and [his] sycophants obviously don’t give a damn about those of us who are poor and 13 old and mobility challenged.” The letter c ontinued throughout in a similar critical 14 vein, suggesting as well that“[m]aybe the new Archbishop, when appointed, will have 15 the intestinal fortitude to remove you as pastor and put you in a strict cloister, like the 16 Trappists or the Carthusians.” At the end of the letter, Plaintiff attached two pennies 173 with a hand-written note stating, “your tip for being such a good pastor.” Cardinal 1 Stella and Archbishop Vigano werecopied on the correspondence. 2 {3} Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendant Schultz revealed the contents of the 3 letter to Norbert Moya, a “non-clerical laym an,” and that Moya subsequently accosted 4 Plaintiff at a local restaurant. In betray ing Plaintiff’s confidence by disclosing what 5 the letter said about Defendant Schultz, and because of Mo ya’s participation in that 6 betrayal, Plaintiffs says that he “has an elevated and complete distrust of Catholic 7 diocesan clergy in general, which had led to [his] diminished use/reception of the 8 Sacraments.” On these facts, Plaintiff brought claims for negligent and intentional 9 infliction of emotional distress (Count I), defamation (Count II), and punitive damages 10 (Count III). Only Counts I and III are at issue in this case as the defamation claim was 11 asserted solely against Moya. 12 {4} Defendants Schultz and the Roman CatholicArchdiocese of Santa Fe filed a 13 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6). Specifically, 14 Defendants argued that the district court l acked jurisdiction to hear the case under the 15 church autonomy doctrine and that the inte ntional infliction of emotional distress 16 claim failed on the merits because New Mexico does not recognize such a claim 17 except in cases of bystander liability and Defendant’s conduct wa s not extreme and 18 outrageous. After briefing and a hearing, the district court took the case under 19 advisement and subsequently entered an order granting Defendants’ motion. The order 204 did not specify the basis for the court’s d ecision. Plaintiff now appeals the dismissal 1 of his claims against Defendants Schultz and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 2 Santa Fe. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Standard of Review 5 {5} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) . . . 6 tests the legal sufficiency of the comp laint, not the facts that support it.” Wallis v. 7 Smith , 2001-NMCA-017, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 214, 22 P.3d 682. “For purposes of the 8 motion, the well-pleaded material allegations of the complaintl, or petition, are taken 9 as admitted.” Villegas v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. , 1976-NMCA-068, ¶ 4, 89 N.M. 10 387, 552 P.2d 1235. We regard dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) as proper only when 11 the law does not support the claim under any set of facts subject to proof. Wallis , 12 2001-NMCA-017, ¶ 6. All that is required is that “the esse ntial elements prerequisite 13 to the granting of the relief sought can be found or reasonably inferred.” Derringer v. 14 State , 2003-NMCA-073, ¶ 5, 133 N.M. 721, 68 P.3d 961 (internal quotation marks 15 and citation omitted). “We re view rulings on Rule 1- 012(B)(6) motions de novo.” Id. 16 {6} We understand Plaintiff’s arguments on app eal to be that he alleged sufficient 17 facts to support a claim for intentional inf liction of emotional distress and for common 18 law negligence for which relief could be granted. He further contends that the district 19 court erred in dismissing his claims under the church autonomy doctrine and by not 205 treating Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment for which 1 disputes of fact existed. We are not persuaded. 2 {7} We begin with Plaintiff’s claim for inte ntional infliction of emotional distress 3 because this issue is dispositive. As a preliminary matter, although Count I of 4 Plaintiff’s complaint claimed both intenti onal and negligent infliction of emotional 5 distress, he appears to haveabandoned his claim for negligent infliction of emotional 6 distress (NIED) both at the district court and on appeal. To be sure, our Supreme 7 Court has stated that “NIED is an extremely narrow tort that compensates a bystander 8 who has suffered severe emo tional shock as a result of witnessing a sudden, traumatic 9 event that causes serious injury or death to a family member.” Fernandez v. Walgreen 10 Hastings Co. , 1998-NMSC-039, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 263, 968 P.2d 774. Plaintiff essentially 11 concedes that he has not alleged any facts supporting bystander liability and, 12 therefore, he fails to state a claim for NI ED. We next determine whether, as a matter 13 of law, Defendant Schultz’s c onduct of revealing the conten ts of Plaintiff’s letter to 14 a third person reasonably may be regarded as so extreme and outrageous that it will 15 permit recovery under the tort of intenti onal infliction of emotional distress (IIED). 16 {8} The tort of IIED “provides recovery to victims of socially reprehensible 17 conduct[.]” Baldonado v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. , 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 24, 143 N.M. 18 288, 176 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In that regard, our 19 Supreme Court has limited recovery for IIED to claims in which the plaintiff can 206 establish, among other things, extreme and outrageous conduct. See Trujillo v. N. Rio 1 Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc. , 2002-NMSC-004, ¶ 25, 131 N.M . 607, 41 P.3d 333. As the 2 Trujillo Court noted, the “Restatement [(Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)] 3 describes extreme and outrageous conduct as th at which is ‘so outrageous in character, 4 and so extreme in degree, as to go be yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 5 regarded as atrocious, and utterly into lerable in a civilized community.’ ” Trujillo , 6 2002-NMSC-004, ¶ 25. The “outrageous conduct” requirement is a high standard that 7 our courts have consistently regardedas a significant limitation on recovery. See id. 8 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 9 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley , 10 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 416, 981 P.2d 1234. 11 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 12 determined that a defendant ’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 13 For example, in Baldonado , a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 14 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC -005, ¶ 3. The plaintiff firefighters 15 claimed that the defendant gas company had failed to properl y design and maintain 16 gas pipelines, had been earlier cited for the failure, and thatsuch failure had resulted 17 in two other explosions. Id. ¶¶ 2, 35. This knowledge, c oupled with the defendant’s 18 obligations under federal law to actively c ooperate with firefi ghters, supported the 19 Court’s conclusion that the defendant ’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Id. 207 ¶¶ 33, 36. In contrast, the facts supporti ng Plaintiff’s IIED claim bear no relation to 1 the extreme and outrageous conduct described above. 2 {10} Here, Plaintiff alleged that he hand-deliv ered a letter to De fendant Schultz who 3 disclosed the contents of that letter to a third party. As a result of the disclosure, 4 Plaintiff claims he has been “demorali zed, dispirited, and psychologically/emotionally 5 traumatized” and that his “biorhythm patterns have drastically/dramatically changed, 6 which has resulted in loss of sleep, loss of appetite, disruption of bodily functions and 7 exacerbation of arthritic pains in [his] joints.” As we have noted, the letter, which 8 directly impugned Defendant Schultz’s credibility, integrity and professionalism, was 9 not made in the context of a confessional, was not marked confidential, and was 10 copied to two other individuals within th e church. Under the circumstances, we cannot 11 conclude that the disclosure of the letter’s contents—by the person being derided in 12 it—supports a cause of action for IIED by the author of the letter. In our view, this 13 type of occurrence rarely, if ever, rises to the level of being “beyond all possible 14 bounds of decency” and “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Trujillo , 2002- 15 NMSC-004, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has not 16 pointed to evidence of any other specifi c instance in which Defendant Schultz’s 17 conduct was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all 18 possible bounds of decency. Moreover, Plainti ff fails to cite any authority recognizing 19 an IIED claim under the factual scenario here, so we presume none exists. See In re 208 Adoption of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. This Court 1 will not consider propositions that are unsupported by citation to authority. ITT Educ. 2 Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 3 P.2d 969. Plaintiff has not established a clai m for IIED as a matter of law in this case. 4 {11} In light of our conclusions above, we need not reach Plaintiff’s remaining 5 arguments. We briefly address, however, wh ether Plaintiff has stated a claim for 6 common law negligence. As a general matter, damages for emotional distress in 7 ordinary negligence are not permitted in New Mexico. Flores v. Baca , 1994-NMSC8 021, ¶ 21, 117 N.M. 306, 871 P.2d 962. However, we sua sponte asked the parties to 9 brief the issue in our calendaring notice. Inparticular, we directed the parties to 10 address whether such a cause of action exists pursuant to Alexander v. Culp , 705 11 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that 12 the facts of that case are su fficiently distinguishable such that it does not. We explain. 13 {12} In Alexander , the plaintiff met with the defendant, a minister at a church, for 14 marital counseling. Id. at 379. The plaintiff asked the defendant whether his 15 disclosures would be kept confidential, and she assured him they would be. Id. The 16 plaintiff then confided to the defendant th at he had several affairs during his marriage, 17 including one that was on-going. Id. Sometime thereafter, the defendant met with the 18 plaintiff’s wife for lunch and told her that the plaintiff was having an affair, that he 19 was a liar, and was not to be trusted. Id. She also advised the plaintiff’s wife to get a 209 restraining order, change the locks on the house, divorce the plaintiff, and keep the 1 children away from him. Id. at 379-80. 2 {13} The Alexander plaintiff asserted that the defendant had a duty, arising out of the 3 minister/parishioner relationship, to maintain confidentiality and that the defendant 4 breached that duty by disclosing the info rmation to his wifeand her family. Id. at 381. 5 The Ohio Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of 6 action for common law negligence. Id. at 380-81. The court first noted that the breach 7 of the duty to preserve the plaintiff’s conf idences did not involve or compromise any 8 religious tenets. Id. at 382. It then concluded that there is a public policy—as 9 expressed in an Ohio statute—encouragi ng people to seek religious counseling and 10 a concomitant expectation that any di sclosures will be kept confidential. Id. Thus, 11 under Ohio law, public policy may support anaction for breach of confidentiality by 12 a minister under certain circumstances. Id. at 381. 13 {14} This case bears no resemblance to Alexander . There is no statutorily created 14 public policy or case creating a duty to maintain the type of confidentiality in 15 correspondence that Plaintiff seeks here. Plai ntiff was not seeking religious counseling 16 or guidance in any form fro m Defendant Schultz. By his own admission, none of the 17 events “took place within the Sacrament of Penance (confession).” The letter, which 18 was intended solely to disp arage Defendant Schultz, wa s not marked confidential, 19 contained no confidential information about Pl aintiff, and was copied to third parties. 2010 Further, unlike the Alexander plaintiff, Plaintiff here did not ask for, nor was he ever 1 assured, that his disclosures would be kept confidential. Alexander is inapplicable. 2 Accordingly, we hold that under the facts of this case, Plaintiff has not stated a cause 3 of action for common law negligence. 4 CONCLUSION 5 {15} The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint is affirmed. 6 {16} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________________________________ 8 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

_________________________________ 11 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 12

_________________________________ 13 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 14