SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1162-18T1

SALVATORE J. MORETTI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOROUGH OF PARAMUS,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued telephonically March 23, 2020 –

Decided July 15, 2020

Before Judges Rothstadt and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Docket No. DC-105530-18.

Salvatore J. Moretti, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

R. Scott Fahrney argued the cause for respondent 

(Kaufman, Semeraro & Leibman, LLP attorneys; R. 

Scott Fahrney, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1162-18T1

Plaintiff Salvatore J. Moretti appeals from the Law Division's order 

granting, without prejudice, defendant Borough of Paramus's motion to dismiss 

his complaint. Plaintiff's complaint alleged a shade tree fell on and damaged his 

car in the amount of $6000. Plaintiff claimed the alleged damages prevented 

him from working and defendant negligently caused his damages. The motion 

judge granted defendant's Rule 4:6-2 motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted after concluding there was no proof that 

plaintiff complied with the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, or 

if he did, that the complaint was timely.1 

On appeal, plaintiff argues: 

POINT I

THE BOROUGH OF PARAMUS CANNOT RELY 

UPON THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT 90 

DAY NOTICE PROVISION, WHICH DOES NOT 

APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 

POINT II

THE BOROUGH OF PARAMUS CREATED THE 

SHADE TREE COMMISSION, AUTHORIZING THE 

 

1

 Plaintiff's complaint alleged the cause of action accrued on May 16, 2018. 

Pursuant to the 90-day notice requirement, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, plaintiff should have 

filed a notice of tort claim by August 14, 2018. Plaintiff should have then waited 

six months from the date that notice of the claim was received to file suit. Ibid. 

Expiration of the six months occurred on February 14, 2019. Plaintiff filed his 

complaint on June 6, 2018. 
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AUTHORITY TO LEVY FINES, AND THUS 

[FINANCIAL] RESPONSIBILITY IS A BOROUGH 

DUTY. 

POINT III

THE TORT CLAIMS ACT NOTICE REQUIREMENT 

DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR, SINCE 

THE NETWORK OF NUMEROUS INTERRELATED 

LEGAL ACTIONS SHOW AN INVERSE 

CONDEMNATION OF MORETTI'S REAL ESTATE. 

We are unpersuaded by these contentions. Applying our "plenary standard 

of review from a trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 4:6-2(e)," under which we "owe no deference to the trial court's 

conclusions," Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. 

Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011), we affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed by the motion judge. We add only the following brief comments. 

When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule

4:6-2(e), the test to determine the adequacy of the pleading is whether the facts

as presented in the complaint suggest a cause of action. See Printing MartMorristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989); Velantzas v.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988). Plaintiff's complaint did not

suggest, as he argues, a constitutional issue of inverse condemnation, barring 

application of the TCA's notice requirements. 
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A-1162-18T1

An inverse condemnation involves the taking of real property by the 

government, see Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J. 390, 406 (2010), not 

damage to a car. The TCA, therefore, applied. See Greenway Dev. Co. v. 

Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546, 557 (2000) (holding that the TCA does not 

apply to inverse condemnation claims). 

Finally, to the extent plaintiff argues that the TCA did not apply because 

the municipal shade tree commission caused the damage to his car, he did not 

join that entity and his claim is barred by N.J.S.A. 40:64-14. The statute 

provides: 

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 

make any shade tree commission . . . responsible 

for . . . an injury to any property or highway tree or 

shrub. Liability for any such . . . injury shall be 

governed by [N.J.S.A. 59:4-10] and any other relevant 

provisions of the [TCA].

See also Petrocelli v. Sayreville Shade Tree Comm'n, 297 N.J. Super. 544, 547-

48 (App. Div. 1997) (declining to consider whether immunity under N.J.S.A. 

40:64-14 extends to the entity which established the shade tree commission).

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's 

remaining arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.