Looking Closer and Looking Broader: 

Gambit and Hexagon — The Peak of FilmReturn Space Reconnaissance After Corona*

By Robert A.McDonald, Ph.D. and Patrick Widlake

*Pre-printed from the forthcoming National Reconnaissance Journal

Analytical Article
Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance

January 2012
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Editorial Staff

 Editor Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D.

Managing Editor Susan D. Schultz, Ph.D. 

 A ssistant Managing Editor Patrick D. Widlake

 Editorial Support Sharon K. Moreno

design and layout Media Services Center

The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) publishes National Reconnaissance — Journal of the 

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Looking Closer and Looking Broader: Gambit and Hexagon—The Peak 

of Film-Return Space Reconnaissance After Corona 

Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D. and Patrick Widlake

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance

In his 1986 State of the Union Address, President Ronald Reagan remarked, 

“. . . the threat from Soviet forces, conventional and strategic, from the Soviet drive 

for domination, from the increase in espionage and state terror remains great. This 

is reality. Closing our eyes will not make reality disappear.”

Like his five predecessors dating back to the early 1960s, President Reagan had eyes on 

the Soviet Union and saw the reality of its strategic threat. Those eyes were the National 

Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) imaging reconnaissance satellites: first, Corona from 

1960 to 1972, and then joined and subsequently replaced by the peak of film-return space 

reconnaissance systems—the Gambit surveillance system that, from July 1963 through 

August 1984, used its high resolution to look closer at intelligence targets; and the Hexagon wide-area search system that, from June 1971 to October 1984, used its ground coverage capabilities to look broader across the Earth’s surface.

The technical details of these two systems describe an amazing set of capabilities, especially considering that engineers pioneering satellite technology in the period made their 

calculations with paper and pencil and slide rules, programmed satellite commands on 

punch cards, and communicated with typewriters. The first part of this article summarizes those details. The second part summarizes the systems’ intelligence contributions to 

national security—contributions that proved to be invaluable to a series of U.S. Presidents. 

Gambit and Hexagon gave the Presidents enough confidence in their knowledge of 

the strategic threat to national security that they were willing to enter into arms control 

agreements with America’s Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. After two and a half 

years of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Soviets, on 26 May 1972 U.S. 

President Richard Nixon signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim 

Agreement on strategic offensive arms with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 

a ceremony in Moscow. The Nixon administration was confident that the Gambit and 

Hexagon-acquired intelligence would provide an objective, reliable means of verification 

and enforcement. Both arms control documents used the phrase “. . . each Party shall use 

national technical means of verification at its disposal” (U.S. Department of State, 1972). 

The phrase “national technical means,” or “NTM,” meant satellite reconnaissance—a 

capability that was so sensitive and highly classified at the time that the U.S. was unwilling 

to publicly acknowledge it. The sensitivity was a consequence of the phenomenal capabilities that these National Technical Means offered in the 1960s, 70s, and early 80s.
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What were the Gambit and Hexagon “National Technical Means?”

By 1963, the revolutionary Corona photoreconnaissance satellite had been capable 

of acquiring images with a resolution within the 10- to 20-foot range, but the second 

Gambit-1 KH-71

 mission in that same year acquired imagery with a best resolution of 2.5 

feet2

—comparable resolution to what cameras on the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft could 

acquire. This was a remarkable qualitative leap forward less than three years after the CIA 

and Air Force had launched the first successful Corona mission. By 1966, the Gambit-3 

KH-8 system further improved resolution with a 160-inch effective focal length optical 

system, a five-foot diameter and 43 1⁄2 inch aperture. The NRO continually improved the 

Gambit’s resolution throughout the life of the program by upgrading the optics, satellite 

control, satellite vehicle stability, and film. Figure 1 shows an image of the KASPIYSK (see 

footnote 3) Special Research and Development Facility taken on the final KH-8 mission. 

Some argue that its ultimate best resolution was so good that it remains sensitive and 

cannot be revealed at the time of this writing. 

The Hexagon system had its own sensitivity and represented another technological leap 

forward. Its twin panoramic cameras could photograph a 300 nautical miles (nm) wide 

by 16.8 nm long ground area in a single frame (more than 3 times the area acquired by 

1

 The KH-7 designator referred to the system’s camera and imagery and stood for “KeyHole,” the IC’s security control 

system for overhead satellite reconnaissance products. The number “7” refers to the 7th satellite photointelligence 

system (see sidebar “What’s in a Name – Gambit”) (McDonald, 1997).

2

 Resolutions given are in ground resolved distance (GRD), a measurement of image quality applied to film satellites 

that indicates the distance two objects need to be apart to be distinguished as separate from each other (McDonald, 

2002).

Figure 1. KH-8 (M4354) Image of the “Caspian Sea Monster” at the

KASPIYSK Special Research and Development Facility. 
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Corona’s cameras) to produce nominal 1:100,000 scale images that could be magnified 

up to 100 times. At its nominal operating altitude of 100 nm, and a scan angle of 120 

degrees, the panoramic cameras could scan 370 nm in one frame—covering approximately 

the distance between Washington, D.C. and Cincinnati, Ohio. This was an astonishing 

capability that, for example, could allow the U.S. to monitor individual Soviet and Chinese nuclear test sites that KH-9 photographs could capture completely in a single image.3

Figure 2 shows a KH-9 image taken over Shea Stadium in New York. Initially the Hexagon 

satellite operated only with panoramic cameras for collecting intelligence, and then for 

later missions it added a mapping camera system for collecting mapping imagery. Over 

Hexagon’s lifespan, its mapping camera succeeded in imaging most of the Earth’s land 

surface (excluding much of Australia, and the polar icecaps of Greenland and Antarctica).

Hexagon’s broad-area coverage with superior resolution and Gambit’s unusually 

high-quality, space-based imagery provided the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) with 

3

 Hexagon’s capabilities enabled the system to capture “fleeting events of intelligence interest” (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & 

Worthman, 1992, p. 203), such as its inadvertent imaging on M1213 of a Soviet vessel, the KASP-B, being pulled by 

tugboats to an unknown location. Mostly because of Gambit imagery, U.S. intelligence had discovered this huge 

vessel with indeterminate mission in 1967 and dubbed the mysterious craft the “Caspian Sea Monster” (1992).

Figure 2. KH-9 (M1216) Image of Shea Stadium. 
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comprehensive, high-quality photographic coverage through complementary satellite missions of area search—the ability to “look broader”—and high-resolution surveillance—the 

ability to “look closer.” When the Hexagon KH-9 cameras detected a new target of interest on the search mission, the NRO would precisely point Gambit KH-8 cameras at the 

area or object on the surveillance mission to give a high level of detail. Both systems 

returned images that photo interpreters could magnify 100 times their original size. These 

state-of-the-art—and therefore highly sensitive at the time—film-return satellite reconnaissance systems had a major impact on the national security policymaking and operations 

of six American Presidents throughout the Cold War. Along with parallel and successor 

systems, Gambit and Hexagon played a significant role in reducing military and diplomatic tensions between the two global superpowers of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. They were 

the “National Technical Means” that were too sensitive to identify.

The Gambit and Hexagon programs built upon Corona’s legacy. Both Gambit and Hexagon acquired images on film that they stored in on-board “buckets” and subsequently returned 

to Earth in heat-shielded recovery vehicles (RV). The programs used C-119 and C-130 aircraft 

recovery systems comparable to what engineers had pioneered for Corona (see Figure 3, “Aerial 

Recovery of Hexagon Film by JC-130 Aircraft”). Although their data retrieval method was 

showing its age by the first Hexagon launch in 1971, and the NRO had begun system definition for a more time-responsive digital system, both Gambit’s and Hexagon’s imaging capabilities represented breathtaking advances over Corona. 

Figure 3. Aerial Recovery of Hexagon Film by JC-130 Aircraft

(Reprinted from Oder, et. al., 1992, p. 98). 
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Looking Closer to Assess the Adversary’s Capability—How Did Gambit Do it? 

Gambit’s high resolution camera system provided the U.S. its first ever close-in satellite 

surveillance capabilities,4

 which enabled analysts to assess the adversary’s scientific and technical capabilities. The NRO developed and flew two versions of the Gambit satellite, the 

Gambit-1 with the KH-7 camera, and its successor, the Gambit-3 (“cubed”) with the KH-8 

camera. Gambit-1 was one of the first satellite programs developed under the auspices of the 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Special Projects (SAFSP)—what would become the 

NRO’s Program Office A—and using National Reconnaissance Program budget dollars. The 

NRO operated Gambit-1 from July 1963 to June 1967, numbering the KH-7 missions with a 

4000 series, 4001 to 4038, and Gambit-3 from July 1966 to August 1984, numbering the KH-8 

missions 4301 to 4354 (see Table 1) (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991). 

4 Gambit was not, however, the first high-resolution imagery satellite that the NRO produced; on 18 March 1963, 

the NRO launched a high-resolution imaging satellite called Lanyard, which featured a 66-inch focal length, f/6.0 

optics camera—designated the KH-6—that the Itek Corporation had manufactured for the Samos program. The 

Lanyard satellite failed to reach orbit on that first mission because of an Agena-B upperstage malfunction. The 

NRO would produce five Lanyard satellites, three of which launched, but only one returned any imagery. The 

Lanyard system had been deemed necessary when U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara became concerned 

about intelligence reports of suspected Soviet anti-ballistic missile development. When McNamara requested highresolution imagery of a suspected site in early 1962, DCI John McCone urged DNRO Joseph Charyk to expedite 

launching the first Gambit satellite. Charyk’s awareness of the program’s progress convinced him that the first 

Gambit launch would likely happen no earlier than mid-1963, and he consequently signed an agreement to have 

the Air Force and CIA jointly produce the interim Lanyard satellite (Oder, et. al., 1991; McDonald, 1997; Classified 

source, CSNR reference collection). 

What’s in A Name—Gambit

U.S. Air Force Colonel Paul J. Heran is generally credited with naming Project 

Gambit, a codename that evoked the tactics of a chess move. The program office and 

others used additional names for the Gambit project.

To conceal the existence of Gambit-1’s highly-sensitive development at its program 

initiation, the Director of SAFSP, Brig Gen Robert E. Greer invented a “null” program—

one having no origin or acknowledged goal. The program office used this “null” 

program name—Program 307—to purchase the hardware under the Air Force’s 

Space System Division (SSD), without reconnaissance association. The NRO further 

obscured Gambit procurement activities within “Project Exemplar,” a classified 

activity for which the goal was four space launches beginning in February 1963 from 

the Pacific Missile Range. The unclassified codename for Project Exemplar was “Cue 

Ball.” Gambit-1 also had an overt Air Force identifier of “Project 206.” 

There was no Gambit-2. After conducting studies for an “advanced Gambit” system, 

Eastman Kodak presented the NRO with three options for the optical system, called 

respectively Gambit-2, Gambit-3, and Gambit-4, in ascending order of resolution 

improvement and cost. The NRO chose Gambit-3 as the optimal compromise of 

required resolution improvement and acceptable cost and development schedule. 

The Gambit-3 was often referred to as “Gambit Cubed.” In program management 

planning documents, Gambit-3 carried the overt Air Force identifier of “Project 206-

II,” which later changed to “Project 110.”

The user community in the “Talent-Keyhole” world knew of these systems as the 

“KH-7” for Gambit-1 and “KH-8” for Gambit-3 (McDonald, 1997; Classified source, 

CSNR collection).
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The Gambit-1. The Gambit-1 KH-7 camera system collected satellite imagery with 

reconnaissance aircraft imagery quality—and nearly 50 years before commercial satellite 

imaging systems and “Google Image” were regularly making high-quality space imagery 

available to the public. Gambit proved the viability of high-resolution space photography. 

On 6 September 1963, the date of the NRO’s second anniversary, the second Gambit-1 

satellite—the first mission was little more than a one-day trial flight5

—launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on an Atlas launch vehicle (LV) with Agena-D upperstage6 that 

thrust the satellite into a near-polar orbit, some 110 nm above the Earth’s surface. The 

KH-7’s camera completed the two-plus days of its photographic mission, and after a C-119 

aircraft caught the returning film capsule and analysts exploited the film, the Intelligence 

Community (IC) discovered 1,930 feet of exposed film containing imagery that included 

10 priority intelligence targets, with a best resolution of 2.5 feet, as already noted. That 

resolution was unprecedented for a satellite system and the demonstrated capability held 

tremendous potential intelligence value because the detail revealed in higher-resolution 

imagery enabled IC photo interpreters to do scientific and technical analysis of Soviet and 

Chinese weapon systems, a type of analysis that had not been possible with earlier satellite 

imaging systems (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991; Smith, 2002). 

How did Gambit achieve such high-resolution photography? The camera’s lens produced a larger image at the focal plane, providing substantial resolution improvement. 

The KH-7 featured a Matsukov-type strip camera7

 with an aperture of 19.5 inches, an 

effective aperture of f/4.0, and an effective focal length of 77 inches. The KH-7’s photo 

resolution of 85 lines/mm translated to a ground resolution at nadir of about 2 feet. This 

resolution was considered very good in 1961 when the Gambit development was initiated 

and was still comparable to some of the best available commercial systems launched in the 

late 1990s and early 21st century (e.g., Quickbird and IKONOS).8

Of course, increasing focal length was not the only means to improve resolution: 

although Corona’s designed 24-inch focal length camera never got any larger on the later 

KH-4 cameras, the NRO consistently improved its resolution by changing the thermal 

design, upgrading the quality of manufacturing and testing, understanding and adjusting 

5 The first KH-7 mission returned just 198 feet of film, with only 3 intelligence targets imaged among its 74 exposed 

frames (NRO, 1991).

6

 The Lockheed Missiles and Space Company introduced the Agena-D in 1962, which standardized interfaces, 

improved component accessibility, and integrated the guidance and power systems of the spacecraft. Both KH-7 

and KH-8 Gambits used the Agena-D (Standard Agena) over the life of the program (Powell, 1997).

7

 Dmitri Maksutov (b. 1896) was a Russian-born pioneer in the field of optical telescopes. In 1941, he produced the 

meniscus telescope. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Maksutov oversaw fabrication of many large-aperture optical 

systems. A strip camera “continuously exposes a narrow strip on the film as the camera passes over the area being 

photographed” (NRO, 1963, p. 7). The KH-7 strip camera system photographed small target ground areas through 

a narrow slit near the camera focal plane and could produce stereo pairs, lateral pairs, and strip photography up to 

a maximum of 600 stereo pairs or an equivalent amount of continuous strip photography per mission.

8

 It should be noted that commercial satellites’ resolution is controlled by the U.S. Government. As of 2011, 

commercial remote sensing licensing granted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

limits commercial imagery’s resolution to no better than 0.5 meter (1.64 ft.) ground sampled distance (GSD) for 

black and white imagery, and 2.0 meters (6.56 ft.) GSD for multispectral imagery.
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for orbital temperature effects on focus, and improving orbital vehicle stability, film, and 

film processing (NRO, 1982). Gambit operators used yet another method to get sharper 

pictures, which was to fly in very low orbiting altitudes of approximately 80–90 nm above 

the earth (the NRO could fly Corona’s KH-4B system as low as 80 nm, too), requiring 

command system orbital adjustments to keep the satellite from an uncontrolled re-entry 

into Earth’s atmosphere. On one later KH-8 mission, the NRO flew the satellite as low as 

63 nm (NRO, 1963; Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991; NIMA, 2002; Smith, 1997).

The NRO attempted 38 Gambit-1 surveillance satellite missions from July 1963 to June 

1967. Ultimately the Gambit-1 program was a success, with 36 payloads reaching low 

earth orbit and 34 being recovered, but the early flight program experienced a myriad of 

challenges. A significant number of the first 23 missions were plagued with flight issues 

caused most frequently by control gas valves in the orbital control vehicle (OCV), and 

the intelligence value of returned film was minimal in a majority of the first 14 missions 

through 1964. Once the NRO corrected the valve and other problems, Gambit-1 had very 

good operational success, with 15 of the final 17 missions returning imagery of more than 

1,000 intelligence targets each, at best resolutions of 2 feet GRD. Taken together, the 29 

successful missions (i.e., missions providing meaningful imagery intelligence; see mission 

summaries in attachment) returned 19,000 frames, some 43,000 linear feet of film, and 

captured 27,534 intelligence targets (see Figure 4 for a KH-7 system diagram) (Oder, 

Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991; NIMA, 2002).9

9 The average number of KH-7 targets per mission increased over time, from 4.25 in the first year to 1,824 for the 

three 1967 missions, the last year of KH-7 flights (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991).

Figure 4. Gambit-1/KH-7 System Diagram

(Reprinted from classified source,CSNR reference collection). 
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The Gambit-3. The Gambit KH-8 camera system provided imagery that was significantly sharper and of higher quality than Gambit-1 imagery. It used a camera with an 

effective focal length more than double the KH-7’s camera (160 inches to 77 inches) and 

used higher quality film and processing techniques.10 The final KH-8 camera had a 175-

inch focal length, f/4 Newtonian prime lens with Ross corrector that gave a ground resolution so good it is still considered too sensitive to reveal. The system could be operated in 

a number of different modes to produce stereo (up to 2000 stereo pairs for the original 

KH-8 system) or monoscopic strips, and lateral pair or lateral triplet photography. Another 

primary reason for the KH-8’s very high quality imagery was improved orbital control and 

payload maneuvering through the use of a modified Agena incorporating an ingenious 

roll joint that rotated the camera in a plane perpendicular to the line-of-flight of the 

satellite vehicle (see Figure 5). By contrast, Gambit-1 used a 15-foot long orbital control 

vehicle that expended attitude control gas to perform roll maneuvers. A counter-rotating 

wheel on the Gambit-3’s roll joint compensated for the sweeping motion of the payload 

and helped maintain Earth orientation. Later versions of the roll joint were capable of 

thousands of operations per mission. Gambit’s pictures provided photo interpreters with 

a level of detail they had never gotten from satellite photos before, and would not again 

for some years. The NRO flew the Gambit-3 system operationally for a remarkable 18 

years (1966 to 1984), during which time it completed 50 successful satellite missions in 54 

attempts.11 Whereas more than half of Gambit-1 missions lasted fewer than 5 days and 

the longest Gambit-1 mission lasted 8 days, no successful Gambit-3 mission lasted shorter 

than 5 days, and the longest mission was 126 days (see “Mission Duration Comparison” 

box). Consequently, the KH-8 returned many more photographic frames on average per 

mission than the KH-7. Although it is difficult to calculate the total number of KH-8 targets (one historical estimate puts it at approximately 675,000), as a point of comparison, 

the penultimate mission (M4353) alone photographed 49,372 targets on 27,652 frames, 

more than the combined photographic take of all KH-7 missions (Oder, Fitzpatrick, and 

Worthman, 1991).

10 Eastman Kodak developed improved photographic films throughout the Gambit and Hexagon programs’ lifespan. 

To improve both film speed and resolution, Kodak produced high-definition (Type-1414) and fine-grain (SO-217) 

film, and “monodispersed” films with silver-halide crystals that were uniform in size and shape (Oder, et. al., 1991). 

11 Multiple references credit 51 successful missions, using imaging operations as the primary success criteria; 

however, Mission 4311’s imagery take never got to the users. Upon completion of 10 imaging days in January 1968, 

the satellite vehicle ejected the recovery vehicle as expected, but the parachute malfunctioned and the NRO failed 

to recover the film. The loss of the imagery qualifies as a failed intelligence mission, and so we have counted it 

as an overall mission failure (see Mission Table attachment) (Classified source), CSNR reference collection; Oder, 

Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991).

Mission Duration Comparison:

Gambit-1 vs. Gambit-3

The shortest successful Gambit-3 mission—its first, Mission 4301—lasted 6 days 

(5 photographic days), nearly equal to the longest Gambit-1 mission (8 days). Gambit-3’s 

mission 4353 acquired 27,652 frames of imagery, containing 49,372 targets, more than the 

combined photographic take of all Gambit-1 missions put together.
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 One key to the Gambit-3’s longevity was the NRO’s willingness and ability to make 

continual improvements to the system, the more significant of which were called satellite 

block changes. Mission 4332 added the R-5 optical system with a 175-inch, f/4 Newtonian 

Prime lens and Ross corrector that improved performance an estimated 30 percent and 

set a new resolution standard on its first mission. Mission 4332 also saw the first use of 

the “stretched tank” Titan-IIIB (24B) (LV). Several times the NRO upgraded the critical 

roll joint to increase the number of maneuvers that could be made throughout a mission. 

This became an increasingly vital feature after the Gambit-3 program office adopted on 

M4323 a two-RV configuration, because the roll joint (Figure 5) also compensated for 

change in the satellite’s mass and rotational inertia that occurred with the separation 

of the first RV. The two-RV Gambit system, the first block II Gambit-3, enabled longer 

length missions and the potential for more time-responsive exploitation.

One of the drawbacks with film-return systems was they could not provide finished 

intelligence data quickly enough to be communicated in the moment global crises 

developed—a capability the NRO would not have until it launched near-real-time, electrooptical satellites—but the two-RV Gambit system, with the capability to return the first 

RV on demand, allowed the NRO to monitor critical global situations without having 

to curtail an ongoing mission or wait until it concluded. After the first RV separated 

from the satellite, the remaining film was loaded into the second vehicle and the satellite 

resumed its mission (the same principle applied to Hexagon’s four-RV configuration) 

(Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991).

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 5. Gambit-3 Roll Joint (Reproduced from Oder, et. al., 1991, p. 57). 
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NRO Program Name, 

Overt ID

Gambit-1,

Program 206

Gambit-3, (“cubed”)

Program 110

Gambit-3, (“cubed”)

Program 110

Camera System KH-7 KH-8, 160-in focal 

length

KH-8, 175-in focal 

length, R-5 lens

Camera Type Strip Strip Strip

Mission Numbers 4001 - 4038 4301 - 4331 4332 - 4354

Period of Operation Jul 1963 - Jun 1967 Jul 1966 - May 1971 Aug 1971 - Aug 1984

Table 1. Gambit’s Primary Cameras, Mission Numbers, and Period of Operation

Looking Broader to Find Intelligence Targets of Interest--How Did Hexagon Do it?

Hexagon’s primary panoramic camera provided improved search coverage and resolution 

and its mapping camera provided global geodetic positioning, accurate point locations for 

military operations, and data for military targeting.12 Hexagon, with its multiple recovery 

buckets and extended mission life, moved the U.S. closer to achieving continuous space 

imaging capability. In 19 successful missions (see Mission Summaries in attachment). 

Hexagon exhaustively photographed and accurately charted virtually all the world’s 

inhabited regions. Using an average of 230,000 linear feet of film per mission (with 

308,000 linear feet being the most film used on a single mission), and capturing cloud-free 

imagery of about 80 percent of its primary Sino-Soviet bloc target area, Hexagon returned 

a tremendous volume of usable imagery for photo-interpretation. Early requirements 

planning called for area coverage per mission of approximately 20 million square nm 

(snm), but Hexagon exceeded the coverage requirement by as much as three times on a few 

missions. Hexagon missions averaged nearly 130 days in length (see Mission Summaries 

in attachment), performing up to 2,000 imaging operations and returning up to 60,000-

plus frames of panoramic imagery per mission. The NRO operated Hexagon between 

June 1971 and April 1986 and numbered Hexagon missions with a 1200 series, numbers 

1201 to 1220.13 It was America’s last film-return national reconnaissance satellite (Oder, 

Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992; NRO, 2011). 

The first Hexagon mission, number 1201, launched 15 June 1971 at 1141 Pacific Daylight Time from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Recovery vehicle number one 

(RV-1) separated five days later, 20 June, but its parachute was damaged, and it had to 

be retrieved from the Pacific Ocean. Following transport to Rochester, New York, and 

processing by Eastman Kodak, one NPIC representative at the facility reportedly reacted 

with glee: “My God, we never dreamed there would be this much, this good!” (quoted in 

Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, 1992, p. 97). Throughout its operational lifespan, the 

NRO launched Hexagon from Space Launch Complex-4 East (SLC-4E) at Vandenberg, 

12 Corona had proven the viability of space-based imaging with its first successful launch and film recovery on 18 - 19 

August 1960; Hexagon succeeded Corona as the NRO’s broad-area search and surveillance and mapping satellite. 

13 The last mission scheduled to commence in April 1986 never made it into orbit because the launch vehicle 

exploded nine seconds after liftoff.
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using Titan-IIID (later upgraded to Titan 34D) LVs that inserted the satellite into a nearpolar, sun-synchronous orbit with a 97-degree inclination and a typical perigee of 88 nm 

and apogee of 155 nm. The sun-synchronous orbit ensured that the spacecraft’s orbital 

plane maintained the same orientation relative to the Sun and facilitated the KH-9 with 

imaging points on the Earth’s surface at the same sun angle on each orbital pass. The 

shadows cast by the imaged objects on the ground thus did not change over time and the 

resulting photographs contained similar lighting and shadowing that could be analyzed to 

measure a target’s height or to detect changes to frequently imaged sites or the presence of 

new objects (Oder, et. al., 1992; Sellers, 2005).

What’s in A Name—Hexagon

The Hexagon program originated as “Fulcrum,” a CIA-sponsored series of studies 

and preliminary development activities intended to design optimal specifications for 

the next-generation search and surveillance satellite. After becoming DNRO on 1 

October 1965, Dr. Alexander Flax renamed the program: “I always wanted to assign 

a name to a system, so I chose ‘Helix,’ but it was tossed back at me,” Flax recalled. 

“Then I chose ‘Hexagon,’ which was an interesting little twist because it had to do 

with the rotary optical bar, suggesting that shape, and it also said the Pentagon, plus 

one” (Classified interview, CSNR reference collection).

At the time of its first launch in June 1971, Hexagon was the largest satellite the 

NRO had ever attempted to boost into orbit. The satellite vehicle measured 10 feet 

across and 59 feet long, and weighed about 27,000 pounds, including the shroud 

and booster adapter. Hexagon’s unprecedented size prompted a local California 

newspaper reporter covering the first launch to nickname the unacknowledged 

spacecraft, “Big Bird.” 

Hexagon was also known by the overt Air Force program identifier of Project 

467. As with Gambit, the imagery users in the Talent-Keyhole world knew the system 

by its camera number designator, in this case KH-9. The NRO numbered KH-9 missions 

using a 1200 series, 1201 to 1220.

Operators’ Corrections Ensured Hexagon’s First Flight was a Success

The NRO’s operators salvaged the first Hexagon mission through careful anomaly 

resolution. After the satellite settled into its orbit and deployed its solar panels, 

and command and telemetry subsystem operation commenced, the sensor began 

working. Very soon after, however, the flight operators began to detect trouble. 

The temperature of the main battery bay rose precipitously, causing concern over 

a potential explosion. The operator carefully monitored and controlled the sensor’s 

scanning operations to avoid completely discharging the batteries in the main bay. 

While this reduced sensor usage to about one-half its designed capacity on that 

first mission, it did not appreciably decrease expected image taking; first missions 

of new systems are usually functional demonstrations to evaluate performance and 

make corrections and improvements, and are only secondarily intelligence missions. 

Carefully tracking battery voltage for the remainder of the mission, the NRO operators 

ensured that the first Hexagon flight completed 31 days of imaging operations and 

conducted 430 photo operations (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992).
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Hexagon did not use the Agena as both Corona and Gambit had done, but instead incorporated power, attitude control, and orbital adjust functions into the basic spacecraft. 

The Hexagon spacecraft consisted of three distinct sections, forward, mid, and aft, with 

the forward section housing the four recovery vehicles and film take-up, the forward filmpath, and the mapping-camera; the mid-section housed the sensor subsystem (see Figure 

6); and the aft section contained the vehicle controls, including the satellite subsystems 

and the booster adapter needed to attach the vehicle to the Titan rocket. Hexagon had 

two mission camera systems—a panoramic camera system for its intelligence mission, and 

a mapping camera subsystem for its mapping mission.

Panoramic Camera 

The Hexagon optical subsystem housed twin, independently controllable, stereo panoramic cameras mounted side by side on rotating optical bars. The camera optics were 

enclosed within a rigid structure called the optical bar assembly, and the key to the optical 

bar configuration was the “air bar twister.”

Optical Subsystem. The optical subsystem was housed in the satellite’s mid-section. 

Each of Hexagon’s panoramic cameras featured a folded Wright optical system developed by Perkin-Elmer, with both reflecting and refracting optical elements, a 60-inch focal 

length, and f/3.0 aperture. The camera assembly weighed 5,375 pounds without any film 

loaded (the film could add up to another 2,000 pounds). The panoramic cameras used 

6.6-inch, type 1414 or the thinner-base SO-208 (black and white), SO-255 (color), and 

occasionally SO-130 (infrared), medium-resolution film. By positioning the cameras on 

opposite sides of the spacecraft, Hexagon’s design engineers had one camera scan forward 

10 degrees on the vehicle’s port side, while the second panoramic camera scanned 10 

degrees to the vehicle’s rear on the starboard side to produce 20 degree, convergent-stereo 

coverage. Throughout the Hexagon program, the NRO conducted missions containing 

both mono- and stereoscopic imagery.

As Hexagon photographed targets, its optical bars would rotate 360 degrees continuously, and a cylindrical drum platen would direct film across the focal plane, photographing targets from 30 degrees through a maximum of 120 degrees of each scanning rotation. 

The “optical bar assembly” (see Figure 7) consisted of a cylindrical housing unit that 

provided a mount and thermal protection for the optical elements, and facilitated the 

rotating motion for the system’s transverse scan (Classified source, CSNR reference collection; Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992). 
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The “Air Bar Twister” Component. The “air bar twister” was Perkin-Elmer’s (see 

Industrial Base attachment for a discussion of the contractors who built Gambit and 

Hexagon) design solution to the problem of angular changes in the high-speed film transport system. The “twister” was a twin air-bar assembly that adjusted for the twisting in the 

path as film traversed from Hexagon’s fixed position film drive assembly to the oscillating 

platen assembly. The platen assembly accurately positioned the film in the focal plane as 

an image was exposed. The twister component pivoted to accommodate the change in 

angle between the film drive assembly rollers and the platen assembly rollers. The film 

first wrapped one twister air bar before entering the oscillating platen assembly, tracking 

precisely through the focal plane, and then exiting the platen assembly to wrap the other 

air bar and return to the film drive assembly. The gas-cushioned air bars ensured that film 

would move from the supply spool to the focal-plane platen without touching surfaces that 

might streak it or cause it to heat up and stick. There was a chamber called a “looper” that 

held the film slack to prevent tearing or stretching (Classified draft manuscript, CSNR 

reference collection; Classified source, CSNR reference collection). 

Figure 6. Hexagon Sensor Subsystem.
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Mapping Camera Subsystem (MCS) 

Hexagon’s mapping camera subsystem consisted of a terrain and stellar cameras, and 

associated hardware, and a separate recovery vehicle. The terrain camera had a 12-inch, 

f/6.0 metric lens and 8 elements and used 9.5-inch film to capture images that facilitated 

the production of medium- and large-scale maps. The stellar camera featured two 10-inch 

f/2.0 lens systems and 70-mm film and took pictures of stars out of each side of the 

orbiting vehicle to obtain metric accuracy for objects on the ground.14 Because the MCS 

contained its own twin-camera system and recovery vehicle, it could operate concurrently, 

but also independently as a subordinate mission to the panoramic/intelligence mission. 

The MCS requirements called for 16 million snm of denied areas and 10 million snm 

of worldwide coverage annually. Prior to the first mission, the NRO planned to operate 

mapping cameras approximately 60 days before separating the recovery vehicle, a figure 

it reached just three times in the first eight missions, but by the last four missions, coinciding with the introduction of ultra-ultra-thin-base film, the mapping operations nearly 

doubled in length, peaking at 118 days on each of the last two missions, Missions 1215 and 

1216. The MCS coverage amount steadily increased on the first three missions, from 5.9 

million snm on Mission 1205 to 6.7 million snm on Mission 1207, culminating with 16.5 

Figure 7. Hexagon Optical Bar.

14 Both the Corona and Gambit systems used stellar cameras to photograph stars. By triangulating the fixed stars’ 

position, the NRO could determine the satellite vehicle’s precise location at the time the picture was taken. To 

establish accurate positions for Hexagon while in orbit, the NRO also employed a Doppler Beacon System (DBS) to 

get ephemeral information.
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million snm on mission 1216, the last to carry a separate mapping camera15 (Oder, et. al., 

1992; Classified source, CSNR reference collection).

NRO Program 

Name, Overt ID

Hexagon,

Program 467

Hexagon,

Program 467

Camera System KH-9 Mapping Camera 

Subsystem16

Camera Type Panoramic Mapping

Mission Numbers 1201 - 1220 1205 - 1216

Period of Operation Jul 1971 - Apr 1986 Mar 1973 - Oct 1980

Table 2. Hexagon’s Primary Cameras, Mission Numbers, and Period of Operation

Gambit and Hexagon’s National Security Contribution 

From the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s, Gambit and Hexagon collected comprehensive imagery intelligence on strategic forces and weapons systems that contributed greatly 

to U.S. national security planning and policymaking. Photographs always have been an 

information-rich source for intelligence analysts to acquire information and illustrate their 

findings to national security policymakers desirous to know factors such as: (1) where 

the enemy’s military installations are, (2) how many combat forces it has and of what 

strength, and (3) what its economic performance might be. Collecting such photography 

had always been difficult and dangerous, but national reconnaissance imagery satellites 

superseded the limitations of prior methods, e.g., camera-carrying balloons and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft flying over hostile territory, and removed the danger to pilots, 

to give the country a technological advantage in the intelligence war and a strategic edge 

in the broader Cold War. Gambit and Hexagon provided essential imagery coverage of a 

wide-range of intelligence targets, and analysis performed at imagery interpretation centers—the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC – see sidebar) principally 

performed national-level exploitation, although the CIA, DIA, and the military services 

also exploited this imagery—revealed incontrovertible visual evidence that unveiled the 

secrets of America’s Cold War adversaries. 

Although the NRO primarily operated Gambit surveillance or “spotter” satellites to 

obtain high-resolution images of priority intelligence targets for detailed scientific and 

technical analysis, and Hexagon wide-area search satellites to repeatedly photograph 

denied territory for the discovery or negation of new military installations or activities, the 

operational missions encompassed sufficient complexity to complement and overlap each 

other. For example, although KH-9 imagery contributed almost exclusively to economic 

15 A small percentage within each mission was redundant coverage, about 1 to 9 percent on missions for which 

numbers were available. The amount of redundant mission-to-mission coverage peaked at 24 percent on mission 

1215 (Classified source, CSNR reference collection).

16 Technically the mapping camera system is considered a secondary, not primary, Hexagon camera, but we included 

it here because Hexagon’s mapping mission had such impact and the system’s later block changes incorporated a 

panoramic camera with a solid state sensor capable of performing both the intelligence and mapping missions.
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activity assessments and crop yield projections, both KH-9 and KH-8 imagery revealed to 

IC photo interpreters the deployment and activities of military forces that provided orderof-battle data, and uncovered the presence of new facilities and ongoing construction of 

ballistic missile development and deployment (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992). 

During the Reagan administration, the Department of Defense drew on the vast volume 

of Gambit and Hexagon imagery intelligence to produce publications that helped make 

the case of the Soviet threat to the American public and openly demonstrate the reality of 

that threat to the international community. In the 1980s, the DoD published the unclassified Soviet Military Power handbook that highlighted new developments in the Soviet 

Union’s armed forces as it was building new generations of offensive strategic and theater 

nuclear forces, building conventional land, sea, and air forces, and expanding its strategic 

defense forces. The authors of these series of publications consulted the information 

extracted from analysis of Gambit and Hexagon imagery in assessing the Soviet threat and 

making their case.

The scope of the national security contribution of these satellite reconnaissance 

programs is too great to cover in detail in this brief overview article. However, we can 

summarize their contributions in five areas: (1) assessing the Soviet strategic threat and 

arms control treaty compliance, (2) scientific and technical weapons analysis, (3) mapping, 

(4) economic forecasts, and (5) environmental and agricultural management and disaster 

assessment.

Assessing the Soviet Strategic Threat and Arms Control Treaty Compliance 

In analyzing the Soviet strategic threat, the U.S. had to consider a number of key issues 

requiring technical intelligence. Among these were:

•	 Soviet ballistic missile development and deployment (how many the Soviets possessed,

weapons characteristics, etc.)

•	 Soviet antiballistic missile systems, air defenses, and surface-to-air missile upgrades

•	 Soviet strategic bomber force

Strategic Ballistic Missiles. Much of the information that the U.S. had about Soviet 

missile development and deployment came from Hexagon and Gambit imagery. In general 

Hexagon’s panoramic imagery discovered new ICBM sites or monitored activities at known 

locations (answering the “how many” question) and Gambit’s spotting imagery provided 

technical insight into missile development (answering the “weapons characteristics” 

question). Although not an example of Gambit’s highest resolution capabilities, Figure 8 

shows a Soviet ICBM launch site imaged on the last KH-7 mission.17

17 As of the date of this article, KH-8 imagery remains classified and KH-9 panoramic camera imagery is under review 

for release.
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By 1985 the Defense Department was concerned about Soviet development of the SA-X12, surface-to-air missile system under development to replace the SA-4. The Soviets were 

designing the SA-X-12 to counter high-performance aircraft and were to have a capability 

against tactical ballistic missiles. The interaction of the Hexagon and Gambit missions 

enabled the U.S. to monitor and assess Soviet development of the army weapon system; 

in the 1985 edition of Soviet Military Power, the DoD published artists’ sketches derived 

from reconnaissance imagery (See Figure 9) (U.S. DoD, 1985, p 69).

Even though by 1983 land-based ballistic missiles were the predominant delivery system 

for nuclear attack, the Soviets still considered bombers as a viable component of its 

nuclear force. The U.S. knew of the capabilities and deployment of the Soviet bomber 

force through analysis of Hexagon and Gambit imagery. The Backfire, which the Soviets 

introduced in 1974, deployed by 1983 some 100 of these long-range aircraft capable of 

performing nuclear strikes. The Blackjack was a new capability at the time, and it was 

a large, variable-geometry-wing aircraft capable of long-range subsonic cruise with supersonic high-altitude dash and subsonic/transonic low-level penetration. Through analysis 

of Hexagon and Gambit imagery, defense analysts determined that it could deliver both 

free-fall bombs and air-launched cruise missiles with intercontinental range. At the time, 

analysts assessed that the Blackjack would be introduced to the operational force as early 

as 1986 or 1987. Figure 10 shows a map that DoD published in the 1983 edition of 

Soviet Military Power depicting the range of Blackjack and Backfire of 2-way missions 

from Soviet Bases (U.S. DoD, 1983, p. 25).

Figure 8. KH-7 Image of Launch Site 3, Plesetsk ICBM

Complex in Former Soviet Union.
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Arms Control Treaty Compliance. As previously stated, the by-then established capabilities of the KH-8 system (and a gracefully aging KH-4) and the expected capabilities of 

the KH-9 system played a significant part in the U.S. decision to sign SALT I with the 

Soviet Union. Hexagon’s image quality and reliability, extended mission durations, and 

huge imagery volume returned per mission, gave U.S. officials a thorough enforcement 

mechanism.18 The KH-9’s comprehensive and redundant coverage allowed U.S. officials 

to locate and track new Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites, document 

the dismantling of prohibited missiles, and discover new Soviet long-range bombers 

and ballistic-missile submarines. The KH-8 contributed to verification, too. Working in 

conjunction with Hexagon search missions—the NRO typically staggered the launches 

and missions of the two systems—the KH-8 provided the detail on targeted weapons that 

enabled analysts to conclude whether or not the Soviets were deploying newer military 

equipment (e.g., missiles) in contravention of treaty agreements. The KH-8 cameras also 

allowed analysts to assess the hardness of Soviet missile silos. Gambit’s high-resolution 

imagery—and the ability to magnify original negatives up to 100 times—enabled U.S. officials to track arms shipments through a systematic measuring and cataloguing of shipping 

containers (Oder, et. al., 1991).

Figure 9. Illustration of Soviet SA-X-12 Air Defense System.

18 There was apparently some skepticism about relying on space assets so heavily. In particular, then Director of 

Central Intelligence Richard Helms was said to be concerned whether satellite photography would be sufficient 

to detect “Potemkin Village” deceptions with which the Soviets would attempt to circumvent missile deployment 

limits (Classified source, CSNR reference collection).
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Scientific and Technical Weapons Analysis

The very high resolution attainable by the KH-7 and KH-8 cameras made Gambit the 

first imaging satellite to make significant contributions to “technical” intelligence. Using 

Gambit imagery, analysts were able not only to make informed intelligence judgments on 

Soviet weapons deployments, military order of battle, and camouflage and concealment 

practices, but also to perform scientific and technical (S&T) analysis of precisely targeted 

objects and facilities, among them strategic missiles, aircraft, ballistic missile-launching 

submarines, communication vehicles and equipment, military units, and advanced 

weapons facilities. In the early 1980s the Defense Department was concerned about Soviet 

shipbuilding, which was providing their Navy with the world’s largest submarine force. 

The Hexagon and Gambit systems were watching this construction at the Severodvinsk 

Shipyard19 on the White Sea. (See Figure 11 for a KH-9 image of a typhoon class submarine 

at Severodvinsk.) Based upon Hexagon and Gambit imagery, the DoD published an 

artist’s concept of the second unit of the Soviets’ then newest OSCAR-Class nuclearpowered cruise missile attack submarine as it was fitting out at the shipyard (Figure 12) 

(U.S. DoD, 1983, p. 71).

Figure 10. Range of Soviet Strategic Bombers, Blackjack and Backfire.
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The KH-8’s capability, and in turn the analyst’s interpretative ability, dramatically 

improved over the life of the program. Upon its first launch in July 1966, the Gambit-3 

satellite provided immediate improvements over its Gambit-1 predecessor: during the 

Gambit-3’s 11-month “development flight program” (M4301 – 4306), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that it could identify and count individual military vehicle 

types and models. The final KH-8 camera achieved remarkable visual acuity and accurate 

mensuration data. Looking at a NIIRS-5 (see sidebar below) or better photograph—a 

standard that Gambit cameras regularly exceeded—even “the non-photointerpreter would 

find it easier to believe what he was being told; he could actually identify targets in the 

imagery” (Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, 1991, p. 123). Gambit-provided S&T information probably saved the U.S. millions of dollars that otherwise would have been used 

to develop and produce counterweapons for a military worst-case scenario (Smith, 2002; 

Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991).

19 Severodvinsk Shipyard was one of five at the time in the U.S.S.R. providing its navy with submarines.

Figure 11. KH-9 (M1217) Image of a Typhoon Class Submarine at Severodvinsk.
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Mapping 

Beginning on the fifth Hexagon mission (Mission 1205), the NRO incorporated a Mapping Camera Subsystem (MCS), consisting of terrain and stellar camera lenses. Hexagon 

mapping imagery contributed to the establishment of a worldwide system of accurate 

ground coordinates for a wide variety of military, civilian, and intelligence programs. 

The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) produced many products based on KH-9 MCS 

photography, including: (1) Medium- and small-scale maps and charts (topographic, aeronautical, and hydrographic maps/charts production at 1:200,000 and smaller scales); (2) 

Large-scale (1:50,000) topographic line maps; and (3) Digital terrain and feature data used 

to support advance weapons systems targeting (digital terrain elevation data). From the 

MCS-collected data, in the late-1970s the U.S. Geological Survey also constructed maps 

for the National Petroleum Reserve and Alaskan pipeline projects.

Figure 12. Illustration of Soviet Oscar-class Nuclear-powered Attack Submarine at Severodvinsk Shipyard.
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In all, users of KH-9 MCS material generated over 70,000 positional values of various 

targets. Figure 13 below shows a Hexagon MCS image of Moscow taken in 1979. The 

MCS collection assisted U.S. military targeting of newly discovered installations that 

could now be affixed positions on DMA maps. On the last three successful Hexagon 

missions, the NRO flew a block change satellite vehicle that included a solid state stellar 

camera system that gave the requisite metric accuracy to panoramic imagery to make the 

MCS unnecessary. Thus, the DMA could create precise maps from panoramic imagery, 

greatly improving Hexagon’s utility in the last three vehicles (Classified source, CSNR 

reference collection).

Although of lesser importance, the KH-7 system featured a secondary, 1.5-inch frame 

mapping camera. Though its use was limited and resolution relatively poor (400–500 feet 

at a nominal photo scale of 1:3,886,000), the KH-7 secondary mapping camera provided 

the Department of Defense (DoD) with data for production of 1:50,000 scale maps. The 

KH-8 had a 3-inch frame mapping camera, capable of 66-foot resolution at a nominal 

photo scale of 1:1,837,444. The Gambit-3 satellite was also adapted for operations in a 

higher orbit that permitted dual use or dual-mode operations as a search satellite. Still, 

Gambit’s primary mission objective was to capture high-resolution images of priority targets (Classified source, CSNR reference collection; NIMA, 2002).

A New Imagery Evaluation System – NIIRS

 Prior to the early 1970s, photointerpreters of satellite imagery used a subjective 

scale to rate image quality. Analysts would judge imagery to be “excellent,” “good,” 

“fair,” or “poor,” but these descriptions failed to assess the degree to which the 

product satisfied specific intelligence requirements. After John Hicks assumed 

directorship of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in 1973, he 

set about establishing a national imagery rating system that was independent of the 

collection system. Although the work had begun as a SALT Accountability Task Team 

with NPIC, the Committee on Imagery Requirements & Exploitation (COMIREX),* 

and the CIA Offices of Imagery Analysis and Strategic Research participating, the 

effort accelerated after the first few successful Hexagon missions, a system which 

challenged a consistent rating scheme due to the KH-9’s wide variation in image 

quality. In 1973 the SALT Accountability Task Team proposed a revised scale and 

COMIREX approved it to be used to evaluate KH-9 Mission 1207 that November. 

The initial revised scale had categories ranging from 0 to 7, based on an image’s 

“information potential for intelligence purposes,” and in March 1974, the NPIC 

produced a refined scale with categories 0 to 9. After validating the new ratings 

standards on targets imaged on KH-9 missions 1207 through 1209, the COMIREX 

approved the new scale, called the “National Image Interpretability Rating Scale,” or 

NIIRS. Sometime after September 1974 the USIB began to promote the use of NIIRS 

throughout the Community, and photointerpreters in all departments (NPIC, DIA, 

Army, Navy, Air Force) received specialized training on the new interpretive standards 

(Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991).

* The COMIREX was a DCI committee responsible for identifying the intelligence 

collection and exploitation of national reconnaissance imagery assets. It also had 

responsibilities for associated policy and R&D. 
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Economic Forecasts 

Another important use for KH-9 MCS imagery was in forecasting economic production 

of targeted adversary countries. Hexagon’s expansive coverage using both black-and-white 

and color and color/infrared film contributed to more accurate forecasts. Images of 

built-up industrial areas revealed the production of heavy metals, oil, or natural gas, and 

analysts could also derive a target area’s nuclear and conventional power capacities. The 

Hexagon MCS also proved well adapted to collecting large-acre crop inventory intelligence 

data that allowed U.S. policymakers to track Soviet economic development and estimate 

Soviet and Chinese grain production (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992).

Figure 13. KH-9 MCS Image of Moscow, Russia.
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Environmental and Agricultural Management and Disaster Assessment 

The U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior used Hexagon MCS 

imagery for environmental monitoring, agricultural management and land inventories, 

and disaster assessment. These organizations derived other products that supported their 

missions from the imagery, exemplifying Hexagon’s additional value to the country. For 

example, the Environmental Protection Agency used KH-9 MCS imagery to support their 

environmental monitoring program, and the Soil Conservation Services used the imagery 

to update county soil survey maps. The National Ocean Survey was another user of 

MC&G data, with which it revised nautical and aeronautical charts. Finally, the U.S. 

Forest Service consulted Hexagon MCS imagery to take land area inventories as part of 

the National Forest Management Act of 1976. American officials also used Hexagon 

photography to assist with damage assessments and recovery efforts following natural 

disasters. The NRO has expanded on this use for satellite imagery, and in the 21st century 

the mission of national reconnaissance assets includes acknowledged support to disaster 

recovery (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992).

Conclusion 

The Hexagon and Gambit photoreconnaissance satellites were two landmark intelligence 

systems that for more than two decades provided U.S. leadership with invaluable foreign 

intelligence on critical targets and geodetic data for maps and charts having military, 

national security, and civil planning applications. The two systems’ combined capabilities 

provided reliable technical means for U.S. officials to enforce international arms treaties 

that helped control the pace of nuclear escalation. The research, testing, and development 

investment in the spacecraft, payload, film-recovery vehicles, and other system components 

also helped advance emerging space technology and laid the groundwork for innovations 

in other technical fields. In addition, the NRO derived management, engineering, and 

operational lessons from the programs that proved beneficial in developing successor 

satellite systems. Those successor satellites ensured that Intelligence Community (IC) 

agencies thereafter would have access to a near-continual stream of imagery data for 

exploitation and analysis, with which they could make informed assessments based on 

unambiguous visual evidence (Oder, et. al., 1991; Oder, et. al., 1992).
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Gambit’s Legacy

In August 1984, as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) prepared to recover 

the last film bucket released by the Gambit satellite system, President Ronald Reagan 

conveyed the country’s gratitude for the contributions made by the Gambit program. In 

a memo titled “Commendation to the Gambit Program,” Reagan wrote:

The technology of acquiring high quality pictures from space was perfected by the 

GAMBIT Program engineers; GAMBIT photographic clarity has yet to be surpassed. 

Through the years, intelligence gained from these photographs has been essential. . . . 

[and] have greatly assisted our arms monitoring initiatives. They have also provided 

vital knowledge about Soviet and Communist Bloc scientific and technological military 

developments, which is of paramount importance in determining our defense posture. 

(quoted in Oder, et. al., 1991, pp. 117-118).

The National Photographic Interpretation Center 

The NPIC evolved from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Photo Intelligence 

Division of the Office of Research and Reports, a 13-person operation located in 

the M Building in the Foggy Bottom neighborhood of Washington, D.C. In the mid1950s, the primary photo interpretation mission was exploiting aerial reconnaissance 

photography, especially the U-2 after its maiden flight on 04 July 1956, and 

developing a photo intelligence database to satisfy substantive technical intelligence 

requirements. With the advent of satellite photoreconnaissance, the need grew 

for a national-level, interagency capability to analyze overhead photography, and in 

1961, President Eisenhower established the charter for the renamed NPIC. The first 

NPIC director was Art Lundahl, who had been a photointerpreter with the U.S. Navy 

in the Pacific Theater of World War II, and later the Chief of the Photogrammetry 

Division of the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center (NAVPIC).

By the time of the first Gambit launch in 1963, the NPIC had grown in size and 

importance to become a multi-departmental organization of more than 1,000 

employees hailing from CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and U.S. military 

intelligence organizations. The growth necessitated relocation to what would 

become the Center’s longtime home in Building 213 at the Washington Navy Yard. 

With the “quantum leaps” in satellite imagery collection technology that were 

occurring by the early 1970s—including the initiation of Hexagon operations, the 

continuing Gambit missions, and the electro-optical satellites then in development—

the CIA transferred the NPIC from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Directorate of 

Science and Technology, where it received additional funding resources necessary to 

upgrade its exploitation equipment and facilities. The NPIC provided the Intelligence 

Community, State Department, Department of Defense, military commands, and civil 

agencies with photo analysis for the next 23 years. 

The NPIC was decommissioned in 1996 and consolidated with other organizations 

as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The NIMA became the 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2003. 

Source: (Brugioni & Doyle, 1997; classified manuscript, CSNR reference collection).
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Hexagon’s Legacy

Hexagon’s development took longer and cost more than any national reconnaissance 

system that preceded it—one of the most complex mechanical devices ever put into orbit, 

the satellite vehicle had myriad, sophisticated subsystems with many moving parts that 

proved exceedingly challenging to integrate—but it met or exceeded all of the intelligence 

requirements established at program initiation, and it would be difficult to refute the 

assertion that Hexagon’s many national security benefits justified the high dollar cost. 

Throughout its 13-year operational lifespan, the system monitored the development and 

deployment of ICBMs, long-range bombers, ABMs, and ballistic-missile submarines, 

to name just a few recurring target sets. The 48,000 linear feet of usable mapping data 

it returned, resulting in total MCS ground coverage of some 104 million snm, added 

another vital element to Hexagon’s immense national security contribution.

Hexagon’s mapping camera provided the mapping community—both for foreign and 

domestic mapping requirements—with imagery to produce geospatial products at a significantly higher accuracy than the earlier KH-5 mapping system. It provided better than a 

four-fold improvement in accuracy, and more than a ten-fold improvement in resolution, 

over the former KH-5 mapping camera. The geodetic data consisted of precise geographic 

positioning, elevation, and similar information. It gave users accurate point locations 

for air, sea, and ground operations. The information derived from the mapping imagery 

could produce accurate maps at a 1:200,000 scale. It also had applications for tactical and 

strategic weapons systems target planning (NIMA, 2002).

At the end of 1973, after the NRO’s Program B had transferred Hexagon program 

control to Program A,20 the CIA’s Audit Staff reviewed the CIA’s Office of Special Project’s (OSP) management of the program. The Audit Staff concluded that Hexagon had 

been a tremendous technical success, but something of a financial disappointment. The 

design goal for Hexagon had been to produce one search and surveillance system with the 

capability to undertake the missions of both Corona and the KH-7 Gambit system, thus 

saving money by operating one system rather than two. Although Hexagon exceeded the 

technical design goal, it also greatly overran the proposed costs, leading the Audit Staff 

to speculate that had the final costs been known during development, the Community 

might have elected to scale back Hexagon’s technical capabilities or to cancel the program 

and further improve Corona instead. The OSP’s program assessment at the time was 

less speculative and perhaps more to the point: “There is no other photographic satellite 

system which has the combination of resolution, swath, mission duration, and camera 

system flexibility possessed by the Hexagon system. If for some reason the U.S. were 

forced to rely upon only one system, Hexagon would be that system” (quoted in classified 

draft manuscript, CSNR reference collection).

20 In 1962, the NRO established an alphabetic program office structure, with offices A through D. Each office 

received staffing and human resources support from its parent organization, which were as follows: NRO Program 

A–U.S. Air Force; Program B–CIA; Program C–U.S. Navy; Program D (until 1974)–Air Force and CIA.
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Declassification

These satellite reconnaissance programs remained classified until 2011, the year NRO 

celebrated its 50th Anniversary. On 2 June 2011, DNRO Bruce Carlson signed guidance 

declassifying most programmatic elements of the NRO’s Gambit and Hexagon satellite 

reconnaissance programs. While the declassified information included program names, 

mission numbers, operating dates, certain hardware and details about the programs, the 

NRO continues to protect some information still considered to be sensitive.

The decision to declassify these programs was a slow and deliberate process that took 

some ten years. The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) conducted 

a series of assessments of the risks of declassifying program details, and it consulted with 

experts across the Intelligence Community. The NRO’s Information Access & Release 

Team (IART) carefully developed a declassification guide and conducted the necessary 

coordination within the Intelligence Community.21 After the decision, the NRO applied 

the declassification according to its phased implementation plan. This painstaking 

approach underscored that these programs produced state-of-the-art capabilities that, even 

in 2011, remained impressive. As one of the authors remarked in the foreword to a compendium of program documents, “National reconnaissance is too valuable of a national 

treasure for its secrets to be lost to compromise” (quoted from Outzen, 2012, p. IV). 

Even though these programs remained highly sensitive and classified over the past 27 

years, Presidents of the United States made public references to their value.

President Lyndon Johnson, in March 1967, stated,

. . . we’ve spent thirty-five or forty billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else 

had come out of it except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would 

be worth ten times what the whole program cost. Because tonight we know how many 

missiles the enemy has . . . (Soory, 1967)

Johnson made this off-the-record statement to demonstrate that the knowledge the U.S. 

gained from satellite reconnaissance confirmed that initial U.S. estimates of the Soviet 

threat were too high, which enabled the country to reallocate funds to capabilities it 

needed to build.

President Jimmy Carter on 1 October 1978 stated, 

Photoreconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world 

affairs in the monitoring of arms control agreements. They make immense contribution 

to the security of all nations. (p. 1686).

21 The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is a component of the Business Plans and 

Operations at the National Reconnaissance.
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He made this statement during a speech at the Kennedy Space Center to share his 

confidence in the “national technical means” of photosatellite reconnaissance in order to 

engender public support for SALT II.

The Gambit and Hexagon systems impressed Presidents and provided their national 

security teams with critical intelligence about Cold War adversaries. They were revolutionary by the standards of the time and continued to be impressive for a least a quarter of 

a century after their termination. They laid the technological groundwork and were the 

inspiration for the next generation of imaging reconnaissance satellites, NRO’s near-realtime imaging systems. The Gambit and Hexagon operations previewed in the mid-20th 

century what would become commonplace in 2011 at the NRO’s 50th Anniversary date—

satellite reconnaissance imagery routinely incorporated into intelligence and military 

operations, unclassified commercial space imagery available for anyone to purchase, and 

Google Earth where space imagery can be viewed anywhere in the world on an Internet 

computer.

NOTE to Reader: The authors wish to thank Randy Cohen of the National 

Reconnaissance Operations Center (NROC) for reviewing this article. 

Robert A. McDonald is the Editor of National Reconnaissance and the 

Director of the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR).

 Patrick Widlake is Assistant Editor of National Reconnaissance and Senior Research 

Analyst in the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR).
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References

Brugioni D.A. and Doyle, F.J. (1997). Arthur C. Lundahl: Founder of the Image 

Exploitation Discipline. In R. McDonald (Ed.), Corona Between the Sun and the Earth: 

The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (pp. 159-166). Bethesda, MD: American 

Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

Carter J. (1978). “Remarks at the Congressional Space Medal of Honor Awards Ceremony.” 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol 14, No. 40, pp 1671-1727, 9 October.

McDonald, R. A. (1997). Corona, Argon, and Lanyard: A Revolution for U.S. Overhead 

Reconnaissance. In R. McDonald (Ed.), Corona Between the Sun and the Earth: The 

First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (pp. 61-74). Bethesda, MD: American Society for 

Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

McDonald, R.. A. (2002). Beyond Expectations—Building an American National Reconnaissance 

Capability: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National Reconnaissance. Bethesda, 

MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

National Reconnaissance Office. (1963, 5 April). KH-7 Camera Data. CSNR reference 

collection.

National Reconnaissance Office. 2011). Hexagon Exhibit. CSNR reference collection.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (2002). America’s Eyes: What We Were Seeing. 

[Historical Imagery Declassification Conference]. CSNR reference collection. 

Oder, F. C. E.; Fitzpatrick, J. C.; and Worthman, P. E. (1991, June). The GAMBIT Story.

Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

Oder, F. C. E.; Fitzpatrick, J. C.; and Worthman, P. E. (1992, December). The HEXAGON 

Story. Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Special Projects (SAFSP). (1978, January). 

“Project Hexagon Overview.” In J. Outzen (Ed.), Critical to National Security: The Gambit 

and Hexagon Satellite Reconnaissance Systems. Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance. 

Outzen, J. D. (2012). Critical to National Security: The Gambit and Hexagon Satellite 

Reconnaissance Systems. Chantilly, VA: The Center for the Study of National 

Reconnaissance. 

Powell, R. M. (1997). Evolution of Standard Agena: Corona’s Spacecraft. In R. McDonald 

(Ed.), Corona Between the Sun and the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (pp. 

121-132). Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

Sellers, J. J. (2005). Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 3rd ed. New York, 

NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Smith, C. E. (2001). CIA’s Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology. In Haines, G.K. 

and Leggett, R.E. (Eds.). Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union

(pp. 105–133). Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office.
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Smith, F. D. (1997). The Design and Engineering of Corona’s Optics. In R. McDonald 

(Ed.), Corona Between the Sun and the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space

(pp. 111-120). Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote 

Sensing.

Soory, S. H. (1967, 18 March). LBJ Says “Spy” Justifies All Space Cost. The Washington 

Post, reprinted from The Los Angeles Times. CSNR reference collection.

U.S. Department of State. (1972). Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Accessed 14 

September 2011 from http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.

html

U.S. Department of Defense. (1983). Soviet Military Power. CSNR reference collection.

U.S. Department of Defense. (1985). Soviet Military Power. CSNR reference collection.
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Attachments: Gambit and Hexagon Mission Summaries

Launch Mission No. Camera Mission22

Date & Length Designator Success Remarks

1963

12 Jul. 4001 (1 day) KH-7 Yes 1st successful high-resolution imagery mission

06 Sep. 4002 (2 days) KH-7 Yes Resolution better than 3 ft.

25 Oct. 4003 (2 days) KH-7 Yes First flight to use color film

18 Dec. 4004 (1 day) KH-7 No Orbital-control gas lost; no usable film recovered

1964

25 Feb. 4005 (2 days) KH-7 No No usable film due to anomalous yaw

11 Mar. 4006 (3 days) KH-7 Yes First flight with stellar-index camera; conducted

 low altitude experiments (70 n.m.) for 7 revs.

23 Apr. 4007 (4 days) KH-7 Yes Imaged two days at low orbit; 209 targets imaged

19 May 4008 (1 day) KH-7 Yes Mission limited to 1 day due to vehicle instability

06 Jul. 4009 (2 days) KH-7 No Attitude control problems; no targets covered

14 Aug. 4010 (5 days) KH-7 Yes Electrical/programmer issues impaired resolution

23 Sep. 4011 (4 days) KH-7 Yes Focus error and gas leak impaired resolution

08 Oct. 4012 (0 days) KH-7 No Agena failure; satellite did not reach orbit

23 Oct. 4013 (4 days) KH-7 No Re-entry problem; RV lost

04 Dec. 4014 (1 day) KH-7 Yes Power issue; mission aborted on revolution 18

1965

23 Jan. 4015 (4 days) KH-7 Yes

12 Mar. 4016 (4 days) KH-7 Yes

28 Apr. 4017 (5 days) KH-7 Yes Diagnostic instrumentation added

27 May 4018 (5 days) KH-7 Yes 1st mission with over 1,000 targets covered

25 Jun. 4019 (1 day) KH-7 No Massive short circuit; no targets covered

12 Jul. 4020 (0 days) KH-7 No Atlas failure; no orbit

03 Aug. 4021 (4 days) KH-7 No Power converter failure; no targets covered

30 Sep. 4022 (4 days) KH-7 Yes 1st mission with better than 2 ft. resolution 

08 Nov. 4023 (1 day) KH-7 Yes Loss of control gas, stability; mission lasted 1 day

1966

19 Jan. 4024 (5 days) KH-7 Yes First successful use of color film

15 Feb. 4025 (5 days) KH-7 Yes

18 Mar. 4026 (6 days) KH-7 Yes

19 Apr. 4027 (6 days) KH-7 Yes 1st flight with 2,000+ targets covered (2,010)

14 May 4028 (6 days) KH-7 Yes 1st successful night photography

03 Jun 4029 (6 days) KH-7 Yes

12 Jul. 4030 (8 days) KH-7 Yes Longest mission to date (8 days)

29 Jul. 4301 (6 days) KH-8 Yes 1st Gambit-3 mission; better than 2 feet GRD

16 Aug. 4031 (8 days) KH-7 Yes

16 Sep. 4032 (7 days) KH-7 Yes

28 Sep. 4302 (7 days) KH-8 Yes

12 Oct. 4033 (8 days) KH-7 Yes

02 Nov. 4034 (7 days) KH-7 No Pyrotechnic/door problem; no camera operation

05 Dec. 4035 (8 days) KH-7 Yes

14 Dec. 4303 (8 days) KH-8 Yes 1st use of ultra-thin base film (5,000 ft.); ESTAR

 ultra-thin base had thickness of 1.5 + 0.1 mils

22 Mission success can be a subjective measurement, but for the purposes of this table, an unsuccessful mission 

indicates one or more of three conditions: 1) the satellite failed to reach orbit; 2) the NRO failed to recover the 

film; or 3) the Intelligence Community determined that the film recovered contained no useful intelligence 

imagery.
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Launch Mission No. Camera Mission

Date & Length Designator Success Remarks

1967

02 Feb. 4036 (8 days) KH-7 Yes Prime command system failed, revolution 126

24 Feb. 4304 (8 days) KH-8 Yes

26 Apr. 4305 (0 days) KH-8 No Second stage failure; failed to reach orbit

22 May 4037 (8 days) KH-7 Yes Best ever KH-7 resolution

04 Jun. 4038 (8 days) KH-7 Yes Last KH-7 flight; equaled best resolution 

20 Jun. 4306 (10 days) KH-8 Yes 1st Gambit mission lasting 10-days

16 Aug. 4307 (10 days) KH-8 Yes More than 2,000 targets covered (2,091)

19 Sep. 4308 (10 days) KH-8 Yes

25 Oct. 4309 (10 days) KH-8 Yes

05 Dec. 4310 (11 days) KH-8 Yes

1968

18 Jan. 4311 (10 days) KH-8 No Parachute failed; RV not recovered

13 Mar. 4312 (10 days) KH-8 Yes Roll joint capable of 2,250 maneuvers installed

17 Apr. 4313 (10 days) KH-8 Yes New high of 2,658 targets covered

05 Jun. 4314 (10 days) KH-8 Yes Use of shortened photographic burst times

 (conserved film and increased number of targets)

06 Aug. 4315 (10 days) KH-8 Yes More than 3,000 targets covered (3,058)

10 Sep. 4316 (10 days) KH-8 Yes Redundant attitude control system installed

06 Nov. 4317 (10 days) KH-8 Yes

04 Dec. 4318 (7 days) KH-8 Yes Mission cut short; attitude control problems

1969

22 Jan. 4319 (10 days) KH-8 Yes Agena inserted into higher than usual orbit; 

 Soviet satellite Cosmos 264 made a close pass

04 Mar. 4320 (10 days) KH-8 Yes

15 Apr. 4321 (10 days) KH-8 Yes

03 Jun. 4322 (10 days) KH-8 Yes More than 4,000 targets covered (4,032)

23 Aug. 4323 (15 days) KH-8 Yes 1st block-II vehicle; 1st dual-RV system

24 Oct. 4324 (14 days) KH-8 Yes Agena velocity meter burned to depletion;

 higher apogee resulted in some photography loss

1970

14 Jan. 4325 (11 days) KH-8 Yes RV-2 parachute failed, lost RV-2

15 Apr. 4326 (14 days) KH-8 Yes

25 Jun. 4327 (11 days) KH-8 Yes Command programmer malfunction; RV-2 lost

18 Aug. 4328 (16 days) KH-8 Yes RV-2 ejected after 16 days

23 Oct. 4329 (18 days) KH-8 Yes

1971

21 Jan. 4330 (18 days) KH-8 Yes 1st test for atmospheric survivability of spent 

 satellites suggested debris likely not recoverable

22 Apr. 4331 (19 days) KH-8 Yes

15 Jun. 1201 (31 days) KH-9 Yes 1st Hexagon mission; RV-1, RV-3 parachutes 

 failed; RV-1 recovered from water, RV-3 lost

12 Aug. 4332 (22 days) KH-8 Yes 1st mission of R-5 lens (175-in.) system; new

 corrector lens with improved performance 

23 Oct. 4333 (24 days) KH-8 Yes

1972

20 Jan. 1202 (39 days) KH-9 Yes Film broke in Camera B at end of RV-2; the 

 20-days remaining returned monoscopic coverage

17 Mar. 4334 (24 days) KH-8 Yes

20 May 4335 (0 days) KH-8 No Pneumatic regulator in Agena failed, resulting in 

 total loss; satellite debris recovered in England
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Launch Mission No. Camera Mission

Date & Length Designator Success Remarks

1972 (continued)

07 Jul. 1203 (57 days) KH-9 Yes Most coverage capture in a single mission, 

 65 million sq. nm

01 Sep. 4336 (27 days) KH-8 Yes Last Gambit-3, block-II flight.

10 Oct. 1204 (68 days) KH-9 Yes Featured on-orbit image motion compensation

21 Dec. 4337 (31 days) KH-8 Yes 1st block-III flight; new roll joint capable of

 18,000 maneuvers

1973

09 Mar. 1205 (63 days) KH-9 Yes 1st Hexagon with mapping camera system; all RVs 

 recovered in mid-air

16 May 4338 (28 days) KH-8 Yes

26 Jun. 4339 (0 days) KH-8 No Agena main tank ruptured; no orbit

13 Jul. 1206 (74 days) KH-9 Yes Color film and 500 ft. of near-IR film used

27 Sep. 4340 (30 days) KH-8 Yes

10 Nov. 1207 (102 days) KH-9 Yes 1st block-II panoramic camera and SBA23

1974

13 Feb. 4341 (30 days) KH-8 Yes 

10 Apr. 1208 (105 days) KH-9 Yes All objectives satisfied; RV-1 water recovery

06 Jun. 4342 (46 days) KH-8 Yes block changes; TGS says Block-IV on 4348

14 Aug. 4343 (45 days) KH-8 Yes

29 Oct. 1209 (129 days) KH-9 Yes All mission objectives satisfied

1975

18 Apr. 4344 (46 days) KH-8 Yes First Titan (LV) low-level shutdown sensor

08 Jun. 1210 (120 days) KH-9 Yes Power relay failure impaired mapping function

09 Oct. 4345 (50 days) KH-8 Yes

04 Dec. 1211 (116 days) KH-9 Yes Aft camera failed on day 20; resumed monoscopic operations with RV-4

1976

22 Mar. 4346 (56 days) KH-8 Yes

08 Jul. 1212 (154 days) KH-9 Yes

15 Sep. 4347 (51 days) KH-8 Yes

1977

13 Mar. 4348 (69 days) KH-8 Yes Final block change; 1st dual-platen camera with

 9- and 5-in. film and improved film drive

27 Jun. 1213 (180 days) KH-9 Yes 1st block-III vehicle; longest mission to date 

23 Sep. 4349 (73 days) KH-8 Yes

1978

16 Mar. 1214 (177 days) KH-9 Yes Used ultra-ultra-thin base film (1.2 + 0.1 mils)

1979

16 Mar. 1215 (188 days) KH-9 Yes

28 May 4350 (90 days) KH-8 Yes Best resolution ever achieved

23 SBA=satellite basic assembly.
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Launch Mission No. Camera Mission

Date & Length Designator Success Remarks

1980

18 Jun. 1216 (258 days) KH-9 Yes Record mission length; last mission flown with 

 mapping camera

1981

28 Feb. 4351 (110 days) KH-8 Yes

1982

21 Jan. 4352 (119 days) KH-8 Yes Only dual-mode mission; RV-1 lost

11 May 1217 (203 days) KH-9 Yes 1st mission with solid-state stellar sensor; NRO 

 recovered RVs-2, 3, and 4 from water

1983

15 Apr. 4353 (126 days) KH-8 Yes Longest duration Gambit-3 mission: 126 days;

 49,372 targets covered

20 Jun. 1218 (270 days) KH-9 Yes Longest duration Hexagon mission: 276 days, 

 including “solo” flight; 303,527 ft. of film

1984

17 Apr. 4354 (116 days) KH-8 Yes Last Gambit-3 mission; 

25 Jun. 1219 (108 days) KH-9 Yes Command system problem ended mission early;

 RV-4 not used

1986

18 Apr. 1220 (0 days) KH-9 No Titan booster failure; entire mission lost

Source: (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1991; Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992)
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Industrial Base Support to Gambit and Hexagon Programs

Hexagon and Gambit were built by contractors with extensive space systems experience. Some of the nation’s best scientists and engineers developed, or consulted on, 

Hexagon and Gambit; indeed, the history of complex national reconnaissance satellites 

demonstrates how these programs have benefitted from the contributions of innovative 

and forward-thinking individuals and companies. A core group of companies formed 

what became a robust space industrial base that steadily grew in size and capability after the 

advent of ballistic missile development in the 1950s. The complexity and compartmented 

sensitivity of national reconnaissance programs ensured that NRO programs drew upon 

the resources of a recurring group of experienced contractors who had built satellites and 

space components before, including Lockheed Missiles and Space, General Electric, Itek, 

Eastman Kodak, Perkin-Elmer, McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, Thompson-RamoWooldridge (TRW), Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation, Douglas Aircraft 

Company, as well as the not-for-profit advisory organizations, The Aerospace Corporation 

and RAND. As the NRO increased the number and type of satellites being developed, and 

its engineers produced ever larger and more complex payloads, the companies’ number of 

employees also grew dramatically. For example, Perkin-Elmer saw its number of employees 

developing the sensor subsystem on Hexagon, including sub-contractors, grow from 150 

to 700 (Oder, Fitzpatrick, & Worthman, 1992; McDonald, 1995). 

With each of the different contracting companies being responsible for separate system 

components, which they developed individually in secure facilities located quite literally 

from East Coast to West Coast of the U.S., it could have been the proverbial “recipe for 

disaster.” The unifying vision and management of the NRO program offices, combined 

with a “mission-first” approach, even among competing contractors, ensured program success. The contractors all worked on a coordinated schedule, consulting Interface Control 

Documents (ICDs) that helped manage the overall system configuration and the connections between the sub-components to ensure performance specifications were met after 

assembly. The ICDs also served as technically binding agreements on the responsibilities 

of each company. The principal contractors that developed, built, and tested the Gambit 

and Hexagon satellite systems are listed below. 
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Principal Contractors on Gambit Program:

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company — Satellite control system, Agena spacecraft

Eastman Kodak — Photographic payload section

Martin-Marietta — Titan-IIIB booster vehicle and launch support

General Electric — Command subsystem and reentry vehicles

[Source: Oder, et. al., 1991, p. 104]

Principal Contractors on Hexagon Program:

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company — Satellite basic assembly and

system integration

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company — Mark 8 reentry vehicle

(pan film recovery)

General Electric Company, Aerospace Electronics Systems Dept. —

Extended system command

Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation — Software to select scan modes 

Itek Corporation Optical Systems Division — Mapping camera subsystem

GE, Reentry Systems Division — Mark V Reentry vehicle

Aerospace Corporation — General systems engineering

Perkin-Elmer Corporation — Sensor subsystem

[Source: Oder, et. al., 1992, pp. 242-243]