NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

CORY ROBERT CANDLER, 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0279

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-130418-001

The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Michael O'Toole

Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 

Janelle A. McEachern, Attorney at Law, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
STATE v. CANDLER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge James P. Beene and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Corey Candler appeals his conviction of reckless 

manslaughter. He argues the superior court improperly instructed the jury 

on reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-degree 

murder; he also argues insufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 M.W. was married to Candler's mother.

2 Candler moved into 

the couple's Buckeye home to help care for his mother after she was 

diagnosed with cancer and continued to live in the home with M.W.

following his mother's death. By Candler's own admission, however, he 

and M.W. did not get along. M.W. could "be a real jerk sometimes,"

according to Candler. Likewise, M.W. "never liked [Candler]," or at least 

hadn't since Candler "beat [M.W.] up."

¶3 According to Candler, June 24, 2014 was like any other day—

Candler and M.W. drank alcohol and watched television. But then, a 

conversation about Candler's mother and other things escalated. As 

Candler put it, M.W. went on "one of his rants," and Candler got "loud."

Eventually, Candler retrieved a .357 Magnum, loaded three of its six 

chambers with ammunition and began "checking out the action" as he sat 

 

1 The State filed a notice of cross-appeal, but did not pursue it. In the 

absence of briefing in support of the State's cross-appeal, we dismiss the 

cross-appeal. 

2 Upon review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all inferences against Candler. 

State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. CANDLER

Decision of the Court

3

on a couch in the living room near M.W.3 After a verbal exchange about 

the gun, Candler fired a shot, which struck M.W. behind his left ear, 

travelled through his brain and exited his right cheek. By 8:38 a.m., Candler 

presumed M.W. was dead.

¶4 After watching M.W. die, Candler called different members 

of his family to explain what happened. He considered "running" or 

"suicide by cop," but his family convinced him to call the police. Six hours 

after shooting M.W., Candler finally called 9-1-1.

¶5 Candler was indicted on one count of second-degree murder; 

the indictment alleged he intentionally, knowingly or, under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to human life, recklessly caused M.W.'s

death. At the close of evidence, the superior court found insufficient 

evidence to instruct the jury on reckless second-degree murder. But, over 

Candler's objection, the court granted the State's request to instruct the jury 

on the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter.

¶6 The jury found Candler guilty of reckless manslaughter. 

Candler later moved the court to enter a judgment of acquittal, arguing, 

among other things, the court improperly instructed the jury on reckless 

manslaughter and the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 

The court denied the motion and sentenced Candler to 10.5 years' 

imprisonment. Candler timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2017), 13-4031 (2017) and 

-4033(A) (2017).4

DISCUSSION

A. Instruction on Reckless Manslaughter.

¶7 We review the superior court's decision to give or refuse a 

jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hurley, 197 Ariz. 400, 402, 

¶ 9 (App. 2000). "A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory of the 

case reasonably supported by the evidence." State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 

309 (1995). Additionally, "[b]oth the defendant and the prosecutor are 

 

3 Candler left an empty chamber between each loaded chamber, and 

described "checking out the action" as spinning the gun's cylinder.

4 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. CANDLER

Decision of the Court

4

entitled to instructions on any lesser-included offense for which there is 

evidentiary support." Hurley, 197 Ariz. at 403, ¶ 13.

¶8 Candler concedes that reckless manslaughter is a lesserincluded offense of intentional, knowing or reckless second-degree murder. 

But he argues that if he was not reckless enough to commit reckless seconddegree murder, as the superior court determined, he lacked the requisite

mental state for reckless manslaughter. Therefore, he contends, the court 

erred when it instructed the jury on reckless manslaughter.

¶9 Under Arizona law, a person commits reckless second-degree 

murder if, without premeditation, "[u]nder circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to human life, the person recklessly engages in 

conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of 

another person." A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3) (2017). Conversely, as relevant 

here, a person commits reckless manslaughter by "[r]ecklessly causing the 

death of another person." A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) (2017). The additional

element that must be proved to convict a defendant of reckless seconddegree murder—"an extreme indifference to human life which creates a 

grave risk of death to another"—"describes a higher quantum of 

recklessness" than required for manslaughter. State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 

627 (App. 1996) (citing State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 291 (App. 1982)).

¶10 In Walton, the court explained that "while manslaughter 

requires only a showing of recklessness, reckless second degree murder 

requires also a showing of 'extreme indifference to human life' which 

created a 'grave risk of death' to another in addition to the requirement of 

recklessness." 133 Ariz. at 291. This requirement establishes "a more 

culpable mental state" for reckless second-degree murder than for

manslaughter. Id. (degree of recklessness required for reckless seconddegree murder might include, e.g., shooting into a crowded room or

derailing a speeding train). Later, in State v. Woodall, 155 Ariz. 1, 3 (App. 

1987), the court clarified that the additional showing for reckless seconddegree murder "does not create an additional culpable mental state but only 

requires an extreme form of recklessness greater than is required for 

manslaughter."

¶11 In this case, the superior court aptly explained its decision not 

to instruct the jury on reckless second-degree murder, while allowing an

instruction on reckless manslaughter:

The Court will sustain the Defendant's objection to the State's 

request to give the third prong of the murder instruction. 
STATE v. CANDLER

Decision of the Court

5

There is insufficient evidence from which a rational juror 

could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 

committed the killing with the high degree of recklessness 

needed for second degree murder.

The Court will, however, overrule the Defendant's objection 

to the State's request for lesser-included manslaughter. There 

is sufficient evidence of the lower degree of recklessness. This 

lower degree of recklessness is a lesser of the greater states of 

mind included in the definitions of intentional and knowing.

¶12 Although the court expressly cited the "degree of 

recklessness" each offense requires, we understand the basis of its ruling to 

be that there was sufficient evidence of recklessness to instruct the jury on 

reckless manslaughter, but there was insufficient evidence that Candler 

acted under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human 

life that created a grave risk of death, as reckless second-degree murder 

would require. See id. (reckless second-degree murder requires "an 

extreme form of recklessness greater than is required for manslaughter"). 

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 

instruct the jury on reckless second-degree murder but allowed an 

instruction on reckless manslaughter.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶13 Candler also argues there was insufficient evidence showing

he acted recklessly. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). "[T]he 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 562, ¶ 16 

(quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)).

¶14 The culpable mental state of "recklessly" is defined in A.R.S. § 

13-105(10)(c) (2017):

"Recklessly" means, with respect to a result or to a 

circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, that 

a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial 

and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the 

circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and 

degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 

person would observe in the situation. A person who creates 
STATE v. CANDLER

Decision of the Court

6

such a risk but who is unaware of such risk solely by reason 

of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to 

such risk.

Reckless manslaughter, therefore, requires that one be aware of a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that one's conduct will cause another's 

death and consciously disregard that risk. See A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1).

¶15 Candler argues he shot M.W. accidentally, not recklessly. 

According to Candler, at the time of the shooting he was trying to place the 

gun on an end table between him and M.W. because M.W. did not "like" 

that Candler had the gun. According to Candler, as he reached to place the 

gun on the end table, M.W., 69 years old and with a blood-alcohol content 

of .22, reached toward the gun. He contends that in response, Candler 

pulled the gun back and allegedly fired it accidentally, killing M.W.

¶16 As Candler also admitted, however, he retrieved and loaded 

the gun after he and M.W. had been arguing and drinking alcohol. He did 

not empty the chamber of the gun before he allegedly reached to place the 

gun on the end table, and in fact, he left a bullet in the active chamber of the

revolver. And, by his own account, as he pulled the loaded gun away from 

M.W., he kept his finger on the trigger and pointed the gun at M.W. Thus, 

although the jury could have agreed with Candler and found he did not 

intentionally or knowingly cause M.W.'s death, it also could have found, 

based on the evidence presented, that Candler consciously disregarded a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would cause M.W.'s 

death. See State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 153, ¶ 19 (2006) (jury may infer 

from the evidence that a defendant was aware of the substantial risk created 

by his conduct).

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Candler's conviction and 

resulting sentence.