NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KRYSTLE M., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.M., G.M., Appellees. 

 No. 1 CA-JV 19-0013 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015JD201707014 

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Tom Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 11-14-2019
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Krystle M. (Mother) challenges the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her biological children C.M. and G.M.

Because Mother has shown no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother has a history of behavioral health issues and suffers 

from complex posttraumatic stress (PTSD) and attentiondeficit/hyperactivity (ADHD) disorders. Mother and the children lived in 

Oregon, where Mother pursued mental-health counseling through the New 

Perspectives Center. Despite her counseling, Mother refused medication for 

PTSD, anxiety and depression. When triggered, Mother becomes

aggressive and hostile, vacillating between intense anger, frustration and 

hopelessness. Before 2016, Mother learned C.M. was being harassed at 

school, which triggered a major PTSD episode for Mother, and due to 

several other stressors, Mother’s mental health declined.

¶3 In April 2016, Mother’s counselor recommended reducing her 

college workload, and in June 2016, Mother was fired from her job because 

she was “volatile and argumentative and used profanity . . . during the 

training.” At that time, Mother was also facing charges of reckless driving 

and child endangerment (stemming from a feud with her neighbors) and a

related child neglect investigation by the Oregon Department of Human 

Services.1 Around this time, Mother sent the children to live with their 

grandmother in Arizona. Mother remained in Oregon. A few months later, 

Mother lost her housing and had to stay with various friends or, at times, 

lived in her car.

¶4 In Arizona, when Mother had not sought custody of the 

children by April 2017, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) investigated.

1The charges were eventually dismissed, and the neglect allegations 

determined to be unsubstantiated.
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

Mother admitted prior methamphetamine use and a lack of income or 

housing. Based on disclosures by C.M., DCS also expressed concerns that 

Mother was not adequately treating her mental health. Consequently, DCS 

took custody of the children and filed a dependency petition in April 2017.

In March 2018, after several days of evidentiary hearings, the court found 

the children dependent as to Mother and adopted a family reunification 

case plan.

¶5 Meanwhile, DCS provided Mother with services, including 

substance-abuse testing, a psychological evaluation and visitation. DCS 

also asked Mother to continue engaging in mental-health services in 

Oregon. Regarding substance abuse, Mother refused to submit to a rule-out 

drug test until 2018. Mother refused a hair follicle test in February and 

tested positive for methamphetamine in May and June 2018. Mother then 

stopped testing. Despite her positive tests, admissions to her counselor and 

failing to test, Mother denied any recent use to DCS and the court.

¶6 Mother’s mental health did not improve during the 

dependency. Although her mental-health providers repeatedly 

recommended antidepressant medication, Mother consistently refused it.

She continued to struggle with severe anger, frustration and hopelessness 

and remained combative and verbally abusive in stressful situations. She 

also periodically struggled with suicidal thoughts. After getting fired in 

June 2016, Mother did not obtain another job, and she did not establish 

stable housing after October 2016.

¶7 In May 2018, Mother completed two psychological 

evaluations, one with Dr. Martha Wang and another with Dr. Paul 

Stoltzfus. Dr. Wang diagnosed Mother with PTSD and major depressive 

disorder. Dr. Stoltzfus diagnosed Mother with PTSD; major depressive 

disorder; persistent depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; 

somatization disorder; ADHD; and schizoid, masochistic, paranoid, and 

schizotypal personality traits. Dr. Stolzfus concluded that Mother’s mental 

disorders would “have a significant negative impact on her ability to parent 

her children,” and he recommended that she take psychotropic medication.

¶8 In July 2018, the court changed the case plan to severance and 

adoption, and DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on 

neglect, mental illness, substance abuse and nine- and fifteen-months timein-care. A contested severance adjudication followed, resulting in the court 

granting the motion on all grounds alleged, except neglect. This court has 

jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court 103(A) (2019).2

DISCUSSION

¶9 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground

articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); see also Michael 

J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the 

superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this 

court will affirm an order terminating parental rights so long as it is 

supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 

Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s Finding that 

Termination was Proper Based on Fifteen-Months Time-In-Care.

¶10 When seeking termination based on fifteen-months time-incare, DCS must prove that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services” to the parent. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). DCS must show 

that it provided the parent with “the time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” In re Maricopa 

Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS need not 

“provide every conceivable service or . . . ensure that a parent participates 

in each service it offers.” Id. DCS must also prove that (1) “the child has 

been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen 

months or longer,” (2) “the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, and 

[(3)] there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The “circumstances” are those “existing at the time 

of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately 

provide” for her child. Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 96 ¶ 31 n.14 (citation omitted).

¶11 Here, Mother was unable to remedy her substance-abuse, 

mental-health, income and housing issues by the termination hearing.

Mother knew that these were the issues she needed to remedy before the 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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court would reunify her and the children. Although DCS provided, and 

Mother agreed to participate in, drug testing, she refused to submit to a 

drug test until 2018—almost a year into the dependency. When she finally 

tested, she tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother then refused to 

submit to further testing, and she did not pursue substance-abuse 

treatment, despite encouragement by DCS. Instead, Mother consistently 

denied to DCS that she had any substance-abuse issues.

¶12 Mother admitted methamphetamine use during one of her 

psychological evaluations and to her counselor in Oregon. In February 

2018, Mother told her counselor that “she sometimes has to use meth to be 

able to focus and get anything done,” but denied being addicted, stating 

instead that methamphetamine was “just a stronger version of my ADHD 

medicine.” At trial, however, Mother testified that she had not used 

methamphetamine since 2008 and that her positive tests resulted from 

allergy or ADHD medication.

¶13 Mother failed to adequately address her mental-health issues.

As early as June 2016, Mother’s therapist “expressed genuine concern that 

[Mother’s] mood and mental equilibrium [was] spiraling out of control,” 

and Mother agreed but “place[d] the blame outside of herself.” Her 

therapist emphasized the need for antidepressant medication, but Mother 

told her “she will never yield on th[at] issue.” A few weeks later, Mother’s 

therapist noted “how close to truly losing-it [Mother] seems to be.” Over 

the next twenty months, Mother’s therapists repeatedly urged her to 

consider antidepressant medication as part of her ongoing treatment, but 

she refused; consequently, her mental-health and behavioral issues did not 

improve.

¶14 The record shows Mother had significant conflict with many 

in her life after 2015, including her neighbors, children’s school district,

employers, mother, boyfriends, DCS, the court and her attorneys. In times 

of hopelessness, Mother often had suicidal thoughts and periodically 

threatened to kill herself. She was still expressing suicidal intent at the time 

of the termination trial.

¶15 Finally, Mother was unable to maintain stable housing or 

income. She remained unemployed after June 2016. Mother’s only income 

at the time of the termination hearing came from selling items online.

Mother’s counselor described her condition as of May 2018 as “too 

distraught and overwhelmed to work” and “homeless,” emphasizing 

Mother “has gotten involved in a couple of unhealthy and [] unsafe 

relationships, to keep from being a homeless woman.” Mother lost her 
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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housing around August 2016, and by November, she was sleeping in her 

car. Between November 2016 and August 2018, Mother lived out of her car 

and with friends or boyfriends, many of whom had mental-health or 

substance-abuse issues and criminal records. By the time of trial, Mother 

was living in a basement in exchange for performing maintenance on the

home.

¶16 Reasonable evidence also supports the court’s finding that a 

substantial likelihood exists that Mother will not be capable of exercising 

proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. At the time 

of trial, Mother’s substance-abuse, mental health, and instability were 

ongoing issues, each of which placed the children at risk of physical, 

emotional, or mental harm if returned to her care. Citing these reasons, the 

DCS case manager concluded that Mother would be unable to safely parent 

the children in the foreseeable future. The case manager’s opinion coincides 

with that of Dr. Stolzfus, who concluded that 

[Mother] is far from minimally capable of 

parenting her children at this time. Her own 

personal life is in chaos. She is able to talk 

rationally for a period of time, but quickly slips 

into a completely paranoid and irrational 

mindset, along with significant emotional 

decompensation. Without adequate treatment, 

to which she is adamantly opposed, it is 

doubtful she is able to parent her children at this 

time, or in the foreseeable future.

He further explained that the children would be at risk of harm in her care, 

especially because she “is often irrational and agitated” and although she 

“can have times of normal and logical thinking, she triggers easily and 

immediately trips into a mental state characterized by paranoia, distortion, 

and fear.”

¶17 Mother next argues the court erred in finding DCS made a 

diligent effort to provide her with appropriate reunification services, citing 

DCS’s failure to refer her for substance-abuse treatment in Oregon or a 

psychiatric evaluation, the short-lived Skype visits between her and the 

children, and DCS’ failure to timely obtain her counseling records.

¶18 The record does not support Mother’s contentions. Based on 

her refusal to acknowledge her methamphetamine use, the court found that 

offering Mother substance-abuse treatment would have been futile.
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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Throughout the dependency, Mother refused to participate in almost all 

drug testing, and she adamantly denied any substance abuse (other than 

marijuana), even after multiple, positive methamphetamine test results.

Additionally, after admitting her methamphetamine use to her counselor 

in Oregon, Mother minimized her substance abuse, denying that she was 

addicted or that it caused any issues in her life.

¶19 Mother waived any objection to DCS’ failure to provide her 

with a psychiatric evaluation because she failed to raise this issue in 

superior court. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178 

¶ 13 (App. 2014). Even if she had not waived this argument, Mother 

suggests only that the psychiatric evaluation may have suggested helpful 

medication for her conditions. While true, Mother received medical 

management services for most of the dependency through New 

Perspectives in Oregon, and consistently refused to take any medication 

other than Adderall for her ADHD. Mother also expressly rejected Dr. 

Stoltzfus’ assessment and voiced to her counselor her “refus[al] to jump 

through any more of [DCS’] ‘ridiculous hoops’ including random 

[urinalysis tests] and psychiatric treatment in AZ.” Thus, reasonable 

evidence supports the finding that additional mental-health services would 

have been futile based on Mother’s “refusal to remedy her mental illness 

with medication.”

¶20 Finally, Mother argues that technical difficulties with Skype 

prevented her from having visits with her children and that DCS was “less 

than diligent” in obtaining her counseling records from New Perspectives.

However, the case manager testified that DCS offered Mother options other 

than Skype, such as phone visits and in-person visits in Arizona. Moreover, 

Mother fails to show how technical difficulties with her Skype visits 

contributed to the court’s termination order, which was based on Mother’s 

substance abuse, mental illness and instability, not on her lack of a bond 

with the children. Regarding her counseling records, Mother refused to sign 

a release allowing DCS access to most of her New Perspectives records until 

very late in the proceedings. At the termination hearing, the court received 

all of Mother’s counseling records, and therefore had the full benefit of that 

information in making its determination. Mother has thus shown no error

in the finding that DCS proved the fifteen-month time-in-care statutory 

ground. 3

3Mother also challenges the termination order under the remaining 

grounds. However, this Court need only find that reasonable evidence 
KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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II. Mother Has Shown No Error in the Court Finding Severance Was 

in the Best Interests of the Children.

¶21 Mother argues the court erred in finding that severance was 

in the children’s best interests. Mother asserts she properly cared for her 

children through the inception of this case and has been ready to parent 

them since that time. Mother’s arguments essentially ask this Court to 

reweigh the evidence, which it will not do. See Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 

222 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 11 (App. 2009). Moreover, reasonable evidence supports 

the court’s finding.

¶22 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the 

child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if 

severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 

(2018) (citation omitted). Although “the child’s prospective adoption is a 

benefit that can support a best-interests finding,” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 

239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016), the court “must consider the totality of the 

circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,” Alma S., 

245 Ariz. at 150-51 ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶23 The DCS case manager testified that severance would provide 

the children with stability and permanency. The children were in a safe and 

stable home with their grandmother, who was meeting their needs and 

wished to adopt them. There is no question that Mother loves her children, 

but as the case manager testified, grandmother is able and willing to 

provide the children with the stability that Mother could not.

CONCLUSION

¶24 The order terminating Mother’s parental rights to C.M. and 

G.M. is affirmed.

supports one termination ground to affirm the order. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 49 ¶ 14 (App. 2004).