[Cite as State v. Lenzy, 2018-Ohio-3485.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsERIC LENZY 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. 2018CA00023 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2017CR1721 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 27, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN D. FERRERO, KRISTINA R. POWERS 

Prosecuting Attorney, Stark County Public Defender 

Stark County, Ohio 201 Cleveland Ave. S.W. Suite 104 

 Canton, Ohio 44702 

By: KRISTINE W. BEARD 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Appellate Section 

110 Central Plaza, South – Suite 510 

Canton, Ohio 44702 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 2

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Eric Lenzy appeals the judgment entered by the Stark County 

Common Pleas Court convicting him of one count possession of cocaine (R.C. 

2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a)) and one count possession of drugs (R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(2)(a)) upon 

a plea of no contest, and sentencing him to three years of community control. Appellee 

is the state of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} During the afternoon hours of September 8, 2017, Canton Police Officer 

Nicholas Casto and his partner saw Appellant walking near the middle of Dill Street N.E. 

in Canton, Ohio. The area was known by police to be a high crime area. Appellant 

violated a Canton City Ordinance by walking in the middle of the street, for which a minor 

misdemeanor citation could be issued. 

{¶3} Officer Casto and his partner pulled their marked cruiser up to Appellant. 

They exited the vehicle and asked Appellant to step over to them. They wanted to identify 

Appellant, see if he had any outstanding arrest warrants, and possibly issue a citation. 

Appellant asked why he was being stopped, and Casto responded because he was 

walking in the middle of the street. Appellant took a few steps away from the officers. 

{¶4} The officers saw Appellant reach toward his waistband. Concerned 

Appellant was reaching for a gun, they tackled him. The officers seized a baggie of crack 

cocaine and a Suboxone pill in a wrapper from Appellant. 

{¶5} Appellant was indicted for possession of cocaine and possession of drugs, 

both felonies of the fifth degree. He moved to suppress the drugs, and the case 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 3

proceeded to a suppression hearing in the Stark County Common Pleas Court, at which 

Officer Casto was the only witness to testify. 

{¶6} On direct examination, Casto testified when asked to step over to the 

cruiser, Appellant became confrontational, and asked what he was being stopped for. 

Appellant reached in his pockets and waistband, and the officers took him to the ground. 

Casto testified, “And at that point is where we located that he had a baggy with some 

crack on it, which he admitted that that’s what it was, and also a Suboxone wrapper with 

an orange pill that I believe was sent to the lab and tested as Suboxone.” Tr. 12. He 

testified when they saw Appellant go into his pants pocket, they became concerned with 

officer safety. As to the crack cocaine, he testified, “I believe it was hanging out of his 

pocket or right underneath him.” Tr. 13. 

{¶7} On cross-examination, Casto testified Appellant “began to kind of just walk 

away, not acknowledge us. Obstructing, if you will.” Tr. 22. He testified Appellant 

committed the offense of obstructing official business. He testified Appellant took maybe 

two or three steps away from them, delaying official police business by about one second. 

Tr. 26. He testified before Appellant reached into his waistband, he was under arrest for 

obstructing, and they immediately searched Appellant after he was handcuffed. 

{¶8} The court then questioned Casto further concerning where the drugs were 

found. The following colloquy occurred between the court and Casto: 

 THE COURT: Okay. And tell me how then you discovered the 

contraband. 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 4

 THE WITNESS: I think it’s in my report1 where the Suboxone strip 

was, I believe that was in his right pocket, and the baggy of cocaine. That 

he admitted that it was, was laying under him, when we – after we took him 

to the ground. 

 THE COURT: Okay. It didn’t feel like a weapon? Basically, from 

your perspective at this point in time, it was a search incident to an arrest. 

I think you said that at that point in time he was under arrest for obstruction? 

 THE WITNESS: Obstructing, yes. 

 Tr. 38. 

{¶9} The court overruled the motion from the bench. After finding police could 

stop Appellant for walking in the middle of the street in violation of city ordinance, the 

court found in pertinent part as follows: 

 Upon approaching the Defendant and activating the lights, both 

officers got out of the vehicle, they asked the Defendant – asked or ordered 

the Defendant to come to them. So at that point in time they were stopping 

the Defendant. 

 The Defendant, at that time continued to walk away from them which 

gave rise to their position that he was interfering with official business, 

 

1 Casto’s report was not offered or admitted into evidence. 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 5

obstructing official business, and it was thereafter their intent to effectuate 

an arrest of this Defendant. 

 That while doing that, they observed him make a movement towards 

his waist which could well have been pulling up his trousers, as Defense 

counsel has intimated, but the police officers, at that point in time, are not 

in a position to be giving anyone the benefit of any doubt that they’re just 

pulling up their trousers, when they could be pulling out a weapon. 

 Given the history of that area, prior interactions with defendants in 

that area, guns in that area, they had every reason, at that point in time, to 

effectuate the arrest, which included the search for weapons, for 

contraband, as a search incident to an arrest. 

 While the Court appreciates the position of the defense, that the 

individual was just walking down the street when he was, in theory, 

accosted by the police officers, they had every reason to investigate. And 

when he decided to walk away from them, while at the same time reaching 

towards his waist, for officers’ safety they had every reason to effectuate 

the take down and search for weapons in which time search incident to 

arrest the contraband was seized. 

 Tr. 45-46. 

{¶10} By entry filed January 4, 2018, the court overruled the motion to suppress, 

incorporating its findings of fact and conclusions of law as stated on the record at the 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 6

hearing. Appellant entered a plea of no contest and was convicted as charged. He was 

sentenced to three years community control. 

{¶11} It is from the February 21, 2018 judgment of conviction and sentence 

Appellant prosecutes this appeal, assigning as error: 

 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.” 

{¶12} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In 

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said 

findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio 

St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d 

1141(1991); State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 621 N.E.2d 726(1993). Second, an 

appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the 

findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing 

an error of law. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (1993). Finally, 

assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence and it has properly identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the 

trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to 

suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently 

determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 7

appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 641 

N.E.2d 1172 (1994); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 620 N.E.2d 906 (1993); 

Guysinger, supra. As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 

690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), “... as a general matter 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo

on appeal.” 

{¶13} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier 

of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 

988; State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). 

{¶14} Appellant first argues police did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

of criminal activity to justify stopping him. An investigatory stop must be based upon 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, supported by specific articulable facts pointing 

towards a citizen's involvement in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 

{¶15} Reasonable suspicion to stop an individual has been found to exist in cases 

involving misdemeanor traffic offenses, including where pedestrians are illegally walking 

on a roadway. State v. Shorts, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA009965, 2011-Ohio-6202, ¶ 10–

18(officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for walking in the middle of the 

road); State v. Moorer, 2014-Ohio-4776, 23 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 21 (officer had reasonable 

suspicion to stop defendant for jaywalking); State v. Parsons, 11th Dist. No. 2015-P0084, 2016-Ohio-8109, 74 N.E.3d 945, ¶ 25 (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 8

defendant when he observed him walking with a female companion in the middle of the 

road). 

{¶16} In the instant case, Officer Casto testified Appellant was walking in the 

middle of the roadway, in violation of a Canton City Ordinance. The officers therefore 

had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping Appellant. 

{¶17} Appellant next argues the court erred in finding the officers were justified in 

seizing Appellant and conducting a pat down search for weapons. 

{¶18} An officer can conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons 

when the officer has reasonably concluded the individual whose suspicious behavior he 

is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others. 

State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408, 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993). The officer does not need 

to be certain the person has a weapon on them to initiate a pat down. State v. Smith, 56 

Ohio St.2d 405, 384 N.E.2d 280 (1978). Rather, the standard by which the officer is 

judged is that of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances, who would be 

warranted in the belief his safety was in danger. Id. at 407. “The purpose of this limited 

search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his 

investigation without fear of violence * * *.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 

S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972). 

{¶19} In the instant case, we find the officers had a reasonable belief Appellant 

was armed, justifying his seizure for a pat down search. Appellant was in a high crime 

area, where Officer Casto testified they had received prior calls concerning guns. 

Appellant reached for the pockets and waistband of his pants after questioning the reason 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 9

for the stop in a confrontational manner, at which point officers became concerned he 

was reaching for a weapon. 

{¶20} In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1993), the United States Supreme Court established the “plain feel” doctrine as it relates 

to a Terry pat-down search for officer safety. In Dickerson, the court held police may seize 

contraband detected through the sense of touch during a valid Terry pat-down, if its 

identity as contraband is immediately apparent. Id. 

{¶21} If the officer conducting the search must manipulate the object to determine 

its identity as contraband, said search exceeds the scope of a lawful Terry search and 

any resulting seizure of contraband by the officer is not justified under the plain feel 

doctrine. Id. at 378. “[O]nce the officer determines from his sense of touch that an object 

is not a weapon, the pat down frisk must stop. The officer, having satisfied himself or 

herself that the suspect has no weapon, is not justified in employing Terry as a pretext for 

a search for contraband.” Evans, supra, at 414. 

{¶22} However, while Casto’s testimony is inconsistent concerning where the 

drugs were found, he did not testify the drugs were found based on the plain feel doctrine 

during a Terry pat down for weapons. Rather, Casto testified on cross-examination and 

during questioning by the court the drugs were found during a search incident to a lawful 

arrest for obstructing official business. The trial court found the drugs were found during 

the search incident to the arrest. 

{¶23} A search incident to arrest is an exception to the general rule warrantless 

searches are per se unreasonable. State v. Mims, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT–05–030, 

2006-Ohio-862, ¶23. However, police may conduct a search of the arrestee's person 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 10

incident only to a lawful arrest. State v. Dillon, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP–1211, 2005-

Ohio-4124, ¶31. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest is inadmissible at trial. 

State v. Henderson, 51 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 554 N.E.2d 104 (1990), citing Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Probable cause to 

conduct a warrantless arrest exists when police have, at the moment of arrest, knowledge 

of facts and circumstances grounded in reasonably trustworthy information to warrant a 

belief by a prudent person an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. 

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 

{¶24} R.C. 2921.31(A) defines obstructing official business: 

 No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, 

obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act 

within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or 

impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful 

duties. 

{¶25} R.C. 2921.31(A) does not require the state to prove the offender's conduct 

prevented a public official from doing his job. State v. Stayton, 126 Ohio App.3d 158, 

163–64, 709 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (1st Dist. Hamilton 1998). Rather, the statute is satisfied 

by “any act which hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of his lawful 

duties.” Id. at 164. The Slayton court further explained: 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 11

 That is not to suggest that every act that can conceivably be said to 

hinder a police officer rises to the level of criminal conduct. Certainly there 

is a level of hindrance that is simply too casual, remote, or indirect to be 

punishable under the statute. Although entitled to full respect of the badge 

and uniform in the execution of his or her duty, a police officer is expected 

to tolerate a certain level of uncooperativeness, especially in a free society 

in which the citizenry is not obliged to be either blindly or silently obeisant 

to law enforcement. Interference with the police by citizens must, therefore, 

be necessarily viewed as a continuum along which, at a certain point, the 

line is crossed. 

 Id. 

{¶26} We find based on Officer Casto’s testimony the officers had probable cause 

to arrest Appellant for obstructing official business. On direct examination, Casto made 

no mention of an arrest or an intention to arrest for obstructing official business. For the 

first time, on cross-examination, he testified, “He began to kind of just walk away, not 

acknowledge us. Obstructing if you will.” Tr. 22. He testified the conduct which 

constituted obstructing official business was taking two or three steps away from the 

officers, delaying them by maybe a second. Tr. 26. 

{¶27} While Appellant argues at page 11 of his brief the “police were not 

hampered or impeded in any way by a one second delay in the Appellant turning around 

and complying,” the record from the suppression hearing does not support his claim he 

turned around and complied. Officer Casto was questioned concerning a notation in the 
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00023 12

police report Appellant reached in his pocket while “walking back.” Tr. 28. Officer Casto 

testified his partner wrote the supplement, and maintained Appellant was still walking 

away when he reached toward his waistband and was tackled. Tr. 28-30, 37. Officer 

Casto’s partner did not testify at the suppression hearing and his partner’s report was not 

admitted into evidence. 

{¶28} The officers only needed probable cause to arrest, not proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt Appellant was obstructing official business. Although the delay was 

slight, based on the officer’s testimony Appellant walked away and had not taken any 

action to comply with their request when they developed a reasonable suspicion he was 

armed and took him to the ground, we agree with the trial court they had probable cause 

to arrest him for obstructing official business. Therefore, we find the court did not err in 

finding the search justified as incident to a lawful arrest. 

{¶29} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stark County 

Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to Appellant. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Wise, Earle, J. concur