Historical Case Studies of Information Operations

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Edited by Col. Mark D. Vertuli and Lt. Col. Bradley S. Loudon

LARGE-SCALE COMBAT

OPERATIONS SERIES

Army University Press
Cover image: The illustration incorporates words associated with Information 

Operations with a photo of Soldiers from the 350th Tactical Psychological 

Operations, 10th Mountain Division, conducting a 2008 leaflet drop over villages 

in Kirkuk Province, Iraq. Photo by Staff Sergeant (USAF) Samuel Bendet.

Original tear graphic: Designed by Layerace/Freepik, freepik.com 

Original paper texture: Created by Freepik, freepik.com

Composite cover design: Michael P. Serravo, Army University Press
i

This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale 

Combat Operations Series, which includes:

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies 

of Combined Arms Maneuver 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case 

Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies 

of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility 

Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies 

of Information Operations 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations
ii
Perceptions Are Reality

Edited by

Colonel Mark D. Vertuli and 

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley S. Loudon

Army University Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Historical Case Studies 

of Information Operations 

in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Vertuli, Mark D., 1973- editor. | Loudon, Bradley S., 1974- 

editor. | Army University Press (U.S.), issuing body.

Title: Perceptions are reality : historical case studies of information

 operations in large-scale combat operations / edited by Mark D. Vertuli

 and Bradley S. Loudon.

Description: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Army University Press, 2018. |

 Series: US Army large-scale combat operations series | Includes

 bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018036198 (print) | LCCN 2018039418 (ebook) | 

 ISBN 9781940804521 (ebook) | ISBN 9781940804521

Subjects: LCSH: Information warfare--History. | Information warfare--

 Case studies. | Operational art (Military science)

Classification: LCC U163 (ebook) | LCC U163 .P47 2018 (print) | DDC

 355.3/43--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.20:7

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018036198

Army University Press publications cover a variety 

of military history topics. The views expressed in 

this Army University Press publication are those 

of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. A full list of Army University 

Press publications is available at: https://www.

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The seal of the Army University Press authenticates this document as 

an official publication of the Army University Press. It is prohibited 

to use the Army University Press’ official seal on any republication 

without the express written permission of the Director of the Army 

University Press.

2018

Editor

Lynne M. Chandler Garcia

iv
v

Foreword

Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground 

combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following, 

the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and 

conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than 15 

years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders 

and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as 

an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time 

in our nation’s history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and 

the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the 

Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the 

most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage 

is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive 

Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of 

these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest 

US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly 

shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full 

range of military operations. 

Over the last two years, the US Army has rapidly shifted the focus of 

its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations 

against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 

3-0, Operations, dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique 

strategic roles: shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make 

temporary success permanent.

To enable this shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change 

its culture shaped by over 15 years of persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square with 

the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the 

multi-domain battlefield when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.
To emphasize the importance of the Army’s continued preparation for 

large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has 

published these volumes of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations 

Series book set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the US Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader should reflect on 

these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play, 

evaluate leaders’ actions, and determine what differentiated success from 

failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual 

examination of lessons of the past and their application to today’s doctrine, 

organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large-scale combat. 

Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what makes us the world’s 

greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes. 

Prepared for War!

Michael D. Lundy

Lieutenant General, US Army

Commanding General 

US Army Combined Arms Center

vi
vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................... v

Illustrations .............................................................................................. ix

Introduction .............................................................................................. xi

Chapter 1—The Logic of Information Operations (IO) in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations

by Colonel Christopher W. Lowe .............................................................. 1

Chapter 2—US Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat 

Operations: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force

by Major Justin B. Gorkowski ................................................................ 17

Chapter 3—The Fog of Russian Information Warfare

by Lionel M. Beehner, Colonel Liam S. Collins, and Robert T. Person .. 31

Chapter 4—Operation Starkey: The Invasion that Never Was 

by Colonel Michael R. Taylor Jr. ............................................................ 51

Chapter 5—The 1948 War For Palestine: “What Kind of War Was This?”

by Sergeant First Class Brandon S. Riley, Michael E. Kitchens, 

and Colonel Matthew J. Yandura ............................................................ 71

Chapter 6—Leaflets and Loudspeakers: The Role of Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP) in Large-Scale Combat Operations 

by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. Whiskeyman .................................... 91

Chapter 7—Gulf War—Infowar

Dorothy E. Denning with Introduction and Notes by Robert M. Hill .. 107

Chapter 8—Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations—

Operation Iraqi Freedom I

by Colonel (Retired) Carmine Cicalese ................................................ 133

Chapter 9—The Cyber Crucible: Eastern Europe, Russia, and the 

Development of Modern Warfare

by Wesley P. White .............................................................................. 151

Chapter 10—Botnet Evolution during Modern-Day Large-Scale 

Combat Operations 

by Lieutenant Colonel Rick A. Galeano, Katrin Galeano, Samer 

Al-Khateeb, Nitin Agarwal, and Lieutenant Colonel James N. Turner .. 163
viii

Chapter 11—Future Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) 

Implications for Information Operations

by Major General James J. Mingus and Colonel Chris N. Reichart ..... 175

About the Authors ................................................................................. 181
ix

Illustrations

Figure 5.1. Majority Report from United Nations Resolution 181. ........ 73

Figure 5.2. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lessons Learned #1 .......... 76

Figure 5.3. “Balfour Declaration” Letter ................................................ 77

Figure 5.4. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lessons Learned #2 .......... 79

Figure 5.5. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lessons Learned #3 .......... 80

Figure 5.6. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lessons Learned #4 .......... 82

Figure 5.7. Survey of Major Radio Programs in Palestine 1948–1950 .. 83

Figure 5.8. Survey of Major Print Programs in Palestine 1909–1950 .... 84

Figure 10.1. Data Searches Related to 2014 Ukrainian Water Crisis ... 167

Figure 10.2. Sub-networks Observed with Girvan-Newman 

Clustering Algorithm ............................................................................ 168

Figure 10.3. Real Person Network Connected to Broker Bots ............. 169
x
xi

Introduction

Colonel Mark D. Vertuli

All war is inherently about changing human behavior, with each 

side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force of arms. 

Success requires the ability to outthink an opponent and ruthlessly exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative 

advantage. The side that best understands an operational environment learns and adapts more rapidly and decides to act more 

quickly in conditions of uncertainty is most likely to win.1

—Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations

Arguably information operations (IO) is one of the most misunderstood and misused terms in Army doctrine—to the point it has largely become a ubiquitous term of reference that lacks the necessary clarity of purpose and application for the majority of the Army. I am sure that if several 

Army leaders and Soldiers were asked to define information operations 

in their own words, one would receive several differing—and often conflicting—interpretations. Multiple changes to Army doctrine concerning 

information operations after it emerged as a concept from Command and 

Control Warfare (C2W) more than 25 years ago have contributed to this 

confusion. The definition of IO has changed three times in the last 11 years 

alone: from a focus on five core capabilities to information engagement 

(2007), to inform and influence activities (2011), to its current incarnation 

focusing on information-related capabilities (2016). As the Army shifts its 

doctrinal focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and 

near-peer adversaries, the purpose of this volume is to help leaders and 

Soldiers visualize and understand information operations through the lens 

of historical case studies. 

In both Joint and Army doctrine, information operations is defined as 

“the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential 

adversaries while protecting our own.”2

 In more general terms, information operations support the commander’s ability to achieve a position of 

relative advantage through activities in the information environment (the 

physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions) to influence the adversary’s will to fight; disrupt, corrupt, or usurp its capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate information; and ultimately manipulate (deceive) or 

disrupt an adversary decision-maker’s understanding of the operational 
xii

environment. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations does a very good job 

describing the broad scope of possible information-related capabilities and 

effects in the information environment. However, over the course of the 

last 17 years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, information operations has become synonymous in many minds with themes 

and messages, psychological operations (PSYOP)/military information 

support operations (MISO), or strategic communications/ communications strategy and its larger purpose has become lost. Three lessons—dare 

I say themes—are interwoven throughout the historical case studies of 

information operations during large-scale combat operations: (1) the focus 

is the information regardless of the capabilities employed to effect it; (2) 

successful information operations are operations—integrated, synchronized, resourced and commander-led from inception to execution; and (3) 

information operations are, at their core, adversary/enemy-focused operations conducted to gain a relative advantage for friendly decision-makers.

“It Is All about the Information”

The title of this volume in The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series is Perceptions Are Reality. Although this could be a hackneyed 

phrase, its meaning has great significance to the application of information 

operations in LSCO. Leaders visualize and understand the operational environment through information. As an element of combat power, information enables decision-making, and its transmission aids decisive operations. Today, modern technology has significantly increased the speed, 

volume, and access to information. Concurrently, technology has enabled 

significant means to disrupt, manipulate, distort, and deny information—

technology that adversaries have already demonstrated a willingness to 

use with great effect. 

In the book Dark Territory, author Fred Kaplan recounts an anecdote 

from then-Rear Admiral Mike McConnell. While watching the movie 

Sneakers in 1992, the intelligence chief experienced the revelation that 

“it is all about the information;” that whoever controlled the information 

could dominate competition and conflict.3

 In LSCO, this remains as true 

as ever. Leaders direct resources toward intelligence collection in order to 

develop the situation and gain the sufficient information required to make 

a timely and informed decision. Just as importantly, measures must be put 

into place to protect friendly information while simultaneously developing 

and executing means in all domains to attack the adversary’s ability to 

access, process and disseminate information. In this way information operations enable an accurate understanding of the operational environment 

while disrupting or manipulating that of the adversary. Through informa-
xiii

tion operations, the adversary/enemy decision-maker’s reality should be 

that which best supports achieving a position of relative advantage. The 

doctrinal definition change away from the rather limiting five core capabilities (Operations Security, Military Deception, PSYOP, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations) to the current more wide-ranging definition focused on effects is a move in the right direction. That said, 

more needs to be done to fully garner the true potential of information as 

an element of combat power in a LSCO context. Common sense dictates 

that information absent accompanying action does not resonate cognitively in the same way when both are present and complementary. The duality 

of the relationship between action and information must become a constant theme of operations in the “Information Age” of the 21st Century. 

However, the perception of information operations as an enabler to maneuver or operations remains.

Information Operations Are Operations

When addressing the idea of conflict in space, the current United States 

Strategic Command commander, General (USAF) John Hyten, comments 

that there is no such thing as space war or cyber war, for that matter; just 

war. Similarly, I had a recent conversation with a senior leader who remarked that if information operations planners had their way, everything 

would be considered information operations. I would like to flip that on its 

head. During LSCO, maneuver in and through the information environment 

must be given the same attention as has been historically given to traditional 

maneuver on the land domain. Maneuver is maneuver and whatever form of 

maneuver is employed it is done through the operational process.

Recent changes to joint doctrine are beginning to account for the recognition of information’s importance in conflict. Just last year, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a rapid 

joint doctrine modification to make information a joint function. More 

recently, the joint staff issued a directive for operations in the information environment- titled as such to emphasize the activity as operations 

while avoiding the polarizing term information operations. This emphasis comes after observing adversaries wielding information powerfully on 

and off the battlefield to achieve decisive tactical to strategic outcomes.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda staged countless 

engagements against United States and its partners, less for the physical 

effects in the immediate operational environment, but rather to gain an 

informational advantage around the world. Videotaped improvised explosive device attacks, while devastating, worked well to promote an image 
xiv

of organizational credibility, bolster adherents’ will to fight, radicalize 

vulnerable populations, and increase financial support. More importantly 

with respect to LSCO, Russian information confrontation activity preceding, during, and following its illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion 

of eastern Ukraine demonstrates the power of integrated operations in the 

information environment, in this case more appropriately term information warfare. Russia successfully sowed disinformation causing the international community to distrust the information it was receiving while also 

crippling the Ukrainian response through cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. The confusion and misdirection 

caused by Russian information warfare had a paralytic effect on Western 

decision-makers—so much so that Russia was able to achieve its strategic 

and political objectives before the Western leaders could mount a credible 

response.

Adversary-Focused

There is one final lesson or theme that runs through the case studies of LSCO: information operations are, at their core, adversary-focused. 

The 17 years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations gave 

rise to a population-centric focus for information operations while almost 

completely subsuming the adversary command and control elements of 

the doctrine. Only recently—really as a result of adversary successes—

has this begun to change. Unified land operations occur in an operational 

environment dominated by civilians; their presence cannot be ignored or 

bypassed. However, first, the adversary must be defeated.

Warfare is a human endeavor; it is a contest of wills. The focus of 

information operations during LSCO must be on defeating the adversary’s 

will. This can be accomplished directly, as during Operation Desert Storm 

where combined bombing and psychological operations dispirited thousands of Iraqi troops causing their surrender. Or more indirectly, during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, US and Allied application of deception, electronic warfare, physical destruction, and cyberspace operations disrupted 

Iraqi command and control causing an absolute lack of situational understanding and inability to coordinate a defense by Iraqi leadership. As the 

quote at the beginning of the introduction states: “The side that best understands an operational environment learns and adapts more rapidly and 

decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is most likely to 

win.”
xv

The Book

Perceptions Are Reality is composed of 11 chapters. The first 10 chapters explore historical case studies of information operations during LSCO 

while the final chapter considers the future implications of information 

operations for LSCO. While many information-related capabilities are 

explored in the case studies, by no means do they present the definitive 

accounting. Some of the more technical or sensitive capabilities are not 

treated in as much depth as I would prefer due to considerations of security and classification. The case studies cover LSCO from World War II 

through recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. While the United States 

is prominent in most of the case studies, other nations’ operations in the 

information environment are explored as well, particularly those of the 

Russian Federation.

In “The Logic of Information Operations in Large Scale Combat Operations,” Christopher Lowe explores the evolution of US Army information operations doctrine from its command and control warfare roots to 

today’s commonly held (mis)perception that information operations are a 

means to influence civilian populations. Colonel Lowe attributes the origin of the United States IO to Cold War Soviet radioelectronic combat 

doctrine developments. The United States recognized that it needed similar doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions to counter the Soviet’s development and 

an off-set strategy to dominate on the modern battlefield through information. Over the course of several years of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, 

and counterterrorism operations, the Army shifted focus from a command 

and control emphasis to a more population-centric, “hearts and minds” 

approach. The second chapter continues along a similar narrative.

While Lowe explores IO’s past, Justin Gorkowski reflects upon the 

current state of Army IO in “US Information Operations in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force.” 

In his chapter, Major Gorkowski details internal structural challenges to 

Army IO in doctrine, organization, and leadership in juxtaposition to adversarial advancements in the employment information warfare in competition with the United States. While Major Gorkowski’s assessment is 

not positive, it is not without hope for the future. He concludes his chapter 

with several recommendations to address the imbalance.
xvi

The third chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of Russian information warfare. US Military Academy professors Lionel Beehner, Colonel Liam Collins, and Robert Person combine first-hand accounts with 

secondary research to explore recent historical case studies of Russia’s 

systemic strategic use of information warfare—focusing on the evolution 

of its military doctrine, from the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 to the ongoing Russia-backed campaign in Ukraine’s Donbass Region. This look 

at Russian strategy of information confrontation offers stark lessons for 

future large-scale combat operations and the integration of operations in 

the informational environment to achieve strategic effects.

Taking the approach that one can learn as much from failure as from 

success, Michael Taylor analyzes one of the lesser-known Allied deception operations from World War II. In “Operation Starkey: The Invasion 

that Never Was,” Taylor explores the reasons for the deception plan’s failure to convince German leadership of Allied intentions to invade in 1943 

in order to keep German forces in the West and thus relieve pressure on the 

allied Russian forces in the East. In the following chapter, Branden Riley, 

Michael Kitchens, and Matthew Yandura use the 1948 Arab-Israeli War 

to illuminate ways in which information was honed into a weapon by the 

belligerents and their supporters to achieve desired military, political and 

social outcomes within the context of large-scale combat operations. In 

this war, the employment of strategic master narratives to guide operational and tactical maneuver in the information environment proved decisive.

In Chapter 6, Andrew Whiskeyman focuses on the use of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) during the Vietnam War. After a brief exploration of the doctrinal, leadership, intelligence, and organization underpinnings of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Whiskeyman 

details PSYOP employment during the largest ground (Operation Cedar 

Falls) and airborne (Operation Junction City) operations of the war. While 

PSYOP achieved some success during these operations, significant challenges impeded widespread support and operational integration. Many of 

these challenges continue to exist today.

Turning to more recent operations, the next two chapters examine 

IO during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. First, Robert Hill 

updates the first chapter of Dorothy Denning’s 1992 book, Information 

Warfare and Security. Hill adds a contemporary approach and makes the 

information relevant to today’s operational environment by using editorial 

comments throughout the text of Denning’s exploration of what is considered the first true information war: Desert Storm. In the following chapter, 

Carmine Cicalese provides the only first-hand account in this volume. As 
xvii

the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) IO planner 

from April to July 2002, then-Major Cicalese played an instrumental role 

in the design of information operations to support the CFLCC operational 

intent. This chapter offers tremendous insight and lessons learned related 

to planning and executing information operations in LSCO at the highest 

operational levels. 

The final two historical case studies explore elements of cyberspace 

operations during recent conflicts in Eastern Europe. While Chapter 3 of 

this volume examines Russian Federation information warfare from a 

strategic perspective, Wesley White documents Russian operational and 

tactical integration of cyberspace effects in Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine. 

White argues that these conflicts served as test beds—the cyber crucible—

for Russian forces to fully integrate cyberspace operations into multi-domain battle. In Chapter 10, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Galeano, Katrin Galeano, Samer Al-Khateeb, Nitin Agarwal, and Lieutenant Colonel James 

Turner focus on the employment of social botnets in support of military 

operations. Through detailed analysis of botnet use in Ukraine and the 

Baltics, they argue social botnet can be used to promote narratives, alter 

perceptions of viewpoint popularity, and ultimately trigger behavior supportive to military end states.

The volume concludes with a look to the future. In the final chapter, 

Major General James Mingus and Colonel Christopher Reichart explore 

the implications of the future information environment across the range 

of military operations during both competition and conflict. They offer 

several important recommendations touching elements of Army training, 

organization, doctrine, and leadership in order to enable commanders the 

informational capability and capacity to gain and maintain a position of 

relative advantage in the future operational environment.

The intent of this volume is to employ history to stimulate discussion 

and analysis of the implications of IO in future LSCO by exploring past 

actions, recognizing and understanding successes and failures, and offering some lessons learned from each author’s perspective. I leave it you, 

the reader, to determine its success. I want to thank all the authors for 

volunteering their time and research to support this effort. Brad Loudon 

provided tremendous advice and editorial support; I could not have completed this without his assistance. Finally, I want to offer my most heartfelt 

thanks to the leaders at the Army Combined Arms Center and Army University Press for entrusting me with this project.
xviii

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 

3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 1-4. 

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: 2016), 1-2.

3. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 31.
1

Chapter 1

The Logic of Information Operations (IO) in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations

Colonel Christopher W. Lowe

During the late Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union 

developed sophisticated doctrines in response to their increased reliance 

on computers, radios, sensors, and other electronic devices for command 

and control. Known to the Soviets as Radioelectronic Combat (REC), and 

ultimately, to the Americans, as information operations, these doctrines 

made the flow and processing of battlefield information an object of war 

alongside logistics, fires, and maneuver. The cybernetic logic that led to 

the development of these doctrines—now largely obscured, after decades 

of irregular war—should once again inform our thinking about large-scale 

combat operations.

The story of information operations’ development begins, not with 

Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, but with a comparatively recent development in 

the history of warfare: the “electronic battlefield.” In a 1969 address, then 

Chief of Staff of the Army, General William C. Westmoreland, heralded 

its coming:

On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, 

tracked, and targeted almost instantaneously, through the use of 

data links, computer-assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated fire control. With first round kill probabilities approaching certainty, and with surveillance devices that can continually 

track the enemy, the need for large forces to fix the enemy will 

be less important.1

Apolitical, sterile, errorless, frictionless, devoid of large forces and 

high casualty rates, Westmoreland’s battlefield reads as a vision of everything that Vietnam was not—as the setting for an altogether different, 

more pleasant, kind of war. In point of fact, Westmoreland’s vision was 

unfolding in Vietnam, and it had already left its mark on battle command 

during the war. Effective decision making and troop control was, at every 

echelon, mediated through a host of interconnected and often interdependent, electronic technologies, to include unattended sensors, computers, 

and radio communications. 

Three years earlier, with Westmoreland as senior US commander in 

Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directed the develop-
2

ment of a system to identify and interdict North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 

movements along the Ho Chi Minh trail.2 The project, later known as 

the McNamara line, employed some $670 million in unattended seismic, 

chemical, and electromagnetic sensors.3

 The sensors transmitted data to 

overflying aircraft, which in turn relayed this information to an operations center in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. There, raw sensor data was 

processed, displayed, turned into targeting data, and furnished to attack 

aircraft, which could engage and destroy enemy forces in the field.4

Ground forces quickly discovered unattended sensors’ tactical utility. 

In 1968, before the McNamara line’s completion, the NVA attacked the 

nearby Marine Corps firebase at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland diverted uninstalled sensors there, a move that, according to one officer, may have 

reduced US casualties by half.5

 Soon thereafter, units in Vietnam tactically 

deployed sensors along road networks and around installations.6

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) also relied extensively on computers for intelligence analysis. Under Major General Joseph A. McChristian’s direction, the MACV intelligence staff transformed 

into “a computerized, automated intelligence processing organization” in 

which over a thousand US and Republic of Vietnam intelligence workers interrogated, exploited, or analyzed enemy prisoners, weapons, documents and other materiel.7

 This “futuristic intelligence system” included 

the databasing of every captured belligerent.8

 

At the same time, computer systems were showing promise for the 

purposes of battle command. Under the auspices of the US Army Automatic Data Field Systems Command, formed in 1965, the Tactical Operations 

System (TOS) was developed and fielded for trial with the US Seventh 

Army in Germany.9

 Its developers intended that TOS provide the “field 

Army commander and his staff with relevant and timely information in selected functions of intelligence, operations, and fire support coordination 

by utilizing an on-line near real-time automatic data processing system.”10

The use of radio communications also exploded during this time. By 

1971, the standard Army brigade maintained 539 radio sets, a massive 

increase in fielded radios, per brigade, since 1943.11 In the Korean War, 

the division headquarters maintained eight channels, in Vietnam, 32—a 

three-fold increase.12 Very High Frequency (VHF) radio sets provided reliable communications at lower tactical echelons, enabling units to operate 

outside of visual range in disruptive terrain.13 Furthermore, the American 

Army in Vietnam, for “the first time in history” enjoyed both “voice encryption at the tactical level” and a “fully automated telephone system” 
3

for intra-theater communication.14 To support the massive communications effort, one of out every five soldiers at the division level was a 

radio operator.15

Maintenance figures further underscore how communications intensive American warfighting had grown. Signal units serviced communications devices at 150 maintenance sites in South Vietnam, where over 

500,000 stockpiled communications parts were installed.16 The criticality 

of voice communications to modern war was most aptly summed up by 

General Westmoreland himself, who noted that “on the battlefield no plan 

of operation is given serious consideration without assured communications. Compare this with the shooting and moving of the mob which has 

no communication—no control.”17

During the same period, the Soviet military also increased its dependency on communications and computer networks for command and control. Writing in 1964, Soviet Major General Ivan Kurnosov, chair of the 

communications department at the Frunze Military Academy, noted that 

“It is difficult to find a means of combat whose effectiveness to some degree is not dependent upon radio-electronics.”18 Frunze Academy Deputy Chief, Lieutenant General Vasily Gerasimovich Reznichenko assessed 

that the combination of high mobility platforms and reliable communications would expand, accelerate, and intensify combat operations. Battle, 

Reznichenko surmised, would be, “characterized by vast spatial range, 

high dynamism and fluidity, quick changes from one form of combat action to another” and “intensification of critical situations.”19 

Overall, the Soviets appeared to understand the dilemma posed by the 

electronic battlefield: although information flows increased, commanders 

enjoyed “less and less time to collect, process, and communicate it.”20

One theoretical option to resolve this problem would be to increase the 

number of controlling nodes on the battlefield, thereby lessening the span 

of control. However, as one Soviet officer noted, given the army’s size, 

“this would require an enormous number of staff personnel which, in turn, 

would greatly complicate the management of such agencies.”21 In other 

words, from the Soviet perspective, attempts to put more humans in the 

loop would merely add more complexity.

This complexity, characterized in the Soviet literature as a problem 

of “troop control” was manageable only with the assistance of computer 

systems.22 However, as with any battlefield instrument, communications 

and computer networks would be vulnerable to enemy attack and the friction of combat. This was significant, as it constituted a vulnerability to the 
4

command and control function itself. In a 1963 ARMY article, titled “Command Control and Cybernetics,” US Army Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. 

Davis illustrated precisely this point, describing modern command and 

control as a nervous system, vulnerable to paralysis and death:

Picture this “machine-man” on the battlefield. It senses the many 

events in this environment through the delicate mechanism of 

sound, light, electromagnetic radiation, and pressure. Myriads of 

sensory signals, quantitized and at various repetition rates, move 

down the fine network of “adherent nerve fibers” to reflex centers 

where they stimulate the first of the reflex arcs. Insufficient processing has taken place to result in intelligent instructions to the 

effectors of muscles of the system. So the “data” enter the central transmission system—the spinal cord and its amazing trunk 

of communication lines – on its way to the master processor, the 

brain. Here, masses of information are sorted, correlated, rejected, 

and arranged in an orderly array of instructions—orders, if you 

will—to be sent out over the efferent nerve network to the proper effector elements: hands, legs, arms, feet, eyelids, fingers—the 

soldiers of the battlefield. Some days the system is sick—pain 

within, or damage to brain or central nervous system and all response ceases. The thing must be protected—or it dies.23

To fully grasp the meaning and implication of Davis’ “machine-man” 

analogy, it’s important to better understand “cybernetics,” described by its 

founder as the science of “communication and control.” Growing out of 

his experience in World Word II, Norbert Wiener derived the term cybernetics “from the Greek word kubernetes, or ‘steersman,’ the same Greek 

word from which we eventually derive our word governor.”24 The wartime 

challenge that led Wiener to problems of communication and control was 

the improvement of antiaircraft technology, which aviation technology 

had lately outpaced.25 

Increasing aircraft altitude and faster performance meant that air defenders were often unable to visually acquire and engage enemy aircraft 

passing overhead.26 Wiener employed the idea of the servomechanism, 

or feedback loop system, to design a machine that could “predict an airplane’s trajectory by making use of information about its previous trajectories.”27 Wiener and colleagues would continue to look to the idea of the 

servomechanism, or feedback loop system, as a prototype for intelligent machines.28
5

The feedback loop is a circular cause-effect process, by which informational feedback regulates “outputs.” A classic example of a negative (or 

self-regulating) feedback loop is the thermostat. The thermostat “senses” 

temperature information from the environment, causing it to either raise 

or lower the output of hot or cool air; a new temperature reading results, 

causing the thermostat to adjust its output again. This process of feedback 

and response occurs indefinitely, so long as the thermostat continues to 

“sense” its environment (in terms of temperature) and can send messages 

or commands to increase or decrease the flow of heat.

In Wiener’s estimation, the “behavior” of the thermostat is little different from the individual human’s process of homeostasis:

[If] our bodily temperature rises or sinks one degree from its normal level of 98.6 [degrees], we take notice of it, and if it rises or 

sinks 10 degrees, we are all but sure to die. The oxygen and carbon dioxide and salt in our blood, the hormones flowing through 

our ductless glands, are all regulated by mechanisms, which tend 

to resist any untoward changes in their levels. These mechanisms 

constitute what is known as homeostasis, and are negative feedback mechanisms of a type that we may find exemplified in mechanical automata.29

With colleagues Arturo Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow, Wiener described the “behavior” of negative feedback systems, whether man or machine, as purposeful.30 The common goal of all negative feedback systems, 

to include mechanical automata as well as living beings, argued the cyberneticists, is to prevent entropy. However, as the thermo-stat and homeostasis examples show, cybernetic systems require an uninterrupted flow of 

information to balance against entropy. Without continuous information 

flows, a cybernetic system could neither “sense” the environment appropriately, nor could it command new behaviors.

As Davis expressed it, and as Colonel John Boyd would later (and 

more famously) describe with his Orient, Observe, Decide, Act (OODA) 

loop, military forces are information processing systems that continually 

sense and adapt: “the mission is stated, an estimate of the situation is made, 

alternative courses of action are considered, a course of action is chosen; 

orders are issued; the progress of the battle is monitored; and adjustments 

to the orders are made as time passes.”31 The success of the adaptive cycle—and the outcome of battle, even of the war itself—is determined by 

the degree to which a force’s communications system ensures the flow of 
6

information and thereby, staves off entropy. “Progress is fed back through 

the area communications system and its complex network of transmission 

media and switching centers. Using the control information and new battlefield information, another cycle starts—and so on until time is called by 

defeat of the opposing force or agreement between the national powers.”32

The Soviets had long viewed military forces in precisely these cybernetic terms. As Slava Gerovitch contends, Soviet thinkers such as Aleksei 

Liapunov—one of the Soviet Union’s earliest and most prolific cybernetic 

proponents—saw “weapon systems, including both machines and the people who operate them as cybernetic systems.”33 For Liapunov, the military 

was analogous to an organism, the brain of which was the commander.

As Russia scholar and former Deputy Director of the US Army School 

of Advance Military Studies, Jacob Kipp, relates, according to Irina Grekova, “one of the leading Soviet specialists in applied mathematics and 

a long-time professor at the Zhukovsky Academy,” the Soviets were discussing cybernetics as early as 1952, only four years following Wiener’s 

publication of Cybernetics or Control and Communications in the Animal 

World and the Machine.

34 In 1953, Soviet Admiral A. I. Berg, the newly 

appointed Deputy Defense Minister, was given responsibility to develop 

Soviet radio electronics and cybernetics. By 1958, the Soviets had translated Wiener’s Cybernetics into Russian, and a year later, “the Frunze 

Academy organized a faculty of military cybernetics.”35

In the 1960s, after witnessing the successful employment of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) against Soviet equipment in the Vietnam and 

1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the Soviets started integrating various approaches 

to attack their battlefield opponent’s communications network—that is, 

to wage a decidedly offensive counter command and control doctrine.36

The Soviets termed this approach radioelektonnaya bor’ba, or in English, 

radioelectronic combat (REC).37 After a period of internal debate concerning REC’s “proper nature,” Soviet Major General A.I. Paliy, whom David 

Chizum refers to as “the Grand old man of Soviet electronic warfare,” 

published Radioelectronic Combat, thereby galvanizing Soviet doctrinal 

consensus on the topic.38

According to Commander (USN) Floyd D. Kennedy, a 1978 US Army 

study described REC as combining “signal intelligence, direction finding, 

intensive jamming, deception, and suppressive fires to attack enemy organizations and systems throughout their means of control.”39 This combination of elements would “limit, delay, or nullify the enemy’s use of his 

command and control systems” while simultaneously protecting Soviet 
7

systems.40 REC’s most salient feature was its emphasis on integration, entailing the simultaneous combination of multiple protective and disruptive 

means into a “greater than the sum of its parts” whole, in support of the 

ground scheme of maneuver.41 In time, American doctrines would appropriate REC’s integrating precept, and it remains today a definitional feature of information operations. 

As if the Soviet’s sophisticated REC doctrine wasn’t threatening 

enough, the US was woefully outnumbered in raw combat power. Soviet 

expenditures in military equipment had outpaced US investment by $240 

billion in the previous decade, and the principle challenge, evident since 

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was how to fight outnumbered and win. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William Perry’s 

approach was to “counteract a numerical disadvantage in military equipment” through a technological “offset.”42 The “offset” technologies pursued by the Department of Defense under Perry’s strategy included “surveillance systems,” data communication systems, “positioning systems,” 

and missile “guidance systems”—all dependent, in some fashion, on the 

electromagnetic spectrum.43

The Department of Defense and US Air Force conducted several studies between 1975 and 1978 in light of US plans to invest more heavily in electronic communication technologies that REC doctrine aimed to 

exploit.44 These efforts ultimately forged an American version of REC, 

dubbed Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures 

(C3CM), which similarly entailed the integration of Electronic Warfare 

(EW), Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and 

Physical Destruction.

One of the immediate challenges associated with C3CM implementation was the alignment of service doctrine to ensure, in the potential of 

war, a unified and self-reinforcing C3CM effort across the battle space. To 

meet this challenge, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7, Joint Operational Concept for Command, Control, 

and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM) in December 1981. The 

Joint Operational Concept for C3CM would remain in service for a period 

of almost ten years, until it was superseded by the Army’s Field Manual 

90-24, Multi-Service Procedures for Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures, in May of 1991.

The C3CM concept would debut in large-scale combat operations, 

not on the steppes of Europe, but in the Kuwaiti desert. In August 1990, 
8

Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army invaded and occupied its neighboring kingdom. The ensuing Gulf War, in which an American-led coalition expelled 

the Iraqi army from Kuwait and liberated its population, demonstrated 

the fruit of the US military’s technological, doctrinal, and training renaissance of the previous decade. Some also hailed Desert Storm as a proof 

of concept for a new kind of war, in which information and knowledge 

played the definitive, if not decisive role. As retired Air Force Colonel and 

information warfare scholar, Alan Campen wrote, shortly following the 

war, “knowledge came to rival weapons and tactics in importance, giving 

credence to the notion that an enemy might be brought to its knees principally through destruction and disruption of the means for command and 

control.”45 Indeed, the US military did a great deal to destroy Iraqi command and control during the Gulf War, “utilizing a deadly combination of 

hard and soft kill.”46

The destruction or disruption of radar sites, air defense systems, command and control centers, electric power nodes, and communications 

relays effectively severed vital Iraqi information flows, leading many to 

employ the metaphors of decapitation, blindness, paralysis, and shock in 

describing the effects of US targeting against the Iraqi Army. For instance, 

during the war General Colin Powell characterized the “battle plan” as 

“first to destroy the Iraqis’ air defense system and their command, control, 

and communications to render the enemy deaf, dumb, and blind.” Powell 

noted in a press conference that, “Our strategy is . . . very simple . . . First 

we are going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it.”47 In 1993, an 

Air Force First Lieutenant similarly reflected, “The vulnerability of C2 

systems to destruction by air power was demonstrated by the highly centralized Iraqi system. The mixture of Soviet and Western equipment and 

doctrine was blinded, then paralyzed, then largely destroyed by coalition 

air attack.”48 

However, it was not only US dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum, whether through physical destruction or electronic warfare, that contributed to Iraqi paralysis. Nearly some 87,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered 

as US Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces targeted Iraqi units with 

leaflets, loudspeaker scripts, and radio broadcasts.49 Widespread Iraqi surrender and desertion undoubtedly disabled Iraqi command and control 

(C2), as it robbed Iraqi high command of its “eyes and ears,” contributed to poor morale, and lowered tactical responsiveness. PSYOP appeals 

provided Iraqi soldiers with the instructions on how to surrender, even if 

American bombing provided the motivation.
9

The Gulf War seemed to validate the logic of viewing military forces 

as cybernetic systems, dependent on information flows for command and 

control. As the futurist pair, Alvin and Heidi Toffler expressed in their 

influential book, War and Anti-War; Survival at the Dawn of the 20th Century, “The Iraqi forces, especially after most of their radar and surveillance 

were excised, were a conventional ‘military machine’ . . . By contrast, the 

allied force was not a machine, but a system with far greater internal feedback, communication, and self-regulatory adjustment capability. It was, in 

fact, in part at least . . . a ‘thinking system.’”50 

That the US led alliance achieved this relative advantage was, as Alan 

Campen, noted, “ironic,” as “the Soviet Union—Iraq’s prime mentor—

was the first to advance the belief that the balance in war might be tipped 

by attacking the opponent’s control structure.”51 A further irony was that 

the Soviet Union’s political control structure was itself dissolving, virtually concurrent with the American-led takedown of the Iraqi command 

structure. These two events, the near total military success of American 

forces during the Gulf War and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact (and 

with it, the Cold War) would lead to significant reevaluation of threats, 

opportunities, and doctrine.

Prior to the Gulf War, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) launched 

an assessment into the claim, long maintained by the Soviet Union, that a 

military-technical revolution was causing “a major shift in the character of 

military competitions.”52 The assessment, titled Military Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, interpreted the “overwhelming US victory in the Gulf War” as evidence that the revolution had, in fact, arrived.53

However, the assessment also emphasized that the United States was at the 

“beginning of the revolution.”54 While the United States possessed important technologies, such as precision-guided weapons and information and 

simulations systems, it was only able to capitalize on “a fraction of their 

combat potential.”55 This was because “the United States did not come 

close to its potential to move the most useful information rapidly to those 

who needed it most.”56

Introducing language that would later find its way to doctrine, the report asserted, “information dominance could well be the sine qua non for 

effective military operations in future conflicts,” and “information superiority could be the decisive operation in future conflicts.”57 Furthermore, 

the report speculated that, since belligerents also understand the decisive 

nature of information dominance—especially after witnessing the Gulf 

War—a zero-sum-game phenomenon would likely ensue. To allow en-
10

emy exploitation of information networks during peacetime would risk 

enemy information dominance, “which would quickly lead to the progressive inability of friendly forces to execute the highly integrated, information-intensive military operations that will be crucial to success in war.”58

In essence, if the United States failed to maintain continuous information dominance, it would lose the deterrent and coercive power of its 

military force.

The report asserted that during war the United States would likely 

achieve information dominance through a “full-dimensional operation.”59

“Strategic strikes (to include so called ‘electronic strikes’ and special operations forces strikes) against an adversary’s terrestrial information networks would ideally be carried out simultaneously with space control operations.”60 As with Soviet REC and C3CM, dominance comes from the 

destruction of command and control systems.

On the heels of the Gulf War and the ONA’s Military Technical Revolution report, the Tofflers advanced the influential thesis, based on their 

earlier work Third Wave, and fully elaborated in War and Anti-War, that 

“the way we make wealth is the way we make war, and the way we make 

anti-war must reflect the way we make war.”61 According to the Tofflers, 

history has been characterized by “waves” in which wealth generation and 

war-making accorded to specific forms.

The first of these waves, beginning in antiquity and largely terminating with the Industrial Revolution, was agrarian. Agrarian war was seasonal, intermittent, unprofessional, and technologically unsophisticated. 

The Second Wave, brought on by economic industrialization, epitomized 

mass-production, high lethality, and mechanization. The Third Wave, only 

emergent at the time of War and Anti-War, came with the increasing use of 

computer technology within the society and the economy. “Knowledge,” 

the Tofflers claimed, “is now the central resource of destructivity, just as it 

is the central resource of productivity.”62 

This thesis served as a lens through which the Army would view the 

Military Technical Revolution proposed by the ONA’s report. The Tofflers 

already enjoyed considerable influence within the Army. In 1982, the 

Tofflers established contacts with a group of influential Army officers, to 

include the Chief of TRADOC, Commanding General Donn Starry.63 At 

the time, Starry was instituting massive doctrinal and educational reforms, 

to include the development of AirLand Battle and the establishment of the 

School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), both of which later helped 

to account for the Army’s success in the Gulf War. The Tofflers now saw 
11

the Gulf War as the opening campaign of the Third Wave: “Something occurred in the night skies and desert sands of the Middle East in 1991 that 

the world had not seen for three hundred years—the arrival of a new form 

of warfare that closely mirrors a new form of wealth creation.”64

To better understand the ramifications of the Third Wave, the Army 

turned to the Tofflers directly, inviting Alvin Toffler to deliver a keynote 

address at the US Army War College’s conference, “The Revolution in 

Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century.”65 Furthermore, 

no less than the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, 

drew on Toffler’s insights in developing internal documents, such as War 

in the Information Age.

66

War in the Information Age championed Toffler’s idea that knowledge—translated by the Army as “information”—was becoming the central resource of war. In so doing, its authors reiterated the underlying logic 

of General Westmoreland’s “Electronic Battlefield” and William Perry’s 

Offset Strategy—namely, that more perfect information collection and 

sharing, enabled by the integration of electronic technologies, would provide a marked advantage over larger Armies.

In the early 1990s, with talk of the Military Technical Revolution, 

Revolution in Military Affairs, Information Revolution, and Third Wave 

warfare, the Department of Defense went about updating its now venerable and battle tested C3CM doctrine. By the middle of the decade, the Joint 

Staff released Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command 

and Control Warfare (C2W), which held promise “to shape the adversary 

commander’s estimate of the situation in the theater of operations” and 

enable the Joint Force Commander (JFC) “to process information through 

the C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander,” thereby contributing to Joint Force Information Superiority.67 In part, as acknowledgement of the contribution that surrender appeals made to the blinding of 

adversary decision makers in the Gulf War, C2W added PSYOP to the elements formerly associated with C3CM, including EW, OPSEC, MILDEC 

and Physical Destruction. 

However, a new term—information operations—would soon eclipse 

Joint C2W doctrine. In August 1995, less than a year before C2W’s publication, the Army released TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, Concept for Information Operations.

68 In keeping with the Third Wave and RMA discourse, 

the information operations concept announced revolutionary change. In 

the pamphlet’s forward, General William Hartzog, then TRADOC Com-
12

mander proclaimed, “The information age paradigm will . . . change the 

way wars are fought.”69

Revolutionary proclamations aside, the information operations concept both confirmed and programmatically endorsed the logic underlying 

Soviet REC, C3CM, and C2W. In language that sounds remarkably similar 

to Westmoreland’s vision of an electronic battlefield, the information operations concept described the upside of digitization and electronic communications: “Digitization will also assist in combat identification and enhance situational awareness through precise friendly and threat signature 

definition and updating of weapon system recognition software programs. 

The direct connection between the global grid of communications and the 

digitized battlefield will allow precision strike operations against high-value targets.”70 However, the functioning of that same “future C2 system” 

the concept recognized, “is predicated upon our exercising electromagnetic spectrum supremacy or superiority.”71 

In August 1996, a year following the introduction of TRADOC’s concept, and five months following JP 3-13.1, the Army published Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations. In keeping with the concept, the 

new doctrine included Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA) as complementary information operations elements. As with the earlier inclusion of PSYOP within C2W, the addition of PA to information operations 

seems rooted in the broadly accepted lessons of the Gulf War, particularly 

with regard to the flow of information not only across but beyond the battlefield. The war demonstrated the ubiquity and power of media, which 

reached global audiences, principally via English language satellite news. 

This, the doctrine recognized, “can dramatically affect strategic direction 

and the range of military operations.”72

Similarly, CA was deemed important to information operations because “of its ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in 

the GIE [Global Information Environment]; for example, CA’s traditional 

relationship with NGOs and PVOs such as the International Committee 

of the Red Cross.”73 Furthermore, CA’s access to international actors and 

civilian populations meant that it could serve to both preserve and shape 

information flows in both the international and local, public communications environments. 

During the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping operations, and in the 

counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan, Army forces would look to 

this expanded information operations doctrine to provide an advantage. 

However, in these operations, enemy forces, fighting in what Rupert Smith 
13

has termed a “war amongst the people,” would largely adopt deliberate 

strategies that tested the very applicability of information operations’ foundational, cybernetic logic. Insurgents, terrorists, and criminal elements, 

operating in small, decentralized networks, below the so-called “threshold 

of discrimination,” and with low-cunning rather than high technology, rendered the disruption of adversary battle-command somewhat irrelevant, if 

not impossible.74 At the same time, these same asymmetric enemies posed 

little if any threat to joint forces command and control. In this context, 

winning “hearts and minds” has been, for the last two decades, the information task, par excellence.

Unsurprisingly, commanders and information operations practitioners 

have heavily relied on the integration of the doctrine’s newest elements, 

each of which is essentially a public communication means: PSYOP, PA 

and CA. This has almost certainly led to the doctrine’s tacit reinterpretation. Those with first-hand experience of the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are especially likely to understand information operations in 

terms of public relations and strategic communications, despite the doctrine’s cybernetic design and its clear adversary focus.

To be sure, public communications have an important role in modern 

operations. However, large-scale combat operations of the future will almost certainly require commanders at every echelon to fight for superior 

decision making and better command and control, especially at decisive 

moments. In light of their dependence on computers, radios, sensors, and 

other electronic devices, Cold War era specialists answered this very requirement. Their judgment—the basic idea that a positive command and 

control differential is necessary and achievable, through the integration of 

various means, to include physical destruction, operations security, military deception, electronic warfare, and others—should once again define 

our understanding of and approach to information operations. 

 
14

Notes

1. General William C. Westmoreland, “Addresses by General W.C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Volume IV, 3 July 1969–16 December 

1969,” (Washington DC, 1973), 96.

2. Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 108.

3. Mahnken, 109.

4. Mahnken, 110.

5. Mahnken, 112.

6. Mahnken, 112.

7. Lloyd Norman, “Westmoreland’s J2,” Army 17 no. 5, May 1967, 24.

8. Norman, 23.

9. R.H. Scherer, “Data Communications and Field Data Information Handling Systems,” Signal 23, no. 5, January 1969, 8.

10. Scherer, 8.

11. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 238.

12. Van Creveld, 238.

13. Van Creveld, 238.

14. General William C. Westmoreland, “The Military Uses of Communications-Electronics,” Signal, August 1969, 73; Van Creveld, 239.

15. Van Creveld, 239.

16. Van Creveld, 239.

17. Westmoreland, “The Military Uses of Communications-Electronics,” 30.

18. Ivan Kurnosov, “Development of Radioelectronic Means of Troop 

Control and Methods of Their Application,” Voyennaya mysl’, no. 9, September 

1964, reprinted in “Selected Readings From Military Thought, 1963–1973,” 

selected and compiled by Joseph D. Douglas Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Studies in Communist Affairs, 5, Part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 

Office, 1982), 1.

19. Kurnosov, 1.

20. V. Reznichenko “Modern Weapons and Troop Control,” Soviet Military 

Review, December 1978, 11.

21. Reznichenko, 13.

22. V. Kulikov, review of “Idea, Algorithm, Decision,” Soviet Military 

Review, April 1974, 56.

23. Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Davis, “Command Control and Cybernetics,” Army 13, no. 6, January 1963, 55.

24. Norbert Wiener, “The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and 

Society, Da Capo Series in Science” (1954; reprint, Boston: De Capo Series in 

Science, 1998), 1.

25. Peter Gallison, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the 

Cybernetic Vision,” Critical Inquiry 21, no.1, Autumn 1994, 234.
15

26. Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on 

the Battlefields of Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 25.

27. Jennifer Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2003), 37.

28. Gallison, “The Ontology of the Enemy,” 229.

29. Wiener, “The Human Use of Human Beings,” 96.

30. Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, “Behavior, 

Purpose and Teleology,” Philosophy of Science 10, no. 1, January 1943, 19.

31. Davis, “Command Control and Cybernetics,” 53.

32. Davis, 54.

33. Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak (Cambridge, MA: The 

MIT Press, 2002), 265. 

34. Jacob Kipp, From Foresight to Forecasting: The Russian and Soviet 

Military Experience (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, 

Texas A&M University, 1988), 178. 

35. Kipp, 178. 

36. Commander (USN Reserve) Floyd D. Kennedy, “The Evolution of 

Soviet Thought on ‘Warfare in the Fourth Dimension,’” Naval War College Review, March–April 1982, 42; David G. Chizum, Soviet Radioelectronic Combat

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 20–21.

37. Chizum, 3. 

38. Chizum, 24.

39. Kennedy, “The Evolution of Soviet Thought on Warfare in the Fourth 

Dimension,” 42.

40. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-2-1, The Soviet Army, 

Operations and Tactics (Washington DC: 16 July 1984), 5-81.

41. Chizum, Soviet Radioelectronic Combat, 4.

42. Chizum, 9.

43. Chizum 1.

44. Charles F. Smith, “Command, Control and Countermeasures (C3CM),” 

Military Review 63, no. 1, January 1983, 68.

45. Alan D. Campen, Contributing Editor, The First Information War: the 

Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian 

Gulf War (Virginia: AFCEA Press, 1992), x.

46. Campen, xiv.

47. Colin Powell and Joseph Perisco, My American Journey (New York: 

Ballantine Books, 2003), 509–510.

48. First Lieutenant (USAF) Gary A. Vincent, “A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1993, 27.

49. Kathy J. Perry, “The Use of Psychological Operations as a Strategic 

Tool,” Research Project, (Carlisle: US Army War College, April 2000), 7.

50. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and AntiWar: Survival at the Dawn 

of the 21st Century (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 80.
16

51. Campen, The First Information War, 173.

52. Andrew F. Krepinivich Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002): iii.

53. Krepinevich, 8.

54. Krepinevich, 8.

55. Krepinevich, 8.

56. Krepinevich, 8.

57. Krepinevich, 22–23.

58. Krepinevich, 23.

59. Krepinevich, 22.

60. Krepinevich, 22.

61. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and AntiWar, 3.

62. Toffler and Toffler, 71.

63. Ian Curtis, “Misinformed About Information War? The Three-Wave 

Theory is Under Fire,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, March 

1996, 4.

64. Toffler and Toffler, War and AntiWar, 64.

65. Robert J. Bunker, “The Tofflerian Paradox,” Military Review 75, no. 3, 

May–June 1995, 99.

66. Bunker, 99.

67. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for 

Command and Control Warfare (Washington DC: 7 February, 1996): v–vi.

68. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

Pamphlet 525-69, Concept for Information Operations (Washington, DC: 1 

August 1995).

69. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, 4.

70. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, 12.

71. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, 10.

72. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations (Washington DC: August, 1996), 1-3. 

73. Department of the Army, FM 100-6, 3-10.

74. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World

(New York: First Vintage Books, 2007), 19.
17

Chapter 2

US Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat 

Operations: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force

Major Justin B. Gorkowski

Anyone who has participated in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotation will be quick to say that assured communications, 

navigation, and air superiority over the past two decades have spoiled the 

force. The information environment of future large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will be contested at best. Providers of Information-Related 

Capabilities (IRCs) will conduct preparatory fires on a multidimensional 

battlefield months or years ahead of the physical deployment of forces. 

IRCs will evolve to include all elements that have the ability to penetrate 

the information domain, shape physical combat activity, and maximize 

potential for expeditionary operations. Information supremacy will be 

marked by windows of opportunity, which mandates redundancy through 

analog or commercial off-the-shelf systems. A revolution in military information affairs in the face of adversarial advances in technology and application will prepare and enable the Department of Defense for the unified 

application of IRCs to ensure success.

This chapter reflects the study of the current state of information operations in the US Army, adversary information warfare posture, and the 

anticipated future state of the information environment. These points are 

applied specifically in consideration of the ability to address major adversaries in future LSCO. Individually, US IRCs perform new and innovative functions every day. They are managed by agile leaders who adapt 

to the changing information environment and think creatively to develop 

unprecedented applications for constantly changing technology. However, 

they largely remain insulated from the other IRCs and thus, the utility of 

the collective power of information warfare is not maximized. The challenge of integrating capabilities into combined arms warfare is not new for 

the US Army. Lessons from warfare throughout history serve to inform the 

US military in terms of preparation for future major combat. Such a challenge will require substantial change from a mindset, doctrinal, and personnel standpoint. The remainder of this chapter will unpack these points.

The first section will address endogenous variables of concern, which 

are comprised primarily of organizational structure challenges. The following section elaborates on historical examples of similar challenges in 

the US military. Next, an analysis of adversary information warfare proves 

indicative of adversary intent in terms of costly signals and commitments. 
18

The next section provides a hypothetical glimpse into the future information environment LSCOs would operate within. Finally, this chapter will 

conclude with summary implications and recommendations for change 

needed to address future large-scale combat operations. Ultimately, the 

challenges the United States faces in terms of the effective employment 

of information operations in LSCO are familiar—they are structural and 

consist of close coordination, integration, and realistic training. The US 

Army has addressed such challenges before and the same solutions apply 

in this context.

Where Do We Stand? Endogenous Challenges and Limitations

Perceptions of what information operations are and the effects they 

are intended to achieve vary considerably across the US Army, and even 

more so across the joint force and interagency world. There are examples 

of tactics and strategies that have worked well in counterinsurgencies that 

may not translate to LSCO. Ask five different maneuver battalion or brigade commanders what information operations (IO) are and how IO can 

help them, and you will get five different answers and a lot of confused 

looks. This is the state of IO in the US Army today. The most difficult task 

of an IO practitioner is to demonstrate to the operations officer and commander the ability of IO to be a combat multiplier without the possession 

of any significant assets or staff. This description may seem harsh, but it 

represents a reality that is actually much more supportive of IO than just 

five years ago. This section will outline key aspects of the current doctrine 

of IO in the US Army and structural challenges with integration and interagency efforts. 

A discussion of the role of IO must first begin with a baseline understanding of where IO stands currently as a field. US doctrine defines information operations as the integrated employment of IRCs.1

 IRCs consist of 

a laundry list of capabilities that have the potential to influence the information environment, such as Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities (CEMA), 

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) or psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), Combat Camera (COMCAM), Human 

Terrain Teams (HTTs), space operations, special technical operations and 

deception, Soldier and Leader Engagements (SLEs or meetings), and others.2

 It is important to note these are capabilities over which dedicated IO 

personnel typically have no direct control. Trained IO officers (there are 

no non-commissioned officers) now reside at the division level and above. 

The current structure of IO personnel throughout the force serves as a 

hindrance to the integrated employment of IRCs, as will be made clear 

throughout this chapter. 
19

Up until 2015, the Army employed trained IO officers at the brigade 

level to assist with coordinating and employing IRCs. Although challenges regarding access to IRCs existed, dedicated IO officers at the brigade 

level at least had the ability to request assets and integrate effects. Unfortunately, recent doctrinal changes resulted in retaining trained IO personnel 

at the division level and above, with CEMA, CA and MISO personnel 

now falling directly under the operations officer at the brigade level. IRCs 

at all levels are now the most stovepiped and least integrated doctrinally 

in the history of the IO functional area. This reality is exacerbated by the 

adversary, as David Kilcullen’s findings highlight below:

We typically design physical operations first, then craft supporting 

information operations to explain our actions. This is the reverse 

of Al Qaeda’s approach. For all our professionalism, compared to 

the enemy’s, our public information is an afterthought. In military 

terms, for Al Qaeda the main effort is information; for us, information is a supporting effort.3

The information warfare doctrine of major state-level adversaries increasingly reflects the approach of Al Qaeda mentioned above. Fortunately, some US leaders have empowered IO personnel to task organize in 

a more integrated fashion to address the current and anticipated future 

information environment. This was evidenced most recently by the 4th 

Infantry Division (ID) during their participation in Operation Atlantic 

Resolve, where the division staff organized into an ad hoc Information 

Related Capabilities cell to maximize resources and synchronize capabilities.4

 Key IRCs were task organized under a single officer in charge with 

commensurate rank of other senior division staff officers, which maximized information sharing and unity of control. Unsurprisingly, such task 

organization by 4th ID was successful. Individually, IRCs are proven to 

provide valuable effects. However, when IRCs are synchronized, the synergy that develops can be incredibly powerful. There are recent examples 

in Afghanistan of tactically integrated information operations, such as the 

delivery of MISO messages transmitted through electronic warfare ground 

and aerial systems intended to deceive the enemy through his handheld 

radio receiver. Integration is powerful if properly resourced. 

Although it is not reflected so much in doctrine, it is worth noting 

there is a strong tendency in the US to equate IO with marketing or advertising, especially in counterinsurgency warfare. The “war of the story” 

and “control of the narrative” are now common phrases in the IO lexicon. 

The US Army IO qualification course includes blocks of instruction on 

marketing principles, and training with industry opportunities are typically 
20

associated with marketing or advertising firms. Marketing and advertising 

are certainly useful as a thought process in many ways, but from a tactical 

standpoint, it is important to focus on changing behavior rather than attitudes. In LSCO, time will be of the essence, and information operations 

will need to target specific audiences for behavioral change in order to 

multiply combat effects. Should an army patrol care if the local population 

likes them as long as they are not detonating improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs)? Research beginning in the 1930s demonstrates that, “attitudes are 

very poor predictors of behavior.”5 Conversely, once behavior changes, 

attitudes are likely to follow. Retired UK Major General Andrew Mackay and Royal Navy Commander Steve Tatham have written extensively 

on this topic. In a 2012 report for the Defence Academy of the United 

Kingdom, they argued the RAND’s findings on US information operations in Afghanistan were fundamentally wrong and overly reliant upon 

marketing and advertising principles.6

 In LSCO, the US Army should be 

concerned little with the business of advertising. Information operations 

efforts should instead be focused on influencing what the adversary does 

or does not do (behavior). In order to effectively target adversary behavior, 

US IO elements need to perform detailed Target Audience Analysis (TAA) 

well ahead of LSCO. This point will be expanded upon later. 

Finally, another challenge with the current state of IO is scale and interagency coordination. Given the expansiveness and instant nature of the 

information environment, very little discretion is afforded for the tactical 

employment of IO. With advances in technology, the gap between the strategic level and the tactical level is narrowed considerably. This results in 

risk aversion by the US State Department and other interagency partners 

who seek to control US credibility and the overarching narrative. In the 

event a tactical need arises for the employment of IO, approval authority 

is often held at too high a level to achieve prompt effects on the ground. 

This lag will delay or potentially negate the utility of IO in future LSCO.

As evidenced above, the primary limiting factors in the employment 

of information operations in future large-scale combat operations are 

structural. When the need arises and key personnel are empowered by a 

dynamic commander, the Army has demonstrated the ability to task organize to defeat the threat. However, US doctrine and personnel allocations 

currently prohibit the ability to maximize utility. These issues are compounded by interagency approval authorities and discretion delegated to 

the tactical level. As noted in the next section, these types of challenges 

are not new.
21

Examples from Yom Kippur: Same Problem, Different Capabilities

What are some historical examples of stovepiping or integration problems in the military? One example is the Yom Kippur War, which was 

foundational to the establishment of US AirLand Battle doctrine. Two of 

the most significant lessons of the Yom Kippur War, as noted by the inaugural commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) General William DePuy, were the close operational coordination 

between the air and ground forces and the importance of combined arms 

teamwork, which required employment in realistic training.7

 

The US has learned many lessons in terms of combined arms maneuver through the nearly two decades of recent conflict. There are two 

important considerations with regard to the US operations in information 

environment since 2001: the information environment has evolved and 

expanded rapidly, thereby generating new means for warfare; and US operations within the information environment have been relatively uncontested. As a result, the US has not been forced to learn the hard lessons on 

how to employ information operations as an element of combined arms 

maneuver. So how does the United States adapt to defeat the enemy in a 

contested information environment? A revolution in military information 

affairs is needed. 

A Look at the Adversarial Approach: Exogenous Concerns

Major adversaries have wasted no time exploiting the information 

environment and signaling intent. Russia’s doctrine of New Generation 

Warfare is primarily a strategy of influence.8 The objective of Russian information warfare is to control information in whatever form it takes—

information is the object of operations, not the platform through which it 

flows.9

 Similarly, China’s goal with information warfare is to secure information dominance through technology and psychological operations.10

With the control of information, one can control what the adversary hears 

or sees in the information domain, which results in ambiguity increasing or decreasing in support of kinetic operations. In other words, control 

of information can lead an adversary to think what they are hearing and 

seeing is truth when it may just be part of a broader deception or manipulation. Other than the mindset, which holds information as the object of 

operations, adversary information warfare differs from that of the United 

States in a few important ways: structural integration, phases of employment, and data collection. These points are summarized below.
22

Structural Integration

The Russian model for information warfare is comprehensive and holistic. All of what the United States considers IRCs are unified under the 

Russian structure, which falls under the leadership of the Russian General 

Staff.11 Propaganda, deception, cyber, political, and economic warfare capabilities are all part of unified information operations. The Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008 was the country’s first experiment with integrated information and kinetic warfare. Specific deficiencies were identified 

following major operations that fell into two categories: information-technical and information-psychological.12 This perceived shortfall led to calls 

for specific “information troops”:

The personnel of the Information Troops should be composed of 

diplomats, experts, journalists, writers, publicists, translators, operators, communications personnel, web designers, hackers, and 

others. . . . To construct information countermeasures, it is necessary to develop a center for the determination of critically important information entities of the enemy, including how to eliminate 

them physically, and how to conduct electronic warfare, psychological warfare, systemic counterpropaganda, and net operations 

to include hacker training.13

Russian incursion into Crimea in March 2014 presented another opportunity to test information warfare. In this case, Russia established physical control over the telecommunications infrastructure to isolate Crimea 

from news from the outside world.14 Russian special forces were able to 

simultaneously interface kinetic and information operations to manipulate 

information received by internal and external target audiences. In the case 

of Crimea, this resulted in confusion and a lack of significant escalation 

or hostile action. The employment of information warfare in Crimea was 

viewed much more favorably.

The Grey Zone and Phases of Employment

Adversaries the US military are most likely to face in LSCO do not 

distinguish between peacetime and wartime from an information warfare 

standpoint. Efforts are ongoing to seize the initiative in anticipation of 

future conflict. This point is solidified below in an excerpt from 2010 Russian military doctrine:

Features of modern military conflicts include the prior implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve 

political objectives without the utilization of military force and, 
23

subsequently, in the interest of shaping a favorable response from 

the world community to the utilization of military force.15

The Russian concept of information operations, or more appropriately 

information warfare, applies to times of peace and conflict. The information realm is one in which adversaries are comfortable operating without 

significant fear of reprisal or overt US military response. China operates 

along the same lines, as indicated by a publication by the Chinese Academy of Military Science below:

It is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in 

the political, economic, technical, and military realms, as only 

then can one scientifically establish operational plans, appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict, appropriately control 

the level of attack, precisely strike predetermined targets, and seek 

the best strategic interest and long-term benefit.16

There are no conflict specific rules of engagement; Russian and Chinese information operations preparatory fires have already commenced. 

Unfortunately, such operations in the grey zone fall below the threshold of 

overt US military response.17 Adversaries continue to exploit this reality.

Data Collection

A critical component of grey zone operations for adversaries includes 

data collection. This is done in a number of ways, but significant effort is 

attributed to social media. US Soldiers participating in Operation Atlantic Resolve in 2015 were targeted in this regard. Social media data was 

collected on individual officers visiting Kiev and mixed with allegations 

of child rape on Russian-backed media outlets.18 Russia has demonstrated effectiveness in mixing seemingly reliable information with credible 

sources to disseminate fake news. Western reliance on social media and 

cellular communications present a critical vulnerability. The implications 

of examples like this on US participation in LSCO are immense and well 

summarized by Keil Giles:

In time of crisis, if the defense forces of a frontline state decided to 

mobilize in response to a direct and immediate threat from Russia, it 

might find that its personnel—and government officials more broadly—receive apparently trustworthy instructions to remain at home 

and offer no resistance.19

Russian intelligence collection on data that can be used to target individuals or groups through the information environment in conjunction 

with other operations is well underway. The same can be safely assumed 
24

for China with one example being their massive data breach of the US 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM).20 

In summary, the exogenous challenges to information operations by 

key adversaries outlined above should inform how the US approaches information operations in LSCO. The information environment for such a 

conflict is already being exploited for adversarial advantage. The next section outlines a hypothetical scenario where an adversary initiates LSCO 

while maximizing the utility of information warfare. 

Setting the Stage: A Hypothetical Glimpse of the Information 

Environment in LSCO

The information environment for LSCO includes the environment 

currently being exploited by adversaries. Such an environment is much 

more representative of what Clausewitz considers total war, comprising 

at least two elements of the trinity. Primary information warfare objectives will focus on data collection and manipulation with secondary efforts focused on contextual, phased dissemination in conjunction with 

supported operations. Effects will include deception, diversion, character 

assassination, and economic shock and will seek to widen cleavages and 

invoke emotion. Political active measures and economic warfare will be 

of primary concern to adversaries. Active measures will be employed to 

influence political outcomes.21 Adversaries will pursue character assassination through emotion invoking or volatile issues such as claims of sexual assault, race, or sex scandals. Economically, adversaries manipulate 

the transportation infrastructure by imposing a minor tax on the system to 

slow the distribution of goods while activating sleeper cell devices such as 

ZTE phones to passively or actively collect insider information.22 Russian 

hacktivists and patronage networks tapped by the Russian Business Network (RBN) are activated to add complexity and generate revenue.23 As 

chaos ensues under the radar, all channels for information dissemination 

to specific target audiences indicate normal operations. Meanwhile, the 

adversary military mobilizes under a specifically woven camouflage of 

information concealment. 

Militarily, US regional defense forces are informed through quasi-official channels to remain in place. Adversary hackers target USAA 

and empty Soldiers’ bank accounts as they begin to mobilize. The enemy 

dumps large quantities of fake news on WikiLeaks and other outlets to 

mislead and deceive US military decision makers while simultaneously 

forcing US officials to disprove the allegations. Tactical Electro-Magnetic 

Pulse devices are strategically employed around the globe and Position-
25

ing, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) devices are knocked out in predetermined sequence. Once the US military finally begins to mobilize, initiative 

has already been seized and the US government has to operate within the 

constraints of democratic and institutional norms. 

The crude vignette outlined above is perhaps not much of a departure from reality. If a major adversary initiates LSCO, they would be hard 

pressed to avoid exploiting some of the vulnerabilities presented here. 

While actual events in LSCO would be much more nuanced and dynamic, 

the vignette is helpful in framing implications and recommendations.

Summary Implications and Recommendations

Given the international status quo and stabilizing factors such as international institutions, the US is not likely to initiate major war. Therefore, 

US participation in LSCO will likely be reactive and consist of an initial 

loss of ally held terrain. In such a scenario, the US has already come to 

terms with the fact that reactive mobilization will prove timely and costly.24 Critiques of US forces positioned in Eastern Europe have been referred to as “speedbumps” or “tripwires,” but as alluded to by Thomas 

Schelling during the Cold War, these forces are in position as a deterrent, not to defend Europe.25 Such positioning serves as a costly signal to 

demonstrate to adversaries that any aggression implicating these forces 

means the United States is automatically committed to the conflict. The 

implications and recommendations outlined below are in summarized in 

terms of deterrence and compellence. 

Deterrence 

The positioning of troops in Eastern Europe serves as a useful example of a costly signal. The same logic should be applied to the information environment for future LSCO. Costly information signals need to be 

employed in the information environment as tripwires that automatically 

commit the US to military action. If such costly signals are not clearly 

communicated, adversaries will continue to manipulate the information 

environment in their favor to maximize advantage during the outbreak 

of major conflict. This is clearly not just an Army problem, but the Army 

must advocate as a part of strategic change. The US has struggled considerably in the political realm to establish regulations for fear of imposing 

on private corporations or industry and damaging the domestic economy. 

Similarly, international regulations remain lax and clouded in uncertainty. 

Meanwhile, state aggressors like Russia and China exploit the information 

environment to their benefit. This must change for deterrence in the in-
26

formation environment to take root. Recommendations for addressing the 

challenges of deterring adversaries through information warfare in LSCO 

are listed below:

• Emplace Costly Signals. Major adversaries are not going to change 

current behavior unless the United States clearly communicates costly 

signals. The United States and allies must emplace “tripwires” in the information environment that credibly commit the United States to action 

if terms are violated. A lack of costly signals will result in continued exploitation of the information environment and significant disadvantage in 

the event of LSCO.

• Institutionalize Western Information Operations. The United States 

needs to lead the development, manning, and exercise of international institutions, such as the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Latvia with the goal of developing practices and sharing lessons 

learned. Meaningful participation by the United States again demonstrates 

a credible commitment to state aggressors. Such institutions should be 

heavily involved in regional exercises. 

• Embrace the Grey Zone. The distinction between peace and conflict 

is blurred. The United States is currently limited in the types of authorized operations during times of “peace.” The adversary is exploiting this 

fact. Phase zero began long ago and this will require a certain amount 

of catching up on the part of the United States In March 2016, General 

Joseph Dunford commented that most combatant commanders believe 

the adversary is operating in Phase 2 or 2.5 where they are seizing the 

initiative. In order for the United States to set conditions for successful 

shaping operations and regain the initiative for LSCO, significant TAA 

is needed. Such TAA should consist of all elements of adversary national 

power, to include soft power. Perhaps the Pentagon should reconsider 

programs similar to Project Camelot to conduct detailed ethnographic 

research.26 Such efforts are intelligence heavy and should be driven by 

information operations objectives.

Compellence

Once deterrence fails, the US Army needs the assets and resources 

to compel adversary action. In May 2018, a joint group of senior ranking military officers met at Quantico to discuss the challenges of integrating multi-domain operations. The key theme reported out of the meeting 

was regarding challenges due to integration across domains.27 There were 

many similarities and even graphical references to AirLand Battle. A key 

point that needs clarification with the current concept of Multi-Domain 
27

Battle (MDB) is how information is viewed and operationalized. The Russians would view information as a stand-alone domain, through which capabilities like CEMA operate. The platforms or IRCs operate to influence 

the object of operations, which is information. The challenges outlined 

in MDB concept released in December 2017 are indicative of the challenges involved with the US operationalization of information warfare.28

Integration of capabilities across domains with precision and maximum 

utility is incredibly difficult, especially when faced with a peer or superior 

adversary. In terms of information operations, the first step toward maximizing utility from a compellence standpoint is to clearly define and unify 

the concept of information operations across the joint force. Recommendations for addressing the challenges of compelling adversaries through 

information warfare in LSCO are listed below:

• Commission a Study. This may seem cliché, but necessary. Individual services and agencies have developed their own definitions of information operations. The services are not even in agreement on the phrase (i.e. 

information operations vs. information warfare). A comprehensive study 

should include experts from the Department of Defense, interagency, and 

academia. The study should consider the current information environment, capabilities and doctrine of the United States and allies, adversary 

capabilities and doctrine, and anticipated future threats. The findings of 

the study should inform key decision makers of changes needed to address 

emerging information operations challenges.29

• Empower the Information Dominance Force. Considerable doctrine 

and personnel changes are needed within the Information Dominance career field to maximize utility in LSCO. Information Dominance professionals need to be “cross pollinated” to reduce barriers to integration 

and enhance knowledge of synergistic effects. Opportunities for upward 

mobility and proponency at the highest levels of command are needed effect change that matters. Field grade information operations officers and opportunities for non-commissioned Information Dominance 

integrators are needed at the tactical level. Doctrine and qualification 

courses need to reflect combat requirements for adversarial behavioral 

change. The creation of comprehensive Information Warfare brigades 

comprised of all IRCs (including economic, political and legal advisors) 

that can be task organized to support all levels of command may help 

address these challenges.

• Enhance Joint and Interagency Partnerships. In order to maximize 

utility, joint and interagency partners need to operate from the same playbook. If an adversary applies information warfare in a specific area, the 
28

entire force needs to equally understand the potential implications. In the 

information environment, the gap between the strategic and tactical levels is minimized. LSCO will require strategic assets and discretion at the 

tactical level in near real time. This will only happen if structural changes 

are made to place information warfare personnel strategically throughout 

the joint and interagency structure in positions where decisions are made. 

• Build Redundant and Analog Information Capabilities. Information dissemination in contested information environments, as expected in 

LSCO, will be vulnerable to constant disruption and manipulation by the 

adversary. Periods of digital information blackout will be sporadic. Information warfare intent must be clearly communicated and empowered at 

the lowest levels for effective employment. Redundant systems should be 

in place in the event of information failure.

In the end, we come full circle back to the lessons learned by General 

DePuy and his staff at TRADOC after the Yom Kippur War that led to 

the creation of the National Training Center. There is no substitute for 

intense, realistic combined arms training. In order for this type of training 

to be successful in the current information environment, all non-lethal enablers or IRCs need to have the proper authority and be placed appropriately throughout the formation. The new Information Dominance category 

needs proponency with a voice and with options for upward mobility in 

all of the respective IRCs. Such personnel should be placed at all levels of 

command and include noncommissioned officers. 

We are already operating in the information environment in which 

future large-scale combat operations will occur. The challenges presented 

in the information environment have a largely structural solution. The individual IRCs in the US military are incredible and improving every day 

with advances in technology. The US military should approach this challenge from a functional standpoint to flatten stovepipes that have emerged 

through advances in technology. Empowering leaders who can bridge the 

gaps that currently exist between the IRCs through a restructuring of the 

US military approach to information warfare is the only way the increasingly powerful capabilities of cyber, electronic warfare, deception and 

collective information operations can seamlessly merge with kinetic operations to defeat major adversaries in LSCO. Significant opportunity exists 

for the US to regain the initiative.
29

Notes

1. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: 27 November 2012) and Department of the Army Field 

Manual 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, D.C.: December 2016) for a 

more detailed definition. 

2. Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 1-3.

3. Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioral Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict

(Essex: Military Studies Press, 2011), 135.

4. Matthew Sheiffer, “US Army Information Operations and Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities: Lessons from Atlantic Resolve,” 19 March 2018, accessed 

2 June 2018, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Mar/Army-Info-Ops/. 

5. Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham, and Lee Rowland, “The Effectiveness 

of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001–2010: Why RAND 

Missed the Point,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Central Asia 

Series, 2012, 5.

6. Mackay, Tatham, and Rowland, i.

7. Saul Bronfeld, “Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War 

on the US Army,” The Journal of Military History 71, no 2, (April 2007): 477.

8. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Kremlin Playbook: 

Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe,” October 2016, 

accessed 2 June 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook. 

9. Keir Giles, “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,” NATO 

Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, 4, accessed 2 June 2018, 

https://www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-warfare-keir-giles. 

10. Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological 

Warfare Challenge,” The Heritage Foundation, 11 July 11 2013, accessed 2 June 

2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/winning-without-fighting-the-chinese-psychological-warfare-challenge.

11. Oleg Odnokolenko, “Shoygu Orders Information Troops to Take Offensive,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 27 February 2017, accessed 2 June 2018, 

http://www.ng.ru/armies/2017-02-27/2_6936_shoigu.html. 

12. Keir Giles, “Information Troops—A Russian Cyber Command?” 3rd 

International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2011, accessed 2 June 2018, https://

pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7b93/b0b24c10aa0e009b41059e86de054df1711f.pdf. 

13. Giles, “Information Troops,” 52.

14. Giles, “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,” 12. 

15. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 5 February 2010, 

accessed 2 June 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

16. Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge.”
30

17. Paul Scharre, “American Strategy and the Six Phases of Grief,” War 

on the Rocks, 6 October 2016, accessed 2 June 2018, https://warontherocks.

com/2016/10/american-strategy-and-the-six-phases-of-grief/. 

18. Giles, “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,” 14.

 19. Giles, 14.

20. Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese breach data of 4 million federal workers,” 

The Washington Post, 4 June 2015, accessed 2 June 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_

story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e943c37fe800. 

21. Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations,” Special Report No. 88, October 1981, 

accessed 2 June 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001303150031-0.pdf. 

22. Sherisse Pham, “US hits major Chinese tech firm with export ban,” 

CNN, 17 April 2018, accessed 2 June 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/17/

technology/zte-china-us-phones-ban/index.html. 

23. Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the 

Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27, 2014, 

101–130.

24. Sydney Freedberg Jr., “Generals Worry US May Lose In Start Of Next 

War: Is Multi-Domain The Answer?” Breaking Defense, 14 May 2018, accessed 

2 June 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/generals-worry-us-may-losein-start-of-next-war-is-multi-domain-the-answer/. 

25. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 47.

26. George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can social scientists redefine 

the war on terror?” The New Yorker, 18 December 2006, accessed 2 June 2018, 

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/12/18/knowing-the-enemy. 

27. Freedberg, “Generals Worry Us May Lose In Start of Next War.” 

28. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Multi-Domain Battle: 

Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,” Version 1.0, 

December 2017, accessed 2 June 2018, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/multidomainbattle/docs/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf.

29. Such a study should at a minimum include Keir Giles, Heather Conley, 

Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham, and Maxell Thibodeaux. 
31

Chapter 3

The Fog of Russian Information Warfare

Lionel M. Beehner, Colonel Liam S. Collins, and Robert T. Person

“This is an arms race,” Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg told a recent congressional panel in reference to the Russian Federation’s use of social media to conduct information warfare. “They’re 

going to keep getting better.”1

 The tools and tactics of Russian information 

warfare may have changed over the decades, but as many analysts have 

noted, the ends remain largely unchanged since Soviet times: to complicate, contain, and constrain the projection of US strategic power and those 

of its allies, predominantly in Eurasia but also in the Middle East. It is an 

entirely rational way of shaping the strategic environment to gain advantage, given the quantitative and qualitative asymmetries between Russia 

and the West in conventional capabilities. 

With the US Army shifting its doctrinal focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations, peer and near-peer competitors such 

as China, Iran, and Russia are taking on renewed importance.2

 But that 

does not necessarily imply a complete doctrinal shift toward large-scale 

conventional operations, given all the types of warfare these states prefer 

to wage. After all, so-called “contactless war,” as the Russians define it, is 

meant to negate their military disadvantage by avoiding any direct contact 

with Western forces, whether by demonstrating fire discipline or deploying “little green men” in places like Crimea.3

 Russia has shown a remarkable ability and willingness, with fairly straightforward means, to disrupt 

democratic institutions, undermine social cohesion, and sow confusion, 

doubt, and distrust among Western allies and their publics. Social media 

has only accelerated the pace of information warfare (IW) advancement. 

We should be clear by what is meant by Russian information warfare, or informatsionnaya voyna. Information warfare is not simply a tool 

to achieve some kind of limited tactical objective or advantage during 

wartime, typically in the initial phase of hostilities. Rather, information 

warfare should be considered more broadly. Calculated and systematic, 

it consists of operations aimed at degrading the enemy’s ability to control 

the information space, deny it the technical capability to retaliate via cyberspace means, and defend a narrative of Russian nationalism to glorify 

its role on the world stage—a manipulative form of Russian “soft power.” 

Russian information warfare comprises a bounty of tactical innovations, 

from traditional psychological operations (psy-ops) and strategic com-
32

munications aimed at controlling the narrative, to the sophisticated deployment of decentralized trolls and bots across social media and other 

online platforms.4

 

Russian information warfare—informatsionnaya voyna—consists of 

three pillars. First, and most benignly, it aims to put the best spin it can on 

ordinary news. It does this through state-controlled outlets like RT (formerly “Russia Today”), Russian-language radio (“Sputnik”), as well as 

through television outlets that cater to the Russian-speaking population of 

the former Soviet states. This spin generally paints Russia as a viable and 

preferred alternative and counter to US greed and aggression.”5

 Second, it 

uses disinformation to create enough ambiguity to confuse people, both at 

home and abroad, about its current operations, whether in Ukraine, Syria, 

or elsewhere, all with the aim of providing a decoy and contributing to the 

proverbial “fog of war.” Third, it outright lies when given true information and claims it is falsified. This last strategy has several objectives: to 

degrade trust in institutions across the world; push populations currently 

undergoing conflict to simply accept the status quo of the conflict and not 

push for resolution; and finally, it prevents countries in its desired sphere 

of “privileged interest” from Western alliances like NATO by keeping 

these areas in perpetual conflict.

Interestingly, while Western technology firms point to an arms race 

with peer competitors like the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, the US government does not consider itself at war. This 

naivety is a strategic mistake, we argue. In this chapter, we examine how 

Russian information warfare operates and how it should be conceptualized at the strategic level. How does information operations (IO) fit into 

Russia’s larger strategic aims? What are its primary methods? And finally, 

and perhaps most importantly, how can the US military effectively combat 

Russian information warfare, while staying true to its values and simultaneously preventing conflict escalation? In this chapter, we advance three 

central arguments: 

• First, Russia’s leadership does not apply information warfare solely 

to support its military objectives—as a way to soften up the enemy or prep 

the battlefield, as it were—but rather vice versa. Its military operations 

in places like Ukraine or Syria are often ancillary to Russia’s more immediate strategic objective: to challenge US interests wherever possible 

and undermine America’s ability to advance unhindered its own strategic 

objectives. As such, it can be considered a form of post-Cold War strategic balancing by Moscow that involves political, economic, cyberspace, 

and—most formidably—information means to contain and constrain US 
33

activities globally. In this sense, IW should not be seen as simply a tool 

in Russia’s military toolkit. While Russian IW has certainly been used as 

part of military operations, it is often applied in pursuit of Russian political 

objectives where military objectives may be absent. Thus, when observers see evidence of Russian IW, they should not immediately jump to the 

conclusion that they are part of a military strategy to formally seize more 

land in Ukraine’s east or send a column of tanks into the Baltics. Regarding Russia’s IW efforts, the ends are to challenge American interests and 

undermine the foundations of Western democratic institutions; by sowing 

uncertainty, discord, and division in the United States and its allies, IW 

tactics are a particularly cheap, ambiguous, and effective means of achieving those strategic ends. To the degree that information warfare goes hand 

in hand with Russian conventional military operations, recent experience 

demonstrates that the latter are in some respect sideshows to the former, 

not the other way around. 

• Second, while information warfare is frequently applied for nonmilitary political ends, Russia nonetheless considers itself at war with the 

West and brings such a mentality to its operations. Moscow thus conducts 

information warfare primarily preemptively to weaken its enemy—the 

United States and Europe. Information warfare was formally incorporated 

into Russian military doctrine in 2010, and dates further back to the height 

of the Cold War, but it was been exponentially expanded on since. To date, 

Russia has seen itself as able to achieve “information dominance” —that 

is, the ability to penetrate the American information environment, from 

planting stories in the media to hacking the emails of politicians and their 

operatives, and influence political outcomes.6

 

• Third, when it comes to Russian aggression in the information realm, 

we are at war. Though it may be “political warfare,” to borrow George 

Kennan’s term from a 1948 Policy Planning Staff memo, it is warfare nonetheless.7

 To counteract Russian malicious activity, one must “fight fire with 

fire.” US conventional deterrence in the region has primarily consisted of 

stationing several battalions in NATO partners like Poland and the Baltics. 

Yet, a recent RAND report found that Russia would overrun NATO forces 

in a matter of hours.8

 The imbalance is even more severe in the informational realm: there is neither a sufficient deterrent to prevent Russian IW 

attacks, nor a punitive mechanism to enact retaliatory measures beyond 

issuing statements condemning such acts. We recognize that attribution is 

an issue in this space, as is the risk of conflict escalation. However, the 

current defensive position of the United States is not working. To quote one 

congressman, “[W]hy not go on the offense to release information expos-
34

ing corruption at the Kremlin?”9 Without looser rules of engagement and a 

more offensive strategy, we can expect Russia and its agents to continue its 

concerted information operations unabated as the United States continues 

to cede the strategic initiative in the information environment. 

This chapter proceeds as follows: First we provide some background 

of Russian IW, define several key concepts, and identify the main methods 

Russia uses and the challenges they pose. Next, we lay out the larger strategic aims of Russian IW, both against the West and against Ukraine and 

other former Soviet states. Then we detail its IW methods by examining 

the case study of Ukraine. We conclude by outlining a list of recommendations for the US military to effectively combat Russia’s IW efforts. 

Information Operations 101

Clausewitz correctly noted that the nature of warfare never changes, 

only its character. He would have recognized the character of information 

warfare as a distinct and effective form of warfare to accomplish one’s political ends, given that an enemy’s center of gravity is shifting. The United 

States’ greatest strength is paradoxically also its greatest weakness: that 

is, our freedom of speech and press. Here the Russians are practicing a 

playbook straight out of Clausewitz: attack the enemy where they are 

most vulnerable. The US military defines information operations as “the 

integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential 

adversaries while protecting our own.”10 Further, it defines information 

warfare as “a threat’s orchestrated use of information activities (such as 

cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations) 

to gain an advantage in the information environment.” In other words, IO 

refers to friendly actions in the information environment, while IW is used 

to describe threat-based activities.

In keeping with our argument about Russian IW as a form of political 

warfare, it is important to note that the definition above is overly restrictive 

in defining information warfare as residing strictly within the confines of 

military operations. Thus, we find it useful to employ a “holistic concept 

[of information warfare] that includes computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and information operations.”11

Information warfare—sometimes called “influence operations”—refer 

broadly to the practice of collecting information about an enemy as well as 

the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda to seek an advantage 

over one’s adversary, whether in peacetime or wartime. 
35

Russian information warfare is carried out through five main methods, 

ranging from psychological to technical: the manipulation of information 

(fake news), espionage (intelligence), political interference, military deception (plausible deniability), and cyberspace-based capabilities (social 

media). The latter is the only item that is really new and innovative, as 

it allows for increased speed and allows for further distance. We outline 

these methods below.

First, Russia has mastered the use of fake news and other disinformation to confuse or persuade media consumers, both in Russia and the West. 

The purpose of this effort is to erode public support and confidence in 

Western democratic institutions, to create and amplify public and a political discord, to create confusion in order to delay Western decision-makers 

at the highest levels, and to intensify the security competition in areas of 

strategic importance to both the West and to Russia. This is especially 

true in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus along the fault line between NATO and the countries that once orbited within the Soviet Union’s 

sphere of influence: the Baltic states, Georgia, and Ukraine. Intensifying 

the competition serves to rattle Russia’s adversaries, provoke them, and 

influence their risk-averse publics to disapprove of taking any kind of serious retaliatory measures. Another byproduct of this use of IW is to support 

both directly and indirectly anti-establishment groups, parties, and politicians in the West—many of them right-wing or hyper-nationalist—as a 

way to provide them with a veneer of legitimacy and disrupt the democratic process. “Russia’s new propaganda is not now about selling a particular 

worldview,” as Alexei Levinson argues. “It is about trying to distort information flows and fuel nervousness among European audiences.”12 

Second, Russian IW includes the work of traditional Cold War-style 

espionage, like stealing compromising materials and information on one’s 

enemy, known in Russian as kompromat.

13 During the Soviet era, this kind 

of information warfare was referred to as “reflexive control,” a theory with 

deep roots in the Soviet Ministry of Defense’s research into psychology 

and cybernetics that mapped how enemies formed decisions and framed 

problems.14 “In the context of warfare,” as Maria Snegovaya notes, “the 

actor that is most capable of predicting and mimicking the reasoning and 

actions of its opponent has the highest probability of success.”15 

During the Cold War, the primary foot soldiers on this front were KGB 

intelligence officers, including a young KGB officer in Dresden by the 

name of Vladimir Putin. Today Russia relies on “information troops,” who 

act as guns for hire in the propaganda realm—contractors, former criminals, and other cyberwarfare actors and middlemen.16 They are kept at 
36

arm’s length from Moscow, to provide the Kremlin with plausible deniability if caught. The aim of these mercenaries is manifold: to disrupt the 

enemy’s telecommunications or data-storage systems; to interfere in and 

undermine democratic elections in the West, whether by releasing sensitive information, trolling, posting fake news, or other tactics it deems will 

undermine democracy.

Meddling in foreign elections is not a new tactic. Nor is it a technique 

unique to Russia or its Soviet predecessor. According to Dov Levin, “Between 1946 and 2000, the United States and the USSR/Russia intervened 

[to manipulate foreign elections] 117 times, or, put another way, in about 

one of every nine competitive national-level executive elections during 

this period.”17 What has changed, however, is the technological sophistication, the use of proxies operating on the behalf of nation states, and 

the ability to leverage the speed of social media. In February 2017, for 

example, the special prosecutor Robert Mueller charged thirteen Russians 

and three Russian companies for interfering in the 2016 US presidential 

election. Among the companies charged was Internet Research Agency, a 

“Russian troll farm,” with the “strategic goal to sow discord in the US political system.”18 In his book, War in 140 Characters, David Patrikarakos 

profiles entire office buildings in Siberia devoted to creating fake news 

stories to influence voter behavior in Western elections.19

The fourth component of Russia’s IW is to add to the fog of war 

and deny the presence of Russian military forces—specifically its use of 

spetsnaz forces in places like Ukraine. This is to distract and obfuscate 

the existence of an extensive military campaign—what the Soviets used 

to call maskirovka—that might trigger a more robust Western response 

or worse a backlash at home were the full facts of the operations, including death tolls, to be made public.20 The Russian government always denies any use of this kind of warfare and instead attributes these attacks to 

Russian “patriots” operating on their own behalf, with no guidance from 

Moscow. This kind of disinformation campaign is hardly the work of a 

decentralized network of pro-Russia grassroots activists improvising on 

their own but rather is a heavily-structured, national-level effort to facilitate the accomplishment of Russia’s strategic objectives. According to 

former KGB defector, Ion Mihai, this kind of campaign has three prongs: 

deny involvement, minimize damage, and if truth comes out, blame it on 

one’s enemies.21 

Finally, in addition to information brigades, election meddling, and 

deception, Russia employs digital technologies to influence social media 

and add greater speed and sophistication to its IW campaigns. This in-
37

cludes, as Keir Giles notes, “a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising 

on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten 

societal tensions.”22 Malicious actors can harvest the personal data of unsuspecting users of social media such as browsing history and consumer 

spending data, which allows them to target groups and individuals by their 

political views, their income bracket, and their location. They can then 

plant contradictory messages in news stories that already expose ideological fault lines. A case in point was Russia-linked bots and trolls pushing divisive stories and hashtags on social media that fueled the National 

Football League national anthem controversy. Russian hackers also plant 

false reports in mainstream media outlets. In May 2017, Qatari state media 

published false remarks made by the emir of Qatar praising Iran, creating 

an uproar among its Gulf neighbors.23 

Russian Objectives

This section examines Russian objectives and how IW fits into Moscow’s larger strategic aims. Russia is often said to be determined to undermine democracy as an end, and to rewrite the rules of the international 

order. On this point, Russia is actually quite agnostic to the normative 

value placed on democracy or liberalism. If the United States were a totalitarian dictatorship marching its forces across the globe, Russia might surmise that playing to people’s liberal side might benefit its ability to resist 

American domination. Russia, in this role, is playing the foil to the United 

States. In this respect, Russia’s grand strategy is non-ideological in its motivation: its target is not democratic institutions per se, rather the target is 

the political institutions of an adversarial state. That those institutions happen to be democratic is—from an ideological standpoint—immaterial. But 

from a practical standpoint, the openness of liberal democratic institutions 

makes them more vulnerable to attack. 

What many Western audiences fail to appreciate is the fact that Russia 

believes itself to be fighting IO fire with IW fire. Moscow’s narrative of the 

2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2005 Orange Revolution and 2014 

Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2011-2012 mass protests in Russia 

is one of a West intent on interfering in its own elections those of countries 

where Moscow has strong interests. Thus, the Kremlin’s view is that its 

own schemes are simply tit for tat, a game of cat and mouse played against 

the world’s dominant superpower. In seeking to challenge, constrain, and 

contain American interests, Russia seeks a more multipolar world where 

it is accorded a seat among the great powers beyond that which it already 

enjoys with a permanent veto-wielding Security Council position. In Mos-
38

cow’s vision of a multipolar world, great powers like Russia should have 

a right to spheres of privileged interest, and a free hand to pursue their 

interests within their sphere unimpeded. The only way to achieve such a 

world is to roll back American influence. It should also be said that Russia 

is also a declining economic power playing a weak hand—politically, economically, and militarily. To counter American interests, it relies on IW as 

a cost-effective, less risky means of warfare. 

But this logic requires unpacking. First, Russian information warfare 

is often treated as just one part of its larger military strategy, which includes a number of other uses of force. However, this diminishes IW’s 

significance, and treats it as just one of several non-kinetic means—a basket of options sometimes referred to as “new generation warfare”—Russia 

employs in conjunction with kinetic means in pursuit of military objectives.24 But as argued previously, Russia’s objectives are often political 

in nature rather than military. In fact, IW in pursuit of political ends is 

appealing for its low cost, low risk, and its relative simplicity. Russia fancies itself as the “great disrupter,” to disrupt requires no further end goal 

than the mere process of destabilizing Western democracy—including its 

norms, procedures, institutions. Sowing the seeds of chaos is, often times, 

the primary objective. To be sure, one might argue this is part of a grand 

design to tilt the rules of the game in its favor by throwing out any rulebook. As Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo write, “Russia’s approach, unlike 

Nazi Germany’s ethnic and ideological one, is deeply nihilistic.”25 Yet it 

should be emphasized that nihilism is not the ends but rather the means. 

The ends is to contain and constrain American influence across the globe. 

When it comes to the bounds of acceptable behavior to achieve this ends, 

Russia will not follow any rules. As noted in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on 

cyberwarfare, “The Russians are masters at playing the ‘gray area’ in the 

law, as they know that this will make it difficult to claim they are violating 

international law and justifying responses such as countermeasures.”26 

Conceptually speaking, Russia’s IW campaign is seen by many Westerners as defensive and in line with what Russia did during the Cold War. 

But Russia’s information warfare activities should be seen as offensive, 

given that a large part of the effectiveness of IW as a means is its element 

of surprise. To reiterate, Russia considers itself to be “at war” (or more 

precisely, “at political war”) with the West, yet the West does not consider 

itself “at war” with Russia. A popular theory among neorealists known as 

“offense-defense theory” offers insights into the challenge at hand. The 

theory posits that in cases where the offensive measures enhance a state’s 

security more efficiently than defensive measures, and where a state’s 
39

intentions—whether offensive or defensive—are indistinguishable, then 

the threat of war and instability is greater.27 The logic is that this kind of 

setting favors a first-mover advantage and allows for preemptive attacks. 

This principle also applies to the use of information warfare. There is an 

element of surprise built in, as well as one of asymmetry. These operations are offensive—even if non-kinetic—by design. According to Maria 

Snegovaya, “On the tactical level, information warfare allows Russia to 

achieve surprise in the time or manner of an attack. Russia thereby gains 

time and efficiency against the enemy’s ground forces . . . Informational 

cover provides more flexibility and efficiency to the military, as well as improves speed of maneuverability and the speed of battlefield responses.”28

Nonetheless, part of the confusion (and thus the utility from the Russian perspective) of IW is that it can be applied to political ends simultaneously with military ends. In such contexts it can be difficult to determine 

a priori what the objectives of some information operations are. This is 

the situation that we find in Ukraine, where political and military objectives are both part of the conflict’s logic. It should be stated that Russia’s 

strategy in Ukraine is complicated yet also haphazard. The objective of 

Russia’s military operations in Ukraine is not simply to acquire territory—

if it wanted to, Russia could have easily annexed militarily the Donbas, 

the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine, by now—but rather to keep Ukraine 

down, sow confusion among its public, and prevent Ukraine from joining 

Western institutions. Russia seeks to undermine the foundational principles of the very institutions that Ukraine seeks to join. In this regard, IW 

does not serve its military goals of controlling or annexing territory, but 

rather the other way around: its military strategy supports its IW. Ukraine 

in this regard is just one piece of Russia’s larger grand puzzle—an important piece, to be sure, given their close historical ties. Russian military 

operations in Ukraine are but one component to weaken the West and by 

extension make the world more multipolar. 

IW at the Tactical Level in Ukraine

Russia’s information warfare in Ukraine dates back decades, but 

during the most recent campaign it began in earnest around the time of 

the Maidan Revolution in November 2013. Russia employed IW against 

Ukrainian institutions with several objectives in mind: to undermine support for the protesters and pro-western factions in Ukraine, to elicit fear 

among Ukraine’s Russian-speaking and pro-Russian populations in its 

east and south, and to deny facts on the ground during operations to seize 

Crimea and interfere in the war in Ukraine’s east. To accomplish these 
40

objectives, Russia has employed a number of IW tactics, often in combination with cyber warfare, to influence enemy combatants, local populations, 

and allies. 

First and foremost, the Kremlin sought to control the narrative in 

Ukraine through a number of efforts targeted at fence-sitters in the region. 

These efforts include referring to Ukraine in its media or press releases as 

a “failed” or “fascist” state; releasing forged documents from RAND corporation or the Ukrainian military to paint the latter as corrupt and the former as conspiratorial; citing hoax experts to push fake narratives; manipulating the titles of articles it publishes; amplifying the threat of Europe’s 

disintegration and warning of the West’s declining support for Ukraine 

(so-called “Ukraine fatigue”), a consequence of a pending refugee crisis 

from Ukraine. 

Second, Russia has consolidated its control over all Russian media 

covering the conflict in Ukraine. Ukrainian-language broadcast media in 

the east was effectively neutralized, leaving state-controlled RT as the sole 

source television-based information available to local Ukrainians.29 Because Russian servers hosted the dominant Russian-language social media 

platforms—Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki—the authorities were able to effectively block any pages with a pro-Maidan bent. It also allowed the Russian government to monitor sympathizers of the post-Maidan Ukrainian 

government, as well as recruit foot soldiers for its pro-separatist proxies. Second, the Kremlin put considerable spin on its portrayal of events 

in Ukraine, from the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution, to the takeover of 

Crimea, to the ongoing war in the East. It portrayed Crimea as being land 

that historically belonged to Russia. It exaggerated the influence played by 

Ukrainian nationalists and neo-Nazis among the Maidan protestors, and 

later those fighting in the Donbas region in order to stoke fear among ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. By demonizing the enemy, this was tactically important for its proxies, enabling the use of greater 

violence against their fellow citizens. Finally, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media ignored the presence of Russian soldiers and spetsnaz forces in 

Ukraine, and downplayed the illegality of Russia’s land grab of Crimea. 

Conversely, Russia vastly overstated the role played by the United States 

in controlling the protests on Maidan and influencing events in the east. 

Furthermore, Russian operatives sought to shape the battlefield by directly targeting and manipulating the minds of Ukrainian troops through 

subversive forms of propaganda and disinformation. In 2017, the Russian 

authorities created so-called “information operation troops,” whose remit, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu, was to spread 
41

“clever and efficient propaganda.”30 The aim of these troops encompasses 

a mix of strategic communications, psychological operations, and influence activities. They should not be treated as a separate cyberspace-based 

command, as their means go beyond just conducting cyberwarfare to disrupt networks but also include manipulating the media and planting counterpropaganda in order to control and distort the enemy’s cognitive understanding of what is real and what is false. They involve planting fake news 

stories to stoke irredentist violence. A case in point is the steady stream of 

disinformation among Russian-language news broadcasts in the south and 

east of Ukraine threatening locals that Kiev would rescind their right to 

speak the Russian language. On Kolika Square in 2014, the journalist David Patrikarakos documented how a group of masked men armed with bats 

and clubs were told that a group of Ukrainian nationalists called Pravy 

Sektor (“Right Sector”) was coming “to burn down our tents at 4:00 a.m.” 

Much of the disinformation plays on people’s traditional moral values. In 

2014, it was also falsely reported by Russian media that Ukrainian soldiers 

had crucified a small boy.31 Another popular meme circulated on Russian 

social media was that of an LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) 

activist on the Maidan who harassed a straight passerby to the point of him 

bludgeoning her to death. The aim of such efforts is to paint the protestors 

with a broad brush stroke as LGBT activists, a way to sow distrust among 

rural and more conservative segments of Ukrainian society.32 

The target of these IW efforts were also the members of the Ukrainian 

military fighting on the frontline. Shortly after the fighting started in eastern Ukraine in 2014, for example, soldiers deployed to the combat region started receiving “fake texts.” The texts were often meant to threaten 

and demoralize troops in a “grinding” conflict with some texts reading: 

“Ukrainian soldiers, they’ll find your bodies when the snow melts;” 

“Leave and you will live;” “Nobody needs your kids to become orphans;” 

“Ukrainian soldier, it’s better to retreat alive than to stay here and die;” 

and “You will not regain Donbas back. Further bloodshed is pointless.”33 

Other texts were aimed to undermine unit cohesion and morale. Texts, 

often appearing to come from follow soldiers, have claimed the commander had deserted or that Ukrainian forces were being decimated and that 

“We should run away.” Nancy Snow, a professor of public diplomacy at 

the Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, described this as “pinpoint propaganda.” In previous conflicts, leaflets dropped by air or radio messages 

could easily be ignored—by refusing to pick up and read the leaflet or by 

tuning to another radio station—but it is nearly impossible to avoid reading text messages sent to one’s phone.34
42

Russia combines its IW with kinetic operations, starting with a text 

message to a soldier, telling him he is “surrounded and abandoned.” Ten 

minutes later, the soldier’s family receives (recent contacts) a text message 

stating, “You son is killed in action.” The friends and family likely call the 

soldier to see if the news is true. Seventeen minutes after the initial text 

message, the soldier receives another message telling him to “retreat and 

live” with an artillery strike following shortly thereafter to the location 

where the large group of targeted cell phones are detected. Thus, in one 

coordinated action, they use IW to target the soldier and his family and 

friends and combine it with electronic warfare, cyber electronic warfare, 

and artillery to produce both kinetic and psychological effects.35 This is a 

technique that the Russian operatives are likely to employ in large-scale 

combat operations as well—blurring the geographical boundaries between 

the front line and the home front in new and potentially frightening ways.

Likewise, the soldiers of potential allies are not immune to Russian 

IW. NATO troops deployed in the Baltics and Poland as part of the deterrence mission have also been targeted. Instead of “pinpoint propaganda,” 

soldiers have had their Facebook accounts hacked, data erased, or received 

messages stating “Someone is trying to access your iPhone” with a map 

appearing in the text with Moscow at the center of the map. One commander believes the intent of the IW is to intimidate the soldiers and to 

let them know that Russian intelligence forces are tracking them and their 

data is at risk.36 

Russia has also targeted the US military, employing IW in an attempt 

to decrease its military readiness and that of its NATO allies. Russian media outlets have been known to reach out to the mayors of towns outside 

of the Hohenfels training area in Germany, asking them if the noise from 

military training is disruptive to the local population. This is a clear attempt to sow discord between the populations and the US base, with the 

intent of influencing the German government to put restrictions on military training.37 

Finally, Russian IW in Ukraine has included attempts of technological 

interference in political institutions via cyberspace means, with mixed degrees of success. Ukraine provided a laboratory of sorts for Russian hackers who would later interfere more boldly in elections in the United States 

and in Western Europe.38 The concept of “weaponized information” was 

honed in Ukraine to undermine its fledgling institutions and erode public trust. In addition to targeting critical infrastructure—Ukraine’s electric 

grid, government websites, and banks—Russian operatives were active in 

planting fake news stories. The effectiveness of such operations, however, 
43

are questionable. Examining the effects of Russian propaganda vis-à-vis 

Russian state-controlled TV in Ukraine, the political scientists Leonid Peisakhin and Arturas Rozenas found the effects to be uneven:

Ukrainians who were already predisposed in Russia’s favor found 

its media message persuasive. Pro-Russian Ukrainians who 

watched Russian TV were more likely to vote for pro-Russian 

candidates in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections 

than were anti-Russian Ukrainians who watched the same programming. Those with anti-Russian views were dissuaded by 

the Russian media message and became more likely to vote for 

pro-Western politicians. Individuals with no strong political priors 

seem not to have been swayed in either direction.39

The authors argue that the current erosion of credibility as a result of 

Russian IW poses not only a threat to Western democracies but also to 

Russia. Should Russia find itself in a protracted war, not unlike the current 

proxy conflict it faces in the Donbas, it may face an inflection point where 

the effectiveness of its propaganda increasingly wanes. This may result in 

its targeted audiences doubting even the false narratives put out by Russia’s bots, hackers, and other spin-masters. Building on previous research, 

the authors also posit that Russian propaganda does not change minds but 

rather pushes voters to adapt more extreme points of view and increases 

political polarization, itself a factor that undermines democracy and liberal 

norms. Whether this is intended or not, the tactical effect of Russian IW 

in Ukraine is not to change minds but rather to push people toward the extreme and crowd out the middle. The middle is where democracy thrives, 

the polar extremes are where it withers and dies.

Conclusion & Countermeasures

The following includes a list of recommended countermeasures the 

United States and its allies should implement to counteract or deter Russia’s use of information warfare.

• As it did during the Cold War, the United States must contest the IO 

Battlespace. The US was heavily invested in IO during the Cold War and 

the battle of ideas—the idea that capitalism and liberal democracy was 

superior to communism as an economic and political system—contributed 

significantly to the victory. But with the end of the Cold War, the United 

States cashed in its peace dividend and divested itself of national-level 

institutions, such as the United States Information Agency, that were designed to effectively coordinate and integrate strategic efforts and responses to threats. As a result, the United States has largely ceded the strategic 
44

initiative to peer and near-peer actors by default. The United States must 

reinvest in strategic institutions, and arm those institutions with the mandate and authorities needed, to enable the United States to regain the initiative in the information environment. As the world’s superpower, other 

nations follow the lead of the United States and if the United States elevated the importance of IO, other nations will follow. 

• Relax Rules of Engagement to Counteract Russian IW with IO. The 

United States has done little to actually retaliate against Russia. The 2012 

Magnitsky Act demonstrates the effectiveness such measures can have to 

pressure Moscow and “shame” powerful Russian individuals.40 Congress 

has incorporated counter-propaganda funding into its most recent National 

Defense Authorization Act, in addition to proposed reforms to the Foreign 

Agent Registration Act and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 

United States. However, these acts of legislation do not go far enough. 

The National Security Council, in its 2017 strategy, calls it “information 

statecraft.”41 But the United States is limited in its ability to engage in this 

type of warfare. As one senior NSC staffer put it, “we are not going to 

have an RT. The Russians do. The Iranians do.”42 Still, more innovative, 

less overt countermeasures are needed to deter, prevent, and punish future 

Russian aggression in this space, including a more sophisticated and targeted version of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America 

for the Facebook era.

• Establish credible deterrence against IW. Deterrence is premised on 

the threat of inflicting pain on an adversary in order to prevent them from 

taking an undesirable action. Importantly, the threatened pain must be sufficient to alter the cost-benefit analysis of the target state such that they 

alter their preferences: a successfully coerced adversary must prefer to 

avoid pain by complying rather than ignoring the threat and accepting the 

consequences. Thus, a successful coercive—or deterrent—threat depends 

on the capabilities to inflict pain and the willingness to do so. It remains to 

be seen whether the United States has the means to inflict sufficient pain 

on Russia as retaliation for its IW against our political system. But there 

should be no doubt as to our willingness to do so. If we are to have any 

hope of deterring future Russian interference in our democratic processes 

and institutions, we must make full use of the political and economic tools 

at our disposal, including sanctions and other forms of financial warfare, 

to establish a credible threat of pain. Furthermore, it should be clear to 

all—Moscow especially—that punitive measures are punishment for specific actions against American institutions. This requires shining a bright 

and very public light on those actions when doing so does not threaten re-
45

vealing intelligence sources and very publicly declaring the consequences 

of such actions. Only by regularly and visibly demonstrating to Moscow 

the cause and effect relationship between IW and punitive measures can 

we hope to establish a credible deterrent. 

• Provide IO Assistance to Allies. The United States provides $50 

billion in foreign assistance, yet almost none of this goes to support IO 

efforts.43 Despite four years of being targeted by Russian IW, Ukraine is 

on the defensive and seems to have no response to Russian IW efforts. 

Ukraine should improve its defensive measures to prevent “pinpoint propaganda” and better counter Russia’s “fake news.” But it cannot do so 

without significant assistance and outside expertise. While the United 

States must improve its own capabilities, the United States has the capacity, in terms of expertise and funds, to help Ukraine and other allies. 

• Gather & Analyze More Data on IW. The United States should catalog all attacks and take an evidence-based approach to identify sources 

and quantify their effectiveness as a way to track their own progress in 

deterring attacks and measure variation over time and space. For example, 

current efforts by the Ukrainian military to broadcast Ukrainian-language 

radio (Army FM) to the Donbas do not even track the number of listeners, 

much less the effect such positive messaging has on public attitudes. In the 

United States, to our knowledge, there is no database yet that tracks this 

sort of thing. 

• “Protect against Fake News.” Emilio Iasiello, a cyber analyst, recommends “leveraging cutting-edge technology to help identify the fabrications as soon as they emerge. Artificial intelligence and data analytics 

can be used to detect words or word patterns that might indicate deceitful 

stories.”44 The United States must do more than simply correct the record. 

By nature, corrections to the record or fact checks are reactive and are not 

effective to counter the effects of proactive fake news and Russian propaganda. In the battle of perception, the race to shape the early narrative 

is often times the decisive fight. Readers rarely care or read corrections, 

much less disclaimers, especially in an era of social media. To be effective, 

as Giles recommends, “Countermeasures should focus not on fact-checking but on the deceit—emphasizing that people were conned—and, like 

the original disinformation, should appeal to readers’ emotions rather than 

their rationality.”45 This is tricky, given that Western governments are supportive of free speech, and so they cannot blanketly restrict news, even if 

it is false, coming from one country or its citizens.
46

• Create a Robust Task Force. In March 2015, the EU created a StratCom Task Force, whose purpose is to correct disinformation coming from 

Russian media. This kind of task force should be strengthened, and perhaps be bolstered with the addition of economic sanctions. A similar task 

force should be created in the United States and properly resourced and 

given teeth. 

• Establish Stronger Normative Framework for IO much like the Tallinn Manual did for cyberspace. The trouble with propaganda in the digital 

age is there are no agreed-upon rules or norms, as there were during the 

height of the Soviet Union. Also the actors and perpetrators have been 

decentralized, making attribution more difficult, but also the adherence 

to norms or rules more problematic. Even though Russia will not abide 

by covenants agreed to by other states and international bodies, this can 

at least assist the West to determine the rules for the road for a post-Putin 

Russia that may determine that IO and the undermining of American influence is not in its best interest.

• Strengthen retention rates among our allies. Ukraine is a country 

teeming with information technology (IT) expertise. Yet, the government 

and its military have a hard time retaining expertise in this realm, due 

to higher salaries provided in the private sector. US assistance should be 

targeted to not only train our partners but be sure they retain their fighters. 

• Strengthen civil society. Many of the most innovative and effective 

efforts made to target Russian disinformation and propaganda are coming 

from civil society groups like InformNapalm, which relies on open-source 

intelligence and employs volunteer hackers to discredit Russian narratives, 

or StopFake, which puts out media content to counteract Russian propaganda. These groups have been effective, given recent polls that show that 

a majority of Ukrainians now say that Russian propaganda constitutes a 

real threat. 

• Educate service members and their families of Russian IW practices. American service members and their families must be warned of 

Russian IW practices and efforts so they are not discovering it for the first 

time when they are receiving a threatening text message—this will greatly 

reduce or eliminate the desired effect.

It is worth reassessing the threat of Russian information warfare given the recent doctrinal shift toward large-scale combat operations against 

peer and near-peer adversaries, which includes a wide spectrum of the 

use of force. Though it may be tempting to lament the threat that Russian 

IW poses to American interests and institutions in the 21st century, not to 
47

mention those of our friends and allies, it is important to remember that we 

have been here before. As noted earlier, the legendary diplomat and scholar George Kennan was entirely familiar with the threat we face today, even 

if the technologies have changed. But what is important to recognize in 

his 1948 memorandum on political warfare is not the assessment of such a 

threat posed by our adversaries. Rather, it is the recognition that the United States must be willing and able to fight political wars just as we were 

willing to fight conventional wars to secure our interests. Kennan writes:

Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine 

in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, 

to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt 

and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP [the Marshall Plan]), and “white’ 

propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of 

“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and 

even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.46

Kennan’s prescription remains just as valid as it did 70 years ago. It 

is time to recognize the threat that Russian IW poses to America’s core 

interests and respond accordingly.
48

Notes

1. “Zuckerberg: Facebook is in ‘arms race’ with Russia,” BBC News, 11 

April 2018, accessed 2 May 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43719784.

2. See Mike Lundy, Rich Creed, “The Return of US Army Field Manual 

3-0, Operations,” Military Review, November–December 2017.

3. Morgan Chalfant, “Former CIA Director: Don’t call Russian Election 

Hacking ‘Act of War,’” The Hill, 11 April 2018, accessed 20 June 2018, http://

thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/328344-former-cia-director-dont-call-russian-election-hacking-act-of-war.

4. Keir Giles, “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare,” NATO Defense 

College, November 2016.

5. Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo, “Information Warfare: What is it and 

How to Win It?” Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) Infowar Paper 

No. 1, November 2015, 3–4.

6. Andrew Blake, “Michael Hayden, former CIA head, of Russia: ‘We took 

our eye off the ball,’” Washington Times, 1 May 2018.

7. George Kennan, “George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare,” 

Wilson Center Digital Archive, 30 April 1948, accessed 13 June 2018, https://

digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf.

8. Gabriel Samuels, “NATO puts 300,000 Ground Troops on ‘High Alert’ as 

Tensions with Russia Mount,” The Independent, 7 November 2016.

9. Greg Keeley, “Combatting Russian information warfare—in the Baltics,” 

The Hill, 9 April 2018. 

10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: 27 November 2012), GL-3.

11. Sophia Porotsky, “Cold War 2.0: Russian Information Warfare,” Global 

Security Review, 8 February 2018, accessed 20 June 2018, https://globalsecurityreview.com/cold-war-2-0-russian-information-warfare/.

12. Quoted by Anne Vandermey, “Gaining Followers: The Internet and Cold 

War-style Propaganda in the Former Soviet Republics, Wilson Quarterly, Fall 

2016, accessed 20 June 2018, https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-lastinglegacy-of-the-cold-war/gaining-followers-the-internet-and-cold-war-style-propaganda-in-the-former-soviet-republic/.

13. Bruce McClintock, “Russian Information Warfare: A Reality that Needs 

a Response,” RAND Blog, 21 July 2017, accessed 20 June 2018, https://www.

rand.org/blog/2017/07/russian-information-warfare-a-reality-that-needs-a.html.

14. Peter Mattis, “Contrasting China’s and Russia’s Influence Operations,” 

War on the Rocks, 16 January 2018.

15. Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet 

Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, September 

2015, 10.

16. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia announces new branch of military to 

focus on information warfare amid hacking allegations,” The Independent, 22 

February 2017.
49

17. Dov H. Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of 

Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results,” International Studies 

Quarterly 60, no. 2, 2016, 189–202.

18. Dustin Volz, “US grand jury indicts 13 Russian nationals in election 

meddling probe,” Reuters, 16 February 2018.

19. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is 

Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 

131–151.

20. J.B. Vowell, “Maskirovka: From Russia, With Deception,” RealClearDefense, 30 October 2016.

21. Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine.”

22. Keir Giles, “Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of 

Social Media,” Council on Foreign Relations Report, 21 November 2017.

23. Giles, “Countering Russian Information Operations.”

24. Phillip Karber, Joshua Thibeault, “Russia New Generation Warfare,” 

AUSA, 20 May 2016, accessed 14 June 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare.

25. Lucas, “Information Warfare.”

26. McClintock, “Russian Information Warfare.”

27. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2, 1978, 167–214.

28. Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine.”

29. Michael Kofman, et al., “Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea 

and Eastern Ukraine,” RAND, 2017.

30. Damien Sharkov, “Russia Announces Information Operations Troops 

with Counter Propaganda Remit.” Newsweek, 22 February 2017.

31. Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Duggan Books, 2017), 97.

32. Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, 161.

33. Raphael Satter and Dmytro Vlasov, “Ukraine soldiers bombarded by 

‘pinpoint propaganda’ texts,” Associated Press, 11 May 2017, accessed 14 June 

2018, https://apnews.com/9a564a5f64e847d1a50938035ea64b8f Oleksandar 

Golovko, “Ukrainian Frontline: Cyber + EW + Psyops” PowerPoint brief (Kyiv, 

Ukraine: General Staff of the Armed Forces, 2018).

34. Satter and Vlasov, “Ukraine soldiers bombarded by ‘pinpoint propaganda’ texts.”

35. Golovko, “Ukrainian Frontline.”

36. Thomas Grove, Julia E. Barnes and Drew Hinshaw, “Russia Targets NATO Soldier Smartphones, Western Officials Say,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 4 October 2017, accessed 10 May 2018, accessed 14 June 2018, 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-targets-soldier-smartphones-western-officials-say-1507109402.

37. Interview with military officials in Hohenfels, Germany, on 8 May 2018.

38. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for 

Cyberwar,” Wired, June 2017. 
50

39. Leonid Peisakhin, Arturas Rozenas, “When Does Russian Propaganda 

Work—and When Does it Backfire? Here’s What We Found,” Washington Post, 

3 April 2018.

40. The 2012 Magnitsky Act, named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian 

tax accountant who died in prison under mysterious circumstances, punishes 

Russian officials believed responsible for his death.

41. Peter Grier and Harry Bruinius, “With National Security Strategy, Trump ushers new era of Statecraft,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 

December 2017, accessed 20 June 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/

USA/Politics/2017/1218/With-National-Security-Strategy-Trump-ushers-new-era-of-statecraft. 

42. Nadia Schadlow, “Building National Security Strategy,” Speech given 

to Modern War Institute at the US Military Academy at West Point, 2 February 2018, accessed 20 June 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/event/writing-president-trumps-national-security-strategy-dr-nadia-schadlow/.

43. The US spent $49 billion in 2015; see James McBride, “How Does 

the US Spend Its Foreign Aid,” Council on Foreign Relations, 11 April 2017, 

accessed 14 June 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spendits-foreign-aid. 

44. Emilio J. Iasiello, “Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From 

Georgia to Crimea,” Parameters 47, no. 2, 2017, 62–63.

45. Giles, “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare.”

46. George Kennan, “George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare,” 

Wilson Center Digital Archive, 30 April 1948, accessed 10 May 2018, https://

digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf.
51

Chapter 4

Operation Starkey: The Invasion that Never Was 

Colonel Michael R. Taylor, Jr.

Warfare is the art (tao) of deceit.

—Sun-Tzu

In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.

—Winston S. Churchill

Operation Starkey was an Allied military deception (MILDEC) conducted in Western Europe during the summer of 1943 that included a false 

invasion armada targeting the Pas de Calais. This operation was part of 

a larger deception shaping effort across multiple theaters to gain a position of relative advantage for the invasion of Italy.1

 Starkey failed while 

Operation Fortitude South, a similar deception conducted in 1944 to set 

conditions for D-Day’s Operation Overlord, succeeded.2 Why did Starkey 

fail while Fortitude South succeeded? Can any contemporary lessons be 

derived for application in future Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO)? 

Was failure linked to limited resources, a flawed plan, Allied internal politics, lack of unity of effort, the vacancy of the Supreme Allied Commander’s position, or possibly an entrenched opinion by Adolf Hitler and the 

German High Command? These possibilities will be explored in search 

of a plausible theory as to why Operation Starkey failed while looking for 

insights into future LSCO application. 

Military Deception and its Value 

Deception, defined by the US military in 1947, is “the art of causing 

the enemy to derive and accept a particular pre-determined appreciation 

of friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions with the mission of 

causing him to react in a pre-selected manner disadvantageous to the enemy and advantageous to our own forces.”3

 More than 70 years later, this 

definition remains largely unchanged in US Army and Joint Doctrine with 

the fundamental idea to mislead a military decision maker to take action(s) 

that gain an advantage for the commander.4

 

Military deception can be described in two variations—ambiguity 

increasing and, the opposite and more complex, ambiguity decreasing.5

Ambiguity increasing confuses the military decision maker as to what is 

truly occurring and can lead to actions such as delaying commitment of 
52

forces or spreading thin to cover multiple dilemmas. The opposite, ambiguity decreasing, focuses the military decision maker on one incorrect 

threat leading to actions to reinforce or counter, thereby weakening in 

other areas. Daniel and Herbig noted these two variants of MILDEC are 

best viewed as a continuum with utter confusion (ambiguity increasing) at 

one end and convinced misdirection (ambiguity decreasing) at the other—

most deceptions blend the two over time.6

 

Widespread use of military deception by nation states was revealed in 

Sherwin and Whaley’s analysis of 93 cases of Western strategic military 

operations from 1914–1973 which found that 82 percent showed clear evidence that deception was employed—the US and Russia accounting for 

41 percent.7

 Their analysis also provided insight into the value of military 

deception with the probability of achieving victory, given surprise, at 93 

percent while without surprise, dropping to 50 percent. The analysis also 

referenced William R. Harris’s monograph that examined an older version 

of the same data and drew the tentative conclusion that all things being 

equal, “a country not using deceptive ploys was at a strategic disadvantage 

against a country that did.”8

 Nicholas Rankin aptly reinforces the value 

by stating: “Deception or deceitfulness in ordinary life is wrong because 

it corrodes trust, the basic glue of human relationships, but deceiving your 

enemy in wartime is common sense.”9

Emergence in Allied Operations

The British expanded Allied military deception during World War II 

from simply achieving surprise over your enemy to a complex art of deceiving the enemy decision maker on a grand scale through calculated 

manipulation. The British planners persuaded enemy decision makers into 

taking action, based upon an altered theater-wide or cross-theater reality, 

enabling the deceiver to gain an advantage for their commander.10 

Beginning with General Sir Archibald Wavell in the Middle East in 

1940 and encouraged by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British 

built their military deception capability from the tactical to the strategic 

level out of necessity to counter German strength and compensate for 

weakness.11 The flair for deception possessed by both leaders dated back 

to World War I but with widely differing experiences. General Wavell’s 

motivation for deception found its genesis at the tactical level during the 

1915 Ypres attack where he was wounded while losing two-thirds of his 

brigade due to continuous German artillery fire—impressing the need for 

new ways of waging war including deception to avoid mass slaughter.12

Winston Churchill’s roots as a deception proponent was established in 
53

1914 at the strategic level as the First Lord of the Admiralty where he 

directed creation of a dummy fleet to mislead the Germans.13 Daniel and 

Herbig aptly described the British motivation for expanding deception 

during World War II: “When outcomes are critical, adversaries are encouraged to make use of every capability, every advantage, to insure victory or 

stave off defeat.”14 

Leading up to 1943, the British successfully employed deception in 

the Middle East and most recently in coordination with the US during 

Operation Torch in North Africa. The US and British recognized the need 

for continuous deception operations across multiple theaters and agreed to 

geographically split responsibilities. The US would be responsible for the 

Pacific theater led by the Joint Security Control (JSC) and the British for 

the Mediterranean and European theaters led by the London Controlling 

Section (LCS)—both organizations would collaborate and synchronize 

deception efforts going forward. The Allies would now focus their deception efforts in 1943 on Western Europe to gain a position of relative 

advantage over the Germans in the subsequent battles for southern and 

eastern Europe.15 

The Strategic Situation and Creation of COSSAC

January 1943 opened with the Allied offensive in North Africa continuing, the Russians battling the Wehrmacht on a colossal scale on the 

Eastern Front, and the British and American forces slowly massing in England preparing for a future cross-Channel invasion.16 In January, President 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff attended the Casablanca Conference where they designated 

the invasion of Sicily as the year’s priority.17 Allied leadership discussed 

the importance of minimizing the ability of the Germans to reinforce in Italy and Russia, as well as a future cross-Channel invasion. The conference 

ended with the summary that: “plans should be produced for a return to the 

Continent in the event of German weakening or collapse and for deceptive 

operations to be conducted during 1943 . . . and it was recognized that the 

full-scale, cross-channel attack could not take place before 1944.”18 

The Casablanca Conference required a new headquarters to plan for a 

return to the European continent and for deception operations in support of 

that objective. Major General Sir Frederick E. Morgan was designated as 

the Chief of Staff to lead this new headquarters, pending the appointment 

of a Supreme Commander in 1944.19 The deception guidance issued at 

Casablanca later transformed into Operation Starkey, planned and con-
54

ducted by the new headquarters titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC).

COSSAC formed in April 1943 as a planning staff with the intent to 

transform into an operational command once a Supreme Commander was 

designated. Major General Morgan led COSSAC as the Chief of Staff but 

did not possess command authority over component commanders, each of 

whom were charged with specific missions.20 Major General Morgan recognized this weakness and pursued gaining command authority, through 

the British Chiefs of Staff, to transform COSSAC’s orders from recommendations into actual directives and effectively arbitrate disagreements 

on implementation.21 

As COSSAC formed, Major General Morgan created OPS B, a secretive staff section led by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Read, to plan and carry out deception planning and operations.22 OPS B collaborated with the 

intelligence community and the LCS, led by Colonel John Bevan, which 

supported and coordinated the Allied deception efforts across the European and Mediterranean theaters to mislead the German High Command, 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), and ultimately Germany’s primary military decision maker, Adolf Hitler.23 The LCS passed disinformation through a British controlled network of double-agents in England 

also called “special means,” which was guided by feedback from OKW’s 

communications broken by the Ultra signals intelligence (SIGINT). This 

close coordination between deception planning, operations, and the intelligence community would pay dividends during deception operations in 

1943–44.24 

Starkey on Paper

Military deception plans in World War II consisted of three basic components: a mission statement, the deception story, and the means of implementation. The mission statement described what the commander wanted 

the enemy decision maker and target to do, the deception story detailed 

what the deception planners wanted the enemy to think was reality, and 

the means of implementation (physical, signals, double agents, etc.) were 

what the enemy would see to make the story plausible, and ultimately 

lead to the deception target taking an action (or series of actions) disadvantageous to the enemy and advantageous to the commander. Operation 

Starkey included all three components.25 

Cockade was an umbrella plan, with Operation Starkey as the main 

effort of three deception operations in 1943.26 This plan was intended to 

accomplish the Chiefs of Staff directive to plan for: “an elaborate cam-
55

ouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a 

view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of 

large-scale cross Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least 

one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the US 8th Air Force.”27 Central 

to the entire plan was persuading Hitler, the military decision maker and 

deception target, and the OKW, who filtered his intelligence, that the Allies would conduct a cross-Channel operation in the summer of 1943. Plan 

Cockade would create a story consisting of both real and fictitious means 

of implementation leading Hitler to choose to keep forces in Western Europe as a hedge against this threat while committing the German Air Force 

(or Luftwaffe) to battle—shaping at the strategic level across multiple theaters to relieve pressure off the Russians while creating a position of relative advantage for the invasion of Sicily and Italy. 

The first of Plan Cockade’s three operations was Starkey, consisting of 

an actual “amphibious feint to force the Luftwaffe to engage in intensive 

fighting over a period of about 14 days, by building up a threat of an imminent large-scale British landing in the Pas de Calais area” culminating 

between 8 and 14 September.28 The second operation, Wadham, persuaded the Germans that a large-scale American invasion of Brittany from both 

England and the US would follow Starkey in late September.29 This operation, per the deception story, would later be postponed until November and 

then cancelled, to better emphasize Starkey to the OKW. The final operation, Tindall, would fix German forces in Norway by threating an invasion 

of Stavanger in mid to late September.30 This operation would also be 

cancelled to support the deception story of an Allied focus on supporting 

Starkey and Wadham. Each operation employed fictitious divisions—Starkey commanded 14 British and Canadian, Wadham five US, and Tindall 

five Scottish.31 Starkey was the only operation that employed actual forces 

and key to the success of the overall Allied deception plan in 1943.

Operation Starkey was commanded by Air Marshal Sir Trafford 

Leigh-Mallory, Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command in coordination 

with Major General Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General, US 8th Air Force 

along with the Naval and Army commanders designated by the Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, respectively.32 Tindall and Wadham were commanded by a combination of 

Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders with COSSAC having overall responsibility for Cockade, as the coordinating headquarters.33 

The COSSAC planners chose the Pas de Calais as the target for Starkey’s amphibious attack—providing the “greatest advantage” to Allied 
56

fighters to engage the Luftwaffe.

34 The Pas de Calais was considered “the 

most heavily fortified . . . sector of the whole coast of France” and COSSAC determined that “no assault against it could be attempted without 

considerable prior bombardment both from the air and from the sea.”35

The air and sea bombardment was deemed by COSSAC planners as critical observable means that would provide indications to OKW of an impending attack. COSSAC planned to gradually conduct air, land, and sea 

observable means consistent with amphibious preparations to persuade 

OKW that the Allies would invade, forcing commitment of the Luftwaffe

to battle. 

The Starkey air plan massed 45 British and 15 American fighter squadrons opposite the Pas de Calais supporting the invasion and Luftwaffe battle.36 The plan also gradually diverted air activity, including bombing and 

reconnaissance, to the Pas de Calais and secondary to Brittany beginning 

on 15 June.37 Fourteen days prior to the fictitious invasion, the plan diverted 3,000 US day heavy bombing missions and the same number of 

British night heavy bombing missions to targets that created the pattern of 

an impending invasion as the first critical observable. The heavy bombing 

missions were determined by the COSSAC planners to be: “the minimum 

amount of aerial activity needed to convince the enemy that a genuine 

invasion was in prospect.”38 This is an example of deceptive fires being 

employed as observable means to reinforce the deception story.

The naval plan assembled landing craft in the Channel by 1 September and interrupted the coastal convoy program fourteen days prior to the 

invasion to: “simulate a concentration of shipping in ports prior to the 

launching of a large-scale attack.”39 The planners determined that massing 450 landing craft would serve as a second critical observable means 

to convince the Germans that the invasion was more than just another 

small Dieppe raid, conducted by the Canadians against France in August 

1942.40 The shipping concentration in ports would consist of no less than 

130 ships to simulate a break in the convoys.41 

Additional naval actions included British Commando raids portraying 

coastal reconnaissance and massing “essential naval escorts and minesweeping flotillas along with two ‘R’ Class battleships for bombardment 

of long-range German coast artillery in coordination with air attacks.”42

COSSAC indicated that the presence of the two battleships would act as 

“cheese in the mousetrap” to draw the Luftwaffe into battle and serve as a 

third critical observable for the deception plan.43 The naval invasion forces 

would consist of two battleships, 12 destroyers, 29 minesweepers, 59 other ships, and various landing craft.44 
57

Starkey’s land forces consisted of fourteen fictitious British and Canadian divisions—the fourth and final critical observable means that would 

indicate a future attack.45 Actual land forces committed amounted to less 

than two divisions including the Royal Marine Division, five commandos, 

a parachute brigade, an air-landing brigade, and various smaller Canadian units.46 COSSAC determined that the available land forces in England 

would not be capable of convincing the Germans of an impending invasion, so they devised a plan to mislead the OKW into increasing their 

assessment of the Allied Order of Battle.47 The LCS began preparing for 

this requirement in January by feeding disinformation to the Germans 

through double-agents such as GARBO, a collection of German spies that 

had been turned—either coercively or willingly—by British Military Intelligence.48 COSSAC would create two fictitious Army Corps—the VIII 

and the XII—consisting of 60,000 non-existent men through observable 

means such as false camps and dummy vehicles, unit markings, signals 

traffic that replicated units, and the LCS efforts.49 To protect operations 

security (OPSEC) the British government would enact strict security measures in southeastern England beginning on 1 August for six weeks to 

portray heightened readiness in preparation for an invasion.50 

Foreshadowing Starkey’s Demise

Deception planning began in January with the LCS and transitioned to 

OPS B in April—a critical month for the future of Starkey.51 On 14 April, 

General Morgan met with Major General’s Sir Leslie Hollis, Secretary 

to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Sir Hastings Ismay, Military Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet, to discuss preventing command level 

conflicts due to competing priorities of invasion training, the Combined 

Bomber Offensive against Germany, and Allied deception operations—

exacerbated by the lack of a Supreme Commander.52 The meeting minutes recorded:

Deception plans would be drawn up by COSSAC, but they would 

have to be implemented by senior Service commanders who might 

be reluctant to give them priority over operational or training requirements. In order to convince those commanders of the importance of deception he [Hollis] suggested that the situation should 

be explained to them at a Chiefs of Staff Conference, perhaps with 

the Prime Minister in the Chair.53

On 17 April, Major General Morgan addressed his staff at the first 

meeting of COSSAC with: “In spite of the fact that it is quite clear that 

neither I nor you have by definition any executive authority, my idea is that 
58

we shall regard ourselves in the first instance as primarily a coordinating 

body.”54 Major General Hollis published a letter on 22 April to the Chiefs 

of Staff stating: “It is the second phase, namely, the execution of the deception which is complicated. The executive orders for troops to march and 

for troops and aircraft or Air Force personnel to move for deception purposes, must come from the Naval, Army, and Air Commanders-in-Chiefs 

concerned.”55 Later in the same letter, Hollis echoed his 14 April minutes 

by proposing a meeting of all Commanders-in-Chiefs, possibly under the 

chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to explain that effective deception 

may interfere with training and movement of forces.56 

The Chiefs of Staff responded on 27 April and, for unknown reasons, 

declined to support a combined Prime Minister and Commanders’ conference; instead ordered COSSAC to request the commanders cooperate in 

the preparation and invite them “to take the necessary executive action” 

which would preserve the current chain-of-command.57 This Allied decision would begin the demise of Operation Starkey. 

On 19 May, Hitler, the deception target, held a Situation Conference 

with his generals, a week after the last Axis forces surrendered in North 

Africa, and stated that: “Nothing is going to happen in the west; I’m fully 

convinced of that. If they want to attack somewhere, then they’ll only 

attack in Italy, and in the Balkans, naturally.”58 This opinion was a stark 

change from the past two years focused on Western Europe invasion fears 

and would color future German reporting and analysis of Starkey preparations and ultimately Hitler’s reaction, or lack thereof—all but sealing the 

fate of the Allied operation. 

The Execution of Operation Starkey

The implementation of Starkey began in May with LCS double-agents 

passing calculated disinformation reports as observable means to the Germans consisting of invasion preparation rumors, large-scale cross-Channel bomber attacks, observations of offensive troop concentrations, and 

government announcements supporting the three deception operations 

under Plan Cockade.59 Also in May, COSSAC determined that the lack of 

landing craft was not “sufficient to give an air of realism to the invasion 

preparations” causing alarm and discussions of abandoning the amphibious feint, but in the end compensated by the employment of 175 dummy 

landing-craft.60 

On 3 June, Operation Starkey was issued as part of Plan Cockade to 

the Chiefs of Staff.61 The date of the invasion was set between the 8th and 
59

the 14th of September and timed with Operation Avalanche, the invasion 

of Italy.62

On 7 June, Major General Eaker, Commanding General, US 8th Air 

Force sent a memo to Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, Commander 

European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA) arguing against 

supporting Starkey.63 Major General Eaker wrote that: “the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff have given this Air Force a Directive against industrial targets” and the diversion of 3,000 heavy bomber missions for 14 days would 

force abandonment of the Combined Bomber Offensive.64 

On 10 June, Brigadier General R. W. Barker, the ETOUSA G-5, wrote 

to Lieutenant General Devers outlining the US commitments to Cockade and impact on the Combined Bomber Offensive.65 He wrote that: “It 

should be determined which of these two operations take priority, realizing 

that if it is Cockade, the Combined Bomber effort is practically suspended 

for a period of 14 days, and at the same time realizing if it is not suspended, Operation Cockade will probably fail to accomplish its objective.”66

Major General Eaker would get his way and the Combined Bomber Offensive remained the priority. The US 8th Air Force would support Starkey 

with only training units and missions diverted due to weather highlighting 

the need for COSSAC command authority or a supreme commander to 

determine priorities.67 On 15 June the Allies began shifting bombing and 

air reconnaissance to the Pas de Calais and Brittany.68 

Also in June, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound objected to 

the use of the two “R” class battleships and argued that they “should not 

be endangered in a fake operation” and could not reduce coastal artillery.69

He invoked past memories of the loss of two capital ships to Japanese air 

attack in December 1941 to reinforce the point that if sunk, the German 

victory could impact British morale. Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations argued that battleships were essential, 

and Major General Morgan claimed that the Luftwaffe would not take the 

bait unless included in the invasion force.70 The battleships were ultimately removed. 

On 11 July, the OKW informed Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 

Commander-in-Chief West (OB West), the Allied focal point on mainland 

Europe was in the Mediterranean.71 Nine days later, von Rundstedt reported that the removal of German formations from Western Europe provide 

incentive for an Allied invasion; the Allies have sufficient air and naval 

forces to invade.72 
60

British Commandos planned 14 raids on the French Channel coast for 

July and August called Operation Forfar.73 Only eight were conducted, and 

none were detected by the Germans resulting in no discernable counteractions from German decision makers. In mid-August the British instituted OPSEC measures in southern England to portray heightened readiness 

levels.74 The Allies also conducted supply drops to French resistance forces and carefully provided instruction via British Broadcasting Corporation 

(BBC) radio to only take action when specifically instructed by London, 

sparing loss of credibility and lives key to the actual invasion in 1944.75 

On 9 August, COSSAC reported that Starkey was gathering momentum, and by mid-August that the enemy displayed signs of beginning to 

react to reconnaissance and bombing activities.76 On 23 August COSSAC 

assessed that German preliminary reactions to Starkey were as great as 

could be expected.77 

On 24 August, the Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris received the Starkey bombing plan from 

the Air Ministry and replied angrily over “receiving peremptory orders” 

diverting British bombers and that Fighter Command (overall responsible 

for Starkey) assumes “the right to call on Bomber Command aircraft at 

will”—highlighting the personality conflict between fighter and bomber 

community leadership and the need for a supreme commander to arbitrate 

and determine priorities.78 The Vice Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that 

Starkey would interfere with the Combined Bomber Offensive which was 

the highest priority.79 Bomber Command would support Starkey with only 

training units and Wellington squadrons, and surge up to 200 sorties on the 

final night of the operation.80 

False Invasion

On 25 August, Allied bombing began to increase in the Pas de Calais 

and Brittany areas—nearly doubling leading up to 8 September but almost 

half of the missions were cancelled due to weather which would continue to cause challenges.81 Also, on 25 August COSSAC cancelled Tindall 

preparations per the deception story to focus OKW’s attention on Starkey. 

Allied landing craft began to mass in points along the Channel in 

preparation for the invasion convoy. Weather also disrupted minesweeping operations—only three flotillas cleared the passage across the channel 

and received a small amount of gunfire.82 Major General Morgan reported 

on 2 September to the Chiefs of Staff that weather has disrupted plans for 

air and minesweeping operations and given the limited German reaction, 
61

recommended cancelling the invasion convoy.83 The Chiefs of Staff did 

not agree and instructed Starkey to continue as planned. 

In early September, von Rundstedt’s staff questioned the observed 

invasion preparations and whether they are intended to: “entice German 

reserves there and to pin them down.”84 On 5 September, the LCS agent 

GARBO passed through his network to the Germans that the invasion 

will begin on 8 September.85 A day later von Rundstedt admitted that: “it 

could not be laid down with certainty” that a major attack across the Channel was imminent; he noted that all necessary measures have been taken 

to meet it.86 On 8 September, GARBO reported that Allied troops were 

conducting final preparations and landing craft were massing.87 The final preparations and loading were part of Operation Harlequin, an actual 

major exercise involving British and Canadian divisions embarking onto 

transports to support the deception operation; units disembarked before 

the invasion convoy sailed.88 

The morning of 9 September, the invasion began with a convoy of 30 

vessels sailing to within 10 miles of the French coast, and then returning 

under a smoke screen.89 A second convoy of landing craft sailed eastward, 

replicating a landing force, and then returned three hours later. The German defenses on the Pas de Calais were fully alerted but the movement 

of the invasion fleet was not reported as significant. Operation Avalanche, 

the invasion of Salerno, Italy commenced on 9 September, and most likely 

diverted the attention of OKW.90 Following the return of the convoys, the 

Chiefs of Staff issued a general statement to the British media regarding 

the invasion preparations and Starkey, describing the event as only an exercise.91 GARBO reported to the OKW that troops have disembarked and 

“it appears that the operation has been suspended.”92 

Post-operation Analysis

With the completion of Starkey, Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who commanded the operation, reported that the air and naval actions 

did not produce a physical reaction by the Germans; only the minesweeping provoked a response.93 He further noted the desired air battle with the 

Luftwaffe never materialized. COSSAC Intelligence reported there was no 

evidence of any military defensive moves in France:

On the contrary, the movement of troops from France to Italy had 

not been interrupted, and the German forces had not therefore 

been pinned down away from the active fronts. Apparently the enemy had realized that the Allies were in no position to undertake 
62

extensive operations in northwest Europe at the same time as they 

were engaged so fully in the south. [emphasis added]94

German divisions in Western Europe were steadily reduced from 45 in 

May to 35 in September.95 Operation Starkey did not achieve the desired 

actions by Hitler and the OKW to keep forces in Western Europe while 

drawing the Luftwaffe into battle—what contributed to this failure?

A plausible theory for Operation Starkey’s failure can be attributed to 

two overarching factors—lack of COSSAC’s command authority combined with a vacant Supreme Allied Commander’s position and, more importantly, an entrenched opinion by Adolf Hitler and OKW. Both of these 

factors created cascading second and third order effects that would further 

diminish chances of deception success. 

First, Major General Morgan’s lack of command authority as COSSAC and the larger issue of the vacant Supreme Commander’s position 

opened the door for internal Allied politics, personality, and prioritization conflicts amongst the various commanders supporting the deception. 

COSSAC was designated only as a planning and coordinating headquarters responsible for Cockade while execution of each deception operation 

was delegated to a Commander-in-Chief, but with only the authority to ask 

and coordinate with peers; not to task and enforce support. Major General 

Morgan acknowledged the Supreme Commander would not be designated 

until late 1943 and recognized the challenges resulting from his lack of 

command authority early in the planning process. He attempted to address 

the issue through the Chiefs of Staff by asking for a meeting with all of 

the commanders, potentially chaired by the Prime Minister, to convey the 

importance of supporting the deception operation. Major General Morgan 

was rebuffed by the Chiefs of Staff and informed that COSSAC should 

“invite them to take action” and the commanders must provide the orders.96 The lack of an empowered COSSAC led to independent component 

commander decisions which on their own were correct but in aggregate 

would be detrimental to a unified Allied deception effort. 

Command of Operation Starkey was, in name only, given to the Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command and coordinated with Commanding 

General US 8th Air Force and the Naval and Army Commanders-in-Chief 

respectively—all equals with none given authority to resolve disagreements or determine priorities and each charged with independent missions. 

This created friction and prioritization conflicts between commanders on 

whether to support Operation Starkey, the Combined Bomber Offensive, 

individual training efforts, or to protect key naval forces for future op-
63

erations. For example, Major General Eaker, US Commanding General, 

8th Air Force identified the conflict between supporting Starkey and the 

Combined Bomber Offensive and chose to appeal to Lieutenant General Devers, senior US commander, instead of through Fighter Command 

and COSSAC to resolve—US bombers would remain focused on the 

combined offensive knowing the decision would doom Starkey. Similar 

conflicts emerged with the British bombers and battleship support. Each 

of these conflicts were addressed by the individual commanders, leaving 

COSSAC’s Plan Cockade and the main effort, Operation Starkey, a hollow 

plan—reducing critical observable means such as US and British bombing 

missions required to build a plausible deception story. 

A COSSAC empowered with command authority or designation of a 

Supreme Commander would have established unity of command and led 

to priority of support decisions for the components to implement—ultimately holding commanders accountable for resourcing the deception operation while ensuring Allied unity of effort. This point was evidenced in 

the later Fortitude deception plan issued on 26 February 1944 stating that 

the Allied air, naval and land force commanders “will be responsible to 

the Supreme Commander for . . . they will also be responsible for making 

preparations . . . [and] they will adhere to the broad design of Plan Fortitude.”97 This document was clearly directive in nature and backed by the 

authority of the Supreme Commander—the antithesis of COSSAC’s Plan 

Cockade and Operation Starkey. Even with an empowered COSSAC ensuring implementation of critical observables required to build a plausible 

story there is no guarantee that Starkey would have achieved its desired 

effects—especially if Hitler, the deception target, discounted intelligence 

reporting that did not agree with his opinion of future Allied actions. 

The second overarching factor contributing to Starkey’s failure was, 

unbeknownst to COSSAC, Adolf Hitler and the OKW had changed their 

opinion in May that an invasion of Western Europe would not occur in 

1943. This predisposition was formed after losing North Africa, and now 

faced with predicting the location of the next Allied attack either in Italy, 

the Balkans, or Western Europe—Hitler chose Italy and the Balkans. 

Given that Operation Starkey was fundamentally an ambiguity-decreasing deception, the Allies’ lack of knowledge of Hitler’s opinion and 

predisposition in May 1943 proved fatal. The lack of understanding of the 

deception target’s bias, tendencies, and predispositions ultimately led to 

an operation that was doomed from the start. Daniel and Herbig highlight 

that deceivers would have a higher chance of success going with the grain 

or predisposition of the decision maker than against—altering predisposi-
64

tions are the exception not the norm. Operation Starkey would most likely 

have failed even with a fully supported series of critical observable means 

including: an enlarged Order of Battle sufficient to conduct an attack, creating a bombing pattern matching an impending invasion which was an 

indicator tracked by OKW in 1944, employing expected naval battleship 

bombardment support, and massing enough landing craft to enable an amphibious assault in force.98 

One additional factor for consideration was the impact of weather both 

in terms of the diversion of Allied effort, and the simultaneous impact it 

had on Germany’s ability to detect and report on observables. Over half of 

the limited bombing missions conducted in the Pas de Calais and Brittany 

areas over 14 days leading up to the “invasion” were cancelled due to 

weather. Minesweeping operations across the channel were also limited 

in sorties due to weather—resulting in minimal detection and reporting 

from the Germans. Weather negatively impacted implementation of these 

few observables, reduced ability of the Germans to detect and report, and 

likely added to the growing challenge to success. 

Given the overall failure, Operation Starkey was successful in setting conditions for the 1944 deception—Operation Fortitude South under 

Plan Bodyguard. The COSSAC history notes that Starkey was: “useful 

as a rehearsal to improve coordination and support by air, naval, army, 

and civil authorities in advance of Overlord.”99 The means and methods 

used by OPS B and LCS in coordination with the intelligence community and Ultra were tested for 1944. This included building up the double 

agent GARBO network’s credibility with OKW and establishing a proven 

channel to Hitler for deception which would be exploited over the coming years.100 Also the fictitious Allied Order of Battle was increased to 43 

divisions in October, according to the OKW assessment, even though the 

actual strength was only 17 divisions.101 In addition to a rehearsal, on 7 

September Major General Morgan received executive authority from the 

Chiefs of Staff, too late for Operation Starkey, but would allow COSSAC 

to become directive with the Fortitude deception planning and implementation; continuing with General Eisenhower after his arrival in January 

1944. These individual successes would ultimately combine and pay dividends during the “shaping” Operation Fortitude that would set conditions 

for the “decisive” Operation Overlord and the Allies return to continental 

Europe in 1944.
65

Contemporary Lessons for Large-Scale Combat Operations

The 1943 Operation Starkey provides four useful military deception 

lessons for contemporary leaders to consider in planning and conducting 

future Large-Scale Combat Operations. These insights are: employing 

MILDEC increases chances of victory during LSCO; the commander is 

key to effectively incorporating into plans and operations; importance of 

staff and intelligence community collaboration in understanding the decision maker’s predispositions to build a plausible deception; and the need 

for Services to invest and train in the employment of MILDEC observables to reinforce future deceptions. 

First, employing MILDEC increases chances of victory during LargeScale Combat Operations. Historically a nation that does not employ deception will be at a disadvantage against those that do. We can anticipate 

our future adversaries will employ deception given historical widespread 

use to counter our strength and compensate for weakness. US forces, 

barring unforeseen overmatch, will need to employ MILDEC to do the 

same to gain a position of relative advantage against a future peer and win 

during Large-Scale Combat Operations—it is common sense in warfare. 

Second, the commander has a key role in identifying, in the early stages of planning, what he wants the adversary military decision maker to do 

that provides a position of relative advantage for decisive operations—the 

commander’s deception mission statement. This statement drives incorporation of deception into the organization’s planning and operations and focuses subordinate commander’s and staff efforts to prioritize and support. 

A commander’s emphasis is key to staff and intelligence collaboration, 

resource allocation, and overall deception success—gaining a critical advantage against a future peer adversary during LSCO. 

Third, the staff and intelligence community must collaborate to identify the military decision maker’s predispositions and then determine how 

best to achieve the commander’s deception mission. As evidenced with 

Starkey, the deception target’s opinions, biases, and predispositions are 

critical and must be illuminated to build a plausible deception story for 

implementation. The deception staff’s collaboration with the intelligence 

staff and community begin with gaining shared understanding during 

initial planning and continues through execution, ensuring feedback and 

adjustment to the story over time via observable means, and leading to 

accomplishing the deception mission. 
66

Finally, there is a need for Services to invest and train in the employment of MILDEC observables to reinforce deception given utility in 

LSCO. The Allies created staffs and organizations to conduct deception 

operations and create observables such as false camps, dummy vehicles, 

ships, and planes, and signals traffic replicating fictitious units. These observables supported deception operations at the tactical level and applied 

to larger strategic efforts like Starkey. In the contemporary environment 

there is utility in creating observables—physical and virtual—to deceive 

adversary collection efforts and support deception. Services should explore utility of creating observables that can be employed from tactical 

to strategic level to deceive future adversaries including their intelligence 

collection capabilities and then integrate into training to ensure effective 

application in future Large-Scale Combat Operations. 

As we look to future LSCO, our motivation for employing deception 

should mirror that of the British in 1943: “When outcomes are critical, adversaries are encouraged to make use of every capability, every advantage, 

to insure victory or stave off defeat.”102 Operation Starkey should be recognized not for its failure but instead for its service as a training opportunity allowing the deceivers to hone their skills and identify lessons learned. 

Operation Starkey failed to achieve its objectives but served as a stepping 

stone for the successful Fortitude South deception in 1944 and, more than 

70 years later, insights on how to leverage MILDEC to win against a peer 

during large-scale combat operations. 
67

Notes

1. Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 75.

2. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (New York: 

Overlook Press, 2000), 379. 

3. US National War College, Presentation on Measures to Deceive the 

Enemy (Bolling Air Force Base: Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1947), 5; 

emphasis added.

4. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 2-28.

5. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Change 1, Commander 

and Staff Organization and Operations, (Washington, DC: 2015), 11-3.

6. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, Strategic Military Deception 

(New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 7.

7. Daniel and Herbig, 185.

8. Daniel and Herbig, 185.

9. Nicholas Rankin, Churchill’s Wizards: The British Genius for Deception, 

1914–1945, (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 420; emphasis added.

10. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, ix.

11. US National War College, Presentation on measures to deceive the 

enemy, 1.

12. Nicholas Rankin, Churchill’s Wizards, 50.

13. Rankin, xiii. 

14. Daniel and Herbig, Strategic Military Deception, 12.

15. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 71.

16. Howard, 61.

17. Nicholas Rankin, Churchill’s Wizards, 373.

18. Historical Subsection, Office of Secretary, General Staff, Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, History of COSSAC, (Bolling Air 

Force Base: Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1944), 1; emphasis added.

19. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 1.

20. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 6.

21. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 74.

22. Hesketh, Fortitude, ix.

23. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 72.

24. Hesketh, Fortitude, ix.

25. US National War College, Presentation on measures to deceive the 

enemy, 5. 

26. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 75.

27. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, (Bolling Air 

Force Base: Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1943) 1; emphasis added.

28. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 75.

29. Howard, 75.

30. Howard, 75.
68

31. Howard, 75.

32. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 2.

33. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, 2.

34. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, 6.

35. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, 2.

36. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 62.

37. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

38. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 62.

39. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

40. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 68. 

41. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

42. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, 3.

43. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 18. 

44. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 62.

45. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 75.

46. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 62.

47. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 75.

48. Howard, 75.

49. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 62.

50. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

51. Hesketh, Fortitude, xvi.

52. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 74.

53. Howard, 74.

54. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 2.

55. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 74.

56. Howard, 74.

57. Howard, 74.

58. David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War 

II (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1978), 480.

59. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 77.

60. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 19.

61. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 1.

62. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, 1.

63. “Ira C. Eaker Letter to Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, CG ETOUSA concerning Cockade,” Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1943, 1.

64. “Ira C. Eaker Letter to Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers,” 1.

65. R.W. Barker, US Commitments to Operation Cockade (Bolling Air 

Force Base: Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1943) 1. 

66. Barker, US Commitments to Operation Cockade, 2.

67. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 63.

68. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

69. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 62.

70. Cruickshank, 62.

71. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 79.
69

72. Howard, 79.

73. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second 

World War (New York: Scribner, 2004) 486.

74. Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Plan Cockade, 3.

75. Holt, The Deceivers, 97.

76. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 19.

77. Historical Subsection, 19.

78. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 63.

79. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 18.

80. Historical Subsection, 18.

81. Historical Subsection, 19.

82. Historical Subsection, 19.

83. Historical Subsection, 19.

84. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 80.

85. Howard, 78.

86. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 19.

87. Historical Subsection, 78.

88. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 67.

89. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 79.

90. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 72.

91. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 20.

92. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 78.

93. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 21.

94. Historical Subsection, 21.

95. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 79.

96. Howard, 74.

97. Hesketh, Fortitude, 379.

98. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 498.

99. Historical Subsection, History of COSSAC, 21.

100. Public Record Office, Garbo: The Spy Who Saved D-Day, (Public 

Record Office Publications, 2000) 146.

101. Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 76.

102. Daniel and Herbig, Strategic Military Deception, 12.
70
71

Chapter 5

The 1948 War For Palestine: “What Kind of War Was This?”

Sergeant First Class Brandon S. Riley, Michael E. Kitchens, 

and Colonel Matthew J. Yandura

In our democracy, where the government is truly an agent of the 

popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and 

an organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well 

informed or badly informed regarding the factors that bear on 

the subject.1

—General George C. Marshall,

1939 Address to the Washington Historical Society

At its heart . . . the conflict has remained the same: a struggle 

between the original Palestinian majority of Arabs to retain their 

status and land against waves of immigrant Jews laying a claim 

to their biblical heritage.2

 

—Donald Neff, Author of Fallen Pillars

The question of Palestine, the tiny, seemingly insignificant slice of 

land the size of New Jersey that borders three continents, has confounded 

experts of international affairs for a 120-plus years and involved no less 

than 21 consecutive US presidents. The 1948 War for Palestine occurred 

on the heels of World War II—the former claiming approximately 19,900 

lives (approximately 13,500 Arab and 6,400 Israeli). The “1948” War for 

Palestine actually began on 29 November 1947, with United Nations (UN) 

Resolution 181, an act that partitioned Palestine in two. The war ended 

on 20 July 1949, with the completion of individual Armistice agreements 

among the new state of Israel and the participating Arab nations. In comparison to the Second World War, a large-scale conflict that claimed 60 

million lives, military operations in Palestine seem a relatively modest 

affair. After all, World War II was a total war in terms of proportion, participants, cost, and global impact. However, as author Efraim Karsh put it, 

“If anything, the Palestine War demonstrates that there is more to armed 

conflict than the size of the armies engaged in combat operations or the 

nature of their equipment.”3

 To be sure, the War for Palestine was a largescale war—but of a type and myriad complexity that defies single-narrative description. 

At once, the War for Palestine was a British proxy war covered in the 

fingerprints of Britain’s messy colonial-economic policies. It was an ideo-
72

logical war defined by the Zionist movement seeking a homeland for the 

Jews in Palestine. It was a theistic war informed by the Torah and the Bible 

that, according to God, “from the Negev wilderness in the south to the 

Lebanon mountains in the North, from the Euphrates River in the East to 

the Mediterranean Sea,” it was promised to the descendants of Abraham.4

It was an aspirational war for European Jewry seeking a land of their own 

after Nazi Germany and their collaborators murdered six million European Jews as part of a systematic plan of genocide—the Holocaust. For Arab 

League states it was a war of national self-interest deceptively cloaked 

under a banner of pan-Arabism. For devout Muslims committed to the 

defense of the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem it was a holy war. When the 

UN declared Israel a state on 29 November 1947 at the expense of the Palestinians who had been the majority for the previous 500 years, it became 

a civil war. This was also an information war of competing historic, political, social, and religious narratives and propaganda. And last but not least, 

the War for Palestine was a large-scale land war fought on the ground by 

conventional and unconventional combatants.5

 Given such circumstances, 

how could any military officer involved in such a conflict possibly understand the situation? Such was the state of affairs following the Battle 

of Der Suneid in Palestine on 19 May 1947, that a canny Egyptian major 

named Gamal Abdel Nasser remarked “What kind of war was this?”6 

When the ground war began in November 1947, six Arab Nations 

committed a token force of approximately 20,000 largely symbolic Arab 

troops to the “frontier” of Palestine with initial Jewish forces (regular and 

irregular) numbering roughly 55,000.7

 As a combined force they were 

poorly trained and equipped, lacked effective command and control, and 

lacked unity of effort. While the combined domestic populations of the six 

Arab countries near Palestine far outnumbered the sizeable Jewish Community now living in Palestine, the Arabs never mobilized and massed 

their available military strength for war in Palestine like the Jews. But 

why? Some scholars have suggested the Arab leaders cared less for the 

Palestinians themselves and were more interested in their own territorial 

ambitions. A 2010 New York Times Op-Ed by Professor Efraim Karsh of 

King’s College of London stated:

The first secretary-general of the Arab League, Abdel Rahman Azzam, once admitted to a British reporter, the goal of King Abdullah of Transjordan “was to swallow up the central hill regions of 

Palestine, with access to the Mediterranean at Gaza.” The Egyptians would get the Negev. Galilee would go to Syria, except that 

the coastal part as far as Acre would be added to the Lebanon.8

 
73

During the course of the war Israel gained statehood via UN Resolution 181. Israel’s “right of return” immigration law facilitated a significant influx of fresh military-age citizens, with priority given to those with 

combat training or experience from WWII. The Arabs never came close to 

matching Israel in terms of troop strength even when factoring in irregular 

forces of both sides. At its peak, approximate total number of combatants 

for each side were 17,500 Jewish fighters and 51,100 Arab.9

 Sixty-nine 

years later, the question of Palestine has not been resolved. 

From the literature review, the majority of the available English-language scholarship on the 1948 War for Palestine concentrates on precipitating social-political-religious factors and major military offensives. Less 

N

Syria

Mediterranean Sea

Izra



Trans-Jordan

Lebanon

Egypt

Palestine





 

























Nawa

Tiberias

Tyre

Dera

Amman

Haifa

Tel Aviv

Nazareth

Gaza Hebron

Beersheba

Rafah

Ma’an

Aqaba

El Arish

Petra

0 10 20 30 40 Miles

Majority Report from

UN Resolution 181

1947

Arab State/Palestine

Jewish State/Israel

Corpus Separatum/Jerusalem

River

Wadi

Gulf of

Aqaba

Bethelem

Jerusalem 

Sea of

Galilee

Dead

Sea

Figure 5.1. Majority report from United Nations Resolution 181. 

Map created by Army University Press.
74

represented in the available literature is scholarship dedicated to understanding the role of information in this conflict. This chapter contributes to 

the existing scholarship by exploring information as a function of national 

power and military warfare as seen by: (1) a sampling of the war’s master 

narratives, and (2) a selection of the information products and programs 

used to influence public behavior and opinion. Call-out boxes throughout 

this chapter identify lessons learned to assist US military leaders in future 

Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) of similar complexity.

Master Narratives of The 1948 Palestine War

Halverson, Goodall, and Corman define a master narrative as “A 

trans-historical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture.”10

The War for Palestine was shaped, in part, by master narratives. These 

stories of strategic importance were crafted and employed by both sides 

and were used to rally key publics at home and abroad, foster unity-ofeffort, differentiate friends from foes, and so on. But why should narratives 

matter to military leaders responsible for prosecuting ground wars of large 

scale? In his paper titled “The Military Application of Narrative: Solving 

Army Warfighting Challenge #2,” published in 2016, Major Robert Payne 

III suggests, “The US Army has a problem. This problem is made evident 

by 14 years of sustained combat and no victory in sight. The problem is 

that the Army lacks any significant means of engaging its enemy where 

the enemy is fighting, namely, in the narrative space.”11 He further states, 

“The narrative space has always existed within warfare. The difference today is that western societies are adamantly opposed to the violence caused 

by war since WWII and in representative governments the passion of the 

people impact the conduct of the war.”12 

The following section will sample key master narratives put forth by 

the Zionists and the Arabs in the War for Palestine while highlighting lessons learned for military leaders in LSCO. 

At the beginning of this chapter, Major Nasser of Egypt was quoted as 

asking “What kind of war was this?” The Zionist leaders and politicians 

sought to answer such a question using master narrative language to play 

on Jewish emotions, hopes, dreams, and fears. The concept of “total war” 

and the perception of the Palestinian “home front as a war front” were 

major elements of the Zionist narrative for the 1948 War.13 While conventional military scholars would agree that the war for Palestine does 

not constitute a “Total War,” Zionists relied on such language for military 
75

mobilization. Author Moshe Naor describes how key Jewish leaders misrepresented the War for Palestine:

The political leaders who served this function were David 

Ben-Gurion—the head of the Jewish Agency executive, and after 

May 1948 the first prime minister and minister of defense of the 

State of Israel—and Eliezer Kaplan—the treasurer of the Jewish 

Agency and the first finance minister of the State of Israel—who 

repeatedly used the concept of “total war” and the perception of 

the home front as a war front. Ben-Gurion and Kaplan expressed 

in the course of the war the importance that they, as the political 

leadership, ascribed to the mobilization of society and the support of society in the war effort. Ben-Gurion and Kaplan strove 

to stress as part of their mobilization rhetoric that the home front 

and the economy were an additional front in the war, and that the 

home front was no less important than the military front. Thus, 

on 13 November 1948, Ben-Gurion explained that: “this year we 

stood confronted by a total war. Everything was harnessed and 

mobilized on behalf of the requisites of the war—manpower, arms, 

capital, knowledge; because everything stood in jeopardy.”14

In the beginning of the conflict, the Arab master narrative was based 

on notions of Pan-Arab strength and unity. The language evoked exaggerated notions of capability and intent. This narrative functioned as a strategic deterrent-of-sorts through the idea of the inevitability of Arab victory 

in any confrontation. As the actual conduct of the War for Palestine turned 

sharply in favor of the Jews, the Arab narrative changed to reflect a blameand-shame posture. This version of the Arab master narrative evoked betrayal by the British who reneged on the McMahon-Hussein agreement 

and abandoned their mandate in Palestine. The Arabs cast the UN in a 

shameful light for their decision to create the state of Israel. The blameand-shame narrative was a face-saving measure to cover the string of Arab 

military defeats by Jewish forces. The Pan-Arab narrative explains why at 

the outset of skirmishes in 1947 the Arab military actions were largely defensive in nature. Their primary purpose early on was to protect local Palestinians and Arab military personnel from the actions both from the Jew’s 

conventional pre-state Army and Haganah irregular Jewish forces. Early 

on, the average Arab soldier and officer had every reason to be optimistic. 
76

This passage from Major Gamal Nasser captures well the sentiment of the 

Egyptian soldier and state in April 1948:

I myself was engaged in completing my studies at the Staff College. 

But the worries and responsibilities of my work at the College could 

not shut out the sound of the war-drums in Palestine. There was a 

great deal of excitement among my colleagues and the morale, especially among the younger officers, was high. . . . The morning 

papers were full of news of what was happening in Palestine. At the 

same time there were various forecasts and conflicting reports as to 

the official stand that the Egyptian government might take on the 

subject. There was no specific indication in the papers as to what 

this stand might be. But it was beginning to appear that there was a 

possibility of our entering the Palestine war, and the general atmosphere in the country was overflowing with excitement.15

The optimism of the Egyptians was based on a false premise. Through 

government control of their national media, Egypt and other Arab League 

states attempted to conceal the military defeats that had occurred throughout the conflict and later polling suggest that 79 percent of the Egyptian 

population believed Egypt had won the war.16 From the sample analysis 

of master narratives of the warring factions, one can see that the Israelis 

and the Arabs had different and often conflicting versions of actual events. 

History shows that “memory becomes shorter, patience diminishes, and 

propaganda competes successfully with historical knowledge.”17

LSCO Lesson Learned #1

Identify the Master Narratives in play. Ensure you and

your staff understand the crucial role they can play in

achieving political and military objectives in LSCO.

Figure 5.2. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lesson Learned #1. Created by Army 

University Press.
77

Figure 5.3. “Balfour Declaration” letter from Sir Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild. 

Photo courtesy of the British Library.
78

Weaponizing Information: Key Documents and Radio in the 

British Mandate

The 1948 War for Palestine was informed and influenced by a range 

of strategic and operational information products—propaganda to some. 

Information Operations (IO) played a critical role in this war. This section 

will focus on a sample of key documents and radio programs in the former 

British Mandate to show how information was weaponized to meet British, Zionist, and Arab goals.

On 2 November 1917, British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour sent 

a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild, a wealthy British-Jewish banker and 

financier of the Jewish cause. The letter (Balfour Declaration) had no legal 

binding but conveyed a message to the Zionist movement on behalf of the 

British government. It was this letter that allowed the Zionist campaign 

to claim that it was not just their hope and need for a Jewish state; now 

publically Britain supported their goal.

The impact of this state-sponsored document had a strategic effect on 

the League of Nations. On 24 July 1922, the Council of the League of Nations formalized the British government’s role in Palestine. The preamble 

stated the Principal Allied Powers agreed with the Balfour Declaration, 

and that the British Mandate was responsible for putting into effect what 

has become known as the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Article 2 echoed 

the preamble and also required that the Mandatory: “be responsible for 

placing the country under such political, administrative and economic 

conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home 

. . . and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 

irrespective of race and religion.”18

The formal Mandate gave Britain responsibility in seven areas. Article 

3 gave instructions ensuring Jews would maintain a place to migrate to and 

establish a national home. Article 5, limited the ability of a foreign government to take control; Articles 9, 13-16, aimed to ensure religious rights 

and holy sites of all faiths were not restricted. Absent from the Mandate 

was guidance to how the Arabs of Palestine should be treated or guaranteed a national home of their own. The British Mandate of Palestine was a 

key moment for Jews and Arabs. 

Nostalgia among the greater Jewish diaspora to return to its biblical 

home had existed for ages. Hence, the Balfour Declaration was a form of 

Strategic Information Operation made manifest. The Zionist-led cause for 

a Jewish homeland had found a patron in the world’s leading power—
79

Britain. Thus the Balfour Declaration and subsequent policy action by the 

League of Nations in 1922 gave formal impetus and motivation for the 

creation of an Israeli state in Palestine. More important, this statement on 

behalf of the British government served as a successful propaganda tool 

in getting Jewish people from around the world to resettle, legally and 

illegally, in Palestine. The proof is in the numbers: the Jewish population 

was 70,000 in 1917 and 750,000 in 1948.19

Statements on both Arab and Jewish sides were used to influence their 

publics toward or away from conflict. On 11 October 1947, Abdel Rahman 

Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, gave an interview 

in the Egyptian Arabic daily newspaper Akhbar al-Yom. His translated 

statement from the interview reads, in part: “I personally wish that the 

Jews would not work hard to push us to that war, because it will be a 

genocidal war which will cause great destruction and a lot of killing. History will record it like the killing that occurred during the Tatar times and 

the crusades.”20

Azzam was seeking to de-escalate notions of war by emphasizing its 

terrible cost—this was clear in the original Arabic version. Azzam’s quote 

was first modified and distributed by Zionist proponents and Jewish supporters in the press to resemble the following quote: “History will record 

it like the killing that occurred during the Tatar times and the crusades. . . . 

I am concerned about the coming bloody war. I can see its horrible battles; 

I can imagine a lot of fighting, killing, and wounded.”21

In early 1948, the Jewish Agency submitted a memorandum to the UN 

Palestine Commission that significantly changed General Azzam’s quote in 

meaning and context. Their submission to the UN quoted Azzam as saying: 

“This,” he said, “will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre 

which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades.”22

LSCO Lesson Learned #2

Know the political terrain. Strategic public

correspondence, declarations, speeches, etc., can have

operational and tactical implications for the Warfighter.

To avoid operational surprise, stay informed about them.

Figure 5.4. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lesson Learned #2. Created by Army 

University Press.
80

Azzam’s quote was purposefully changed to discredit the Arabs and 

generate support of the Zionist call for a UN decision favorable to the Jewish people. What Azzam actually said was now irrelevant as the truth and 

what some believed was the truth became blurred. This sigular informational effect propogated by the Jewish Agency had succeeded in damaging 

the credibility of Azzam and the intentions of the Arabs with a few strokes 

of the editor’s pen. This disinformation effort, that presented a false account of history, has had a lasting impact: Google lists 395 books that 

include Azzam’s altered quote excerpt and another approximately 13,000 

websites that refer to it.23

The doctored quote became the perceived truth over time. The two 

changes referenced above show how a non-state actor like the Jewish 

Agency, using the power of information, can decisively change perceptions simply through the manipulation and usurpation of a rival narrative. 

In effect, the Jewish Agency was successful in garnering sympathy for the 

Jewish people and painting the Arab League as bloody-minded dervishes, 

but at the expense of the facts at the time.

Clandestine and National Radio Influences the Population

Though print news media was king in the early 20th Century, the 1920s 

saw a rise in amateur and private radio stations. “Technical advancements 

and an increased awareness of the ‘power of radio’ to reach and influence 

people had turned governments around the world into eager players, ready 

to transform broadcasting into a vehicle for serving state objectives.”24

When the British government began its plans to start a state-sponsored 

radio service in its Palestinian mandate, they revoked local licenses and in 

turn removed competition to their own “Palestine Broadcasting Service.” 

LSCO Lesson Learned #3

Truth and deception are powerful weapons in war. Truth

can be rendered irrelevant by ones’ adversaries. Leaders

at all levels should be thoughtful and judicious in the use

of deception: for every deception, there are costs to

maintain it.

Figure 5.5. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lessons Learned #3. Created by 

Army University Press.
81

With dominance of the local airwaves in mind, the British established 

the Palestinian Broadcasting Service (PBS) on 30 March 1936. PBS was 

headquartered in Jerusalem with the main transmitter in Ramallah. Other 

PBS transmitters were established at key locations areas across Palestine. 

In response to this restriction, the Zionist movement made great efforts 

to establish and produce its own clandestine radio operations. Lawrence 

Soley, Communications Professor at Marquette University, defined clandestine radio operations thus: “Illegal political stations that advocate civil war, revolution, or rebellion and provide misleading information as to 

their sponsorship, transmitter location, or raison dêtre.”25 During World 

War II, the potential of radio and radio operations during warfare had been 

fully realized. Just as it had in the Second World War, Radio operations 

would become a key feature of the War for Palestine.

For Arab League nations like Egypt, national radio outlets were weapons of informational power to be wielded in the battle for public opinion 

preceding, during, and after during large-scale combat operations. Such 

information operations targeted Egypt’s enemies as well as its own citizens 

with the truth frequently being misrepresented to suit Egyptian national 

objectives. The below excerpt from memoirs of Gamal Abdel Nasser, then 

a major in the Egyptian Army and deployed to Palestine, underscores 

this point: 

I followed the developments of the battle of Deir Suneid from 

my position in Gaza, minute by minute. I could hear the boom of 

the guns in the distance. Our wounded started arriving in batches 

at Gaza Hospital. That night, the night of May 19, was the worst 

in my life. I spent it at Gaza Military Hospital. The beds around 

me were filled with our wounded from the battle of Deir Suneid, 

which was still in progress. Meanwhile Cairo Radio was announcing an official communique issued by General H.Q. [headquarters] in which our forces were said to have occupied Deir Suneid, 

which our infantry had stormed in a splendid manner. The communique contained a painful lie, for our forces had not yet occupied the settlement, though it was true that our infantry had carried 

out a splendid attack.26

When it became clear that the UN would recognize Israeli statehood 

sometime in 1948, the British began retrograde operations from their 

Mandate. The British plan for administrative continuity and uninterrupted 

service of PBS fell apart as British forces departed the country leaving 

powerful radio production and dissemination capability in the hands of the 
82

two warring factions—Jews on one side and Arabs on the other. Regarding 

the fate of PBS following British retrograde:

The station’s footprint remained: the buildings and transmitter were 

still there and continued to broadcast on the same frequency, but the 

station’s name, identity, and personnel changed. Physically, the station split: the broadcasting house, located in West Jerusalem, ended 

up in Israeli hands; the Ramallah transmitter, which had been taken 

by the Arab Legion, came under Jordanian control.27

The Haganah, and the stream of legal and illegal Jewish immigrants 

coming into Palestine, quickly assimilated this additional radio capability 

into their existing radio arsenal to further their objectives and to counter the 

relative advantage of neighboring Arab states national radio capabilities.

Under the British Mandate period from 1922–1948, unauthorized radio transmissions resulted in fines and punishment(s). Clandestine radio 

stations of both Arabs and Israelis had to be mobile and moved without 

notice. “Haganah Radio was the most extensive and well-organized of the 

Jewish clandestine radio services.”28

The utility of radio operation in Palestine in the War for Palestine was 

also tactically expedient. In 1947, approximately 60 percent of Arabs in 

Palestine were illiterate.29 Radio was an ideal way to quickly reach a mass 

audience. The Haganah also understood what motivated their Arab enemies: “Arabs . . . are highly conscious politically . . . and are greatly 

swayed by editorials.”30 The Haganah took advantage of this:

To this end, one tactic they used was to start a nightly Arabic news 

broadcast at 8:45 p.m. The broadcast covered “information” about 

individual Arab leaders, their “corruption,” and “facts” about their 

embezzlement of public funds. The station would broadcast warnLSCO Lesson Learned #4

In LSCO, prioritize information operations early. Whoever

achieves and maintains relative information advantage

over their opponent gains a significant asymmetric edge.

Figure 5.6. Large-Scale Combat Operations Lesson Learned #4. Created by Army 

University Press.
83

ings to individual Arabs (some of whom took these warnings very 

seriously and escaped to Egypt), and gave “inside information” on 

the situation “behind the Arab lines”—all designed to facilitate the 

ultimate achievement of Zionist objectives in the War.31

Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate the extensive major radio and print programs in Palestine along with their attributable sources.

Figure 5.7. Survey of Major Radio Programs in Palestine 1948–1950. Created by 

Army University Press.32

Name Est. Owned Policy Circulation Significance/Audience

Palestine

Broadcasting

Service

1936–48 Mandate

103,090

sets in

Palestine

Sets were subsidized; Listening

licenses were $4 a year; Primary

source for news, opinion, cultural

influence approved by the British

Mandate; Broadcast in English,

Arabic, and Hebrew.

BBC British

entertainment

Clear reception was attainable in

Palestine.

JCPA

British

Military Relayed BBC news.

Near East

Broadcasting

Corporation

British

Foreign

Office Anti-Jewish

Composed of local Arabs

(educated in Beirut); 1–2

Egyptians; Broadcast in Arabic.

Voice of the

Revolution

Palestinian

Arab

These radio

stations operated

with the intent to

achieve their

supporters’

organizational

goals and vision

through the use

of radio.

All listed radio stations other than PBS, JCPA,

NEABC operated as clandestine radio stations.

Voice of Palestine

Palestinian

Arab

Al-Inqaz

Radio/New Arab

“Secret” Radio

Arab

Liberation

Army

Azerbaijan

Democratic

Station

Azerbaijan

Democratic

Party Tudeh

Party

Haganah

Radio/Voice of

Israel/Voice of

Galilee

Haganah

Army

Voice of the

Jewish

Spearhead/Radio

of Fighters for the

Freedom of Israel

Stem Gang

(LEHI)

Voice of Fighting

Zion/Voice of

Freedom Irgun

Station of Arabic

Prisoners of War Israeli Army

Free Jewish

Station

General

Zionist

Council
84

Figure 5.8. Survey of Major Print Programs in Palestine 1909–1950. Created by 

Army University Press.33

Name Est. Owned Policy Circulation Significance/Audience

Haheruth 1908–18 Hebrew 1st Palestinian Hebrew Daily

Moriah 1909–18 Hebrew

Falastin 1911 Christian Nationalist ̴20,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs

Haaretz 1918 Hebrew Pro-Zionist ̴17,000 in 1940,

Increased postWW II

Liberal

Official

Gazette

1919 Mandate Pro-British Published legal, municipal, and

civil service notices; Weekly

government publication.

Davar 1925 Hebrew Socialist/

Labor

̴32,000;

-̴35,000

TA: Co-op, women, and male

working population.

Ad Difa’a 1932 Muslim Nationalist >10,000; ̴1,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs.

The Palestine

Post

1925,

1932

Jewish Pro-Zion Now The Jerusalem Post;

English, main story on the right

side in an “American Style;”

Opposed British immigration

restriction.

Palestine

Illustrated

News

1933 Jewish English, main story on the right in

a “British Style.”

Haboker 1935 Hebrew Right-Wing down to ̴13,500

by 1950

Two signers of Israeli Declaration

of Independence.

Esh-Shaab Muslim Muslim, backed by Mussa El

Alami (politician).

Al Wahdah Muslim Muslim, ed. Ishak Husseini (uncle

al-Husayni).

Various Hebrew daily papers: A revisionist, liberal farmer, two religious specific, and a German daily

paper for recent immigrants (Hebrew and German).

Immigrant

Specific

Two German daily papers for those that did not learn Hebrew.

Gazetta

Polska

Refugee TA: Polish

refugees

Published by Polish refugees

who stayed after WW II.

London

Communist

Daily Worker

Communist Russian paper banned by the

Mandate government.

Forum

(English)

Early years of

WW II

Public

Information

Office

Pro-British Palestine Broadcast Service and

BBC programs; Literary,

Informational, and Poetry. Hagalgal

(Hebrew)

Pro-British

Al Kafila

(Arabic)

Pro-British
85

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 1948 War for Palestine remains a fascinating academic subject with a complexity that belies its modest size and duration. 

It also gives insight to the political realism of the day. For those ground 

combat professionals seeking insights from historic LSCO, the War for 

Palestine offers maneuver commanders and staffs a useful framework for 

understanding and employing information operations. Three critical implications for the warfighter are presented here.

First, informational power is power as seen in the examples of the 

establishment of the Zionist movement in 1897, the Balfour Declaration 

in 1917, and the UN Resolution 181 in 1947. Given this perspective, one 

could deduce that the War for Palestine was a logical extension of these 

three informational efforts. In such a war as this, how could any ground 

commander fully appreciate the battlefield conditions without the context 

of the Zionist movement’s objectives, the purpose of the Balfour Declaration, or the implications of UN resolution 181? This is a teachable 

moment for the modern day Army officer: if the purpose of war is to make 

conditions for a lasting peace, one must understand the pre-existing 

historic, informational, anthropologic, and political factors bearing on 

the military problem. 

The second critical implication of this study contends that information 

operations are a component of combined arms operations. This point is 

illustrated in the example of the Jewish Agency and how it successfully 

corrupted and usurped Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha’s words, and subsequently, the Arab League’s narrative. Doctrinal terms matter here. Joint 

Publication 3-0 defines an operation as “a sequence of tactical actions with 

a common purpose or unifying theme.”34 Joint Publication 3-13 defines 

Information Operations as: “The integrated employment, during military 

operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines 

of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of 

adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”35 

The Jewish Agency had a clear end-state in mind: to assist in securing 

a future Jewish state by encouraging Jews throughout the world to help in 

the development and settlement of Israel. The literature suggests the Jewish Agency’s task and purpose was to exploit their political connections, 

resources, and access to print and radio media to disseminate a false narrative attributed to Azzam Pasha and the Arab League. The effectiveness of 

the Jewish Agency’s political information operations highlights the power 

that civil-society organizations can have on the context, conduct, and mo-
86

tive of and for armed conflict. In this case, the Jewish Agency successfully 

discredited Azzam Pasha and the Arab league in a masterstroke of planned 

propaganda. So compelling was the Jewish Agency’s propaganda campaign in 1948, that as of 2018, 395 books and 13,000 websites quote the 

altered Jewish Agency language given to the UN and attributed to Azzam 

Pasha as fact. While the Jewish Agency was successful in their efforts, this 

“tactical” action serves as a cautionary tale of the strategic impacts of tactical deception operations. It further underscores the need for LSCO to be 

guided and informed by a higher deception plan that considers long-term 

consequences of deception operations.

The third and final implication of this study maintains that maneuver 

in the information environment is maneuver as evidenced by Arab and 

the Israeli Forces’ extensive print and radio operations. Joint Publication 

3-0 Operations states that maneuver is “the employment of forces in the 

operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a 

position of advantage in respect to the enemy.”36 Consider the two illustrations of major print and radio programs included in this study. That such 

a relatively minor war could have been defined by such a contested information environment is staggering when one considers what this means for 

contemporary armed conflict. In 1948, both sides vied for advantage of the 

information terrain via information operations. Both sides used information operations to generate combat power by synchronizing available information capabilities. Today, with the internet-of-things, mobile wireless 

devices, instantaneous self-publishing software, drones, artificial intelligence programs, micro-satellite deployment, and big data operations, the 

information environment has become exponentially more complicated. 

Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing operations in the information 

environment requires more than a Ranger Tab. IO requires committed intelligence support, a detailed appreciation of how human beings interact 

within the information environment and with another; it calls for knowledge of the full range and application of available information-related capabilities (IRCs); it also calls for fluency in the operations process in order 

to turn the raw potential of informational power into combat power. It is 

likely that the next LCSO involving American troops will be every bit as 

complex as the 1948 War for Palestine. Regardless of the type of war it is, 

it will include, and quite possibly be defined by, a highly-contested battle 

for the information environment as it was in the case of Palestine in 1948.37
87

Notes

1. George Catlett Marshall, “The Time Factor: September 1–December 

31, 1939,” in The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, We Cannot Delay, 1 July 

1939–6 December 1941, eds. Clarence E. Wunderlin, Sharon R. Ritenour, and 

Larry I. Bland, Vol. 2. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1986), 123.

2. Donald Neff, “Preface: The Six Pillars of U.S. Policy, 1897–1995,” in 

Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, ed. Eric 

Hoogland. (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002), 1–2. 

3. Efraim Karsh, “Perpetuating the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in The ArabIsraeli Conflict: The Palestine War 1948, ed. Robert O’Neill, (Oxford: Osprey, 

2002), 87.

4. “Possessing the Land” in Holy Bible: New Living Translation, 3rd ed., 

(Tyndale House Publishers, 2007), 336.

5. “Timeline of Events: After 1945,” United States Holocaust Memorial 

Museum, accessed 24 April 2018, https://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-ofevents/after-1945.

6. Gamal Abdel Nasser, “Nasser’s Memoirs of the First Palestine War,” 

translated by Walid Khalidi. Journal of Palestine Studies 2, no. 2, Winter 1973, 

12.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Palestine Situation 1948,” 1–3, 

accessed 14 April 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/ciardp67-00059a000200200011-5.

8. Efraim Karsh, “The Palestinians, Alone,” Editorial, New York Times

(London), 1 August 2010, accessed 10 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.

com/2010/08/02/opinion/02karsh.html.

9. Avi Shlaim, “Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948,” in War for Palestine: 

Rewriting the History of 1948, eds. Avi Shlaim and Eugene L. Rogan. (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 79–103; Central 

Intelligence Agency, “The Palestine Situation 1948.” 

10. Jeffry R. Halverson, Steven R. Corman, and H.L Goodall Jr., “What Is 

a Master Narrative?” in Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Basingstoke: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 14.

11. Robert D. Payne III, “The Military Application of Narrative: Solving 

Army Warfighting Challenge #2,” technical paper no. AD1020344, US Army 

Command and General Staff College, 2016, accessed 23 April 2016, http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020344.pdf, iv.

12. Payne, “The Military Application of Narrative.”

13. Moshe Naor, “Israel’s 1948 War of Independence as a Total War,” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 2, 1 April 2008, 242.

14. Moshe, “Israel’s 1948 War of Independence as a Total War.”

15. Nasser, “Nasser’s Memoirs of the First Palestine War.”
88

16. Yoav Gelber, “Israel Studies an Anthology: The Israeli-Arab War of 

1948,” Jewish Virtual Library: A Project of AICE, July 2009, accessed 4 May 

2018, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/isdf/text/gelber.pdf.

17. Gelber, “Israel Studies an Anthology.”

18. Lillian Goldman Law Library, “The Avalon Project: The Palestine 

Mandate,” The Avalon Project: The Palestine Mandate, 2008, accessed 27 March 

2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 20th_century/palmanda.asp.

19. Leslie John Martin, “Press and Radio in Palestine under the British 

Mandate,” Journalism Bulletin 26, no. 2, 1949, 186.

20. David Barnett and Efraim Karsh, “Azzam’s Genocidal Threat,” Middle 

East Forum, 1 September 2011, accessed 15 May 2018, https://www.meforum.

org/articles/2011/azzam-s-genocidal-threat. Original newspaper article was 

translated by a Command and General Staff College student and foreign officer.

21. Barnett, “Azzam’s Genocidal Threat.”

22. Jewish Agency for Palestine, Memorandum on Acts of Arab Aggression 

to Alter by Force the Settlement on the Future Government of Palestine Approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations: Submitted to the United 

Nations Palestine Commission, Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1948, 3, accessed 

27 March 2018, https://archive.org/stream/ MemorandumOnActsOfArabAggressionSubmittedToTheUnitedNationsPalestine/ MAAA2#page/n19/mode/2up/

search/Pasha.

23. Tom Segev, “The Makings of History: The Blind Misleading the Blind,” 

Haaretz.com, 11 January 2018, accessed 27 March 2018, https://www.haaretz.

com/1.5201895.

24. Andrea Stanton, “Jerusalem Calling: The Birth of the Palestine Broadcasting Service,” Jerusalem Quarterly 26, no. 50, 2012; The Institute for 

Palestine Studies, accessed 5 April 2018, http:// www.palestine-studies.org/jq/

fulltext/78483.

25. Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda. (New York: Praeger, 1987), 2.

26. Nasser, “Nasser’s Memoirs of the First Palestine War.”

27. Stanton, “Conclusion: The Multiple Afterlives of PBS.”

28. Douglas A. Boyd, “Hebrew-Language Clandestine Radio Broadcasting 

During the British Palestine Mandate,” Journal of Radio Studies 6, no. 1, 1999, 

102.

29. Martin, “Press and Radio in Palestine,” 187.

30. Martin, 192.

31. Martin, 192.

32. Lawrence C. Soley and John S. Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication (New York: Praeger, 1987), 320; Martin, “Press and Radio in Palestine 

under the British Mandate;” Douglas A. Boyd, “Hebrew-Language Clandestine 

Radio Broadcasting During the British Palestine Mandate,” Journal of Radio 

Studies 6, no. 1, 1999, 102.

33. Martin, “Press and Radio in Palestine,” 186.
89

34. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Personal Support

(Washington, DC: 2017), GL-13.

35. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: 2012 w/ Chg 1 2014), GL-3.

36. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-03, Operations (Washington, DC: 2012), GL-12.

37. Major H.O. Lock, “Contents,” in The Conquerors of Palestine through 

Forty Centuries, ed. V. London: R. Scott, 1920, accessed 14 March 2018, 

https://archive.org/details/; Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper, 1949), 149; Ministry for 

Culture and Heritage, “Palestine Campaign Map,” Map in The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, Oxford University Press, 2000, 

accessed 21 March 2018, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/palestine-campaign-map.
90
91

Chapter 6

Leaflets and Loudspeakers: The Role of Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP) in Large-Scale Combat Operations 

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. Whiskeyman

To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of special service, for an adversary is 

more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.

—Flavius Vegetius Renatus, c. 378 AD

“We are in an information war, and we’re losing that war,” is an 

oft-repeated quote regarding the fight against Islamic extremists.

1

 While 

it is not solely the responsibility of the US military to win this narrative, 

it is certainly incumbent on the US military to use information to gain a 

relative advantage over enemies in combat. The raison d’etre of the US 

Army is to win the nation’s land wars. It should be obvious that this includes an element of information warfare because war is inherently a contest of will susceptible to psychological manipulation. This is especially 

important because information is now a joint function, and the US Army 

has recognized the growing importance of information on a multi-domain 

battlefield through the creation of an Information Dominance career field 

inclusive of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and 

information operations (IO) officers.2

 

The US military has struggled with grasping the nature of information 

operations. This is evident in the confused language often heard as the 

terms IO and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are used 

interchangeably. While the two specialties are intimately related, there are 

key differences between them. IO officers integrate a broad range of information related capabilities, while PSYOP officers specialized in the development of messages designed to resonate with a given audience. MISO 

focuses on the message and the most effective delivery method to create a 

perception; IO focuses on the integration of the message with other activities. Additionally, information operations tend to be viewed as a necessary 

evil. IO are not a readily accepted practice within the Army because the 

perception that underhanded methods are employed is an anathema concept to an Americans sense of values-based fair play. 

According to Susan Gough, the use of “‘psychological tricks’ is ‘dirty’ 

and immoral,” and has been viewed as “something that only the ‘bad guys’ 

did: first the Nazis, then the Soviets.”3

 This understanding of the nature of 
92

information operations has often hindered an effective employment of the 

craft.4 Information operations do not come naturally to the Army’s staffs 

because it is not sufficiently emphasized within the Army’s Leader Development, Education, and Training (LDT&E) processes that groom future 

staff officers and commanders. This appears to be evident in ongoing operations where one could argue that the US military has been successful 

in nearly every tactical engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but 

cannot seem to gain the advantage in the psychological fight.5

 The enemy 

holds on. He does not quit. He bides his time. This is not a new problem, 

however. Recall that Napoleon—for all his acclaimed tactical brilliance—

fought all the way to Moscow but failed to convince the Russians to quit. 

He lost the psychological war, and ultimately his tactical successes were 

for naught. So, how does a commander establish the necessary operational 

conditions to enable success in the IO fight? 

Because it can be difficult to make assessments in the midst of action, 

a study of history can be informative. By examining key case studies from 

the past, one can draw out some universally applicable truths, which then 

can be applied to the current (and future) situations in hope that one does 

not repeat the mistakes of the past. The Vietnam War offers a fertile opportunity because to date, it was the largest use of psychological operations 

in US history.6

 

Because information operations as a term did not exist during the Vietnam War, this chapter will attempt to draw some conclusions by examining the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) (the term for MISO 

during the Vietnam War) during large-scale combat operations (LSCO) 

in Vietnam. The first aspect this chapter will examine is at Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) headquarters. The second and third 

aspects to be examined occurred during the largest ground operation of the 

war (Operation Cedar Falls) and during the largest airborne operation of 

the war (Operation Junction City). 

To conduct this analysis, this summary will briefly examine US Army 

doctrine on PSYOP during the period in question (1965–1967). Did the 

US Army have a firm footing upon which to build its PSYOP program? 

Next, each case study will be examined on three key criteria: command 

emphasis, resourcing, and metrics. Finally, this chapter will make some 

conclusions and recommendations for how the Army should conduct some 

facets of information operations during future LSCO based on the lessons 

learned from the employment of PSYOP during the Vietnam War. 
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Doctrinal Review

The US Army’s first official doctrine dates from 1778—a time when 

the Continental Army was poorly trained compared to its adversaries the 

British Army and their Hessian mercenaries. Confronted with this dilemma, General George Washington sought assistance from Major General 

Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who developed and published the Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, 

which became known as the “blue book.” The manual remained the Army’s official military guide until 1812. 

From the time of the American Civil War on, the US Army developed 

field manuals (FMs) to cover specific aspects of warfare. The need for 

a larger standing Army post-WWII necessitated a continual refinement 

of the doctrine required to support the fielding, training, and equipping 

an industrial-age warfare force. Modern US Army PSYOP doctrine is 

rooted in WWII, with further refinement coming through the Korean War 

and the early years of the Cold War.7

 The result of that 25-year history of 

maturation was that the American Army entered Vietnam with a well-defined PSYOP doctrine.8

 While PSYOP doctrine was well-defined, it was 

not well integrated with intelligence doctrine as this tended to fixate on 

order of battle and not on the sorts of intelligence required to produce 

effective PSYOP.9

 

MACV leadership recognized the challenges of the fight in Vietnam. 

So, on 7 September 1965 it published Directive 525-3, “Minimizing 

Non-Combatant Battle Casualties,” which built upon existing doctrine and 

sought to clarify the need to include the psychological aspects of warfare 

in ongoing and future operations.10 The directive stated that “the use of 

unnecessary force leading to noncombatant casualties in areas temporarily 

controlled by the Viet Cong (VC) will embitter the population, drive them 

into the arms of the VC, and make the long range goal of pacification more 

difficult and more costly.”11 Annex A to Directive 523-3 directed commanders to integrate tactical psychological operations with civic action 

and combat operations. Commanders who failed to implement PSYOP 

and civic action in coordination with combat operations were thus not only 

ignoring doctrine, they were also ignoring General William Westmoreland’s orders.12 Unfortunately, officers arriving in Vietnam had little to no 

PSYOP training. The US Army’s yearlong command and general staff college (CGSC) focused on the tactics of fire and maneuver and only taught 

one hour of PSYOP curriculum during the entire year. Despite Westmoreland’s emphasis, the officers arriving to Vietnam lacked the training on 
94

how to execute his orders effectively. MACV had the requisite command 

emphasis but did not have the training to put it into practice.

PSYOP at MACV

By mid-November 1966, this expanded command emphasis placed 

a demand on PSYOP resources that outstripped capacity. So, the decision was made that the 6th PSYOP Battalion would be expanded to a 

group and that staffing levels within the MACV headquarters would be 

increased.13 Additionally, all maneuver battalions were also to be issued 

hand-held loudspeakers based upon a suggestion of then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, who had argued that each brigade should receive its own 

loudspeaker team.14 MACV continued to learn, adjust, and improve its 

operations.15

This was also true with intelligence operations where several assessments led directly to changes in PSYOP tactics and messaging. Despite 

not having well-integrated doctrine, MACV as a command learned from 

ongoing operations and adjusted. Interrogation of enemy captives and Hoi 

Chanh (rallier in Vietnamese) produced assessments that meager rice rations and inadequate medicinal supplies had eroded VC combat effectiveness.16 This analysis led to a focus on those themes in Chieu Hoi (open 

arms in Vietnamese) messages, which demonstrated coordination between 

the MACV J2 and the psychological operations community.17 The Chieu 

Hoi Program was designed to encourage insurgents to abandon the VC and 

join in the building of South Vietnam as a nation. It also aimed to undermine community and family support for the insurgents by destroying the 

belief that friends and family were obliged to support any relatives in the 

insurgency.18 It sought to accomplish these goals by providing job training, political indoctrination, and in some cases a basis for acceptance into 

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).19 The military intelligence 

community published a detailed analysis of who the Hoi Chanh were and 

their likely reasons for defection. The US recognized that each Hoi Chanh 

was one less VC on the battlefield and that the costs of not embracing this 

program would be significant in terms of US lives lost.20 One US estimate 

calculated the cost of each Hoi Chanh at $127, while the cost to kill each 

VC was $300,000.21

So MACV had relatively sound doctrine, command emphasis from 

General Westmoreland, and made resource allocations to support PSYOP. 

The crucial elements seemed to be present for successful psychological 

operations. The next aspect to be examined is how that framework was 

executed during LSCO.
95

Cedar Falls

Operation Cedar Falls began on 8 January 1967 and ended on 28 January 1967. It was the largest US ground operation in Vietnam and included 

the use of 30,000 US troops.22 

The operation’s purpose was to deny the enemy the use of the Iron 

Triangle: an area to the northwest of Saigon that the National Liberation 

Front (NLF) had used as an operations base since at least 1945. This area 

was about 155 square kilometers and had grown along with the increase in 

US troop commitment. By the time of Cedar Falls, the area was a “complex of cement fortifications, three-tier tunnel systems, ammunition depots, munitions factories, hospitals, troop rest and recreation areas, and 

communication centers.”23 Additionally, MACV intelligence assessed that 

significant enemy forces were operating in the Iron Triangle. These forces 

consisted of the NLF’s Military Region IV headquarters, the 272d regiment, and five battalions of the 165th VC regiment. A local force battalion 

and three local force companies were also operating in the Iron Triangle.24

Two days prior to the start of the ground operations, PSYOP conducted a shaping operation by dropping 215,000 leaflets on the area that urged 

the populace to “go to designated assembly points for evacuation before 

the shooting started.”25 The goal was clearly not surprise. Instead, commanders sought to minimize civilian casualties and destroy the NLF structures so that they would no longer be able to use the area. 

The use of tactical PSYOP teams was very effective. As the operation 

continued, the number of Chieu Hoi increased.26 The PSYOP teams were 

able to exploit opportunities rapidly because they had the ability to operate 

at the lowest tactical level. They created “rapid reaction leaflets,” which 

were a very effective means of motivating enemy personnel to defect.27

These leaflets were often comprised of first-hand testimonials from enemy prisoners. This was an example of a multi-domain battle long before 

the phrase was coined. The Army and Air Force used combined arms to 

fix the enemy, while PSYOP used leaflets and loudspeakers to target him 

when he was most psychologically vulnerable. The result of this and other 

efforts was that over 500 VC rallied, or turned themselves into the Vietnamese government during Cedar Falls.28 Post-strike reporting from B-52 

strikes during Cedar Falls showed that the VC rallied due to the terror of 

the bombings and the use of leaflets and loudspeakers.29 Interrogations 

and enemy document exploitation revealed that from the VC perspective, 

“psychologically speaking, the use of B-52’s by the enemy for bombing, 

along with an extensive propaganda program considerably lowered the 
96

morale of cadre and [the] mass[es].”30 Additionally, many enemy units 

largely avoided contact and withdrew across the border into Cambodia. 

While this withdrawal cannot be directly attributed to PSYOP, it is likely that the combination of overwhelming firepower and the targeted use 

of tactical PSYOP created the conditions where the enemy sought to 

avoid contact.

Here again, the fundamental elements and conditions required for success were in place. Commanders placed emphasis on PSYOP (it led the 

operation), applied resources, and the efforts of PSYOP delivered results. 

The next operation serves as our second case study.

Junction City

At the close of 1966, based on captured enemy documents and interrogations of Hoi Chanh, the MACV J2, General Joseph McChristian, 

assessed that seven North Vietnamese divisions subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) operated in Military Region 5.31

Based on this intelligence, he approached Westmoreland with an interesting proposition—that Westmoreland delay and significantly change an operation that was already set to commence. General Westmoreland trusted 

McChristian, and acting on that trust Westmoreland agreed to delay and 

change the planned operation.32 

Junction City was a three-phased operation that began on 22 February 

1967 and lasted 82 days. US Army and Air Force units, along with the 

support of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), fought against 

forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). This operation took place in the region known as War Zone C which was northwest 

of Saigon and just beyond the Iron Triangle—the area previously cleared 

during Cedar Falls.33 Junction City covered an area of approximately 4,000 

square kilometers about 45 miles northwest of Saigon and bordering Cambodia.34 This operation built upon the successes of Cedar Falls and was 

designed to destroy the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), which 

some analysts believed to be the VC equivalent of the Pentagon.35 

Junction City was a search-and-destroy operation, which used more 

troops to cover a larger area than ever before and used more helicopters 

than any previous operation in the US Army’s history. It was also the only 

major airborne operation of the Vietnam War. The mission of the II Field 

Force was to search and destroy COSVN and the 9th VC Division and 

their installations.36

The operation failed to find COSVN but did lead to the capture and 

destruction of a significant amount of VC materiel. The operation had sig-
97

nificant short-term tactical success but failed to secure long-term strategic 

results. That said, there were some notable PSYOP successes.

After the battle of Ap Bau Bang II, General John Hay, the 1st Infantry 

Division commander, wrote to his counterpart in the 9th VC Division and 

had the message printed and dropped into enemy areas. It stated that the 

9th Division commander’s men had disgraced themselves not only by losing the battle, but also by leaving their dead and wounded behind. General 

Hay stated that the Americans were taking care of the wounded and had 

buried the VC dead.37 This command emphasis showed a willingness to 

engage with the enemy psychologically.

Another success came on 28 February 1967, when the 173rd Brigade 

operating northeast of Katum had a major find: 120 reels of motion picture 

film, numerous still photos and pictures, and busts of communist leaders. 

This discovery proved to be one of the major intelligence coups of the 

war.38 The Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) processed 

and analyzed the film, and then combined the analysis into 65 reels of 

varying lengths of five to 30 minutes. This collection was an enormous 

boon to the order of battle effort, as it provided visual identification of 

individuals in the VC hierarchy. It also had psychological operations value, leading the MACV J2, in cooperation with the Joint US Public Affairs 

Office (JUSPAO), to compile five of the films into a 35-minute composite 

with an English commentary.39 Visually identifying individuals in the VC 

hierarchy prevented them from continuing to hide among the population. 

JUSPAO was also able to use some of the intelligence exploitation generated from operations such as Junction City, which could then be used to 

bolster support for similar operations in the future. MACV intelligence 

assessed that the identification of VC leaders demoralized their forces.

Junction City resulted in 139 Chieu Hoi. The lower results were assessed because the 9th VC Division was made up of North Vietnamese 

regulars and hardened VC, which meant the normal appeals to family separation were not as effective.40 Junction City dropped 9,768,000 leaflets, 

and made 102 hours of aerial loudspeaker appeals, with most of the engagements in March resulting in quick reaction leaflets being created and 

distributed to take advantage of the developing tactical situation.41

As was the case in previous operations, the enemy avoided contact, and 

Soldiers were astute enough to recognize that the capture and exploitation 

of VC or VC propaganda presented a significant intelligence advancement 

in terms of identifying a previously faceless enemy. While there were not 

as many ralliers as during Cedar Falls, there were still a company’s worth 
98

of enemy combatants removed from the battlefield using PSYOP. As was 

the case in Cedar Falls, Junction City PSYOP efforts benefitted from command emphasis and resourcing which in the end produced results.

Conclusions

Cedar Falls and Junction City were the two largest ground operations 

conducted by the US Army during the Vietnam War. If those keystone 

operations were emblematic of MACV efforts, then one should have assumed that the US would have won the psychological war in Vietnam. 

MACV (and subordinate commands) had the key elements of success 

present: they placed emphasis on PSYOP, allocated resources, and sought 

to assess effects. Westmoreland briefed all incoming battalion and above 

commanders of the need for PSYOP and their role as the primary PSYOP 

officers in their units. Despite the unprecedented command emphasis, 

General Westmoreland only makes one mention of PYSOP in his autobiography, A Soldier Reports:

Psychological warfare detachments operated throughout South 

Vietnam, distributing leaflets, broadcasting over loudspeakers, 

trying in various ways to persuade the enemy to defect . . . Yet 

despite a major and persistent effort, including bringing civilian 

psychological warfare experts from the United States, results were 

disappointing. Except for an occasional platoon-size group, most 

defectors were individuals. Mass surrenders never developed despite our intense psychological warfare efforts, which apparently 

could not overcome the enemy’s intensive indoctrination.42 

Westmoreland was clearly disappointed with PSYOP’s performance. 

He expected immediate results, and when they did not happen, he blamed 

MACV for the ineffective employment of PSYOP. Yet, even though Westmoreland took a personal interest in PSYOP, a survey of lessons learned 

cited 17 of 21 battalion commanders that there was no requirement for 

psychological warfare personnel at battalion level, and only four commanders felt that psychological warfare personnel should be included in 

the battalion.43 Additionally, the general attitude seemed to be that anyone could write a leaflet, which undermined the desire for the addition of 

PSYOP teams. The expectation was that someone else would take care of 

that fight—that real warriors used firepower and not “dirty tricks.” 

Many commanders interpreted MACV Directive 525-3 as if those 

functions were compartmented, rather than complementary. Thus, some 

units in Vietnam were also dividing the functions of PSYOP and Civil 

Affairs as two unrelated activities; failing to see the linkage between deeds 
99

and words. Commanders viewed leaflet and loudspeakers as a type of fires, 

which could be measured, assessed, and would produce immediate results.

There were other instances where “commanders saw PSYOP as more 

of a sideshow than a valuable combat multiplier.”44 There is also the remark of one commander “who boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two 105mm howitzers—one of which was marked ‘Chieu’ and 

the other ‘Hoi.’”45 

The intelligence community also had systemic challenges with PSYOP 

support. While McChristian cited incidents of cooperation and support 

from intelligence to PSYOP, the 7th PSYOP Group report from November 

1967 was not so sanguine. PSYOP personnel did not have access to the 

3M Reader Printers needed for CDEC use. Thus, they were unable to mine 

that vein of intelligence.46 Additionally, as late as mid-1967, both the 6th 

PSYOP Battalion and 7th PSYOP Group requested that MACV J2 place 

them on its distribution lists, but no action had been taken because the requests were not relayed to the correct section of the MACV J2.47 

The study also found that PSYOP intelligence unit interrogators were 

not being granted access to military interrogation facilities.48 PSYOP specialists were required because J2 analysts were consumed with the collection of order-of-battle information, and often either missed or ignored 

intelligence of psychological value.

Despite the command emphasis, success was not forthcoming during 

Vietnam. The largest use of psychological operations in US history had 

failed to deliver the expected results. The failure does not seem to rest 

at the tactical level, as units attempted to integrate PSYOP, learned lessons from ongoing operations, and adjusted tactics. The failure then is in 

expectation management. General Westmoreland did not understand the 

nature of psychological operations and placed the wrong sort of command 

emphasis on those operations. He unrealistically expected instantaneous 

results and believed that tactical level PSYOP could produce operational 

and strategic level effects.

Lessons for Today

Commanders today face similar challenges with MISO (i.e. previously PSYOP) and more broadly with the integration of non-lethal fires 

into the fight. Too often commanders view non-lethal fires writ large as a 

mechanism to mitigate risk from the fallout of tactical operations instead 

of viewing information warfare as the main point of conducting operations. Commanders are not expected to by MISO experts, but they should 
100

have a solid grasp of how to integrate information related capabilities into 

plans and operations. 

The point of warfare is to get one’s enemy to capitulate. Unless the 

enemy is dead, the only other way to do so is to win the information fight. 

Yet, information operations is taught only as an elective at CGSC—not a 

very helpful fact when we are engaged in ongoing struggles with adversaries who plan the IO-effect first and then plan the tactical engagement. 

This is true of the fights with extremists as well as with the actions short of 

armed conflict with states such as Russia and China. 

After all, the refrain of “we are losing the IO fight” still resonates 

within many headquarters. So, what is to be done? First, commanders 

must look inward to acknowledge, despite their experiences, they are not 

IO experts. Commanders must embody the mission command spirit and 

trust those that are experts to do their jobs. 

Secondly, cultural barriers must be broken down that limit the optimal 

effectiveness of information-related capabilities. This starts with establishing the leader development training and education (LDT&E) processes within professional military education (PME) that places value on the 

employment of information related capabilities (IRC) in a multi-domain 

battle context. The IRCs must be taught within PME as more than just 

an elective—the core concepts must be infused in every lecture, reading, 

and exercise. Additionally, IRCs must be resourced with personnel, equipment, intelligence support, and office space. IRCs planners should be included in normal staff battle rhythm events and should be a priority when 

it comes to boots on the ground (BOG) requirements. IRC personnel are 

a vital part of the team and must be integrated within the commander’s 

battle rhythm events. 

Lethal and non-lethal fires must be part of the same commander’s 

decision-making cycle. Too often, these are viewed as separate events. 

Further, intelligence must support IRCs. Most of the intelligence required 

by MISO comes from non-traditional sources that are outside of normal 

order-of-battle collection. Intelligence for IRCs must be prioritized. Fundamentally, the IO fight must be planned early. As seen during Cedar Falls, 

IRCs can be used to shape an operation. The use of IRCs should be proactive vice reactionary. 

Finally, command emphasis is not a panacea. The commander must 

understand the nature of psychological warfare. Tactical MISO is very 

effective because the enemy is most vulnerable when he is faced with 

a multi-domain dilemma—when he has nowhere to turn for escape and 
101

has lost hope. MISO above the tactical level does not produce immediate 

results. This is where the inclusion of MISO as part of information operations becomes vital. Those operations take time, are difficult to measure, 

and require sustained commitment. MISO is more than leaflet and loudspeakers—or in today’s parlance more that tweets and Facebook posts. 

There is no magic tweet that will cause mass defections. The campaign 

must be well-planned, resourced, and sustained over time. 

Warriors must heed the words of General Edward C. Meyer, former 

Army Chief of Staff who stated, “The keystone of our contribution toward 

peace is total competence in waging war. That expertise can only come 

from an ardent study of tactics and strategy.”49 Warriors must also recognize that the study of tactics and strategy must include the mind of the 

enemy as key terrain.
102

Notes

1. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton while speaking before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee on 2 March 2011, accessed 12 May 2018, https://

www.dailysignal.com/2011/03/08/clinton-to-congress-we-are-losing-the-information-war/.

2. The Information Dominance branch was designated in April 2017. It includes cyber (17A), electronic warfare (EW) (FA29), and information operations 

(FA30) officers. As of October 2018, FA29 officers will be redesignated 17B. 

The EW field is being incorporated in the cyberspace operations career field.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Susan L. Gough, “The Evolution of Strategic Influence,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2003), 2.

4. Paul E. Valley and Michael A. Aquino, “From PSYOP to MindWar: The 

Psychology of Victory” (Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Group, 

United States Army Reserve, Presidio of San Francisco, 1980), 1.

5. In the words of Yogi Berra, “It’s déjà vu all over again.” Scott Stump, 

‘It’s deja vu all over again’: 27 of Yogi Berra’s most memorable ‘Yogi-isms’, 23 

September 2015, accessed 20 May 2018, https://www.today.com/news/its-dejavu-all-over-again-27-yogi-berras-most-t45781.

6. Although propaganda has been in use since time immemorial, the US 

efforts in Vietnam were at an unprecedented scale given the ability to produce 

leaflets, and radio and television broadcasts. See Project CHECO (Contemporary 

Historical Examination of Current Operations), “Psychological Operations by 

USAF/VNAF in SVN,” 16, and author’s unpublished dissertation, “The Learning Curve: MACV’s Grasp of Intelligence, PSYOP, and Their Coordination, 

1965–1971,” 15 May 2015, 41. Military information support operations (MISO) 

is the term now used by the Department of Defense instead of PSYOP.

7. For an excellent discussion of the development of PSYOP from WWII 

through Vietnam, see Lieutenant Colonel Susan L. Gough, “The Evolution of 

Strategic Influence,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2003.)

8. Michael G. Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th Psyop Group in Vietnam,” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 

Information Center, 2007), 8.

9. This seemingly small difference caused significant problems in the 

approach toward what intelligence was collected, processed, and disseminated. 

See Andrew Whiskeyman, “The Learning Curve: MACV’s Grasp of Intelligence, PSYOP, and Their Coordination, 1965–1971,” unpublished dissertation, 

15 May 2015.

10. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, USMACV Directive 525-3, 

“Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties,” 7 September 1965, Virtual 

Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech, accessed 13 October 2014, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/024/0240301028.pdf.
103

11. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Command History 1965, Historical Research Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff; MACV, Command 

History, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, 1965, Headquarters Department of the Army, Information Management Support Agency, 

Alexandria, VA, 1966, 252. 

12. General Westmoreland was not fixated solely on firepower as the 

solution to the problems in South Vietnam. The battle of Binh Gia in December 

1964 had shown him the conventional threat. Directive 525-3 proved he had not 

forgotten about the unconventional one.

13. II Field Forces Vietnam, “Operational Report for Period Ending 31 October 1966,” Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, 15 November 1966, 12, 558.

14. Mervyn Edwin Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2018) , 232.

15. Whiskeyman, “Learning Curve,” 457.

16. Hoi Chanh was the Vietnamese term meaning “rallier” or “one whom 

returned to the righteous side” was the name given to those who rallied under 

the Chieu Hoi Program.

17. Chieu Hoi means “Open Arms” in Vietnamese. Military Assistance 

Command Vietnam, Command History 1966, 558.

18. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Command History 1965, 452.

19. J.M. Carrier, and C.A.H. Thompson, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: 

The Special Case of Chieu Hoi (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966), v.

20. The plan developed included more US support, the construction of 

regional CHP centers in each corps, and changes to operational procedures. 

Additionally, six United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

advisors and four US military liaisons would be assigned in support of the 

program, and by the end of 1965, three of the USAID advisors were on the job. 

The Government of Vietnam (GVN) agreed to construct a National Chieu Hoi

center with scheduled completion in early 1966. A lack of qualified contraction 

bids delayed construction of the regional centers. Military Assistance Command 

Vietnam, “Command History 1965,” 452.

21. Bob Considine, “Pacification cadres,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 September 1967, cited in Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 

University Press, 1996), 100.

22. Bernard W. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City (Washington, DC: US 

Government Printing Office, 1974), US Army Heritage and Education Center 

(AHEC) Collection.

23. Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 263 citing USIS Vietnam 

Feature Service, Operation Cedar Falls . . . Out of the Iron Triangle, 1, TTVA, 

DPC: Unit 2 – Military Operations, box 8, folder 7.
104

24. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 19.

25. Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 263.

26. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 56.

27. Typical of the leaflets was one written by Le Van Sa, in which he called 

out to his friends by name and gave them instructions on how to rally. Sa stated 

that he was being treated well and that he had been lied to by the VC. The leaflets written in Vietnamese (rather than being translated from English) were much 

more effective. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 57.

28. Rogers, 57.

29. Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, 279.

30. Roberts, 396; see also Project CHECO, “Psychological Operations by 

USAF/VNAF in SVN,” 14.

31. This conservative estimate did not include the additional one possible 

and one probable division-level units operating in the area. This brought the total 

enemy forces available to COSVN at the end of 1966 to nine division headquarters with personnel strength totaling 280,600. Military Region 5 was designated 

by the DRV and included the provinces south of the DMZ to Khanh Hoa and 

Darlac. See Ronald B. Frankum, Jr. Historical Dictionary of Vietnam (New 

York: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 291.

32. Joseph McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1974), 56.

33. Major G.S. Lorenz, et al., “Operation Junction City Vietnam Battle 

Book,” Combat Studies Institute, 1983, 16.

34. Lorenz, 19–20.

35. COSVN was later referred to as the “Bamboo Pentagon” and was one 

of the factors that led President Richard Nixon to authorize the invasion of 

Cambodia. Some US military leaders were convinced that if COSVN HQ were 

destroyed, it would crush the North Vietnamese (NVN) efforts in the south, 

accessed 20 May 2018, https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-myth-of-thebamboo-pentagon-the-fabled-viet-cong-headquarters-that-pushed-america-intocambodia. See also Lorenz, “Operation Junction City Vietnam Battle Book,” 

19–20.

36. Lorenz, “Operation Junction City Vietnam Battle Book,” 16.

37. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 135.

38. Rogers, 109.

39. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965–1967, 55.

40. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 151.

41. Rogers, 151.

42. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 282.

43. Evaluation of US Army Combat Operations in Vietnam (ARCOV), 

Volume 5, Annex, D-3-8.

44. Michael G. Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th Psyop Group in Vietnam” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
105

Information Center, 2007), 1.

45. Terry F. Greene, “US Army Psychological Operations into the Year 

2000,” DTIC Document, 1993, 5. 

46. 7th Psychological Operations Group. “Report on Psychological Operations Intelligence in Vietnam,” Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations 

Group, Target Analysis Section, 15th PSYOP Det (STRAT), 7th PSYOP Group, 

17 November 1967, 10.

47. 7th Psychological Operations Group, “Report on Psychological Operations Intelligence in Vietnam,” 1.

48. 6th PSYOP Battalion had two psychological operations interrogators 

who were supposed to have access to the interrogation facilities (according to 

DA PAM 33-1) but did not have official access to MACV J2 interrogation facilities. 7th Psychological Operations Group, “Report on Psychological Operations 

Intelligence in Vietnam,” 2, 10.

49. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War 

(New York: Presidio Press, 2009), 91.
106
107

Chapter 7

Gulf War—Infowar

Dorothy E. Denning

with Introduction and Notes by Robert M. Hill

2018 Introduction

In 1990 and 1991, the United States fought the Gulf War, a large-scale 

combat operation that pitted US and coalition forces against Iraq in order 

to liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s annexation. Although the airland conflict 

(Desert Storm) was brief and, in hindsight, only moderately intense, the 

Gulf War was large-scale in that nearly 300,000 US Soldiers participated 

in the war, out of a total US force of more than one million—more than 

participated in either Korea or Vietnam at their peaks. Another feature of 

large-scale combat operations present during the Gulf War was the robust 

presence of echelons above brigade. The US contingent alone consisted of 

two Army corps, one Marine Expeditionary Force, seven Army divisions, 

and two Marine divisions. 

The Gulf War was the first large-scale combat operation of the digital 

era, opening new possibilities to influence, deceive, manipulate, and shape 

not only the decision making of the enemy but of all relevant actors and 

audiences with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. Even if information warfare has existed since humankind’s first conflict—largely in 

the form of deception—the revolution in new technologies from the 1960s 

on so dramatically changed the means and methods by which information 

could be used to “wage war” that it has taken almost three decades for the 

US military to fully embrace informational power as co-equal to physical 

power in the conduct of operations. The bottom line is that operations in 

any physical environment simultaneously occur in the information environment, the effects of which are less directly controlled but, as a result, 

must be carefully and deliberately planned. 

In her seminal book, Information Warfare and Security, Dr. Dorothy 

Denning, currently Emeritus Distinguished Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, provides an introduction to information warfare just as 

the Dotcom bubble and other technological advancements were impacting 

every facet of business, politics, social interaction, education, as well as 

the nature of warfare.*

 In the first chapter, excerpted here, Denning explored the role information warfare played in the Gulf War, the history and 

nature of information warfare more broadly, and—from her 1998-vantage 

point—the trends she envisioned would play out in future years in terms of 
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both technology and information warfare. Reading her work today, we see 

just how prescient she was. 

For clarity’s sake, Denning’s use of information warfare is specific 

to her book and not intended to replace the currently approved doctrinal term information operations. As I am writing this introduction, there 

remains much discussion about the best term to define and describe operations, activities, and actions US forces undertake in the information 

environment to affect threat decision making, as well as influence a range 

of other audiences affected by military operations. Consensus seems to 

be emerging around the term operations in the information environment 

(OIE), cognizant of the fact that it is more encompassing of all that occurs 

in the information environment beyond simply a win-lose calculus against 

the threat or purely what IO forces and professionals do. For the purposes 

of this article, information warfare (IW) and information operations (IO) 

will be used interchangeably: IW is retained in Denning’s text, while IO 

is used in my italicized 2018 notes, except in those select instances where 

IW aptly applies. 

Before diving into Denning’s first chapter, there are a few truisms 

about IO in large-scale combat operations to keep in mind that are summarized here and reflected in the notes that accompany Denning’s text:

• Information is an element of combat power. In 2017, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved adding information as a joint function. The Army is presently considering whether to add information as a 

seventh warfighting function. Whether it is added or not, information is 

already an element of combat power but one often undervalued and underemployed. Perhaps initially, information was simply viewed as shared 

understanding. Shared understanding is critical to success but as an element of combat power, information is far more expansive and potent. Units 

and commanders who fail to integrate informational power with physical 

power will fail at consolidating gains achieved during large-scale combat 

operations, if not the combat operations themselves.

• Information is ubiquitous and IO always active. Tanks, maneuver 

forces, and artillery do not continuously move, shoot, or otherwise create 

effects in the operational environment; they do so only when an enemy is 

declared and authorization granted. IO, however, is always “on” or active; it does not rest or sleep. 
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• Information is integral to all operations but IO varies by the capabilities available to execute it. Because IO is always active, it supports 

any form or type of operation, across all levels and phases and the conflict 

continuum. IO execution, however, is not static or applied in boilerplate 

fashion. It is continually modulated to support other lines of operation or 

effort (or become itself the main operation or effort), optimizing available 

capabilities to create effects in the information environment necessary to 

seize, exploit, and retain the initiative therein.

• There are limitations to IO that necessitate proactive and long 

lead time planning, speed, precision, creativity, and a strong defensive 

posture. The United States will face enemies and adversaries that employ 

IO unconstrained by of the types of laws, policies, regulations, and ethical 

mores that govern its use by US forces. This merely means US forces must 

be far more proactive, innovate, nimble, and faster at applying lessons 

learned in the planning and execution of IO. They must also place extra 

emphasis on information protection to ensure unfettered decision making.

• Every Soldier is an information warrior. One of the limitations of 

the terms IW and IO is that they tend to denote a function performed 

by specialized experts. The sooner the Army trains every Soldier to be an 

information warrior the better. This begins with the simple realization that 

everything we do sends a message and we have a responsibility to align 

what we say with what we do so that our message is consistent with and 

reinforces the commander’s intent, as well as higher headquarters’ themes 

and narrative. This mindset extends to the fact that every Soldier is a sensor who must be able to report on indicators that show progress toward 

accomplishment of IO objectives. These basic skills are equally applicable 

to large-scale combat operations as they are to advise and assist or to 

counterinsurgency missions.

The italicized notes that accompany Dr. Denning’s text seek to complement, expand, and update her observations and conclusions with current 

and emerging Army thinking about operations in the information environment. Readers might opt initially to skip over the notes and read Denning’s 

original text in its entirety. Doing so will provide a more contemporaneous 

account of the Gulf War from a pre-counterinsurgency (COIN) operations 

vantage point. They can then return to factor in the notes. The 2018 notes 

are in italics throughout this chapter. 
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Gulf War—Infowar

To illustrate the scope and diversity of information warfare even 

within a single area of conflict, this chapter begins with a brief account 

of information warfare incidents relating to the Persian Gulf War. It then 

summarizes a theory of information warfare and trends arising from 

new technologies.

The story starts with five hackers from the Netherlands who, between 

April 1990 and May 1991, penetrated computer systems at 34 American 

military sites on the Internet, including sites that were directly supporting 

Operation Desert Storm/Shield. They browsed through files and electronic 

mail, searching for keywords such as nuclear, weapons, missile, Desert 

Shield, and Desert Storm. They obtained information about the exact locations of US troops, the types of weapons they had, the capabilities of 

the Patriot missile, and the movement of American warships in the Gulf 

region. When they were done, they removed traces of their activity from 

system logs to conceal their hacking spree.1

 

Large-scale combat operations do not simply pit one nation or actor 

against another; they involve multiple entities—state, nonstate, criminal, 

and terrorist—each vying to ensure their vested interests predominate, are 

advanced or, at the very least, are protected and preserved.

According to Jim Christy, program manager of computer crime investigations and information warfare at the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations, the targets included military supply systems. “They didn’t, 

but they could have, instead of sending bullets to the Gulf, they could 

have sent toothbrushes,” he said.2

 Eugene Schultz, then manager of the 

Department of Energy’s Computer Incident Advisory Capability, said that 

the hackers had so much information that they filled up the disks on the 

machines they used to launch the attacks. They also filled several floppy 

disks. When they ran out of places to store their loot, they broke into computers at Bowling Green University and the University of Chicago and 

downloaded the information, figuring they could transfer it somewhere 

else later.3

 By some accounts, the Dutch hackers tried to sell their pilfered 

information to Iraq during the Gulf conflict. Schultz said he told the British Broadcasting Corporation that he had been informed through government officials that Saddam Hussein had been offered the data through an 

intermediary working on behalf of the hackers. Schultz also reported that 

Baghdad, fearing a trap, declined the offer.4

As the example of the Dutch hackers reveals, the United States may 

have to “fight” an array of third-party entities—whose objective is merely 
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to prove their moxie, make money or mischief, or have fun—simultaneously 

with a declared enemy. IO must be planned and executed—across the whole 

of government—to consider all relevant threats, actors, and audiences.

Even though the hackers were identified, the United States was powerless to do anything about it, Schultz said. At the time, computer break-ins 

were not illegal in the Netherlands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

almost lured the lead attacker to the United States under the guise of an 

interview with a major aerospace firm in Florida, but the hacker inadvertently was tipped off. Two of the five eventually ended up in jail, but not 

for the US military intrusions. They were convicted of credit card fraud.5

Meanwhile, Baghdad had access to inside spies. In May 1991, Juergen 

Mohhammed Gietler, a 42-year-old archivist for the German Foreign Ministry, was sentenced to five years in prison for passing Western military 

and political intelligence to Saddam Hussein on the eve of the Gulf War. 

Threat espionage and many forms of sabotage are elements of IW as 

these acts seek to gain an information advantage over the United States. 

We must assume that anything and everything about us (i.e., the United 

States and its partners) can and will be used against us. Not only will the 

truth be weaponized against us but also the untruth.

Gietler gave Iraqi agents in Bonn hundreds of documents before his 

arrest, including letters between President George Bush and Chancellor Helmut Kohl about US military plans to move troops and weapons 

through Germany, reports describing what Western intelligence agencies 

knew about foreign companies helping Iraq build weapons of mass destruction, confidential estimates on Iraq from the US State Department 

and from NATO, German intelligence reports on Iraq’s missiles and maps 

showing where they were located and likely targets in Israel, French satellite images showing Israeli missile sites, and a list of how many US 

stealth bombers were being deployed to the Gulf region. In reaching its 

guilty verdict, the Dusseldorf court ruled that the meaningful military intelligence brought Iraq “considerable advantages.”6

 After serving his fiveyear sentence, Gietler said on a CBS 60 Minutes segment that providing 

allied secrets to Iraq was “permanent fun, five days a week.” He said he 

was paid for his spying but that money was not his motive. “I was on the 

Iraqi side,” he told the news magazine. “I felt it was my duty.” He said that 

after meeting Iraq’s military attaché, General Osmat Joudi Mohammad, by 

chance at a restaurant, he volunteered to supply the information. Gietler 

was arrested after German counterintelligence agents intercepted a phone 

call by Osmat.7

 
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The United States and its allies had their own sources of intelligence, 

including satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Iraqi defectors. In 1990, US spy satellites saw Iraqi forces massing on the Kuwaiti 

border, although an invasion was discounted after Arab allies said Saddam 

Hussein was bluffing.8

 Also before the war broke out, satellite imaging 

systems mapped potential target areas. The maps were put on board Tomahawk cruise missiles during the war and compared with images taken by 

the missiles’ own radar.9

 The Global Positioning System (GPS), a 24-satellite constellation that emits signals used for determining location, helped 

coalition land forces navigate the desert terrain. GPS was used by aircraft 

to map minefields accurately and by US warships to obtain correct launch 

positions for missiles.10 UAVs orbited the battlefield, using video and infrared imagery to provide real-time tactical information on the movements 

of Iraqi troops and bomb damage assessment. These drone aircraft logged 

a total of 530 missions and 1,700 hours of flight time. Iraqi troops even 

surrendered to one.11

Gaining and maintaining contact with the adversary is necessary to 

reveal the adversary’s areas of influence and dispositions; therefore, intelligence support to IO is essential to exposing the adversary’s intent in the 

information environment. Technology increasingly offers a more diverse 

array of intelligence-gathering platforms, but more information does not 

necessarily mean better intelligence, particularly when it comes to discerning the threat’s “mind” and modes of decision making.

Equally important, coalition forces neutralized or destroyed key Iraqi 

information systems with electronic and physical weapons. During the 

first moments of Operation Desert Storm, clouds of antiradiation weapons 

fired from helicopters and aircraft disabled the Iraqi air defense network. 

Ribbons of carbon fibers, dispensed from Tomahawk missiles over Iraqi 

electrical power switching systems, caused short circuits, temporary disruptions, and massive shutdowns in power systems.12 An Air Force F-117 

Stealth fighter directed a precision-guided bomb straight down the air-conditioning shaft of the Iraqi telephone system in downtown Bagdad, taking out the entire underground coaxial cable system, which tied the Iraqi 

high command to their subordinate elements. This eliminated the primary method of communications between the command center in Bagdad 

and subordinates in the field.13 Once the command and control centers 

were out of action, the coalition went after Iraq’s radar systems, taking 

away their ability to “see” the battlespace.14 Blind and deaf, Iraq had little 

chance of victory.
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IO is lethal and nonlethal but never strictly offensive or defensive; it 

modulates among attack, defend, and stabilize weighted efforts in support 

of lines of operation or lines of effort. In other words, IO’s focus is not so 

much the type of operation but the type of effects that need to be generated in and through the information environment to support the large-scale 

operation being undertaken.

According to one tale, the allies further disabled Iraqi military computer systems with a computer virus, shipped to Iraq in printers. The story, 

which aired January 10, 1992 on ABC’s Nightline following publication 

in US News & World Report, said the US government targeted the virus 

at Iraqi’s air defense. A few weeks before Operation Desert Storm, a virus-laden computer chip allegedly was installed in a dot matrix printer 

that was assembled in France and shipped to Iraq via Amman, Jordan. The 

virus was said to have been developed by the National Security Agency 

(NSA) and installed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It apparently disabled Windows and mainframe computers. The operation was 

said to have worked. 

Cyberspace is a domain that is fully a part of the information environment. To achieve synergy, IO and cyberspace electromagnetic activities 

(CEMA) are closely coordinated. As Gantz’s story reveals, most cyberspace effects are planned and executed at the operational and strategic 

levels, but tactical units can request cyberspace operations and electronic 

warfare support, through channels, using standard message formats (see 

FM 6-99).

The story originated from John Gantz’s weekly Infoworld column on 

1 April 1991. Gantz had reported that the NSA had written a computer virus dubbed “AF/91” that would “attack the software in printer and display 

controllers.” The column went on to say that “By January 8, 1991, Allies 

had confirmation that half the displays and printers . . . were out of commission.” It concluded with: “And now for the final secret. The meaning of 

the AF/91 designation: 91 is the Julian date for April Fool’s Day.” As Winn 

Schwartau observed, AF/91 also denotes April Fool’s, 1991. According 

to a letter from Gantz to Schwartau, Infoworld Japan picked up the story 

and translated it to Japanese, in the process losing the meaning of “April 

Fool’s.” US News had gotten the article from their Tokyo Bureau, which 

in turn had gotten it from the Infoworld Japan piece.15 What began as a 

practical joke had become national news. It was a hoax.

During the Gulf War, both sides exploited television to their advantage to influence perceptions and public opinion. Shortly after invading 
114

Kuwait, Saddam’s “EliteRepublicanGuards” (spoken as one word by TV 

journalists) faked a retreat in front of the cameras of global television. In 

fact, Iraq was reinforcing its grip on the country. 

Reports from CNN’s Peter Arnett in Bagdad were skewed by the limited amount of satellite time he had available to coordinate his reportage, as 

well as the best efforts of his Iraqi minders, who were bent on using CNN 

as an instrument of propaganda. Even prior to his arrival, the Iraqi censors 

scored big when CNN aired, live as received, Iraqi-provided video. Saddam’s propagandists also gained direct access to the friendly Jordanian television system, causing anti-US and anti-Alliance riots in Jordan.16 Some 

Iraqi propaganda backfired. When Saddam boasted that Iraq would win 

because they were prepared to sacrifice thousands of soldiers whereas the 

Americans could not stand the loss of even hundreds, his troops realized 

he was talking about sacrificing them. This was said to have contributed to 

their willingness to defect and surrender.17

Deception is fundamental to large-scale combat operations. It’s not a 

skill reserved only for the IO or military deception officer or designated 

representative. MILDEC is a competency that every unit and individual 

must possess, to varying degrees.

US forces staged several amphibious exercises along the Saudi coast 

in front of CNN crews in order to trick Saddam into believing that the 

coalition planned an amphibious assault to flank Iraqi forces along the 

Kuwaiti border. The deception paid off, as several Iraqi divisions were tied 

down defending the coast from an allied Gulf landing.18

As the example of the amphibious exercises demonstrates, the most 

effective deceptions are rooted in truth.

One news story depicted Iraqi soldiers yanking Kuwaiti babies out of 

incubators. The story apparently was hyped by an American public relations 

firm hired by a Kuwaiti government-backed organization. The only eyewitness to the horror was the 15-year-old daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador 

to the United States. After investigating, ABC’s 20/20 reporter John Martin 

found little proof that the story was anything more than propaganda. At the 

time, however, the story had a major impact on policy makers in the United 

States. President Bush is said to have mentioned the “incubator atrocities” 

eight times in 44 days, and seven senators brought it up during debate over 

the war. The war resolution passed by only five votes.19

The amount of “fake news” on all sides is increasing at an exponential 

rate. Its intentional use by US forces—particularly if its aim is to influence 
115

audiences other than the enemy or an adversary—is problematic and runs 

the risk of being illegal, immoral, or both.

During the war, the allies dropped 29 million leaflets behind Iraqi 

lines. The leaflets, which came in 14 varieties, reached approximately 98 

percent of the 300,000 troops. They were tested on cooperative prisoners 

of war, whose recommendations included removing any trace of the color 

red (a danger signal to Iraqis), showing allied soldiers with beards (convey 

trust and brotherhood in Iraqi culture), and add bananas (a great delicacy) 

to a bowl of fruit shown being offered to surrendering Iraqis. The Voice of 

the Gulf was broadcast over six clandestine radio stations, including both 

air and ground stations. During its period of operation in early 1991, a total 

of 189 psyop (psychological operations) messages were aired. Additional 

messages were broadcast from loudspeakers in manpacks, vehicles, and 

helicopters during ground campaigns.20 

Military information support operations (MISO) provide a wide array 

of means to reach the enemy or adversary, such as printed products, radio, 

and loudspeakers. MISO programs must be approved through channels, 

typically requiring a long lead time to plan properly.

The leaflets and broadcasts conveyed the inevitability of Iraq’s defeat. 

Over 40 percent of the leaflets were appeals for surrender; seven percent 

urged Iraqi troops to abandon their weapons and flee. The messages, which 

were part of the campaign in psyop and perception management, attempted to reassure Iraqi soldiers that they would be treated well in allied hands. 

They blamed an “evil” Saddam for the war, depicting the solders as brave 

men who had been led astray. The messages stressed Arab brotherhood 

and peace or warned that Iraqi commanders would be held accountable for 

war crimes against Kuwaiti people and property. To deter use of chemical 

weapons, messages warned that Iraqi soldiers were ill equipped with protective gear and that commanders would be punished.21

MISO products (and the scheme of IO more broadly) require an acute 

understanding of the full range of target audiences in the area of operations, including the enemy. PSYOP forces bring the ability to conduct 

target audience analysis, which is essential to crafting the right messages 

and ensuring their delivery at the right time and place in order to achieve 

psychological objectives in support of the commander’s intent.

According to the American Red Cross, nearly 87,000 Iraqi soldiers 

turned themselves over to coalition forces, most of them clutching the 

leaflets or hiding them in their clothing.22 A postwar survey of 250 prisoners of war found that 98 percent had seen the leaflets, 58 percent heard 
116

radio broadcasts, and 34 percent heard loudspeaker broadcasts. The soldiers found the messages credible, with 88 percent saying they believed 

the leaflets, 46 percent the radio broadcasts, and 18 percent the loudspeaker broadcasts. The POWs also reported that their decisions to surrender 

or defect were influenced by the messages, with 70 percent saying they 

were influenced by leaflets, 34 percent by radio broadcasts, and 16 percent 

by loudspeaker broadcasts.23 A captured general said that “Second to the 

allied bombing campaign, PSYOP leaflets were the highest threat to the 

morale of the troops.”24

The Red Cross statistics cited here also demonstrate the necessity of 

conveying messages via multiple platforms. Repeated messages from multiple sources are more likely to “stick.”

Iraq’s own program in psyop was much less successful, failing in part 

because they did not understand American culture. For example, they used 

a woman, “Baghdad Betty,” to make broadcasts aimed at disillusioning 

American soldiers. She lost credibility early on, however, when she told 

the soldiers that their wives and girlfriends back home would be sleeping with Tom Cruise, Tom Selleck, and Bart Simpson. It was ridiculous 

enough suggesting that the women would be seduced by movie stars, but 

a cartoon character?25

At the end of the war, Soviet General S. Bogdanov, chief of the General Staff Center for Operational and Strategic Studies, said: “Iraq lost 

the war before it even began. This was a war of intelligence, electronic 

warfare, command and control and counter intelligence. Iraqi troops were 

blinded and deafened. . . . Modern war can be won by informatika and that 

is now vital.”26 Psyop and perception management also played an important role, not only with Iraqi soldiers but also with the public. When Kuwait 

City was liberated, images on television showed hundreds of Kuwaitis 

waving American flags as liberating forces entered the city, demonstrating their support for American efforts. A public relations firm had earlier 

arranged the mass distribution of the handheld American flags, as well as 

lapel pins.27

As the quote from General Bogdanov makes clear, adversary military 

commanders consider IW not simply as another element of their combat 

power but one that is decisive. In 2017, the US Department of Defense 

designated Information as a joint function in recognition of its parity with 

other functions in achieving military and national objectives.

After the Gulf War, the United States, through the CIA, reportedly 

continued to use perception management in an attempt to overthrow Sadd-
117

am Hussein. The operation, eventually broken apart by the Iraqi president, 

used radio broadcasts and other media for spreading messages. In a 1997 

interview, Warren Marik, retired CIA agent, said a Washington-based public relations firm produced radio scripts and videotapes denouncing the 

regime. The scripts, which called on Iraqi army officers to defect, were 

broadcast on two large radio transmitters the CIA established and managed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; and Kuwait. Additional stations sprang up 

in Cairo and Amman. Marik also reported that unmanned aircraft dropped 

leaflets over Baghdad ridiculing the Iraqi dictator on his birthday.

28

IO and the various capabilities it synchronizes are involved in perception management; that is, they seek to affect the way that various audiences 

perceive or construct their reality so it is favorable to US and allied objectives. As this article suggests, the term perception management is typically 

applied to non-military efforts that must be part of a whole-of-government 

approach to operations in the information environment.

The challenge with perception management that confronts the United 

States and many of its allies is the rules by which it is employed. Enemies 

and adversaries are quite willing to do whatever is necessary to get the 

United States and its Unified Action Partners to believe what they want 

us to believe, with little or no concern for the truth. Legally and morally, 

US forces must be able to articulate clearly—and then enforce—the allowable limits of shaping, shading, or disregarding the truth in pursuit of 

military objectives.

Iraq has continued its intelligence activities. In November 1997, US 

military and intelligence officials reported that Iraqi intelligence agents 

successfully spied on United Nations weapons inspectors in 1996 and 

1997. The methods used included eavesdropping, wiretapping, and placing spies in the U.N. camp. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said in a 

television interview that “the Iraqis have always watched every move the 

inspectors have tried to make. They anticipate where they’re going. They 

may have, in fact, penetrated their inspection team.” Officials said the team 

might even be under surveillance at U.N. headquarters in New York.29

Iraq’s agency for electronic eavesdropping, known as Project 859, 

is staffed by almost 1,000 technicians and analysts who monitor satellite 

telephone calls and other telecommunications from six listening posts in 

the country. International calls are picked up at a switching post in Al 

Rashedia, where Project 859 headquarters are located. There, messages 

are taped and analyzed by Iraqi intelligence officers. The agency may have 

the ability to decode some scrambled calls.30
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The nation’s largest intelligence agency is the Iraqi Intelligence Service, which is responsible for spying overseas. It is believed to have members working abroad under diplomatic cover. The two agencies report to 

the Special Security Organization, which collects information about all 

threats, domestic and foreign, to Saddam.31 On 19 October 1997, Israel’s 

general security service, Shabak, arrested two people suspected of spying for Iraqi military intelligence. One of the persons, 37-year-old Yukhar 

Faran, had emigrated to Israel with false papers identifying him as the son 

of a Jewish family that remained in Iraq. The second person, 30-year-old 

Joseph Hirsch, also held Israeli citizenship. Both operated out of the port 

of Ashdod.32

American “eyes and ears” watch over Iraq to ensure Iraqi compliance with agreements on weapons inspections. The airborne surveillance 

system has three layers: Keyhole KH11 photographic reconnaissance satellites orbiting at an altitude of about 660 miles, US Air Force U2R spy 

planes operating from up to 90,000 feet, and US Navy ES3A “Shadow” 

Viking aircraft, which can pick up military radio signals from 34,000 feet.33

In June 1998, Richard Butler, the Australian diplomat who heads the U.N. 

Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, showed photographs suggesting that Iraq had 

buried some missile parts and then dug them up again after inspections. 

The photos, which were backed up by satellite images, were presented as 

evidence that Iraq was still hiding illegal weapons.34

Iraq allegedly used deception to cover up its weapons programs. 

During the three-week interruption of U.N. searches for hidden weapons 

in late 1997, Iraq apparently moved equipment that could be used to produce forbidden missiles out of range of U.N. surveillance cameras. Butler 

said the equipment included “gyroscope rotor balancing equipment which 

could be used to balance prohibited missile gyroscopes.” He also said that 

it appeared the Iraqis had tampered with U.N. cameras, covered lenses, 

and turned off lighting in facilities under monitoring.35 Information underpinning the entire Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare program was said to be stored on computer hard drives and disks that were 

constantly moved from one location to another in an effort to frustrate the 

U.N. team.36

Iraq has also continued its use of psyop and perception management. 

When U.N. inspectors resumed their business after the crisis that had 

barred Americans from the inspection team, thousands of Iraqis shouted 

“Down with America” as they took part in a mass funeral for dozens of 
119

children. Iraq blamed the deaths on U.N. sanctions, claiming the children 

had died from lack of food and medicine.37

Perception management can be viewed as the means by which the 

Information instrument of national power is exercised. It is also increasingly becoming the chief instrument by which state, non-state, terrorist, 

and criminal actors achieve their aims. Of the four instruments (DIME: 

diplomatic, information, military, economic), information is the one that 

is in continual use. Therefore, it must be planned and executed continually across the cooperation-competition-conflict continuum. There is no 

pause or break in action with information. Like Iraq during the post-Desert Storm period, adversaries will not hesitate to do everything they can to 

shape our perceptions favorable to their ends. US forces must do likewise, 

both to counter threat narratives and promote their own such that they 

decrease the need for large-scale combat operations and enhance their 

success should they become necessary. 

Later, Iraq accused the United States of planning air strikes to plant 

fake chemical or germ warfare evidence at “presidential sites” declared 

out of bounds to U.N. inspectors.38 Butler and others, for their part, voiced 

suspicions that these mammoth complexes, some of which stretched for 

several miles, were being used to hide weapons of mass destruction from 

the inspectors. The Clinton administration estimated there were 78 of 

these presidential sites.39 One covered 31.5 square miles and contained 

1,058 buildings.40

When the crisis over U.N. inspections and the threat of an American 

air strike ended in early 1998, Iraq portrayed Saddam as the winner. Television broadcasts showed a beaming Saddam waving an old rifle as he 

visited village after village. Adoring crowds were dancing, singing, and 

clapping as Saddam waved from a balcony.41

Information Warfare

The brief history of the Gulf conflict presented here illustrates several types of information warfare operations—computer intrusions, human 

spies, spy satellites, eavesdropping, surveillance cameras, electronic warfare, physical destruction of communications facilities, falsification of papers, perception management, psychological operations, and computer virus hoaxes. There are others—theft of trade secrets, privacy invasions, and 

e-mail forgeries, to name a few. Depending on the circumstances, some 

acts are crimes. Others are unethical even if legal. Still others are considered acceptable practices, of governments if not other parties. Some operations are affiliated with military conflicts. Others are situated in broader 
120

conflicts at an individual, organizational, or societal level. What they have 

in common is that they all target or exploit information resources to the 

advantage of the perpetrator and disadvantage of another. 

Information has always been a component of warfare but its impact 

has become more acute given technological advancements and the pervasiveness and instantaneousness of information across all aspects of life. 

Although Army doctrine has addressed information as a component of operations for decades, it wasn’t until the mid-1990s that it achieved parity 

with other elements of combat power and warranted its own field manual. 

In the intervening 25 years, IO has gone through three name changes (information environment, inform and influence activities and back to information operations). As of the publication of this desk reference, it is uncertain whether IO will again be rebranded as information warfare (IW), 

operations in the information environment (OIE), or another term yet to 

be decided. The bottom line is this: as an element of combat power, information has often been misunderstood, under-valued, and under-utilized. 

Whatever term is applied, commanders and units must be adept at optimizing this element of combat power in concert with all other elements. 

In the preface to Winn Schwartau’s book Information Warfare, John 

Alger, then dean of the School of Information Warfare and Strategy at National Defense University, wrote, “Information warfare consists of those 

actions intended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information 

or information resources in order to achieve a significant advantage, objective, or victory over an adversary.”42 A December 1996 directive from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense defines information warfare as “Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve 

or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries,” 

where information operations are “Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information 

and information systems.”43

This book [Denning’s Information and Security] attempts to take these 

definitions deeper, to provide a theory of information warfare based on the 

value of information resources to an offense and defense. An offensive operation aims to increase the value of a target resource to the offense while 

decreasing its value to the defense. A defensive operation seeks to counter 

the potential loss of value. Information warfare is a “win-lose” activity. 

It is about “warfare” in the most general sense of conflict, encompassing 

certain types of crime as well as military operations.
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The value gained by the offense can have a monetary component, as 

when intellectual property is stolen and sold, but this is not always the 

case. In destroying and disrupting Iraqi command and control and radar 

systems during the Gulf War, the United States and its allies gained a military advantage over Iraq. Disabled, the systems became virtually useless 

to Iraq but of great strategic value to the allies, who took advantage of 

Saddam’s blindness and inability to communicate with his troops. It would 

be impossible to assign a dollar value to these systems, before or after 

the attack, to either side. Similarly, it would be difficult to assign a dollar 

value to the advantage gained by Saddam in censoring the broadcasts of 

his adversaries.

As currently defined, IO is about affecting enemy or adversary decision making while protecting our own. Decision making cannot occur 

without information or, using Denning’s lexicon, without information resources, whether these resources are physical (cell tower, computer hardware), informational (algorithms, software, data processing), or human/

cognitive (perception, biases, sense making). 

The value of an information resource to a player is a function of six 

factors. First is whether the resource is relevant to the concerns and commitments of the player. Second is the capabilities of the player. The player 

must have the knowledge, skills, and tools to use the resource effectively. 

Third is the availability of the resource to the player, and fourth is its 

availability to other players. Often, a resource has the most value to a particular player when it is readily available to that player but not to others. 

When Gietler sold Western intelligence documents to Iraq, for example, 

their value to the allies was diminished. Iraq, on the other hand, gained 

from the acquisition. Fifth is the integrity of the resource, which includes 

completeness, correctness, authenticity, and overall quality or goodness. 

In general, the greater the integrity, the more reliable and hence valuable 

a resource to particular player—unless it is the player who intentionally 

corrupts the resource. Then lack of integrity can be used to advantage. 

This happened when the allies staged the amphibious exercises in front of 

CNN cameras, compromising the integrity of Iraq’s source of news and 

giving the allies an advantage in their ground-based attacks. The sixth and 

final factor is time. The value of an information resource can increase or 

decrease with time.

Offensive information warfare operations produce a win-lose outcome 

by altering the availability and integrity of information resources to the 

benefit of the offense and to the detriment of the defense. In so doing, they 
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may also alter the concerns, commitments, and capabilities of the defense, 

but the immediate effect is a change of availability or integrity. There are 

three general outcomes. First, the offense acquires greater access to the 

information resource; that is, the availability of the information resource 

to the offense is increased. This was illustrated by the Iraqi acquisition of 

intelligence documents from the German spy and the allied acquisition of 

information about the battlespace from spy satellites. Second, the defense 

loses all or partial access to the resource; that is, the resource becomes less 

available to the defense. This was illustrated by the attacks that sabotaged 

Iraq’s command and control and radar systems and by Saddam’s censoring 

of broadcast media. Third, the integrity of the resource is diminished. This 

was illustrated by the TV broadcasts that aired misleading or distorted stories such as the amphibious exercises. Many operations produce multiple 

effects. Acts of sabotage, such as those against Iraq’s command and control systems, both deny access and damage integrity. Computer intrusions 

give the hacker greater access to computer systems while diminishing the 

integrity of the systems, especially if files are altered. Some operations 

begin with an acquisition phase, then move on to sabotage, or use a combination of both throughout.

Offensive information warfare is a win-lose activity. It is usually conducted without the consent of the defense and often without their knowledge. Even when the defense apparently agrees to participate, it is without 

fully understanding the motives of the offense and the consequences to 

themselves. The insider who reveals a password to a hacker on the other 

end of a phone call who says it is needed to fix a problem does not know 

the hacker’s true intent.

Denning uses “win-lose” to refer to the intended result of a single 

operation, not a whole campaign or sustained effort. It is adversarial as 

opposed to “win-win”. To win, one side or the other must gain a window 

of advantage in the information environment and hold the advantage long 

enough that the other side makes a fatally-flawed decision or believes it 

cannot prevail.

As the Gulf War example illustrates, information warfare involves 

more than destructive acts. Many acts of acquisition, such as covert intelligence operations, aim to leave originals intact. The objective is to get the 

information without being detected. Media manipulation and censorship 

are also nondestructive acts, aimed at influencing perceptions and beliefs.

IO involves risk. When units employ it against the threat, they must 

be cognizant of second and third order effects—of both intended and un-
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intended consequences. They must also recognize that destroying threat 

information resources might achieve a temporary, tactical advantage that 

is offset by a longer-term disadvantage. Defensively, it is impossible to 

achieve an impenetrable shield against enemy IW efforts. There will always be gaps or vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Commanders must 

weigh the costs of achieving ever-higher levels of security with the benefits, which may offer diminishing returns.

Defensive information warfare seeks to protect information resources from attack. The goal is to preserve the value of the resources or, in 

the event of a successful attack, recover lost value. Defenses fall in six 

general areas: prevention, deterrence, indications and warnings, detection, 

emergency preparedness, and response, although specific operations and 

technologies may fall in more than one area.

In IO’s definition, the phrase “while protecting our own” is almost 

an after-thought. It is anything but secondary. Given the legal and moral limitations and/or prohibitions placed on US forces that delimit offensive—or attack-weighted IO efforts, protecting friendly information may 

be the primary means by which US and allied forces gain advantage in the 

information environment.

Defensive information warfare is closely related to information security. They are not, however, identical. Information security is concerned 

mainly with owned resources and with protecting against errors, accidents, and natural disasters as well as intentional acts. Defensive information warfare addresses non-owned resources, including broadcast and 

print media in the public domain, but is not concerned with unintentional 

acts. The term “information assurance” is often used to encompass both 

information security and defensive information warfare. 

Information warfare involves much more than computers and computer networks. It encompasses information in any form and transmitted over 

any media, from people and their physical environments to print to the 

telephone to radio and TV to computers and computer networks. It covers 

operations against information content and operations against supporting 

systems, including hardware and software and human practices.

Offensive information warfare operations succeed by exploiting vulnerabilities in information resources. These vulnerabilities can arise in 

hardware and software components and in human practices. They can be 

introduced at the time products are developed, delivered, installed, configured, used, modified, and maintained. Implementing airtight defenses is 

extremely difficult, and security holes are discovered in areas where they 
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were not expected. Although many information resources can be reasonably hardened against all but the most sophisticated outsider attacks, 100 

percent security is neither possible nor worth the price. Computer systems 

are tremendously complex, containing millions of lines of code. No single 

person can comprehend that much code well enough to confirm that it is 

free of security holes or hidden trapdoors. Moreover, systems and environments change, and even the most thoroughly studied and highly protected 

resources are generally vulnerable to threats from insiders with access. 

The goal is risk management, not risk avoidance at all cost.

Vulnerabilities in themselves do not constitute a threat to information resources. Nor does the existence of methodologies to exploit those 

vulnerabilities. A threat arises only when there is an actor with the intent, 

capability, and opportunity to carry out an attack. Defensive information 

warfare aims primarily to protect against credible threats, especially those 

that have some reasonable chance of occurring and could lead to substantial losses. A goal of this book is to make some assessment of what those 

threats and losses are today and what they are likely to become in the 

future. Toward that end, emphasis is on actual incidents that have taken 

place and on observable trends. 

From Chicks to Chips

This section is substantially edited for length. See Denning’s book for 

the complete version.

Information warfare is not new. It is not a “third-wave” phenomenon 

nor a by-product of the computer revolution. Indeed, it is not even unique 

to the human species. Take the cuckoo bird. This information warrior has 

duped as many as 180 different species into foster parenthood by laying 

its eggs in the nests of other birds. To avoid detection, it adjusts the egg’s 

morphology to that of the host. Through its behavior, it destroys the integrity of the information environment of its host. The visual appearance of 

an egg is no longer a reliable source of information.44 As another example, 

the raven makes phony submissive gestures to hated rivals in order to entice them to come close. When they do, it makes an abusive attack. Again, 

it has compromised the integrity of its adversary’s information environment.45 Plants and animals also employ methods of defensive information 

warfare to guard information that is crucial to their survival. For example, 

they may be countershaded or have special coloration in order to make 

them inconspicuous to species that are higher up on the food chain.

Denning uses an apt phrase when discussing the raven’s use of IO/

IW: compromising the integrity of the adversary’s information environ-
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ment. Put another way, the information environment is everything in our 

surroundings that enables us to make sense of things, formulate thoughts, 

make decisions, and take action. IO is about affecting the information environment so that it confounds the enemy’s ability to do these things while 

preserving our own ability to make swift, accurate, and fully informed 

decisions. Although IO tends to focus routinely on synchronizing information-related capabilities to achieve these ends, in large-scale combat 

operations, any and all capabilities must be harnessed to create effects 

in the information environment that optimize the information element of 

combat power or informational power.

Human beings have always been concerned with protecting prized 

information from adversaries. Some 5,000 years ago, Chinese emperors 

guarded the secret of silk production—the larval worm that produced the 

fiber, the mulberry plant that provided its food source and place of dwelling, and the weaving techniques that transformed the fibers into elegant 

cloth—with the threat of death by torture. Their security system worked 

for about 3,000 years, when the secret was carried out by a princess who 

left to marry a prince in a far-off land.46 In 1500 BC, a Mesopotamian 

scribe guarded the secret to pottery glazes with a less threatening method. 

He encoded the recipe in cuneiform signs on a clay tablet.47 In the first century BC, Julius Caesar, fearing his messages would be intercepted, wrote 

to Cicero and other friends in a secret code that today bears his name.48 

Even though information warfare is not new, it has been transformed 

by new information media and technologies. At the turn of the twentieth 

century, an information warrior would not have contemplated hacking into 

a computer system to steal secrets, launching a destructive computer virus 

onto a network, intercepting cellular phone calls, gathering imagery with 

spy satellites, or broadcasting propaganda and disinformation over radio 

and television stations. The technologies simply did not exist. By 1950, 

computers had been invented (as well as radio and TV), but hardly anyone 

had them and none of them were connected or even remotely accessible. 

There were no Web sites to hack, no Internet service providers to take 

down, no Web transactions to intercept, and no e-mail for delivering malicious code. There was no low-cost method whereby an ordinary person 

could reach potentially millions of people with destructive computer viruses, hate messages, hoaxes, and conspiracy theories. 

It was not until the 1960s that computers began to be interconnected, 

initially on local area networks within an organization. By 1969, the first 

wide area network was operating in the United States. Named after its 

sponsor, the Department of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, 
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ARPANET connected Stanford Research Institute, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and 

the University of Utah. It eventually evolved into the Internet—a network 

of networks that spans the globe.49 When ARPANET was finally decommissioned in 1990, there were more than 300,000 hosts on the Internet. 

This jumped to 1 million in 1992, 10 million in 1996, and 30 million by 

1998. As of September 1998, the Irish firm NUA Ltd. estimated that 147 

million people worldwide were using the Internet.50

We approach the end of the [20th] century with computers everywhere. They are cheap, often tiny, frequently interconnected, and incorporated into everything from microwave ovens to precision guided missiles. 

They have been integrated into all types of processes, including business 

processes, banking and finance, transportation and navigation, energy and 

water delivery, education, entertainment, government, health care, emergency services, and military operations. They have enabled electronic 

commerce, telemedicine, teleconferencing, and telecommuting. A consequence is that sensitive information, once confined to conversations and 

paper documents in offices, is now computerized and transmitted over 

public networks—making it potentially vulnerable to theft, exploitation, 

and sabotage by distant parties.

Advances in computing have been joined by equal advances in sensors. 

They too are cheap, tiny, pervasive, and connected to other technologies. 

They are paving the way to a future when information in the environment 

is readily available to remote persons. Already, some day care centers let 

parents watch their children while browsing the Web. Video cameras are 

placed in the rooms where the youngsters play and then fed to the center’s 

Web site.51 Although access to the sites is restricted to parents, are there 

risks to the children if the sites are hacked? Will totalitarian governments 

install such systems everywhere so they can watch their citizens? Andrew 

Leonard, technology correspondent for Salon, observed: “Just imagine 

how tempting that kind of Net-enabled Panopticon will be in a country 

whose leaders have always looked upon the [population] as one big mass 

of pre-schoolers.”52

While new technologies have enabled new methods of information 

warfare, old methods have persisted and are likely to continue to do so. 

Spies still penetrate organizations to steal their secrets and police use undercover operations to infiltrate organized crime groups. Military units 

use visual surveillance along with high-tech sensors and other gadgetry 

to acquire information about the battlespace. They engage in deceptive 

maneuvers to fool the enemy and in psyop and perception management to 
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influence behavior. They use bombs and other physical weapons to take 

out enemy communications systems. 

Perception management in particular is likely to play a significant role 

in future operations. John Petersen predicts that information warfare in 

the future will look much like advertising, convincing people to behave 

in ways that meet the objectives of the warrior. Information warfare will 

move away from hardware toward ideas and perceptions. It will involve 

the manipulation of “memes”—big, powerful ideas such as global warming and nuclear war that move people to action and the manipulation of 

perceptions through such means as holographic projections.53 Human history has been shaped by memes, religion being a good example, so Petersen’s projection might be viewed as a continuation of age-old methods.

Our adversaries, Russia in particular, have become masters of perception management, largely through the use of misinformation and disinformation. An excellent primer on their techniques and ways to counter 

them is found in Christopher Paul’s and Miriam Matthews’ publication 

The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model, available online 

through the RAND Corporation.54

The big question is this: Can someone launch an attack with catastrophic consequences and, if so, what are the chances of that happening? In truth, nobody knows. It is easy to postulate scenarios such as 

“Stock market crashes after hacker tampers with Wall Street computers” 

or “Planes collide after terrorists hack into navigation system and alter 

routes.” It is much more difficult to assess whether a scenario is plausible 

or likely. Several factors must be considered, including vulnerabilities in 

technologies and the way they are used, the capabilities needed to exploit 

those vulnerabilities, redundancies and other safeguards that compensate 

for weaknesses, and whether there are people with the capabilities, motive, and opportunity to carry out an attack.

Denning raises the specter that IW will involve more than purely 

military means to achieve an adversary’s aims. Simultaneous to physical attacks in distant areas of operations, the threat will employ informational attacks on the homeland, such as against power grids, information networks, telecommunications infrastructure, banking, and so 

on. There will also be psychological attacks across all media platforms 

designed to spread propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation, as 

well as sow uncertainty and discord. This future reality demands a robust 

whole-of-government approach to information, as well as mutual, reinforcing support from Unified Action Partners. Due to its size and budget, 
128

the Department of Defense will play an outsized role in coordinating this 

whole-of-government approach to the threat’s use of IW and our response 

to it. The increasing level of connectedness among systems—both governmental and nongovernmental—means that attacks to any part of the 

system threatens all others and national security.

What we do know is that information systems are vulnerable and there 

are people who are motivated to do bad things. For this reason, it is worth 

taking information warfare seriously, particularly as it affects critical national infrastructures and one’s own information resources—not because 

a catastrophic attack is inevitable, but to prepare for an uncertain future.
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Notes

* Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security (New York: Addison 

Wesley/ACM Press, 1999)

1. Graeme Browning, “Counting Down,” National Journal 16, 19 April 

1997, 746–49; Associated Press, 23 March 1997; “Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks,” US General Accounting Office, GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 1996, 25; Jack L. Brock, Testimony 

in Hackers Penetrate DOD Computer Systems, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation, Committee on Governmental 

Affairs, United States Senate, 20 November 1991.

2. Gina Smith, “Hackers Could Switch Toothbrushes for Bullets,” ABCNews.com, 18 November 1997.

3. Communication from Eugene Schultz, 15 May 1998.

4. Graeme Browning, “Counting Down,” 746–49; Associated Press, 23 

March 1997; communication from Eugene Schultz, 15 May 1998.

5. Communication from Eugene Schultz, 15 May 1998.

6. Erik Kirschbaum, Reuters, Bonn, 17 November 1997.

7. Associated Press, New York, 30 April 1998.

8. John Diamond, “CIA Seeks to Provide Warnings of Global Conflicts,” 

Associated Press, 27 December 1997.

9. Bruce Kammer, “Information Warfare: The Revolution in Military Affairs 

and How the US Is Adapting to the Future of Warfare,” term paper for COSC 

511, Georgetown University, 1 May 1997, citing Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 

1991), 172–78.

10. Kammer, citing United States Department of Defense, Conduct of the 

Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1992), 91–94.

11. Kammer, citing Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider, and James A. 

Blackwell Jr., Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1993), 106–07.

12. Alan D. Campen, “IRAQI Command and Control: The Information Differential,” in Alan D. Campen, editor, The First Information War (Fairfax, VA: 

AFCEA International Press, 1992), 171–77.

13. Heather Yeo and Hadley Killo, The Evolution of Military Information 

Warfare, http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Quad/8813/main.html.

14. Kammer, “Information Warfare,” citing Friedman, Desert Victory, 

172–78.

15. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare, 2nd ed. (New York: Thunder’s 

Mouth Press, 1996), 426–35.

16. Chuck de Caro, “Softwar,” in Cyberwar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age, eds., Alan D. Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. 

Thomas Goodden (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1996), 203–18. 
130

17. Chad R. Lamb, “Military Psychological Operations,” term paper for 

COSC 511, 4 May 1997, citing Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of 

US Air Operations in Four Wars 1941–1991 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), 

149–50.

18. Kammer, “Information Warfare,” citing Philip M. Taylor, War and the 

Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester, England: 

Manchester University Press, 1992), 235.

19. Chuck de Caro, “Softwar,” in Cyberwar, 203–218.

20. “Psychological Operations/Warfare,” http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1012/psyhist.html; Chad R. Lamb, “Military Psychological Operations,” 

term paper for COSC 511, 4 May 1997, citing Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars 1941–1991 (Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand, 1996), 143–148.

21. Lamb citing Hosner, 143–48.

22. “Psychological Operations/Warfare,” http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1012/psyhist.html.

23. Lamb, “Military Psychological Operations,” citing Hosmer, Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars 1941–1991, 143–48.

24. Lamb, citing “US Army Special Forces: The Green Berets—US Special 

Operations Command: Psychological Operations,” http://users.aol.com/armysof1/PSYOPS.html.

25. “Psychological Operations/Warfare,” http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1012/psyhist.html.

26. Mark R. Jacobson, “War in the Information Age: International Law, 

Self-Defense, and the Problem of ‘Non-Armed’ Attacks,” The Ohio State University, citing Briefing by Martin S. Hill at the Worldwide PSYOP Conference, 

November 1995.

27. John Rendon, “Mass Communication and Its Impact,” in National Security in the Information Age, James McCarthy ed., Conference Report, US Air 

Force Academy, 28 February–1 March 1996.

28. Jim Hoagland, “How CIA’s Secret War on Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, 26 June 1997, A21.

29. Tim Weiner, “Iraqi Spies Know U.N. Inspectors’ Next Moves, Officials 

Say,” New York Times, 25 November 1997.

30. Weiner.

31. Weiner.

32. “Israel Catches Iraqi Agents,” Intelligence Newsletter 324, 4 December 1997.

33. Michael Evans, “American Spies in the Sky Keep Watch on Regime,” 

The Times, 26 February 1998.

34. “UN Inspectors: Iraq Hiding Weapons,” Associated Press, 4 June 1998.

35. John M. Goshko, “Iraqis May Be Acting to Avoid Surveillance,” Washington Post, 6 November 1997, A1.

36. Patrick G. Eddington, “Information Should Be Main Target in Iraq,” 

Navy Times, 23 February 1998.
131

37. “Iraq Blames Sanctions for Deaths,” Associated Press, 30 November 

1997.

38. “Iraq Accuses US of Plotting to Plant Fake Germ Warfare Evidence,” 

Boston Globe, 12 December 1997, A5.

39. Jorgen Wouters, “Magical Mystery Tour,” ABCNews.com, 19 December 1997.

40. Associated Press, Iraq, 13 March 1998.

41. Associated Press, Iraq, 18 March 1998.

42. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare, 2nd ed. (New York: Thunder’s 

Mouth Press, 1996), 12.

43. Department of Defense Directive S-3600.1, Information Operations, 9 

December 1996; see also Information Assurance: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and 

Organization Considerations, 3rd Edition, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of 

Defense, 17 September 1997.

44. Loyal Rue, By the Grace of Guile: The Role of Deception in Natural History and Human Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 

120–22.

45. Rue, 120–22.

46. “Risky Business: The Threat from Economic Espionage,” video, The 

National Counterintelligence Center, 1997.

47. David Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: Macmillan 1967), 75.

48. Kahn, 83–84.

49. For a brief history of the Internet, see Peter J. Denning, “The Internet 

after Thirty Years,” in Dorothy E. Denning and Peter J. Denning, eds., Internet 

Besieged: Countering Cyberspace Scofflaws (New York: ACM Press, Addison-Wesley, 1997), 15–27.

50. NUA Internet Surveys, Review of 1997, 5 January 1998. For the latest 

figures, see http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online.html.

51. Jennifer Lenhart, “Keeping an Electronic Eye on the Kids,” Washington 

Post, 29 May 1998.

52. Alex Cohen, “Net Politics: A Mover, but Not a Shaker,” Wired News, 8 

April 1998.

53. John Petersen, “Information Warfare: The Future,” in Alan D. Campen, 

Douglas H. Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden, eds., Cyberwar, 219-226.

54. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of 

Falsehood” Propaganda Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2016).
132
133

Chapter 8

Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations—

Operation Iraqi Freedom I

Colonel (Retired) Carmine Cicalese

Every DOD [Department of Defense] action that is planned or executed, word that is written or spoken, and image that is displayed 

or relayed, communicates the intent of DOD, and by extension the 

USG [United States Government], with the resulting potential for 

strategic effects.1

As of this writing, it has been 15 years since the Iraqi invasion, and 

nearly as long since the US Army trained for high intensity conflict or 

large-scale combat operations. While the Mission Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises are able to generally replicate kinetic conflict 

with objectively quantifiable results, higher echelon exercises and simulation have not yet matured to the point that information operations (IO) actions, and their resulting effects on adversary decision making, are equally 

quantifiable or translatable to practical lessons learned. As a result, the 

Army lacks recent, relevant experience or tested command competence to 

plan and execute essential IO in large-scale combat operations.

Information is an element of national power that creates, strengthens, 

and preserves favorable conditions. Given that the United States goes to 

war as an extension of politics to impose its policies by threat or use of 

violence, legitimacy is a key factor and dependent on the audiences. Information is an element in unified action and is integrated with other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, 

and objectives.2

 Without being mutually supportive, legitimacy becomes 

at risk or violence becomes preeminent. 

IO was a vital part of the Coalition’s defeat of the Iraqi military, and 

its neutralization and ultimate destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime. 

IO was also part of the collective failure to rapidly stabilize post-invasion 

Iraq, or deter the emergence of intra-ethnic conflict and an active, externally supported insurgency. While IO has not proven to be a proverbial 

“silver bullet” to success in today’s complex operating environment, it is 

also undeserving of primary blame when an adversary or other target of IO 

action fails to respond as desired. Indeed, these are maneuver failures and 

overall Unified Action failures as much as they are specific IO failures, 

and frequently attributable to a larger inability to sufficiently harmonize 
134

and publicly contextualize our actions and overall message from the strategic to tactical echelons. 

This chapter will discuss how IO was planned by the Combined Force 

Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and executed by subordinate 

forces; discuss lessons learned to include how incomplete efforts led to 

challenges for the occupation; and end with an examination of how the 

Army can successfully enact information as a warfighting function in future large-scale combat operations. However, before going into detail on 

IO and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it is necessary to baseline understanding of what information operations is, and also additional reasons 

why it is a challenge to integrate properly. 

Part of IO’s inconsistent application stems from a multitude of doctrinal changes leading to a general lack of common IO understanding across 

the Army. From 2002 to present, the Army changed its definition of IO 

several times, including a period when the Army defined IO a joint activity while the Army conducted “inform and influence activities.” In 2014, 

General Raymond Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, discontinued inform and 

influence activities in favor of the joint definition of IO. General Odierno 

considered IO an operation that needed to be tightly nested within the 

overall operational concept and conduct of operations. He also saw that 

IO had practical application for the Army Service Component Commands 

executing theater engagement and security cooperation plans in support of 

Combatant Command deterrence missions.3

In decisive action, Army forces normally operate as part of a joint 

force, often within a multinational and interagency environment.4

 Because the joint and Army IO definitions are synonymous, this chapter will 

utilize the joint and Army IO definition as of June 2018: “Information 

operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of 

information-related capabilities, in concert with other lines of operation, 

to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own.”5

In practice, IO is fundamentally about affecting an adversary or enemy’s decision-making, while simultaneously protecting friendly decision-making, whether information quality of availability, thus creating a 

relative advantage for US commanders. IO integrates information related 

capabilities (IRCs) that can be generally conceptualized as either affecting 

information content or information flow. For example, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Operations Security (OPSEC) and Military Deception (MILDEC) predominantly target the adversary’s percep-
135

tions and cognitive process, with the objective being a response beneficial 

to US end-states (normally reducing US risk, resources, or both) —information content. Simultaneously, IO coordinates other IRCs like Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare to affect the adversary’s ability 

to collect, transmit, store, or access information that supports effective or 

timely decision making and battle command—information flow. Each of 

these IRCs have a similar function to protect friendly forces, either directly or by identifying similar attempts by the adversary. 

The purpose of this explanation is not to establish IO primacy over 

the IRCs but rather to simply acknowledge the long-standing synergy of 

synchronizing and de-conflicting activities. Indeed, IO is a planning and 

integration function. It does not possess capability in itself, and only succeeds through open collaboration with all the IRC stakeholders. That said, 

the integrated application of IRC through the IO function is inherently 

a commander-centric activity prone to subjective bias, experiences, and 

understanding.6

 This, more than any other factor, has led to an uneven 

application of IO over the past 15 years of combat. Quite simply, the commander’s understanding of and operational experience with IO invariably 

influences their guidance and direction to the staff. The ultimate fault for 

this disconnect is not with IO, but rather with the Army’s broader leader 

development, education, and training processes that fails to equip leaders 

with a consistent understanding and peacetime training application of IO. 

Convoluting this dynamic, many of the IRCs are cloaked in mystery 

due to their classification requirements. Many IO successes and failures 

are hidden behind this curtain of secrecy—a curtain that is seldom exposed to the larger Army. So much so, it is difficult to find and discuss Department of Defense (DoD) discreet and acknowledged military deception 

and cyberspace activities other than for the DoD to admit that, in general, 

it conducts such operations when it has the proper authorities. Discussing 

unique IRCs can be as vague as a doctrinal hand wave due to classification 

levels and perceived “need-to-know” restrictions.

For example, coordinated small arms ground fire disrupted the rotary wing deep attack of OIF I: Did non-lethal suppression of enemy air 

defense fail to disrupt the voice command nets and data links? The Iraqi 

Army quit fighting and disappeared into the city population: Did MISO 

leaflets and tactical net intrusions with messages provide the final push 

that persuades the enemy to quit fighting? The Iraqi Army misallocated 

forces north rather than committing them south against the Coalition’s 

main axis of advance: Was there a successful MILDEC plan executed to 

convince the Iraqi military leadership to commit forces away from the 
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main coalition attack? While these answers can be discovered with the appropriate clearances and access, IO lessons-learned personnel frequently 

are not determined to possess a “need-to-know.” This chapter will discuss 

and work through these challenges attempting to use multiple open sources to best account for an action.

The CFLCC IO Mission: “Go Faster”

In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) deployed the Third United States Army, “Patton’s Own” Headquarters forward to Kuwait to serve as the nucleus of 

the CFLCC for Operation Enduring Freedom. From Kuwait, CFLCC led 

the hybrid ground war of conventional and special operations forces in 

Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne, Marines, and Special Forces that successfully and quickly routed the Taliban while Osama Bin Laden and other 

Al Qaeda leaders successfully escaped into the Pakistani Tribal Areas.7

By April 2002, CFLCC Headquarters was extricating its role as the ground 

component lead for Afghanistan, and turning over authority to Combined 

Joint Task Force–180.

Surprisingly, CFLCC was preparing for a second conflict that would 

be different than Operation Enduring Freedom, and more familiar as a 

conventional large-scale combat operation for which the CFLCC personnel had trained. The Bush Administration was pressuring Iraq to comply 

with the United Nations mandate to destroy its inventories of weapons 

of mass destruction, end support to terrorism, and cease prosecution of 

its civilian population.8

 Weighing possible military options, the Secretary 

of Defense summoned CFLCC leaders and planners to the Pentagon for 

a Joint Chiefs of Staff “Tank” discussion. The “Tank” is a reference to 

where the DoD leadership gathers for important briefings and decisions. 

CFLCC planners briefed an operations plan which, in the words of the 

lead planner, “turns Kuwait into a huge armored parking lot,” amassing 

overwhelming combat power before invading Iraq.9

 Leadership questions 

oriented on how long it would take to amass adequate combat power, and 

how to accelerate the timeline. The ubiquitous question “can we go faster?” permeated the discussion.10

CFLCC planners returned to Kuwait with the guidance to re-assess 

the plan and develop more timely alternatives. The planners deliberately 

developed a flexible option that would afford the president more latitude 

and not be bound by over bearing military timelines. At first, the plans 

team struggled to adapt the plan as it tried to identify how to achieve the 

same goals as the operational plan given the DoD leadership intent to go 
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faster. Then, Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, the CFLCC, offered 

guidance: “Do what you think you can with what you think you would 

have.”11 This again created a planning pause until the CFLCC strategic 

planner recommended planning based off the Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL). 

CFLCC had an Army armored brigade from the Third Infantry Division 

on the ground which could be enough to secure the Iraqi port of Um Qasr. 

Next, a Marine Division might secure the Iraqi city of An Nasiriyah. The 

plans team worked its way through the TPFDL. The concept of a “Running 

Start” plan was born. The plan would pick up that moniker because it 

did not wait until the optimum force was in place to launch an invasion. 

As directed, the military timeline would not limit or impinge upon the 

presidential decision making. 

The “Running Start” would continually evolve and become more agile 

and dynamic by adding and dropping units from the plan and even execution. The USCENTCOM plan focused on decapitating Saddam Hussein’s 

regime as USCENTCOM identified Saddam Hussein as Iraq’s strategic 

center of gravity (COG). In kind, the CFLCC designated the Republican 

Guard Forces Command (RGFC) as the operational COG. While there 

was some debate within the CFLCC planning group as to whether the 

Iraqi military leadership was the operational COG, the planning group 

concluded that the RGFC had to be rendered combat ineffective to force 

the Saddam regime to capitulate. Saddam’s son Qusay directed the RGFC 

and the Special Republican Guard protecting the regime. From here, the 

IO planners and intelligence support team deconstructed the COG.

An Integrating Planning Strategy

When he was the First Cavalry Division Commander, General Dave 

McKiernan often ended the Warfighter Battle Update Brief with the following guidance to his commanders: conduct aggressive counter-reconnaissance and maintain constant pressure on the enemy. This guidance 

was not lost on the CFLCC IO planner who hearkened the guidance of 

his former command and saw information as means to maintain constant 

pressure on the enemy. 

If the CFLCC mission was to defeat the Iraqi Army by focusing on 

the RGFC, then IO should contribute towards the accomplishment of that 

end. This is consistent with Unified Action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.12 To 

support the invasion and the commander’s intent, the CFLCC IO plan used 
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proven military planning techniques like COG analysis and Information 

Preparation of the Environment. 

Given the previously discussed definition of IO, the IO team was most 

interested in which RGFC Critical Capabilities relied heavily upon vulnerable information content or information flow. Supported by the 1st Information Operations Command reach-back intelligence support team, the 

CFLCC IO intelligence planner developed a robust Information Preparation of the Environment (IPE) describing how the Iraqi military information 

flowed. This analysis included the strategic military telecommunications 

infrastructure, operational to tactical radio frequency communications networks, plus the RGFC communications. The IPE described how the Iraqi 

people processed and consumed information and the influence of culture 

in terms of information context. For instance, the ordinary Iraqis of 2002 

did not have consistent access to the Internet while the elite did have access. Radio, print, and word-of-mouth were the most common forms of 

communications. Saddam’s rumor mill ruled the streets.13 

Non-state controlled television was available to the elite who were 

allowed television satellite dishes, and to a small minority of Iraqis who 

were willing to take a chance in defying the regime. A Sunni Muslim 

minority ruled over a Shia Muslim majority. While Sunni and Shia have 

much in common, they have their differences in how they practice their 

religion. In sum, the IPE described the military and civilian information 

environment regarding how information flowed within the Iraqi military 

and how information content mattered especially to the civilian Iraqi populace. It was an information overlay upon the physical terrain of the operational environment.

Using the Information Preparation of the Environment and applying 

Joe Strange’s COG methodology, the IO plans team identified the RGFC 

as having four critical capabilities: fires, maneuver, command and control, 

and protection. As the IO team further analyzed the critical capabilities, it 

evaluated which critical capabilities and subordinate critical requirements 

and critical vulnerabilities were possibly susceptible to IO. Consequently, 

command and control (C2) and protection were the two critical capabilities that bore the most worthwhile critical vulnerabilities. Maneuver also 

had common critical vulnerabilities; a military leader gave maneuver directions via C2 means.14 

Command and control across any military has technical and human 

aspects: the ability to physical transmit an order, as well as the ability to in-
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spire obedience to the order. Similarly, the RGFC C2 had a technological 

aspect—information flow—and a human aspect—information content—

both of which exposed many vulnerabilities. For instance, the RGFC 

maneuver voice command nets were vulnerable to electronic attack, and 

the Iraqi soldiers receiving information through command channels were 

susceptible to the manipulation of information. The CFLCC IO Planners 

realized that if MISO messages could be synchronized with overwhelming 

kinetic fires, IO might have the same effect on Iraqi ground forces as it did 

during Desert Storm.

Regarding protection, the ground air defense units were critical to protecting the RGFC from CFLCC rotary wing deep attacks and the artillery 

units, which could have also been part of the critical capability shoot, had 

similar technical and cognitive information vulnerabilities. The CFLCC 

IO plan directed units and information-related capabilities to mass non-lethal fires directly upon the RGFC and the protecting air defense and artillery fires to disrupt the Iraqi Army’s ability to command and control, 

maneuver, and protect its forces. In terms of the suppression of enemy air 

defenses (SEAD), the IO plan directed the use of MISO and electronic 

warfare supported by OPSEC and, when applicable, supporting unique information related capabilities, like cyberspace operations, to disrupt Iraqi 

Army C2 and degrade their will to fight. 

As Sun Tzu wrote, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you 

need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”15 While the main part of the 

IO plan intended to mass information-related capabilities to increase the 

adversary’s friction, the IO team had to acknowledge that IO was critical toward maintaining friendly freedom of action. In this instance, the 

IO team conducted an internal analysis (i.e. BLUE Forces COG analysis) 

based on warfighting functions (WfF). For an attacking CFLCC, maneuver 

was the most critical WfF. First, the IO plan emphasized operations security (OPSEC) and communications security to protect critical information 

regarding CFLCC timelines and intentions to include routes and timing of 

ground and rotary wing movements. At that time against the Iraqi military, 

CFLCC retained an overwhelming advantage in assured and secured communications to include encryption and frequency hopping radios. Similarly, protecting against mass casualty events was important to maintain US 

political will. So, the IO effort had to support any counter-missile effort 

that was capable of producing mass casualty events as a result. In hindsight, it would have been appropriate to have a collection plan that placed 
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a priority on identifying Iraqi Special Forces serving as forward observers 

for SCUD missile teams to mitigate the threat. In sum, the defensive IO 

plan assured maintaining freedom of action from adversary intervention.

Because the IO definition is adversary-focused, there is a perception 

gap as to how IO can affect civilian decision making. Most civilians, in 

this case, were not adversaries. The prevailing assessment was that many 

of the Shia Iraqis to the south, for instance, would support Saddam’s removal from power. The CFLCC IO plan intended to communicate to the 

Iraqi people to support Coalition actions by avoiding combat operations. 

Here, MISO, Civil Military Operations, Public Affairs, and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy would be critical toward communicating with 

the Iraqi people to stay safe and not interfere with combat operations. The 

CFLCC IO plan intended to limit collateral damage to the Iraqi communication infrastructure so that the new Iraqi government would be able to 

communicate to its other echelons of government and the Iraqi people. IO 

plan branches and sequels included options to use escalating non-lethal 

capabilities to protect the Iraqi communication infrastructure for future 

use by the Iraqi people. Information access would be critical to securing 

the peace. 

To put it into Clausewitzian terms, the CFLCC IO for the invasion 

used the Direct Approach in attacking the adversary’s decision cycle 

and the Indirect Approach in keeping the Iraqi civilians from turning on 

the Coalition. Or, in a more complete perspective, the IO plan sought to 

maximize friction for the Iraqi military, especially the RGFC, and minimize friction for Coalition ground forces. The CFLCC IO plan had great 

breadth because CFLCC would have many different types of Coalition 

ground forces with a variety of IRCs responsible for covering a tremendous amount of battlespace.

After completing Phase 3 planning, CFLCC took a short break before the CFLCC C9 hosted a Civil-Military Operations (CMO) conference 

with supporting unit planners. Most planners had a CMO, IO, or PSYOP 

background and CFLCC had a strategic planner attend to assist in maintaining continuity with the Phase 3 plan. Using a draft Department of State 

planning strategy, the conference produced Phase 4 objectives and end 

states to secure the peace. Then, planning concluded, for a time, while 

CFLCC redeployed back to Fort McPherson, Georgia to prepare for the 

next possible mission. In October 2002, a CFLCC exercise validated the 

IO plan.16
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Planning and Expectation Frictions

During the Phase 3 IO plan internal brief back to the CFLCC planners, 

a CFLCC logistics planner challenged the IO plans team that attacking 

the adversary’s information cycle, while protecting the CFLCC decision 

space and keeping Iraqis safe, was not enough if not outright misguided. 

IO needed to win the Iraqi people hearts and minds. This was not new. 

Since its inception and mentioned in the introduction, IO has suffered 

from others viewing IO through a clichéd prism: “winning the hearts and 

minds,” “wagging the dog,” or even “mind-trick.” 

The IO plans team countered. While winning the hearts and minds is 

often considered an IO specialty, the CFLCC plan had limitations. First, 

it was inherently challenging to win hearts and minds when the bullets 

would be flying in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) context. Secondly, the commander would have to be willing to commit more than just 

information-related capabilities towards winning the hearts and minds. In 

most instances, information unto itself is not enough to positively influence people to support a cause. Information requires action or a convincing promise of action. Many Army commanders would learn to appreciate 

this during the 2007 Surge and counterinsurgency operations. Lastly, and 

most importantly, the IO plan was singularly focused on facilitating the 

defeat of the Iraqi military including the RGFC.17

By late June 2002, the IO staff and planner had a one-on-one session 

with the CFLCC over such dissonance. The commander was rightfully 

ambitious challenging the IO staff to consider how an IO plan might win 

the battle without firing a shot. The IO team understood that the commander was implying that thoughtful precision application of strategic action 

synchronized with information-related capabilities could convince Iraqis 

to take matters into their own hands and overthrow Saddam.18

The CFLCC IO plans team struggled to identify the appropriate information-related capabilities and authorities needed to fulfill this rather 

ambitious objective within the prescribed available time. Often, the identified capabilities and authorities fell outside CFLCC’s span of control, 

and CFLCC planners needed to coordinate capability delivery with owning commands/departments and/or request an expansion of authorities to 

leverage said capability unilaterally. The IO plans team recommendation 

to the commander was to keep the people and their communication infrastructure safe during combat operations so the peace could be secured 

in Phase 4. Still, the CFLCC would continue to press USCENTCOM for 

more authority.19 In the end, though, USCENTCOM would retain the stra-
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tegic initiative, and use IRCs in a synchronized manner with kinetic actions to compel Iraqis to remove Saddam from power prior to the commitment of Coalition ground forces.

Execution and Innovation

On 19 March 2003, USCENTCOM initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom 

with coordinated strategic bombing and information activities. “Shock and 

Awe,” as it was coined by the Western media, rained bombs and messaging down on the Iraqi military. The Coalition attempted to decapitate 

the Saddam regime through precision strikes and messaging designed to 

reduce Iraq’s ability to wage war and establish the conditions necessary to 

promote regime change from within Iraq.20

After the invasion, open source media reports included stories that 

USCENTCOM sent MISO messages to Iraqi leaders in attempts to influence them to not support and even kill Saddam. The US government never 

confirmed these stories. If true, though, such IO efforts would have been 

consistent with the CFLCC guidance to win the fight without firing a shot.

Whereas days of air and indirect preparatory fires preceded the Desert 

Storm ground invasion, Operation Iraqi Freedom had only a day of preparatory kinetic fires. CFLCC massed its forces along the International 

border between Kuwait and Iraq. These forces included from east to west: 

the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force including a Marine Division, a Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade and a British Armored Division; Fifth United States 

Army Corps with three Army Divisions—also in play was the 4th Infantry 

Division awaited equipment landing in Turkey, and US Special Operations 

Command-Central with multiple task forces. Ultimately, Saddam and his 

sons were able to maintain their fleeting grip on power prior to the invasion despite CFLCC’s coordinated and direct efforts to the contrary. As a 

result, CFLCC forces crossed the line of departure on 21 March 2003.21

It is important to understand that, in 2003, many of the IO staffs were 

lightly manned, often with people not possessing any IO training or experience. Furthermore, commanders had a variety of perspectives of IO from 

classical command and control warfare that was designed to create advantages in C2, to influence operations intended to mitigate violence between 

ethnic groups. Given the breadth of the CFLCC IO plan designed to maintain constant pressure on the enemy, protect friendly decision space and 

minimize Iraqi civilian casualties, subordinate commanders had to make 

decisions as to how to best utilize their limited staff and IRCs. CFLCC 

had an operational approach towards the application of IO, while each of 
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the CFLCC subordinate commands took an integrated tactical approach 

tailored to their missions.

By most accounts, the CFLCC invasion crossed the line of departure 

without incident as the Iraqi military may have expected a longer preparatory fire barrage as witnessed during Desert Storm. On 26 March 2003, 

the 173rd Airborne brigade conducted an airborne operation in northern 

Iraq that met no organized resistance from the Iraqi Army. The ground operations were over in less than two months.22 Other than some unexpected 

resistance from the Fedayeen, to discuss later, all indicators pointed to the 

fact that CFLCC had successfully protected its decision space.

As CFLCC forces made progress, CFLCC IO was successful in shaping the operational environment through the information environment. 

MISO, nesting with the Shock and Awe narrative, was hugely successful 

in degrading the Iraqi military’s will to fight. This was a tiered approach. 

CFLCC and immediate subordinate headquarters nominated targets and 

messages for delivery by air assets. The coalition dropped millions of leaflets upon Iraqi RGFC and army forces imploring them to not fight. MISO 

messages ranged from questioning the value of Iraqis fighting for Saddam, to how the Iraqi military should properly park armored equipment. 

Other messages highlighted Saddam and his sons’ ostentatious lifestyle to 

separate the rank-and-file of the Iraqi military from its leadership.23 Meanwhile, tactical MISO teams used loudspeakers to encourage forces in contact to surrender.24

As the saying goes, the enemy gets a vote. While the RGFC may have 

been the COG that CFLCC identified, Saddam’s Fedayeen gave the most 

resistance and arguably impeded progress more than the RGFC. For several days, the Fedayeen delayed 3rd Infantry Division’s (3ID) advance 

inflicting casualties and disrupting Coalition logistics forces. In late March 

2003, a misoriented logistical convoy would suffer deaths and the Coalition’s first prisoners of war. Within days, a Special Forces team would rescue Private Jessica Lynch from the hospital using helmet camera to video 

tape all of it including a team member presenting Private Lynch with an 

American flag to soothe the Soldier’s nerves. The video images of American Special Forces rescuing Private Lynch gave some ease to an anxious 

American public and military concerned for their Prisoners of War. The 

Iraqis, to their credit, highlighted the humane treatment they gave the unguarded Soldier at the hospital.25

Within a week, 3ID defeated the outgunned Fedayeen and continued 

north. This begs the question, though, would a dedicated and loyal Fed-
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ayeen been as susceptible to Coalition MISO as the RGFC seemed to be? 

Furthermore, the Fedayeen fought more like a guerilla organization than 

the traditional military organization so its communications networks may 

not have vulnerable as were the RGFCs.

As 3ID advanced, the RGFC had two divisions waiting at the Karbala 

Gap—critical terrain that defended the high-speed avenues of approach 

towards Baghdad. The Battle of Karbala offers a few instances of IO execution. As discussed, the CFLCC IO plan included coordinating IRCs 

as part of SEADs to support rotary wing attacks. Before the 3rd ID tanks 

arrived at the Karbala Gap, the 11th Aviation Regiment launched a rotary 

wing deep attack against the Medina Division. By deploying civilian forward observers using cell phones and hand-held radios, the Iraqis successfully thwarted the attack damaging several helicopters and resulting in the 

Iraqis capturing two US Apache helicopter pilots. The pilots would later 

be freed without harm.26

There were several factors that contributed to the Aviation Regiment’s 

challenges. It is possible this was also an indication the non-lethal SEAD 

may not have been adequately planned. By 2003, the Army had divested itself of the bulk of its organic Electronic Warfare capabilities and 

expertise, so the Army lacked both the capabilities and capacity needed 

to unilaterally suppress enemy air defenses to enable the 11th Aviation 

Regiment’s deep attack. Compounding this macro-level issue, the few IO 

personnel in theater that did possess the requisite expertise to effectively 

plan and integrate electronic warfare were not present in the 11th Aviation 

Brigade’s planning efforts prior to the attack.

While OPSEC was successful in protecting the invasion timing, it 

could not protect all elements of deployment information. This may have 

contributed to the array of Iraqi forces in Karbala. According to open 

source reports after the Battle of Karbala, the threat of 4th Infantry Division (4ID) invading from Turkey convinced Qusay Hussein to redeploy a 

depleted Republican Guard Corps from Karbala to north of Baghdad. This 

reduced the enemy armor presence at the Karbala gap that would allow 

unprotected 3rd ID to promptly defeat the Median Division, pour through 

the gap and race to Baghdad unimpeded.

Many Iraqi soldiers simply chose not to fight and went home, but not 

the way CFLCC expected. Persistent MISO messaging gave specific instructions on how the armored formations should array their vehicles to 

depict surrender, and how the Iraqi soldiers should present themselves to 

the Coalition for surrender. Instead, the Iraqi Army just abandoned most of 
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their vehicles and faded back to civilian life with their individual military 

issued side arms. After the Battle of Karbala, there were very few instances where the RGFC offered organized resistance.

Once 3ID passed through the Karbala Gap, the RGFC forces arrayed 

around Baghdad were mostly empty vehicles. One Iraqi unit did successfully resist for a while near Baghdad Airport before relenting to a 3ID 

Thunder Run through downtown Baghdad. As one RGFC general pondered after the battle of Baghdad airport: 

The percentage of forces that really fought was simple. I don’t 

have exact numbers, but I can say almost 15 percent. In spite of 

that, it kept on fighting for three weeks—so what if everybody 

was fighting? We might have fought for longer time, and we could 

have delayed the enemy and forced him to pay heavy price, so as 

to have justice for the Iraqi people and armed forces from historic 

point of view?27

CFLCC forces had many other instances of executing the IO plan to 

include their own adlibbing and originality. In the Shia holy city of An Najaf, an element from the 101st Airborne Division surprised the Najaf citizenry when they appeared in the city square. A quick-thinking commander 

told his troops to take a knee and point their weapons at the ground while 

the commander and his translator spoke to a local cleric. The situation 

quickly diffused and the coalition avoided offending any Shia religious 

leaders. If anything, this singular event set the tone that demonstrated that 

the Coalition’s valued and respected Iraqi beliefs, customs, and institutions. Meanwhile, a Marine detachment to the east in Um Qasr led Iraqis 

in a cheer for Iraq with the event captured on television.

The most far-reaching IO action of the invasion came from a tactical MISO team assigned to the 1st MEF. After 3ID’s famous “Thunder 

Run” concluded and the Iraqi Army disappeared into the night, an M88 

armor wrecking vehicle and the tactical MISO team found itself in Firdos 

Square (not far from Saddam’s statue towering over the square). Noticing 

the Iraqis feeling emboldened enough to defame Saddam’s statue, the tactical MISO team used loudspeakers to compel the Iraqi crowd to assist as 

the M88 tore down Saddam’s statue. The Iraqis frolicked on the befallen 

image of Saddam, throwing their shoes at it.28 The resultant images sent a 

very clear strategic message: Baghdad was no longer Saddam’s city. Although, more than one media outlet claimed it to be a staged event.29

The CFLCC plan called for the protection of the Iraqi communication infrastructure. To make this happen, commands had to submit rec-
146

ommendations to higher headquarters to maintain a restricted target list. 

This required diligence and negotiations with other headquarters to convince them, for example, to not destroy a bridge that has a telecommunication line running through the infrastructure of the bridge itself. Likewise, 

CFLCC had to offer non-kinetic alternatives which could degrade, disrupt, 

neutralize, or otherwise deny a target.

Perhaps the best instance of this was how the Coalition handled Saddam’s ubiquitous spokesman Muhammed Saeed al-Sahhaf (aka Baghdad 

Bob). Saeed had a perpetual TV presence, adamantly denying any and 

all coalition progress. Night after night, he appeared unfazed of any impending coalition action. The coalition tried several non-lethal options to 

deny Baghdad Bob from transmitting having some success in forcing him 

to move. Eventually, the Coalition physically destroyed the transmitter to 

neutralize the Iraqi Government’s primary means to propagate itself to the 

outside world. 

Lastly, the CFLCC plan to protect the Iraqis non-combatants had 

mixed results. In general, there were few media accounts of collateral 

damage or Iraqi civilian deaths due to ground operation during the forty-five days of combat. This did not mean, however, that Coalition operations did not create any civilian casualties. Iraqi civilians died. Plus, there 

were some instances of concern that could affect a future peace. During 

the initial push through southern Iraq, Civil Affair teams reported meeting 

Iraqis who said, “Thank you, now leave.”30 This indicated that the Coalition to include CFLCC may not have fully understood the tensions within 

the country. 

Immediately after combat operations, Frontline documented a tank 

squad destroying an Iraqi man’s vehicle because he was allegedly stealing 

wood and his child was not enrolled in school. While the Soldiers promptly faced disciplinary actions, the damage was done. Such actions do not 

win hearts and minds if that is what IO is supposed to do. On the other 

hand, one could argue it was tactical level Shock and Awe, just not the 

kind of Shock and Awe CFLCC wanted. 

Conclusion

While there is no limit to the IO lessons learned, the most important 

lessons involve tiered coordination, the precursors of what would become 

CEMA, and post combat operations planning. CFLCC was two headquarters removed from its next closest subordinate command which created 

an environment where it was easy for higher headquarters to defer too 

much action to the subordinate headquarters such that higher is only a 
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pass-through command. This would not be acceptable. For instance, CFLCC had to manage MISO leaflet drop and broadcast target nominations. 

Amidst coordination, all units need to have cognizance of what higher and 

lateral are doing with information such that there is trust that the lowest 

headquarters doesn’t have to do it all. This allows each headquarters to 

manage its limited IRC assets and nest efforts to achieve synergy.

In another instance, it is easy to argue whether the approach of applying IRCs to disrupt the adversary’s air defense has merit. After all, CFLCC 

itself might not directly oversee an attack involving rotary wing aircraft 

so how can CFLCC force a subordinate unit to plan and execute a proper 

non-lethal SEAD? Also, subordinate Army units might not have the necessary skilled personnel to do all of this. At least, though, the guidance 

assists subordinate commands with priorities and focus.

With regard to SEAD planning, the advent of CEMA and renewed 

emphasis on assigning EW personnel to army formations should improve 

the future success of army aviation. Likewise, the addition of cyberspace 

operations and personnel to army formations gives the IRCs more capability. This alleviates responsibilities that previously fell on the IO planners 

and synchronizers. This development could portend the improved future 

integration of technical IRCs that will enable decisive results against enemy C2.

While Phase IV planning did occur, the strategic decision to not conduct Stability Operations damaged the post-Phase III operational environment. Still, CFLCC and the coalition writ large did not fully understand or 

appreciate the complexity of the Iraqi information environment, and more 

so the actors and stakeholders operating within it. Iran was strategically 

committed to making Iraq a weak state from which it could forward project its influence regionally. Given the overwhelming number of Iraqi Shia 

to Iraqi Sunnis and their proximity to Iran, Iran had interior lines, not just 

logistically, but culturally as well that the Coalition could never hope to 

replicate or consistently interdict. Iran understood the differences between 

Iraqi Shia and Sunni and how to exploit it. 

Information without corresponding action is pointless. Such was the 

occupation. The coalition said life would be better without Saddam. Yet 

after a few months, life was not improving. Crime was rising and the society was falling apart. The coalition told the Iraqi military Saddam was 

not worth fighting for and to go home with honor. Then, the Coalition Provincial Authority fired them. With honor lost and the Iranian backed Shia 

killing Sunni Baathists, the Sunni options were to fight, flee, or do nothing. 
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CFLCC’s IO plan worked mostly as intended. Inevitably, though, the 

invasion itself mired in a deliberate lack of afterthought and decisions 

made at strategic levels. The lack of coordinated message to action in 

Phase III led to the inexorable slide towards a counter-insurgency. Many 

of the information principles of a counter insurgency, like coordinating 

message to action, using information to find high value targets, and so 

forth, apply to large-scale combat operations but differ in scale. 

The importance of successfully managing and manipulating information in the 21st Century’s Information Age cannot be overstated. The chapter’s opening quote from the National Defense Strategy highlights the importance of information. Plus, the Secretary of Defense has produced more 

guidance for information. In the 2016 “Department of Defense Strategy 

for Operations in the Information Environment,” Secretary Ashton Carter 

avers: “Information is such a powerful tool, it is recognized as an element 

of US national power—and as such, the Department must be prepared to 

synchronize information programs, plans, messages, and products as part 

of a whole of government effort.”31

This DoD guidance set the table for Secretary Mattis to approve the 

Information Joint Function which is a superior intellectual model to IO 

that fully captures the breadth, diversity and importance of information to 

warfighting. The Information Joint Function is not bound to just the adversary but influences all relevant actor perceptions and behaviors. Indeed, 

the relevant actor’s behavior is more important than the actor’s perception. 

Moreover, information is vital to human and automated decision making. 

The human aspect and the human reliance on technology are inseparable. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy acknowledges the changes information and associated technology as it notes the use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, 

and eastern Ukraine is concern enough.32 From actions in Ukraine to the 

South China Sea, US competitors recognize that information is a weapon. 

The US military must adapt more quickly to this changing environment and fully adopt information as a way of fighting war. To do less is to 

cede the space to a capable, agile, and willing adversary who wants to win 

as much as the US military hates to lose.
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Notes

1. James Mattis, “National Defense Strategy, 2018,” 2, accessed 8 July 

2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

2. Mattis, “National Defense Strategy, 2018,” I-14.

3. Matthew J. Sheiffer, “US Army Information Operations and CyberElectromagnetic Activities: Lessons from Atlantic Resolve,” Military Review, 

19 March 2018.

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC:) 2-1.

5. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, 

DC: 2012).

6. FM 3-0, Operations, 2-24.

7. Army Central Command ARCENT, accessed 8 July 2018, https://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arcent.htm.

8. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York,” official transcript, press release, 

12 September 2002, accessed 8 July 2018, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.

archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

9. Lead CFLCC Planner, Name Unknown, Remarks to the CFLCC planning 

team upon returning from the tank session, April 2002.

10. Colonel Carmine Cicalese, “Firsthand experience while serving as the 

CFLCC IO Planner, April 2002 to July 2002.”

11. Cicalese, Firsthand experience.

12. FM 3-0, Operations, 2-1.

13. Cicalese, Firsthand experience.

14. Joseph Strange, “Center of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities,” Marine 

Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1996.

15. Sun Tzu, Art of War, (Hollywood, FL: Simon and Brown), 2011.

16. Kevin Cavanaugh, CFLCC PSYOP Officer email note to Major Carmine Cicalese circa November 2002.

17. Carmine, Cicalese, “Redefining Information Operations,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, 69, 2013.

18. Cicalese.

19. Cicalese.

20. David Martin, “Iraq Faces Massive US Missile Barrage,” CBS News, 24 

January 2003, accessed 8 July 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-facesmassive-us-missile-barrage/.

21. Gregory Fontenot, et al, On Point. The United States Army in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 

441–496.

22. Fontenot, On Point, 441–496.

23. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Conflict 21. United States Air Force, 13 
150

March 2006, accessed 8 July 2018, http://c21.maxwell.af.mil/iraq.htm#willing.

24. Sergeant Major Retired Herb Friedman, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

accessed 8 July 2018, http://www.psywarrior.com/OpnIraqiFreedom.html.

25. Helen Kennedy, “RESCUE POW IN DARING RAID Supply clerk 

found wounded at hospital,” NY Daily News, 2 April 2003.

26. Colonel David Eshel, “Deadly Scourge of the US Helicopter Pilots 

in Iraq,” Defense Update, 10 February 2007, accessed 8 July 2018, http://defense-update.com/20070210_us-helicopter-iraq.html.

27. Interview with Raad Haamdani, Frontline, accessed 8 July 2018, https://

www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/raad.html.

28. Fontenot, On Point.

29. David Zucchino, “Army Stage-Managed Fall of Hussein Statue,” 

Los Angeles Times. 3 July 2004, accessed 8 July 2018. http://articles.latimes.

com/2004/jul/03/nation/na-statue3; Common Dreams, 9 December 2004, accessed 8 July 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Dreams.

30. Mark Shankle, Interview circa 2 April 2003. The 1st Cavalry Division 

G5 shared a 3ID G5 SITREP with the 1st Cavalry Division IO Officer.

31. Ashton Carter, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the 

Information Environment, June 2016,” 1.

32. Mattis, “National Defense Strategy, 2018,” 2.
151

Chapter 9

The Cyber Crucible: Eastern Europe, Russia, and the 

Development of Modern Warfare

Wesley P. White 

The United States Army is unequivocal in its belief in the importance 

of cyberspace. The first paragraph in Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace 

and Electronic Warfare Operations, states that superiority through indirect 

means (either through cyberspace operations or other electronic warfare) 

is decidedly advantageous to all commanders at all levels, and that these 

indirect means will serve as a critical component to future land operations.1

Though the US Army has recognized the importance of the cyber domain 

in conflicts going forward, the Russian Federation has delivered a masterclass on the development and integration of cyber capabilities into modern 

conflicts and seems wholly invested in the idea of cyberspace operations 

and other indirect actions being a primary means of force projection, rather than a useful (or necessary) pairing with traditional kinetic forces.

In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of the 

General Staff (comparable to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff), published an article titled “The Value of Science is in the Foresight,” in the weekly Russian trade paper Military-Industrial Kurier. In it, 

Gerasimov suggested that the “very ‘rules of war’ have changed,” and that 

in many cases, nonmilitary means have exceeded the power and force of 

weapons in their ability to effect change on the international stage.2

 Gerasimov argues that new technologies have reduced gaps between traditional 

forces and their command and control, though also noting that “frontal 

engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational 

level are gradually becoming a thing of the past.”3

 The future, Gerasimov 

suggests, lies in “contactless actions”—made through cyber or other electronic means—being used as the main means of military or intelligence 

goals. This belief—that traditional military interactions are giving way to 

newer and subjectively more effective indirect interactions via computers 

and electronics—has been dubbed by some as the Gerasimov Doctrine.4

The timing of the release and publication of the Gerasimov Doctrine is 

important. Closely after the release of Gerasimov’s article, Russia invaded 

Ukraine with both tanks and malware. The Russian digital incursion into 

Ukrainian networks, in tandem with a physical military assault, was something the Russian Federation had been practicing for almost a decade. Targeting Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and eventually Ukraine in 2014, 
152

these attacks used cyber effects, more traditional effects (with mechanized 

ground units, troops on the ground, and aircraft), or a combination of both. 

In each of the three instances, Russian force escalated in both scope and 

complexity. Russia has set forth the blueprint for the training and development of an effective cyber corps, and broadcast to the world how it has 

effectively integrated cyber operations with traditional large-scale military 

maneuvers. Moreover, Russia is making it known how they perceive the 

place of cyber, and other indirect forms of conflict, as shapers of policy. 

From a military perspective, Russia’s crawl-walk-run progression 

of cyber operations—enacted through casual disregard for international norms and standards of conduct—has enabled it to develop its cyber 

corps through real world cyberspace missions. Russian cyber operators 

have worked in tandem with Russian military operations to find the most 

effective ways to integrate cyber effects into more traditional military battlespace. This invaluable experience, unable to be fully recreated in training laboratories and exercises, affords Russia the dual abilities of both 

shaping and better understanding the battlefield of the future.

Understanding the Terms

Before considering the how cyber operations fit into the current understanding of battlespace, one must ensure that he or she understands at least 

the definitions of baseline concepts within the cyber domain.

First, this chapter will eschew the term “hacker.” “Hacker” is a loaded, ill-defined word; its position as a ubiquitous catch-all for bad actors 

“on the internet” necessarily means it should be excluded from a more 

granular discussion of cyberspace operational development. Because the 

concepts dealt with herein deal more with nations and nation-states, the 

term “attacker” is more appropriate.There are two types of actions to delineate for the purposes of this chapter: cyber-attack and cyber-warfare. A 

cyber-attack must aim to undermine the function of a computer or computer network and must have a political or national security purpose.5

 A 

generic end user being infected with malware from a bad website is not a 

cyber-attack. Further, state or non-state actors may propagate a cyber-attack. Richard A. Clark, former member of the US National Security Council, defines cyber-attacks as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another 

nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or 

disruption,”6

 and Michael Hayden, former Director of the National Security Agency, describes cyber-attacks similarly as a “deliberate attempt to 

disable or destroy another country’s computer networks.”7

 
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On a larger, purely nation-to-nation scale, is cyber-warfare. Cyber-warfare will also always meet the benchmarks of a cyber-attack, though not 

all cyber-attacks are cyber-warfare. A cyber-attack rises to the level of cyber-warfare—that is, the “level of an armed attack justifying self-defense 

under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter”—when the attack results in physical 

destruction comparable to a conventional, kinetic effect.8 If an attacker 

launches a denial-of-service attack against a telecommunications provider 

or datacenter, for instance, this would not rise beyond the definition of 

cyber-attack; however, if the attacker unleashes malware which destroys 

stored data, device firmware, or information back-ups, those events would 

be more in-line with “cyber-warfare.” 

With that said, where else should the Gerasimov doctrine—a doctrine 

of increased belligerence and warfare through indirect means and “contactless actions”—be eventually aimed but at the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), Russia’s trans-Atlantic menace which too often 

stands in the way of Moscow’s Russo-centric policies?

NATO is based on the concept of collective defense that enhances 

its strategy of deterrence. Through formal agreements and long-standing 

and extensive collaboration, NATO sends a strong signal that member 

states will stand together in the face of threats to deter aggression against 

its members. NATO exists to preserve the peace and to make sure that 

changes to the status quo in Europe occur through political processes that 

lead to the spread of democracy, the rule of law, and adherence to international norms.

To achieve its varied Russo-centric objectives, Russia opted to pick a 

course of action not to defeat NATO, but to defeat NATO’s strategy. By 

presenting the Western alliance with actions that produce minimal death 

and minor (if any) physical destruction, Russia has attempted to shift the 

responsibility of escalation onto NATO, attempting to goad the defensive 

alliance into launching a pre-emptive attack in order to keep the status 

quo.9

 If, through ambiguously legal actions, Russia could goad NATO 

(or simply a NATO-aligned country) into a traditional, military response, 

Russia could claim to be the wronged, vulnerable defender now suffering 

an act of aggression—merely because there is no concrete international 

understanding of when and where a military response is appropriate for 

a cyber-attack. 

Estonia

The attack on Estonia was a two-phase offensive. Initially, the attackers engaged in little more than electronic vandalism, such as hacking into 
154

the website of the political party that led Estonia’s coalition government, 

where the attackers posted a fake letter of apology from Prime Minister 

Andrus Ansip for moving a statue. In the second phase, the attacks escalated into a full-scale campaign. The aim was to overload Estonia’s 

computer servers with massive volumes of message traffic causing them 

to crash, leveraging bot-nets—large networks of computers which have 

been taken over by malware and which are controlled from one or more 

central locations—to bombard the targeted Estonian systems with millions of fake messages. Some estimates suggest that one million computers were co-opted or otherwise employed globally for this Distributed 

Denial of Service (DDoS) onslaught on the servers of a country of 1.3 

million inhabitants.10

Georgia

Cyber-attacks on Georgian systems were already under way before 

Russia invaded in 2008. On the day the ground attacks began, sites such 

as stopgeorgia.ru posted lists of Georgian targets to attack as well as instructions on how to launch those attacks.11 While Moscow baited Georgia 

with troop movements on the borders of the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, bot-nets were already on the attack, degrading 

Georgian websites, including the pages of the president, the parliament, 

the foreign ministry, and news agencies. Banks, which were also targets of 

cyber-attacks, shut down their servers at the first sign of attack to pre-empt 

identity or monetary theft.12 This was the first (recognized) time Russian 

cyber and traditional military attacks were performed in coordination.13 

Target surveys, targets, domains, and instructions were ready to go 

and posted to the internet in accompaniment with the initial Russian incursion into Georgia. This was not a fly-by-night operation set up by helping 

hacktivists; rather, the timing suggests this was a state-sponsored, military-ordered cyber incursion specifically designed to be launched in tandem with the military operation.

Ukraine

Some suggest that Russia is using Ukraine as a perpetual cyber-war 

testing ground, or as Wired described it in a lengthy and detailed report 

on the matter last year, “a laboratory for perfecting new forms of global 

online combat.”14 A digital army has systematically undermined practically every sector of Ukraine: media, finance, transportation, military, politics, and energy. Seemingly unstoppable intrusions deleted data, destroyed 

computers, and in some cases paralyzed organizations’ most basic functions.15 There is no way to know exactly how many Ukrainian institutions 
155

have been hit in the escalating campaign of cyber-attacks, and any count is 

liable to be an underestimate. For every publicly known target, others have 

not admitted to being victimized. Still more have not even discovered the 

intruders in their systems. 

The attackers’ intentions can be summed up in a single Russian word: 

poligon, translated loosely as “training ground.” Even in their most damaging actions, the attackers never seem to go too far; the attackers could 

have knocked out Ukrenergo’s transmission station for longer or caused 

permanent, physical harm to the grid, but instead settled (repeatedly) for 

blackouts.16 The attacker never seem committted to full destruction of 

their targets in Ukraine. Instead, the attackers cease before delivering irreparable damage, playing their cards close to their chest as if reserving 

their true capabilities for some future operation—one can almost think of 

it as game planning during a pre-season football game.17

The attacks on Estonia, Georgia, and the Ukraine, while highlighting the fusion of cyber-effects with more traditional military operations, 

should also serve as a wake-up call to military and security circles in 

NATO nations on both sides of the Atlantic and to highlight questions 

in need of thoughtful consideration: namely, what are the lessons to take 

away from the Russian Federation’s increased utilization of the cyber domain in their combat operations, and how does this help to shape the 

battlefield of the future?

Analysis

The cyber domain offers an increased latitude of action for commanders in the modern battlespace in part due to the fog of uncertainty that surrounds the proportion, suitability, and overall effectiveness of responding 

to a cyber-attack. An attack on a base which wounds and kills opposing 

soldiers or physically destroys infrastructure may invite a response inkind, where a communications system that has been denied service or otherwise degraded may not elicit a physical strike in retaliation. Cyberspace 

operations serve as an excellent avenue of force projection without putting 

Soldiers in harm’s way; these operations have increased the latitude for 

action in the same way that the development and fielding of the Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) did. A UAV can be sent on a mission that may be 

deemed too hazardous or not important enough to send Soldiers into the 

field to risk life and limb to accomplish. The same concept applies to a cyberspace operation—rather than send a team into a known hostile area to 

physically retrieve and return intelligence from an enemy’s digital devic-
156

es, it is easier (and may make more sense) for the commander to approve a 

cyberspace operation to electronically retrieve the same intelligence.

A cyberspace operation also does not require the complex partnerships 

that a mission with Soldiers being transported via airplanes, helicopters, 

ships, or ground vehicles may require. Where a traditional mission may 

require the use of an airfield in a partner country, or the use of another country’s airspace or other violation of territorial sovereignty for the 

delivery and retrieval of Soldiers and effects, a cyberspace operation is 

not constrained in the same way. Cyberspace operations may also require 

significantly less deconfliction to perform than a traditional military operation. There is a far smaller chance of collateral damage coming from a 

cyberspace operation than through the launching of missiles or dropping 

of bombs; with that decreased chance of sparking an international incident 

through harming or killing citizens or soldiers of a different country, an 

increased utilization of cyberspace operations would allow a commander 

more avenues to prosecute their target or objective.

The ability to launch a cyber-attack changes the face of a large-scale 

combat operation because the efficacy of the operation can be wildly 

out-of-proportion to the risk of damage or loss. When a few strokes on the 

keyboard—from dozens, hundreds, or thousands of miles away—can turn 

an enemy’s power off, disable their communications, or turn their transportation systems into a chaotic, unmanaged mess, and the cost in lives, 

equipment, and resources is negligible, then a commander finds him or 

herself in an advantageous position from which to launch further attacks 

(cyber or otherwise). 

For all the new and exciting avenues open to a commander on the 

offensive, the introduction of cyberspace operations should also be of 

great concern. Much of the modern battlespace is shaped by timely—if 

not instantaneous—communication, and it is exactly that communication 

which would be targeted by a group waging a cyber-attack. Unfortunately, 

the best and only surefire way to defend a machine with any sort of connectivity is to disable or unplug it; otherwise, a determined attacker will 

eventually gain access. He or she only needs to wait for an end-user of that 

machine or equipment to make the fatal mistake which grants the attacker 

access. Defensive cyber operations have their place but, due in part to 

the ever-present risk of human error, serve primarily as a delaying action. 

What this practically means is that the best defense is a good offense, and 

that energy should be focused on assaulting any enemy’s (digital) position 

with such overwhelming force and violence that the same force and violence cannot be offered in return. Scenes from Hollywood, with defenders 
157

running to and fro, typing on this terminal or that keyboard to fend off 

some sort of cyber-attack have no basis in reality; once a machine has 

been compromised or degraded, it should be effectively considered out 

of the fight (until properly remediated). Not only has the commander lost 

that piece of equipment, but now the attackers who had been focused on 

the now out-of-commission equipment can redouble their efforts against a 

different target. In a persistent cyber-attack scenario which a commander 

would find him or herself in a large-scale combat operation, the losses 

cascade together like so many dominoes, failures and defeats compounding exponentially until the enemy attacker has control of the systems and 

freedom of movement within.

The binary choice of offense or defense, at least with regards to modern cyber battlefield operations, is an anachronism. The new commander 

should seek to deny, degrade, or destroy the capabilities of the enemy 

with whom he is engaged as expeditiously as possible, understanding that 

his or her enemy is seeking to do precisely the same thing at precisely the 

same time.

Conclusion

A crawl-walk-run approach through Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine 

has lent the Russian cyber-arm a smooth, well-oiled quality; at the same 

time, the Russian ability to conduct real world operations, absent effective 

international intervention, external defense, or interdiction has allowed a 

honing of tactics, techniques, and procedures (or TTPs) and tools to greater obfuscate Russian presence and activity.18

Estonia, the initial victim, was a low-key affair, or the crawl: cyber-attacks launched, without being paired with military intervention, which in 

retrospect can be viewed as a proof-of-concept. Georgia, a step beyond 

Estonia, was the walk: pre-formed bot-nets sending pre-formed packets, 

in a larger-scale denial of service attack, but now paired with an incursion 

of troops and tanks and a traditional military movement into the South 

Ossetia area. Through postings on various internet forums and sites, paramilitary cyber activity seems to have been, if not encouraged, but also not 

discouraged—which only served to swell the ranks of those conducting 

cyber-attacks on Russia’s behalf. Finally, Ukraine, was the run: large-scale 

cyber-attacks paired with military incursion and occupation. Simultaneous attacks occurred on media firms; an attack on the Central Election 

Commission’s website triggered the announcement of an ultra-right-wing 

candidate as winner of the election; and an incursion took over the networks which connected and controlled the systems for entire power grids. 
158

Once the desired levels of denial, degradation, and destruction had been 

achieved, the attackers destroyed the firmware for the network cards in 

the machines, leaving administrators and responders unable to fix the issue remotely.

19

It is perhaps best to think of the ongoing cyber activity in Ukraine as 

Russia’s Combat Training Center, or CTC. The purpose of a CTC is to 

provide realistic collective training for Soldiers, leaders, staffs, and units 

according to Army and Joint doctrine, simulating as closely as possible 

the rigors and stresses of combat.20 The CTC ensures Soldiers, units, and 

leaders are well prepared for current and future operations; no other means 

of training provides the Army with the ability to maintain the consistently tough and realistic training environment that combatants require for 

success in warfare.21 Though cyberspace is a tested domain at both the 

National Training Center (NTC) and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), there is not a dedicated electronic or cyber CTC with which 

to train US Army (or military at-large) cyber actors.22 This leaves cyber-training to be conducted in more traditional, lab-based environments, 

the limitations of which are clear: training networks can only be so large; 

the trainer can only provide the types of operating systems that he or she 

has access or license to provide; and the vulnerabilities and/or exploitation 

vectors provided to train a cyber-actor are limited to what the training 

facilitator can think of (or knows about) at the time he or she is putting together a network. In the case of Russia, however, adventurism in Ukraine 

has served to offer a holistically complete training environment for the 

Russian cyber-forces—state-sanctioned or otherwise. Russian forces will 

find a width and breadth of computers and operating systems, in a variety of patched and unpatched states, administered by both the lazy and 

hyper-vigilant. Russian cyber actors can train against medical, transportation, banking, power, or education systems, take note of what works and 

what does not, and then take that real-time, operational data back to the 

coders and developers to manipulate their cyber toolkit on the fly, increasing their efficacy for the next round of attacks. 

“Russia is not only pushing the limits of its technical abilities,” says 

Thomas Rid, a professor in the War Studies department at King’s College, 

London, “but also feeling out the edges of what the international community will tolerate.”23 The Kremlin meddled in the Ukrainian election and 

faced seemingly ineffective repercussions; Russian and Russia-aligned actors continue to wreak havoc across the country in a variety of necessary 

and national-security-level industries, including turning the power off and 

on in Ukraine with impunity.24 Then, full of confidence from their eastern 
159

European triumphs, Russia tried similar tactics in Germany, France, and 

the United States. Russian government cyber actors have targeted “government entities and multiple US critical infrastructure sectors,” including 

those of energy, nuclear, water and aviation, according to an alert issued 

by the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).25 Critical manufacturing sectors and commercial facilities 

also have been targeted by the ongoing “multi-stage intrusion campaign 

by Russian government cyber actors.”26 A joint analysis by the FBI and the 

Department of Homeland Security described the intrusions as extremely 

sophisticated, in some cases first breaching suppliers and third-party vendors before hopping from those networks to their ultimate target. 

Rid suggests that Russia is testing out boundaries and trying to map 

out red lines; if Russian actions are rebuffed in one area, or an effect that 

they have produced draws too much attention or creates unacceptable 

consternation, then Russian forces simply move on to the next target or 

the next intrusion. However, without significant ramifications—or even 

merely effective international reaction—Russia may not feel significantly at-risk and, lacking necessary external push back, might continue to 

the “next step” for their targets.27 What the escalation of Russian attacks 

truly suggests, however, is a cyber-war will not be waged at some abstract point in the future; it is happening, at least the initial stages, now, 

throughout the world, propagated (at least in part) by a seasoned corps of 

Russian veterans.

Every so often in the history of warfare a sea-change occurs which 

affects the way militaries function and how combat is conceived. Stone 

gave way to metal, bows to gunpowder and bullets. Automatic weapons 

eventually offered commanders a multiplicative increase in firepower and 

destructive capability. The advent of airpower opened up an entirely new 

domain on the battlefield, and now the advent of weaponized cyberspace 

has done the same. The Russian Federation’s stepped-inclusion of cyber 

operations into their military campaigns serves as a proof of cyber operations’ utility and benefit to a commander in the modern battlespace. The 

lesson of Russia’s success is not how the Russian Federation developed 

their program. Instead, having seen the effectiveness that cyber operations 

can have both in shaping a battlespace and in offering a decided tactical or 

psychological advantage over an enemy, the lesson is that cyber operations 

must be more fully integrated into modern combat. Peer and near-peer 

adversaries alike are fielding cyberspace capabilities and integrating those 

same capabilities into their operation plans; Russia just happened to display their progression and development on the world stage. With the lati-
160

tude of action it affords commanders on the ground, the ability to degrade 

or deny the communications of an opposing force, and the psychological 

aspect of an effective cyber-attack on the armed forces of an adversarial 

country (in addition to the population), the cyber domain truly is the next 

evolution of battlespace. The United States must fully embrace and work 

to seamlessly integrate cyberspace operations into their plans for combat 

operations, both large-and small-scale. As has been demonstrated by the 

Russian Federation’s military adventurism through the past decade, the 

adversaries of the United States fully intend to do just that.
161

Notes

1. Department of the Army, (FM) Field Manual 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronics Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 1-1.

2. General Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight 

New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out 

Combat Operations.” Military Review, January/February 2016, 23.

3. Gerasimov, 23.

4. Molly K. McKew et al., “The Gerasimov Doctrine,” POLITICO Magazine, September/October 2017, accessed 27 April 2018, https://www.politico.

com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538. For the opinion that the Gerasimov doctrine is not necessarily “real,” 

see Roger N. McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?” US Army 

War College Quarterly Parameters 46, no. 1, 103.

5. Oona A. Hathaway and Rebecca Crootof, “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” 

2012, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 3852, 836–837.

6. Richard A. Clarke, Cyber War (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), 6.

7. Tom Gjelten, “Extending The Law Of War To Cyberspace,” National 

Public Radio, 22 September 2010, accessed 15 February 2018, https://www.npr.

org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130023318.

8. Hathaway and Crootof, “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” 841.

9. Clarke, Cyber War, 34.

10. Robert Mandel, Optimizing Cyberdeterrence: A Comprehensive Strategy 

for Preventing Foreign Cyberattacks, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 

Press, 2017). See also Franklin D. Kramer and Melanie J. Teplinsky, “Cybersecurity and Tailored Deterrence,” Atlantic Council, 3 January 2014, accessed 20 

February 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/cybersecurity-and-tailored-deterrence.

11. More than likely, these instructions amounted to having the interested 

user download a tool such as the low orbit ion cannon, which lets a user opt for 

their box to be coopted and controlled as part of a larger, Denial of Service or 

Distributed Denial of Services intent bot-net.

12. John Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” The New York 

Times, 13 August 2008, accessed 13 February 2018, http://www.nytimes.

com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.

13. David J. Smith, “Russian Cyber Strategy and the War Against Georgia,” 

Atlantic Council, 17 January 2014, accessed 20 February 2018, http://www.

atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-cyber-policy-and-the-war-againstgeorgia. This is more along the lines of what the Rand Corporation was defining 

as a cyber-attack—computer-based occurrences paired with actual military 

movements and force.

14. Christopher Miller, “What’s Ukraine Doing to Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? ‘Not Enough,’” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 8 March 2018, 

accessed 22 February 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html.
162

15. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab 

for Cyberwar,” Wired, 20 June 2017, accessed 14 February 2018, https://www.

wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/.

16. Greenberg, “How An Entire Nation.” “A power company responsible 

for operational and technological control of the Integrated Power System (IPS) 

of Ukraine and electricity transmission via trunk power grids from generating 

plants to the distribution networks of the regional electricity suppliers,” About 

Us, УКРЕНЕРГО, accessed 7 March 2018. https://ua.energy/about-en/.

17. Greenberg, “How An Entire Nation.”

18. I say “absent effective international intervention” because if the international intervention had been effective, then the cyber-attacks, which still ravage 

Ukraine, would have been stopped.

19. Greenberg, “How An Entire Nation.”

20. “Combat Training Center Directorate (CTCD),” 8 July 2014, accessed 

27 April 2018, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cact/ctcd. See also: US 

Army, “Combat Training Center (CTC) Program 2009 US Army Posture Statement,” accessed 25 February 2018, https://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_

papers/combat_training_center_program.html.

21. US Army, “Combat Training Center (CTC) Program.”

22. “Combat Training Center Rotations Continue to Drive Evolution of 

Army Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities,” Army News, 29 June 2017, accessed 

26 April 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/190201/combat_training_center_rotations_continue_to_drive_evolution_of_army_cyber_electromagnetic_activitie

23. Greenberg, “How An Entire Nation.”

24. Greenberg.

25. “Alert (TA18-074A).” Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting 

Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors | United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), 15 March 2018, accessed 21 March 2018. 

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.

26. Jennifer A. Dlouhy and Michael Riley, “Russian Hackers Attacking U.S. 

Power Grid and Aviation, FBI Warns,” Bloomberg, 15 March 2018, accessed 

March 21, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/russianhackers-attacking-u-s-power-grid-aviation-fbi-warns.

27. Greenberg, “How An Entire Nation.”
163

Chapter 10

Botnet Evolution during Modern-Day 

Large-Scale Combat Operations1

Lieutenant Colonel Rick A. Galeano, Katrin Galeano, 

Samer Al-Khateeb, Nitin Agarwal, and 

Lieutenant Colonel James N. Turner 

Large-scale combat operations no longer involve only land, sea, and air 

domains, but also an Information Environment (IE) capable of quickly and 

unexpectedly changing conditions in all domains within the multi-domain 

operational environment. A new artificial means, social bots, has been introduced to the constantly evolving IE to shape and influence perceptions 

and cognitively trigger behavioral change on an exponentially massive 

scale worldwide. The goal is to influence the IE by amplifying social media followership in the form of “social bots”—scripted codes that mimic 

human users and serve as super-spreaders of information. These social 

bots can be used to promote particular points of view, fabricate perception 

of popularity or popular viewpoint, muddle the discourse and narrative 

space, and/or serve as a means to bolster these points of view by promoting blogs or other digital content. Effects can range across the physical, 

cognitive, and informational dimensions to ultimately trigger specific behaviors in individuals and groups that impact the operational environment 

in a way that is beneficial to those who operate the bots.

For example, in the physical dimension, bots are capable of disrupting 

infrastructure by overloading networks or hosting platforms with a deluge 

of information; or they could easily carry obtrusive malware or viruses 

to deny or degrade a targeted system. Once an infection starts inside a 

network, it is difficult for network defenders to isolate and contain. Contemplate the potentially catastrophic effect that a Tactical Operations Center’s (TOC) mission command systems being denied during large-scale 

combat operations (LSCO)—where assured communications is vital and 

may well prove to be the difference between a mission’s success or failure. 

Correspondingly, social bots can shape the informational dimension by 

corrupting and/or disrupting how information is received, processed, and/

or disseminated through mission command systems and human filters—

effectively limiting the optimal employment of friendly combat power. 

Contrary to popular belief effects within the IE are not solely generated 

through non-kinetic effects; rather “the warfighting functions (particularly 

movement and maneuver fires) produce effects in the information envi-
164

ronment, whether intentional or not.2 Lastly, the cognitive dimension revolves around the perceptions that the audiences receive from any of the 

messaging and the resultant behavior based on those stimuli. Repeated 

messaging from what appears to be a variety of independent sources create 

an echo chamber that focuses on repetition in order to resonate cognitively 

within targeted individuals or groups. “Rarely does a single tactic, task, 

method, action, or message change behaviour.”3

 Quite simply, the variety 

employed in disseminating a message and frequency at which that message is disseminated in some cases matter just as much as content itself to 

generate to required resonance to trigger the desired behavioral change. 

The case study discussed in this chapter provides empirical evidence in 

support of this.

The 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea provides a historical case study 

of hybrid warfare activities involving ground operations and information 

operations.4

 Social bots operating during this time moved specially-crafted messages through the information environment. Data collected from 

social media, including blogs and Twitter clearly demonstrate both Russia’s intent and capability to manipulate information through the use of social bots.5

 Western analysts utilized socio-computational methodologies to 

identify the “seeders of information”—sources of information supplying 

content to the botnets or a set of bot accounts working together—and the 

communication and coordination strategies used. During the aforementioned event the botnets deployed for propaganda dissemination evolved 

by becoming increasingly deceptive and well-coordinated to mislead targeted audiences on the direct level of Russian participation and strategic 

objectives to confuse and delay decision from Western political leaders. 

This chapter provides the relevancy and importance of reinforcing effects 

into the information operations domain, especially in the realm of social 

media, by studying the social network analysis of the effect of hybrid warfare during large-scale combat operations. 

What Is a Bot?

A bot is a coordinated computer program that tries to mimic human 

behavior through messaging/interacting. For example, a bot can manipulate the search results returned by various search engines such as Google.6

Such methods can be used to elevate a topic into “top trends”—which are 

often highlighted at the top of search results or social media platforms. 

This is especially important in today’s “Information Age” where many 

users simply rely on these “top results” to formulate their initial perceptions/positions of a particular event without rigorous examination of all 

informational sources. In short, the Russians, through their systematic em-
165

ployment of social bots were able to effectively filter information received 

by the vast majority of their targeted audiences. 

Research shows that most internet traffic, especially on social media, 

is generated by “botnets.”7

 In addition to botnets, the Russians employed 

large numbers of people to troll social media sites and blogs to disseminate 

propaganda.8

 The diverse nature of social media user interaction and news 

distribution creates a huge gap-filled territory for exploitation by social 

bots and human-bot collaborations that engage in information conflicts, 

“trolling,” or in influencing narratives. 

Case Study: The 2014 Crimean Water Crisis

Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 16 March 2014 was 

met with international discontent, and a sense of Russian imperialism to 

expand their reign of power. Both the United Nations and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen condemned Russia’s blatant aggression and disregard of international law. Grievances, requests for help, 

and on-the-ground accounts on the developing conflict were reported to 

worldwide audiences through a variety of open source platforms including 

blogs, news websites, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.

Several stories published by Russian news agencies to mislead and 

confuse target audiences through the dissemination of disinformation 

(i.e. lies) and misinformation (i.e. misleading). Examples of these national-level, coordinated efforts include ITAR-TASS, which claimed that 

the Ukrainian government had ceased work on the North Crimean Canal 

which carries water from the Dnepr River to Crimea.9

 In another example, the Russian international television network Russia Today (RT) reported that satellite images showed Ukraine deliberately trying to cut off 

the Crimean Peninsula’s water supply by building a dam, while Russian 

scientists were trying to find ways to supply Crimea with fresh water in 

the meantime.10 Reliant on these false and misleading stories, a subsequent New York Times article reported that a water shortage was observed, 

Crimean farms were drying, food supplies were inadequate, and the price 

of basic goods, such as milk and gas, had doubled.11 All the while, Russian 

armed forces were fully engaged in LSCO against Ukrainian forces in the 

eastern Ukraine in July 2014. Russia’s employment of new weapons and 

methods of employment were not limited to non-kinetic capabilities. In 

eastern Ukraine, an entire Ukrainian battalion was virtually destroyed in 

four minutes from a barrage of high explosives, cluster, and thermobaric munitions.12 What remains is clear from Russian involvement in the 

Ukraine is that they are employing a variety of capabilities in new and 
166

innovative ways to generate a relative edge on the battlefield. The thought 

that should keep Western military analysts up at night is that the Russians 

surely did not reveal their full bag of tricks.

Pro-Russian bots leveraged the internet to shape the information environment in the form of echo chambers. “Confirmation bias perpetuates 

misinformation, and when incorrect information bounces around through 

an echo chamber, it leaves a mark every place it hits. Even if something 

we read is disproven, we can’t un-see incorrect information.”13 The creators of bots understand the effect of an echo chamber. The low effort and 

cost combined with the high effect of seeding information through social 

bots can quickly influence the masses over the short, and in some cases, 

the long-term. In this case study, these bots were disseminating anti-West 

and pro-Russian news articles in a bid to create a window of opportunity 

for Russian forces to achieve their strategic objectives prior to potential 

Western intervention. Numerous bots were simply tweeting the same article after copying it to various websites and blogs, making it appear as if 

the articles were independently posted on different website URLs. In other 

words, bots were cloning the [mis]information, creating an echo chamber 

and misleading targeted audiences about the military operations that were 

ongoing in the Ukraine.

Data Description

Often content (e.g., reports, images, videos, and articles) originated 

from one social media site and were diffused to many other sites without 

sufficient source attribution. For the purposes of illustrating this point, the 

authors tracked multiple popular social media sites in an attempt to identify sources and their implicit interconnections. The keywords “Ukraine,” 

“Ukraine Crisis,” “Euromaidan,” “Automaidan,” and “Ukraine’s Automaidan Protestors” were used to collect data about the crisis. First, popular blog posts were identified for the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and then 

cross-referenced these posts with Twitter data to find the posts that were 

diffused the most on Twitter. Tools such as TweetTracker, and NodeXL 

were then used to collect Twitter data for the research period between 29 

April 2014 20:40:32 and 21 July 2014 22:40:06 UTC—which coincided 

with [event].14 This series of methodical queries resulted in 1,361 unique 

tweets, 588 unique Twitter users, and 118,601 relations (including follows, 

mentions, replies, and tweets) between these users.
167

Figure 10.1. Word cloud depicting data description searches of the information 

dimension related the 2014 Ukrainian water crisis. Graphic created by the authors.

Methodology to Identify Botnets

As Russia’s strategic objectives and resultant aggression transitioned 

from Crimea to the Ukraine proper, worldwide media attention did not 

correspondingly shift. Russia’s misinformation efforts played a significant 

role is this delay. As misinformation continued about the Russian-invented water crisis (just enough information that made it believable), Russian 

forces—both proxy and conventional—were operating with relative freedom within the territorial borders of the eastern Ukraine.15

The hashtag #Crimea, in both Russian and Ukrainian language, had 

erratic results from day to day using the same filtering algorithm. Topics 

such as the end of the ceasefire and the advance of troops into Southeast 

Ukraine began to take precedence. “Propaganda, deception, disinformation, and the ability of individuals and groups to influence disparate populations through social technologies reflect the increasing speed of human 

interaction.”16 Misinformation promulgated across social channels, keeping all but the outside confused as to what was happening. Controlling this 

line of communication in the information domain was conducted with an 

implicit use of narrative control by using botnets. The use of botnets to 

influence is portrayed in Figure 10.2. 
168

Figure 10.2. Three sub-networks with unusual structural characteristics in S1 

are observed when the Girvan-Newman clustering algorithm is applied to the 

network. On the left are the expanded clusters and on the right is the collapsed 

view of the identified five clusters. Graphic created by the authors.

The first network that was analysed was the friends and followers network, i.e., the social network. As shown in Figure 10.2, the accounts that 

were related to the collected data had three sub-networks: S1, S2, and 

S3. The sub-network S1 exhibited unusual structural characteristics. The 

other two sub-networks were ignored due to their relatively small size and 

lack of anomalous behaviors. We applied the Girvan-Newman clustering 

algorithm—an algorithm that detects communities in a network based on 

how closely the nodes are connected—and found that the network had five 

clusters (communities or groups of nodes), as shown in Figure 10.1.17 The 

center of the star-shaped cluster within S1 belonged to a “real-person.”18

Figure 10.2 shows the Twitter account, which was connected to 345 bots 

out of 588 Twitter accounts in this network. This real person was the 

owner/operator of a specific webpage that all the other bots referred 

to in their tweets with different shortened URLs.

The star-shaped cluster was connected to the other two-syndicate 

groups, viz. syndicate-1 and syndicate-2. Close examination of these ties 

revealed that the members of the syndicate groups followed the “real-person” node, and not the other way. The research conclusively determined 

that “real-person” is the most central node of the entire bot network in 

question, and functioned as the bots” information source. 

The other ties within the two syndicates were mutually reciprocated 

relationships, suggesting use of the principles “Follow Me and I Follow You” (FMIFY) and “I Follow You, Follow Me” (IFYFM)—a wellknown practice used by Twitter spammers for “link farming,” or quickly 

gaining followers.19
169

Unlike the “real person” network, there is no single most central node 

in these networks, indicating an absence of a hierarchical organization 

structure in the “syndicate-1” and “syndicate-2” networks. Further analysis showed that the broker nodes act as interfaces between the group 

members and other groups. They established bridges that facilitated tweet 

circulation across the syndicates. The broker nodes were primarily responsible for connecting with the “real person” network, specifically the 

most influential “real person” node. The operational effect being achieved 

through this method was narrative control as depicted in Figure 3. Thus 

Russia, through their use of bot-seeded misinformation, was able to successfully shape the necessary strategic conditions within the IE to allow 

for large-scale combat operations to begin in eastern Ukraine.

The Military Implications for the Expanded Use of Social Bots

The instantaneous speed and worldwide reach of social media coupled 

with the quick pace of interactions between a exponentially large set of users, many of whom do not verify the veracity of proffered information and 

sourcing, create the conditions ripe for the massive manipulation of technologically-dependent societies such as the United States. Quite simply, 

the more popular a social media message is the more likely non-discerning 

individuals are to believe that the content is true. This dynamic should 

not be lost on Western militaries who are beholden to elected individuals 

that are subject to the approval of their constituencies. The nation’s future 

adversaries and enemies will likely increasingly leverage information as 

a low-cost and low-risk instrument of national power to corrupt the interconnected tissues of America’s “Clausewitzian trinity.” At the strategic 

and operational levels of war, social media platforms that are manipulatFigure 10.3. This real person network is connected to broker bots that coordinate 

the dissemination of propaganda through the bots in their respective syndicates. 

Graphic created by the authors. 
170

ed by bots can shift international and regional opinions about the use of 

military force or validity of military operations in a region. At the tactical 

level, bot-induced social media propaganda could potentially be used to 

persuade susceptible targets to disrupt or delay military operations through 

protests or other “non-lethal” resistance.

Military leaders need to understand that the narrative can be easily 

manipulated and influenced by bots and trolls. Most users of social media 

cannot or will not differentiate between real accounts and fake bot accounts. Because social bots can be employed clandestinely in a low-cost, 

low-risk context military leaders can expect to encounter an increased 

amount of adversary-generated social media propaganda. Bots will likely 

be a weapon of choice for America’s adversaries and enemies for the foreseeable future.

The growing weaponization of social media is influencing large-scale 

combat operations. Military units at all levels need to develop tools for 

identifying threats and opportunities within the IE, and responding to them 

appropriately across all domains. There is a present need for social media 

cells that are able to monitor the IE in real-time, and have requisite authorities to pre-emptively act or rapidly respond to adversary actions within 

the IE. Developing well-trained social media cells at the appropriate tactical headquarters for an operation enables rapid and appropriate response 

that can neutralize propaganda and mitigate its negative effects. 

Three key enablers should be incorporated into Army units to effectively counter bot-enabled social media propaganda. These enablers are 

Public Affairs (PA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Operations 

Security (OPSEC). Army Divisions are typically augmented with a Military Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD), a Tactical PSYOP Development Detachment (TPDD), and occasionally an Information Operations 

Field Support Team (IO FST) in addition to organic support. The MPAD 

can directly counter bot-enabled propaganda through media engagement 

and social media outreach. The TPDD can help assess propaganda and 

evaluate what messages within the propaganda resonate with specific local audiences. The IO FST can manage OPSEC to identify critical 

information that must be protected to ensure successful operations. All 

of these enablers must coordinate their efforts to address the threat of 

bot-enabled propaganda.

Military leaders at all levels must have a broad understanding of the 

IE, and the potential cross-domain of information. This understanding enables leaders to better incorporate social media considerations into intelli-
171

gence collection, planning, and operations to best achieve desired effects 

in an integrated and synchronized manner. Once bots and trolls are identified, Army units can use Public Affairs official social media accounts to 

counter adversary propaganda by informing interested audiences of the 

truth so that they can validate this trusted source of information to verify 

truthful information or debunk myths espoused by propaganda.

Conclusion

Social media use has been shifting from entertainment to public discourse, thereby making it a preferred tool for influencing group opinions 

or achieving political goals by disseminating propaganda or misinformation about various events. The hybrid warfare observed in Ukraine in 2014 

identified how information warfare was successfully employed to support, 

facilitate, and allow large-scale combat operations; since this time bot networks have evolved into even more complex entities that could exponentially magnify the scale and reach of the effects seen in 2014. A follow-on 

study conducted by the Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock 

identified an even more complex series of botnets operating during the 

2015 military exercise Dragoon Ride conducted by US Army Europe.20

These botnets demonstrated a probing attack into the information dimension, the goal was to also change the overall narrative. Although, not included for this chapter, Dragoon Ride 2015 does demonstrate the continued evolution of echo chambers with the use of botnets. 

By presenting half-truths, contorted facts, manipulated images, and 

videos in a cogent manner substantiated by URLs to other propaganda 

riddled websites, it is not very challenging to mislead a potential target audience, especially during LSCOs—where time constraints make sufficient 

analysis exceedingly more challenging. Twitter and other social platforms 

are merely just a mechanism to steer readers in the desired direction. This 

is where other forms of mass media that allow more expansive content are 

most helpful to developing a credible story for target audience consumption. Bots are used to steer attention to these blogs. The goal of the bots 

is to bring the propaganda to as many readers as possible by employing 

clandestine means as demonstrated in these case studies. Military leaders 

must consider how they will incorporate information operations to counter adversary use of social media to counter adversary actions and create 

positions of relative advantage for US Commanders within the IE, and 

ultimately the OE. 
172

Notes

1. Preliminary research for this study was conducted in Agarwal et. al., 

2017. Since its publication, the research has been updated with revisions such 

as the correlation to large-scale combat operations. This research was funded in 

part by the US National Science Foundation (IIS-1636933, ACI-1429160, and 

IIS-1110868), US Office of Naval Research (N00014-10-1-0091, N00014-14-1-

0489, N00014-15-P-1187, N00014-16-1-2016, N00014-16-1-2412, N00014-17-

1-2605, N00014-17-1-2675), US Air Force Research Lab, US Army Research 

Office (W911NF-16-1-0189), US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(W31P4Q-17-C-0059), and the Jerry L. Maulden/Entergy Endowment at the 

University of Arkansas at Little Rock. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions 

or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do 

not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations. The researchers 

gratefully acknowledge the support.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: 2016), 3-3.

3. FM-3-13, 8-25.

4. News BBC, “Russia Fears Crimea Water Shortage as Supply Drops,” 

BBC News, 25 April 2014, accessed 12 June 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-europe-27155885.

5. Nitin Agarwal, Samer Al-khateeb, Rick Galeano, and Rebecca Goolsby, 

“Examining the Use of Botnets and their Evolution in Propaganda Dissemination,” Journal of NATO Defence Strategic Communications 2, 2017, 87–112.

6. Tuja Khaund, Richard Young, Samer Al-khateeb, and Nitin Agarwal, “Blog Farm Detection Using Social Network Analysis and Social Cyber 

Forensics Informed Methodologies,” in proceedings of the Advances in Social 

Network Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2018), 28–31 August 2018, Spain.

7. Alex Cheng and Mark Evans, “Inside Twitter An In-Depth Look at the 

5% of Most Active Users,” Sysomos Inc., 2009, accessed 12 June 2018, http://

sysomos.com/insidetwitter/mostactiveusers.

8. Daisy Sindelar, “The Kremlin’s Troll Army: Moscow Is Financing 

Legions of pro-Russia Internet Commenters. But How Much Do They Matter?” 

The Atlantic, 12 August 2014, accessed 15 June 2018, https://www.theatlantic.

com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932/.

9. Alexel Pavlishak, “Water Supply Problem in Crimea to Cost $247–417 

Million - Kremlin Aide,” TASS Russian News Agency, 28 April 2014, accessed 

12 June 2018, http://tass.com/russia/729854.

10. RT News, “Ukraine Builds Dam Cutting off Crimea Water Supply,” 

News Website, RT Question More, (10 May 2014), accessed 12 June 2018, 

https://www.rt.com/news/158028-ukraine-water-supply-crimea/.

11. Neil Macfarguhar, “Aid Elusive, Crimea Farms Face Hurdles,” The 

New York Times, 7 July 2014, accessed 12 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.

com/2014/07/08/world/europe/aid-elusive-crimea-farms-face-hurdles.html.
173

12. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 1-5.

13. Quora, “Are You In A Social Media Echo Chamber? How to Take An 

Objective Look,” Forbes, 28 February 2018, accessed 20 May 2018, https://

www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/02/28/are-you-in-a-social-media-echo-chamber-how-to-take-an-objective-look/#718fb21961f9.

14. Shamanth Kumar et al., “TweetTracker: An Analysis Tool for Humanitarian and Disaster Relief,” ICWSM, 2011, accessed 12 June 2018, http://

tweettracker.fulton.asu.edu/Kumar-etal_TweetTracker.pdf; Marc A. Smith et al., 

“Analyzing (Social Media) Networks with NodeXL,” Proceedings of the Fourth 

International Conference on Communities and Technologies, ACM, 2009, 

255–264, accessed 12 June 2018, http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1556497.

15. “Conceptual: Deception - GlobalSecurity.org,” accessed 28 March 2018, 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_3-88_concept.htm.

16. M. Girvan and M.E.J. Newman, “Community Structure in Social and 

Biological Networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the 

United States of America 99, no. 12, 6 April 2002, 7821–26, accessed 12 June 

2018, doi:10.1073/pnas.122653799.

17. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-13.

18. Girvan and Newman, “Community Structure in Social and Biological 

Networks,” 7821–26.

19. The term “real person” is used so as not to disclose the identity of this 

node; Saptarshi Ghosh et al., “Understanding and Combating Link Farming in 

the Twitter Social Network,” Proceedings of the 21st International Conference 

on World Wide Web, ACM, 2012, 61–70, accessed 12 June 2018, http://dl.acm.

org/citation.cfm?id=2187846.

20. Nitin Agarwal, et al. Journal of NATO Defence Strategic Communications, 87-112.
174
175

Chapter 11

Future Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) Implications 

for Information Operations

Major General James J. Mingus and Colonel Chris N. Reichart

The far-reaching impact of social media, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and competitor influence campaigns have dramatically affected military operations and changed the character of 

modem warfare.1

—Patrick M. Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Over the past 15 years, the Army has focused the majority of its efforts on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, honing the ability to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations where information operations efforts were 

focused more on affecting a non-military population than on enemy decision makers. With the designation of information as a joint function, 

the Department of Defense has increased the importance of the use of 

information during operations across the range of military operations, to 

include during large-scale combat operations. As the military scans the 

horizon for the character of future conflicts during an era that is increasing 

being defined by the proliferation and expansion of information-related 

technologies, information will have a larger—if not decisive—role in the 

accomplishment of military missions, both in competition and conflict.

The unique aspect of the use of information during military activities 

is that its effects are potentially global in nature—blurring the lines between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict. The military 

can employ the use of information to affect outcomes not only on adversary military formations, but multiple audiences simultaneously, affecting 

state actors, societies, and individuals not just in the geographical theater 

of conflict, but globally. In the future, war will be characterized by an 

increasing use of information and its associated technologies to achieve 

objectives below the level of armed conflict. Multiple actors, to include 

nation states, global corporations, transnational terrorists and criminal organizations, societies, and even individuals will all have an important and 

direct role in the composition and conduct of future conflict. These current 

and emerging characteristics will require future Army forces to leverage 

information and associated technologies to understand operational envi-
176

ronments and employ capabilities to achieve informational effects across 

multiple systems and audiences to achieve military objectives.

Future adversaries will increasingly look to expand on this global perspective of the information environment, by leveraging expanding informational means to shape and exploit societal and political vulnerabilities 

on the home-fronts of America and its allies to increase friction amongst 

friendly actors and undermine and erode strategic resolve. From a defensive standpoint, this dynamic presents a very real and increasing risk to 

America and its allies that are beholden to maintaining the sanctity of the 

relationships within the Clauswitzian Triad (e.g. the people, the government, and the military). Indeed, it is a very distinct possibility that a nation 

state could be strategically defeated during the competition period through 

the sufficient corruption of these relationships. 

While this volume is focused on large-scale combat operations, the 

use of information has and will continue to have universal application in 

the accomplishment of positive military outcomes at all echelons. The Army’s purpose is to fight and win the nation’s wars, but future wars will be 

multi-domain endeavors that will increasingly stress, and ultimately render useless, traditional operational approaches, paradigms, and processes. 

Wars of the future will be fought in an increasingly contested information 

environment, where state and non-state actors will proliferate information 

through the use of technology on a scale never before seen. The US military will be simultaneously and continuously shaping, preventing, and 

consolidating gains against adversaries at home and abroad in the information environment to gain and maintain operational and strategic advantage. 

The future force must account for the use of information across the range 

of military operations in each of the four Army strategic roles. Information 

and its employment to achieve military objectives will continue to grow 

in importance as our adversaries achieve political and military objectives 

over time below the level of armed conflict. 

While the requirement to integrate information-related capabilities to 

affect adversary decision making is rooted in all military operations, the 

primary focus for employment of information during past 15 years of counterinsurgency has largely been a population-centric—not adversarial—effort. However, during large-scale combat operations, the Army will need to 

refocus its efforts to employ these capabilities against enemy information 

and command and control systems to create conditions in the information 

environment that place our forces at a position of relative advantage. 
177

The use of current and emerging technology to manipulate information will allow military forces to create false perceptions in the minds of 

adversary decision makers, causing them to act in a manner that places 

their forces in a position of relative disadvantage. During modern and future operations, however, commanders must be cognizant of the totality of the information available to adversary decision-making processes. 

This presents both risk and opportunity. The increasing prevalence of internet-based technologies, to include social media, provide military organizations information that can support or discount efforts to manipulate 

decision making systems and processes. 

In an increasingly interconnected world, future military planners must 

sufficiently account for efforts to shape a broader information environment, inclusive of social media, the internet, mass media, and artificial 

intelligence. The internet has allowed information to be disseminated faster, across greater distances, and at greater volumes than at any point in 

human history. Quite simply, the sheer volume of information available 

to relevant actors surpasses the capability and capacity of human analysts. 

This trend will continue to increase exponentially. Technological tools and 

capabilities will be required in increasing numbers to augment the limits 

of human analytic abilities and decision making. Machine learning and artificial intelligence that can process big data and automate the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop to operate at inhuman speeds offer glimpses 

of what this future may look like.

The Army must adapt its culture and processes to elevate the importance of information in future competition and conflict. Current efforts to 

create an information warfighting function as well as creating an information center of excellence that will develop, produce, and deliver improved 

capability to operate in the information environment are only the first steps 

in this effort. However, these efforts alone will have no effect unless the 

culture of the Army changes. The Army and its leaders must place a premium on the use of information and information technology by devoting 

the proper resources to change the Army culture. Culturally, Army leaders 

need to evolve from the narrow approach of massing lethal fires to defeat 

an enemy army to a more blended approach that combines the massing 

of lethal and information effects to comprehensively defeat a nation state 

both militarily and politically. This effort starts in Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) at the proponent level, but also requires changes 

in policy to allow commanders the freedom to employ information and 

technology from the tactical edge to the operational level.
178

The Army must initiate change at every echelon across the operating 

force, and within the generating force, to ensure future commanders have 

the capability and capacity along with the requisite knowledge and authority to optimally employ information through current and future technologies. Army leaders must account for information and its effects in the 

operations process, not as a separate effort managed by a separate group 

of individuals, but mastered by commanders and staffs with the same degree of proficiency by which they employ and maneuver physical forces. 

Information operators must be just that, operators, capable of integrating 

physical and informational power seamlessly, as part of operations, and 

must understand the effects information will have on military formations 

and civilian entities alike. All operations must be designed with an informational end state and operations, actions, and investments must support 

that end state. Information capabilities must be inherent in every formation, from tactical to strategic.

The current system of augmentation and reach back capability is insufficient for future conflict. The fact that the majority of the Army’s current information forces that would be needed to support LSCO contingencies reside in the reserve component underscores the point that current 

force structure does not meet projected LSCO force requirements. The 

Army must balance the requirement for large physical forces with tailored, 

adaptable information forces that can achieve strategic objectives below 

the level of conflict through the weaponized use of information.

The US Army is at a pivotal crossroads on how it will employ information power in the future. It can decide to continue on the same path 

that relegates the use of information to a small group of professionals 

that have to fight for their relevance on a daily basis, or it can decide to 

take another course. The US Army can decide to create a total Army force 

trained, organized, and resourced to operate and prevail in the information 

environment during the Army’s four strategic roles of shape operational 

environments, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and 

consolidate gains to achieve outcomes. The US Army can design and approve a strategy to approach operations in the information environment, 

shaped by policy that provides funding and that concisely assigns roles 

and responsibilities to achieve Army, Department of Defense, and national 

objectives. The US Army can align agencies, commands, formations, and 

proponents that design, build, and deliver capability to the warfighter to 

achieve information dominance in the conduct of unified land operations. 

The US Army can develop and elevate a professional, multi-disciplinary 

capability of generalists and experts that possess the necessary knowledge, 
179

skills, and abilities who are armed with the tools required to deliver operational advantage in the information environment. Only by doing so can 

the Army provide commanders the information capability and capacity 

required to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy not only 

in the information environment, but also in the operational environment.

This volume, though intended for Army leaders at every echelon, will 

undoubtedly be read and studied by our allies and adversaries alike. They, 

too, will glean lessons from this volume—not only on how the Army has 

used information in the past but seek to learn how the Army will leverage it 

in the future. For the intended audience, the only question remains is this, 

“Who will better harness the power of information to defeat an adversary 

before the battle ensues?” Advantage in the future information environment will start with armies that are culturally inclined to recognizing the 

potentially decisive nature of information in the “Information Age.” Secondarily, achieving informational advantage on the LSCO battlefield will 

require a professional force that is trained, organized, resourced, and most 

importantly empowered by commanders to leverage effects efficiently and 

effectively in the information environment. Will the US Army realize that 

vision before it is too late? 
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Notes

1. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Designated Senior 

Official for the Integration of Strategic Information Operations and Cyber-enabled Information Operations,” 24 May 2018.
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About the Authors

Nitin Agarwal

Nitin Agarwal, PhD, is the Jerry L. Maulden-Entergy Endowed Chair 

and Distinguished Professor of Information Science at the University of 

Arkansas and Director of the Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS). He researches cyber information 

campaigns, social computing, deviant behavior modeling, group dynamics, social-cyber forensics, data mining, and privacy. 

Samer Al-Khateeb

Samer Al-Khateeb, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of 

Journalism, Media, and Computing at Creighton University and a former 

Postdoctorate Research Fellow at the Collaboratorium for Social Media 

and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) at the University of Arkansas 

at Little Rock. His research interests include deviant behavioral modeling; 

deviant cyber flash mobs; cyber propaganda campaigns; bots behaviors, 

evolution, and detection; and social cyber forensics.

Lionel M. Beehner

Lionel M. Beehner, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Department 

of Defense & Strategic Studies at the United States Military Academy at 

West Point and director of research of West Point’s Modern War Institute. 

He previously was a senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

He holds a doctorate in political science from Yale University and a master’s of international affairs from Columbia University. His research has 

appeared in Security Studies, Military Review, Parameters, Democracy

& Security, Orbis, Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, and The National 

Interest, among other publications. 

Carmine Cicalese

Colonel (Retired) Carmine Cicalese served for 29 years of active duty 

in a variety of signal, information operations, and cyberspace operations 

positions at every headquarter level from platoon to Headquarters, Department of the Army. He was the 1st Cavalry Division IO officer from 

2000–03 and 2005–08, with a stint at Joint Special Operations Command 

from 2003–05. During his first assignment with 1st Cavalry Division, he 

fulfilled a one-year WIAS tasker that included an assignment to Command 

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). He concluded his information career as Director, Joint Command and Control & Information Op-
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erations School and as Division Chief, HQDA G-3/5/7, Cyberspace and 

Information Operations. Cicalese enjoys sharing his experiences, and especially his failures, with interested information professionals.

Liam S. Collins

Colonel Liam S. Collins is the director of the Modern War Institute 

at West Point. A career Special Forces officer, he has conducted multiple 

combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq; operational deployments to 

Bosnia, Africa, and South America; and more than a dozen trips to Ukraine 

during the 18 months prior to this publication. He has a master’s degree 

and a doctorate from Princeton University.

Dorothy E. Denning 

Dorothy E. Denning is Emeritus Distinguished Professor of Defense 

Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. She is author of Information 

Warfare and Security, Cryptography, and Data Security and more than 200 

articles on topics relating to cybersecurity and cyber conflict. She previously worked at Georgetown University and served as president of the International Association for Cryptologic Research. She has received numerous 

awards for her pioneering work in cyber security and was inducted into 

the inaugural class of the National Cyber Security Hall of Fame in 2012. 

She received BA and MA degrees in mathematics from the University of 

Michigan and a PhD degree in computer science from Purdue University.

Katrin Galeano

Katrin Galeano is a PhD student at the University of Arkansas. She is 

majoring in computers and information science and has a research interest in support of the US Army operations security program, in which she 

volunteers as a social media administrator. Her background is in strategic 

communications for non-profit and government organizations.

Rick A. Galeano

Lieutenant Colonel Rick A. Galeano is an active-duty US Army officer. He is a PhD student at the University of Arkansas, pursuing a degree in Computers and Information Science. His research interests revolve 

around strategic communications, social network analysis, and social cyber forensics.

Justin B. Gorkowski

Major Justin B. Gorkowski is a PhD student at the University of Virginia, where he is studying international relations. Prior to this assignment, 

Gorkowski was a Congressional Fellow in the US Senate and Congressio-
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nal Budget Liaison for HQDA. Gorkowski is an information operations 

officer and previously managed the integration of information-related capabilities in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Vilseck, Germany for the 2nd 

Cavalry Regiment.

Robert M. Hill

Robert M. Hill is a military analyst and doctrine writer for the US 

Army Information Operations Proponent and a retired field artillery and 

public affairs officer. Over the past decade, he has contributed articles to 

Joint Force Quarterly and Military Review on topics ranging from communication to leadership and women in the Army. He is also a published 

novelist. He has an MA in English from Duke University and an EdD from 

the University of Missouri.

Michael E. Kitchens

Michael E. Kitchens is a Department of the Army Civilian as a Doctrine and Concept Developer for the US Army Knowledge Management 

Office at the Force Modernization Proponent Center (FMPC). He has a 

master’s in Information Management from Webster and undergraduate degrees in Economics and History from Auburn University. Kitchens served 

on active duty in the US Navy and 28 years in the Army National Guard 

and Reserve. His military training includes Military Intelligence Basic and 

Advanced, CAS3, CGSC, Combat Advisor Course, Knowledge Manager 

Qualification Course and FA-30 Qualification Course (information operations). He served in multiple assignments to include S-2, Information 

Operations Combat Advisor, Division Knowledge Manager and Division 

G-7. His most recent assignment before retirement in 2018 was Chief 

Knowledge Officer (CKO) for US Army Reserve Command, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. He deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Hurricane Katrina support.

Bradley S. Loudon

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley S. Loudon has been Director of the United States Army Information Operations Qualification Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since September 2017. Previously as 1st ID’s IO Officer, 

he oversaw Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve’s IO efforts in support of large-scale combat operations during the Battle of Mosul (November 2016 to July 2017). Previously, Loudon was selected as the 2014 military recipient of the Secretary of 

the Army’s Pace Award for his work as a HQDA G-3/5/7 Cyber Planner. 

He has a bachelor’s degree in History from the University of Kansas and a 

Juris Doctorate from Washburn University School of Law.
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Christopher W. Lowe

Colonel Christopher W. Lowe has more than 22 years of military service, with more than a decade of experience as an information operations 

officer. He has master’s degrees in Military Arts and Sciences from the 

US Army School of Advanced Military Studies and in National Resource 

Strategy from the Eisenhower School, National Defense University.

James J. Mingus

Major General James J. Mingus is the Commanding General of the 

82nd Airborne Division. Prior to this assignment, he was the Director, 

Mission Command Center of Excellence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

He commanded at every echelon from company to division, gaining extensive experience with integrating information operations into the operational process during numerous combat deployments. He has a bachelor 

of science degree from Winona State University and a master’s in strategic studies from the US Army War College.

Robert T. Person

Robert T. Person is an associate professor of International Relations 

at the US Military Academy, where he also serves as Director of Curriculum for West Point’s International Affairs Program. He has a PhD in political science from Yale University as well as a master’s degree in Russian, 

East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University. His research focuses on Russian foreign policy and grand strategy, post-Soviet 

political and economic transitions, Eurasian security, and nationalism in 

the post-Soviet space. He has conducted extensive field research across 

Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 

Person is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Resident Fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute.

Christopher N. Reichart

Colonel Christopher N. Reichart is the Director of the Force Modernization Proponent Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served 

as an infantry officer and information operations officer over the past 24 

years, recently serving on the CENTCOM staff as the director of several IO portfolios. Reichart holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the 

United States Military Academy, a Master of Arts Degree in International 

Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies,and a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College.
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Brandon S. Riley

Sergeant First Class Brandon S. Riley is a Military Analyst at the Army’s Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Post University. Riley has served with 1st Cavalry Division, US Army Recruiting 

Command, 3rd Infantry Division, the US Army Armor School, and the 

101st Airborne Division. He has served in leadership positions from Team 

Leader to Platoon Sergeant and has four operational deployments—two 

each to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Michael R. Taylor Jr.

Colonel Michael R. Taylor Jr. is an information operations officer. He 

serves as the Chief, CJ39 Information Operations, for Headquarters Resolute Support, in Kabul, Afghanistan. He has a master’s in International 

Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, D.C.

James N. Turner

Lieutenant Colonel James N. Turner is an active-duty US Army officer. Turner has served for nine years as an information operations planner 

at the brigade, division, and theater Army level and has honed his understanding during three deployments and multiple training exercises. Turner 

is respected as one of the most experienced information operations officers 

at Third Army.

Mark D. Vertuli

Colonel Mark D. Vertuli is the Chief, Operations Plans (J35) for US 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). He has more than 23 years of military experience and has planned information operations in Afghanistan 

and the European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) 

areas of operation. He was the battalion commander for 1st Battalion, 1st 

IO Command (Land) from 2012–14. He has master’s degrees in History 

from Vanderbilt University and in National Resource Strategy from the 

Eisenhower School, National Defense University.

Andrew D. Whiskeyman

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. Whiskeyman is Acting Deputy for the 

US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Joint Cyber Center. He has more 

than 23 years of military experience and has worked extensively in the 

information operations field while deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He 
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earned a doctor of Philosophy in Military Strategy from Air University in 

2015 and has master’s degrees both from Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 

(SAASS). He is also a member of the Military Writer’s Guild.

Wesley P. White

Wesley P. White is a Department of the Army Civilian. He previously 

was a sergeant in the 781st Military Intelligence Battalion (Cyber) as a 

17C, Cyber Operations Specialist. He has a master’s degree in history 

from the University of Florida, where he wrote his thesis on Chernobyl 

and its representation in the contemporary Soviet press. During his enlisted career, he was an Exploitation Analyst on a National Mission Team, a 

job which he continues in his position as an Army Civilian.

Matthew J. Yandura

Colonel Matthew J. Yandura is Chief, Concepts, Requirements, Integration, Personnel, and Doctrine for the Information Operations Proponent 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Bachelor of Applied Arts in Interpersonal-Public Communication from Central Michigan University and a 

master’s in International Relations from The Catholic University of America. He has served with the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, 

173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, 11th Psychological Operations Battalion, US Army Cadet Command, US Military Training Mission to Saudi 

Arabia, and the US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. He has served in leadership positions from Platoon Leader to Chair 

and Professor of Military Science at Loyola University-Chicago. Yandura 

has three combat and two operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel respectively.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center