Historical Case Studies of Maneuver

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Edited by Jack D. Kem

LARGE-SCALE COMBAT

OPERATIONS SERIES

Army University Press
Cover image: Soldiers in an interim armored vehicle and AH-64 Apache 

helicopters with Battle Group Poland move to secure an area during a June 2018 

exercise in Poland involving allies and partners from 10 countries. US Army 

photo by Specialist Hubert D. Delany III.

Original tear graphic: Designed by Layerace/Freepik, freepik.com 

Original paper texture: Created by Freepik, freepik.com

Composite cover design: Michael P. Serravo, Army University Press
 

This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale 

Combat Operations Series, which includes:

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies 

of Combined Arms Maneuver 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case 

Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility 

Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies 

of Information Operations 

in Large-Scale Combat Operations
 
Deep Maneuver

Edited by

Jack D. Kem

Army University Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Historical Case Studies of 

Maneuver in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations
iv

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kem, Jack D., editor. | Army University Press (U.S.), issuing body.

Title: Deep maneuver: historical case studies of maneuver in large-scale

 combat operations / edited by Jack D. Kem

Other titles: Historical case studies of maneuver in large-scale combat

 operations | US Army large-scale combat operations series.

Description: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Army University Press, 2018. |

 Series: US Army large-scale combat operations series | Includes

 bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018034739 | ISBN 9781940804507

Subjects: LCSH: Maneuver warfare--Case studies. | Tactics--Case studies. |

 United States--History, Military--20th century--Case studies. | United

 States--History, Military--21st century--Case studies.

Classification: LCC U250 .D44 2018 | DDC 355.422--dc23 | SUDOC D 

 110.20:5.

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018034739.

Army University Press publications cover a variety 

of military history topics. The views expressed in 

this Army University Press publication are those 

of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. A full list of Army University 

Press publications is available at https://www.

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The seal of the Army University Press authenticates this document as 

an official publication of the Army University Press. It is prohibited 

to use the Army University Press’ official seal on any republication 

without the express written permission of the Director of the Army 

University Press.

2018

Editor

Diane R. Walker
v

Foreword

Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground 

combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following, 

the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and 

conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than 15 

years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders 

and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as 

an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time 

in our nation’s history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and 

the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the 

Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the 

most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage 

is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive 

Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of 

these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest 

US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly 

shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full 

range of military operations. 

Over the last two years, the US Army has rapidly shifted the focus of 

its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations 

against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 

3-0, Operations, dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique 

strategic roles: shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make 

temporary success permanent.

To enable this shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change 

its culture shaped by over 15 years of persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square with 

the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the 

multi-domain battlefield when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.
To emphasize the importance of the Army’s continued preparation for 

large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has 

published these volumes of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations 

Series book set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the US Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader should reflect on 

these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play, 

evaluate leaders’ actions, and determine what differentiated success from 

failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual 

examination of lessons of the past and their application to today’s doctrine, 

organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large-scale combat. 

Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what makes us the world’s 

greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes. 

Prepared for War!

Michael D. Lundy

Lieutenant General, US Army

Commanding General 

US Army Combined Arms Center

vi
vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................... v

Illustrations .............................................................................................. ix

Introduction .............................................................................................. xi

Chapter 1—Surprise: The XIX Panzer Corps’ Lightning Advance into 

France, May 1940

by Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. Shanahan ................................................. 1

Chapter 2—Considerations for Deep Maneuver: Operation “Crusader”

by Major Glen L. Scott .....................................................................................11

Chapter 3—The Debaltsevo Raid by the Bashkir Cavalry Division 

During “Operation Gallop,” February 1943

by Robert F. Baumann and William E. Bassett ....................................... 33

Chapter 4—Creating Operational Depth through Coalition Integration: 

Seventh Army and Operation Dragoon

by Major Christopher J. Shepherd .......................................................... 55

Chapter 5—Command Decisions on Counterattack and Deep Envelopment in the Battle of the Bulge

by Dean A. Nowowiejski ........................................................................ 83

Chapter 6—From the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Deep Maneuver in 1945

by Major (US Marine Corps Reserve) Timothy G. Heck .................... 101

Chapter 7—The Israeli Experience: The Apogee of Blitzkrieg

by Major Ronnie L. Coutts, British Army ............................................ 123

Chapter 8—Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation that Started 

Operation Desert Storm

by Colonel Paul E. Berg and Kenneth E. Tilley.................................... 139

Chapter 9—Army Attack Aviation: The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s Deep Strike in Karbala

by Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David W. Tohn ......................... 157

Chapter 10—Task Force Viking: Conventional Forces-Special Operations 

Forces Synergy in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations

by Daniel E. Stoltz, Stephen E. Ryan, and Joseph A. Royo ...................177

Chapter 11—Maintaining Capability and Options: Dismounted Reconnaissance in the Division and Corps Deep Area

by Major Brendon E. Terry ................................................................... 201
Chapter 12—The Future of Army Aviation in Deep Maneuver

by Major General William K. Gayler ................................................... 225

Chapter 13—Disrupted, Degraded, Denied, but Dominant: 

The Future Multi-Domain Operational Environment

by Major General Gary M. Brito and Major Keith T. Boring ............... 233

About the Authors ................................................................................. 241

viii
ix

Illustrations

Figure 1.1. Campaign in the West ............................................................. 3

Figure 2.1. Auchinleck’s Offensive ......................................................... 23

Figure 3.1. First and Fourth Panzer Armies Recapture Kharkov ............ 37

Figure 3.2. Deep Raid by Soviet 8th Cavalry Corps ............................... 43

Figure 3.3. Major General M.D. Borisov’s Cavalry Corps. .................... 45

Figure 4.1. German Dispositions in Southern France ............................. 59

Figure 4.2. The Anvil/Dragoon Landing Plan......................................... 61

Figure 4.3. Operation “Dragoon,” The Breakthrough ............................ 67

Figure 4.4. Seventh Army Advance Toward Belfort ............................... 69

Figure 5.1. The Bulge ............................................................................. 91

Figure 5.2. Erasing the Bulge ................................................................. 93

Figure 6.1. The Vistula-Oder Offensive ................................................ 105

Figure 6.2. Distribution of Front Assets ............................................... 107

Figure 6.3. Density of Front Assets per Kilometer ............................... 109

Figure 7.1. The Breakthrough of Tal’s Ugda at Rafa El-Arish ............. 125

Figure 7.2. Operation Gazelle, 15–23 October 1973 ............................ 131

Figure 8.1. January 1991 AH-64 Apache Attack on Radar Sites .......... 141

Figure 9.1. 11th AHR Attack Scheme for 23 March 2003 .................... 159

Figure 9.2. Overview of 11th AHR Planned Routes ............................. 161

Figure 10.1. Iraqi Military and Militia Positions, March 2003 ............. 179

Figure 10.2. Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Boundaries ...................................................................................... 181

Figure 10.3. ODA Disposition, Battle for Debecka Crossroads .......... 183

Figure 10.4. Task Force Viking Operations, March–April 2003 .......... 187

Figure 10.5. Liberation of Kirkuk and Mosul, 10–11 April 2003 ......... 189

Figure 11.1. Cedar Falls Concept of the Operation .............................. 209

Figure 11.2. XVIII Airborne Corps Surveillance Missions ................. 213
Figure 11.3. V Corps and I MEF Maneuver to Baghdad ...................... 214

Figure 11.4. LRS Team Positions Around Objective RAMS ................ 215

x
xi

Introduction

Jack D. Kem

Deep attack is not a luxury; it is an absolute necessity to winning.1

—General Donn A. Starry

All right, Mister, let me tell you what winning means . . . you’re 

willing to go longer, work harder, give more than anyone else.2

—Vince Lombardi

The various terms of “deep maneuver,” “deep attack,” and “deep operations” have been prominent in Army doctrine for many years. The concept relates to extending operations in time, space, and purpose in order to 

gain an advantage over enemy forces and capabilities before adversaries 

can use their capabilities against friendly forces.3

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, emphasizes this concept of extending operations in time, space, and purpose in order to gain an advantage over potential peer enemies—in highly contested, lethal environments—in order to prevail and win.4

 Deep maneuver—the employment of 

forces using the combination of movement and fires to gain a position of 

relative advantage over enemies—is fundamental to warfighting.5

Deep maneuver for large-scale combat operations at the division and 

corps level has not been practiced for many years in the US Army. The 

focus on stability operations and protracted counterinsurgency campaigns 

caused a shift away from large-scale combat operations and conducting 

deep maneuver. The current operational environment demands that we 

once again sharpen our focus on the threats that exist today and study deep 

maneuver as a core competency.

So, we turn to the past to study both the successes and failure of deep 

maneuver in warfighting. This book is a collection of 11 historical case 

studies of deep maneuver operations and campaigns drawn from the past 

100 years with lessons for modern large-scale ground combat operations 

(LSCO). The book is also focused on operations at the division and corps 

level, chronologically organized to include case studies from World War 

II, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The last two chapters provide perspectives on the 

future of deep maneuver.

The authors were asked to look at deep operations in terms of time, 

space, and purpose; the default is to think of deep maneuver only in terms 
xii

of space, but time and purpose are critical factors to understand the concept 

of deep operations. We also asked the authors to not only include successes but also failures and shortfalls. Each of the chapters are relatively short 

and are focused on deep maneuver. When possible, the authors provided 

their insight into the implications of the lessons learned—or not learned.

Deep operations require boldness and audacity and yet carry an element of risk due to overextension. Readers should carefully study these 

case studies and reflect on the components that still apply today and in the 

future—and to reflect on those components that are not applicable today. 

The critical role of commanders communicating their vision in terms of 

purpose and end state are enduring; weapon systems and their capabilities 

are ever-changing. Balancing boldness and risk are enduring challenges; 

geography and weather are situationally independent. Readers should 

read, study, and analyze each case study in light of these considerations.

Chapter 1 by Edward P. Shanahan, “Surprise: The XIX Panzer Corps’ 

Lightning Advance into France, May 1940,” studies the German penetration of the Ardennes in May 1940. The operations by the Wehrmacht took 

less than one week to shatter the French Army; in less than three weeks the 

Germans conquered France and drove the British Army from the European 

continent. The element of surprise—attaching in a way that was completely unexpected—allowed the German Army to accomplish in six days what 

they had only attempted to complete in World War I. 

Glen L. Scott addresses operations in Northern Africa in November 

1941 in “Considerations for Deep Maneuver: Operation Crusader” as 

Chapter 2 of the book. This chapter focused on corps-level operations 

details the actions of the British XXX Corps, who had moved deep into 

Axis territory to fight the German Afrika Korps. Initially, Rommel’s Afrika Korps achieved a tactical victory in a series of battles and maneuvers. 

Rommel then led the Axis mobile on a bold, but futile, maneuver designed 

to encircle the British 8th Army and break their will to continue the offensive. At the end of the operation, neither side had a conclusive victory.

Chapter 3 by Robert F. Baumann and William E. Bassett is titled 

“The Debaltsevo Raid by the Bashkir Cavalry Division during ‘Operation 

Gallop,’ February 1943.” The chapter outlines a 1943 raid by the most 

decorated Soviet division in World War II—the 112th “Bashkir” Cavalry 

Division, later re-designated as the 16th Guards Cavalry Division. The 

division, which began this operation at 48-percent strength, conducted two 

successive major operations and months of hard combat against some of 

the best German divisions fielded during World War II. The 112th Cavalry 
xiii

Division (16th Guards Cavalry Division) penetrated German defenses and 

achieved tactical mission objectives as well as complicated coordinated 

operations with friendly units over vast distances.

Christopher J. Shepherd authored Chapter 4, “Creating Operational 

Depth through Coalition Integration.” Shepherd describes the second invasion of Western Europe (after Normandy) along the Southern Riviera 

known as Operation Dragoon. The objectives of Dragoon were the ports 

of Marseille and Toulon, which enabled the logistical support for continuing Allied efforts through France and into Germany. A key consideration 

for this operation was the integration of US, French, and British forces, 

including the US Seventh Army, the French Armée B, the American VI 

Corps, the Anglo-Canadian-American First Special Service Force (1st 

SSF), a provisional airborne division, the Anglo-American First Airborne 

Task Force (FATF), and the French Group of Commandos and French Naval Assault Group.

Chapter 5 by Dean A. Nowowiejski is titled “Command Decisions on 

Counterattack and Deep Envelopment in the Battle of the Bulge.” In December 1944, Hitler’s Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies attacked the US First 

Army in the Ardennes Forest of eastern Belgium, a surprise move that penetrated the army front and created a large salient in the Allied lines known 

as The Bulge. Rather than reviewing the defense in the early days of the 

German offensive, this chapter focuses on decisions that the Allied generals 

made to counterattack the German salient in order to save Bastogne and, 

most importantly, the decisions they made in order to remove the Bulge itself. Nowowiejski specifically addresses the employment of counterattacks 

in the Battle of the Bulge to not only gain a position of tactical advantage 

but also achieve the larger purpose of counterattack to stop the enemy and 

take the initiative away from the enemy through envelopment.

Chapter 6, the last chapter in the book to address World War II deep 

maneuver, was written by Timothy Heck and titled “From the Vistula to 

the Oder: Soviet Deep Maneuver in 1945.” By 1945, the Soviet Army 

had pushed the Germans back to the Vistula River in Poland; the Soviets 

planned a series of front-sized campaigns to defeat the Germans and allow 

the seizure of Berlin. The Vistula-Oder strategic offensive was the main 

Soviet effort during these 1945 campaigns. The offensive was conducted 

in two fronts—each consisting of 10 armies (approximately 2.2 million 

men), an air army, and four to five corps-sized mobile groups, giving the 

two front commanders the ability to echelon their forces for breakthrough 
xiv

and exploitation phases. The application of mass and tempo, along with 

the necessary enablers, was fundamental to Soviet success when conducting large-scale maneuver in depth during the Vistula-Oder campaign.

We shift away from World War II case studies in Chapter 7, written 

by Ronnie L. Coutts of the British Army. In “The Israeli Experience: The 

Apogee of Blitzkrieg,” Coutts describes the adoption of the concept of 

deep maneuver in 1967 and 1973—necessitated by the Israelis’ lack of 

maneuver space and the need to avoid deliberate battles of destruction. In 

1967, General Israel Tal’s Ugda (division) conducted rapid deep maneuver across the Sinai to quickly bring the battle into Arab territory. Then in 

1973, General Ariel Sharon gambled to attack across the Suez Canal into 

Egyptian rear areas—a gamble that was won only due to the piecemeal 

attacks by the Egyptians.

Colonel Paul E. Berg and Kenneth E. Tilley authored “Task Force Normandy: Deep Operation that Started Operation Desert Storm” in Chapter 

8. This chapter describes the initial strikes in Operation Desert Storm by 

Task Force Normandy, which initiated Operation Desert Storm in January 

1991. This operation by Task Force Normandy showed the effects of dramatic changes in thinking about the dimensional multi-domain battlefield 

and how to organize and fight in it. Task Force Normandy also proved the 

doctrinal ideas about deep attack operations in large-scale combat operations and aviation in the 1990s. This deep maneuver mission also proved 

the importance of moving toward joint integrated operations that will be 

fundamental in the thinking of future Army doctrine and the current continued concepts of large-scale combat operations.

Chapter 9 by Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn is titled 

“Army Attack Aviation: The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s Attack in 

Karbala.” This chapter, an excerpt from On Point: The United States Army 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom, describes the unsuccessful deep strike by the 

11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (AHR) on 23 March 2003 as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this attack, 31 of 32 aircraft were damaged, one 

aircraft was downed in enemy territory, and two pilots were captured—

without decisively engaging the Iraqi Medina Division. As a result, it took 

30 days for the 11th AHR to restore the regiment to full capability, and the 

situation cast a shadow over deep-attack operations throughout the duration of major combat operations in Iraq.

Joseph A. Royo, Stephen E. Ryan, and Daniel E. Stoltz authored 

Chapter 10, titled “Task Force Viking: Conventional Forces-Special Operations Forces—Synergy in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations.” This 
xv

chapter outlines the importance of gaining synergy between Conventional 

Forces (CF), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and indigenous forces at 

all levels of warfare. Using Coalition operations in Northern Iraq during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the authors describe how Task Force Viking integrated the 52,000-man-strong Kurdish Peshmerga to effect the liberation 

of Kirkuk and Mosul in 2003.

Chapter 11, written by Brendon E. Terry, is titled “Maintaining Capability and Options: Dismounted Reconnaissance in the Division and Corps 

Deep Area.” This chapter describes the importance of a critical enabling 

capability for deep operations—dismounted reconnaissance. Focusing on 

the Division and Corps fights, Terry describes the evolution of dismounted reconnaissance. Terry then provides two case studies on the utility of 

this enabling capability: Long-Range Patrol (LRP) units in Vietnam and 

Long-Range Surveillance Units (LRSU) in Operation Desert Storm and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom I. He concludes that the US Army must maintain 

this capability for the future.

The final two chapters focus on the future of Deep Maneuver. Major 

General William K. Gayler, the Commander of the US Army Aviation Center of Excellence discusses “The Future of Army Aviation in Deep Maneuver” in Chapter 12. Major General Gary M. Brito, the Commanding General of the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and Major Keith Boring explore 

the future of multi-domain battle in Chapter 13, “Disrupted, Degraded, Denied, but Dominant: The Future Multi-Domain Operational Environment.” 

Both of these chapters provide insight into the future of deep maneuver.

We owe thanks to the staff of Army University Press for putting this 

book into physical and electronic form as part of The US Army Large-Scale 

Combat Operations Series book set. Special thanks to Colonel Paul E. Berg, 

project general editor; Donald P. Wright; Robin D. Kern; Diane R. Walker, 

and Lynne M. Chandler Garcia for their support. As the general editor, I 

alone am responsible for errors, omissions, or limitations of this book.
xvi

Notes

1. Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield,” Military Review 61, no. 3, 

March 1981, 32.

2. Hannah Hutrya, “115 Vince Lombardi Quotes to Use in the Game of 

Life,” accessed 14 July 2018, http://www.keepinspiring.me/vince-lombardi-quotes.

3. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-94.2, 

Deep Operations (Washington, DC: 1 September 2016), 1-2.

4. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: October 2017), Foreword.

5. FM 3-0, 2-202.
1

Chapter 1

Surprise: The XIX Panzer Corps’ Lightning Advance into 

France, May 19401

Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. Shanahan

In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, 

operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to 

where they no longer pose a threat.

2

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

The desire to achieve surprise in military operations is timeless. Considered an essential element of victory from ancient times to the present, 

the concept of surprise is almost universally enshrined as a principle of 

war. Because surprise is vital to successful offensive and defensive operations, particularly at the operational and tactical levels of war, it can 

decisively shift the balance of combat power and affect the outcome of 

campaigns and battles.

Surprise influences the enemy’s sense of self-confidence, mental stability, competence, and will and ability to fight. Surprise induces psychological shock in enemy leaders and soldiers when it targets their command, 

control, and communications systems—thus delaying their reactions and 

reducing the effectiveness of their combat and support systems. The enemy need not be taken totally unaware but only become aware too late to 

react effectively, thereby allowing the attackers to establish favorable battlefield conditions and set the terms of battle. Through the use of surprise, 

success out of proportion to the effort expended can be gained.

A classic example of surprise is the Germans’ penetration of the Ardennes in May 1940. The German plan in 1940 was to win a quick, decisive 

victory against the French and their Allies by achieving strategic surprise. 

Beginning its operation at 0535 on Friday, 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht 

launched its campaign in the west by invading the Netherlands, Belgium, 

and Luxembourg. In less than one week, the Wehrmacht had shattered the 

French Army and, within the next six weeks, had conquered France and 

its Continental Allies in the west, driving the British Army from the Continent. The key to the Wehrmacht’s smashing victory was the successful 

attack of a major German force through the Ardennes, an operation that 

achieved almost complete surprise. General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer 

Corps, which spearheaded the advance, moved approximately 220 miles in 
2

11 days, penetrating the “impassable” Ardennes Forest, breaching a fortified river line, and defeating a major slice of the French Army. The decisive 

German victory reaffirmed the critical importance of surprise in warfare.

The original German plan to invade France and the Low Countries 

(Fall Gelb or Plan Yellow) was unimaginative and highly conservative. 

When Fall Gelb was compromised in January 1940, French forces were 

alerted and deployed to the frontiers. Nothing happened, however, and 

operations on the Western Front lapsed into the routine of the so-called 

“phoney war.” Fortunately for the Germans, the Allies had revealed a preview of their wartime strategy and dispositions. As a result, two changes 

occurred: The Germans altered their plans, and Hitler tightened the security surrounding the forthcoming operations. The Allies also initiated their 

own changes, deciding to reinforce the Netherlands and Belgium. General 

Maurice Gamelin shifted the French Seventh Army from strategic reserve 

and committed it to the Allied left flank in the Netherlands. Under this 

revision, known as the Breda Variant to the Dyle Plan, 30 French divisions 

would wheel into Belgium and the Netherlands at the outset of the German 

attack. The hinge of this operation was the French Ninth Army, composed 

of 10 weak, mostly reserve, divisions. The other unit facing the so-called 

impenetrable Ardennes was the French Second Army, deployed with its 

strongest division on its right, to protect any attempt to outflank the Maginot Line, and its weakest divisions on the left, behind Sedan and adjacent 

to the Ninth Army.

One of the alternative plans to Fall Gelb was drawn up by General Erich von Manstein, the chief of staff of General Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army 

Group A. The Manstein variation shifted the main effort from the northern 

right wing to the center in the Ardennes region. Manstein’s aim was to 

achieve a decisive victory through a two-phase campaign: Phase I was to 

break through the enemy’s front and cut off forces that had advanced into 

Belgium; phase II was to envelop the remaining enemy forces north of 

the Somme River. Manstein’s plan was predicated on achieving strategic 

surprise. He believed the French High Command would anticipate a German repetition of the World War I Schlieffen Plan and would react to stop 

a German drive into Belgium as far to the east as possible. Manstein also 

argued that the bulk of the Allied forces would be committed prematurely. 

Therefore, the German main effort should be shifted from Army Group 

B in the north to Army Group A in the center, and the penetration should 

occur along the Meuse River between Namur and Sedan.

On 24 February, the OKH (Army High Command) issued a modified version of Manstein’s plan. Army Group B, with 30 divisions, would 
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University Press.
4

strike the Allied left flank as a major supporting attack to confirm the Allies’ preconceived belief that they were the main effort. This would draw 

the Allies into the Low Countries prematurely and divert their attention 

from the critical area of the main attack executed by Army Group A. Army 

Group C, with 19 divisions on the left wing, would hold the southern flank 

and demonstrate in front of the Maginot Line defenses to hold those forces, particularly the reserves, in place.

The main effort through the hilly and densely wooded Ardennes 

would be made between Liege and Luxembourg. This thrust through the 

“impassable” Ardennes would be entrusted to General Ewald von Kleist’s 

panzer group, comprised of two spearheads—General Heinz Guderian’s 

XIX Panzer Corps with three divisions aimed at Sedan and, on his right, 

General Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s XL1 Panzer Corps of two panzer divisions aimed at Montherme. Farther north was General Hermann Hoth’s 

5th and 7th Panzer Divisions to cover the northern flank of the main attack.

The plan could only work if German armored and motorized units 

successfully negotiated the difficult Ardennes, with its limited road network, before the Allies identified the main effort. Surprise, speed, and 

operational security would be critical, as would the success of the deception executed by the right wing. German intelligence on Allied troop dispositions confirmed Manstein’s conviction that the Allies had discounted 

a blow in the Ardennes.

Army Group A’s divisions were packed into the Ardennes from the Luxembourg border to the vicinity of Giessen-Marburg, some 200 kilometers. 

Despite the need for surprise, the assault tanks were moved as far forward 

as possible prior to the actual attack and put on designated priority roads. 

Guderian’s formations were drawn up in the attack zone with three divisions 

abreast. The main effort of the XIX Panzer Corps was the 1st Panzer Division in the center, the 2nd Panzer Division on the right, and the 10th Panzer 

Division and the Grossdeutschland Infantry Division on the left. 

On 9 May 1940, Hitler authorized the initiation of operations. In turn, 

Kleist’s panzer group issued its start order. While the bulk of the XIX 

Panzer Corps prepared for the assault, special operations troops infiltrated 

across the border to seize key targets, thus facilitating surprise and the 

swift movement of major units.

In conformity with their plans, the Allies turned their attention north 

to what appeared to be the main assault. The II and XI Corps, on the left 

of Ninth Army, moved from their frontier positions into Belgium between 

Namur and Givet. To their right, with orders to delay the enemy, two light 
5

cavalry divisions, a brigade of Spahis (African) Cavalry, plus a similar 

force (four-and-one-half cavalry divisions) from the Second Army, moved 

across the Meuse to meet Rundstedt’s vanguard in the Ardennes. The Belgian forces in the Ardennes consisted of two light infantry divisions, also 

with a mission to delay the Germans.

On the morning of 10 May, elements of the XIX Panzer Corps rushed 

across the Luxembourg border. The 1st Panzer Division, in the center of the 

corps advance, crossed at Wallendorf and headed for Martelange (the Belgian’s first line of resistance) and then to the first day’s objective at Neufchriteau. The 2nd Panzer Division on the northern (right) flank crossed 

at Vianden and headed for Tintage and then Libramont, while the 10th 

Panzer Division, on the southern (left) flank, crossed near Echternach and 

proceeded toward Rosignol. The entire corps advanced in a tight formation, presenting an excellent target, but the Allies had been unable to penetrate the Luftwaffe screen and were taken in by the deception in the north. 

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe completely surprised the Allies by attacking 72 

key airfields in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—in some cases to a 

depth of 300 kilometers. In addition, the German use of special operations 

forces, unconventional tactics in Luxembourg, and airborne and air assault 

operations behind Belgian lines assisted the rapid movement of the XIX 

Corps by securing key facilities and critical passage points along the major 

routes of advance. By 1000, the 1st Panzer Division’s forward detachment 

reached the Belgian frontier east of Martelange.

At Martelange, a company of Belgian chasseurs blocked the Wehrmacht’s advance, the first of several short but costly battles that upset the 

Germans’ timetable. By 1100, however, German lead elements had seized 

the high ground northeast of the town. By 1200, the advance guard had 

reached Bodange. Again encountering fierce resistance by Belgian defenders, the Germans attacked using concentrated artillery and four 88-mm 

antitank guns. By 1800, the defenders, unable to withdraw, surrendered. 

By evening, the Belgian frontier had been penetrated, but as a result of the 

battles along the frontier, Guderian’s XIX Corps did not accomplish its 

first day’s objectives—a credit to the valiant Belgian soldiers.

During the night of l0–11 May, the 10th Panzer Division, ordered to 

halt, prepared a hasty defense between Etalle and Arlon against an anticipated French counterattack on the left flank. Guderian vehemently argued 

against halting his advance, insisting that reaching the Meuse River should 

remain the XIX Corps’ main focus to exploit the advantage of surprise. 

Guderian prevailed. The orders were canceled and the three panzer divisions continued their advance until around 0430 on 11 May.
6

The divisions’ objective for the 11th was to reach the Meuse River. 

As the German panzer divisions proceeded, they struck the next defensive 

line about 1130. Then, the 10th Panzer Division bogged down in the forest 

around Arlies and Rulles, while the 2nd faced stiff resistance at Libramont. 

Though slowed again by numerous road obstructions and artillery fire, 

the 2nd penetrated the second Belgian defensive line, and by 2100, its advance guard had pushed out to Paliseul, 15 kilometers west of Libramont.

Guderian intended for the 1st Panzer Division to break through the 

second defensive line in the vicinity of Neufchateau (the first day’s objective) and, if possible, advance to Sedan. The 1st, however, did not begin its 

advance until around noon and then ran into numerous road demolitions 

and mines. To add to the confusion, the Belgian chasseurs had changed 

many of the road and town signs. Neufchateau was not secured until 1500.

At 1700, for the first time since the beginning of the operation, the 

Germans of 1st Panzer Regiment encountered French troops, the 5th Division Légère Mécanique. The French put up stiff resistance but, after an 

hour, withdrew to Bouillon, a key defile on the Semois River leading to 

the Meuse at Sedan. In two days, the 1st Panzer Division had advanced 

100 kilometers, 5 kilometers short of the French border and 20 kilometers 

from Sedan.

Additionally on the 11th, OKH intelligence positively identified the 

Allied main effort along the Dijle River. Orders for operations on 12 May 

reiterated the importance of reaching the Meuse River and establishing 

bridgeheads there. On the 12th, the XIX Panzer Corps resumed its attack, again successfully exploiting the element of surprise. By evening, 

the bulk of the XIX Corps (except for the 2nd Panzer Division, which 

was delayed due to numerous detours) reached the northern bank of the 

Meuse River in the vicinity of Sedan. By 1900, the French withdrew to 

the left bank, destroying all bridges as the Germans concentrated their 

artillery to support the river crossing.

The OKH, apprehensive about the river crossing, threatened to slow 

down the advance, but Kleist objected, emphasizing the importance of 

speed, timing, and surprise. He ordered Guderian to cross the Meuse at 

1600 on the 13th. In response, the XIX Panzer Corps’ staff worked on the 

operations order throughout the night. The final order was issued at 0815 

on 13 May, which gave the divisions little time to execute a difficult operation. Fortunately, the plan mirrored an operation they had wargamed and 

rehearsed earlier along the Moselle River.
7

Guderian’s attacking forces, the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions, were 

to attack on line, with the main effort in the 1st Panzer Division’s zone of 

action (the 2nd Panzer Division was still delayed at the Semois River). 

The Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment, corps artillery, and heavy artillery battalions were to follow the 1st Panzer Division. To encourage his 

men, Guderian personally visited each of his three divisions that morning 

prior to their assaults.

In the vicinity of Sedan, the Meuse was 55 meters wide and unfordable. Further enhancing the main line of resistance were concrete bunkers 

and trenches hedged by belts of barbed wire. In addition, each defensive 

position had an antitank gun and machine guns spaced at 183-meter intervals. However, the defenses were incomplete and were manned by the 

French 55th and 71st Infantry Divisions, which were composed of elderly 

reservists. Nonetheless, Marfee heights, which overlooked Sedan, provided an excellent position for observation by French artillery observers, and 

the 55th had massed 140 guns in this sector.

By 0800, after working all night, all German elements were in their 

assault positions in the wood lines along the river. Forward of these positions, they faced several hundred meters of ground open to enemy observation and fire. At 1000, the Luftwaffe commenced a five-hour bombardment of enemy artillery, defensive positions, and assembly areas. At 1500, 

as the Luftwaffe bombing effort reached its culmination, the German artillery joined in for a massive combined, concentrated preparation. At the 

same time, infantry and engineers in the initial assault elements used this 

opportunity to cover their advance to the river’s edge.

At 1600, the 1st Panzer Division advanced slowly but gradually increased its momentum. By dark, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck’s 1st 

Infantry Regiment had gained a foothold across the river. By 1730, the 

lead elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had reached the Donchery-Sedan rail line 11⁄2 miles southwest of the crossing site. By 1800, Guderian crossed the river and joined the 1st Infantry Regiment in the advance. 

Meanwhile, Balck attacked the defensive line south of the Sedan-Bellevere 

road. By 2030, he had breached the line and opened a gap in the French 

line between Frenois and Wadelincourt. Balck realized the surprise he had 

achieved, understood his commander’s intent, and kept pressing the attack 

in order to carry the bridgehead as far forward as possible. At this point, 

French resistance was still minimal. A bridgehead 3 miles wide and 6 miles 

deep was established by dawn, and the first tanks were ferried across.
8

The 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions of the XIX Corps fared worse than 

the 1st Panzer Division, even with their superior firepower. Due to extremely effective defensive fires, the 10th managed to establish only a small foothold by 1930—at a tremendous cost in lives and materiel. The 2nd Panzer 

Division suffered an even worse fate than the 10th. The 2nd assaulted across 

open terrain under devastatingly accurate artillery fires and faced tank-tobunker firefights. At 2100, Guderian redirected its crossing efforts.

Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps managed to establish the critical bridgeheads south of Sedan and at Gaullier. Without these significant bridgeheads across the Meuse, the corps would not have been able to maintain 

its center of gravity.

By midnight, the XIX Panzer Corps had established a salient 6 kilometers deep and 5 kilometers wide. Guderian, now concerned about a 

French counterattack, used the remainder of the night to strengthen his 

positions. He directed the infantry to dig in and all available panzer and 

antitank units to continue to move forward. On 14 May, he intended to 

widen and protect the bridgehead, exploit his success, secure crossing sites 

along the Ardennes Canal, and conduct a breakout toward Rethel.

The actions of 14 May proved to be highly significant in terms of 

the campaign, as the XIX Panzer Corps continued to enlarge its bridgehead south toward Stonne and the Ardennes Canal. Throughout the day, 

the French tried unsuccessfully to cut Guderian’s lifeline by attacking the 

bridgehead, both sides attacking and counterattacking throughout the day. 

Guderian, staunchly sustained by his vision of how the attack should unfold and the campaign’s objectives, continued to push armor and artillery 

over the Gaullier bridge site—some 300 armored vehicles and a 105-mm 

battalion. Also during the night, the 2nd Panzer Division managed to advance a panzer regiment with infantry across. To keep the bridge operable, 

corps engineers endured continual air attacks.

The 1st Panzer Division absorbed the brunt of the French counterattacks. In these engagements, the tactical competence and leadership of 

the well-trained Germans proved to be critical. The Germans’ capability 

to communicate and maneuver quicker than the slower-reacting French 

allowed them to engage French armor with flank shots—in microcosm, an 

analogy of the entire campaign in France. By 2400, the XIX Panzer Corps 

had fought off five and one-half French divisions and secured a great tactical victory—but at the operational level, it would be for naught if Guderian did not continue to exploit the advantage that surprise had given him 

and maintain the momentum and initiative he held.
9

Again, Guderian’s superiors expressed concern for the security of 

his rapidly moving corps and feared that it was overextended. Guderian, 

however, opposed stopping and wanted the uncommitted divisions so he 

could continue the deep attack. By striking immediately and continuously, 

he could disrupt any Allied countermoves, and the speed of his advance 

would ensure XIX Corps’ security. Late that night, Kleist withdrew the order to stop Guderian and allowed him to continue the advance. As it turned 

out, OKH’s intelligence assessment reported no significant repositioning 

by the French reserves that would indicate a counteroffensive.

On 15 May, the XIX Panzer Corps’ breakthrough continued to develop 

successfully, literally splitting two French armies at their weakest points 

and setting the stage for the pursuit of forces to the English Channel. As 

a result of this success, the bridgehead was expanded to a depth of 25 kilometers by 50 kilometers, and French resistance in the sector dispersed. 

By nightfall, however, the operation was again halted because OKH feared 

that the XIX Panzer Corps’ deep penetration would be cut off by a French 

counterattack. Once again, Guderian pleaded to continue so he could take 

advantage of the surprise he had gained. Guderian believed that he should 

advance as long as he had the freedom to maneuver. If the XIX Panzer 

Corps slowed down or halted operations, the French would have the critical time they needed to react effectively. With Kleist’s support, the OKH

rescinded the order, and Guderian spurred his weary troops on and effected 

a linkup between his 1st Panzer Division and the 6th Panzer Division from 

Reinhardt’s XLI Panzer Corps at Montcornet. By establishing this twocorps front, Guderian set the stage for the pursuit phase of the operation.

As the XIX Panzer Corps’ soldiers surveyed the open horizon on the 

morning of 16 May, they realized their achievement. The XIX Corps accomplished in six days what the German Army in World War I had only 

attempted. As Guderian wrote, “We are in the open now, the men are wide 

awake and aware that they have achieved a complete victory.”
10

Notes

1. This article is reprinted from Roger J. Spiller, ed., Combined Arms in 

Battle Since 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General 

Staff College Press, 1992), 231–239. Sources for this chapter include Robert A. 

Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, 

CT: Archon Books, The Shoe String Press Inc., 1990); Heinz Guderian, Panzer 

Leader (Washington, DC: Zenger Publishing Co., 1979); Alistair Horne,To Lose 

a Battle: France, 1940 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1969); Erich von 

Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982); and Florian K. 

Rothbrust, Guderian’s XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France: Breakthrough in the Ardennes, May 1940 (New York: Praeger, 1990).

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 7-1.
11

Chapter 2

Considerations for Deep Maneuver: Operation “Crusader”1

Major Glen L. Scott

The ability of a commander to posture friendly forces for a decisive or shaping operation depends on the commander’s ability to 

move that force. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability 

to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate combat 

power at decisive points and times.

2

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

The British offensive termed Operation “Crusader” began on 18 November 1941 in the vicinity of the Egyptian-Libyan frontier and lasted 

until the middle of January 1942, by which time the Axis forces had withdrawn to El Agheila. Whereas in “Battleaxe” the maneuver forces were 

divisions, in “Crusader” corps formed the maneuver base. “Crusader” thus 

provides an excellent opportunity to observe the maneuver of large units 

by both the Allied and Axis forces.

This chapter focuses upon the period of greatest relevance for the study 

of maneuver warfare, 18–23 November and 24–27 November 1941. Beginning 18 November, the British XXX Corps moved deep into Axis territory 

and fought the German Afrika Korps in a series of battles and maneuvers 

that culminated at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November with a tactical victory for 

the Axis. From 24 to 27 November, Rommel led the Axis mobile forces on 

a bold, but futile, maneuver designed to encircle the British 8th Army and 

break their will to continue the offensive. The emphasis during discussion 

and analysis will thus be upon the actions of the British XXX Corps, the 

German Afrika Korps and the respective army commanders. Actions of 

other major units, the British XIII Corps and German and Italian supporting forces, will be limited to that necessary to maintain continuity. 

Setting

After “Battleaxe” in June 1941, both sides were exhausted. Rommel 

was unable to exploit his success. Instead he began to assemble forces 

to assault Tobruk and remove it as a threat to his rear prior to invading 

Egypt. On the British side, Churchill relieved Wavell and the British forces in North Africa underwent extensive reorganization. As the time for 

“Crusader” approached, the British were increasingly able to devote more 

resources toward North Africa, particularly as the Russians successfully 
12

slowed the German advance to the Caucasus. The German war effort, on 

the other hand, was concentrated upon their Russian campaign. The British realized that they must strike during the period of German preoccupation with Russia and before Rommel could overpower Tobruk.

General Sir Claude Auchinleck replaced Wavell as commander of the 

Middle East in July 1941. He immediately came under pressure from London to resume the offense in North Africa. His reaction was to insist on 

receiving sufficient resources to conduct a major operation. The remnants 

to the British Western Desert Force were redesignated as the 8th Army, 

under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham. With 

reinforcements and new equipment, the 8th Army grew to two corps—the 

XIIIth, commanded by Lieutenant General A.R. Godwin-Austin, and the 

XXXth, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir W. Norrie. The XIIIth consisted of two infantry divisions (4th Indian and New Zealand) and a tank 

brigade. The XXXth contained an armored division (the 7th), an armored 

brigade group, an infantry division, and a motorized infantry brigade. 

Within Tobruk, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir R. Scobie, was an 

infantry division (the 70th), an armored brigade, and a Polish infantry brigade. An infantry division (2nd South African) and infantry brigade group 

formed the Army reserve. En route to North Africa were elements of a 

second armored division.3

The British estimated the Axis forces could field seven armor battalions with about 390 tanks, including light German tanks but excluding 

light Italian tanks. According to official records, the British 8th Army 

fielded 12 armor battalions (including 3 battalions of “I” tanks, but excluding the mixed tank brigade in Tobruk) with 477 tanks in XXX Corps 

and 135 tanks in XIII Corps. Additionally, the British maintained more 

than 250 tanks in reserve, to serve as replacements for battle losses, with 

another 236 tanks en route by sea.4

The British reorganization and refitting effort neared completion by the 

end of October 1941. However, as in the case for “Battleaxe,” many units 

were not fully trained.5

 Recognition of this was a major factor in delaying 

the offensive to last half of November. Another concern was the relative 

quality of equipment. Although the British expected to outnumber the Axis 

at least 3-to-2 in armor strength, the German tanks, if not the Italians, were 

more heavily gunned. The British had greater numbers of anti-tank guns 

than previously but they were still primarily the weak 2-pounder, except for 

some 18-pounders in the 1st South African Division.6
13

The British expected to gain air superiority.7 After “Battleaxe,” the 

Desert Air Force sought to improve army/air cooperation and revised 

many of its procedures for providing close support and conducting the tactical air campaign. One significant change was the recognition that the air 

commander must locate control elements forward with the ground forces.8

Rommel believed the British would attack sometime around November 1941. British strength had grown sufficiently and, more importantly, 

the German advance toward the Caucasus was slowing.9

 Thus the British 

could concentrate upon attacking without worrying about a German attack 

through the Caucasus.10

Rommel faced much the same situation as he had prior to “Battleaxe.” 

By the beginning of September, the Italian and German High Commands 

had concluded that until the port of Tobruk was captured, any advance into 

Egypt was pointless.11 While Tobruk remained under British control, the 

Axis had no supply port close to the front near Sollum. Benghazi was 300 

miles away and Tripoli almost 1,000. Accordingly, it became a question 

of who could build up enough strength to attack first—Rommel against 

Tobruk or the British against Rommel.

Rommel’s forces consisted of one German and two Italian corps. The 

heart of the Axis forces was the German Afrika Korps. Commanded by 

Generalleutnant Ludwig Cruewell, the Afrika Korps consisted of the veteran 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and a newly formed provisional infantry division (the Afrika Division, later to be renamed the 90th Light). 

The Italian XXI Corps under Generale di Corpo Navarrini consisted of 

five infantry divisions. The Italian Armored Corps, under Generale di 

Corpo Gambara, consisted of the Ariete Armored Division and the Trieste 

Motorized Division. The Italian Armored Corps was nominally under Italian national control and not subject to Rommel’s orders; however, General 

Gambara agreed to position his forces to support Rommel’s desires.12

The Axis forces were far from uniform in equipment or quality. The 

German forces were generally mobile, well-armed (particularly with 

anti-tank guns when compared to the British), and well-led. The Italian 

forces suffered from poor equipment and leadership.13 The Italian infantry 

was generally without transport and weak in anti-armor weapons while 

the Italian armor was obsolete and inferior to the British. The Axis tank 

strength comprised 260 German and 154 Italian tanks.14 Unlike the British, the Germans did not seek to build a reserve of tanks, at least in part 

because they simply did not have any to spare.
14

Rommel intended to attack Tobruk 23 November 1941.15 By 16 November, the Axis forces had been repositioned to attack Tobruk while also 

guarding against an attack out of Egypt.16 Four divisions of the Italian 

XXI Corps, strengthened with some German units, invested Tobruk. The 

German Panzer divisions were centrally located between Tobruk and the 

frontier, relatively close to the Mediterranean Coast. The Italian Armored 

Corps was located south of Tobruk (the Ariete Armored Division at Bir el 

Gobi and the Trieste Motorized at Bir Hacheim). The Axis frontier defenses were mostly manned by Italians with some German elements. In the 

months since “Battleaxe,” continued improvements had been made in the 

frontier defenses, including the use of extensive mine fields.17

If the British launched a major attack out of Egypt, Rommel depended 

on their mobile forces making a wide movement to bypass the static Axis 

frontier defenses. Rommel would then have the option of either attacking 

the British armor or its vulnerable line of communications.

The Plan and Preparations

The British mission was to destroy Rommel’s Army, relieving Tobruk 

in the process. Exploitation toward and beyond Tripoli was thought possible. With the defeat of the Axis forces in Libya and subsequent occupation of airfields by the Royal Air Force, decisive British air and naval 

influence would expand well into the central Mediterranean; pressure on 

Malta would be eased and Italy itself threatened with invasion. The key to 

accomplishing this had not changed since “Battleaxe.” Rommel’s armor, 

particularly his two German panzer divisions, had to be destroyed.

Two courses of action were considered for “Crusader.” The bolder alternative involved a deep thrust from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier across 

the bulge of Cyrenaica to seize the key Axis port of Benghazi, severing 

Rommel’s line of communication. A supporting attack would be made 

against the Axis forces around and to the east of Tobruk. The second course 

of action considered was a much shorter hook from the frontier, around the 

Axis frontier defenses, toward Tobruk. This attack would directly threaten 

the Axis forces around Tobruk and also the Axis line of communications 

with their frontier defenses. A supporting attack would serve to mask the 

frontier defenses. The idea of the second alternative was to force Rommel 

into a decisive tank battle short of Tobruk.18

The first course of action, the deep thrust to Benghazi, was rejected 

as too risky. It required the movement of large forces over 400 miles of 

questionable terrain. There were doubts such a force could be supplied and 

provided effective air support. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect was the 
15

uncertainty as to Rommel’s reaction to such a movement. It might be the 

British rather than the Axis supply line that was cut or, worse still, Rommel might ignore the British advance and attack a weakly defended Egypt 

where he could live off the British stores in the Delta.19

The alternative selected bore a resemblance to “Battleaxe,” substituting corps for divisions. XIII Corps would fix the Axis frontier defenses 

while XXX Corps thrust around the defenses to the south, then turned 

northwest to engage the Axis armor near Tobruk. After the Axis armor was 

defeated, the siege of Tobruk would be raised in conjunction with a sortie 

by the garrison. An armored brigade group, nominally under command of 

XXX Corps, would operate between the two corps to guard the left flank 

and rear of XIII Corps from any German armor attack. As a deception 

measure, a small brigade-sized force, would thrust along the route originally envisioned in the alternative plan for a deep thrust on Benghazi.

The critical assumption of the plan was that Rommel would react 

strongly to the penetration by XXX Corps. On the first day, the British 

armor would advance about 30 miles into the Axis rear, near the vicinity of 

Gabr Saleh. General Cunningham, 8th Army commander, left his options 

open for subsequent movements, depending on how Rommel reacted. The 

commander of XXX Corps, General Norrie, favored advancing on the 

second day to the area El Adem-Sidi Rezegh. The Sidi Rezegh area both 

contained an excellent airfield and was dominating terrain. If the British 

held the airfield, and the ridge to its north, they would effectively interdict 

Rommel’s line of communications west of Tobruk as well as overlooking 

the Axis forces investing Tobruk.20

The British were determined not to repeat the mistakes of “Battleaxe.” The Army Commander intended to be positioned well forward.21

The British knew they could not deceive Rommel that there would be an 

attack. However, they intended to deceive him as to the time and place of 

the attack.22 A significant effort was made to achieve surprise and prevent 

German observation of preparations for the offensive.23 An example of the 

British deception measures were the elaborate camouflage efforts, including the use of canvas “sunshades” to disguise hundreds of tanks as trucks 

when seen from the air.24

Unlike “Battleaxe,” British preparations for “Crusader” were methodical and complete. The railway line was extended more than 50 

miles west of Mersa Matruh, water was piped from Alexandria almost as 

far as the railhead, and more than 25,000 tons of supplies were stockpiled 

in forward areas.25
16

Opening Phases of the Battle: 18–23 November

Preparations for “Crusader” were not limited to the Army. In the days 

preceding 18 November 1941, the Desert Air Force conducted an extensive 

air campaign against Axis air, ground and sea logistics.26 The British navy 

conducted aggressive patrolling to further disrupt the Axis supply effort. 

Deep operations by parachutists and commandos were staged against supply 

centers, airfields and critical command centers.27 As expected, the Desert Air 

Force achieved air superiority from the start of the operation and maintained 

it, with rare exceptions, throughout the campaign in North Africa.28

By midnight on 17 November, the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force 

was concentrated along the frontier. At dawn, XXX Corps crossed the 

frontier and by evening had generally completed its planned advance for 

the first day, encountering only light resistance from reconnaissance elements. XIII Corps by evening had closed on the Axis frontier defenses. 

The British now waited for Rommel to react.

While the Germans expected a British attack, they did not know when 

or where it would occur. British security and deception measures during 

the preparations for “Crusader” had succeeded to such an extent that the 

attack was a tactical surprise. British success in thwarting German reconnaissance and signals intelligence was reinforced by other factors, among 

them the German concentration upon their own planned assault on Tobruk, 

heavy rains on the Axis airfields, and the fact that Rommel himself was out 

of North Africa for several days preceding the 18th.29

Rommel was initially skeptical of the significance of the British attack, believing it might simply be a reconnaissance in force to distract him 

from his attack on Tobruk. Not until the 19th did Rommel give General 

Cruewell of the Afrika Korps permission to attack, with one panzer division only, in the direction of the British armor.30

For the British, things had not worked as planned. The British armor 

had penetrated deep into Axis territory, but Rommel had not reacted. Early 

on the 19th, the 7th Armored Division commander gave orders which, 

rather than concentrating his division, dispersed the three armored brigades of XXX Corps. The 4th Armored Brigade was ordered to continue 

protecting the flank of XIII Corps. The 7th Armored Brigade was ordered 

to reconnoitre toward Sidi Rezegh. The 22nd Armored Brigade was to 

reconnoitre toward Bir el Gobi. The Support Group was to be prepared to 

support either the 7th or 22nd Armored Brigades.31

As a result of British impatience and Axis sluggishness, a series of 

separated and indecisive engagements were fought on the 19th. The 22nd 
17

Armored Brigade fruitlessly assaulted the Italian Ariete Armored Division 

at Bir el Gobi. The 7th Armored Brigade overran the airfield at Sidi Rezegh against light resistance, barely 10 miles from Tobruk. The 4th Armored 

Brigade dueled elements of the German 21st Panzer Division probing 

down from the north toward Gabr Saleh. Meanwhile, XIII Corps continued to develop a shallow envelopment around the Axis frontier defenses.

On the 20th, the British were faced with a dilemma. They had reached 

the airfield at Sidi Rezegh, only 10 miles from Tobruk, but had not yet 

engaged the bulk of the German armor. Indications were that the Germans 

were concentrating their armor and would be moving south toward Gabr 

Saleh. The British decided to modify their offensive plan and relieve Tobruk while simultaneously fighting Rommel’s armor. The position at Sidi 

Rezegh would be strengthened (7th Armored Division’s Support Group 

would join the 7th Armored Brigade there), and the Tobruk garrison (70th 

Division) was ordered to sortie on the 21st toward Sidi Rezegh. At the 

same time, the 22nd Armored Brigade would move to join the 4th Armored Brigade at Gabr Saleh to face the Afrika Korps. XXX Corp’s infantry division was split, one brigade assuming the mission of “masking” 

the Italian armorer at Bir el Gobi while the other moved to Sidi Rezegh.32

While the 4th Armored Brigade was fighting at Gabr Saleh on the 19th 

and 20th, the XIII Corp’s New Zealand Division and “I” tank brigade were 

only 7 miles away at Bir Gibni. Offers by these units to assist XXX Corps 

at Gabr Saleh were declined.33

By the 20th, Rommel had finally concluded the British were mounting a major offensive. Unwilling to abandon the investment of Tobruk, or 

his frontier defenses, he instructed General Cruewell to destroy the British mobile forces. Believing the British 4th Armored Brigade near Gabr 

Saleh had been largely destroyed in combat with elements of the Afrika 

Korps since the 19th, he ordered Cruewell to attack the British forces at 

Sidi Rezegh on the 21st. As the 20th progressed, the Afrika Korps broke 

contact with the 4th Armored Brigade (and the arriving 22nd) and began 

to move toward Sidi Rezegh, leaving anti-tank screens to protect its rear.

During the period 21–23 November 1941, a confusing series of engagements were fought on and around the airfield and ridges of Sidi Rezegh. The British Official History captures the complex nature of the battlefield as it stood on the 21st:

Over the 20 or so miles of country from the front of the Tobruk 

sortie to the open desert southeast of Sidi Rezegh airfield, the forces of both sides were sandwiched like the layers of a Neopolitan 
18

ice. In turn, starting from the north, there were (a) the troops of 

the 70th Division who had broken out, opposed by (b) German 

and Italian troops facing north and west; (c) a layer of Axis troops 

facing south, opposing (d) part of the 7th Support Group north 

of Sidi Rezegh airfield; the rest of the 7th Support Group and the 

7th Armored Brigade facing south to oppose (e) the bulk of the 

Deutsches Afrika Korps heading north, pursued by (f) the 4th and 

22nd Armored Brigades. To complete the picture, there were the 

troops of the 361st Afrika Regiment on Pt 175 to the east of Sidi 

Rezegh airfield, and the whole of the 155th Regiment to the west. 

A complicated situation indeed, which if suggested as the setting 

of a training exercise, must have been rejected for the reason that 

in real life these things simply could not happen.34

Each side had a different interpretation of what was happening. The 

Germans were attacking to destroy the British around Sidi Rezegh, believing they had already badly hurt the British armor around Gabr Saleh. In 

contrast, the mood at XXX Corps and 8th Army Headquarters on the 21st 

was optimistic. The British believed the Germans were retreating from Gabr 

Saleh and hoped to trap the Afrika Korps between their pursuing brigades 

(the 4th and 22nd) and their forces at Sidi Rezegh. They estimated 170 German tanks had been damaged while 209 British tanks were still operational. 

Elements of the British XIII Corps were also making good progress.35

Throughout the 21st and 22nd, both the British and Germans alternately attacked and retreated. Without clear information on losses or exact 

locations of units, both sides maneuvered and fought almost continuously. 

There were differences in the way in which they fought, however. Invariably it seemed that a British or South African Brigade, often without supporting arms, would battle a German panzer division organized for and 

practicing combined arms tactics.

By the 22nd, the British armored forces were in serious trouble. Tank 

losses on both sides were mounting, with the British having actually 

lost almost 200 tanks on the 21st alone. Late on the 22nd, an example of 

Clausewitzian chance occurred. The 15th Panzer Division, responding to 

a call for support from the 21st Panzer Division, made a night movement 

and literally stumbled into the night leaguer of the British 4th Armored 

Brigade with devastating results. The 4th Armored Brigade was overrun 

and scattered with a loss of several hundred prisoners and about 50 tanks. 

The brigade was effectively out of the battle until reorganized on the 24th. 

In a period of five days, the 450 tanks of XXX Corps had been reduced to 
19

about 50. By contrast, the Germans still had 173 operational tanks out of 

a starting strength of 250.36

By morning on the 23rd, the extent of British tank losses was being 

realized at British headquarters. Still, it was thought the Germans had also 

suffered heavy losses. In fact, the German losses had not been as severe, 

in part due to their superior tactics and in part to their superior battlefield 

vehicle recovery and repair capability.

Early on the 23rd, Rommel ordered Afrika Korps to “encircle the enemy and destroy them.” To accomplish this, the Italian Ariete Armored Division would advance northeast from Bir el Gobi while the 15th and 21st 

Panzer Divisions drove down from the north and east. When the armored 

forces met, the British would be driven against the German infantry and 

guns holding the ridge at Sidi Rezegh.37

General Cruewell’s attack on 23 November (“Totensonntag” or Sunday of the Dead in German) was costly. While the attack did not develop 

exactly as planned, the Germans succeeded during the day in attacking 

and overrunning the separated British brigades in the Sidi Rezegh area 

(primarily the 5th South African Brigade and the 7th Armored Division’s 

armored brigade and Support Group), while preventing the remnants of 

the British 4th and 22nd Armored Brigades from interfering. Cruewell’s 

forces killed or captured 3,000 men but lost more than 70 of its remaining 

tanks. This was the highest daily loss of German tanks during “Crusader.” 

Nevertheless, most of the 7th Armored Division and part of the 1st South 

African Division were destroyed and XXX Corps was shattered. The remnants of XXX Corps withdrew southward to reorganize. The immediate 

danger to the investment of Tobruk had passed, and the British armored 

forces were greatly weakened and disorganized.38

The British came close to admitting defeat on the 23rd. Citing his tank 

losses, General Cunningham prepared to abandon the offensive, but General Auchinleck realized that Rommel had no reserves left and intervened, 

stating: “continue to attack the enemy relentlessly using all your resources 

even to the last tank. Your main object as always to destroy the enemy tank 

forces. Your ultimate object remains the conquest of Cyrenaica and then 

advance to Tripoli.”39

When General Cruewell reported his victory to Rommel early on the 

24th, he recommended that he be allowed to complete the destruction of 

the British armor which had escaped from Sidi Rezegh to the south. Rommel, however, had other ideas.40
20

Raid and Retreat: 24 November to 7 December

Rommel decided the time had come for a bold move. Generalleutnant 

Fritz Bayerlein, chief of staff of the Afrika Corps, stated:

Rommel’s intention was to exploit the disorganization and confusion which he knew must exist in the enemy’s camp, by making an 

unexpected and audacious raid into the area south of the Sollum 

front. He hoped to complete the enemy’s confusion and perhaps 

even induce him to pull back into Egypt again. Our entire mobile 

force was to take part in the operation.41

At midmorning on 24 November 1941, Rommel left his headquarters 

and personally led the Afrika Korps toward the Egyptian border. From 

the 24th to the 26th, the Afrika Korps spread chaos and panic through the 

British rear areas.42 Unfortunately for the Germans, the British infantry 

units of XIII Corps did not panic and fought stubbornly. Not only did the 

British not withdraw but Rommel was unable to relieve the pressure upon 

his frontier garrisons, and elements of XIII Corps (the New Zealand Division) continued a dogged advance toward Tobruk.43

An essential factor in the British resolve to continue the offense was 

the attitude of the British Commander for the Middle East, General Claude 

Auchinleck. On the evening of the 25th, he decided to relieve the 8th 

Army commander, no longer having confidence in his ability to continue 

an aggressive offensive. On 26 November, Auchinleck appointed his own 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General N.M. Ritchie, to replace Cunningham and continue the offensive.44

While Rommel was raiding toward Egypt with the Axis armored forces, the British were busy. XXX Corps was engaged in reconstituting an 

armored force. The 7th Armored Brigade was sent back to the Delta to be 

re-equipped. Remnants of the 7th were consolidated and attached to the 

4th and 22nd Armored Brigades. The tank reserves which Auchinleck had 

insisted upon and recovery efforts began to have an effect; 37 Cruisers 

joined XXX Corps on the 27th, 44 arrived on the 28th, and another 31 

arrived on the 29th. While XXX Corps was reconstituting, XIII Corps had 

assumed the mission of relieving Tobruk.45

The situation for the Axis forces in the Tobruk-Sidi Rezegh area became critical by the 25th. Urgent signals were sent to Rommel explaining the need for the Axis armor to return, but Rommel had been out of 

radio contact for most of the time he had been leading the raid toward 

Egypt. Growing desperate on the 26th, Rommel’s operations officer, General Siegfried Westphal, contacted the 21st Panzer Division directly and 
21

ordered it to return to the Tobruk area.46 That same day, elements of XIII 

Corps effected linkup with elements of the 70th Division from Tobruk.47

By evening on the 26th, it was clear to Rommel that his raid was not 

having the desired results. Rather than collapsing, the British were continuing offensive operations around Tobruk. Throughout the raid, and particularly on the 26th, the German columns had sustained losses from heavy British 

air attacks. On the 27th, the Afrika Korps turned back toward Tobruk.

From 27 November to 1 December 1941, a series of engagements 

were fought around Tobruk. The German and Italians fought to sever the 

corridor linking Tobruk’s garrison with the XIII Corps while the British 

sought to maintain the corridor while continuing to bring up reserves.48 On 

1 December, the Germans succeeded in isolating Tobruk again, but it was 

becoming clear that whereas the British were able to bring fresh forces 

forward (particularly the 2nd South African Division and elements of the 

arriving 1st Armored Division), the Axis had no reserves left to commit. 

Furthermore, because of the British naval and air superiority, Rommel 

could not expect any reinforcements before the beginning of January.49

Reluctant to admit that time was now favoring the British, Rommel attempted to relieve his frontier garrisons by ordering armored battle groups 

to break through to them on 3 and 4 December while continuing to attack 

in the vicinity of Tobruk. However, the British were also attacking and the 

Axis assaults were generally unsuccessful. XXX Corps had reconstituted 

to the point it was again engaging in offensive operations, and XIII Corps 

(in conjunction with the Tobruk garrison) continued to stubbornly fight 

both to reestablish the corridor to Tobruk and reduce the frontier defenses.

On the 6th and 7th, the Afrika Korps launched final attacks against the 

British in the vicinity of Bir el Gobi. The attacks failed with heavy losses. 

Rommel was now forced to admit that his forces, both German and Italian, 

were too exhausted and depleted to continue offensive operations. Local 

withdrawals had already begun as early as the 4th; on 7 December, the 

Axis forces began a general withdrawal to the west.50

Withdrawal: 7 December to 17 January

From 7 December to the beginning of January 1942, Rommel conducted a skillful withdrawal of almost 500 miles across the breadth of 

Cyrenaica to strong positions in the vicinity of El Agheila. The combination of British logistical difficulties, the steady shortening of his own line 

of communications, and aggressive delaying tactics by the Afrika Korps 

allowed Rommel to successfully extract the bulk of his forces. The notable exceptions were his frontier garrisons in the Bardia-Halfaya-Sollum 
22

area. The last of the Axis frontier garrisons held out against ground attacks, aerial bombing and naval bombardment until 17 January. The resistance of these cutoff defenses, interdicting as they did the main east-west 

roadways, were one of the key reasons for British logistical difficulties in 

pursuing Rommel.51

Results of “Crusader”

Although the British lost more tanks in combat, because of the Axis 

retreat they were able to recover and repair many of them, an opportunity 

the Germans did not have. Thus the final tank losses were 278 British to 

about 300 German and Italian. With respect to personnel, during the mobile fighting casualties were roughly equal at around 18,000 each. However, the British ultimately captured 4,000 Germans and 10,000 Italians who 

had been cut off in the frontier defenses at Bardia, Sollum and Halfaya. 

Approximately 300 British aircraft were lost, while Axis losses were well 

over 300. Thus according to the numbers and by ground gained, the victory belongs to the British.52

The difficulty which even the British acknowledged in claiming a major victory was that in one essential aspect, the offensive had failed. Tobruk 

had been relieved and Cyrenaica recaptured, but the Afrika Korps had not 

been destroyed. Moreover, of the approximate 13,000 German casualties, a 

considerable portion were administrative personnel. The bulk of the British 

losses were combat soldiers whose experience would be missed.53

“Crusader” was a long, complex, and confusing offensive. The Clausewitzian concepts of chance and friction were much in evidence. Nevertheless, “Crusader” is a rich source of insights regarding the maneuver 

of large forces in mobile warfare. The analysis first addresses the British 

failure to destroy the Afrika Korps during the period 18–23 November 

1941. Last is a discussion focusing on Rommel’s thrust to Egypt from 

24–26 November 1941.

As in “Battleaxe,” the immediate tactical objective of the British was 

the destruction of the Axis armored forces. From the very beginning, the 

British recognized that all other objectives—including the relief of Tobruk 

and reduction of the Axis frontier defenses—must be secondary to destroying the estimated seven battalions of armor that Rommel could field. 

Against this criteria for success, the British failed in “Crusader.” The Afrika Korps and the Italian Armored Corps were weakened but not destroyed.

Why the British failed to destroy the Axis armor is fundamental to any 

examination of “Crusader.” To all appearances the British should have succeeded, certainly they were in a much superior position than during “Bat-
23

tleaxe.” They achieved tactical surprise. They had accurate intelligence of 

enemy numbers and dispositions and were familiar with the ground. They 

were numerically superior both on the ground and in the air. Their logistical preparations were thorough and complete. With the Tobruk garrison, 

they already had a significant force in the enemy rear. Because of the naval 

and air situation, it was unlikely the Axis would receive significant reinforcement. Finally, British morale was excellent.

Part of the reason for the British failure can be attributed to equipment 

and training. The British armor and anti-armor systems were generally 

inferior to those of the Germans. Not all units and headquarters were fully 

trained. However, these reasons are insufficient to explain the problems the 

British encountered. Italian equipment and training were markedly inferior, yet the Italian mobile forces generally acquitted themselves quite well. 

The problem was not in the tools but rather in how they were employed.

The concept for “Crusader” was sound. The idea of seizing ground in 

the Axis rear which Rommel would feel compelled to retake with his armor is not new. Basil H. Liddell Hart called this the “baited gambit.” J.F.C. 

Fuller referred to it when he wrote:

Seldom can armoured forces be fixed, because not only does their 

mobility enable them to refuse battle, but also to disengage after engagement. Therefore, in order to bring the enemy armour 

to battle, it is necessary to attack an objective which is of such 

importance that the enemy must protect it.54

The validity of Fuller’s thought was amply demonstrated by the repeated attacks that Rommel conducted in the Sidi Rezegh area. Clearly the 

Axis command considered the area around Sidi Rezegh as critical, dominating as it did both the Axis line of communications to the frontier garN Mediterranean Sea

Libya Egypt

Auchinleck’s Offensive

10 November–31 December 1941

0 30 60 90 100 Miles

Cyrenaica 



28–30 Dec

El Haseiat

Soluch

Msus

Timini

Mekili

Bir

Hacheim

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Derna

Gazala Tobruk

Bardia

Salum

El Alamein

International Boundary

Elevation 600m

Elevation 1,500m

Elevation over 3,000m



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1–7 Dec

Bir El Gobi

El Adem

Acroma

Maddalena

 Halfaya

Sid Omar

Capuzzo

Gambuf

Sofafi

El Daba

Mersa Matruh

 Benghazi

 El Agheila

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24 Dec

31 Dec

Agedabia

Bada Fomm 25 Dec



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27 Nov

Sid Barrani

 12–15 Dec

18 Nov–4 Dec

18 Nov–1 Dec

 Nibeiwa

BuqBuq

18 Nov

26 Nov

Gulf

of

Sirte

XXXX

EIGHTH

ROMMEL

XXX

XIII

XXX

XXX Concentration area

and railhead.

Figure 2.1. Auchinleck’s Offensive, 10 November–31 December 1941. Map 

created by Army University Press.
24

risons and overlooking Tobruk. Auchinleck recognized this and the Sidi 

Rezegh area acted like a magnet, drawing British and Axis forces to it. 

Jomini would have recognized Sidi Rezegh as the “decisive point,” while 

Carl von Clausewitz would have identified the Afrika Korps as the Axis 

“center of gravity.”

What went wrong was the British failure to balance mass and economy of force to achieve concentration at the decisive point. The decisive 

point was recognized by both sides as being the Sidi Rezegh area. The difference was that the Axis command was able to concentrate better than the 

British. The British demonstrated, as they had in “Battleaxe,” an inferior 

ability to handle large mobile forces. This inferiority began with the initial 

allocation of forces and continued through the offensive.

The British consistently maneuvered their armor brigades in a piecemeal manner. Five total tank brigades were available to the British 8th 

Army. One was in Tobruk and thus not available for the initial stages of 

the offensive. A second tank brigade, with more than 100 “I” tanks, was 

assigned to support the fixing attack by XIII Corps. That left three armor 

brigades, a total of nine tank battalions, to engage the Axis armor. But 

examination of the first week of “Crusader” reveals that these three brigades were never effectively concentrated. On the 19th, the opportunity 

was missed to mass all four brigades (the “I” tank brigade of XIII Corps 

was only seven miles away) near Gabr Saleh and overwhelm the Afrika 

Korps; instead the brigades were further dispersed.

On the 20th, the British made a fundamental mistake. Unable to resist 

temptation, they decided to split their effort and simultaneously relieve Tobruk, fight the Afrika Korps, and continue operations against the frontier 

defenses. This resulted in a continued dispersion of British armor which, 

in many cases, reverted to its traditional British role of infantry support 

and protection. The original intention of first concentrating upon destruction of Rommel’s armor was lost. With the destruction of the Axis armor, 

the relief of Tobruk would have been virtually uncontested. Instead, the 

British responded to German attacks at different locations by sending tank 

brigades off, like firetrucks, to put out fires.

In contrast to the British, the Germans consistently sought to mass 

their armored forces. The result of this difference in orientation was that by 

the end of 23 November, the Axis armor was still an effective fighting unit 

whereas the British XXX Corps was disorganized and decimated.

The British clearly missed the lesson of “Battleaxe” concerning combined arms operations. They persisted in employing relatively pure forma-
25

tions. Still, even these relatively pure ground formations would have been 

formidable if effective air-ground interoperation had been achieved. British tank brigades at Sidi Rezegh, with effective close air support, would 

have been tough to beat. Unfortunately, while the British succeeded in 

gaining air superiority, the Desert Air Force still had great difficulty delivering ordinance in support of ground tactical maneuver. There was still 

not a sense of close coordination of the air and ground efforts. The British 

showed no better ability to integrate aerial fires with their armored formations than they did artillery and anti-tank fires.

The Germans continued to demonstrate a keen appreciation for the 

efficacy of combined arms operations. They invariably attacked using 

combined arms formations. They considered the anti-tank gun to be a primary tank killer and fully integrated them, with artillery and infantry, into 

offensive maneuver. The British took a far more rigid approach, viewing 

the anti-tank gun as essentially a defensive weapon for the protection of 

infantry. The British considered the tank as the primary weapon to kill enemy tanks. Aside from the impact this had on degrading the effectiveness 

of British armor in the attack, it also encouraged a reflexive response to 

throw whatever armor was available at Axis armor which attacked British 

infantry. The result was to dissipate British armor strength and degrade its 

mobility to that of the “helpless” infantry.

This rigidity of outlook extended to the employment of the “I” tank 

brigade. Once the decision had been made to allocate this potent asset to 

XIII Corps, there was no consideration given to using it in conjunction 

with the armor brigades of XXX Corps.

Finally, in looking at the events of 18 to 23 November 1941, the impact of personal leadership cannot be overlooked. Two factors surface, the 

importance of forward command and the impact of moral resoluteness. 

With respect to leading forward, while the British did better than during 

“Battleaxe,” there were still problems with senior commanders not understanding what was happening at the decisive point. The disaster at Sidi 

Rezegh did not happen suddenly. It built up over several days. The British 

commanders simply were not aware of the severe losses which their armor had sustained since the 19th. Contrarily, the Afrika Korps commander invariably was at the critical point. On the cautionary side, Rommel 

demonstrated the danger in being too far forward. While he led the Afrika 

Korps into Egypt from 24 to 26 November, his headquarters was unable 

to contact him and was left to fight a desperate battle around Tobruk. The 

resulting confusion of orders resulted in lost opportunities in both efforts.
26

The significance of Auchinleck’s intervention on the 23rd cannot be 

overstated. General Cunningham had admitted defeat. Only Auchinleck’s 

insistence that the offensive continue prevented “Crusader” from ending 

in a British withdrawal on the 24th.

Many soldiers and historians have debated the wisdom of Rommel’s 

raid from 24 to 26 November. As many arguments supporting it can be 

raised as those condemning it as foolhardy. What is certain is that Clausewitz correctly stressed the importance of chance and friction in war. Rommel did not have an accurate picture of the enemy in the frontier region. 

There were problems of coordination and logistics with the raid itself. The 

Axis columns suffered from almost continuous air attacks. Yet the panic 

and chaos which spread through the British rear areas was phenomenal.

The issue of how deep an envelopment or penetration should also be 

raised. Shallow operations tend to yield immediate results, whereas deeper 

operations are slower but tend to produce more significant results. The problem with the deeper operations is the increased time required for their effects to be felt. The British infantry divisions simply continued to fight and 

advance despite heavy German armored forces pillaging through their rear. 

Whether they would have continued to fight after several days of disrupted 

logistics is unknown. Also clear is that in such a raid the mobile raiding 

forces can be very successful in overrunning “soft” targets, yet lack the ability to overwhelm resolute resistance from determined combat formations. 

Again, the influence of moral factors is supreme. Cunningham was relieved 

on the 26th, at the height of the panic in the British rear. His successor was 

determined to show the same degree of resoluteness as Auchinleck.

The British ability to sustain their offensive logistically was a key factor in Rommel’s decision to withdraw. The British tank reserves enabled 

XXX Corps to be virtually rebuilt and resume offensive action in a matter 

of days. On the other hand, the German ability to recover and repair armored vehicles on the battlefield was a significant factor in their ability to 

wage offensive maneuver warfare over a period of weeks of intense combat despite a lack of reserve equipment. The British logistical preparations 

for “Crusader” freed them from the immediate need to reduce the Axis 

frontier garrisons. Thus, rather than being tethered to an infantry attack on 

the garrisons, as happened during “Battleaxe,” the British armorer was, at 

least in theory, free to maneuver.

British tactical doctrine had not appreciably improved since “Battleaxe.” The British soldier fought stubbornly and courageously, but not as 

smartly as the Germans. Despite enjoying overall numerical superiority, at 
27

the actual point of tactical combat the British usually faced a locally superior and more agile enemy who could focus greater combat power. What 

forced Rommel to withdraw was not British tactics but steady attrition 

and the recognition that whereas the British could replace losses, the Axis 

forces could not.

An unresolved issue arising from German operations is what constitutes victory. On several occasions, notably on the 20th at Gabr Saleh 

and the 24th at Sidi Rezegh, Rommel stopped short of exploiting tactical 

successes. On the 20th, this led to the Afrika Korps turning toward Sidi 

Rezegh rather than completing the destruction of the 4th Armored Brigade 

and destroying the approaching 22nd Armored Brigade. After General 

Cruewell’s attack at Sidi Rezegh on the 23rd, Rommel chose to thrust 

toward the Egyptian border on the 24th rather than seeking to complete 

the destruction of XXX Corps. As a result, XXX Corps was reconstituted 

and reentered the battle. In each of these incidents, it appears that faulty 

intelligence and overoptimistic reports contributed toward a misleading 

impression of how badly the enemy had been hurt. However, it is also 

clear that Rommel probably did not properly credit the British with the 

ability to rapidly recover from a severe tactical setback.

The implication drawn from the rebirth of the British XXX Corps is 

that decimating the weapon systems of a mobile formation, even a corps, 

is only a temporary measure so long as the formation retains a functioning 

command structure and has access to reserve equipment or has a strong 

recovery and repair capability. Rommel chose to pursue the opportunity 

to achieve a staggering victory by maneuver at little cost rather than accept the cost in time and resources which destroying XXX Corps in detail 

would have involved. It worked in “Battleaxe” against Beresford-Peirse 

and Wavell but failed in “Crusader” against Ritchie and Auchinleck. Perhaps the critical lesson is the overriding importance of the moral factor.

Conclusion: Lessons for Deep Maneuver

The lessons of Operation “Crusader” would have been familiar to Napoleon Bonaparte, Antoine-Henri Jomini, and Clausewitz: throwing the 

weight of your forces upon the critical point and having the resources, 

both materially and morally to sustain the fight. For the commander contemplating deep maneuver, “Crusader” expands upon the lessons derived 

from the earlier Operation “Battleaxe.” These lessons fall into two general 

areas, those of planning and those of execution.

A fundamental requirement for success in deep maneuver is accurate 

and realistic targeting or selection of the maneuver force objective. The 
28

British succeeded in this during the planning for “Crusader.” The mission could be accomplished either by destroying the Axis armor or by rendering the Axis defenses untenable (obviously accomplishing the former 

would result in the latter; the opposite did not necessarily follow). Both 

options would be addressed by threatening the dominant terrain of Sidi 

Rezegh; the Axis command would either have to commit its armor to Sidi 

Rezegh or retreat.

Essential to accurate “targeting” of the deep maneuver force during 

the planning phase is adequate intelligence concerning both enemy tactical dispositions and his operational situation, to include intentions. The 

British command was fortunate in having relatively accurate intelligence 

ranging from tactical to strategic sources.

Given appropriate “targeting” of the maneuver force, the next planning 

issue is the adequacy of the maneuver force to accomplish the mission, that 

is, ensuring it will have sufficient combat power to force a favorable decision at the critical point. For the British in planning “Crusader,” the critical elements in ensuring this combat power were assignment of sufficient 

combat forces (to include aerial forces) and development of a logistical 

support operation that would allow the ground maneuver force to engage 

in sustained combat despite operating in the depth of the enemy defenses.

A final part of the planning process for deep maneuver revolves around 

the truism that combat power is not absolute. Accordingly, degrading the 

enemy’s combat power is equivalent to enhancing one’s own. Overall 

combat ratios in deep maneuver are less important than the relative combat power of forces at the critical point (Sidi Rezegh during “Crusader”). 

Surprise, with the attendant techniques of security and deception, constitutes a basic means by which the deep maneuver force can achieve local 

superiority at the critical point before the defender can react and shift forces. Planning for secrecy before and speed of movement after the operation 

begins is thus critical in the absence of overwhelming superiority.

Rommel’s raid toward Egypt exemplifies what can happen when a maneuver force inadequately plans deep maneuver. Poor intelligence, leading 

to an inaccurate assessment of British vulnerabilities, coupled with inadequate combat forces and logistical support resulted in an operation which 

depended for success solely on psychological shock. While moral factors 

are certainly a fundamental aspect of war, basing operational maneuver 

upon them is at best a gamble.

The actual execution of Operation “Crusader” illustrates several important considerations for deep maneuver. Among the most important of these 
29

considerations are the impact of uncertainty and chance, the importance of 

combined arms in generating combat power, and the impact of leadership.

During “Crusader,” neither commander had totally accurate or complete information on either their own forces or the enemy. One implication of this is that the commander must consider the process of maintaining information on the status of his own subordinate units as being just 

as important as gaining intelligence of the enemy. Despite these efforts, 

however, a great amount of uncertainty is bound to exist, and therein lies 

a further danger.

In the face of uncertainty there is a temptation to adopt caution, to try 

and prepare for all eventualities. Trying to cover all possibilities inevitably 

results in a dispersion of effort. To concentrate at the decisive point, one 

must economize elsewhere. The willingness to accept risk is a necessary 

element in maneuver warfare. What is equally clear, however, is that there 

are means of reducing that element of risk, foremost among them being 

accurate intelligence and the ability to quickly use it. These, in turn, support the need for a continuous and large-scale reconnaissance effort and 

leaders being sufficiently forward to reap the benefits.

A conspicuous failing of the British in “Crusader” was their inability to synchronize the various combat arms to maximize combat power. 

Given the limited assets available to a force operating deep, the ability 

to integrate the use of infantry, armor, artillery, and air is essential. This 

requires adequate doctrine, organization, and equipment. The German approach of employing combined arms formations at relatively low levels of 

organization appeared to yield superior results as compared to the British 

tendency to employ pure formations. Likewise, British weakness in integrating aerial and ground fires resulted in ground formations being unable 

to achieve sufficient combat power in numerous instances.

Finally, the impact of leadership upon sustaining unity of effort during 

the execution of deep maneuver cannot be overemphasized. The commander of a deep maneuver force will be faced with many temptations 

to divert forces and attack targets of opportunity under the rationale of 

exploiting success. The difficulty with this is that such dispersion of effort 

may lead to an inability to generate sufficient combat power at the critical 

point. The maneuver commander must constantly reassess the situation 

and refrain from weakening his thrust unless and until he becomes convinced that the original objective is no longer appropriate.
30

Notes

1. This chapter is an excerpt from “Considerations for Deep Maneuver: 

Lessons from North Africa, 1941–1942,” Military Art and Science (MMAS) 

thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

2003, 63–96.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 5-71.

3. J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939–45 (New York: Duell, Sloan 

and Pearce, 1949), 155; Colonel E.G. Keogh, Middle East 1939–43 (Melbourne: 

Wilke and Company Ltd., 1959), 231; Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Western 

Desert 1941 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1980), 488–89.

4. General Auchinleck insisted on building up a substantial reserve of 

tanks in order to quickly replace battlefield losses, in part to offset the British 

weakness in battlefield recovery and repair operations. Major General Ian S.O. 

Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 2; History of the Second World 

War, United Kingdom Series (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956), 

4. For a detailed breakdown of British tank figures, see Playfair, The Mediterranean, 30–31. For information on British intelligence of Axis armor strength 

and dispositions, see F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: 

Its Influence on Strategy and Operations 2 (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1981), 296–297.

5. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 5.

6. Brigadier R.M.P. Carver, “Tank and Anti-Tank,” The Journal of the Royal 

United Service Institution, February 1946, 42–43; Hinsley, British Intelligence 

in the Second World War, 297–298.

7. Prior to the end of October the British estimated they would outnumber 

the Axis air forces by 528 to 385. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 14.

8. British Air Ministry, Air Support: The Second World War 1939–1945, 

Royal Air Force (British Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, 1955), 55–60; Lord 

Arthur W. Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air 

Force Lord Tedder G.C.B. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 188–189.

9. In early October, Berlin evaluated British strength in North Africa, 

excluding Tobruk, as 850 tanks (Cruisers and 10 tanks) and 775 light tanks and 

armored cars in eight infantry divisions and two armored divisions. Colonel 

General Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries 2 (Boulder: T.N. Dupuy Associates 

and Westview Press Inc., 1976), 1274–1275.

10. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), 

155; Major General F.W. Yon Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine 

Books, 1980), 69.

11. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 19–20.

12. Pitt, The Crucible of War, 489–490; Fuller, The Second World War, 

155–156; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 71.

13. Generalfeldmarchall Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record

(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1954), 120–122.
31

14. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 156.

15. Heinz W. Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: George G. 

Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1953), 100.

16. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 156; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 71.

17. Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 104.

18. Major General Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 94.

19. De Guingand, 96.

20. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 6–8; Major General Gerald L. Verney, 

The Desert Rats: The History of the 7th Armored Division 1938–1945 (London: 

Hutchinson and Son Ltd., 1954), 68.

21. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 7.

22. Lieutenant General Sir Arthur F. Smith, “The War in the Middle East: 

June 1940–March 1942,” The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 

February 1943, 11.

23. For a discussion of British security and deception, see Playfair, The 

Mediterranean, 8–9, and Notes from Theatres of War, No. 14: Western Desert 

and Cyrenaica August / December 1942, British War Office Pamphlet (London: 

His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1943), 5.

24. Verney, The Desert Rats, 661; Robert Crisp, Brazen Chariots (New 

York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1959), 19.

25. Crisp, Brazen Chariots, 66.

26. Air Marshall Sir P.R.M. Drummond, “The Air Campaign in Libya and 

Tripolitania,” The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, November 

1943, 259.

27. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 15–19; US War Department, The Libyan 

Campaign November 1941 to January 1942, Military Intelligence Service, Campaign Study No. 1 (Washington, DC, 25 August 1942), 81; General Siegfried 

Westphal, The German Army in the West, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 

1951), 108.

28. RAF Middle East Review No. 1 (Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle 

East, May–December 1942), 90.

29. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 158; Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 100; Westphal, The German Army in the West, 108.

30. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 73–74.

31. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 39.

32. Playfair, 41–44.

33. Basil H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1970), 187.

34. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 46.

35. Playfair, 46.

36. Playfair, 48; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 306.

37. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 85.

38. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 49–50; Liddell Hart, History of the Second 

World War, 189.
32

39. Cunningham had already issued orders to begin a withdrawal back into 

Egypt when Auchinleck arrived at his headquarters and rejected the idea. D.W. 

Braddock, The Campaigns in Egypt and Libya (Aldershot: Gale and Polden 

Ltd., 1964), 60; De Guingand, Operation Victory, 98; Winston S. Churchill, The 

Grand Alliance, The Second World War 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 

1950), 567–568; Playfair, The Mediterranean, 52. For an account of the intelligence available to Auchinleck on 23 November, see Hinsley, British Intelligence 

in the Second World War, 307.

40. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 163; Westphal, The German Army in the 

West, 109; Playfair, The Mediterranean, 53.

41. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 163.

42. For a first-hand account of the panic and confusion that Rommel caused, 

see Alexander Clifford, Crusader (London: George G. Harrap and Company 

Ltd., 1942), 83–98, and Alan Moorehead, Don’t Blame the Generals (New York: 

Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1943), 68–73.

43. Keogh, Middle East, 237–239; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 90–921; 

Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 163–166; Playfair, The Mediterranean, 53–59.

44. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 61; De Guingand, Operation Victory, 98; 

Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 568–569.

45. The Libyan Campaign, 21; Playfair, The Mediterranean, 62; R.M.P. Carver, “The Seventh Armoured Division,” The Army Quarterly, October 1948, 48.

46. Lieutenant Colonel Westphal was left in charge of Panzergruppe Afrika 

headquarters when Rommel left to lead the Afrika Korps toward Egypt on the 

24th. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 92–93; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 167.

47. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 61–62.

48. For a good overview of the fight for the Tobruk corridor, see The New 

Zealand Division in Cyrenaica and Lessons of the Campaign, Pamphlet by 

Headquarters, New Zealand Division, 4 January 1942, 16–21.

49. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 167–171; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 

94–97.

50. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 171–172; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 

97–98.

51. Playfair, The Mediterranean, 77–79, 81–921; Rommel, The Rommel 

Papers, 173–179; Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 118–123; Westphal, The 

German Army in the West, 109–110; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 98–99.

52. Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 178; Playfair, The Mediterranean,

97–100.

53. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 198.

54. Fuller, The Second World War, 164.
33

Chapter 3

The Debaltsevo Raid by the Bashkir Cavalry Division During 

“Operation Gallop,” February 1943

Robert F. Baumann and William E. Bassett

The corps or division conducts deep operations . . . to defeat or 

destroy the enemy’s cohesion, nullify the enemy’s firepower, disrupt enemy command and control, destroy enemy supplies, or 

break the morale of enemy commanders and soldiers in the deep 

area. . . . Corps and division headquarters mass effects across 

multiple domains in the close area to enable maneuver forces to 

conduct a penetration. After the initial penetration, friendly forces 

exploit their success in sufficient depth to create dilemmas for the 

enemy commander across the entire depth of the enemy defense. . 

. . As elements of the enemy reposition, they become less effective 

and more vulnerable to attack by joint fires.1

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

A February 1943 raid by the most decorated Soviet division in World 

War II provides a superb example of deep operations to achieve the operational objectives described above. It also illustrates how large scale combat 

operations can be desperate, uncertain, lethal and brutally relentless. The 

112th “Bashkir” Cavalry Division—later re-designated as the 16th Guards 

Cavalry Division—began this operation at 48-percent strength, transitioning without pause from two successive major operations and months of 

hard combat outside Stalingrad against some of the best German divisions 

fielded during WWII. The Debaltsevo Raid illustrates how “the fluidity 

and rapid tempo of large-scale combat operations poses challenges for 

the protection of friendly assets.”2

 The same fluid, chaotic conditions 

that helped the 112th Cavalry Division (16th Guards Cavalry Division) 

penetrate German defenses and achieve tactical mission objectives also 

complicated coordinated operations with friendly units and return of what 

remained of the division to Soviet lines.

Strategic Context 

1943 was the year during which the war on the Eastern Front in World 

War II turned decisively in Russia’s favor. This reversal of offensive momentum followed two successive summer campaign seasons dominated 

by spectacular German advances that failed to deliver a decisive strategic 

result. If the Soviet stand in front of Moscow in the fall of 1941 marked 
34

the first turning point, the second was the battle at Stalingrad—a colossal 

confrontation of massed armies focused on the urban cauldron of a Soviet 

industrial city situated on the lower Volga River. In the late summer and 

autumn of 1942, the German 6th Army spearheaded a rapid drive eastward 

through the Don River basin to Stalingrad. There, once again with a great 

victory almost accomplished, the offensive bogged down in grim urban 

combat as the Red Army desperately dug in and preserved a toehold on 

the western bank of the Volga River. Hitler prematurely declared victory 

in December, but the city did not fall. 

Hitler directed his field commander, General Friedrich von Paulus, to 

take the city at any cost and that his troops should not withdraw under any 

circumstances. Its strength eroded by months of combat, 6th Army slowly 

starved and froze due to lack of supplies and bitter winter conditions. The 

surrender of 6th Army on 2 February 1943 represented a huge psychological as well as strategic blow to Hitler’s ambitions in the east.

As 6th Army neared collapse in December and January and the Soviets launched Operation Little Saturn, the first of several operations in rapid succession to sustain pressure on beleaguered German forces. A wellaimed counteroffensive, Little Saturn struck along 6th Army’s flanks to 

enlarge the Stalingrad encirclement established by Operation Saturn and 

enable Soviet forces to roll westward toward Kharkov and Rostov, strategic cities in the eastern Ukraine. 

This study encompasses the concluding stage of Operation Little Saturn in early and mid-January, the transition without pause to Operation 

Gallop in late January, and the Gallop offensive itself up until the point of 

culmination in late February 1943. This historical analysis concentrates 

on the operations of the 112th/16th Guards Cavalry Division within the 

framework of the deep raid assigned to the 8th Cavalry Corps/7th Guards 

Cavalry Corps. The 8th Cavalry Corps was subordinate to the 3rd Guards 

Army, which conducted a major thrust westward into Ukraine under the 

direction of Soviet Southwest Front, the equivalent of an army group in 

western parlance. Southwest Front, in turn, reported to the Supreme High 

Command, or STAVKA, in Moscow.

The westward thrust of Soviet Operation Little Saturn to some extent 

boiled down to a race. Red Army units hoped to exploit a massive breakthrough and reach the eastern Ukraine before German forces—which 

were in withdrawal across the front—could rally and consolidate a new 

defensive line. Thus, the 8th Cavalry Corps covered roughly 300 kilometers en route to its objective, and encountered increasing resistance as it 
35

approached Voroshilovgrad (today known as Luhansk) along the North 

Donets River. To cross the river, it was first necessary to fight for control 

of the town of Belaia Kalitva near the east bank. More important still was 

control of Height 79.9, remembered today by residents as “the Height of 

Immortality” in honor of the combat action involving cavalrymen from the 

112th that took place there on 21–22 January 1943. 

Immediately upon the conclusion of Little Saturn, a pair of follow-on 

operations, Gallop and Star, commenced on 29 January 1943 in an effort to 

isolate German forces east of Stalino (today known as Donetsk). As Little 

Saturn moved seamlessly into Gallop, the 112th set its sights on the deep 

objective, Debaltsevo. 

Colonel General N.F. Vatutin, commander of Southwest Front, directed Operation Gallop with support from Voronezh Front on his northern 

flank. To Vatutin’s south, Southern Front would drive westward to assist, 

once it had secured Rostov.3

 Unfortunately for the Red Army, the depth of 

the operational objectives assigned to Southern Front “far exceeded their 

capabilities” in the estimate of Eastern Front scholar David Glantz.4

 Expecting a rapid German withdrawal, Southern Front faced a much stiffer 

defense around Rostov and the southern Donbas than anticipated. This delay allowed First and Fourth Panzer Armies to break contact and obstruct 

Soviet operations to the north, directed by the Southwest and Voronezh 

Fronts. Of course, this operational shift of German armies was unanticipated when offensive action began. 

The German Perspective

The challenge facing German forces was how to regroup under extreme pressure during a rapid withdrawal from Stalingrad. Conversely, 

as Red Army units raced westward toward the Don River, they hoped to 

attack into Ukraine before German forces could consolidate a new line of 

defenses in the eastern Donbas region. On 6 February, a full week after 

the start of Operation Gallop, Field Marshall Erich von Manstein advised 

Hitler to conduct a general withdrawal from eastern Ukraine but did not 

receive an immediate decision.5

 Manstein did not believe it was possible 

to salvage the entire Donets Basin and sought permission to hold the western portion alone.6

 By this point, 6th Army was already effectively lost at 

Stalingrad, but a little time remained to pull back other units and organize 

coherent defenses several hundred kilometers to the west. Each day was 

consequential. Still, according to von Manstein, 6th Army’s sacrifice by 

holding on into February at least prevented the Soviets from committing 

even greater forces to their westward advance.7

 Concurrently, as the sur-
36

viving elements of Army Group Don fell back, they were consolidated 

with the remains of Army Group B and renamed Army Group South on 

12 February. The threat to German Army Group South was formidable, as 

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein informed the Fuhrer on 17 February—

with only a force of 32 depleted divisions to cover a front of 470 miles. On 

19 February, Hitler directed Army Group A to divert any forces it could 

spare to support von Manstein’s defense in the south.8

Regardless of the operational risk, Hitler was determined to hold the 

Donbas region because of its vast resources, such as coal, upon which Germany had become highly dependent. On 4 February, Reich Minister Albert 

von Speer, who directed the German economy, and Paul Pleiger, the Managing Director for the Donets River Basin (a part of the Donbas) during 

the German occupation, informed Hitler: “Without the Donets Basin, the 

annual production of which amounts to 6 to 7 million tons, an increase 

in armament is impossible.” Hitler himself observed that loss of the area 

would be a severe blow to the war effort.9

Soviet Operational View

The Soviet offensive raced westward with 16 armies along three major axes. Of these, the central thrust aimed at Voroshilovgrad and Rostov. Armies, corps, and divisions under Southwest Front—commanded by 

Colonel General Vatutin—advanced directly through gaps in Hungarian 

and Italian positions towards Voroshilovgrad. Southwest Front included 

the 6th, 1st Guards, 3rd Guards, and 5th Tank armies, along with Mobile 

Group Popov, to operate along a 160-mile front. Estimates of the Front’s 

combat strength in early February were about 325,000 men and 360 tanks. 

Along roughly the same frontage, Vatutin’s four armies and one mobile 

group faced German First Panzer Army, including Army Detachment Fretter Pico, as well as elements of Army Detachment Hollidt and Army Detachment Lanz, which accounted for about 160,000 men and 100 tanks. 

Two fresh SS Panzer divisions would subsequently bring 250 additional 

tanks into the equation.10 Once Operation Gallop began, 3rd Guards Army 

conducted a crucial deep attack between Army Detachment Hollidt and 

First Panzer Army. Victory along this axis—if combined with a successful 

Soviet thrust toward Slavyansk to the northwest—would cause the collapse of German defenses at Voroshilovgrad. Furthermore, a push beyond 

Rostov by Southern Front would make First Panzer Army vulnerable to 

double envelopment.11

Planning for Gallop took place in January even as Little Saturn wound 

down. At best, the fast-moving situation was chaotic, but Soviet forces 
37

commenced Gallop without an operational pause in hope of bagging as 

many Germans as possible. Units on both sides, with a few exceptions such 

as the SS Panzer divisions noted above, were far below authorized strength 

and in an acute state of fatigue. Intelligence, particularly concerning enemy intentions, was sketchy. Vatutin was convinced as late as February that 

German units were in a hurry to exit the Donbas and reach the left bank of 

the Dnieper where they could make a proper stand.12 Hitler felt otherwise.

Figure 3.1. First and Fourth Panzer Armies Recapture Kharkov. Map created by 

Army University Press.

N

Turkey

Crimea







U.S.S.R.



Sevastopol

Black

Sea

Caspian

Sea

Sea of

Azov



Kerch

Maykop 



Kursk





 









Svobode

Saratov

Novorossisk Tuopso

Batum

First and Fourth Panzer

Armies Recapture Kharkov

January–March 1943

0 50 100 150 Miles

Voronezh

Belgorod

Nikopol

Kharkov

Poltava

Melilopol

Tikhoretsk

Stalingrad









Mariupol

Taganrog

Kalach 

Kotelnikovo

Voroshilovgrad Dnepropetrovsk

Rostov



XXXX

2

Bryansk

XXXXX

XXXX

HOLLIDT

SS

XXX

1

XXXX

KEMPF 

XXX

1

XXX

Voronezh

XXXXX

Southwest

XXXXX

South

XXXXX

XXXX

Front Line, 18 January1943

Front Line, 18 February 1943

Soviet Advances, February–March 1943

German Counterattacks, March 1943

Railroad

Soviet Advance Elements Cutoff
38

Southwest Front operations resumed on 29 January. The 3rd Guards 

Army received the mission to advance westward from positions north and 

south of Voroshilovgrad along a frontage of about 100 kilometers. According to the ambitious timetable established by STAVKA (supreme high 

command) planners, Soviet units would reach a line west of Stalino (modern-day Donetsk), a depth of more than 120 kilometers, on the ninth day.13

The 3rd Guards Army would not come close to advancing so far, so fast. 

Unrealistic optimism pervaded the Soviet leadership at STAVKA, Front, 

and army levels. Tragically, they ignored warnings from field commanders 

regarding the exhaustion of men and resources and discounted evidence of 

the massing of German forces.14

112th Cavalry Division

Among the bold strikes undertaken by constituent forces of 3rd 

Guards Army as part of Gallop was a deep raid conducted by the 8th Cavalry Corps, which consisted of three cavalry divisions: the 21st, 55th, and 

112th. The focus of this case study is the deep raid conducted by the 112th 

Cavalry Division (subsequently renamed the 16th Guards Cavalry Division) in the direction of an important rail junction at the town of Debaltsevo. The events of that raid exemplify both the opportunities and risks 

associated with rapid maneuver in a highly fluid environment while facing 

a still-capable and dangerous foe. 

The 112th was a rarity in the Soviet Army. Often known as the “Bashkir Division,” the 112th was raised in Ufa, the capital of the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan. In November 1941, as the demand for 

manpower intensified, the State Defense Committee (GKO) directed the 

formation of 20 cavalry divisions from the minority republics and autonomous republics of the Soviet Union. The principal functions of cavalry divisions were to exploit breakthroughs, pursue retreating enemy forces, and 

attack the enemy rear area. Bashkirs—a distinct Turkic ethnic group from 

the South Urals region with a semi-nomadic, horse-centered culture—

made up the largest share of the personnel of the 112th, although many 

Soviet ethnic groups were represented in its ranks. To provide a level of 

seasoning, half of the personnel were recent draftees from the 1922 birth 

year cohort and the other half were Bashkir veterans pulled from other 

units. This blend of experienced troopers and raw recruits advanced the 

training process.15 The Red Army classified the division as “light” cavalry—meaning that it lacked tanks, heavy artillery pieces, antitank weapons, 

and antiaircraft guns. Key support would come primarily from corps level. 

This expedient accelerated the process of fielding the division, which also 

required collecting a suitable horse for every rider.16
39

Yet another challenging task was the selection of officers. An inspection in January 1942 showed that the division had filled only 48 percent of 

its junior officer positions. Moreover, the 112th still lacked a commander, chief of staff, two regimental commanders, three regimental chiefs of 

staff, and seven squadron commanders. In addition, the division suffered 

an acute lack of weapons and had conducted only irregular training. Only 

409 cavalrymen and 32 percent of officers had earned a high rating in 

military and political training. Due to a lack of barracks, the men were 

quartered on collective farms or in private cottages, and typically slept 

on bare dirt floors. Although morale was good, the inspection counted exactly 5 training rifles, 15 revolvers, a single machinegun, and 132 unsuitable saddles. Only 832 of a projected 3,221 cavalry horses were available. 

Draft horses, however, far exceeded need—with 2,182 on hand against a 

requirement of 310.17

A subsequent inspection followed from 26 February to 2 March and 

found that almost all of the officer slots had been filled. The enlisted ranks 

were slightly over strength at 109 percent; 91.7 percent of the men were 

Bashkir. Material deficits persisted, however. This situation began to improve with the selection of an experienced senior leader, who was given 

up to 15 days to get the division ready for transfer to the front once they 

were fully equipped. The 112th became one of four new cavalry divisions 

to join the active army in the spring of 1942.18

The choice for division commander was Mingalei Minazovich 

Shaimuratov (pronounced shy-moor-Ah-tov), a Bashkir from a village in 

the area. Born in 1899, Shaimuratov served the Red Army during Russia’s 

civil war as a cavalryman. It was hardly surprising that he would gravitate 

toward cavalry service. Bashkir culture emphasized horsemanship and included a long cavalry tradition. Bashkir cavalry first entered into service 

of the tsars in 1798, and Bashkir units earned acclaim during Russia’s 

triumphant repulse of Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of 1812.19

In any case, Shaimuratov enrolled in the Combined Arms School of the 

Red Army in 1924 and assumed command of a cavalry regiment in 1925. 

In 1931, he joined the faculty at the famous Frunze Academy in Moscow. 

Shaimuratov was a gifted linguist—fluent not only in Russian and Bashkir, but also German and Chinese. In 1935, he served as a Soviet attaché 

to China where he functioned as a military adviser to Mao Tse Tung until 

1940, interrupted only by a period in 1937 during which he recovered in 

Moscow from a combat wound.20 During German Operation Barbarossa 

in the summer of 1941, Shaimuratov saw action near Smolensk. On 13 

November 1941, in response to a directive from the STAVKA, nation-
40

al military units began to form in the minority republics in Central Asia, 

Kazakhstan, and Bashkortostan.21 In December 1941, six months after the 

start of the German invasion, Shaimuratov officially received command of 

the newly formed 112th Cavalry Division but did not reach his new unit 

until early 1942. On 17 April, the last elements of the 112th arrived by rail 

to the Tula region, where they began to train with other elements of the 8th 

Cavalry Corps. By fall, the 112th also acquired horse-drawn artillery, an 

antiaircraft battery, signal support, a veterinary detachment, and medical 

and other supporting elements.22

In June, the 8th Cavalry Corps joined the Bryansk Front and would 

take a place in the second-echelon defense between the Bryansk and 

Southwest Fronts. The 112th saw its first action against a German breakthrough on 4 July 1942. After five days of intense combat, the 112th was 

reassigned to a quieter sector to recover from significant losses, including 

12 officers and more than 3,000 men.23

The division saw additional combat during the summer and joined the 

line for the Stalingrad counteroffensive in November 1942 as part of the 

5th Tank Army. Prior to the start of the offensive, Shaimuratov surveyed 

the landscape and informed his corps commander, Major General M.D. 

Borisov, that the 112th would need antitank weapons and air defense artillery in such open terrain. Borisov declined to pass the request along to 

the commander of 5th Tank Army—to whom the corps was at that time 

subordinated—on the grounds that additional support was unnecessary. 

Sure of his own assessment, Shaimuratov replied that such improvements 

were inevitable. In fact, antitank and antiaircraft weapons would become 

standard for all cavalry divisions in 1943.24

In November, Shaimuratov received promotion to Major General. 

From November 1942 to January 1943 during Operations Saturn and Little Saturn, he led the 112th over a distance of more than 300 kilometers 

with almost no break in combat operations. Along the way, they helped 

cut off enemy communications with 6th Army and killed, wounded, or 

captured an estimated 3,000 Germans and destroyed 100 tanks.25 The sustained fighting and movement would test the division’s resilience. 

Soviet horse cavalry divisions underwent several reorganizations between 1941 and 1943. At the start of the war, a division had an authorized 

strength of only 2,336 men. After the experience of combat in the summer of 1941, the size roughly doubled in 1942. Further combat experience 

showed the importance of greater firepower and air defense capabilities. 

Therefore, the 1943 standard cavalry division consisted of three cavalry 
41

regiments supplemented by an artillery regiment (16 X 76-mm and 8 X 

122-mm guns), a reconnaissance battalion, an antiaircraft squadron, an 

engineer squadron, and a signal squadron. Total authorized strength of 

the Red Army cavalry division reached 4,700 men; 42 guns; 18 anti-tank 

guns; and 6 anti-aircraft guns. Three such divisions made up the heart of 

a cavalry corps, which also included 2 tank regiments of 39 tanks each, 

a self-propelled artillery regiment, a tank destroyer regiment, an artillery 

regiment, an antiaircraft regiment, a mortar regiment, a mortar battalion, 

and a separate tank destroyer battalion. Overall strength was 14,000 to 

15,000 men as well as 90 tanks or self-propelled guns.26 Due to the lag 

time involved in adjusting unit structure and composition, it is difficult to 

ascertain the exact strength of the 112th in February 1943. Of course, by 

the time Operation Gallop began, actual strength was much lower than 

authorized due to two months of continuous combat.

The role of the cavalry division depended as much on the horses as on 

the men. By 1942, the authorized strength of a cavalry regiment as about 

1,400 men and 1,500 horses. Given enough the latter, cavalry units enjoyed a great advantage in cross-country mobility over German defenders. 

The Russian countryside was vast and had minimal infrastructure. Spring 

and autumn both typically featured protracted muddy periods, which hindered movement. German vehicles were mainly confined to the roads, 

even in their poor unpaved condition, and most German soldiers were still 

dismounted infantry.

Soviet Action at Belaia Kalitva

In January 1943, the 112th Cavalry Division along with the elements 

of the 5th Mechanized Corps and 55th Cavalry Division coordinated in 

the encirclement of the city of Belaia Kalitva, a short distance east of the 

North Donets River but several hundred kilometers west of Stalingrad 

where the offensive began. After street fighting during the night of 19 January, German forces fell back across the North Donets. Cavalry elements 

in hot pursuit raced across the river to seize a toehold on the west or left 

bank, where they withstood a series of German counterattacks intended 

to crush them before reinforcement arrived. Anchored to these positions, 

Soviet forces concentrated and held until the end of the month. 

On 21 January during the fight for Belaia Kalitva, Major General 

Shaimuratov ordered an attack to seize key terrain along the west bank 

of the river, noted in Russian sources as Height 79.9, from which German 

forces could survey the entire area.27 Moving in darkness through a heavy 

snowfall, a small cavalry detachment of 30 men under the command of 
42

Lieutenant Annaklych Ataev advanced with automatic weapons, machine 

guns, antitank guns, and grenades across a mine field directly toward German trenches along the military crest of Height 79.9. Backed by indirect 

artillery fire, the cavalrymen assaulted the trenches and seized the height. 

At dawn, German panzer grenadiers attacked with tanks in support, but 

Ataev’s small detachment held its ground using antitank guns and grenades. Joining the next German assault were two companies of Schutzstaffel (SS) troops under the cover of artillery support. As the Germans drew 

near, Ataev led a counterattack—losing 13 of the 30 men under his direct 

command. The Soviets estimated that German forces suffered 200 casualties while scaling the height under fire. Ataev’s unit withstood yet another 

counterattack on the 22nd.28

Aware of desperate fighting on Height 79.9, Major General Shaimuratov directed reinforcements to cross the river to reinforce Ataev’s small 

detachment. Upon arrival they were struck by a nightmarish scene. The 

approaches were widely cratered and German corpses were strewn across 

adjacent slopes.29 Ataev himself was killed during the last assault as his 

unit was wiped out by an overwhelming attack. His comrades found his 

body—shot through the heart—on the breastworks still clutching an automatic weapon. The lone surviving cavalryman, severely wounded, died 

within hours.30 In all, 29 Soviet veterans of that fight were awarded the 

Order of the Fatherland War 1st Degree. Ataev was subsequently honored 

as a Hero of the Soviet Union.31 Seizing and retaining Height 79.9—commemorated on the 25th anniversary of the fight as the “Height of Immortality”—enabled Soviet forces to cross the North Donets in force. The 

fight for Height 79.9 provides some sense of the kind of hard fighting 

experienced by 112th troopers in the months preceding Operation Gallop 

and the Debaltsevo raid.

Operation Gallop and the Road to Debaltsevo

Southwest Front operations against German Army Group Don, which 

would become part of German Army Group South in February, commenced on 19 January. On 31 January, the 8th Cavalry Corps—which 

would come under control of 3rd Guards Army on 6 February—received 

orders to attack Voroshilovgrad and prepare for a move on Debaltsevo. 

Despite reinforcements, the corps was well below strength in personnel 

and virtually every category of equipment. Especially acute was the lack 

of tanks, all of which had been destroyed in preceding battles.32

Together with the 55th Cavalry Division, the 112th advanced on 8 

February—supported by corps artillery and division mortar fires—to en-
43

velop German infantry in hasty defenses on the western outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. In two days of fierce combat, the Germans lost more than 900 

men and officers.33

On the evening of 10 February, the commander of the 3rd Guards 

Army, D.D. Leliushenko, ordered 8th Cavalry Corps to execute a rapid 

breakthrough to Debaltsevo in order to seize the rail junction and paralyze 

German rear-area communications. That same evening, Borisov instructed 

Shaimuratov to be prepared to turn over command of the 112th Cavalry 

Division and assume duties as his deputy corps commander upon conclusion of the operation.34

Initially expecting support from the 1st Guards mechanized and 2nd 

Guards Tank Corps, the 8th ended up largely on its own. According to 

Major General G.P. Koblov, then cavalry inspector of the Southwest Front, 

tanks were supposed to lead the raid. Their participation was preemptFigure 3.2. Deep Raid by Soviet 8th Cavalry Corps During Operation Gallop 

(February 1943). Map created by Army University Press.

N

To Stalingrad







 

To Rostov

To

Kharkov

Belaia

Kalitva

Stalino

(Donetsk)

Debaltsevo

Chernukhino

Voroshilovgrad

(Luhansk)

6 ARMY

XXXX

XXXX

1 GA

XXXX

3 GA

XXX

8 CC

XXXX

5 TA

Deep Raid by 8th Cavalry Corps

February 1943

0 6 12 18 24 Miles

0 10 20 30 40 km

XXXX

1 PA

XXXX

4 PA

XXXX

Army Detachment

Hollidt

XXXX

Army Detachment

Lanz

Height German 79.9

Army Group South

(Field Marshall E. von Manstein)

Russian

Southwest Front

(Col General N.F. Vatutin)
44

ed by supply shortages and a German attack along the front at Voroshilovgrad. As 8th Cavalry Corps stormed forward, a German enveloping 

attack closed the door behind them.35 Leaving that problem for 3rd Guards 

Army to solve, 8th Cavalry Corps proceeded as planned—encountering 

assorted enemy small units—and broke through a line of defense on 12 

February. Meanwhile, the 8th Corps breakthrough had created disruption 

and confusion on the German side, and numerous motorized and railroad 

units hastily evacuated Voroshilovgrad and streamed west. Many were 

intercepted and destroyed by 8th Cavalry Corps. Despite foul weather, 

the corps advanced 70 kilometers westward, completely shutting down 

German communications between Voroshilovgrad and Debaltsevo. Yet, 

ominously, resupply from the Soviet rear was already sporadic and insufficient. Strain on depleted Soviet logistics, coupled with early German efforts to isolate Soviet forward elements, began to affect operations barely 

four days into a two-week operation.

As for the 112th Cavalry, the division was at 48 percent strength at the 

time of the raid and had only 45 percent of its prescribed complement of 

horses, 35 percent of its guns, and 30 to 40 percent of mortars. Nevertheless, the division broke through German lines on 11 February and quickly 

moved westward. By the evening of the 12th, the 112th Cavalry reached 

Iashchikova and Malo-Ivanovki.36

Across the front, the Soviet tactical success threatened to become an 

operational victory. German Field Marshal von Manstein ordered an urgent 

response to annihilate the cavalry forces now wreaking havoc behind Army 

Group South. Three German infantry divisions—the 62nd, 164th and 304th, 

as well as the 6th Tank Division—rapidly entered the Debaltsevo area to 

confront the Soviet raiders. (Authors’ note: The size of the German response 

ordered by von Manstein, himself, is indicative of the threat posed by the 

8th Cavalry Corps to German control of the eastern Donbas.) In addition 

to recommitting ground divisions, the Germans capitalized on their significant air assets. Under aerial bombardment, 8th Cavalry Corps advanced in 

two columns on Debaltsevo, slipping between the German 17th Corps and 

Army Detachment Fretter-Pico. By the morning of 13 February, the 55th 

and 112th Cavalry Divisions captured a number of small villages.37

From there, the two cavalry divisions moved westward on the 13th to 

Chernukhino, which proved to be well-defended by parts of two motorized 

infantry battalions backed by four heavy guns and light tanks. After a full 

day of fighting led by two cavalry regiments advancing from the east and 

southeast, Soviet cavalry entered the town. There they occupied defensive 

positions and withstood German aerial attack. Planned Soviet air support 
45

was not forthcoming, and the town remained contested.38 German defenders obliterated one Soviet reconnaissance squadron in the town center.

Undeterred by continuous casualties and dwindling supplies, the 112th 

and 55th resumed the offensive on 14 February. In the course of intense 

street fighting, they killed up to 200 Germans and knocked out four tanks. 

Nevertheless, counterattacks by German reserve elements succeeded in dislodging Soviet forces from Chernukhino, meaning that Debaltsevo was just 

out of reach. However, in the meantime, the 21st Mountain Cavalry division 

attacked the rail station at Baronskaia, where it destroyed stockpiles of enemy ammunition and supplies. Moreover, they blocked German rail access 

to Debaltsevo and severed another line of enemy communications with unit 

fighting for Voroshilovgrad, which fell to the Soviets on the 14th.39

As official acknowledgement of its heroic contribution to the capture 

of Voroshilovgrad, 8th Cavalry Corps on 14 February was re-designated 

as the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps. In turn, the 112th, 55th, and 21st Cavalry 

Divisions were henceforth designated the 16th, 15th, and 14th Guards Cavalry Divisions, respectively. The satisfaction resulting from this prestigious 

designation was quickly countered by German propaganda. On the 16th, a 

German aircraft passed over Soviet positions and dropped leaflets hailing 

Russian defeat. They read: “You hope to conceal your destruction by renaming yourselves as guards. It won’t work. We will destroy you. We advise you 

to put down your weapons and cease resistance. Bayonets in the earth.”40

The Germans acted quickly to keep their pledge. On the same day, 

16 February, according to information obtained through prisoner interrogations, up to two infantry divisions and 50 tanks were committed to the 

Figure 3.3. Composition of Major General M.D. Borisov’s Cavalry Corps before 

and after its 14 February 1943 re-designation as a Soviet Guards Cavalry 

Corps. Table created by Army University Press.

8th Cavalry Corps

(Until Redesignation)

7th Guards Cavalry Corps

(Upon Redesignation)

21st Cavalry Division 14th Guards Cavalry Division

55th Cavalry Division 15th Guards Cavalry Division

112th Cavalry Division 16th Guards Cavalry Division
46

fight for Chernukhino. The main attack was directly against the 15th and 

16 Cavalry Divisions. On the evening of the 17th, a German attempt to envelop the town failed but a separate counterattack succeeded in dislodging 

the 14th Guards Cavalry Division from Baronskaia. Meanwhile, the 7th 

Guards Corps commander requested support from army headquarters as 

enemy pressure increased. 

In the meantime, the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps commander set up a 

360-degree defensive perimeter and awaited the arrival of armored support. The 15th Guards Cavalry Division reinforced defensive positions 

to the northeast of Chernukhino, and the 16th covered the eastern and 

southeastern approaches. Unwilling to relinquish all initiative, the corps 

continued to disrupt rail connections leading to Debaltsevo. During the 

day of the 18th, Soviet forces lost a significant fraction of their guns and 

horses to aerial bombardment. It is worth mentioning again that when 7th 

Guards Cavalry commenced its raid on the 13th, the divisions were already reduced to 48 percent official strength and continued to take losses 

during the subsequent five days.41 German maneuver forces, supported by 

artillery and aviation, advanced from Chernukhino and Debaltsevo to encircle Soviet forces.42

Following the bombardment, German forces conducted an attack 

aimed at the division and corps staff headquarters, situated on Red Partisan 

Street in Chernukhino. The attack failed, but German pressure continued 

to increase. Soviet troops were so low on ammunition that they had to 

scrounge up rounds from their own dead and grab the weapons of dead 

Germans. Combat in the town inexorably devolved into small unit engagements punctuated by close combat at scattered points. 

Fighting Out of Encirclement

A message from the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps commander to 3rd 

Guards Army headquarters read as follows: “the ring is closing. There is 

no ammunition, and none has been received. Today enemy aviation conducted heavy bombing. No friendly units are nearby. I request urgent measures, especially aviation support, otherwise a catastrophe is possible.”43 A 

further problem was that the eastern Donbas did not provide forested areas 

in which to conceal the horses, and forage was scarce.

According to 15th Guards Cavalry Division commander, I.T. Chalenko, 3rd Army promised resupply but advised encircled forces to hold their 

positions, and, if necessary, resort to partisan warfare.44 By the end of the 

day on 18 February, the corps commander concluded that the existing defensive positions were untenable and that it would be necessary to return 
47

to more mobile warfare and pull units out of Chernukhino. Meanwhile, 

information from prisoner interrogations indicated the hasty formation of 

a German defensive line along the Mius River in the areas of Striukovo 

and Faschevka. At Striukovo, Soviet forces withdrawing from Cherukhino collided unintentionally with German forces. To avoid encirclement, 

Major G.A. Chernikov, the chief of operations staff of the 16th Guards 

Cavalry Division, led units under the cover of darkness and through deep 

snow to envelop enemy positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets left a few men 

and a single piece of artillery in Chernukhino to cover the withdrawal and 

ambush entering enemy forces. This small stay-behind element managed 

to inflict significant casualties and take out three tanks before abandoning 

their position.45

That same day, von Manstein met with Hitler to advise that Soviet 

forces had struck German positions on the Mius River and had broken 

through in several places where Army Detachment Hollidt had not yet 

been able to secure a continuous front. Moreover, Russian cavalry units, 

though encircled, were still at large in the area of Debaltsevo. Even so, von 

Manstein believed a greater crisis was shaping up near his northwestern 

flank, and requested permission to redirect some motorized units in that direction. Elsewhere, Soviet forces were in evidence heading for the Dnieper 

crossings between First Panzer Army and Army Detachment Lanz, on the 

northern edge of von Manstein’s defenses. Action against this threat could 

not wait.46 On the following day, Hitler allowed some transfer of units 

from Army Group A to help secure the left flank Army Group South.

On 20 February, Soviet cavalry elements at Striukovo received word 

via prisoner interrogations that a significant German force was on its way. 

As enemy aerial bombardment continued, no aerial help from the Soviet side was forthcoming. At that point something remarkable occurred. 

At Shaimuratov’s initiative, Borisov met with his senior commanders 

and resolved to withdraw from Chernukhino.47 With no assistance coming from 3rd Army, Shaimuratov took the astonishing step of ordering his 

staff to send an encrypted message directly to Stalin himself spelling out 

the cavalry corps’ predicament.48 At Shaimuratov’s insistence, 7th Guards 

Cavalry Corps moved toward Illiria to meet elements of the 1st Guards 

Mechanized Corps, which was supposed to be on its way to provide reinforcement. 16th Guards Cavalry Division advanced on the villages of Ivanovka, Petrovo, and Krasnosel’e, while the 15th moved against Krasnyi 

Kut based on reports of an enemy approach. German elements in the town 

were hit unaware, and hastily evacuated.49
48

On 22 February, 3rd Army directed 7th Guards Cavalry Corps to meet 

elements of the 14th Rifle Corps at Shirokii. From that point, Soviet forces 

began pulling back from their deep raid only to encounter German forces 

in positions astride the main roads. One was a German artillery brigade at 

Frondirovka. The 15th Guards Cavalry Division and 78th Cavalry Regiment drew the mission to clear the town. Prolonged fighting followed, and 

the Germans brought reinforcements. The 16th Guards Cavalry Division 

received orders to clear the area at Shirokii. After suffering severe losses, 

including Deputy Corps Commander I.S. Dudko, what remained of the 

corps took defensive positions.50

Elements of the 15th and 16th Guards Cavalry Divisions met at the 

northeastern edge of Ivanovka. Later on the 22nd, what remained of the 

two divisions attempted to break out to meet lead elements of the 3rd 

Guards Army, only a few kilometers to the east. The attack by this composite cavalry force was repelled by heavy enemy fire. After marching 

continuously for three days, exhausted Soviet soldiers collapsed in the 

snow, many seriously wounded.51 At this point, the remnants of both cavalry divisions reformed as three composite regiments. 

On the morning of the 23rd, MG Borisov summoned Shaimuratov to 

ask directly why no breakthrough had yet been achieved. Shaimuratov explained that the exhausted physical condition of his troops—combined with 

an acute shortage of ammunition and lack of information about German 

forces—would make a breakout suicidal. Instead, Shaimuratov requested 

one day to conduct reconnaissance to find the weakest point in enemy lines, 

and promised that he would not only extricate his own men, but the rest as 

well out of encirclement. Borisov, believed by multiple witnesses to have 

been intoxicated at the time, insisted on a breakout as soon as possible. Although differing in small details, eyewitness accounts generally indicated 

that a heated exchange occurred between the two generals. Determined 

to salvage as much of the force as possible, Shaimuratov personally led a 

small reconnaissance team as the remnants of his division followed about 

half a mile behind.52 Shaimuratov suffered a severe wound near the village 

of Iurino No. 1 and was taken prisoner. By one account he died under torture at the hands of his captors, but his sacrifice was not in vain.53

Though they had to fight their way out, the 16th Guards Cavalry Division managed to lead a significant number of the force out of encirclement. A few who could not make it out linked up with local partisans 

and continued the fight behind enemy lines. On the 24th, the surviving 

elements managed to link up with leading elements of 3rrdArmy at Malonikolaevka.54 The losses were severe; one regiment made it out with only 80 
49

survivors.55 In recognition of its extraordinary efforts to carry out a raid in 

terrible winter conditions and through continuous combat, the 7th Guards 

Cavalry Corps earned the moniker “Wild Corps.”56

During the raid, 7th Guards Cavalry Corps inflicted losses on the enemy estimated at 12,000 officers and men, 28 tanks, 70 motorcycles, 50 

guns, 35 mortars, 54 machine guns, and two armored trains. In addition, 

they eliminated 6 communications centers, 30 supply depots, and 3 railroad bridges. Traffic along all three major rail lines eastward from Debaltsevo was severely interrupted.57

On the other hand, the German counterstroke against Southwest and 

Voronezh Fronts had not only blunted the Soviet advance, but pushed it 

back toward the Donets River with sometimes-severe losses. Overall, according to von Manstein, the efforts of First and Fourth Panzer Armies 

led to the ultimate defeat of Soviet Operation Gallop. German forces by 

their own estimate essentially destroyed 25 Soviet tank corps and three 

rifle divisions. German reports claimed 23,000 Soviet troops killed and 

another 9,000 taken prisoner. Von Manstein noted that the latter figure was 

small because German armored forces lacked the infantry support to seal 

encirclements of Soviet units.58 During a three-week period from 3 to 24 

February, Soviet losses attributable to Operation Gallop were estimated at 

17,000 killed and more than 6,000 captured. Tank losses exceeded 500.59

Von Manstein’s decision to abandon positional warfare and exploit the 

maneuverability of his panzers made a huge contribution to stemming the 

Soviet tide. Writing of the “miracle of the Donetz,” General von Mellenthin stated, “there was no miracle; victory was gained by masterly judgment and calculation.”60

The reversal of the Soviet offensive also exposed intelligence limitations on the Soviet side. Soviet armored forces advancing west between 

Kharkov and Stalino (Donetsk) in late February were completely surprised 

by five panzer divisions. Soviet information depended heavily upon prisoner interrogations since the Soviet Air Force remained too depleted to 

effectively fulfill a reconnaissance function. At the same time, Soviet planners missed significant opportunities due to a lack of information in the 

extremely chaotic operational environment. German XXIV Panzer Corps, 

holding the extreme southern portion of the defensive front in March, actually had no tanks whatsoever but this vulnerability remained unexploited.61

In reality, “victory” meant that German forces narrowly avoided additional catastrophe at multiple points in February 1943, but the success 

was not sustainable. Soviet confidence and competence were growing in 
50

tandem. The visionary deep operations doctrine—swept aside during Stalin’s purge of the Red Army officer corps in 1937–1938—would mature 

in practice in 1944. Following Operation Gallop, the 16th Guards Cavalry 

Division would pause for reconstitution and return to the fray by summer. 

Most of the replacements were not Bashkirs, but the division retained its 

identity. Transferred to the Central Front, the 16th joined the successful 

offensive on Chernigov and participated fully in the two-year drive on 

Berlin that ended the war on 8 May 1945. Over three years of combat, the 

16th compiled a remarkable combat record and—as measured by the 78 

division veterans named Heroes of the Soviet Union—became the most 

decorated division in the Red Army.62

During Operation Little Saturn and Operation Gallop, German retreat under Soviet pressure created operational and tactical opportunities. 

It also exacerbated Soviet logistical weaknesses and complicated Soviet 

commanders’ coordinated response to German counterattacks and the unexpected appearance of bypassed German forces from the east. 

Summary

The opening paragraphs of FM 3.0 use operations in Ukraine in 2014 

to illustrate the lethality of large-scale combat operations. Operations on 

the same ground in January and February 1943 illustrate lethality of a 

different but enduring nature. US forces may one day face operational and 

strategic opportunities that demand “come as you are” commitment of depleted forces with insufficient logistical support for sustained operations. 

Once committed, it may not be possible to sufficiently reconstitute or rotate units, or to declare an operational pause. That day will demand much 

of agile, resolute, highly competent cavalrymen like M.M. Shaimuratov 

and the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division. It will also demand application of 

current Army doctrine in FM 3.0.
51

Notes

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 7-23–7-24.

2. FM 3-0, 2-248. 

3. David M. Glantz, Operation Don’s Main Attack: The Soviet Southern 

Front’s Advance on Rostov, January-February 1943 (Lawrence, KS: University 

Press of Kansas, 2018), 399.

4. Glantz, Operation Don’s Main Attack, 601.

5. World War II German Military Studies 9, Part IV: The OKW War Diary 

Series (New York: Garland, 1979), 191. The relevant portions cited in this article 

are from the Situation Reports at Hitler’s Headquarters from 12 August 1942 to 

17 March 1943.

6. Daniel Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of 

Army Group Don (Mechaniscburg, PA: Stackpole, 1990), 198.

7. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General (Novato, Ca: Presidio, 1994), 441–42.

8. Manstein, Lost Victories, 426–427.

9. World War II German Military Studies 191.

10. David Glantz, From the Don to the Dneper, (London: Routledge, 1992), 

87–95. The Germans formed Army Detachments (Armee Abteilung) as an ad 

hoc response to operational exigencies. It was their means to rapidly cohere 

fragmented forces into stronger composite organizations.

11. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad, 104.

12. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnieper, 95, 119–21.

13. Glantz, 95.

14. Glantz, 120–21.

15. Natsional’nye voennye formirovaniia bashkirskogo naroda perioda 

velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 1941–1945.[National Military Formations of the 

Bashkir People during the Period of the Great Patriotic War]. This unsigned 

monograph appears on the Vatandash website at http://vatandash.ru/index.

php?article=1927. This work, published by the Executive Committee of the 

World Bashkir Congress, makes extensive use of archival references from the 

Bashkir State Historical Archive and the Central State Defense Archive of the 

Republic of Bashkortostan.

16. National Military Formations of the Bashkir People during the Period of 

the Great Patriotic War. This reference is based on files in the Bashkir Military 

Historical Archives.

17. National Military Formations of the Bashkir People during the Period of 

the Great Patriotic War.

18. National Military Formations of the Bashkir People during the Period of 

the Great Patriotic War. 

19. For full background on the Bashkir cavalry tradition in the tsarist 

army, see Robert F. Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Service of the Tsar: 
52

The Case of the Bashkirs,” Slavic Review 46, No. 3/4, Autumn/Winter 1987, 

489–502.

20. A.Kh. Nasyrov, Podvig generala: Vospominaniia komandira eskadrona 

112-i Bashkirski kavaleriiskoi divizii [The General’s Achievement: Memoirs of 

a Squadron Commander of the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division] (Ufa: Kitap, 

2006), 1–8. The author of this book was himself an officer in the 112th and conducted interviews with other Soviet participants as part of his research.

21. “Sud’ba generala Shaimuratova,” [The Fate of General Shaimuratov] 

Veteran Bashkortostana, www.veteranrb.ru. The full article is posted at http://

nailtimer.com/articles_page/bashkortostan_general_shaymuratov.html.

22. Natsional’nye voennye formirovaniia.

23. Natsional’nye voennye formirovaniia.

24. G.G. Bulatov, ed., Generaly Bashkortostana,[Generals of Bashkortostan] (Ufa: Kitap, 1995), 318–19.

25. Natsional’nye voennye formirovaniia; Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 

26–34; Bulatov, 319. The authors speculate that many of these German tanks 

were either out of gas or mechanically incapable of movement. Obviously, the 

requested anti-tank guns came in handy. 

26. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnieper, 41.

27. M.S. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony [The Squadrons went into battle] 

(Moskva voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1995), 31.

28. Dokuchaev, 31–32; Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 28–29.

29. Dokuchaev, 32–33.

30. Dokuchaev, 33; Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 29.

31. A.I. Zakharov, Gordost’ i slava 16-i kavdivizii [Pride and Glory of the 

16th cav division] (Bashkirskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1990), 48.

32. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 35; Bulatov, Generaly Bashkortostana, 320–22.

33. Dokuchaev, 36.

34. Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 31. This change never transpired due to 

Shaimuratov’s death and Borisov’s capture. 

35. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 37.

36. Dokuchaev, 31–32.

37. Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 31; David A. Shunk, “Field Marshall von 

Manstein’s Counteroffensive of Army Group South, February-March 1943: 

The Last Operational Level Victory of the Panzer Forces on the Eastern Front,” 

Master of Military and Art and Science thesis, US Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1988, 25–26.

38. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 38.

39. Dokuchaev, 39; Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 35.

40. Nasyrov, 32.

41. Nasyrov, 32.

42. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 42–43.

43. Dokuchaev, 44.

44. Dokuchaev.
53

45. Dokuchaev, 45.

46. Manstein, Lost Victories, 425–26.

47. Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 33.

48. Nasyrov.

49. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 46–47.

50. Dokuchaev, 48–49.

51. Nasyrov, Podvig generala, 34.

52. Nasyrov, 32–40.

53. A.A. Maslov, “The Unknown Pages of a Heroic Raid,” trans. David M. 

Glantz, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 2, 1997, 176–180. For years 

after the war, there was doubt surrounding the exact circumstances of Shaimuratov’s death. Accounts still differ in some details to this day. These circumstances 

delayed the general’s receipt of the Hero of the Soviet Union award. Today there 

is a statue of Shaimuratov in his home village in Bashkortostan.

54. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 50–51.

55. Natsional’nye voennye formirovaniia.

56. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony, 56.

57. Dokuchaev, 58.

58. Manstein, Lost Victories, 431–33.

59. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad, 126.

60. F.W. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 

253. Also of interest by the same author is German Generals of World War II as 

I Saw Them (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 1977).

61. Timothy Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the 

Russian Front During World War II: Prelude to March 1943 (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1986), 163–65.

62. Accounts vary as to whether there were 76, 77, or 78 Heroes of the 

Soviet Union in the 112th / 16th Guards Cavalry Division. This is probably because several of the awards, such as the one given to Major General Shaimuratov, were conferred years after the war’s end. Regardless of the precise number, 

consensus among the sources is that no other division had more Heroes of the 

Soviet Union than the 112th. 
54
55

Chapter 4

Creating Operational Depth through Coalition Integration: 

Seventh Army and Operation Dragoon

Major Christopher J. Shepherd

Operational movement and maneuver requires enough operational reach to execute operations decisively without an operational 

pause. Success demands full integration of all available means in 

a multi-domain approach. Thus, successful operational movement 

and maneuver combines force projection with land maneuver to 

operational depth in an integrated, continuous operation.1

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

Coalition warfare is fraught with both challenges and opportunities. Despite this, an August 2017 article coauthored by Generals Robert 

Brown and David Perkins discuss coalitional warfare as a constant in the 

paradigm for the Army’s future operating concept of Multi-Domain Battle 

(MDB). “The future battlefield will be one where integration into joint 

and multinational forces is a prerequisite for victory.”2

 The complications 

of coalition warfare manifested themselves continuously during Operation Dragoon, yet these actions also demonstrated the effective operational 

depth possible by leveraging the capabilities of a coalition.3

The second invasion of Western Europe two months after Normandy—

along the Southern Riviera—is less known and sometimes subordinated in 

contributions toward the Allied victory in Europe. Yet this second invasion 

was just as critical to ultimate success in the liberation campaign. The rapid 

exploitation demonstrated both geographic and cognitive depth, forcing the 

collapse of German resistance in France and withdrawal to the Rhine. 

Seventh Army integrated the ad hoc coalition from two different theaters spanning different operational agendas. Challenges included a reduced familiarity between the US and French forces, the late allocation 

of forces, language barriers, and competing interests. The difficulties in 

the Franco-American coalition’s success provide a relevant case study for 

application toward challenges in future large-scale combat operations, and 

integration within a coalition framework to achieve operational depth.

Dragoon’s objectives, which were the vital ports of Marseille and Toulon, formed the critical basing for logistical volume that enabled the Allies’ 

endurance through France and into Germany. The operation’s momentum through simultaneous pursuit isolated the German Army Group G in 
56

southern France.4 This endurance—combined with the momentum created 

by the coalition’s exploitation following penetration of the southern defenses—projected combat power deep into Southern France simultaneous 

to fierce urban fighting in the port cities. Seventh Army’s rapid coalition 

integration balancing national capabilities with national constraints created an operational reach which increased relative tempo for combat power 

projection, while enhancing geographic depth in exploitation and destroying German physical and cognitive will to resist in Southern France. 

Shaping the Coalition’s Attack

On the night of 14 to 15 August 1944, the partisans from the French 

Forces of the Interior (FFI) listening to a London broadcast heard the 

words, “Nancy has a stiff neck.” From this confirmation of the impending 

invasion of Southern France, the partisans sprang into action. They cut 

critical cable networks, attacked German couriers and staff cars, placed 

obstacles across roads, and removed poles from drop zones and landing 

zones. Critically, partisans severed the cable linking the German Army 

Group G with forces in northern France, preventing coordination between 

the Nazi forces spread out across the country. 

The Seventh Army’s commander, General Alexander “Sandy” Patch, 

created an organization within his staff to better control the shaping effects 

of host nation partisan warfare in depth. The Provisional Number 4 Special Forces Group within Seventh Army’s staff contained 66 French-speaking British and Americans who oversaw an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 

trained and armed FFI operating in southern France, plus a further 30,000 

to 40,000 more mobilized but unarmed. They directed priority target lists 

and delivery of advance supply drops between 5 and 15 August consisting 

of more than 100,000 containers of weapons, explosives, and ammunition 

to resistance forces. By Dragoon’s D-Day (the day the operation commenced), the FFI already nominally controlled the area between the Aixen-Provence and the Rhone River east of Grenoble in the high Alps.5

Seventh Army also integrated the French Armee B, the American VI 

Corps, the Anglo-Canadian-American First Special Service Force (1st 

SSF), a provisional airborne division, the Anglo-American First Airborne 

Task Force (FATF), and the French Group of Commandos and French Naval Assault Group. Only a month prior to the landings did the coalition 

operate under a unified army commander for the first time when the Allied 

Force Headquarters (AFHQ) officially assigned all French forces for Dragoon to Seventh Army on 7 July 1944. The French Army, consisting of I 

and II French Corps, was itself a coalition of Frenchmen from the main-
57

land and colonial troops from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Even 

Armee B’s commander, Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, called it “a 

melting pot . . . able to bring so rich an alloy to so high a degree of fusion.”6

Between 28 April and 10 August 1944, the Mediterranean Allied Air 

Force dropped more than 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. Although the Germans knew an assault was coming, the severed communications and successful deception operations by Seventh Army meant that 

the defenders were completely surprised by where it occurred. Deception 

operations included increased bombing attention west of Marseille, paratrooper dummies, electronic simulators creating ghost convoys, and heavy 

radio discussions regarding landings.7

In the first week of August 1944, Seventh Army embarked across five 

ports on two continents under the careful command of the respective Near 

Shore Control Parties. The 853 vessels of American, British, French, Greek, 

and merchant ships forming the naval task force converged from 10 convoy 

routes on an assembly area west of Corsica by 14 August 1944. Despite 

the massive effort required to coordinate the coalition dispersed across so 

many staging areas, the smooth execution relied on this dispersion.8

Just after midnight on 15 August, following the commencement of FFI 

sabotage operations in depth, the first man of Operation Dragoon touched 

French soil. By request and design, this belonged to a Frenchman. Commandant Marcel Rigaud landed alone on the beach at Rayol in his “rendezvous with France,” establishing a guide light for the assault force.9

The French provided the overall preponderance of forces, with the 

United States limited in available manpower due to continuing operations 

in Normandy and Italy. US forces also lacked armor and mechanized forces 

for exploiting a penetration. While the American VI Corps under General 

Lucian Truscott formed the initial amphibious assault, the follow-on forces 

consisted mainly of the French Armee B under the command of de Lattre. 

The assault objective of the American VI Corps penetrating the defenses was a beachhead east of Toulon, providing the base for follow-on 

operations. The French provided the main effort for the operation, seizing 

the ports of Toulon and Marseille for strategic logistical efforts. Dragoon 

forces then planned an exploitation of the penetration up the Rhone Valley 

to Lyon, linking up with forces advancing from Normandy. 

Separate basing for follow-on supply provision increased the effectiveness of the army’s logistics. While Near Shore Control at Naples maintained overall responsibility, French Armee B established their own supply 

bases in Africa and Italy, validating transportation and shipping into the 
58

target area through their US counterparts. Liaison efforts at both French 

and US supply bases formed critical linkages for this effort. Following 

embarkation, Near Shore Control Headquarters in Naples, augmented 

with French personnel, continued administration and supply management 

based on reported consumption data.10

German Preparations

Desperately trying to determine where the main assault would land, 

Generalfeldmarschall Johannes Blaskowitz, commanding German Army 

Group G, worked feverishly with limited resources to stop the impending 

invasion. By July 1944, Army Group G owned the two-thirds of France 

below the Loire River, and many of the soldiers were an international conglomeration, or refitting after tough fighting on the Soviet front. Their motivation largely stemmed from an intense fear of capture by FFI showing 

little mercy, and of their own officers with orders to shoot those retreating.11

Blaskowitz’s reserve contained one of the best remaining divisions in 

France, the 11th Panzer, consisting of 26 Mark IVs and 49 Mark Vs. It occupied Bordeaux for employment against a southern invasion, though Hitler owned the release criteria. Blaskowitz’s additional reserve, the 157th 

Division, remained contained to the north fighting resistance fighters in 

the mountains. The Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine also provided support. 

The Luftwaffe had 186 aircraft for use in southern France. The 6th and 7th 

Kriegsmarine consisted of 28 torpedo boats, 9 submarines, 5 destroyers, 

and 15 patrol craft.12

At Avignon, General Friedrich Wiese commanded Nineteenth Army, 

tasked with defending southern France. A month earlier, three of his 11 

divisions shifted to help stem the Normandy invasion, weakening his 

250,000-man force. Wiese’s three corps headquarters and eight remaining 

divisions positioned their best troops east of the Rhone, along the Cote de 

Azur, and precisely in the way of the impending coalition. These included the 244th Division defending Marseille with 88 coastal guns, and the 

242nd Division defending Toulon with 106 coastal guns. The 148th Division defended the coast from Agay to the Maritime Alps.13

The extensive Mediterranean defenses spanned 100 miles of casemated positions and block houses. The defenders saturated the approaches to 

the beaches with mines, well-sighted barbed wire and machinegun positions, and flame thrower crews. Wiese additionally covered all potential 

landing zones for airborne and paragliders with poles and stakes, which 

the FFI largely cleared by the time the Seventh Army assault began.14
59

The Assault

Following Commandant Rigaud to the beach, the French Groupe de 

Commandos drifted westward due to currents and a low haze, landing a 

mile farther west than Rayol beach. Realizing they were in the wrong location, they surprised the German defenders and overran a pillbox and artillery emplacements before moving inland and establishing a road block 

on the coastal highway. A second group landed farther east, worked their 

way back and cleared Rayol Beach, then also established a roadblock on 

the coastal highway. A third group continued 3 miles inland, capitalizing 

on surprise and the FFI, seizing the town of La Mole and capturing an 

artillery battery there. 

All three groups of French commandos were augmented with British Forward Observers Bombardment (FOB) and US Shore Fire Control 

Parties. They conducted hasty training with the commandos in the final 

month before D-Day at the North African Theater of Operations (NATO) 

Invasion Training Center (ITC). AFHQ placed the ITC under operational 

control of Seventh Army on 10 June 1944, for the final two months of 

training. These elements coordinated the combined-joint fires from the naval and air forces supporting the invasion. Although suffering increasing 

casualties during multiple German counterattacks of their roadblocks, the 

Figure 4.1. German Dispositions in Southern France. Map created by Army 

University Press.

N

Toulouse

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244

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338

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Antibes
60

initial French assault succeeded in preventing these counterattacks from 

affecting the US VI Corps landings on the left flank.15

Meanwhile, 1st Special Service Force, three battalion-sized regiments 

of US Rangers, landed on the offshore islands. One regiment attacked Port 

Cros, and two regiments attacked Levant. Their objectives included neutralizing the enemy defenses on these islands to protect the left flank of 

the invasion force. However, the coastal defense battery on the eastern 

end of Levant turned out to be a cleverly disguised dummy, and the small 

German garrison surrendered early on 15 August.16

The German garrison put up stiffer resistance against the one regiment 

assaulting Port Cros, falling back on prepared fortifications on the northwest corner of the island. This fort proved impenetrable even to coordinated air and naval fire and required a deliberate assault of the fortifications 

on the 17th to force surrender. This difficulty delayed installation of radar 

equipment, as well as relief by French army and navy base personnel following behind. However by D+2 (a designated number of days after the 

operation commenced), the remaining Rangers transferred to the mainland, and French personnel garrisoned both Levant and Port Cros.17

An hour after the assaults on Cape Negre and the offshore islands, 

the French Naval Assault Group of approximately 50 French commandos 

landed on the rocky shore of Deux Freres Point past the extreme right of 

the VI Corps assault. This became the lone failure on D-Day, but even this 

contributed to the ultimate success of the operation. The small group ran 

into barbed wire and a minefield, alerting the German defenders who destroyed a considerable number of commandos before the rest surrendered. 

Despite this setback, these actions furthered deception efforts regarding a 

main attack in the Genoa area.

The FATF took off from airfields around Rome early on D-Day. There 

is some controversy on how scattered the drops were, though official histories indicate most landed near their objectives. At least some landed away 

from their assigned objectives, but they formed small groups and seized 

alternate objectives, while sabotaging German defenders. One group of 

mis-dropped paratroopers landed near St. Tropez and—after weathering 

friendly bombardments—linked up with FFI and captured the town, German garrison, and their artillery. These actions accomplished one of the 

US 3rd Infantry Division’s (3ID) objectives for later on D-Day, increasing 

their momentum.18

The airborne and glider troops established a network of screens inland from the assault beaches while repulsing counterattacks. Most im-
61

portantly, the airborne troops dispersed the German LXII Reserve Corps 

headquarters at Draguignan by the 17th—capturing the commander, Lieutenant General Neuling, and the principal German communication center. 

This last act isolated the Germans in southern France, degrading the cognitive will of the defenders as resistance outside of the port cities became 

a battle to escape the closing net.19

Two hours prior to H-Hour (the designated hour of the attack), the naval fire support group opened with a ferocious barrage across the 45-milelong coast designated as Alpha, Delta, and Camel Beaches. They ceased 

one minute before H-Hour. Mine sweepers led the way for the assault 

craft, and the final 10 minutes consisted of a large barrage of rockets from 

supporting naval craft. In this effort, the US employed an innovation: 

drone boats laden with explosives to destroy mines closer to shore. Between 0800 and 0810, Truscott’s US VI Corps assaulted the beaches on 

three divisional fronts. Facing a surprised German force and overcoming 

light resistance from mortars, snipers, and minefields, the American assault forces quickly cleared the beaches and began expanding inland. Only 

one temporary setback occurred, at Camel Red on the right flank in the 

36th Infantry Division’s area of operations.20

Figure 4.2. The Anvil/Dragoon Landing Plan. Map created by Army University Press.

Gulf of

the Lion

France

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

St. Maximin

Brignoles

Blue Line

Drop Zone

Elevation 200m

Elevation 600m

Elevation over 1,000m

Toulon

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62

Patch viewed the capture of the St. Raphael port, and the town of Frejus on the coastal highway, as critical for maintaining momentum in depth 

on D-Day. The location provided the best route inland, the only airfield 

in the area, and a crucial port basing area. VI Corps lacked an armored 

force for mobility and exploitation, negotiating attachment of the mechanized French Combat Command (CC) Sudre to VI Corps for the assault 

up the Rhone Valley from St. Raphael. While de Lattre accepted this compromise, international political concerns dictated its use. French concerns 

over the difficulties involved in seizing Toulon and Marseille—coupled 

with tense interactions between Truscott and de Lattre during the planning 

for operational control—created the basis for an ad hoc American force 

as a branch plan. This improvised US force became Task Force Butler, 

consisting of staff and communication teams from the VI Corps Headquarters, the Corps Cavalry Squadron, 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, 

one armored field artillery battalion, one tank battalion minus one armored 

company, one tank destroyer company, one motorized infantry battalion, 

an engineer battalion, and service troops necessary to support this force.21

The 3ID landed on the left flank, secured the St. Tropez peninsula, 

established the western Blue Line, and gained contact with the French 

Commandos. The Blue Line established the initial lodgment limit of advance for the assault penetration, enabling the initiation of the French II 

Corps’ exploitation toward Toulon and Marseille. Upon 3ID’s landing, the 

French commandos at the roadblocks transferred to US VI Corps’ operational control. The commandos advanced along 3ID’s southern flank, protecting from multiple German counterattacks and clearing the Cape Benat 

peninsula. The 3ID landed with 7th Infantry Regiment and 15th Infantry 

Regiment abreast at Alpha Red and Alpha Yellow on Cavailaire Bay, then 

passed 30th Infantry Regiment on 7th Infantry’s right flank and continued 

advancing to the north and west. Audie Murphy earned one of his Distinguished Service Crosses during action clearing a German strongpoint on 

the St. Tropez peninsula. Each regiment task-organized with four amphibious tanks, Naval Fire Shore Control Parties, and French LNOs. The amphibious tanks launched from Landing Craft-Tanks (LCT) two thousand 

yards from the beach. Advancing rapidly, 3ID contacted the paratroopers 

in St. Tropez and with 45ID on the right flank.22

The 45ID landed along four narrow beaches in the center, with the 157th 

Infantry Regiment assaulting Delta Red and Green Beaches on the left, and 

180th Infantry Regiment assaulting Yellow and Blue Beaches on the right. 

The fiercest resistance occurred during house to house fighting clearing Ste. 

Maxime. Truscott and his French liaison officer (LNO) came ashore here 
63

midafternoon of D-Day. That night, 45ID contacted the paratroopers outside 

Le Muy, and established the central Blue Line by the 16th. FFI assisted VI 

Corps as they advanced, providing advanced warning of German defenses 

and in some cases joining the assaults. Truscott praised the high quality of 

their local knowledge, information, and fighting ability.23

The delay on the right flank stemmed from a controversial decision. 

The east two beaches consisted of poor exits. The plan called for the 141st 

Infantry Regiment landing at Camel Blue and Green at H-Hour, then passing 143rd Infantry Regiment through to attack St. Raphael—with the 142nd 

Infantry Regiment assaulting St. Raphael, Camel Red, from the front. The 

first regiment landed, passing the second to attack St. Raphael from the 

rear. The right flank in the Camel Beach area also contained the most fortified German positions from the 242nd Division in the sector. Both the US 

142nd and 143rd met fierce German resistance while expanding out from 

the beaches to attack Frejus and St. Raphael. The third regiment planned 

an assault on St. Raphael from the front at H+6 (H-Hour plus a designated 

number of hours). When Admiral Spencer S. Lewis—commanding the amphibious assault force in this sector—decided to avoid the frontal assault 

on St. Raphael and shifted those forces to the eastern beaches, Truscott was 

livid. Although 45ID seized Frejus and St. Raphael from the rear on the 

16th, this placed the follow-on forces a day behind schedule. This delay 

also forced Truscott to adjust Sudre’s landing to the 45ID beaches, near his 

established VI Corps headquarters. Combat Command (CC) Sudre consolidated at Le Muy and attacked west through heavy resistance in the gap 

between 45ID and 3ID. That night, Camel beaches experienced the only 

effective attack against their beachhead by the Luftwaffe.24

An innovative organizational component adapted from previous amphibious invasion experience consisted of task-organized beach groups as 

principal integrating elements. These units consolidated functions—increasing endurance and momentum—while providing protection of forces 

during reception, staging, and onward movement over the beaches. These 

task forces organized under Patch’s control through his G4, and now included the function for passage of French follow-on forces.25

Seventh Army organized a beach group for each assault division, with 

responsibility for operation of depots on the beach and movement of 3,000 

tons of supplies per day from ships to these depots. Additional responsibilities included obstacle reduction, anti-aircraft protection, communications, prisoners of war, decontamination sites, medical, personnel administration, and traffic control. Each beach group planned potential passage 

missions for French forces, creating branch plans and options for Patch 
64

and the coalition. Procedures established by the ITC created mutual understanding among all coalition forces.26

Due to the added complications inherent in the passage of a coalition force, beach groups established an agency within each unit for the 

rigid control of landing, assembling, and immediate movement from the 

beach areas for the French forces. The French II Corps provided personnel 

who accompanied the beach groups during the assault, organized from the 

French divisions passing over the planned beaches. Their purpose included selection and reconnaissance of routes for passing the French forces, 

selection of assembly areas, and posting guide signs in French for onward 

movement. The beach groups thus formed a centralized, integrating organization for reception, staging, and onward movement.27

Adaptation in Combat Power Projection—The French Attack

After the initial successes of D-Day, Patch expedited the landings. The 

beach groups adapted and reorganized—prioritizing supply depot establishment and unloading of troops and equipment, in addition to mine and 

lane-clearing operations. They also reversed the prioritization of ammo 

and gas in favor of the latter—establishing supply depots, opening roads, 

and controlling traffic. Protecting the force, they additionally managed 

prisoners of war, established smokescreens, conducted antiaircraft operations against the Luftwaffe, and assisted medical evacuation of casualties. 

The 40th Engineer Beach Group on the right flank developed and cleared 

the landing strip for artillery observation near Frejus, while the 36th Engineer Beach Group did the same on the St. Tropez peninsula in the center. 

The 40th also prepared the port of St. Raphael for operations by D+3 under the Seventh Army Beach Control Group. On the left flank, the beach 

group prepared to pass the French II Corps toward their objectives.28

The hasty reorganization of the beach group on the left flank expedited 

French landings as Patch ordered the acceleration from 16 to 19 August. 

By the evening of 16 August, Patch established his headquarters in a resort west of St. Tropez, providing quick access between the two corps. De 

Lattre shifted his assembly areas forward off the beaches—increasing momentum toward the ports, reducing beach congestion, and enabling easier 

passage. Four hours after receiving the order, de Lattre’s ships arrived in 

the bays of Cavalaire and St. Tropez by 1900 on 16 August. Three divisions and de Lattre’s headquarters landed on the left flank of the assault 

area. Assisted by the beach groups, de Lattre quickly maneuvered his forces into their assembly areas and began relief-in-place with the Americans, 

expediting the attack on Toulon by six days. De Lattre linked up with 
65

Patch that night, establishing crucial shared situational understanding, 

German dispositions, the return of CC Sudre and the commandos, and 

updating coordination plans between the two Corps.29

Patch was convinced Toulon and Marseille “would be a tremendous 

morale factor for the French” and would destroy German hope in southern 

France.30 They remained his priority, despite Truscott’s contrary urgings. 

While Truscott felt de Lattre delayed too long, Patch restrained VI Corps’ 

advance, also turning down Truscott’s recommendations for 3ID to attack 

and seize Toulon. De Lattre insisted he needed forces still downloading 

for the attack. With Patch’s urging and de Lattre’s desire to remain abreast 

of US positions, the advanced French assembly areas enabled de Lattre’s 

expedited movement toward Toulon.31

Prior to transferring back to French operational control, CC Sudre provided a crucial outflanking maneuver at Brignoles for 3ID, leveraging its 

speed and armor. As the French II Corps approached Toulon, de Lattre 

expedited plans for capturing Marseille—continuously focused on maintaining pace with the Americans and avoiding relegation to the Alps after 

capturing the ports. Patch accepted this risk based on surprise, belief in 

French training, and French morale in their homeland—despite two reinforced German divisions in fortified positions at the ports.32

The combined beach groups labored from 17 to 20 August, unloading the entire II Corps. Rapid landings enabled a quick turn to Corsica 

48 hours ahead of schedule with the remaining II Corps forces. The 1st 

French Armored Division (1DB) —reinforced by CC Sudre on the 19th—

maintained contact with VI Corps on the right, while continuing the attack 

west to Aix. The expedited landing and 1DB provided the additional forces de Lattre needed to begin operations against Marseille.33

As II Corps began encircling Toulon on 19 August, de Lattre requested additional munitions for his attack. This jeopardized Truscott’s plan 

for three mutually supporting division maneuvers—protecting the French 

right flank while attacking north to isolate Weise’s Nineteenth Army—due 

to lack of fuel. The Seventh Army staff initially disapproved de Lattre’s request, but Patch overrode them. Patch assured Truscott that this approach 

would also expedite French relief of 3ID forces, freeing VI Corps for a 

limited attack up the Rhone.34

Following a breach of the Hyeres defenses east of Toulon by the French 

commandos—while equipment and forces continued arriving across the 

beaches in a “real gun race” —de Lattre initiated his 20 August attack 

with two divisions onto the outer perimeter of Toulon. De Lattre’s close 
66

collaboration with the FFI provided critical tactical intelligence on German 

positions and freed II Corps through FFI assistance with mop-up operations. 

With II Corps now controlling the area west of the Blue Line, de Lattre coordinated for air and naval bombardments of the St. Mandrier peninsula.35

Employing a division of Moroccan Gourmiers, II Corps meanwhile 

completed encirclement and control over all routes out of Toulon. Patch 

initially denied Gourmier participation in Dragoon due to atrocities the 

unit had committed in Italy. However, De Lattre valued their extensive experience maneuvering through mountainous terrain using pack mules for 

logistical supply. Patch relented only when the French found and provided their own ships to transport the unit. The Gourmier’s quick maneuver 

through the high mountains north of the ports became critical to overall 

French momentum.36

The 1DB relieved 3ID forces at Aix, reaching the outer defenses of 

Marseille by the 20th while receiving reports of 11th Panzer operating in 

the area. Continuing reorganization for simultaneous assaults, de Lattre 

shifted his headquarters west from Toulon to Aux-en-Provence for command over both battles. De Lattre placed the complete assault on Toulon under the command of his now-full-strength 9th Colonial Division 

(9DIC), with the 2nd Combat Command (2CC) from 1DB in support. 

The 3rd Algerian Division (3DIA), the Gourmiers, and the rest of 1 DB 

attacked to seize Marseille. De Lattre earlier forfeited an infantry regiment 

from the 3DIA to allow the required shipping for his second armored CC, 

which proved critical for rapid French movements encircling both ports 

simultaneously. As the French pressed the attack directly into the outer ring 

of Toulon’s forts, the entrenched German artillery “punished all our movements,” and the encircled Germans fought with fanaticism. Small-unit tactical actions broke out everywhere, and the Gourmiers and FFI seized multiple points by “gangs, and by groups of two or three . . . this very special 

kind of warfare was just their kind of business.” The Gourmiers and 1DB 

also worked together closely fighting through hedges, mines, and broken 

walls on the outer defenses of Marseilles against a stiff defense while other 

elements unsuccessfully attempted outflanking to the northeast.37

Prior arrangements ensured superb coordination between the French 

forces and the US Air Force and Navy during the seizure of Toulon and 

Marseille. First in Toulon from 18 to 24 August—then shifting priorities 

to Marseille from 25 to 27 August—the Air Force bombarded the coastal 

batteries despite heavy flak. Simultaneously, the Navy reduced the German batteries harassing the French—screened by French artillery smoke 
67

and directed by French observation posts with liaison shore fire control 

parties. The Navy began port opening mine clearance by the 26th.38

Final resistance in Toulon collapsed on the 27th, with surrender on 

the 28th enabled by French forces’ local knowledge. On 26 August, the 

US 13th Artillery Brigade landed and moved into action at Marseille 

as a planned reserve provided by Patch. The 13th silenced the German 

155-millimeter coastal batteries by the 28th. Seventh Army’s history credits the entire coalition that the “seemingly brilliant tactics of the French 

were made possible only by the combined efforts of the entire Seventh 

Army.”39 The plan called for the capture of Toulon by D+20 and Marseille 

by D+60. Instead, the combined-joint efforts accomplished both objectives by D+14.

Figure 4.3. Operation “Dragoon,” The Breakthrough. Map created by Army 

University Press.

France

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The Breakthrough

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68

Pursuit in Depth—Collapsing Resistance

During the pursuit over the ensuing three weeks, Seventh Army’s 

campaign took on its most integrated character. The French I Corps landed 

on VI Corps’ right, officially creating Armee B. The three corps attacked 

north in the direction of Lyon and, by 14 September, extended more than 

750 kilometers north into France. Task Force Butler, reinforced by a regiment from 36ID, penetrated deep behind German lines to Montelimar on 

23 to 24 August, and isolated the German forces in the ports from the rest 

of the German Nineteenth Army. 

On 25 August, Patch ordered VI Corps’ advancement on the east 

bank of the Rhone and a reconnaissance-in-force on the west bank from 

de Lattre, while fighting in Toulon and Marseille still raged. As the ports 

fell, Patch also directed the French move east to the Alps—relieving the 

FATF protecting the right flank. Patch wanted to shift French forces to the 

eastern flank in preparation for a US junction with forces from Normandy, supporting Eisenhower’s intent for a continuous US frontage with the 

French on the far right.40

De Lattre exploited the reconnaissance opportunity—intending to not 

remain “behind our friends, but at least beside them.” He established a 

garrison in both Toulon and Marseille then shifted additional forces across 

the river, joining the 1DB in pursuit. The French still retained the only armored division available. De Lattre’s orders sending the reduced division 

northwest of Marseille helped increase their utility during the initial stage 

of the pursuit north. CC Sudre again maintained contact with VI Corps.41

A series of negotiations coordinating the pursuit occurred from 25 

August to 1 September. The commanders agreed the French would seize 

Lyon; only then would II Corps transfer the remaining elements east, uniting Armee B’s zone between the Swiss frontier and the Saone. A further 

agreement delayed Armee B’s relief of the airborne forces closer to the 

sea, allowing their continued use against the Germans. Although splitting 

Armee B with VI Corps in the center created additional liaison, communication, and supply challenges for both nations, de Lattre argued that “the 

strictly military decisions of the French command of the army of liberation 

could not leave out of account the effect of our national pride.”42

The Rhone River posed a significant obstacle to de Lattre’s forces. 

French engineer units were only at half-strength this early in the campaign, and only one bridge escaped destruction. De Lattre’s engineers improvised, floating the heavier equipment and tanks across by pontoons, 

while also using a system of ferries coordinated through local French 
69

networks. Patch shifted a company of amphibious trucks to the French 

on the 28th and followed with eight US landing craft at Arles. With this 

assistance and their own ingenuity, the combined troops accomplished the 

impossible by the 29th. By the 31st, the French II Corps was abreast of the 

US VI Corps.43

As the French advanced, their ranks swelled with volunteers. The 

first FFI unit officially integrated into Armee B on 31 August. While the 

Americans remained east of Lyon, the French entered from the west on 2 

September. FFI helped coordinate the maintenance of law and order. The 

1DB and 45ID attacked retreating Germans north of Lyon, where the 11th 

Panzer defended the flank of the retreating Nazis whose resistance stiffened as their lines contracted.44

Figure 4.4. Seventh Army Advance Toward Belfort. Map created by Army University Press.

France

Châtillon-sur-Seine

N

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Switzerland

Corps Location 4 September

Axis of Advance, 4–14 September

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Seventh Army Advance

Toward Belfort

4–14 September 1944 0 20 40 Miles

 Mouchard
70

Patch again adjusted Seventh Army operations—focusing on pursuit 

and annihilation of the Germans within their two likely escape routes. 

He, therefore, delayed rearranging the commands or shifting the French 

to the eastern flank. VI Corps pursued toward the Belfort Gap, while 

Armee B attacked along the northwest bank of the Saone toward Dijon 

and Strasbourg.45

De Lattre believed this prevented his regrouping and 1DB from effectively pursuing the Germans west of the Saone. The French commander 

responded by adjusting his own command, formalizing I Corps, and making things more difficult by creating an army headquarters under Seventh 

Army. He advanced his two corps toward the Rhine on either side of VI 

Corps “whom I did not despair of beating to these two objectives.”46 De 

Lattre remained at Aix to “keep contact with Patch’s command.”47

Supply management and distribution remained a point of contention 

during the pursuit. The main issue was fuel. Supplies lines extended across 

a 600-mile turnaround from bases around the Mediterranean to the three 

corps. Armee B’s technical bureau expertise from service units gained 

from the Expeditionary Corps helped, while the beach groups managed 

distribution based on Patch’s priorities.48

The French I Corps became operational on 5 to 6 September—necessitating further agreement on a boundary with VI Corps. After conducting a combined attack with the FATF into the Maurienne Valley, I Corps 

advanced toward Bensacon-Belfort. German resistance stiffened, and 

they counterattacked across the front on 8 and 9 September. To the east, 

the 19th Army and elements of 11th Panzer temporarily halted I Corps’ 

momentum, but both the II and VI Corps defeated these attempts. The 

French successfully liberated Dijon, while VI Corps captured Besancon 

on 10 September. Through September, the airborne troops and French I 

Corps eliminated the threat to Seventh Army’s supply lines on the eastern 

flank. The II Corps meanwhile now officially sought linkup with General 

Patton’s Third Army near Neufchateau. Eisenhower directed the French 

2nd Armored Division south from Paris to conduct linkup with the French 

II Corps. By 14 September, the forces established firm contact, officially 

joining Dragoon and Overlord.49

Seventh Army now regrouped Armee B on VI Corps’ right. Field 

Order Number 5 suspended further advance pending reorganization, although German counterattacks continued. The VI Corps established contact with the US Third Army to the west, and the rest of Armee B moved 

north to the junction of the French-Swiss-Italian frontier. The 6th Army 
71

Group became operational 15 September—containing both Seventh Army 

and Armee B—and the Dragoon forces passed to the SHAEF.50

De Lattre reminisced that “too often [there was] a belief that it was 

obtained easily because of the weakness of a demoralized enemy yielding 

in advance.” Despite ferocious fighting in Toulon, Marseille, St. Raphael, the St. Tropez peninsula, and withstanding continuous counterattacks 

from a desperate enemy, Dragoon was an enormous success. Within 30 

days, Seventh Army cleared all southern France; killed, wounded, or captured nearly 100,000 German troops; and seized and destroyed thousands 

of German vehicles and pieces of equipment. This came at a cost to Seventh Army of approximately 4,200 killed, captured, or missing and 8,700 

wounded. Toulon and Marseille doubled the supply chain availability for 

forces in France, while Marseille alone provided 14 divisions and an average daily distribution of 8,000 tons of supplies. On 15 September, the first 

Liberty ships arrived in Marseille.51

An Old Paradigm for Future Concepts

The Army’s current operating concept “emphasizes the integration” 

of joint and multinational partners. It further states: “Joint combined arms 

operations allow the Army to respond quickly and conduct operations of 

significant scale and duration to accomplish the mission across the range 

of military operations.” The multi-domain battle (MDB) concept for the 

US Army’s view of the future war paradigm describes “how future ground 

combat forces working as part of joint, interorganizational and multinational teams will provide commanders the multiple options across all domains.” Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, postulates 

that coalitions often occur ad hoc with different objectives between the 

participating nations. These ad hoc coalitions across multiple simultaneous domains increase freedom and depth of action while presenting multiple dilemmas simultaneously to an enemy force.52

The Franco-American coalition’s rapid integration for Operation Dragoon enabled tremendous operational depth by balancing national capabilities and constraints. Seventh Army expanded their operational reach—

projecting combat power while simultaneously exploiting the penetration 

to seize operational objectives and collapsing all German resistance in 

southern France. Their increased tempo overwhelmed the German Nineteenth Army physically while collapsing their cognitive will. The ability 

for commanders to understand coalition politics and conduct effective negotiations focused on the mission’s objectives and intent created an environment which took advantage of both host nation and US capabilities. 
72

Flexibility provided by French armored commands, US Task Force 

Butler, US and British forward observers and joint fires, French Commandos, US airborne forces, and the French I Corps as follow-on forces 

all provided momentum across time and space. Separate basing into the 

theater—coupled with centralized logistic efforts across the beaches to 

forward forces enabled by combined beach groups, along with negotiated 

priorities established by Patch—provided the endurance to prevent culmination at the ports, across the rivers, or during the pursuit. French understanding of the operational environment and US understanding of the administrative systems necessary for an army in combat worked in synergy 

throughout the operation, and sped integration of US and French forces. 

These balanced capabilities enabled by the integrated coalition projected 

the combined combat power until linkup with forces from Normandy, and 

collapsing German resistance in France. 

The doctrine informing future multinational structures may not fit perfectly into ad hoc situations, so understanding adaptation as well as critical organizational tenets becomes key to managing rapid integration of a 

coalition. Integration in Dragoon occurred at staffs down to the regimental level—and in cases like the Beach Groups, down to the battalion level. 

Seventh Army achieved success in their command structure by focusing on 

capabilities, and integrating multinational structures and capabilities both to 

fill gaps and shared understanding while maintaining unity of command.53

Direction for the French partisan forces also enabled increased depth 

in combat power projection. Patch’s Provisional Number 4 Special Forces 

Group within his staff provided operational control for the coordination 

of organized French resistance in support of Dragoon. VI Corps received 

direct support as they advanced up the Rhone Valley, and de Lattre used 

FFI not only to assist in capturing Toulon and Marseille but eventually to 

replace his personnel losses. 

Additionally, planners leveraged partner capabilities to fill national 

gaps. The gap in US armor during the invasion was filled by CC Sudre 

and the 1DB, enabling outflanking German forces at Brignolles. Additionally, the French provided superior local knowledge when interacting 

with the FFI in Marseille and Lyon, while also enabling local resistance 

through pride in the French forces. Flexibility and coordination with the 

French Commandos protected 3ID’s flank during the initial landings. Simultaneously, the Americans augmented the French in areas including employment of joint fires, communication, and technical supply specialists. 

The US Fire Shore Control Parties with the French enabled joint fires to 

reduce the batteries in Toulon and Marseille, and the French LNOs oper-
73

ating with the US artillery brigade supporting de Lattre outside Marseille 

proved critical to effective fires. The signal teams and equipment provided 

to de Lattre enabled continuous coordination between Seventh Army and 

Armee B throughout the operation. Finally, Seventh Army augmented personnel to assist with Near Shore Control Parties in loading—while leaving 

command details to French unit commanders at each port—along with 

expediting training for the administration sections of Armee B during the 

final month prior to the operation.

Frustrations over supply—both ammunition and later fuel—also absorbed coalition negotiations during the pursuit. To maintain momentum 

toward Dragoon’s primary objectives, Patch held Truscott back from 

his initial desire to exploit north from the Blue Line and used the Beach 

Groups to reorganize supplies and facilitate provision of additional artillery munitions to the French for seizure of Toulon and Marseille. During 

the pursuit, Patch reallocated fuel to the French to ensure the continued 

armored advance on the west flank—taking advantage of an unexpected 

opportunity—and then maintaining the French on the flank for linkup with 

the French 2DB with Patton’s Third Army from the north. Truscott also 

assisted with provision of fuel to 1DB in Lyon, after coordinating directly 

with du Vigier to maintain contact on the seam between VI Corps and II 

Corps. Throughout, Patch balanced the needs, focused on the capacity of 

each national armed force component’s capability to project combat power 

based on requirements and politics. Arbitrarily diverting resources from 

one nation to another would have created conditions for culmination. Instead, Patch’s calculated decisions extended his army’s operational reach.54

The Beach Control Group proved critical to easing integration at the 

tactical level. A situationally dependent task force, this organization composed itself around a nucleus of engineer battalions then attached the additional capabilities. This included supply, medical, and prisoner of war 

interrogation, holding, and transport. The engineers not only continued 

reduction of obstacles and mines—freeing the assault forces—but created 

passage lanes and coordinated unloading and direction of follow-on forces. For Seventh Army, these forces were French. Therefore, Seventh Army 

and Armee B attached French liaison sections to this critical node. Organization of supply depots and dumps facilitated onward transportation to 

both French and US forces. Even as de Lattre shifted his assembly areas 

forward to expedite his attack, the Beach Groups adjusted while accounting for Patch’s reprioritization of supply and unloading. This was only 

possible through the unique combined-joint task organization of these 

groups at the specific point of greatest confusion. 
74

Coalition warfare was not new in World War II, nor will it disappear 

regardless of what future complexities manifest in the US Army’s operating environment. Seventh Army employed a relatively new force in the 

French First Army—Armee B—created for operation in its homeland with 

a very short period from allocation to D-Day. This provided challenges 

in negotiating supply and equipment, along with understanding how to 

take advantage of differences in capabilities rather than viewing them as a 

detractor. It also challenged rapid integration absent a period of habitualization and norming. 

The future operating environment envisioned by the US Army’s 

multi-domain battle concept only increases the likelihood of coalition employment as the joint force combats anti-access technology. As the US 

Army cannot predict where this will occur, but with heightened tensions 

across both state and non-state actors, the chances of employment outside 

a common command structure provided by alliances like NATO increase. 

In describing the joint planning process during operational integration of 

multinational forces, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, points to 

a Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) document drafted by military planners in the Indo-Pacific theater as an important example. Innovations like the MNF SOP as starting points for discussion become important to bridging the gaps across coalitions.55

Organization and doctrine establishing combined procedures are the 

most critical components to enabling rapid integration of forces. Continuing other paradigms like the operationalization of Theater Security Cooperation exercises like Pacific Pathways also further combined understanding of future partners. Understanding how to maximize capability gaps 

across nationalities and using multi-functional elements helps streamline 

functions across an otherwise unwieldy coalition. Together these considerations help leaders understand how to integrate a coalition force rapidly—

absent a period of forming and normalization—and leverage the combined 

capabilities to expand operational depth.56

US doctrine on multinational operations did not exist prior to the late 

1990s, with recognition of both the difficulties and the necessity for future 

combined operations. However, US large-scale formative experiences in 

World War II continued shaping approaches given the scale and scope of 

operational success. The Army Operating Concept’s central idea acknowledges that “forces tailored rapidly to the mission exercise mission command 

and integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities.”57
75

While the current doctrine forms an important framework for US 

planning, explaining this doctrine within an ad hoc framework requires 

commanders and planners to have special negotiating skills. The more 

combined planning conducted in peace will inherently help reduce the integration timeline upon commencement of large-scale combat operations. 

The current operational problem frame shows the US Army requires the 

capability to plan, organize, and integrate coalition forces rapidly into a 

coherent structure for operations in physical and cognitive depth.58
76

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 1-108.

2. General Robert B. Brown and General David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain 

Battle: Tonight, Tomorrow, and the Future Fight,” War on the Rocks, 18 August 

2017, accessed 18 April 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/multi-domain-battle-tonight-tomorrow-and-the-future-fight/.

3. The liberation of Southern France was known as Operation Anvil until 

early August 1945, when the name changed to Operation Dragoon over compromise concerns. This chapter follows the same timeline when referring to the 

name. Planning and discussion involving the campaign prior to the beginning 

of August 1945 will refer to Anvil, while those after this point, during, and post 

campaign refer to Dragoon.

4. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 

1-02, Terms and Military Symbols (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 2016), 1-91. Use of the term “endurance” throughout this paper relates 

to the Army’s definition of the sustainment warfighting function which is the 

“related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom 

of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.”

5. Harry Yeide and Mark Stout, First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in 

World War II (Saint Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), 20; Arthur Layton Funk, 

Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landings 

in Southern France, 1944 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 74–79. The 

organizational arrangements are in Alexander M. Patch, Report of Operations: 

The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Nashville: 

The Battery Press, Inc., 1988), 68–69.

6. The quote is from Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the 

French First Army, trans. Malcolm Barnes (London: George Allen and Unwin 

Ltd, 1952), 30. Information on the task organization and operational control in 

Letter from the Seventh Army G3, Colonel Richard T. Guthrie, to the French 

Mission, Collection of Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, 4 

August 1944. Colonel Guthrie attempted to clarify the French naming conventions during the initial landings as II Corps versus Armee B in Patch, Report 

of Operations, 17–18. The Americans preferred II Corps until both French 

corps landed to revert to Armee B, but both names continued in use throughout 

the planning documents. The codification came only after General Charles de 

Gaulle and General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding the Mediterranean 

Theater of Operations at AFHQ, reached an agreement. Many of the documents 

were bundled in a collection declassified at one time and maintained at the Ike 

Skeleton Combined Arms Research Library in Fort Leavenworth, KS, Reference 

Number N-11685-B. These documents are referred to in these endnotes generally as “Collection of Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence.”

7. Patch, Report of Operations, 62–63.
77

8. Colonel A.O. Connor, Committee Lead, “Studies of Recent Operations, 

Report of Committee No. 2, Subject: Operation Anvil” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Command and General Staff School, 1946), Supplement Number 4; William B. 

Breuer, Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of the South of France (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987), 80–81.

9. De Lattre, History of the French First Army, 64. Rigaud was captured in 

1940, but escaped through Spain.

10. General Charles de Gaulle, “General Order: Presidency of the Privisional (sic) Government of the French Republic,” translated, Collection of Seventh 

Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, General Staff of National Defense, 

No. 611/DN/3.TS, 4 July 1944; Patch, Report of Operations, 63–64; Headquarters, VI Corps, “Notes on the Conduct of VI Corps Operational Planning for 

Operation Anvil/Dragoon,” 10 August 1944. By the time Toulon and Marseille 

became operational, close to 100 tons of supplies had moved across the three 

landing beaches.

11. The German composition and disposition are located in Patch, Report 

of Operations, 33–34. Soldiers in Army Group G represented Poles, Armenians, 

Ukrainians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis in addition to Germans. Colonel Connor, “Studies of Recent Operations,” Supplement Number 4. German General 

Major Bieringer, from the German Nineteenth Army, later stated that they shifted two divisions to Genoa to meet an attack there which never materialized.

12. Colonel Connor, “Studies of Recent Operations,” Supplement Number 

2, Algiers Phase; Breuer, Operation Dragoon, 21–23.

13. Headquarters, Seventh Army, “Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 15 

August 1944 - 8 May 1945: G-2 History,” 3 June 1945, 1–2, 8–9.

14. Patch, Report of Operations, 35–41; Breuer, Operation Dragoon, 25. 

French conscripts provided the majority of the manpower for construction of the 

extensive defense-works and fortifications.

15. Patch, 108–09; Memorandum from US Naval Forces Northwest African 

Waters to Captain (US Navy) R.A.J. English, Collection of Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, memo undated. The subject was the employment of British Forward Observers Bombardment (FOB) determined through the 

combined joint conference. The combined agreement attached the FOBs at the 

battalion level and used US Shore Fire Control Party equipment. Seventh Army 

attached 15 Shore Fire Control Parties to French Divisions, augmented by 10 

FOB parties, and 2 FOBs each attached to the FATF and the French Commandos.

16. Patch, 106–08; Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the 

Rhine (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), 98–100.

17. Patch, 106–08; Clarke and Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, 98–100.

18. Additional details on the First Airborne Task Force operations on D-Day 

are referenced in Patch, 110–15; Clarke and Smith, 102–04.

19. Truscott recounts the capture of the LXII Corps Commander, Lieutenant 

General Neuling in Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions: A Personal Story

(New York: Dutton, 1954), 419–20.

20. Patch, Report of Operations, 117–18, 138–40.
78

21. Truscott gave command of this task force to his assistant Corps Commander, Brigadier General Fred W. Butler, from which the unit derived its name. 

Patch, 52–53; Truscott, Command Missions, 401–403, 407; Robert A. Miller, 

August 1944: The Campaign for France (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 

114–115. After an invited visit by Truscott to Sudre’s headquarters in early July, 

Patch received a formal protest by de Lattre, demanding all future interactions 

and orders go through de Lattre for approval. Miller gives extensive treatment 

of this dispute between de Lattre and Truscott, and the decision and formation of 

Task Force Butler.

22. Patch, 119–27; Clarke and Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, 108–13.

23. Patch, 127–35; Truscott’s praise is found in Truscott, Command Missions, 420; Information on Truscott’s LNO is found in Truscott, 414.

24. See Patch, 138–43, 151; Truscott’s response to the decision is found 

in Truscott, 414, 418. The 36th Division Commander previously approved the 

alternate landing plan Admiral Lewis committed to as a branch if the fortifications at St. Raphael were too strong, Admiral Lewis could not reach the division 

commander at the crucial point and fell back on previous understanding for the 

decision without fully grasping the ground force impact. 

25. The idea for these formations originated from the Allied experience in 

Operation Torch. The functions included the arrangement and control for the 

movement of all personnel and vehicles from the landing craft to inland assembly areas, movement of stores from ships’ holds and craft to dumps in the 

beach maintenance areas, organization of the beach maintenance areas, protection efforts, vehicle recovery, medical evacuation, communications, prisoner of 

war holding and transportation, supply depots, and assembly areas for arriving 

personnel and vehicles. A good overview of general beach group organization 

without the combined augmentation added by Seventh Army is found in Joseph 

and David Rogers, D-Day Beach Force: The Men Who Turned Chaos into Order

(Stroud: The History Press, 2012), 14.

26. Alexander M. Patch, “Field Order #1 (Anvil),” (Headquarters, Seventh 

Army, AG 370-C, July 29, 1944), Ref No. X-1317. The order tasked the Alpha 

Beach Group with passage of two French divisions, Delta Beach Group with a 

be-prepared-to task passing one French division, and the Camel Beach Group 

for the landing and passage of CC Sudre, with a be-prepared-to mission for 

advancement toward Toulon upon capture for initial repairs while the French 

maintain the garrison.

27. For the recommendation and outline of the reception, staging, and 

onward movement augmentation to the Beach Groups, see Memorandum from 

Office of the Beach Control Group, through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, 

to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, “Landing of French Units,” Collection of 

Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, Reference Number 59, July 

17, 1944; for the requested French personnel accompanying VI Corps on D-Day, 

see Seventh Army Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel John G. Berry to 

Colonel Edwin C. Eller with concurrence by the Seventh Army G3, Collection 

of Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, 28 July 1944.
79

28. Patch, Report of Operations, 145–9.

29. Patch, 146–47, 151–52; Truscott, Command Missions, 423; De Lattre, 

History of the French First Army, 72–73; Reuben E. Jenkins, “Operation ‘Dragoon’ - Planning and Landing Phase,” Military Review 26, no. 5 (August 1946), 

3–9.

30. Patch, 152.

31. Truscott credited Patch’s political understanding of the French and 

his ability to convince de Lattre, as found in Truscott, Command Missions, 

421–422; de Lattre writes that he decided on boldness and surprise despite the 

inferiority in men and material relative to the Nazi defenders in Toulon as the 

better course of action over adhering to the initial plan in De Lattre, History of 

the French First Army, 71.

32. CC Sudre operations are from De Lattre, History of the French First 

Army, 70; advancing planning for Marseille is from Jenkins, “Planning.”

33. De Lattre, 71–73. While sending the Tabors north with 3 DIA, de Lattre 

committed the 9 DIC in the gap between the 1 DFL and the 3 DIA, and retained 

a task force with 9 DIC in reserve from CC2.

34. Clarke and Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, 126-128, 137; De Lattre wrote 

that Patch gave de Lattre “a free hand, the munitions and my C.C.1” in De 

Lattre, History of the French First Army, 75; additional details on the command 

discussions and decisions in Truscott, Command Missions, 421.

35. The quote is from De Lattre, 97; French coordination with the FFI is 

found in Patch, Report of Operations, 168. The FFI discovered their inability to 

match German forces at Marseille, where they attempted to seize control of the 

city before the II Corps arrived. This helped force de Lattre’s hand in decided 

to attack Marseille simultaneously. Coordinated air and naval bombardment 

information is found in Patch, 160, and Jenkins, “Planning.” The antiaircraft fire 

hit 28 aircraft, with 3 destroyed.

36. Memorandum from Colonel John S. Guthrie, Seventh Army G3, to 

Chief of French Mission, Collection of Seventh Army Planning Papers and Correspondence, July 23, 1944; De Lattre, 55–56.

37. Forfeiting of the infantry regiment is found in the Memorandum from 

Colonel John S. Guthrie, Collection of Seventh Army Planning Papers and 

Correspondence, July 23, 1944; the encirclement of Toulon and outskirts of 

Marseille are found in De Lattre, 97–98, 100–01, and Clarke and Smith, Riviera 

to the Rhine, 138–39; the quotes are found in De Lattre, 85, 87; additional information on the German defense is found in Jenkins, “Planning.” Aix was actually 

in the French area of operations, but 3ID spilled across this boundary through 

confused fighting during initial integration of French forces as they advanced 

from the beaches. The report on 11th Panzer came from a combination of allied 

and FFI intelligence, relayed to de Lattre through Patch.

38. Patch, Report of Operations, 159, 166; Jacob L. Devers, “Operation 

Dragoon: The Invasion of Southern France.” Military Affairs 10, no. 2, Summer 

1946, 15, accessed 25 July 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1983451; Jenkins, 

“Planning.”
80

39. As the French attempted early efforts at parlaying with the German 

commander, a signal officer in the 9 DIC found and repaired a telephone cable 

because his house was just down the street from the severed communication 

node. This is found in De Lattre, History of the French First Army, 93. The 

quote crediting combined efforts is from Patch, Report of Operations, 170; many 

of the US-specific efforts aiding in the capture of Marseille are included in the 

footnotes in de Lattre, 110; additional information on the final collapse of German resistance is found in Patch, 166–69.

40. De Lattre, 121–22.

41. De Lattre, 118, 125–26.

42. De Lattre, 119; the proposal of changes is found in De Lattre, 123; the 

debates regarding Lyon are found in Truscott, Command Missions, 434. The 

FFI requested a general uprising of partisan forces in Lyon on 30 August, but 

Patch directed them to wait for further coordination with US and French regular 

forces.

43. Patch, Report of Operations, 169; Jenkins, “Planning;” De Lattre, 125. 

Seventh Army planners did not foresee a major river crossing for several more 

weeks, and the materials did not exist on shore at this point in the campaign. The 

river’s swift current extended across 250 yards in most areas.

44. De Lattre, 127; Patch, 254–56; Jenkins, “Planning.” The 1DB’s attack 

north of Lyon killed another several hundred Germans and captured two thousand.

45. Patch, 258–59, 269.

46. De Lattre, History of the French First Army, 123, 134–35. De Lattre 

gave temporary command of elements on the right flank of Seventh Army to his 

Chief of Staff, along with part of his Army headquarters. Subsequently, General Antoine Bethouart arrived from Italy and took command of I Corps, while 

General Joseph de Goislard de Monsabert assumed command of II Corps. To the 

eastern flank, de Lattre dedicated the 2 Moroccan Infantry Division (2 DIM), 

which was still landing over the beaches, 3 DIA, and 9 DIC.

47. De Lattre, 123, 134–35. De Lattre gave temporary command of elements on the right flank of Seventh Army to his Chief of Staff, along with part of 

his Army headquarters. Subsequently, General Antoine Bethouart arrived from 

Italy and took command of I Corps, while General Joseph de Goislard de Monsabert assumed command of II Corps. To the eastern flank, de Lattre dedicated 

the 2 Moroccan Infantry Division (2 DIM), which was still landing over the 

beaches, 3 DIA, and 9 DIC.

48. De Lattre, 57, 126; further information on supply shortages is in Jenkins, “Planning.”

49. Details on I Corps operations on the eastern flank are found in De Lattre, 

135, and Patch, Report of Operations, 246–47; the agreement between VI Corps 

and I Corps is found in Truscott, Command Missions, 440; orders for II Corps 

counterattack and link up are found in Patch, 269–72, and Jenkins, “Planning.” 

On the night of 10–11 September, a patrol from a French armored reconnaissance 

group west of Dijon met a patrol from the French 2 DB at Sombernon. On 12 
81

September, reconnaissance forces from the French 1 DFL also linked up with 

a patrol from the 2 DB near Chatillon-sur-Seine. The linkage of Overlord with 

Dragoon resulted in the further German surrender of 18,000 troops, including 3 

generals and an admiral.

50. Patch, 271–72; Jenkins, “Planning.”

51. De Lattre, History of the French First Army, 95.

52. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-1, The U.S. 

Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040 (Washington, 

DC: 2014), 25; General David G. Perkins, “Multi Domain Battle: Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st Century,” Association of the United States 

Army, 2016, accessed 2 December 2017, https://www.ausa.org/articles/multidomain-battle-joint-combined-arms; Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, 

Multinational Operations (Washington, DC: 2013), GL-5. JP 3-16 distinguishes 

the term “combined” as “identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or 

more allies operating together.”

53. Joint Staff, JP 3-16, II-4–II-5.

54. General Jacob L. Devers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations,” Military Review 27, no. 7, October 1947, 3–15.

55. The MNF SOP was written by a large group of Pacific nations under 

an American effort to increase the speed of response, interoperability, mission 

effectiveness, and unity of effort in MNF operations . . . while reducing the “ad 

hoc nature” in crisis. See US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, II-19. The MNF SOP is available at http://community.apan.org/.

56. Pacific Pathways is an ongoing effort begun under Pacific Command 

(PACOM) in 2014, which combines multiple existing exercises into an operational deployment of forces. These joint forces provide advanced posturing in the PACOM Theater, while building readiness, advancing joint and interagency interoperability and access, and enhancing regional partner capability and collaboration.

57. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 17.

58. General George A. Joulwan, “Doctrine for Combined Operations,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1996–1997, accessed 6 May 2018, http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529421.pdf. The author notes the doctrine then in 

development as of 1997 for JP 3-16 closing a critical gap. However, he also 

notes explaining this doctrine to partners would remain the principal challenge 

in future multinational operations. At the time, service doctrine published before 

joint, and the Army released Field Manual (FM) 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations, in November 1997 as the US Army’s first doctrinal publication specifically addressing Coalition operations.
82
83

Chapter 5

Command Decisions on Counterattack and Deep Envelopment 

in the Battle of the Bulge

Dean A. Nowowiejski

In December 1944, Hitler’s Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies attacked the 

US First Army in the Ardennes Forest of eastern Belgium, a surprise move 

that penetrated the army front and created a large salient in the Allied lines 

known as The Bulge. The Battle of the Bulge is renowned by its principal 

chroniclers as the greatest battle in the history of the US Army. It involved 

key decisions regarding reinforcements and counterattacks by General 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Lieutenant 

General George S. Patton Jr., Major General J. Lawton Collins, and British 

Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. In terms of casualties, troops 

committed, significance to the outcome of the war, leaders involved, and the 

impact on the popular imagination, the scope of the Battle of the Bulge is 

large. Lasting most of two months in December 1944 and January 1945, the 

Battle of the Bulge marked the last gasp of Hitler’s armies on the western 

front and hastened the end of the war. Its outcome was by no means foreordained and the battle itself remains worthy of examination for lessons of 

leadership and doctrine. This chapter evaluates how the Allied armies used 

maneuver in their final counterattack to eliminate the German penetration.1

This chapter will not discuss in depth the defensive role of the US V 

and VIII Corps in the early days of the German offensive. That is a tale of 

how hard-pressed troops delayed the German offense and kept the German 

Sixth and Fifth Panzer Armies from reaching the Meuse river crossings. It 

also does not examine the destruction of the 106th Infantry Division, the 

retention of St. Vith and eventually Bastogne, or the critical defense of 

Elsenborn Ridge on the north shoulder of the Bulge. Those actions denied 

the German leadership, and Hitler principally, their operational objective 

of the Meuse and their strategic objective of Antwerp. Rather, this chapter will focus on decisions that the Allied generals made to counterattack 

the German salient in order to save Bastogne and, most importantly, the 

decisions they made in order to remove the Bulge itself. Analysis of those 

decisions broadens our understanding of enveloping counterattacks.

This chapter mentions “Allies” because the command structure involved in the counterattack decisions was combined, involving both 

American and British generals. The key British general was Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, whom Eisenhower had given command 
84

of the north shoulder of the Bulge in order to ensure that the actions of the 

US First Army and the British forces were coordinated. Montgomery, in 

return, committed the British 30 Corps to protect the critical Meuse crossings and actively engaged with three US corps commanders in their efforts to hold that north shoulder (VII Corps under Collins, XVIII Airborne 

Corps under Major General Matthew Ridgway, and V Corps under Major 

General Leonard Gerow). Aside from Montgomery’s command over the 

forces on the northern shoulder, the Battle of the Bulge was an American 

fight: American in terms of divisions, casualties, and leadership. It is therefore worthy of examination in terms of American army doctrine.

In Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (October 2017), the concept 

of maneuver is defined as “the employment of forces in the operational 

area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position 

of advantage in respect to the enemy.”2

 Maneuver is used to achieve a 

position of relative advantage over the enemy and is fundamental to the 

way that the US Army operates. The maneuver used by American forces 

in the Battle of the Bulge focused on achieving a position of advantage 

by counterattacking to eliminate the German army’s massive penetration 

of the American lines, and to continue the offensive through the Westwall

and into Germany. Eisenhower and Montgomery argued about how to best 

accomplish these goals. Eisenhower saw opportunity in the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes. After months of stalemate, the Germans had 

come out of their defenses in the Westwall and presented vulnerabilities 

which if exploited would allow the Allied march into Germany to resume. 

The Allied debate about how to carry out the counterattack to eliminate the 

German penetration took place with the goal of regaining the operational 

initiative through offensive maneuver. 

For the purposes of doctrinal examination, the strict term for reexamination of important command decisions in the Battle of the Bulge is counterattack, which FM 3-0 defines as “an attack by part or all of a defending 

force against an enemy attacking for such specific purposes as regaining 

ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the 

general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s 

purpose in attacking.”3

In the Battle of the Bulge, the counterattack debate occurred in two 

stages. The counterattack to eliminate the Bulge was not a local tactical 

action as defined by FM 3-0, though many local counterattacks occurred 

at the tactical level throughout the battle. At the theater level, Eisenhower 

and his generals employed major counterattacks first to defeat the ene-
85

my penetration and then to seize the overall initiative from the enemy 

through offensive action. 

The first stage of the Allied response to the German attack was to limit 

the width of their breakthrough at the northern and southern shoulders of 

the initial penetration. The second stage was the American counterattack 

to remove the Bulge itself and resume the offensive into the heart of Germany. The employment of counterattacks in the Battle of the Bulge illustrates the doctrinal concepts of maneuver to regain a position of tactical 

advantage, and to achieve the larger purposes of major counterattacks at 

the theater level to stop the enemy and then to take the initiative from him 

through the employment of envelopment. 

Command Decisions

There are several commonly analyzed decisions on the American side 

in the Battle of the Bulge. There were early decisions to release reserves 

to Major General Troy H. Middleton’s VIII Corps. Eisenhower ordered 

Bradley to send the 7th and 10th Armored Divisions to reinforce Middleton almost immediately, on the first day of the German offensive. One of 

Eisenhower’s best-known decisions was to release the theater reserve, the 

82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, early in the battle as well. The German 

attack began on 16 December 1944. By 17 December, on petition of the 

First Army HQ, SHAEF released the two airborne divisions to reinforce 

Hodges’ threatened defense. The role of the 101st in winning the race to 

Bastogne and holding that town against all odds is well-known. These 

were not counterattack decisions and so won’t receive analysis here. They 

instead released reserves and positioned them to staunch the flow of German panzer units toward deep objectives across the Meuse River.4

Another command decision—made by General Dwight Eisenhower at 

Verdun on 19 December 1944—was significant to the employment of maneuver in the counterattack. This was the decision to turn Patton’s Third 

Army north to attack into the southern flank of the German penetration. It 

will receive some in-depth analysis regarding context, options, and consequences. Eisenhower decided to thin the defensive front of the 6th Army 

Group in the south and move its boundary north to release divisions of the 

Third Army for a counterattack to relieve besieged Bastogne and prepare 

for a final counterattack to destroy the German forces in the Bulge.5

The most notable counterattack decision was how to close the Bulge. 

After much anticipation and discussion, Eisenhower and Montgomery 

agreed on 27 December 1944 to attack the German salient from both the 

northern shoulder (with VII Corps and XVIII Corps) and the southern 
86

(with VIII and III Corps). This two-pronged counterattack began on 3 January 1945 against determined German resistance in harsh winter conditions. It was not until mid-January that the First and Third Armies met near 

the town of Houffalize, Belgium. There were two options for this allied 

counterattack, and the debate between Ike and Montgomery reveals much 

about the personalities and national perspectives of these two leaders.6

The Influence of Command Personality on Maneuver Decisions 

The command personalities of the leaders in this case study influenced 

their willingness to resume offensive maneuver in the face of uncertainty and to employ deep envelopment in the counterattack. An underlying 

premise of this analysis is that certain command personalities are more 

likely to take aggressive action.7

Deep envelopment in the counterattack exposes the flanks of the advance and puts the logistics of the counterattacking force at some risk. Such 

maneuver is made by commanders whose vision of the battlefield and belief 

in the power of the offensive allows them to take risks and overcome uncertainty. There is a certain force of personality involved, one which has the 

confidence of decisions and actions. And there are some educational or cultural aspects that affect a leader’s willingness to be bold in offensive maneuver. During the interwar years, graduates of Fort Leavenworth were often 

accused of reaching predictable and unimaginative—even conservative—

tactical decisions. Nevertheless, American generals as a group viewed the 

German Ardennes offensive as an opportunity to destroy the German forces 

by offensive action outside the German Westwall fortifications. Their British 

foil was Bernard Montgomery, whose consuming desire was to preserve 

dwindling British manpower and the Empire that it represented. Let’s briefly assess Eisenhower’s and Montgomery’s personalities and backgrounds in 

order to understand their differing views of where to strike the Bulge.

Eisenhower’s signal contribution to the war effort in general—and this 

episode in particular—was to balance the competing interests of the Western Allies and keep the team together. In the Battle of the Bulge he had 

to keep peace between Omar Bradley and Bernard Montgomery, and this 

occupied his greatest attention. The Battle of the Bulge is notorious, particularly among Omar Bradley supporters, for Eisenhower’s decision to 

give the First Army to Montgomery. Ten days later Eisenhower came near 

to asking for Montgomery’s relief because of the British general’s continued tone-deafness to American sensibilities and his constant priggishness. 

Both decisions consumed Eisenhower’s attention, yet he always tended 

to the conservative solution which would maintain the Anglo-American 
87

alliance. This balance of interests was illustrated by his broad-front strategy, his resistance to selecting one commander over another to make the 

decisive thrust into Germany, and his resistance to Montgomery’s constant 

petition to be selected as the one ground forces commander. 

Eisenhower exemplified the interwar Army educational and professional development process, as he was first in his class at Fort Leavenworth, personally mentored by Pershing’s operations officer (Fox Connor), and moved 

to command in North Africa directly from serving under George Marshall in 

the War Plans Division. He also may have suffered some negative effects of 

the process by having served so long as General Douglas MacArthur’s aide 

in the Philippines. Following in the heritage of American offensive-mindedness, Eisenhower looked for aggressive counterattack solutions early in the 

Battle of the Bulge, casting for offensive options three days into the battle 

before the full extent of the German attack was even clear.8

Next, we will turn our attention to the Army Group Commanders: 

First, Omar Bradley, the 12th Army Group Commanding General. Bradley was a plodder. He rarely showed any operational imagination; opted for the conservative, textbook solution; and in the Battle of the Bulge 

was slow to understand the situation. He also was so tied to his forward 

headquarters in Luxembourg City and resistant to the idea of a general 

German offensive that he forced Eisenhower to give control of the U S 

First Army to Montgomery, who was in a better position to command it 

on the northern flank. Bradley seemed more concerned with his tug-ofwar with Montgomery for First Army command than with aggressive or 

imaginative efforts to restore the front. Bradley threatened to resign when 

Eisenhower transferred the First Army to Montgomery’s command, and he 

threatened to resign again when Montgomery continued his efforts to be 

named the overall ground force commander. 

Though he was an advocate for resuming the general offensive and 

taking advantage of the German exposure, Bradley was more worried 

about having Montgomery as a boss than a concern for a deep offensive 

maneuver to restore the salient. He did serve as a counter at the army 

group level to Montgomery—most significantly when he wrote a private 

letter to General Hodges the day after a Christmas meeting with Montgomery, advocating privately to his old friend Hodges that Bradley did 

not agree with Montgomery on the inability of the First Army to resume 

the offensive quickly. Throughout the war, Bradley served as a restraining 

force on his most aggressive subordinate, George Patton, and in the case 

of the Bulge took direct steps to make sure that Patton’s counterattack did 

not go off half-cocked.9
88

Bernard Montgomery, the British 21st Army Group Commander, was 

a constant thorn in the American generals’ sides. He irritated Eisenhower, 

Bradley, and Patton. He had his own approach to ground combat in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), borne of his success at El Alamein. 

It was a conservative approach requiring ample logistics, firepower, and 

a tidy battlefield with regular front lines. His method of attack has been 

described as creating “Colossal Cracks” in enemy defenses. Throughout 

the Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery was consumed with the potential for 

one more German breakthrough and was all about protecting the Meuse 

River crossings against such an eventuality at the expense of any Allied 

counterattack. He had to be pressured from above and below—specifically 

Eisenhower and J. Lawton Collins, VII Corps commander—to commit the 

First Army to an offensive on the northern shoulder. Rather than counterattack as soon as Eisenhower wanted to, Montgomery focused on tidying 

the battlefield to fix defensive problems caused, he believed, by American mistakes. To do this, he withdrew American forces into stronger positions to protect his logistics base and the Meuse Crossings. These were 

prudent moves, but unfortunately he also brought attention to himself in 

the British Press—insinuating that he had single-handedly unsnarled an 

American-made mess. He was nearly relieved for his misplaced words. To 

his credit, he did relate well with the corps commanders who worked for 

Courtney Hodges, Collins, Ridgway, and Gerow, but Montgomery was a 

strong restraining force on offensive action, the main counterattack, or a 

deep envelopment of the German penetration.10

There were two strong advocates for immediate counterattack to disrupt the German advance and deeply envelop his penetration. George Patton, the Third Army Commander, as well as VII Corps Commander J. 

Lawton Collins advocated pincer attacks from the north and the south near 

the eastern shoulder of the Bulge. To a limited extent, they found a partner 

in advocating such an offensive action in Courtney Hodges. Eisenhower, 

Bradley, Hodges, Patton, and Collins believed that a counterattack was 

essential to take advantage of the German exposure in moving out of the 

Westwall. George Patton was the strongest advocate for this deeper offensive maneuver. He wanted to keep the enemy off-guard by constantly 

attacking. His preparedness for counterattack saved Bastogne. Patton was 

an advocate for deep counterattack as early as the December 19 Verdun 

meeting, and he was the principal proponent for cutting the penetration off 

at its shoulders by an attack toward Prum. In the summer of 1944, Patton 

had also been a strong advocate for closing the Argentan-Falaise Gap before the enemy escaped, and in December he fought to seal the German 
89

penetration with deep envelopments. Pity that there were not more serious 

students of military history and the operational art—including the power 

of deep envelopment—like Patton in the American Army.11

VII Corps Commander Collins was a partner to Bradley, Patton, and 

Hodges in advocating closing the Bulge at an early opportunity. Perhaps 

First Army Commander Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges deserves 

a mention here, as he joined Collins in advocating for early counterattacks from the north flank of the Bulge. However, Hodges’ unimaginative 

leadership during the battle has been noted by most historians. Collins, 

on the other hand, had the stature and aggressive nature required to prod 

Montgomery into action. He argued with Montgomery for an earlier and 

deeper counterattack than Montgomery wanted, but in the end he was 

Montgomery’s choice as the American commander to lead the drive on 

the north shoulder to link up with the Third Army. Collins also had the 

advantage of having two aggressive armored division commanders, Ernest 

Harmon of the 2nd Armored and Maurice Rose of the 3rd Armored, under his command. They made an indomitable offensive combination. His 

counterattack against the 2nd Panzer Division at Celle blunted the German 

drive to the Meuse. As a corps commander, he stands out as an advocate 

of aggressive counterattack and deep envelopment. One wonders when 

Montgomery would have finally gotten around to being comfortable with 

counterattack absent Collins’ strong advocacy.12

Considering these personalities, we will examine in more detail two 

of the most significant command decisions in the Battle of the Bulge on 

the Allied side, as introduced above: the decision to counterattack with 

Patton’s Third Army into the southern flank of the German salient and the 

decision on how to close the Bulge.

The Counterattack to Relieve Bastogne Decision

Context. The first decision to employ American forces in a major counterattack was at Verdun on 19 December. Verdun was the location of the 

12th Army Group’s main Command Post, Eagle Main, located in a French 

Army barracks. It provided a rather dour setting for a meeting between Supreme Commander Eisenhower and his army group commanders: Bradley, 

Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, and Montgomery. This meeting was 

an immediate reaction to the deep German penetration of Hodges’ army 

only three days earlier. The full extent of the German counteroffensive was 

only then beginning to be made plain, and the shock brought on by the 

size and success of the early German advances still gripped these leaders. 

Bradley brought along his Third Army commander Patton because of dis-
90

cussions he had had with Patton. Bradley knew Patton was ready to counterattack the penetration. Eisenhower set the general tenor for the meeting 

by not allowing gloomy faces at the conference table and in instructing his 

commanders to look on the German attack as an opportunity. Considering 

the depth of penetration of the American lines, this was a challenge. Eisenhower focused on developing options to address the depth of German 

penetration and on making forces available for major counterattack.13

Options. Eisenhower assessed the flow of forces from the United 

States, England, and available reserves on the continent. There weren’t 

enough divisions to restore the front, so Eisenhower and his generals needed a maneuver solution. The Americans as a group looked for a major 

counterattack alternative and the forces required to make it possible. Eisenhower instructed the Sixth Army Group commander, Jacob Devers, to 

extend his line northward to make divisions available for a counterattack, 

and Patton thinned his defensive lines to make forces available as well.14

Famously, Patton promised a rapid counterattack based on his army’s 

anticipatory planning. Historians have analyzed in some detail Third Army’s staff planning ability and readiness to execute the missions. Patton 

was able to relieve Bastogne because he anticipated the need and started 

his army, corps, and division staffs toward creating plans to reposition 

forces and make a counterattack possible. He and his staff had been preparing counterattack alternatives even before the Germans attacked in the 

Ardennes, and in earnest for about three days thereafter. Patton and his 

planning group already had a three corps counterattack conceptualized before he departed for Verdun. The ability of the US Third Army to relieve 

Bastogne was attributable not only to the efforts of the attacking divisions 

in horrible conditions, but also to the competence and hard work of the 

staffs. Turning the Third Army took exhaustive road movement planning, 

adjustments to wired communications and logistics trains, repositioning of 

supply dumps, and generally a series of minor miracles in staff planning. 

Patton had in fact already ordered the 4th Armored as well as 26th and 

80th Infantry Divisions north the previous day after a consultation with 

Bradley in Luxembourg.15

Patton’s accomplished and stable staff knew how to act in concert with 

their commander. His operations officer, when asked where the counterattack should be directed, confidently stated that it should be directed into 

Germany toward the lines of communications of the German salient not 

just into the flank of the penetration. The staff clearly saw the opportunity: 

“If they will roll with the punch up North, we can pinwheel the enemy 

before he gets very far. In a week we could expose the whole German rear 
91

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 LXVI 106th ID

Figure 5.1. The Bulge. Courtesy of Center of Military History.
92

and trap their main forces west of the Rhine.” Patton’s staff enabled the 

aggressive actions of their commander.16

Eisenhower asked Patton if he could attack with six divisions within 

six days. Patton initially demurred, emphasizing his readiness to provide 

three US divisions in three days. Eisenhower was concerned about the 

strength of the attack, and so pressed Patton for six divisions because of 

his concern that the counterattack into the flank of the Germans not be 

too weak or go in piecemeal. Patton acceded to the demand. His III Corps 

would attack toward Bastogne, and the XII Corps would attack on its 

east—each corps with three divisions. He counterattacked into the southern flank of the German Fifth Panzer Army with the promised three Divisions of III Corps on the appointed date, 22 December 1944. As it developed, this counterattack with three divisions came to focus on the relief of 

the siege of Bastogne and did not presage a greater general counterattack. 

That would come later.17

Consequences. If Patton hadn’t prepared these options, then even 

though 101st Airborne Division and the 10th Armored Division (-) won 

the race to Bastogne, they would likely not have been able to hold out 

against the strengthening German attacks without the relief that Patton’s 

Army brought the day after Christmas. Patton’s initial three-division attack took longer to reach Bastogne than he promised and encountered 

problems of poor execution, strong enemy resistance, and treacherous 

weather throughout its counterattack. His counterattack options depended 

on turning Third Army, as outlined above, and could not have been executed by an inexperienced or incompetent staff or untrained frontline forces. 

The relief of Bastogne was a shining moment for Patton and his aggressive 

army. The main consequence was one of confidence that the Americans 

could do something offensively to counteract the German penetration, and 

this involved a major counterattack in arduous conditions with some risk.18

Closing the Bulge Decision

Envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force 

seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives 

behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be 

destroyed in their current positions.19

—FM 3-0, Operations

Context. The Bulge was 40 miles wide and 60 miles deep at Christmas 

1944. Everyone knew the German Panzer armies’ penetration had to be 

closed in order to resume the Allied offensive into the heart of Germany. 

But a robust debate broke out on the depth and timing of envelopment 
93

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Figure 5.2. Erasing the Bulge. Courtesy of Center of Military History.
94

that the Allies would undertake to remove the bulge in their lines. There 

were those, namely Montgomery, who were concerned that the German 

offensive had not spent its force and that there were unaccounted-for divisions near the salient. American commanders like Eisenhower who had 

access to Ultra intercepts knew that it was more likely that the German 

momentum had been exhausted. As discussed above, some commanders 

were more aggressive in their conceptual work and command style, but the 

Americans as a group were more inclined to attack and close the Bulge for 

good. They differed on where the attack should fall.20

Options. The Allies could have closed the Bulge with a classic deep 

envelopment targeted at the depth of the German penetration, to cut it off 

at its shoulders. This is what interwar doctrine as taught in Army schools 

called for. This would have created a pocket akin to the one earlier in the 

European campaign at Argentan-Falaise. But the Allies instead went for 

the lesser option of reducing the Bulge at its waist. Instead of a classic 

deep maneuver to cut the German penetration through its lines of communication, they went for a more direct approach against the flanks of 

the penetration. This undoubtedly resulted in more casualties because it 

attacked into enemy positions rather than lines of communication, took 

more time to restore the penetration, and was substantially hampered by 

the extreme winter conditions of January 1945. Most significantly, it allowed the German forces in the salient to escape to the east and resume 

their defense in Germany. 

Patton was the strongest advocate for cutting off the German penetration at the shoulders by attacks from the south toward Bitburg, and from 

the northwest toward Prum. But he could not find a significant partner 

among Montgomery or Bradley at the Army Group level to cooperate in 

ordering such a plan. Patton’s roads from Luxembourg toward Bitburg 

would support rapid advance for armored forces in winter, but the advance 

southeast in the First Army sector would not support Patton’s deep envelopment concept. The First Army staff, 12th Army Group staff, and SHAEF 

all estimated that the road network southeast from Elsenborn Ridge and 

St. Vith toward Prum was inadequate for such a maneuver. When you add 

the deteriorated state of the roads from the German attack west and the 

winter weather conditions delaying the American advance, this deep envelopment solution by the First Army was just not feasible.21

Instead, on 27 December, the Allied leaders decided to close the Bulge 

at its waist. J. Lawton Collins deserves credit for prodding this decision. 

Despite Montgomery’s resistance to any suggestion of offensive action 

from Eisenhower through Christmas 1944, Collins arrived at the First 
95

Army command post on 27 December with three distinct plans of attack 

to close the Bulge by meeting Patton’s attack from the south. Collins’ proposed lines of attack were at two levels of depth, one toward Bastogne, and 

one toward St Vith. His proposals echoed the general American desire for 

strong action to remove the German penetration. The solution to closing the 

Bulge seems to have thus developed from the bottom up to the army group 

commanders. Patton, Hodges, Collins, and Major General Leonard Gerow, 

V Corps Commander, all pushed for an immediate major counterattack.22

The decision to launch the attacks at the waist of the Bulge was a 

conservative option, counter to Patton’s deeper envelopment concepts, so 

much so that Bradley in his recommendation of the option to Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) specifically mentioned 

that this was not the maneuver that Patton espoused. Montgomery finally 

relented on 31 December in the face of pressure from Hodges and Collins—giving permission for an attack on 3 January 1945. The VII Corps 

would attack south toward Houffalize and the Third Army north toward 

it with VIII Corps. XVIII Corps would attack southeast toward St. Vith, 

and III Corps north toward it. Charles MacDonald likened this maneuver 

to two automobile windshield wiper blades sweeping the enemy out of 

the way. The maneuver avoided the nose of the penetration and attacked 

at some depth, but not to the depth that would have closed the Bulge at its 

shoulders and made it into a pocket. It is an interesting side note that in 

the operations order which directed VIII Corps north toward Houffalize 

and III Corps north toward St. Vith, Patton inserted a paragraph stating 

that the XII Corps should be prepared to extend the advance into the Prum 

river valley and toward the Rhine, the area of his deeper counterattack 

objective. Patton retained the last word on the correct objective of these 

counterattacks within his Third Army.23

Consequences. The Allies spent the month of January executing their 

selected option to close the Bulge. The forces finally linked up at Houffalize on 16 January, and command of the First Army reverted to Bradley. 

This attack into the waist of the penetration under harsh conditions was 

hard combat for the ground forces—with limited air support and high casualties, many of them cold weather casualties. Gradually, the German armor 

and general unit strength was reduced and they were forced to withdraw, 

but not without producing significant casualties to the attacking Americans. The German armies again escaped encirclement as they had at Argentan-Falaise. St Vith would not be recaptured until 23 January, with the 

lines of the original American positions restored and the Bulge erased by 

28 January. This was an American major counterattack to medium depth of 
96

envelopment. Despite all his bluster, Montgomery committed precious few 

British troops to the counterattack. From the 28th of January, the general 

line was restored and the Allied armies continued their irresistible advance 

through the Westwall, around the Ruhr industrial complex and eventually 

across the Rhine. Eisenhower resumed his broad-front offensive.24

The Professional Lessons 

The deep envelopment based on surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines, is and always has been the most decisive maneuver of war. A short envelopment which fails to envelop and 

leave the enemy’s supply system intact merely divides your own 

force and can lead to heavy loss and even jeopardy.25

—General Douglas MacArthur

There were several considerations at play in the counterattack decisions discussed here. First and foremost was the willingness of commanders to counterattack early and in depth. Patton counterattacked successfully to relieve the siege of Bastogne, but the force of his effort was diluted by 

internal Third Army problems and the absence of a supporting attack from 

the north flank. The American senior commanders wanted to conduct a 

major counterattack to close the Bulge sooner than Montgomery was willing to. The delay allowed the Germans to both set their defenses against 

the counterattack and begin to withdraw. One wonders about the effect if 

the counterattack to close the Bulge had occurred when the Americans first 

proposed it just after Christmas, rather than the first week in the new year.

When considering the depth of the envelopment in the proposed major counterattack, most of the Americans and Montgomery took the conservative solution and argued for counterattacks at the waist of the German salient. Bradley certainly did, Eisenhower was too busy balancing 

Montgomery and Bradley to override them both, and only Patton was the 

consistent advocate of deep envelopment toward the shoulders of the German penetration. This whole episode—particularly the debate about how 

to close the Bulge—reminds one of the missed opportunity represented 

by the failure to close the Argentan-Falaise Gap. The weather conditions 

and limited road network on the north shoulder were a bigger inhibitor, 

but the debate had eerie similarities. This was another failure to destroy a 

confined enemy force when the opportunity presented itself—with many 

of the same hesitant actors, Montgomery and Bradley in particular. 

To be fair, the First Army and 12th Army Group staffs were most probably correct that the road network and winter conditions made an attack 

by First Army southeast toward Prum infeasible, so the depth of the envel-
97

oping counterattack chosen to close the Bulge was probably all that could 

have been done. Given the difficulties of balancing competing Allied command interests, respected historian Harold R. Winton concludes that the 

compromise counterattack only to the waist of the German penetration 

rather than to the depth of envelopment advocated by Patton was the best 

that could have been expected under the circumstances. The winter weather conditions that made the January counterattack so difficult would have 

affected a deeper envelopment, too, so the remaining question relates to 

the timing of the attack to close the Bulge. Would more Germans have 

been captured if the counterattack had gone earlier? The answer to that 

question is a matter of conjecture.26

What we do know is that education and command temperament affected the willingness to counterattack sooner and in-depth. The Americans by 

culture and education seem to have been much more willing to counterattack early. They were not consumed with the tidiness of the battlefield 

like Montgomery, nor were they consumed with his fear of casualties and 

efforts to preserve British manpower. There was also the matter of professional military education. The Americans were under the influence of 

the interwar school system which contributed to this offensive mentality. 

Among them, Patton was a serious student of military history throughout his professional life, and his personal boldness matched his historical education. He knew that the classic doctrinal solution was to envelop 

a penetrating enemy at the shoulders of the penetration, and he strongly 

sought that solution. He was the strongest advocate for maneuver among 

the senior American commanders. It is a good thing there were young, aggressive corps commanders like J. Lawton Collins in the Bulge who could 

partner with the old maneuver master when the time came. They were 

serious enough students of doctrine and military history—having also 

benefited from the interwar army school system—and were ready to take 

advantage of decisive, offensive opportunities. Collins persuaded Hodges 

and Montgomery of the importance of an early and deep counterattack 

from the north shoulder of the Bulge.

Officers today must remain serious students of this episode and be 

aware of the benefits of professional study of doctrine and military history, 

the importance of staff competence and anticipatory planning like Patton’s 

Third Army demonstrated, the opportunity presented by bold maneuver, 

and the need to bring allies along in the thinking process. Similar circumstances are likely to occur again in the tumultuous conditions of largescale combat operations.27
98

Notes

1. Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the 

Battle of the Bulge (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 11; Harold R. Winton, Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and the Victory in the 

Ardennes (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), xv; Stephen R. 

Taaffe, Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 274.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 1-80.

3. FM 3-0, 6-165; major counterattack is defined in 6-167.

4. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, 262; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s 

Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington, 

IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 481. On release of the two armored divisions; Taaffe, 265 and; Colonel Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of 

Patton’s Third Army (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1947), 200–02. In Trevor 

N. Depuy, David L. Bongard and Richard C. Anderson Jr., Hitler’s Last Gamble: 

The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944–January 1945 (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 361; Depuy argues that Bradley’s decisions to chop the 7th and 10th 

Armored Divisions early probably kept the Germans from crossing the Meuse; 

Weigley, 458.

5. MacDonald, 419–21.

6. MacDonald, 599–600. Weigley, 546–47.

7. Command personality as used here refers to the way that a commander 

commands as a reflection of his personality, cultural and educational background, ability to make decisions and interact with a staff. 

8. On Eisenhower’s delicate balancing act between Montgomery and Bradley, see Winton, Commanders of the Bulge, 287–91.

9. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1965), 610.

10. Winton, Commanders of the Bulge, 250.

11. Cole, The Ardennes, 611. On Patton’s state of mind and his aggressive 

interaction with his staff, see Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 496–501.

12. On why Hodges was an insignificant actor in the counterattack to close 

the Bulge, see John A. English, Patton’s Peers: The Forgotten Allied Field Army 

Commanders of the Western Front, 1944–45 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books, 2009), 128; on why Hodges should have been relieved, English, 129; 

on Collins aggressive subordinates, Taaffe, Marshall and His Generals, 273; on 

Collins prodding Montgomery, Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War 

in Western Europe, 1944–1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 2013), 469.

13. Atkinson, 445; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 497–98.

14. English, Patton’s Peers, 127.

15. Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, 446; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 497.

16. Allen, Lucky Forward, 201; Weigley, 498–99.
99

17. Cole, The Ardennes, 509.

18. On the delays in Patton’s attack, Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, 466.

19. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 7-96.

20. English, Patton’s Peers, 126; Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, 469.

21. English, 126; Trevor N. Dupuy, Hitler’s Last Gamble (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 326.

22. Cole, The Ardennes, 611.

23. Cole, 612; on Patton’s order for the deeper objective, see Cole, 613; 

Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, 470.

24. English, Patton’s Peers, 128; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, 600.

25. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 7-22.

26. Winton, Commanders of the Bulge, 208.

27. The author wishes to acknowledge the careful editorial review of Colonel James Scott Wheeler, author of the definitive biography of General Jacob 

L. Devers. Wheeler corrected for both facts in error and the author’s prose. The 

author acknowledges Wheeler’s efforts and effectiveness.
100
101

Chapter 6

From the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Deep Maneuver in 19451

Major (US Marine Corps Reserve) Timothy G. Heck 

Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power 

to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum.2

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

By January 1945, the Soviet Army had pushed German forces from 

their high-water mark on the outskirts of Moscow in 1941 back to the Vistula River in Poland, a distance of more than 1,100 kilometers. Soviet offensives in 1944 alone “destroyed or captured 96 divisions and 24 brigades 

and defeated 219 divisions and 22 brigades.”3

 The German armed forces 

remained a potent foe to the Allies despite the enormous losses—amounting to approximately 1.6 million troops. Germany’s defenses—compressed 

as the Red Army pushed east—gave them interior lines of communication 

and the added morale boost of fighting on its home territory.

Looking to end the war, the Soviet high command, the Stavka, planned 

a series of front-sized campaigns that would defeat the Germans and culminate with the seizure of Berlin. These campaigns had the objective of 

“breaking through . . . and splitting up of the front into parts, disrupting 

communications and disorganizing the coordination of the enemy groups 

of forces and, as early as the first stage, of destroying the main forces of 

the German-Fascist troops.”4

 In October 1944, Stavka planners estimated 

these objectives would take “45 days of offensive activities to a depth 

of 600–700 kilometers, in the course of two consecutive efforts (stages), 

without operational pauses between them.”5

 The Vistula-Oder strategic offensive was the main Soviet effort in these 1945 campaigns. 

Soviet planners believed the Warsaw-Berlin axis was the crucial strategic axis and where German defenses would limit operations to a depth of 

approximately 150 kilometers.6

 As a result, initially, its planned objective 

was the Posen-Bromberg line. As the fronts advanced—despite the fact 

that the Stavka recognized the impossibility of predicting the future situation—the end goal became the Oder River, from which the Soviet forces 

could strike Berlin.7

 The application of mass and tempo, along with the 

necessary enablers, were fundamental to Soviet success when conducting 

large-scale maneuver in depth during the Vistula-Oder campaign.

Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military art developed in response to the new realities of highly dynamic, mechanized ma-
102

neuver warfare. Zhukov remarked in February 1941, “[in] war, all that is 

obsolete and ill-adapted to modern warfare is replaced by new and more 

perfected forms.”8

 The Stavka codified the offensive lessons of 1942 and 

1943 in the 1944 Red Army Field Regulations (Polevoy Ustav Krasnoy 

Armii 1944, hereafter Ustav), which provided commanders a template and 

doctrinal foundation for operational planning. The doctrine of 1944 “emphasized reliance on the offense, an offense characterized by maneuver 

and judicious use of massed armor, artillery, and air power to effect success on the battlefield.”9

The 1944 Ustav defined maneuver as “one of the most important conditions for achieving success.”10 Maneuver was described as “the organized movement of troops to create the most advantageous grouping and 

to place it in a favorable position for delivering a crushing blow on the 

enemy or for winning time and space.”11 During the Vistula-Oder campaign, the Red Army conducted large-scale maneuver in the operational 

depth using mass and tempo in order to decisively defeat the Germans in 

accordance with Soviet doctrine and practices. 

Operational Picture

 As Soviet commanders prepared for the operation, they matched the 

scale of their forces to the intended strategic objectives. Stalin released the 

entire Soviet strategic reserve for the Vistula-Oder campaign, a first in the 

war.12 The Soviets, in two fronts, mustered approximately 2.2 million men; 

4,500 tanks; 2,500 assault guns; more than 13,000 field artillery pieces; 

2,200 multiple rocket launchers; and more than 5,000 aircraft.13 In relative 

terms, the fronts had “almost one-third of all Soviet infantry formations 

and almost a half (43 percent) of all Soviet armour committed at that time 

on the Soviet-German front.”14 Each front consisted of 10 armies, an air 

army, and 4 to 5 corps-sized mobile groups—giving Zhukov and Konev the ability to echelon their forces for breakthrough and exploitation 

phases. These fronts were also supplemented by a long-range air army 

and fronts on their flanks conducting near-simultaneous operations in the 

Carpathians to the south and East Prussia in the north.

German Army Group A, initially commanded by Generaloberst Josef 

Harpe, stood opposite the bridgeheads and in depth throughout Poland.15

Strategically, Harpe sought to “prevent the breakthrough of the main Vistula defensive line by Soviet forces and, in the event of the latter’s success, 

to slow down [the Soviet] offensive along succeeding lines and through 

flank attacks by [German] forces to restore the situation.”16 Harpe assembled approximately 450,000 soldiers; 1,150 tanks; and 4,100 artillery piec-
103

es, including five panzer corps, many of which were overstrength in terms 

of armored vehicles.17 Defending the Warsaw-Berlin axis, the Germans 

arrayed “35 divisions, including four panzer and two panzergrenadier [divisions], two combat groups, 10 independent regiments, more than 50 independent battalions, and one screening and six sapper brigades.”18 Army 

Group A’s subordinate corps and armies were headquartered farther back 

but not significantly. Additionally, approximately 700 aircraft of the Luftwaffe’s Sixth Air Fleet supported German defenders, of which 300 were 

based on Polish soil.

19

At the operational level, German defensive tactics “relied on the 

first-echelon forces, which in the case of necessity were to successively fall back and occupy defensive positions that had been prepared in 

depth.”20 Starting in 1944, the Germans constructed seven defensive lines 

stretching between the Vistula and Oder in an effort to shore up the defenses of the ever-shrinking Reich. These lines notionally gave the Germans 

prepared or partially prepared defenses the Red Army would have to maneuver. In the fall of 1944, similar defensive lines in Eastern Prussia may 

have helped German defenders stave off Soviet advances.21 Constructed in 

haste under the supervision of Nazi party members and not military district 

commanders, many of the lines in Poland were poorly planned, situated, 

and prepared.22 While the lines were of unequal strength and quality, they 

provided German forces the opportunity to conduct defensive operations 

from prepared positions instead of having to dig in while retreating. In 

Reichsgau Warthegau, the B1 defensive line contained more than 9,300 

machine gun positions and 470 anti-tank positions over a length of 100 

kilometers.23 It was supposed to be manned by 14 combat divisions, but 

in the end less than 30 hastily assembled battalions occupied the line.24

Supplementing retreating German units, these defensive lines were also to 

be manned by Volkssturm battalions. In spite of these plans, many of the 

main lines went unmanned during the Soviet drive. 

Harpe’s forces, due to a lack of fuel, were significantly less mobile 

than the Soviet forces. Its infantry units were understrength. The operational reserves were too close to the tactical defenses, which led to their 

destruction in the opening barrages and battles. Army Group A was spread 

thin and—despite its positioning on the main axis of approach to Berlin 

from the East—was not the priority for the Wehrmacht in early 1945. Instead, Hitler chose to leave a sizeable force in the Courland Pocket in Latvia and to reinforce units around Budapest. German units sent to Hungary 

included those pulled from the failed Ardennes offensive.25 The anemic 
104

force lacked an ability to counter Soviet assaults or the mobility to defend 

key terrain, let alone fight a large-scale organized withdrawal.

Stavka planned for sequenced attacks by the two fronts in order to 

confuse German defenders as to the main effort. Konev planned a massive, 

powerful assault from the Sandomierz Bridgehead in the direction of Breslau. His reserve armies were to advance toward Krakow and the Silesian 

industrial region near Katowice. Two days after Konev launched his assault, Zhukov would launch three attacks from his bridgeheads—the most 

powerful one coming from the Magnuszew bridgehead in the direction of 

Posen. One of his subsequent attacks came from Pulawy bridgehead and 

attacked toward Lodz, while another attack supported by the 1st Polish 

Army was to encircle and liberate Warsaw.26

The Campaign

On 12 January, Konev launched his attack from the Sandomierz 

bridgehead through a 40-kilometer breakthrough sector toward his distant 

objective of Breslau.27 In order to rapidly break through the German tactical defenses, Konev deployed his combined arms armies. Once the defenses were breached, Konev committed his Guard’s tank and tank armies 

in order to avoid a prolonged battle out of the bridgehead, which advanced 

20 kilometers into German lines while widening the breakthrough gap to 

60 kilometers. Within the day, the 1st Ukrainian Front broke through the 

strongest sector of the German defenses, allowing for the armored and 

mechanized lead forces to advance while leaving pockets of German forces in their rear to be defeated by follow-on formations, largely infantry. 

Within 36 hours, Konev’s forces “had broken clean through . . . the strongest sector of the German line.”28

On 13 January, Zhukov’s forces went on the offensive from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads toward Lodz. On its first day, the 1st 

Belorussian Front advanced almost 100 kilometers. Zhukov’s decision 

to hold his tank armies in reserve “until day two or three of the offensive, when enemy defenses had already been breached” allowed for an 

“in-depth exploitation of the breakthrough.”29 In combination with Konev’s armies, “within days, [the Red Army] had swept around and encircled 

German operational reserves.”30

The 17th of January marked the fall of Warsaw and all but completed 

the breakout phase of the operation. With German tactical and operational 

reserves defeated, the Stavka issued new orders to the fronts, stating they 

were to “advance their forces to the Oder River, while overcoming the intermediate defense lines from the march.”31 Accordingly, “the mobile forc-
105

es were ordered to bypass powerful centers of resistance” and strove “to 

preempt the enemy in occupying rear defensive lines.”32 Zhukov’s forces 

were then tasked with capturing Poznan—approximately 120 kilometers 

to the west—through a gap between Fourth Panzer Army and Ninth Army. 

Soviet planners envisioned taking Poznan would take until early February; 

Zhukov had the city surrounded within a week.33

By 19 January, Army Group A and Army Group Center (to the north 

in the Königsberg pocket) were out of contact with each other, creating 

an ever-increasing gap through which Soviet forces maneuvered. The two 

fronts continued “striking deep into the rear . . . [which] prevented the German troops from utilizing most of their deliberate defenses.”34 Throughout 

Poland, Soviet forces “were advancing twice as fast as had been envisaged.”35 By late January, the 1st Belorussian Front headquarters could not 

keep up with the progress of its subordinate units, “sometimes issuing 

orders for objectives which had already been seized.”36 General Heinz 

Guderian, then-Chief of the German Land Forces General Staff, later remarked that “the pressure of the Russian forces had reached such a pitch 

that we found ourselves on the threshold of a catastrophe.”37 The Soviet 

offensive ended on 2 February 1945 as a result of a combination of political strategy, logistical exhaustion, declining weather conditions, growing 

German resistance along the Oder River, and the threatening presence of 

Figure 6.1. The Vistula-Oder Offensive. Map created by Army University Press.

0 25 50 75 100 Miles

The Vistula-Oder Offensive

12 January–3 February 1945

Germany 

Warsaw



 





 









 





East

Prussia

Czechoslovakia



Pulawy

Sandomierz

Katowice

Sochaczew Leczyca

Lodz

Ostrowiec

Radom

Bydgoszcz

Poznan

Berlin

Glogau

Breslau

Poland

XXXX

Second

Byelorussian Front

First

Byelorussian Front

First

Ukrainian Front

Fourth

Byelorussian Front

12 Jan

17 Jan 3 Feb

Krakow



Czestochowa

Frankfurt

Kuestrin
106

sizeable German forces along Zhukov’s northern flank in Pomerania.38

In the span of three weeks, the Red Army had advanced nearly 600 kilometers to bridgeheads, within 60 kilometers of Berlin. “The operation 

was distinguished by a very swift advance of our troops . . . by extensive 

maneuvering not only of the tanks, but of the infantry as well, the troops 

boldly advancing not in a continuous front, but by strike groupings in important directions.”39 In the process, the Red Army destroyed 35 German 

divisions, routed another 25, entered German territory, and were poised to 

end the war.40 The consecutive operations initially planned by the Stavka

far exceeded their plans’ expectations.

Mass

The sheer volume of Soviet troops committed to the operation might 

suggest the inevitability of a Soviet victory, but a closer study reveals Soviet mass went beyond overwhelming frontal assaults stereotyped in postwar German memoirs. Doctrinally, mass meant achieving overwhelming 

superiority in terms of combined arms forces and weapons in support of 

operational objectives. The 1944 Ustav describes “combat actions [as] 

characterized by the mass participation of artillery, mortars, tanks, aviation, 

and motorized infantry working together with rifle troops and cavalry.”41

Tactical force superiority was achieved by “resolute massing of troops and 

weapons on the main lines of advance.”42 Central to the operational use of 

combined arms was the “skillful concentrations of forces and weapons on 

the main lines of advance” during decisive phases of campaigns.43 Overall, 

the massing of Soviet forces by 1944 to 45 was “3.5 times greater than the 

artillery densities and 1.5 times greater than the tank densities envisaged 

by prewar views.”44 By 1945, the Red Army massed in accordance with 

the combat requirements for large-scale maneuver operations.

Pure manpower ratios along the entire front reveal that the Soviets 

possessed a force superiority of 5:1.45 For armor, the Soviet superiority 

overall was approximately 8:1.46 Soviet commanders achieved the concentration of manpower that ranged from 6:1 to 16:1 against the seven 

German divisions holding the bridgeheads. The concentration of Soviet 

forces massed in the breakthrough area can be seen in the balance of forces 

charts. However, the armor ratio was more dire for Army Group A, with 

estimates placing Soviet advantages at the bridgeheads between 30:1 and 

40:1.47 Artillery “preponderances would be even higher than those involving manpower and armor.”48 Across multiple Soviet offensives in 1944 to 

1945, aerial superiority was three to five times that of the Germans.49 
107

But massing forces connoted more than merely having more soldiers 

and armor than the Germans did across the entire front. Soviet commanders massed decisively at the operational level based on their plans to break 

through German defenses and maneuver into the operational depth. As 

examples, the 1st Ukrainian Front’s artillery in the bridgehead was deployed “hub-to-hub,” giving it overwhelming fire superiority.50 Furthermore, behind the bridgehead, Konev staged two additional armies, creating a second echelon of forces with which to exploit operational success. 

Figure 6.2. Distribution of Front Assets. Created by Army University Press based 

on details that author collected from multiple sources.

Armor Infantry Artillery Engineer Aviation Note

1st Ukraine – – – – –

Sandomierz

Bridgehead1

100% 77% 89% Approx.

100 km

Breakthrough

Sector2

90% 90% 16% of

total

frontage

1st Belorussian – – – – –

Magnuszew

Bridgehead

– – – 51%

Including

75% of

pontoon

bridge

assets3

~80%4

Chart developed by author from multiple sources.

1 P.T. Kunitskiy, “Methods of Defeating the Enemy in Strategic Offensive Operations,” VIZh vol. 10,

October 1987, 17. 2 United States Army Center for Land Warfare, 1986 Art of War Symposium: From the Vistula to the

Oder: Soviet Offensive Operations-October 1944-March 1945: A Transcript of Proceedings (Carlisle,

Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1986),, 511, 521. 3 Ye. Kolibernov, “Characteristic Features of Engineering Support for Troops of the Fronts during the

Vistula-Oder Operation,” VIZh, January 1985, 37, 38. 4 A. Yefimov. “Employment of Aviation in Conducting an Operation at a Rapid Pace and To a Great

Depth (From the Experience of the VistulaOder Operation),” VIZh, vol. 1, January 1985, 22.
108

Cumulatively, Zhukov massed a division for every 800 meters of frontage 

in the breakthrough sector.51

Crucial to the breakthrough and subsequent deep-maneuver operations, both fronts were supplemented with additional engineer assets and 

troops. These troops largely came from the Stavka’s strategic reserve. The 

1st Belorussian Front was reinforced with two assault brigades, one motorized engineer brigade, one combat engineer brigade, two pontoon bridge 

regiments, and six pontoon bridge battalions.52 The 1st Ukrainian Front received a comparable but slightly smaller number of engineer units. As the 

offensive continued, the forward placement of the bridging assets proved 

essential in overcoming the river barriers encountered.

Both commanders also stockpiled significant amounts of ammunition 

and fuel. In the Magnuszew bridgehead, 1st Belorussian Front stockpiled 

2.5 million artillery and mortar shells and at the Pulawy bridgehead 1.3 

million. “By comparison, in the whole Stalingrad operation Don Front had 

fired less than a million artillery and mortar rounds,” one account noted.53

Fuel, essential to maneuver operations, was also stockpiled for the advance. 

In the depots of Eight Guards Army—part of 1st Belorussian Front—900 

tons of fuel were stockpiled, with an average daily consumption of 105 

tons.54 Across the 1st Belorussian Front, more than three complete refuelings of diesel for the tanks were stored in anticipation of the operation, 

giving the tank armies the fuel needed for maneuver operations.55

Furthermore, Soviet commanders were able to mass forces along the 

main lines of advance by using fortified regions to achieve economy of 

force. North of the Magnuszew bridgehead, Zhukov held 20 kilometers 

of frontage with the 119th Fortified Region, allowing him to mass armies 

in the bridgehead for the assault.56 Near Konev’s Sandomierz bridgehead, 

the 77th Fortified Region held approximately 40 kilometers of frontage.57

Fortified regions also held the boundaries of the fronts, putting stable and 

primarily defensive forces in place in order to fix German defenders as 

well as to maintain Soviet positions as the assault forces were massed and 

organized. The level of concentration in the Distribution of Front Assets 

chart (Figure 6.2) shows the high proportion of front forces committed 

to the breakthrough area. Similarly, the Soviet 6th Army—with two rifle 

corps of five divisions—held approximately 30 percent of the entire 1st 

Ukrainian Front’s sector.58

Both fronts’ armies were massed in such a way as to exploit their 

materiel and manpower advantages over the Germans along main lines of 

advance.59 Zhukov and Konev led fronts that were operationally organized 
109

differently than their American or British counterparts. “The Russian 

spearhead was heavily weighted—in contrast with the Western armies—

along its cutting edge.”60 The Soviet’s cutting edge was built around the 

T34 tank, which was organized in brigade strength and supported by motorized infantry and engineer units. By massing their tank brigades, Konev 

and Zhukov maneuvered their tank armies with bold mobile thrusts after softening blows were delivered by accompanying artillery, which was 

brought to bear “at the slightest sign of determined resistance.”61

On 15 January, the weather cleared and the 16th Air Army flew 3,400 

sorties in two days in support of Zhukov. By comparison, the Luftwaffe

flew a reported 42.62 Complete tactical air superiority helped the Red 

Army force open the bridgeheads and extend into the exploitation phase. 

Through close coordination with ground forces, Soviet aviation “disorganized the withdrawal of enemy columns retreating to intermediate lines of 

defense,” including helping destroy the main elements of 4th Panzer Army 

opposite the Sandomierz bridgehead.63

As the breakthrough transitioned into the exploitation phase, Soviet aviation “actively helped” assault crossings over the Nysa, Pilica, and 

Warta rivers.64 Furthermore, frontal ground-attack aviation struck targets 

in the enemy’s operational rear.65 By centralizing aviation assets, Soviet 

Figure 6.3. Density of Front Assets per Kilometer. Created by Army University 

Press based on details that author collected from multiple sources.

Armor Infantry Artillery Engineer1 Aviation2

1st Ukraine – – – 13

companies

73

planes

1st

Belorussian3

140

tanks/

selfpropelled

guns

1.2

divisions

250

guns/

mortars

17

companies

57

planes

Chart developed by author from multiple sources.

1 Ye. Kolibernov, “Characteristic Features of Engineering Support for Troops of the Fronts during the

Vistula-Oder Operation,” VIZh, January 1985, 38. 2 Martin van Creveld, Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Power, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare.

(Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Power University, 1994), 141. 3 For land forces excluding engineers, V. Matsulenko, “Massing of Forces,” Soviet Military Review,

February 1975, 55.
110

commanders were able to mass against decisive points and targets at the 

operational level, supporting ground maneuver. As the tactical defenses 

broke, Soviet ground-attack aviation attacked “rail and road traffic, supply 

and traffic installations of all types,” disrupting German ability to assemble, move, and defend.66

Soviet ability to mass superior forces did not end with the breakout. 

By the end of the campaign—after three weeks of continuous deep operations on poor road networks with ever-growing lines of communication—

both fronts outnumbered German forces “more than threefold in infantry 

and over fivefold in tanks and artillery.”67

Tempo

Tempo was crucial to Soviet success, particularly after the breakout. 

Soviet application of tempo included rapid rates of advance, especially 

by the tank armies as well as continuous operations and the element of 

surprise. The 1944 Ustav used words like vigor, rapid, bold, and speed to 

convey the concept of tempo, specifically when looking at battles of maneuver and encirclement. Similarly, the application of tempo allowed the 

Red Army to defeat German defenders in time and space.

Creating and controlling tempo gave Soviet commanders three primary advantages over the Germans. First, tempo facilitated surprise. Second, 

tempo prevented defenders from shifting forces or occupying prepared positions. Third, tempo protected Soviet units from German counteractions 

through the use of speed.68 Generally, Soviet application of tempo required 

a “rapid and bold move into the attack” by the main body in order to defeat 

the enemy.69

The Stavka planned for operations “out about 100 to 150 kilometers in 

the depths as they put together their force packages and assigned missions 

to the tank armies and the tank corps that led the offensive all the way to 

the Oder River.”70 Both fronts organized for tempo from the outset. Konev formed his mobile group with two tank armies—his first echelon with 

six combined-arms armies and three tank corps then two combined-arms 

armies in the second—and a mechanized and cavalry corps in reserve.71

Konev used his combined-arms armies to break through the German tactical defenses and destroy the German operational reserves. Once complete, 

he deployed his tank armies to exploit the gaps, creating the momentum 

that helped propel his front toward their objectives. Similarly, Zhukov deployed his tank armies after tactical breakthrough was achieved. In both 

fronts, the tank armies “operating on main attack axes had subordinate 

to them one full tank or mechanized corps.”72 This allowed commanders 
111

to better tailor their forces for operations in-depth, including creating the 

forward detachments and logistics elements needed in order to sustain maneuver operations in-depth. 

After breaking through the tactical defenses, Soviet forward groups 

“developed the attack and carried out the pursuit . . . on separate axes, 

independently from the main forces of the fronts and armies.”73 At the 

vanguard of the advance, Soviet commanders placed significant emphasis 

on the forward groups built around the tank or mechanized corps which 

served as reconnaissance units and “combat-oriented forward detachments.”74 In the tank armies, the most effective forward groups were “often a reinforced brigade commanded by the most experienced, innovative, 

[and] aggressive officers.”75 These groups moved ahead of the main army 

at depths of 80 to 100 kilometers. In the combined-arms armies, the forward detachments were smaller—often reinforced battalion size—and operated 20 to 40 kilometers ahead.76

Forward detachments served multiple roles for their parent units. They 

identified defenders, seized river crossings, captured railroad junctions 

and lines, and guided follow-on units. Additionally, they “prevented German preparation of intermediate defense lines, . . . anticipated German 

movements, and negated the impact on combat of newly arrived operational reserves.”77 They were assisted by Soviet airpower, as commanders 

of forward detachments had the communications with aviation elements 

in order to identify “the most important targets for action and to obtain air 

help immediately.”78 By seizing key terrain and engaging enemy units in 

depth, the advanced detachments significantly improved the armies’ ability to maneuver and maintain tempo. Furthermore, they added to enemy 

confusion by appearing unexpectedly deep in the enemy rear.

In addition to the forward detachments in all armies, significant Soviet 

planning effort went into bringing up combat service support elements 

from the rear, including aviation. Engineering support was largely focused on crossing water barriers and clearing minefields. In the forward 

detachment of the tank armies, a combat engineer company or battalion 

was included with bridging elements up to a pontoon bridge battalion 

in strength.79 Minefield clearing elements were also included as Soviet 

units maneuvered against the Ostwall defensive lines. Additionally, the 

formations of 5th Shock, 8th Guards, 69th, and 1st and 2nd Guards Tank 

Armies included airfield maintenance battalions in the forward detachments.80 These airfield maintenance battalions were assigned to rapidly 

repair airfields so they could begin receiving Soviet aircraft.81 The embed-
112

ded combat service support allowed commanders to conduct and sustain 

deep maneuver.82

Tactics for Tempo

Soviet planners sought to overcome German defensive lines and defended positions from the march in order to retain the initiative.83 The 

planners’ tactics predominately took three forms: bypassing resistance and 

organized defenses, enveloping defenders, and outflanking enemy units.84

Bypassing resistance and organized lines of defense, Soviet units were 

able to continue maneuvering in the operational depth, isolating German 

defenders to be overwhelmed by follow-on forces. Soviet commanders 

were told “there is no necessity to engage in minor combat of no significance everywhere the enemy resists. The main principle is to find the weak 

places, strike, bypass, and break out into the rear area.”85 Avoiding combat 

prevented tank units and advanced echelons from being fixed or bogged 

down. As the forward elements for 4th Tank Army, the 93rd Separate Tank 

Brigade operated 80 to 100 kilometers in front of the main body, where it 

actively sought to avoid combat through bypassing resistance. Its operational mantra was: “if the enemy has occupied the defense, do not assault 

it. It is better to bypass.”86 Even following units like 5th Shock Army attempted to bypass German resistance during the pursuit phase.87

When bypassing was not an option, German units were enveloped. 

German forces around Warsaw—including 9th Army—found themselves 

rapidly enveloped by Zhukov’s 47th Army.88 Within four days of the start 

of Zhukov’s operation, Warsaw fell after being surrounded. As the operation continued, opportunities for envelopments were exploited by Soviet 

forces. Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland was rushed from East Prussia to 

stabilize the German front but instead found itself rapidly surrounded by 

1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies.89 Once encircled, Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland was all but destroyed in a meeting engagement before it could 

successfully deploy.90 Soviet forces conducting parallel pursuit frequently 

“wedged in between the retreating columns of the enemy, bypassed them, 

and—outstripping their speed—emerged in the way of their retreat.”91

Nearing the Oder, the fronts were not always able to bypass or encircle 

strengthening German resistance. As a result, neighboring units of brigade 

or army strength were required to cross operational boundaries in order to 

keep Soviet flanks secure. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, the left flank started 

to significantly lag as a result of German resistance in Silesia. On 20 January, Konev turned General Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army to the south 

in order to capture the Silesian industrial areas intact while destroying 
113

the German defenders in the open. In response, 3rd Guards Tank Army 

rapidly doubled-back in a complicated and large-scale maneuver.92 By 27 

January, German defenders in Silesia were threatened with entrapment by 

Rybalko’s forces, and most fled the collapsing pocket.93 The maneuver 

outflanked German defenders and allowed the 1st Ukrainian Front to seize 

the area with little damage to industry. Rybalko’s operation demonstrated 

Soviet agility when conducting decisive, large-scale maneuver.94

Rate of Advance

Soviet advance rates were significantly faster than Stavka plans and 

previous combat experience, specifically Operation Bagration in the summer of 1944. Across both fronts, the Soviets attained an average speed 

of 25 kilometers per day during the operation.95 This average, however, 

belies the differences between the types of armies and phases of the operation. Initial rates of advance during the penetration phase were slower due 

to combat with German defenders as units fought out of the bridgeheads 

and entered the operational depth. Similarly, toward the end of the operation, German resistance stiffened along the Oder River, causing rates of 

advance to slow as the Red Army engaged in decisive combat. 

In the operational depth, the tank armies advanced at rates of advance 

as high as 70 to 100 kilometers per day but averaged approximately 45 

kilometers on most days.96 Combined-arms armies averaged 21 to 37 kilometers per day during this period due to their relative lack of vehicles.97

In the 171st Rifle Division, “the infantry moved on foot, all the regimental 

equipment was horse-drawn, and just the divisional artillery was provided 

vehicle transportation.”98 Some infantry divisions were fortunate enough 

to have vehicles.99 Others improvised. In 8th Guards Army, the infantry 

“mobilized everything, up to and including phaetons, horses [and] any 

type of civilian transportation they could find.”100

As the advance continued westward, Soviet forces were increasingly fragmented, potentially allowing the risk of encirclement by German 

counteraction. As a result, especially in the forward detachments, there 

was “patient care taken by the Soviets to make sure that the tank armies 

[did not] go too fast.”101 The follow-on forces of the combined-arms 

armies, however, were instructed “not to reduce the rates [of advance] 

forward to the Oder.”102

In addition to speed and avoiding decisive combat, Soviet commanders maintained tempo through continuous operations by swapping lead 

units and engaging in night maneuver. Soviet commanders maintained 

pressure on the Germans by periodically interchanging their lead ele-
114

ments with those from the second echelons and reserves, especially important in the leading detachments of the tank armies.103 In 2nd Guards 

Tank Army, the advance detachments of 1st Mechanized Corps changed 

six times from 18 to 30 January.104 Similarly, the 7th Guards Tank Corps’ 

forward detachment was replaced five times between 14 and 24 January.105

Rarely did forward detachments engage in more than two or three days of 

continuous action.106 Aviation assets rebased in order to provide continual 

close-air support and fighter coverage. During the course of the campaign, 

fighter units redeployed seven times and ground attack units redeployed 

six times.107 The constant interchange precluded German defenders from 

getting any respite while allowing Soviet commanders to maintain operational tempo. As a result, Soviet forces were able to advance without 

the degradation in troop performance normally associated with continuous 

operations.

In addition to continuously changing forward elements, Soviet forces 

conducted night operations, something unexpected to German defenders. 

Soviet commanders “didn’t postpone combat actions until the next day, 

until the day after that, or until some other day,” which denied the Germans the opportunity to regroup and precluded rest.108 In 4th Tank Army’s 

93rd Separate Tank Brigade, “special attention” was given to night operations prior to commencing the operation.109 The Soviets cloaked their 

operational maneuvers in darkness, preserving the element of surprise. By 

operating at night, the Red Army was “able to carry out a maneuver or a 

movement or a blow against a target . . . at dawn, to appear suddenly.”110

The breaching of the Meseritz fortified area between Posen and Kustrin by 

44th Brigade, 11th Tank Corps, was undertaken at night, which resulted in 

the breaching of a supposedly impenetrable defensive position.111 Similar 

to continuous operations, Soviet exploitation of the night sustained high 

rates of advance while wearing down German defenders.

The Soviet tempo’s impact on the Vistula-Oder Operation was multifold. First, it allowed for the seizure of objectives before effective defenses could be mounted. Second, it reduced Soviet casualties. Third, it 

increased German casualty rates in both men and materiel. The high tempo 

rate also reduced the amount of ammunition consumed, especially during 

the pursuit.112 The Soviet’s rates of advance put their leading elements 

well into the operational depths of the enemy before German reserves or 

reinforcements could be called upon. The destruction of Panzer Corps 

Grossdeutschland is a prime example of Soviet troops maneuvering more 

rapidly than the German defenders. The rapidity also “prevented the enemy from redeploying, reinforcing, or supplying on any but a very small 
115

scale.”113 Furthermore, by arriving in key positions “before or, at worst, 

simultaneously with hurriedly redeployed German formations,” the Red 

Army was able to seize objectives from the march.114 In mid-January, the 

61st Guards Tank Brigade—acting as a forward detachment for the 10th 

Guards Tank Corps—surprised a group of Germans defending a bridge 

on the Warthe River. The seizure of this span enabled the tank corps to 

continue crossing the river in column formation.115 The intact bridge was 

then used by trailing combined-arms armies and logistics forces to sustain 

the offensive.

The high tempo also reduced Soviet casualties. Soviet analysis revealed that the rate of advance and losses had an inverse relationship.116 In 

units across the Red Army during this phase of the war, manpower losses 

for units advancing up to 10 kilometers a day were five to six times higher 

than those of units operating at 20 to 30 kilometers or faster.117 Similarly, equipment loss rates were reduced by four to four-and-a-half times.118

By the conclusion of the operation, the 1st Belorussian Front suffered 1.7 

percent in personnel casualties while the 1st Ukrainian Front suffered 2.4 

percent.119 These rates were significantly lower than previous operations.

In addition to reducing Soviet casualty rates, tempo increased German 

losses.120 These losses were both quantitative—in terms of men and equipment—and qualitative in terms of capacity. Advanced detachments cut off 

German retreat routes and seized river crossings and rail junctions, further 

enabling Soviet logistics support. German defenders—rapidly cut off and 

isolated—were encircled or forced to make their way to the west as groups. 

The isolation of German defenders led to increased capture rates. The Soviet Fourth Tank Army broke into the operational depth and advanced at a 

daily tempo of 30 to 33 kilometers, taking twice the number of prisoners 

when compared to a tempo of 10 to 13 kilometers.121 Additionally, both 

fronts found the number of seized automobiles, artillery pieces, and tanks 

rose with higher speeds—with each captured vehicle and soldier further 

reducing German capacity.122 When the 1st Belorussian Front seized Lodz, 

400 train cars loaded with military equipment were captured.123 Furthermore, much of Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland’s equipment was captured 

or destroyed while still in rail cars.124 By the end of the campaign, at least 

300,000 German soldiers were killed, captured, wounded, or missing.125

Conclusion

Soviet operational application of mass and tempo during the Vistula-Oder campaign led to a strategic victory. Operationally, Soviet maneuver overwhelmed the German ability to occupy prepared defenses, employ mobile 
116

forces, or conduct a fighting withdrawal. Red Army maneuver embodied 

1944 Ustav’s dictum that “commanders at all levels . . . have the ability to 

make rapid regroupings before and during combat, to organize and conduct 

outflankings, to encircle, to capture, or to destroy enemy groupings.”126 German General Friederich von Mellenthin wrote “The Russian offensive was 

delivered with a weight and fury never yet seen in war. It was clear that their 

High Command had completely mastered the technique of maintaining the 

advance of huge mechanized armies.”127 The Red Army benefited from their 

tank armies’ mobile striking power, “which enabled them to make deeper 

thrusts, maneuver extensively, [and] attack at high tempos.”128

During the Soviet era, the Vistula-Oder campaign was a key model 

for studying large-scale combat operations, as evidenced by the volume of 

military literature published on the campaign—attention that continues in 

today’s Russian army. As described in FM 3-0, Operations, American commanders and planners will need to mass combat power in order to replicate 

the shock, tempo, and surprise seen during the Vistula-Oder campaign. Improvements in lethality, command and control, and intelligence will serve 

as force multipliers to facilitate the application of mass and tempo.129
117

Notes

1. Many of the places in this chapter have had their names changed since 

1945. Histories like Earl F. Ziemke’s use place names interchangeably. I have 

attempted to be consistent and include endnotes for names that have changed.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 2-41.

3. S.M. Shtemenko, “How the Last Campaign for Defeating Hitler’s Germany Was Planned,” in ed. Richard W. Harrison, Prelude to Berlin: The Red Army’s 

Offensive Operations in Poland and Eastern Germany, 1945 (Solihull, United 

Kingdom: Helion & Company, 2016), 17.

4. Shtemenko, 25.

5. Shtemenko, 23.

6. Shtemenko, 19.

7. Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, trans. Novosti (New 

York: Delacorte Press, 1971), 560; Ivan S. Konev, “From the Vistula to the 

Oder,” Soviet Military Review, February 1970, 46. Bromberg is now Bydgoszcz. 

Poznan was Posen. 

8. John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1983), 563.

9. David M. Glantz, “Soviet Offensive Ground Doctrine Since 1945,” Air 

University Review 34, no. 3 (March–April 1983), 26.

10. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Polevoy Ustav Krasnoy Armii 1944

(Red Army Field Regulations 1944) 1 (Moscow, 1944, translated by US Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service), 10.This source is hereinafter referred to as Ustav.

11. Ustav, 10.

12. Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–1945

(New York: Perennial, 2002, reprint), 417.

13. Christopher Duffy, Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945. (New York: Routledge, 1991), 24–25.

14. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 447.

15. On 25 January 1945, German Army Group A was renamed Army Group 

Center. Army Group A is used in this chapter.

16. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation. The Defeat by Soviet Forces of the German Fascist Troops in Poland in January 1945,” in Harrison, 

Prelude to Berlin, 38.

17. US Army Center for Land Warfare, 1986 Art of War Symposium: From 

the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Offensive Operations-October 1944–March 1945: 

A Transcript of Proceedings (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 

1986), 512. Hereafter cited as Symposium.

18. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” 38.

19. Soviet General Staff, 42.

20. Soviet General Staff, 38.

21. Alastair Noble, “The Phantom Barrier: Ostwallbau 1944-1945,” War in 

History 8, no. 4, 2001, 463.
118

22. Noble, 460.

23. Reichsgau Warthegau consisted of much of modern western Poland, 

including Posen.

24. Noble, “Phantom Barrier,” 465.

25. A. Zvenzlovsky, “Breakthrough to the Oder,” Soviet Military Review, 

January 1975, 7.

26. Zhukov, Memoirs, 560.

27. Konev, “From the Vistula to the Oder,” 45.

28. Clark, Barbarossa, 413.

29. Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov (New 

York: Random House, 2012), 216.

30. David M. Glantz, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” Military Review 75, 

no. 2 (March–April 1995), 95.

31. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” 75.

32. Soviet General Staff, 75.

33. Poznan was declared a Festung city as part of an overall German defensive strategy and did not fall until 23 February 1945.

34. Zhukov, Memoirs, 579.

35. Zhukov, 580.

36. Antony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin, 1945 (New York: Viking, 2002), 44.

37. N. Kurov, “The Last Military Campaign in Europe” Soviet Military 

Review, August 1975, 57.

38. Zvenzlovsky, “Breakthrough,” 9. Soviet authors focused on the military reasons for ending the operation. See David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. 

House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 2015), 314–19, for political considerations.

39. Konev, “From the Vistula to the Oder,” 47–48.

40. Kurov, “Campaign,” 56.

41. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ustav, 9.

42. A. Radzievsky, “Military Science and Armed Struggle,” Soviet Military 

Review, July 1971, 36.

43. A.P. Beloborodov, “Triumph of Soviet Military Art,” Soviet Military 

Review, July 1975, 5.

44. Radzievsky, “Military Science,” 37.

45. US Army Center for Land Warfare, Symposium, 507.

46. Symposium, 514.

47. Symposium, 507.

48. Symposium, 514.

49. V. Matsulenko, “Massing of Forces,” Soviet Military Review, February 

1975, 55. A Soviet advantage of 3:1 to 5:1 is reasonable during this offensive.

50. Donald R. Sims and Anthony M. Schilling, “Breakout from the Sandomierz Bridgehead,” Field Artillery, October 1990, 22.

51. Yu. P. Maksimov, “The Strategic Offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces 

in the Concluding Campaign of 1945,” Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (VIZh), 

Military Historical Journal, October 1985, 69.
119

52. Ye. Kolibernov, “Characteristic Features of Engineering Support for 

Troops of the Fronts during the Vistula-Oder Operation,” VIZh, January 1985, 

37.

53. Earl M. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. 

(Washington: Center for Military History, 1968), 420. Cumulatively, by the 

end of the operation, both fronts expended more than 6 million artillery and 

anti-aircraft shells. First Belorussian Front fired 3.2 million shells on the first 

three days of the operation alone (13–16 January 1945); S.G. Peredelskiy and G. 

Khoroshilov, “Artillery in the Engagements from the Vistula to the Oder,” VIZh

1, January 1985, 33.

54. H.G.W. Davie, “The Logistics of Combined Arms Armies—The Rear: 

High Mobility through Limited Means,” unpublished manuscript, 39.

55. Davie, “Logistics,” 35.

56. US Army Center for Land Warfare, Symposium, 512.

57. Dennis K. Hill, “Fortified Regions: What is the Operational Significance 

of the Employment of Fortified Regions for NATO and the United States?” 

Thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1990, 9.

58. US Army Center for Land Warfare, Symposium, 514.

59. Alexander Vasilevsky, “Serving the People,” Soviet Military Review, 

September 1975, 42.

60. Clark, Barbarossa, 416.

61. Beevor, Fall, 44.

62. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941–45 (Novato, California: 

Presidio Press, 1993), 536.

63. M.N. Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air 

Force in the Great Patriotic War: A Soviet View. (Washington: Department of 

the Air Force, 1977), 172. 

64. Kozhevnikov, Command and Staff, 172. 

65. Jacob W. Kipp, “Soviet ‘Tactical’ Aviation in the Postwar Period: 

Technological Change, Organizational Innovation, and Doctrinal Continuity,” 

Airpower Journal 2, no. 1, Spring 1988, 12.

66. Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German 

Commanders, United States Air Force (USAF) Historical Series no. 175, 

USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1960, 

333; Kipp, 12.

67. David M. Glantz, “The Soviet-German War 1941–1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay,” presentation, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government 

and Public Affairs, Clemson University, 11 October 2001, 91. Italics in original.

68. Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War: Revised Edition (Santa Monica, 

California: RAND, 1992), 130.

69. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ustav, 122.

70. US Army Center for Land Warfare, Symposium, 512.

71. Maksimov, “Strategic Offensive,” 69.
120

72. David M. Glantz, “Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver” in ed. Carl 

W. Reddel, Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military History: Proceedings 

of the Twelfth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 

1–3 October 1986 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 210.

73. P. Kurochkin, “Operations of Tank Armies in Operational Depth” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), no. 11, November 1964, 52.

74. David M. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Intelligence: A Case Study” in 

ed. Walter T. Hitchcock, The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective. 

Proceedings of the Thirteenth Military History Symposium, October 12–14 1988

(Washington, DC: US Air Force, 1991), 167.

75. Richard N. Armstrong, “Battlefield Agility: The Soviet Legacy,” The 

Journal of Soviet Military Studies 1, no. 4, 1988, 502.

76. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Intelligence,” 169.

77. Glantz, 171.

78. S.I. Rudenko, “Over the Vistula, Oder and Berlin,” Militera.org, http://

militera.org//cards/show.html?card=45489.

79. Kolibernov, “Engineering Support,” 41.

80. Rudenko, “Over the Vistula;” a reinforced airfield-engineering engineer 

battalion moved with armies’ rear.

81. Yefimov, “Employment of Aviation,” 26.

82. Glantz, “Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver,” 210.

83. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” 89.

84. Soviet General Staff, 91.

85. David M. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak! Interviews with Veterans of 

the Vistula-Oder Operation (January–February 1945) (Carlisle, PA: self-published, 2007), 53. 

86. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak!, 71.

87. G. Korotkov, “Pursuit,” Soviet Military Review, December 1970, 45–47.

88. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” 91.

89. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak!, viii.

90. Charles J. Dick, From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 

1944. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume II (Lawrence, KS: 

University Press of Kansas, 2016), 226.

91. “The Development of the Breakthrough and Crossing the Fourth Defense Line,” East View Information Services, Sbornik materialov po izuchenii︠u

︡

opyta voĭny, no.25 Collection of Materials for Studies on the World War II Experience 25 (Minneapolis, MN: East View Information Services, 2004).

92. Ronald J. Wright, “Destroying the Wehrmacht: January 1944–May 

1945,” in ed. Jacob W. Kipp, Historical Analysis of the Use of Mobile Forces 

by Russia and the USSR (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, 

1985), 398.

93. Wright, 398.

94. Armstrong, “Agility,” 508.
121

95. Robert L. Hembold, A Compilation of Data on Rates of Advance in 

Land Combat Operations, CAA-RP-90-04 (Bethesda, MD: US Army Concepts 

Analysis Agency, 1990), B-16.

96. V.I. Filonov, “Combat Service and Logistic Support in the Vistula-Oder 

Strategic Offensive Operation (toward the 60th Anniversary of Victory of the 

Great Patriotic War),” Voennaia Mysl 2, 2005, 66.

97. Soviet General Staff, “The Vistula-Oder Operation,” 80.

98. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak!, 9.

99. Glantz, 20.

100. Glantz, 13.

101. US Army Center for Land Warfare, Symposium, 536.

102. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak!, 9. 

103. Leites, Soviet Style in War, 63.

104. N. Kireyev and N. Dovbenk, “Wartime Experience in the Employment 

of Armored Corps.” VIZh 9, September 1982, 34.

105. Leites, Soviet Style in War, 63.

106. Leites, 63.

107. Kozhevnikov, Command and Staff, 173.

108. Glantz, Red Army Officers Speak!, 61.

109. Glantz, 69.

110. Glantz, 69.

111. Claude R. Sasso, Soviet Night Operations in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1982), 21. Kustrin is Kostrzyn nad Odrą, 

Poland. Meseritz is in the vicinity of Międzyrzecz, Poland.

112. V.I. Filonov, “Combat Service,” 66.

113. P.H. Vigor, “Soviet Planning Successes in the Great Patriotic War: The 

Results of Correct Formulae?” in ed. Harry R. Borowski, Military Planning in 

the Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the Eleventh Military History Symposium, 10–12 October 1984 (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 1986), 100.

114. Dick, From Defeat to Victory, 226.

115. Wright, “Destroying the Wehrmacht,” 396–97.

116. Leites, Soviet Style in War, 130.

117. Leites, 132.

118. Leites, 132.

119. M.A. Gareev “Applying Zhukov’s Command Heritage to Military 

Training and Reform in Today’s World,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

12, no. 4, 1999, 93. Exact Soviet casualty statistics are difficult to determine. 

Fritz Stoeckli, “Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios and Casualties 

in Soviet Front and Army Operations,” The RUSI Journal 134, no.1, 1989, 34 

puts losses at 0.53 percent.

120. John Hemsley and David Bolton, “The Influence of Technology upon 

Soviet Doctrine,” The RUSI Journal 131, no. 2, 1986, 26.

121. Leites, Style, 130.

122. Leites, 130.
122

123. Oleg Hoeffding, Soviet Interdiction Operations, 1941–1945. (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970), 17.

124. Robert Citino, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand: The German Campaigns 

of 1944–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 434. 

125. Citino, The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand, 434.

126. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ustav, 7.

127. F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 343.

128. Kurochkin, “Tank Armies,” 58.

129. The author wishes to thank his wife, Heather, and their daughter for 

their support and encouragement. Also, without the support of Colonel (Retired) 

David Glantz, this chapter could not have been written. Colonel William Wyman, formerly at Joint Forces Staff College, encouraged my initial studies of the 

Vistula-Oder campaign while I was his student. Thanks to Rachel J. Daniels at 

the Russian Military Studies Archive at Cranfield University; Margaret Harrison 

and Jeff Turner at Joint Forces Staff College; H.G.W. Davie, Roberta Borky, 

Colonel John M. Borky (USAF, Retired), 1st Lieutenant (USMC) Walker Mills, 

Major Paul F. Tanghe, J. Overton, and Gregory Liedtke for providing critical 

source material and feedback.
123

Chapter 7

The Israeli Experience: The Apogee of Blitzkrieg1

Major Ronnie L. Coutts, British Army

Commanders seize the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, 

there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to reduce uncertainty. Waiting and gathering information 

might reduce uncertainty, but does not eliminate it. Waiting may 

even increase uncertainty while providing an enemy with time to 

seize the initiative. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting 

and developing the situation instead of waiting. Exploiting the initiative requires positive action.2

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

Israel . . . should seek to reduce to the [greatest] extent possible 

the duration of the Fighting: and in every military confrontation 

would strive for a clear, decisive and visible military victory.

3

—A.I.S. Nusbacher

In examining the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, one finds oneself battling between the extraordinarily successful military outcomes utilizing deep maneuver and the reality that Israeli success was often borne 

not by such decisive tactics, but from ruthless determination to succeed 

expressed as fighting spirit and high morale. That this ruthlessness was in 

part generated from a fear of annihilation by its Arab neighbors is a key 

motivation. In harnessing this motivation into tangible doctrine, there is an 

irony that Israeli armored doctrine builds upon Blitzkrieg and Aufstragtaktik derived from a nation that at one point in history dedicated its national 

resources to exterminating the Jewish people. A.I.S. Nusbacher’s study of 

this evolution, whilst focused on the Golan Heights in 1973, explores this 

natural development. In his interviews, with Israeli commanders, grudging 

respect is given by them to Panzer leader Heinz Guderian and German 

General Erwin Rommel, but their statements reflect lessons more from 

J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell-Hart as much to hide German influence as 

to also show the roots of German thinking. With Rommel and Guderian 

setting the scene in the German experiences from World War II, moving to 

the Israeli experience is therefore not only logical from a theoretical perspective but, as will also be shown, logical from an examination of tactics. 

This study of Israeli operations draws upon both the 1967 Six-Day 

War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In doing so it seeks to draw upon the 
124

best lessons for deep maneuver balanced with the failings and stark lessons learnt. There may appear to be the occasional historical schizophrenia 

as lessons jump from both conflicts, but by drawing the best lessons rather 

than attempting to mold a single operation or campaign to suit all ends, 

the greatest benefit for the deep maneuver commander should be derived.

Geo-Political Considerations

Germany’s geographical position in Central Europe, surrounded 

by strongly armed neighbors, compelled the study of war on several fronts. Since the possibility of such a war invariably involved 

the prospect of Fighting against superior force, this problem, too, 

had to be carefully examined. . . . The strict limitations of our 

resources compelled the General Staff to study how a war could 

most quickly be conducted.

4

—Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader

As much as the fear of annihilation should be seen as a motivating 

factor, Israel’s geo-political situation must be examined to set in context 

their view of an often-precarious existence in the Middle East. Guderian’s view of Germany’s situation in 1938, whilst stretching the reality of 

the time does, however, encapsulate an accurate view of Israeli Defense 

Forces (IDF) thinking in 1967 and 1973. These wars may have lessened 

this phobia, but not exorcised it. Israel has no strategic depth and although 

it emerged from the 1948–1949 War of Independence with more territory 

than that granted in the 1947 United Nations Security Council Resolution, 

it nevertheless has inherited troublesome borders. With a width of just a 

few miles in some places to at best a few score miles, any Arab neighbor 

can quickly and easily attack population centers and industrial assets. This 

reality gives rise to a desire “that fighting must be transferred to Arab territory to the greatest possible extent.”5

 Demographically the population of 

Israel is insignificant when compared to the combined numbers of its Arab 

neighbors.6 Even with the mass immigration evident since 1948, keeping 

a large standing army would inhibit economic growth. A nation-in-arms 

concept has therefore been sought once quipped as, “We are a nation of 

soldiers on leave for 11 months of the year.”7 Great power patronage to 

secure resources and to possibly fall back upon for political and military 

support, preferably in the guise of the United States, was initially articulated by its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion understood 

that a small state such as Israel could never be self-sufficient and should 

not consequently find itself isolated in time of war. Such patronage, whilst 

generating international leverage, also produces a “political stopwatch” inevitably bringing Israel and its adversaries to the negotiating table. The 
125

correlation between ceasefire lines and ultimate political settlements is evident since 1949; hence the importance of the stopwatch. With a backdrop 

of constrained geography, limited manpower, and a political stopwatch, the 

aggressive and dynamic pursuit of deep maneuver by the IDF makes sense.

Breakthrough Battle

Finding an open flank or weak enemy area to permit deep maneuver 

and the subsequent space to allow forces to roam free is often simply not 

possible. A breakthrough battle may be needed to create the essential space 

requisite for deep maneuver. The subtlety between a direct attack to defeat 

an enemy force and an attack to permit the onward passage of a deep maneuver force is often lost in the mire of battle. The subtlety must not, however, be lost on the attacking commander. He must understand and more 

importantly convey to his subordinates that a swift, crushing, and decisive 

battle must be fought if the deep maneuver force is not to culminate. 

General Israel Tal on 5 June 1967 knew he faced just such a breakthrough battle. He did not know that the 5th was day one of only a Six-Day 

War. The northernmost of three Israeli Ugdas (divisions), his task was to 

break through Egyptian and Palestinian forces defending the “Opening of 

Rafa,” a narrow tract of land between the sand dunes on the coast and the 

sand sea to the south.8

 He knew that “the first day of the war would decide 

the war” and that his Ugda was to spearhead this first day.9

 Tal, a natural 

philosopher and the tank expert in the IDF, started his armored career as a 

Khan

Yunis

Pattons

The Breakthrough of Tal’s

Ugda at Rafa–El Arish

5–6June 1967 0 5 10 Miles

N

Israel

Mediterranean Sea

Egypt

XX

7

 





X

X

II

X

II El Arish

Jeradi

Sheik Zuwied

Rafa

Junction

Rafa

Kerem

Shalom

Bir Lahfan

To Gaza

Bde Res

(-) 4

Menachim

Eytan

Tal’s

Ugda

7th Egyptian

Armored Bde

Assembly Area



X

Menachim’s

Armored Bde

Assembly Area





II

XX

Bde Reece

I

(-) Centurians

II

(-)Centurians

II

Pattons

II

II

I

II

II

II

I

I

7th Bde Res

Road

Railroad

Wadi

Gaza Strip

Soft Sand and Dunes

Eytan’s Armored Bde

Assembly Area

X

II

––

Figure 7.1. The Breakthrough of Tal’s Ugda at Rafa El-Arish, 5–6 June 1967. Map 

created by Army University Press.
126

carrier platoon sergeant in the British Army in the Second World War. He 

went on to become a machine gun officer in the Haganah and only after the 

1956 Sinai Campaign, when he saw the importance of the Armored Corps, 

did he transfer.10 Tal brought coherence to Israeli doctrine based largely 

on the writings of Liddell-Hart and the experiences of Guderian, which he 

coupled to a strict disciplinary outlook. He was a consummate professional who understood that in a fundamentally technical Corps, only adherence to discipline and rules would succeed. In response to his critics who 

saw his style in direct contrast to “Kibbutz style,” he cited the following 

example, “A Paratrooper with a deep inner discipline is capable of fighting 

bravely and tenaciously, even when he is hungry and his shirt is torn. But 

no tank will function, even given the most rousing Zionist orations, when 

there is no fuel in the tank or when it has thrown a track.”11

Facing General Tal’s Ugda was a brigade of 20th Palestinian Division 

in Khan Yunis and two brigades of 7th Egyptian Infantry Division at Rafa 

Junction covering the coast road. A further brigade was deployed in depth. 

In all, the position was 35 miles deep. Tal’s aim was to break through this 

“crust” before the Egyptian 4th Armored Division could counterattack and 

stifle the Israeli deep attack across the Sinai. Tal was clear that he must 

succeed at the first attempt and that a time-consuming attritional battle was 

not an option. The Ugda had armored punch but lacked infantry and artillery balance.12 Avoiding the obvious maneuver corridor and consequently 

well-defended area around the Opening of Rafal, Tal decided to attack 

along the coastal strip. He reasoned that the Egyptians would not have 

mined the coastal road and rail line nor registered their own camps in this 

area with artillery. Colonel Shmual Gonen, with 7 Brigade, would break 

through the light defenses in Khan Yunis to attack Rafal Junction from the 

north and drive on to El Arish. A scratch brigade commanded by Colonel 

Raphoul Eytan was to cross the border and attack Rafal from the south. 

Colonel Menachim Aviram was to navigate along a track in the sand sea 

and link up with a parachute drop on El Arish airfield.

At Khan Yunis, the Israelis discovered that a brigade now sat where 

they had anticipated a battalion. A breakdown in communication within 

the lead Patton armored battalion caused a delay, but the battalion was able 

to rally at Khan Yunis station in accordance with their preliminary orders. 

The sudden arrival of 60 tanks caused the Palestinians to surrender en 

masse. With no infantry in support, the armor could do little to capitalize 

on this breakdown in cohesion. The Palestinians made up for their initial 

shock by holding up a subsequent mechanized brigade for three days. As 

the lead tanks of 7 Armored Brigade pushed on to Rafal Junction, the 
127

Egyptians waited until they were within 100 meters of their positions before unleashing their ambush. Gonen then attacked in a pincer movement, 

with the Centurion battalion continuing to advance along the road whilst 

the Patton battalion moved west. 

Simultaneously the Egyptians launched a counterattack with T54 

tanks. These ran straight into the pincer movement and were defeated with 

the loss of nine tanks. On seeing this, the Egyptian infantry went quiet and 

the Pattons moved into the Egyptian divisional rear area— overrunning 

gun positions as well as the divisional headquarters and killing the divisional commander. Gonen then committed his reserve of two Centurion 

companies and a jeep reconnaissance company to maintain momentum. At 

the Jeradi defile, the Centurions passed a sleeping Egyptian battle group.13

The reconnaissance company was not so lucky and after two vehicles were 

destroyed, the defile was closed by a now-alert Egyptian position. Eytan’s 

brigade fared worse. Lack of all arms training separated the tanks from the 

paratroopers who were then counterattacked by an Egyptian tank battalion. Tal diverted Gonen’s Patton battalion south to deal with this threat. In 

the interim, Israeli Fouga Magisters destroyed this Egyptian counterattack. 

Tal now reoriented his advance centered on Rafa Junction. The Menachim 

brigade’s slow advance was curtailed when the parachute battalion he was 

to link up with diverted to Jerusalem. Jordan had entered the war. To clear 

the Jeradi defile, Gonen ordered a frontal attack down the road combined 

with a flank attack over sand in the south. The attack was repulsed with the 

killing of the commanding officer (CO) and wounding of three company 

commanders. The second-in-command rallied the battalion and rushed the 

position, taking it with the loss of one tank. The Egyptians recovered from 

this shock and held up follow-on elements. By now, darkness had fallen 

and the Ugda was now spread over 30 miles centered on the obstinate 

block at the Jeradi defile. 

Tal realized that his attack was faltering and with it any hope of breaking through the “crust.” He now reinvigorated the advance. Releasing a 

mechanized battalion from mopping up operations at Rafal Junction and a 

Patton company, he augmented Gonen’s brigade and placed at the mechanized battalion CO’s disposal the entire Ugda’s artillery, including an 

illumination shoot. The battalion CO urged his drivers forward to reach 

the defile, forcing waiting administrative vehicles off the road to allow 

his passage. Pausing to regroup prior to the defile, he then called for the 

illumination shoot to enable the centurions to give covering fire and attacked. After breaking through the defile, the battalion then spent the next 

four hours clearing a mile of trenches backward to the start of the defile. 
128

The following morning, Tal’s Ugda attacked south from El Arish to link 

up with Yiska Shadmi’s armored brigade moving up from the south. The 

crust had been broken, and Israeli armor was free to strike deep toward 

the Suez Canal.

Israel Tal created the conditions for the subsequent Israeli rout of the 

Egyptians in the Six-Day War. In modern American doctrinal parlance, his 

was a shaping operation, but it should additionally be viewed as the decisive operation for, without this breakthrough, the overall Israeli plan would 

have stalled. His determination and singlemindedness, particularly during 

the confused night at the Jeradi defile, translated into a determined attack 

that maintained the objective.14 The mistakes over combined arms cooperation within his formation are evident, and arguably throughout this battle 

he also accepted risk by being off balance at various periods. His feel for 

the battle was, however, faultless as he constantly sought to bring about a 

decision and focused efforts toward this point. As an example of a breakthrough battle to enable deep maneuver, the 5–6 June 1967 at Rafal-El 

Arish is first class. Tal was also conscious of the chaos many might have 

perceived in his Ugda as they fought west and resisted against a natural 

tendency in many military minds to tidy the battlefield in order to stop and 

consolidate. He knew that to do so would cost him time and momentum, 

allowing the Egyptians, similarly working in this chaos, to gain composure.

Chaos and Balagan15

How better to exemplify the natives’ improvisational capacities than 

in descriptive analysis of how Israelis park their vehicles in a lot. 

Even when there is plenty of space, the painted lines are perceived 

not as fixed limits but merely as suggestive points of departure.16

—A.I.S. Nusbacher

In a recent British Army Review article on “The Management of Chaos,” the author used a series of complex graphs and diagrams to espouse 

how the modern commander must be adept at managing chaos in all its 

guises on the battlefield.17 A study of the Israeli military character and their 

“grip” of chaos more vividly proves that in deep operations, commanders 

must expect, understand, and then capitalize upon chaos. Managing chaos 

is in short unachievable, but working within chaos and using it to one’s 

advantage is not. Consider the following experience from 1967:

Brigadier Ben-Ari relates an episode, which illustrates Israeli acceptance of chaos not in action against the enemy, but in using 

internal lines of communication. On the last day of the war, his 

10th Mechanized Brigade was ordered to move from the Central 
129

Front near Jericho to the Golan Heights. He was given 24 hours 

from the warning order to have his brigade in its new position, 

some 180 kilometers away. He called all the brigade drivers (some 

1,000 men) together and briefed them on the timing. He told them 

that between them and their goal there were only two roads. There 

were military police checkpoints, other units, and fuel dumps 

where logistics officers would expect signatures in return for supplies. He did not care how they made it to the Golan, he said, just 

so long as they were there by the next morning at 0400. Every 

vehicle in the brigade was at the rendezvous by 0400.18

Ben-Ari’s view is Clausewitzian in nature but reflects an understanding of the dynamics of movement on the battlefield, in his case even without the added complication of enemy interference. War to the Israelis was 

seen as a complex and at times inexplicable phenomenon that would place 

commanders and soldiers alike in situations unplanned for and diverse. 

Failure to do something in such a situation is tantamount to surrendering 

one’s destiny to the gods, in this case Mars and he is now on the other side. 

This “fog of war” is acting on both sides and only those comfortable with 

chaos are likely to endure, for attempting to manage it is not possible. The 

contra-argument that chaos is not solely peculiar to the deep battle is true, 

but consider the dynamics of a commander during deep maneuver. He is 

operating at the limits of surveillance and communications; his logistics 

will at best be extended and at worst cut for periods of time. Reconnaissance and familiarity with the ground will not be complete despite any 

advances in technology. As far as is humanly possible, Israeli commanders 

such as Ben-Aris and Tal have been able to operate and succeed in such 

conditions. Tal’s outlook on chaos was remembered by his 7 Armored Brigade commander already on his third war by 1967, “In war nothing goes 

according to plan, but there is one thing you must stick to: the major designation of the plan. Drum this into your men.”19

Major General Ariel Sharon 1973

Ask a group of staff college students for the name of a successful deep 

maneuver commander and United States General George S. Patton with 

his flamboyant dress, language, and style will almost inevitably emerge as 

an archetypal deep maneuver commander and consequently he too often 

clouds discussion on command attributes in such a situation.20 More often 

the reality is that successful deep maneuver commanders have been studious technicians such as Guderian and Von Runstedt who have understood 

the need to, “in the midst of emotional pressures, to juggle considerations 
130

such as the speed of tanks over various terrains, the availability of fuel, 

or the likelihood of the rendezvous coming off.”21 Major General Ariel 

Sharon sits as a complex character who combined an “almost implausible 

mixture of physical machismo and intellectual brilliance.”22 More Patton 

than Von Runstedt in terms of persona, his “physical machismo” and with 

it a proven willingness for ferocity in combat, emerged in the early years 

of the Israeli State. A fighter with the Haganah during the War of Independence, he continued combat against Egyptian troops and in one 1955 Gaza 

Strip operation killed 38 Egyptians. In June 1967, during the Six-Day Way, 

as a divisional commander, his success against the Egyptian Army played 

a key part in Israel’s capture of the entire peninsula.23 Intellectually, with a 

degree in oriental history, he chose to bring a professor in ancient history 

onto his Southern Command staff and remained scornful of his contemporaries whom he derided as, “suburbanites with degrees in economics.”24

Sharon was to spearhead the IDF’s offensive deep into Egypt with 

the aim of reversing Israeli fortunes in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Split 

between the Golan and the Sinai, the IDF on 11 October 1973 faced the 

unnerving reality that it was being drained at a rate, in terms of men and 

materiel, that it could not sustain, even with American re-supply. The double specter of a Russian resupply of SAM-6 missiles to its Arab dependents also threatened to shift the air war balance between the Egyptian 

and Syrian air defenders and the Israeli Mirage and Sky Hawk pilots. The 

normal default setting for Israeli commanders faced with such a military 

conundrum would be an unexpected and devastating deep maneuver, an 

option Sharon vociferously advocated. The IDF, however, did not simply 

have the combat power at this stage. By nightfall, a fierce battle to clear 

the last remaining Syrian positions at Khusniye and Kuneitra on the Golan 

was won not by guile, but by a costly frontal charge.25 The fortified piles 

of rubble were secured, and initial Syrian successes began to wane as they 

withdrew in disarray. With the Syrians now withdrawing and the Golan 

effectively secured, Sharon now had the conditions to cross the Suez Canal 

and decisively defeat the Egyptians. Operation Gazelle was authorized.26

Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal in Operation Gazelle and the ultimate defeat of the Egyptian Third Army has often been cited as an exemplary example of deep maneuver and its ability to shatter an enemy’s cohesion. One commentator hinted at “military genius.”27 The reality behind 

this myth is one of vicious combat and confusion, both self-induced and 

from the chaos of war. The Israeli plan, hopelessly optimistic, called for 

three divisions to cross at the tip of the Bitter Lakes and to decisively en-
131

circle the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in 48 hours. “Hopelessly optimistic,” for the Israelis wrongly assumed that the Egyptians had reverted 

to their 1967 competencies. Movement to the crossing site was initially 

held up in vicious fighting at Chinese Farm on the two roads leading to the 

site. Sharon later described this battle as, “it was as if a hand-to-hand battle 

of armor had taken place. . . . Coming close you could see Egyptian and 

Jewish dead lying side by side, soldiers who jumped from their burning 

tanks and had died side by side. No picture could capture the horror of the 

scene, none could encompass what had happened there.”28

The crossing itself proceeded with minimal opposition, but poor planning had the Ugda crossing in rafts in painfully slow fashion. Lack of 

Egyptian response, however, enabled a small foothold to be established, 

but no great armor reserve to break out. The initial foothold consisted of 

no more than 200 men, including Sharon. Meanwhile armored battles 

raged to the north and south of the crossing as the Ugda attempted to clear 

the route for heavy engineering plant. By daylight, the engineers began to 

establish the crossing site. The navigator of the lead barge, Sergeant Zvi, 

recounted, “there was a tank battle on both sides of the road and we were 

Ɣ

Cairo (40 miles)

N

Egypt

24 Oct

Ɣ

Ɣ

Rumani

XX

Sasson (-) X

X

XX

(-)

Operation Gazelle

18–23 October 1973

0 5 10 15 20 25 Miles

Quartara

Cease-fire Line

24 Oct

17 Oct

18 Oct

Ɣ

Ɣ

Ɣ

Ɣ

Mitla Pass

Bir Gifgafa

Tasa

Bir Gidy

X

XX

Sharon (-)

XX

Meron(-)

XX

Gavish (+)

XX

Adan

IsmailiaƔ

THIRD

XXXX

Suez

X

XX

Magan (-)

Isolated Egyptian

units operated

in this area.

Gulf of

Suez

Mediterranean Sea

Roads

Railroad

Elevation 610m

Elevation over 610m

Ɣ Port Said

Ɣ

Ɣ

Ɣ

Ɣ

Mitla Pass

Bir Gifgafa

Tasa

Bir Gidy

X

XX

Magan (-) XX

Meron(-)

XX

Gavish

(Arriving 26 Oct)

Cairo (40 miles)

Operation Gazelle

(Planned Exploitation

Sharon: Open corridor, establish bridgehead,

build bridges.

Adan: Pass through corridor and

bridgehead, exploit toward Suez.

Magan: Cross behind and support Adan.

N

Mediterranean Sea

Egypt

Roads

Railroad

Elevation 610m

Elevation over 610m

14 Oct

XX

Adan

Ɣ

Ɣ

Rumani

XX

Sasson (-)

(in bridgehead)

XX

Sharon

16(-)

XX XX

2

XX

Magan (-)

X

21

Ismailia Ɣ

XX

Adan

Operation Gazelle

15–17 October 1973

0 5 10 15 20 25 Miles

Quartara

Suez

14 Oct

Great

Bitter

Lake

Gulf of

Suez

X XX

Sharon

Port Said

Figure 7.2. Operation Gazelle, 15–23 October 1973. Maps created by Army 

University Press. 
132

going down the middle. It was a battle for the junction and the junction 

was in their sights and they hit every vehicle that went through there. We 

were a slow convoy, very easy to hit. . . . There were a few hits . . . a few 

holes. With dawn, we got to the crossing area.”29

By 0800, 30 tanks had made it across on rafts. The Egyptian Second 

Army in the northern area of the crossing responded by launching a battalion counterattack, which was defeated by the small bridgehead force. 

This piecemeal attack was to characterize Egyptian operations over the 

next few days, with a succession of uncoordinated attacks lacking mass 

and the necessary combat power to destroy the Israeli forces. They did, 

however, succeed in negating an Israeli move north to interdict Second 

Army’s supply lines. Focus for the Israeli advance switched consequently 

south toward Suez. From 19 to 23 October, General Adnan passed through 

Sharon’s bridgehead and exploited south to Suez, not at the 200-kilometer-per-day rate of the 1967 war, but at a more pedestrian 20 kilometers per 

day.30 The constriction of Third Army in the south was only complete by 

24 October after heavy fighting and a breaking by both sides of a ceasefire 

initiated on the 22nd.

Whatever the reality of Sharon’s operation, the effect must be remembered. The crossing and deep penetration to isolate the Egyptian Third 

Army effectively ended the war for Egypt, and the annihilation of this 

Army was only prevented by the timely second ceasefire on the 24th. Sharon, true to his character, had from the outset pushed for a rapid penetration across the canal into “Africa.” Cooler heads in the shape of General 

Gonen, the Southern Front Commander, resisted Sharon’s protestations. 

Their viewpoints were never reconciled and at one point in a volcanic 

radio conversation Sharon shouted at Gonen, “if you had any balls, I’d tell 

you to cut them off and eat them.”31 Sharon’s perspective on the strategic 

dilemma facing Israel was that conserving resources in the Sinai until the 

Golan had been recaptured only gave time and space for the Egyptians 

to consolidate, making it more difficult for them to be destroyed later. A 

decisive early move would stifle Egyptian initiative, albeit the carefully 

choreographed Egyptian initiative.

When one looks at Sharon’s character, it is easy to see the attributes 

of dash, vigor, and decisiveness married to a willingness to take risks. 

However, as a man of clear intellectual capability, his concept and execution for the Operation Gazelle crossings were remarkably flawed in 

their lack of coordination and detail. Here is the dichotomy for the deep 

maneuver commander when honing his command and leadership skills. 

In many ways he must have the confidence and imagination coupled to a 
133

ruthless determination to prosecute a bold plan, taking risks when his staff 

and subordinates may openly disagree with his methods. Ideally this drive 

must be harnessed to an acute understanding of the details of their trade if 

the confusion at Chinese Farm and on the Suez crossing are to be avoided. 

Risk is applicable to all military operations, not solely deep maneuver, but 

commanders must identify these risks and through forethought and planning ensure they remain understood risks and not gambles. General Ariel 

Sharon was guilty of gambling, not risk management, but remained lucky 

enough to win his gamble in October 1973.

Israeli Deep Maneuver

Unique geopolitical circumstances make the Israelis’ adoption of 

deep maneuver understandable. A narrow country with a small population 

means only quick victory on its adversaries’ soil could negate the disastrous effect any war would have on the people and economy of the country. 

When additionally coupled to their ebullient character against that of their 

neighbors, it reveals why they chose not to develop a “fortress Israel” 

mentality and became masters of deep maneuver. As a “textbook” example of a breakthrough battle, General Tal’s actions with his Ugda on the 

night of 5 and 6 June 1967 are exemplary. His ruthless pursuit of his aim, 

or objective in US doctrine, enabled a massive deep penetration by the 

balance of Israeli forces. By not allowing himself to become embroiled 

in a deliberate battle of destruction, he effectively “drove through” the 

Egyptian positions and ensured his subordinates continued to move west 

instead of dwelling on the destruction of the enemy.32

For the deep maneuver commander, an understanding of the dynamics 

and pitfalls of such a battle are crucial and Tal’s lessons are self-evident. 

Keep focused on the end state, ensure your subordinates are of the same 

mind, and maintain momentum at all costs to prevent your enemy consolidating and thereby stifling your breakthrough. That the night of 5 and 6 

June 1967 was chaotic would be to naively understate the ferocity of the 

fighting, but such a situation suited not only the character of the Israelis, 

but also their spirit. The willingness of commanders, at all levels, to endure this chaos and to capitalize upon its effect is a crucial style for a deep 

maneuver commander to adopt. By its very nature he will find himself in 

a part of the battlespace that in terms of his understanding is not complete 

and will be chaotic. Knowing and understanding the dynamics of chaos on 

the battlefield, and most importantly, not being overawed by such effects 

is a facet of command the Israelis understood and is critical for a deep 

maneuver commander. 
134

General Ariel Sharon offers a complex character for study, and many 

writers have drawn differing conclusions from his actions as a divisional commander in October 1973. These conclusions range from genius to 

“military dementia.”33 By combining his clear drive and tenacity with a 

willingness to take risks, one sees a style that espoused, “To hell with the 

bridgehead, the important thing is to get behind the Egyptian lines.”34 His 

contempt for detail and planning nearly derailed Operation Gazelle and 

without the “help” of Egyptian ineptitude, he almost certainly would have 

failed, with disastrous results for the Israeli state. The characteristics of a 

deep maneuver commander if one draws from good and bad Israeli lessons 

should ideally be one of risk-taking and drive balanced with a keen eye for 

detail and the realities of the situation. General Ariel Sharon had more than 

enough of the former, but often scant regard for the latter.

If the Israeli lessons of 1967 and 1973 epitomized the “Apogee of 

Blitzkrieg,” they also served as a model for the development of US AirLand Battle doctrine. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 saw that this 

doctrine was never to be tested in the theatre intended, but was to be used 

during the 1990 and 1991 Gulf War.

Conclusion

In a central irony, the Israeli Defense Force in their wars of 1967 and 

1973 demonstrated their adaptation and mastery of Blitzkrieg resulting in 

deep maneuver with the aim of winning quickly, while transferring the 

fight onto Arab territory—two aims that reflect Israel’s precarious geo-political situation. 

Savage armored fighting by General Israel Tal’s Ugda on the night of 

5–6 June 1967 created the conditions for the rapid deep maneuver across 

the Sinai so devastating in the Six-Day War. His battle is exemplary in 

showing that in executing deep maneuver, an assailable flank may not be 

available and commanders may have to fight to create the conditions to unleash deep maneuver. His, and his subordinates’, maintenance of their aim 

ensured that in a chaotic night battle, they persevered. Comfort with chaos 

is a character trait that emerged from study of Israeli command style. Deep 

maneuver commanders, above all others, must be comfortable with operating in a confused and changing environment as they fight to the limit of 

communications and surveillance assets, no matter their modernity.

General Ariel Sharon offered an interesting study on the ideal command style for the deep maneuver commander. Bold, aggressive, and fearsomely intelligent, he nonetheless displayed rashness and lack of attention to detail that could so easily have ended in failure as he crossed the 
135

Suez Canal into Egyptian rear areas on 15 October 1973. Only piecemeal 

Egyptian attacks prevented his weak bridgehead, designed to enable deep 

maneuver, from being destroyed. His actions and decisions—along with 

consideration of other commanders in the guise of Guderian, Rommel, and 

Napoleon—demonstrated an ideal command style that encompassed not 

only aggression and audacity, but also deep analytical thought. It is only 

through such thought an initial gamble can turn into a viable plan through 

the identification and mitigation of risk. Sharon continued to press a gamble in October 1973 and never mitigated the risks presented.
136

Notes

1. This chapter is an excerpt from “Deep Maneuver: Past Lessons Identified for Future Bold Commanders,” a Military Art and Science thesis, US Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003. Martin Van 

Creveld, The Sword and the Olive (New York: Public Affairs, 1988), 179.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 1-76.

3. A.I.S. Nusbacher, Sweet Irony: German Origins of Israeli Defence 

Forces’ Manoeuvre warfare Doctrine with Particular Reference to Israeli Land 

operations on the Golan Heights, 1973 (Ontario: War Studies Program Royal 

Military College of Canada, 1983), 43.

4. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957), 385. 

5. David Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: an Introductory 

Overview,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, September 2001, 2.

6. Combined totals for Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria are 116 million against 

6 million Israelis. Source: CIA Fact Book 2002, accessed 6 May 2018, https://

www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2002/index.html.

7. Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” 4.

8. Ugda is an Israeli Division. In reality there are no standing Israeli divisions so an Ugda is best described as a formation bigger than a brigade.

9. Shabtai Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz (New York: Viking Press, 1969), 155.

10. From its initial foundations as a Jewish underground terrorist and civil 

defense organization, The Haganah evolved into the IDF in 1948 at the direction 

of David Ben-Gurion, http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/haganah.html.

11. Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz, 69.

12. General Tal’s Ugda consisted of the 7 Romani Armored Brigade. The 

unit was probably the best armored brigade in the IDF and commanded by 

a disciplinarian, Colonel Shmual Gonen. The 7 Brigade was a conventional 

armored brigade of two armored battalions, a mechanized infantry battalion, 

and a reconnaissance company. One further armored brigade commanded by 

Colonel Menachim Aviram (composition as for 7 Brigade) and a scratch brigade 

commanded by Colonel Raphoul Eytan (consisting of an armored battalion and 

a parachute battalion) hurriedly issued armored personnel carriers in the week 

preceding the war.

13. A battle group is a task-organized battalion normally based upon either 

an armored or infantry battalion. Equates to a task force in the US Army.

14. Objective. The first US principle of war, Department of the Army, Field 

Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington DC, July 2001), 2-3.

15. Russian for complete mess.

16. Nusbacher, Sweet Irony, 41.

17. British Army Review (BAR) published every Autumn models itself as 

the “magazine of British military thought.” Whilst paid for by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, the editor enjoys considerable latitude.

18. Nusbacher, Sweet Irony, 39.
137

19. Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz, 126.

20. Test was conducted by the author on the 14 people in his December 

2002 US Command and General Staff College Staff group. Whilst not exhaustive, it was nonetheless illuminating. Napoleon also emerged high on every 

student’s list.

21. Insight Team of The London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New 

York: Doubleday and Company, 1974), 324.

22. Insight Team, 324.

23. BBC News Profile on Ariel Sharon, 1 January 2014, accessed 6 May 

2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11746593.

24. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 326.

25. Insight Team, 239.

26. Speculation has been made that in concert with tactical victories such 

as Khusniye and Kuneitra, the Israelis may have rattled their nuclear saber to 

precipitate a Syrian withdrawal from the Sinai. Van Creveld, The Sword and the 

Olive, 280.

27. Van Creveld, 337.

28. Dr. George W. Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross 

of Decisive Victory (Leavenworth Papers No 21, US Army Center of Military 

History, 1996), 62.

29. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 334.

30. Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 68.

31. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 337.

32. Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 187.

33. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 337.

34. Insight Team, 337.
138
139

Chapter 8

Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation that Started 

Operation Desert Storm

Colonel Paul E. Berg and Kenneth E. Tilley

Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted 

or out of contact enemy maneuver forces from being committed in 

a coherent manner or preventing enemy enabling capabilities, such 

as fires and air defense, from creating effects in the close area.1

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

“One of the smallest yet most successful and important Joint-Army-Air 

Force operations in the initial strikes in Operation Desert Storm was Task 

Force Normandy.”2 During the opening hours in the Iraqi desert on 17 January 1991, Task Force Normandy consisted of eight Army AH-64 Apache helicopters working with four Air Force MH-53J Pave Low helicopters were 

on a mission to destroy two Iraqi early warning (EW) radar sites with the 

purpose to blind Iraqi air defense and open a 20-mile wide air corridor in the 

opening minutes of the air campaign.3

 The task force operation was named 

Normandy after the site of the 101st Airborne Division’s famous airborne 

insertion on D-Day during World War II.4

 This operation created an unobstructed pathway for a plethora of fast moving Navy and Air Force bombers 

to fly deep into Iraq and destroy key targets to start Operation Desert Storm. 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Shield were the largest combat operations 

in US military history since the Vietnam War.5

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered his Army to invade and occupy 

their neighbor border country of Kuwait in early August 1990 with approximately 300,000 troops, because he accused Kuwait of “siphoning 

crude oil from common border oil fields and accused them of keeping oil 

prices low to assist Western oil-buying nations” in addition claimed “Kuwait was an artificial state carved out of Iraqi coast by Western colonies.”6

General Norman Schwarzkopf was Commander-in-Chief of United States 

Central Command (CENTCOM) and led the United Nations and US first 

phase response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by establishing a deterrent defensive force to prevent the Iraqi Army from continuing into Saudi Arabia. 

This defensive posture also established valuable time for the UN and US 

militaries to build up more forces to mount a major offensive to forcefully 

remove Saddam’s forces if he did not withdraw his forces from Kuwait. 

The name given to the initial defensive operation was Operation Desert 
140

Shield.7 Hussein defied United Nations Security Council demands to withdraw from Kuwait by mid-January 1991.

Mission Analysis

As UN and US forces were establishing Operation Desert Shield, the 

Iraqi Army’s immediate threat into Saudi Arabia declined. This opportunity allowed an initial planning cell from the US Air Force’s 20th Special 

Operations Squadron (20 SOS) to start planning an air campaign, with a 

an essential task of penetrating Iraq’s air defenses and allow freedom of 

maneuver for UN and US aircraft to conduct deep operations into Iraq to 

reduce risk management to crews.8

 The 20 SOS was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (USAF) Rich Comer from 1st Special Operations Wing 

(SOW) at Hurlbert Field, Florida, and consisted of multiple MH-53J Pave 

Lows helicopters in Saudi Arabia to provide area coverage—their primary 

mission for search and rescue operations.9

The Iraqi defense system consisted of French and Soviet air defense 

equipment. The Iraqis had built an integrated air defense system that included medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and shortrange anti-aircraft artillery pieces. The multi-layered defense system established overlapping coverage against high fixed-wing aircraft and low 

rotary wing aircraft. The Iraqis were only able to establish this defense 

system through powerful EW radars that provided essential enemy air 

threat critical information regarding size, direction of attack, and speed 

axis of any enemy force.10 The Iraqi security operations centers (SOC) 

would receive the early warning information and determine what air defense asset to use to maximize effects. If a task force could destroy several 

EW sites, that effort could cripple SOC’s capability to integrate air defense 

system against enemy air. The tactical challenge was that the SOC’s were 

usually deep inside Iraq and well defended, and to minimize causalities 

during any future air campaign, a military operation must take out the eyes 

and ears of the Iraqi air defense system.11

The new arrival of global positioning system (GPS) technology played 

a pivotal role in the mission analysis. GPS technology started in 1980s with 

a global network of GPS satellites launched into space orbit.12 The new 

network of GPS technology allowed accuracy up to 100 meters in Southwest Asia 24 hours a day with the aircraft that were GPS-enabled. This 

technological navigational advantage gave certain aircraft (mainly special 

operations aircraft like the MH-53J Pave Lows) an unparalleled precision 

of navigation during day, night, and instrument weather conditions.13
141

Colonel Jessie Johnson, Commander of US Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), initially had Colonel (USAF) George Gray,

Commander of the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW), and his staff planners target on two Iraqi EW radar sites that were positioned in the proposed air attack corridor, but total simultaneous destruction of these sites 

was critical to mission success. These EW sites had to be destroyed at the 

same time to prevent any warning or alert to the larger Iraqi air defense 

systems. Due to the overlapping of EW coverage, destroying only one EW 

Figure 8.1. 17 January 1991 AH-64 Apache Attack on Radar Sites inside the 

Iraqi border. This opening Deep Attack kicked off Operation Desert Storm. Map 

created by Army University Press.

R

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Iran

Iraq

Kuwait

Turkey

Persian Gulf

•

Al Farah

H1

K2

Diyarbakir

Urfa

Wasit

Ninevah

Al Anbar

An Najaf

Muthanna

Kirkuk

Diyala

Babil

Dahuk

Salah Ad Din

Mosu Irbil l

Irbil

Kirkuk

Tikrit

Balad

Baqubah Ar Ramadi

Al Asad

Al Qaim

N

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

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Al Sahra •

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•

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H2

Mudaysis

Ad Diwaniyah

As Salman

• Jalibah

Ar Ar

Rafha

Hafar Al Batin

Ras Al Khafji

Ras Al Mishab

Al Jouf

Ar Rutbah

Kuwait City

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Umm Qasr

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Naisiriyah

Karbala Al Kut

As Samawan •

Karbala

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Al Basrah

Al

Qadisiyah

Maysan

H3

Dhi Qar

Tallil

Ar Rumayfah•

Corvette 3

Baghdad Stamford 01

Quicksand 12

Clap 74 Sunliner 403

Slate 46

Stroke 65

Newport 15

Norwich 02

Norwich 21

Tbird 56

Basrah

Caesar 44

Jackal 11

Wolf 01

Bergan 23

Hostage 75

Ah-64 Apache Attack

on Iraqi Radar Sites

0238 17 January 1991 0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles

Known Radar SAM Coverage (pre-Desert Storm)

Airfields

Ah-64A Apache Helicopters

Task Force Normandy Targets

Airstrikes

Red Team

White Team

Targets of

Task Force

Normandy
142

site would still leave enough capability to threaten future attacking air 

forces.14 During this timeframe of planning, intelligence assets had identified that the Iraqis tactically moved the three radar sites 20, 27, and 40 

miles, respectively, further back into Iraq and hardened the sites.15

During initial mission planning using only the MH-53Js because of 

their enabled GPS navigation, the helicopters could attack the two EW sites 

with their 50-caliber machine guns. Colonel Johnson briefed this initial 

plan to General Schwarzkopf, who only approved the concept for further 

planning. However, Lieutenant Colonel Comer was not convinced of success of this initial plan, because he believed “that the 50-caliber machine 

guns would not be powerful enough to satisfactorily destroy the sites.”16

In addition, the 3d Battalion, 160th Special Operation Aviation Regiment 

(SOAR) contacted Colonel George Gray and recommended Army MH60s armed with 2.75-inch rockets and 7.62-mm mini-guns would be better 

for the mission accomplishment than then the Pave Lows. Colonel Gray 

and Lieutenant Colonel Comer “rejected that proposal believing that, in 

reality, the Army special operations aviators were just looking for a way to 

block the Pave Low guys from being in the mission.”17

The initial planners recommended three course of actions (COA) to 

achieve the objective: COA #1 was to insert special operation forces on 

the ground; COA #2 was to have Air Force Pave Low helicopters attack 

and destroy the EW sites only using their .50-caliber machine guns; and 

COA #3 used cruise missiles.18 Each of the COAs involved a certain high 

risk and mission failure that something might survive or be missed. The 

planners all agreed that the use of helicopters was the best option “because 

their pilots could loiter on station, assess damage, and reengage targets until they were sure nothing was left.”19 The helicopter was the best answer 

to destroy the objective, assess damage, re-engage, and provide a rescue 

option for any downed aircraft scenarios; however, which ones, what type, 

and how many was the next step.

The best aircraft for navigation would be the Pave Lows, but the most 

accurate helicopter to destroy the EW sites was determined to be the AH-64 

Apache helicopter. The AH-64 Apache helicopter was a new attack platform that was the replacement for the US Army’s Vietnam era AH-1 Cobra 

helicopter. Lieutenant Colonel Comer further discussed the mission and 

also highly recommended the mission include Army AH-64s with Hellfire 

missiles, Hydra-70 rockets, and 30-mm machine guns to do the job. The 

AH-64 Apache could carry a mix of weapons that could assure destruction 

of both hard and soft targets. The Apaches did not have GPS navigation 

capability like the Pave Lows, and flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE) in the 
143

desert and night was high-risk. The key for mission success was destroying 

two Iraqi EW sites simultaneously attacking both sites at the same determined time. This scenario required two aircraft teams to maintain arrival at 

night at the objective on time, which the Apaches were unable to do alone 

with its navigational capabilities. The Apaches needed assistance in precision navigation to get to the objective on time where they would have the 

ability to do what they did best by destroying the objective.20

As the plan was maturing to a Pave Low and Apache mix, CENTCOM 

intelligence reported three Iraqi EW sites had consolidated into two sites 

and moved 10 miles closer to the border.21 The result was a hybrid option 

using Pave Lows with Apaches; the Pave Lows’ onboard GPS assured precise navigation, while their terrain-following radar could provide the safety for the Apaches to maintain precise speed along the route. The planners 

took their modified plan of Pave Low and Apache mix to Colonel Johnson 

at SOCCENT. Colonel Johnson updated General Schwarzkopf, who then 

approved the use of Apaches from the 101st Airborne Division and cleared 

them collectively to start training.22

On 25 September 1990, Colonel Johnson called in Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Cody, Commander of the 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation 

Brigade, to discuss the mission capability and assurance of success and 

who were also co-located at King Fahd Airport.23 After the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Comer met with Lieutenant Colonel Cody, and they began 

planning the mission in detail not knowing when the D-Day (day of the 

operation) or H-hour (designated hour of the attack) was expected to be. 

The Task Force was officially called Task Force Normandy.24

The mission concept was that the Pave Low helicopters were going to 

lead and navigate using their GPS technology and terrain-following radar 

and the Apaches would follow to the release point then move on to the 

objectives. The Pave Lows would also be available to search and rescue 

any Apache crewmen should any aircraft get shot down.25

The identified immediate challenges of this package of Joint aircraft 

were the Apaches’ fuel load constraint. With a full weapons load (Hellfires, rockets, and 30-mm), the Apaches could barely fly the mission with 

internal fuel and would have no margin for error if needed to avoid unexpected threats or bad weather. A crewmember flight engineer Tech Sergeant (USAF) Jeff Morrison recommended one option that “a Pave Low 

could ground transfer fuel from its tanks to the affected Apache and also 

could assure the necessary equipment was aboard each Pave Low.”26 An 

additional option was to establish a forward arming and refueling point 
144

(FARP) inside Iraq; this was quickly abandoned because of its complexities and fears from Desert One (a failed 1980 Joint aviation mission in 

Iran that resulted in two destroyed aircraft and killed eight crewmen). The 

approved recommendation was to use an external fuel tank that replaced 

one 2.75” rocket pod.27 

Another challenge was how to identify the release point; some of the 

best solutions came from enlisted crewmembers. One of the Pave Low 

gunners recommended that “they lead the Apaches to a pre-designated position (release point) and then mark it with chemical night lights.”28 The 

Apache pilots could identify the chemical sticks position and update their 

Doppler systems for the final run into their targets.

There would be two flights of aircraft to destroy the EW sites. Each 

flight (Red Team and White Team) would consist of two MH-53s that would 

lead and navigate four Apaches each to the site and also provide combat recovery support. Lieutenant Colonel Cody selected his aircrews in December 

to conduct the mission into two teams of four Apaches.29 Lieutenant Colonel 

Cody had 24 Apache crews and picked only eight but commented any of the 

24 could have completed the mission; crews averaged 26-years-old and include three warrant officers out of flight school. Lieutenant Colonel Comer 

would lead the Red Team to the western radar site and Lieutenant Colonel 

Cody would lead the White Team to the other radar site.30

Through the next three months in the fall of 1990, they would train 

in the Saudi Arabian desert for the mission. The Apaches received permission to only six Hellfire live-fire ranges in the Saudi desert. The crews 

on the mission were not briefed on specific targets or locations until two 

days before execution; also there would be one trained spare AH-64 and 

one UH-60 with four mechanics trained available on standby if needed.31

The White Team consisted of 20th Pave Low crews of Captain Michael 

Kingsley and Major Robert Leonik and Apache crews of Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody, Chief Warrant Officer 2 William Stewmom, Lieutenant 

Tom Drew, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Tim Zarnowski, Chief Warrant Officer 

3 Ronald Rodriguez, Chief Warrant Officer 2 David Miller, Chief Warrant 

Officer 3 David Jones, and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Thomas O’Neill. 32

The Red Team consisted of 20th Pave Low crews of Captain Corby 

Martin and Major Ben Pulsifer, and the Apache crews consisted of 

Captain Newman Shufflebarger, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Tom Roderick, 

Warrant Officer 1 Tim Vincent, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Shawn Hoban, 

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Lewis Hall, and Warrant Officer 1 Jerry Orsburn. 
145

The spare Apache consisted of Lieutenant Tim Devito and Chief Warrant 

Officer 2 Mark Ivey. 33 

The maintenance crew aircraft selected in a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter were Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terry Seanor and Captain David Parker, along with intelligence officer Lieutenant Russ Stinger, mechanics Staff 

Sergeant Robert Sparks and Staff Sergeant John Frady.34 Their mission 

would be to conduct downed aircraft recovery duties if an aircraft crashed 

or was shot down.

Challenges of Joint Operations

Joint operations always come with longstanding challenges in bringing multi-service agencies together to work as a team. The Apache and 

Pave Low crews had never worked with each other before this mission, 

and each aircraft had different service troop, training, and procedures 

(TTPs). In addition, between inter-service aircrews there was a natural 

and mutual mistrust within the aviation community. Additional differences in equipment were that the Apaches operated at night using infrared 

and needed no ambient light while Pave Lows used night vision goggles 

(NVG), which required some ambient light; each aircraft had to find ways 

to accommodate the equipment differences.35

Operational security (OPSEC) of the future Task Force Normandy 

mission was of critical concern to assure covert training specifics and 

avoid any suspicion. The Army and Air Force crews were not informed 

of the details or the exact target until hours before the mission. Both Lieutenant Colonel Cody and Lieutenant Colonel Comer conducted all training 

almost 700 miles away from the actual objective; the crews never practiced the actual route; the movements to the actual operational base was 

classified; the Air Force and army crews planned to fly separately to the 

staging base at King Khalid Military City.36

As each aircraft type were conducting successful training flights in the 

fall independently, the pressure from Joint Special Operations Command 

(JSOC) and CENTCOM on the decision of the Apache to complete the 

mission over other aircraft had to overcome doubt by the staff, because 

this was the first time the AH-64 Apache were in combat and had not been 

fully tested. One of the final training scenarios from higher to confirm 

the choice of the Apache was tasked to fly a 1,000-mile specified route 

at night, arrive at a gunnery range undetected and blow up some targets 

at a precise time down to the exact second. Lieutenant Colonel Cody and 

his selected crews performed, unaware CENTCOM staff was present. The 

1-101st battalion operations officer (S3) was in the range tower with the 
146

CENTCOM staff and with 15 seconds to go, no one in the tower could 

see or hear the Apaches in the darkness as they were passing the tower; 

a CENTCOM staff officer asked the S3 where the Apaches were; within 

three seconds to go the S3 said, “I guess they are not going to make it?” 

and instantly the area around the tower lit up as all four Apaches fired at 

the exact designated time.37 That demonstration clinched the decision: if 

the Apaches could sneak that close to the people who knew they were 

coming and were looking for them, then they had the stealth for the real 

mission. All doubts were erased that the Apache could do the mission.

After three months of training, Colonel Johnson personally briefed 

General Schwarzkopf in late October “that Task Force Normandy was 

ready to execute its mission to destroy two Iraqi EW sites . . . and Colonel 

Johnson assured him that the mission would be 100 percent successful;” 

then Schwarzkopf replied, “Okay, Colonel, then you get to start the war.”38

The date of the mission was still undetermined and would be decided by 

President George H.W. Bush.

The week before Christmas 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, General Colin Powell, and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), 

Honorable Dick Cheney, flew to Riyadh to review the CENTCOM war 

plans personally. As General Schwarzkopf was briefing the Task Force 

Normandy mission to the SECDEF, he brought in Colonel Johnson and 

Colonel Gray and pointedly asked if they could guarantee 100-percent 

success; both answered yes.39

Task Force Normandy held a final rehearsal on 10 January 1991 and it 

went as planned and flawless which involved actual timing and distances 

to identify any errors. Lieutenant Colonel Comer said “We were eager for 

the mission to fly . . . not since Desert One in Iran had special operations 

helicopters been given a better chance for a good mission.”40 On 14 January, the Apaches and Pave Lows departed separately to Al Jouf, which was 

a Joint airfield about 130 miles south of the Iraqi border.

During the final exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Comer spoke with Joint 

Special Operations Command’s (JSOC) air component commander and 

noticed that Lieutenant Colonel Doug Brown, the commander of the 1st 

Battalion of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) did 

his best to insure that the aviation unit of choice for the upcoming mission 

was his unit and not the 20th SOS. Lieutenant Colonel Comer identified 

the differences in capabilities between the aircraft types to JSOC and almost lost the mission due to preference to Brown’s unit, but in the end, 

Comer kept the mission.41
147

On the afternoon of 16 January 1991, all last-minute diplomatic UN 

and Allies’ efforts to avert any future combat failed as the United Nation’s 

January deadline to Saddam Hussein came and went. President Bush secretly declared D-Day, the start of the air war against Iraq, as 17 January 

1991, and the entire world held its breath in anticipation of the war.42 To 

set the conditions for the war and open an air corridor for bombers and 

fighters, General Schwarzkopf approved the Task Force Normandy mission to destroy two early-warning radar stations on early morning of 17 

January 1991. CENTCOM notified all of its forces that the war would start 

the next morning at 0300.43

At 2130, Lieutenant Colonel Comer and Cody held a final mission update brief for all the Apache and Pave Low crews. The crews were highly 

professional and had been well trained and knew the significance of their 

mission to the future large-scale combat operations that were going to happen next. At 2330, crews began pre-flight checklists and at midnight they 

started engines.44

Mission Execution

Because their flight times required different departures, the “White 

Team” Apaches left first from Al Jouf Airfield at 0100; the first “White” 

Pave Low lifted at 0113. The “White Team” Pave Lows linked with their 

Apaches to fly the eastern target now designated “California.” The Red 

team led seven minutes later and crews joined their four Apaches en route 

for the western target designated “Nevada.”45 Lieutenant Colonel Comer 

flew as a copilot in Red Team in a Pave Low and maintained communications with Colonel Gray and Colonel Johnson at SOCCENT command 

center. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody was a copilot with White Team in 

an Apache. There were also two MH-60’s for combat rescue support (55th 

SOS), one UH-60 with Apache mechanics, and one spare Apache if needed up in orbit north of Arar.46

The Red and White Teams avoided any ground lighting to preserve 

operational security. The Red Team encountered an unexpected observation post that was extremely brightly lit, which required them to divert 

the route slightly and noticed small arms fire that had no effect. When 

the White Team neared the border, they drew a missile fired by an Iraqi 

assumed by the response to the sounds of the helicopters.47 At 0212, Task 

Force Normandy crossed into Iraq, varying their flight paths to avoid 

known or suspected enemy observation posts or Bedouin locations. The 

western target was 13 miles farther; the eastern target, 23 miles.48
148

Both teams flew in radio silence and crossed the border at 120 knots 

at an altitude of 75 feet and from 40 kilometers out, crews could make out 

lights near the objective.49 The Iraqis had left the lights on at the objective. 

The flight slowed to 80 knots and descended to 50 feet as they approached 

the release point. Two minutes later, the Pave Lows slowed to a hover and 

dropped green chemical stick to the ground to mark release point and then 

turned south. As the Pave Lows departed south and went into a holding 

pattern—ready to provide combat search and rescue (CSAR) or extra firing power if needed—the Apaches slowly passed over the chemical lights 

and updated their Doppler navigational systems for the final 10-mile run to 

their individual targets. Task Force Normandy arrived into firing position 

exactly 90 seconds early.50 Lieutenant Colonel Cody commented that, “the 

waiting after they were already in Iraq made him old before his time.”51

The Apaches achieved complete surprise on the Iraqi EW sites. The 

Apache crews also saw enemy troops around the structures. Suddenly, the 

lights began to go off and one of the pilots commented, “I think they know 

we are here” as the Apache crews turned on their ranging lasers.52 The radars were turned up looking for fixed winged aircraft, not expecting slow 

moving helicopters. At exactly 0237:50, White Team Apache pilot 2nd 

Lieutenant Tom Drew keyed his radio and broadcast, “Party in 10” and 

Red Team broadcast “Joy.”53 Precisely 10 seconds later, all crews began 

firing their Hellfire missiles. Twenty seconds later, the deadly weapons 

began to detonate against the structures. The generators were first, then 

the command bunkers, and finally, the radar dishes themselves. By hitting power sources first, the pilots would silence the radar site before it 

could alert the Iraqi central control headquarters in Baghdad.54 The enemy 

soldiers died in the melee. The intelligence-gathering aircraft high above 

monitored the sites and noted that all radar signals immediately ceased. 

Each of the Apaches had a primary target, along with another Apache’s 

primary as a secondary target. Cody arranged primary and secondary targets to assure every piece of the EW site had redundant hits.55 The intent 

was to assure that nothing could be easily repaired. After all Hellfires were 

expended, the Apaches moved to 4 kilometers and started firing Multipurpose Sub-Munitions (MPSM) rockets and at 2 kilometers from the sites, 

they opened up with their 30-mm chain guns and riddled what remained 

of the compounds with every bullet they had.56 In addition some of the 

rockets fired were flechettes to tear up wires and cables connecting parts 

of the site; nothing would be repairable, the whole attack, from first to 

last shot took only a few minutes. Within four minutes, the radar sites and 

their bunkers were completely destroyed with full mission accomplish-
149

ment, then Task Force Normandy turned for home. Cody transmitted “California A-A-A” to Comer, who then relayed the message to CENTCOM 

that the White Team target had been 100-percent destroyed and with no 

casualities.57 Comer reported “Nebraska A-A-A” to CENTCOM to signal 

the Red Team had 100-percent destruction of their site and no casualties. 58

Task Force Normandy created a 40-kilometer corridor for Allied aircraft to 

begin Desert Storm’s air operations. The sites were completely destroyed 

and would not reactivate during the war.59

The radar facilities were destroyed 22 minutes before H-Hour (termed 

H-22), a timing that was based on the estimated time that the Iraqis’ radar 

network could detect the “strike force” as it moved toward the border. The 

hole in the Iraqis’ defense system reduced their ability to detect, identify, 

and respond to the Coalition attack.60

The Apaches had expended 27 Hellfire missiles, 100 Hydra-70 rockets, and 4,000 rounds of 30-mm cannon fire. They turned south, rejoined 

with the Pave Lows, and headed home. En route, crews observed what appeared to be the launch of two SA-7 missiles. Utilizing onboard defensive 

systems and some aggressive maneuvering, the crews managed to escape 

them. Outbound, Lieutenant Colonel Comer radioed a code-word message 

to SOCCENT headquarters reporting their complete success: “SOF targets 

destroyed.”61 Colonel Johnson personally reported the results to General 

Schwarzkopf’s command center. “Thank God!” the general responded.62

As the Task Force Normandy helicopters flew out of Iraq, strike aircraft roared toward Baghdad; at the Saudi border. The last danger for the 

aircraft was the need to stay low to the ground and not rise above 100 feet 

as the largest air armada since Vietnam raced toward Baghdad. A coalition 

of US and Allied aircraft began crossing Iraqi airspace which included the 

F-117 stealth fighter’s first mission in combat and joined the attack along 

with dozens of F-15s and F-111s. British Toronado fighters along with 

Saudi and Kuwaiti F-15s also joined in the attack on Iraqi targets. The 

lights were so numerous in the total blackness that Lieutenant Colonel 

Comer called the formation aluminum overcast. After crossing the border, 

the Pave Lows disappeared to resume CSAR duties, the Apaches returned 

to their original base. The Apaches from the 1-101st had rejoined the 101st 

Airborne Division at Camp Eagle and landed at 1600.63

The Pave Low and Apache combination worked as planned and the 

training had fully paid off. The returning aircraft could see in the clear night 

air above the multiple formations of US and Allied fixed-winged aircraft 

heading for the radar gap. The pilots remembered how “you could look off 
150

to the south, and there were blinkers lined up . . . you could see a long way 

on goggles . . . there were anti-collision lights lined up; it looked like an LA 

freeway . . . then, all of a sudden, there were no more lights as each aircraft 

turned off their lights to enter Iraqi airspace.”64 One F-15E fighter pilot 

wrote a thank-you letter to the crews of Task Force Normandy that said, 

“During our [flight intelligence] brief, we noticed our route of flight took us 

right over an active [radar] site. . . . We were told not to worry about it . . . 

We saw the explosions and your helicopters in our FLIR [forward-looking 

infrared radiometer] as we flew over you; there was immense relief.”65

Operation Desert Storm in Effect

The shift noncommissioned officer on duty at the 101st Airborne Division main command post at Camp Eagle, King Fahd International Airport, 

Saudi Arabia, received a phone call just before 0200 on the 17th of January 

from the XVIII Airborne Corps G-3 staff informing him that the US Navy 

had launched 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles toward Iraqi targets at 0152 

and passed a verbal order from ARCENT that stated “Operation Desert 

Storm is in effect.”66 With this order, more than five months of training in the 

Saudi desert had come to a conclusion. The defense of Saudi Arabia from 

Iraqi aggression, Operation Desert Shield, had been mission accomplished, 

and the 101st Airborne Division immediately began implementing its role 

in the Liberation of Kuwait and the start of Operation Desert Storm.67

At 0635 on 16 January, seven B-52 bombers launched from Barksdale 

Air Force Base, Louisiana, to be a participant in the first wave of aircraft 

bombers in Operation Desert Storm. These B-52’s and others from the 

continental US had flown a 35-hour, 14,000-mile combat mission—which 

would be the longest air combat mission in history.68 The strategic air campaign was now in full swing as allied aircraft swarmed over Iraq and Kuwait. On 17 January, the Turkish government finally gave its approval to 

begin combat operations and Colonel Gray was relieved that he now had 

a personal recovery force for the northern part of the country for the rest 

of his Pave Lowes.69

As Task Force Normandy opened up the Iraqis’ western flank to allow 

Coalition air to start precision bombing, Saddam Hussein continued to 

improve his defenses in Kuwait and had 41 Iraqi divisional headquarters 

postured in defense.70 Saddam had increased five divisions since November, which were infantry divisions that joined the coastal and forward defenses and added an additional three regular army armored divisions to 

complete the formation of two regular army corps, which would serve as 

operational reserve.71
151

Military analysts assessed the defense strategy and assumed Saddam 

had decided to accept risk in the west due to terrain that a western attack 

would be too difficult and the route too long for the Coalition to consider 

an option. Saddam had residual forces of 24 divisions in Iraq, largely recently mobilized infantry units that possessed little military tactical value 

and further reinforcements were unlikely. In retrospect, Saddam had left 

the back door open, and from all appearances he had neither the capability 

nor the inclination to close it.72

By the end of operations on 26 February 1991, 24 Iraqi Divisions were 

destroyed; Iraqi Soldiers surrendered faster than CENTCOM could count 

them, but military police estimated POWs exceeding 30,000 soldiers; the 

24th Infantry Division had outrun its fuel trucks; and President Bush ordered a ceasefire, which went into effect at 0800 on 28 February. By the 

ceasefire, the UN and US forces nearly destroyed the entire Iraqi ground 

force—3,847 of their 4,280 tanks (90 percent) destroyed, more than half 

of the 2,880 armored personnel carriers and nearly 3,100 artillery pieces 

destroyed; only 5 to 7 of 43 combat divisions remained capable for any 

offensive operations, and there were about 60,000 Iraqi POWs being held. 

The US forces had lost 147 killed in action; Operation Desert Storm had 

been the fastest and most complete victory in American military history.73

Conclusion

Task Force Normandy succeeded beyond all expectations and set the 

conditions for the future fight with both radar sites completely destroyed 

and two days later an AC-130 gunship went to the radar sites to destroy 

anything left and found nothing left to shoot at. The casualty results of the 

first night of the air campaign were the real measures of success; in which 

planners expected high losses among aircraft deep in the heart of Iraq on 

the first night, but the losses did not occur.74

Task Force Normandy represented several successful lines of effort to 

the Army from lessons learned from the Vietnam War; the success was a 

testimonial to the Aviation branch’s ability to attract and retain extremely high-quality aviators, train them to perfection, and let them be critical 

thinkers in highly stressful combat environments.75 The most important 

keys to their success were gains of key technology since the end of the 

Vietnam War; most important was the technological leap in capability that 

came with the AH-64 Apache helicopter, the laser-guided Hellfire missile, 

and night vision devices. After this initial combat mission of the Apache, 

those who doubted the performance of the Apache were silenced by the 

aircraft’s ability to prepare and execute the missions at high levels of read-
152

iness for long periods under horrible environmental conditions. The most 

significant technological advantage over peer threats was precision navigation that came with the GPS; only a year or two earlier this mission 

would have seen impossible.76

Finally, Task Force Normandy showed the effects of dramatic changes in thinking about the dimensional multi-domain battlefield and how to 

organize and fight in it. Task Force Normandy proved the doctrinal ideas 

about deep attack operations in large-scale combat operations and aviation 

(in 1990s). This deep maneuver mission also proved the importance of 

moving toward joint integrated operations that was fundamentally in the 

thinking of future Army doctrine and the current continued concepts of 

large-scale combat operations.77 Task Force Normandy prevented the Iraqi 

Army from employing air defense fires by destroying the EW sites that 

disrupted enemy command and control (C2) and enabled Allied air forces 

to mass effects against key Iraqi capabilities to enable the rapid movement 

into Iraq, which provided an excellent example that defines large-scale 

combat operations of today.
153

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 1-150.

2. James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From its Beginnings to 

the War on Terror (New York: Universe, 2005), 246.

3. Jerome Martin, Victory from Above: Air Power Theory and the Conduct 

of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 

Air University Press, 1994), 65; Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: United 

States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of 

the United States Army,1993), 168; US Army Aviation After Action Report: 

Aviation in Desert Shield/Storm, Fort Rucker, AL, Army Aviation Center, 1991, 

4; Darrell Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, (Maxwell Air 

force Base, AL: Air University, Air University Press, 2006), 90; 101st Aviation 

Brigade, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Executive Summary, 1991, Fort 

Campbell, KY, 5.

4. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “101st Airborne Division 

History for Operation Desert Storm/Operation Desert Shield; Command Report, 

101st Airborne Division After-Action Report Notes, History of the 101,” 1991, 

11; Darrell, D. Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride: A history of the MH-53J 

Pave Low helicopters in war and peace, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 

University Press. Air Force Research Institute, 2012), 329; Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 70; Special report “The US Army in Operation Desert 

Storm,” Arlington, VA, The Institute of Land Warfare, June 1991, 12.

5. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 246.

6. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 11.

7. Martin, Victory from Above, 22; CALL, “101st Airborne Division AAR,” 

11; US Army Aviation, Desert Storm, 4; Thomas Taylor, Lightning in the Storm: 

the 101st Air Assault Division in the Gulf War, 1994 (New York, NY: Hippocrene Books), 29.

8. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 247.

9. Williams, 247; Martin, Victory from Above, 286.

10. Martin, Victory from Above, 22.

11. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 11; Williams, History of 

Army Aviation, 247.

12. Matthew, Skeen, “The Global Positioning System: a case study in the 

challenges of transformation,” Joint Forces Quarterly 51, 2008, 92; Williams, 

History of Army Aviation, 246.

13. Williams, 246.

14. Williams, 247.

15. Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride, 329.

16. Whitcomb, 329.

17. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 397.

18. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 247; Martin, Victory from Above, 286.

19. Martin, 286.
154

20. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 247; Martin, 186.

21. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 397.

22. Whitcomb, 397; Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride, 71; Williams, 

History of Army Aviation, 248.

23. Williams, 248; Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 397.

24. Whitcomb, 297; CALL, “101st Airborne Division AAR,” 11; Williams, 

246.

25. Martin, Certain Victory, 168; Whitcomb, 397.

26. Whitcomb, 397.

27. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 248.

28. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 397.

29. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 11.

30. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 250.

31. Williams, 249.

32. Taylor, Lightning in the Storm, 149; Richard Comer, “Operation Eafer 

Anvil: Pave Low Leaders,” 2016, Defense Media Network website: www.

defensemedianetwork.com, 131.

33. Taylor, Lightning in the Storm, 149.

34. Discussion, Mr. Bobby Gunter, Fort Campbell, KY, with Ken Tilley, 

USAACE Historian, Fort Rucker, AL, 11 May 2018.

35. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 249.

36. Williams, 249.

37. Williams, 249; Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride, 71.

38. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 298.

39. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 249.

40. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 299.

41. Whitcomb, 298.

42. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 97.

43. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 306.

44. Whitcomb, 306; Williams, History of Army Aviation, 250.

45. Whitcomb, 306; Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride, 96.

46. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 81; Whitcomb, Combat 

Search and Rescue, 306; Whitcomb, On A Steel Horse I Ride, 96.

47. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 250.

48. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 306–07.

49. Scales, Certain Victory, 168.

50. Scales, 168; Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 307.

51. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 82; Oral History Interview, 

General Richard A. Cody, The West Point Center for Oral History, West Point 

New York, NY, 28 July 2011.

52. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 307.

53. Whitcomb, 307; Scales, Certain Victory, 159; Taylor, Lightning in the 

Storm, 176; Drew to Tilley, 3 May 2018.

54. Scales, Certain Victory, 159.
155

55. Interview, Mr. Brian Stewmon, USAACE DOTD, with Ken Tilley, USAACE Historian, Fort Rucker, 24 April 2018.

56. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 307; Williams, History of Army 

Aviation, 251.

57. Interview, Mr. Ronald Rodrigues, PEO AVN, Redstone Arsenal, to Ken 

Tilley, USAACE Historian, Fort Rucker, AL, 04 May 2018.

58. Interview, Jim Miller, USA CW4 (Retired), Ozark, AL with Ken Tilley, 

USAACE Historian, Fort Rucker, 10 May 2018.

59. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 251; CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 85; Scales, Certain Victory, 159–60.

60. Dick Cheney, “Final Report Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress,” vol.1, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, April 1992, 

152–56. 

61. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 307.

62. Whitcomb, 307.

63. CALL, History of the 101st Airborne, 86; Williams, History of Army 

Aviation, 251; Taylor, Lightning in the Storm, 190–91.

64. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 308.

65. Whitcomb, 307.

66. CALL, “101st Airborne Division History,” 78.

67. CALL, 79.

68. Cheney, Final Report, 157

69. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 309.

70. Scales, Certain Victory, 160.

71. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 252.

72. Williams, 161.

73. Williams, 252.

74. Scales, Certain Victory, 160.

75. Williams, History of Army Aviation, 256.

76. Williams, 252. 

77. Williams, 252.
156
157

Chapter 9

Army Attack Aviation: The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s 

Deep Strike in Karbala*

Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David W. Tohn

How the many entities behave and interact with each other within 

an operational environment is difficult to discern and always results in differing circumstances. No two operational environments 

are the same. In addition, an operational environment is not static; 

it continually evolves. This evolution results from opposing forces 

and actors interacting and their abilities to learn and adapt.

1

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s deep strike of 23 March 2003 

remains one of the key components of the “darkest day.” On the night of 

23 to 24 March, the Army sent its most powerful deep-attack system, the 

AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, to destroy Medina Division armor and 

artillery before they could affect the maneuvering ground forces. However, the regiment returned with 31 of 32 aircraft damaged, one downed 

in enemy territory, and two pilots captured, without decisively engaging 

the Medina. While Marines eventually rescued the pilots, and the aviators 

repaired many of the damaged aircraft rapidly, it took 30 days to restore 

the regiment to full capability. The mission cast a shadow over deep-attack 

operations throughout the duration of major combat operations. In fact the 

Army only attempted one other deep attack. Moreover, the incident placed 

in question the efficacy and utility of attack helicopters in Army doctrine. 

Soon after the sandstorm cleared, the 101st Airborne Division successfully 

executed a deep attack. On that mission, two aircraft crashed in brownout 

conditions on takeoff, marring even this achievement.

But the mission is significant and important for other reasons, chief 

among which is that 11th AHR quickly assessed what went wrong and shared 

their assessment with the 101st and others. More important, all of the attack 

aviation units in theater learned lessons from the unsuccessful mission and 

applied them to great effect. A close review of the attack suggests the failed 

mission suffered from a classic “first-battle” dynamic. Specifically, Apaches 

ravaged Iraq formations during Desert Storm. As a consequence, the Iraqis 

adjusted and prepared a defense specifically against attack helicopters going 

deep. No one detected their dispositions, with the result they achieved surprise and defeated one of the best-trained attack aviation units in the world. 

The aviators flew against these defenses using tactics, techniques, and pro-
158

cedures inappropriate to the combat environment. It took the hard lessons of 

the night of 23 March to change these tactics. 

To be sure, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (AHR) did not fail 

solely because of inappropriate tactics. As with most failures, there was a 

chain of events—a “failure chain”—that led to the ultimate outcome. In this 

case, the failure chain links the inevitable fog and friction of combat with 

a series of individual and collective decisions and the human ego in war. 

From delayed convoys to confusing terrain management to an indomitable 

warrior spirit to get into the fight, a variety of dynamics contributed to the 

unsuccessful mission. Yet even with the loss and damage of equipment, the 

capture of two aviators, and an unmolested enemy, the mission triggered an 

amazing revision of tactics and procedures that is a testimony to the integrity, flexibility, and perhaps most important, persistence of Army aviators.

The 11th AHR, commanded by Colonel Bill Wolf and composed of 

two attack helicopter squadrons—2-6th Cavalry (CAV) and 6-6th CAV—

began planning for OIF in October 2002. At that time, 2-6th CAV was 

already in Kuwait supporting Operation Desert Spring, and the aircrews 

and planners were comfortable with conducting operations in the desert 

environment. By the time the rest of the regiment arrived in Kuwait, 2-6th 

CAV had flown some 4,000 hours training in the Kuwaiti desert. In January 2003, the rest of the regiment alerted to deploy to Kuwait and learned 

that it would receive attachment of the 1-227th Attack Helicopter Battalion (AHB). The 1-227th AHB, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dan 

Ball, an AH-64D Longbow-equipped attack helicopter squadron joined 

from Fort Hood, Texas.2 Thus, the regiment would consist of three attack 

squadrons fitted with the most advanced attack helicopters in the world.

The AHR aborted its first planned deep-attack mission against the 

Iraqi 11th Infantry Division (ID) in the vicinity of Tallil Air Base due to 

haze, dust, and poor visibility. The mission would have been a “JV [junior 

varsity] fight,” preparing the 11th AHR for the “varsity fight” with the 

Medina Division.3 Frustration over aborting their first mission was palpable within the staff and aircrews. In particular, the 2-6th CAV aviators 

felt tremendous frustration. Not assigned to fly that night, they harbored 

the idea, with their longer experience in the desert that they might have 

been able to execute the mission had they flown. Second, the running start 

option reduced the number of ground combat units available to V Corps 

so the regiment, as Major John Lindsay the operations officer put it, “felt 

significant obligation to alleviate as much pressure as we could on the 3rd 

ID.”4 But, when the regiment received the mission to destroy the Republi-
159

can Guard Medina Division’s artillery and armored maneuver units, it was 

determined to succeed.5

The 11th AHR Attack: The Plan

The 11th AHR planned to move forward to Objective RAMS immediately after 2nd BCT had cleared it. The initial quartering party and 

command post would fly into the assembly area, followed by the regiment’s support units bringing fuel and ammunition forward. The attack 

helicopters would arrive last. Moving would position the corps’s deep-attack capability well forward, extending their reach ahead of the rapidly 

11th AHR Attack Scheme

23 March 2003

0 5 10 15 Miles

Figure 9.1. 11th AHR Attack Scheme for 23 March 2003. Map created by Army 

University Press.
160

advancing ground forces. Moreover, it would enable the corps to continue 

combat operations unabated while the ground forces refitted from their 

200-kilometer dash north from the border. 

Intelligence on how the Medina’s three maneuver brigades and its artillery were arrayed for battle was incomplete and led to debate between corps 

and the regimental staff officers. Intelligence estimates reported the Medina 

brigades in the vicinity of their home garrisons but their actual disposition 

for battle was unclear.6 Although corps intelligence painted a fairly clear 

picture for the 10th Armor Brigade of the Medina, the corps directed the 

regiment to attack the Medina’s 2nd AR Brigade because it appeared to be 

astride the avenue of approach north of Karbala that 3rd ID planned to use.7

Unfortunately, the corps could not accurately locate the units assigned to the 

2nd AR Brigade. The original mission, purpose, and end state were: 

On order, 11th AHR attacks to destroy the artillery and armor of 

the Medina Division to facilitate 3rd ID freedom of maneuver 

through the Karbala Gap and seizure of Objective SAINTS. The 

purpose is to shape the Corps’s battlespace and thereby provide 

the 3rd ID freedom to maneuver in the Karbala area by destroying 

the artillery and armor forces of the 14th, 2nd, and 10th Brigades 

of the Medina Division. The end state is the destruction of the 

Artillery and Armor of the 14th, 2nd, and 10th Brigades, 3rd ID 

freedom of maneuver maintained, and 11th AHR postured to conduct shaping attacks against the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi 

Division in support of V Corps establishment of the inner cordon 

[around Baghdad].8

The 11th AHR estimated that the destruction of the Medina would 

take two nights of deep attacks, employing three battalions each night.9

Planning, already contentious because of inexact intelligence, became 

more contentious on the matter of routes. Regimental planners repeatedly 

requested to attack into their objectives from the west, avoiding the urban 

areas to the north and east of RAMS.

The western avenue of approach crossed Milh Lake north of Karbala, 

followed by a sparsely populated Iraqi army maneuver training area. Because the 101st’s division boundary was to the west, the 11th AHR had 

to request these routes through the corps. V Corps denied the western avenues because to use them would have required establishing a forward 

arming and refueling point (FARP) near Milh Lake to refuel the attack 

helicopters. This FARP would have been well forward of the advancing 

3rd ID’s forward line of troops and thus vulnerable. The corps had already 
161

received multiple reports of Iraqi forces maneuvering in the area where the 

FARP would have to go and did not believe the risk was acceptable. Even 

if the corps had approved the western approach and the forward FARP, it 

is clear that 11th AHR could not have executed such a plan. As it turned 

out, the regiment only got enough fuel to RAMS to refuel part of two 

battalions. On 23 March, they had no means to establish a FARP north of 

Overview of the 11th AHR

Planned Routes

2100Z, 20 March 2003 0 5 10 15 Miles

Figure 9.2. Overview of 11th AHR Planned Routes. Map created by Army 

University Press.
162

RAMS, let alone as far north as they imagined prior to departing Kuwait. 

As it was, attacking the Iraqi 2nd Armored Brigade required a south-tonorth approach, directly over the Iraqi equivalent of urban sprawl.10

In any case, a route near the lake may not have solved the problem. 

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Troy Templeton recalled that “we templated all 

this ADA [Air Defense Artillery] expecting us to come up the lakes.”11

Templeton believed that the 1-227th AHB routes reflected concern about 

possible ADA that could engage units attempting to use the lake to reach 

targets. In short, the enemy may well have anticipated that attack helicopter units would use the lake as a means to avoid ADA and so placed 

ADA where they thought the aviators would have to come to use the lake 

on their approach to the Medina. Templeton liked the idea of avoiding the 

ADA at the lake. As he put it, “They (the routes) were fine with me. We 

didn’t start getting shot until we were right over the city—and what is a 

good way to enter a city?”12

Still, the regiment planned routes that avoided the towns and villages 

along the way to the target. To do this they used FalconView, which enables route planning and rehearsal using high-resolution imagery. FalconView is first-class software that essentially supports a “magic carpet ride” 

over the terrain. Of course the utility of the tools is entirely dependent on 

the imagery. The relatively open areas the regiment planned to fly were not 

devoid of habitation. As Wolf put it, “We avoided any idea of a village at 

all. I will tell you once you cross the Euphrates everything is lit up. Every 

farm has a light and every farmhouse has a brick wall around it. Everything became a hiding place for whoever wanted to be there.”13

Captain Karen Hobart, the regimental intelligence officer, understood the threat urban terrain posed to the aircraft. In her intelligence 

estimate for operation plan (OPLAN) 1003, she explicitly described the 

threat to rotary-wing aircraft operating over the Iraqi urban terrain. Her 

intelligence summary described how Iraq’s air defense systems enjoyed 

advantage in urban areas. Iraqi guns had the advantages of high rates of 

fire and high gun elevations, and they were light and easy to deploy and 

move on civilian vehicles.

In general terms, the regimental intelligence summary also addressed 

how smaller-caliber weapon systems, such as antiaircraft artillery, could 

be placed on rooftops and on mobile trucks for hit-and-run operations. 

Moreover, the summary assessed that the air defense assets could be 

placed around schools, mosques, and hospitals, indicating Iraq’s awareness of coalition attempts to avoid collateral damage. Finally, Hobart 
163

described Iraq’s air defense ambush techniques along friendly routes, to 

include massing small-arms fires on low-flying and hovering aircraft. At 

the final rehearsal for the mission, Wolf highlighted the small-arms threat, 

noting that he told his aviators that small arms “would ruin their day.” 

But after the fact he recalled, “nobody in their right mind would have 

envisioned what we ended up facing.”14 In fact, the Iraqis had perhaps as 

many as a dozen air defense teams deployed along possible routes. The 

teams included light air defense artillery cannon and shoulder-launched 

surface-to-air missiles.15

The coalition intent to avoid destroying the Iraqi power grids also concerned Hobart. City lights could silhouette aircraft against the night sky 

and hinder the pilots’ use of their night vision goggles. Thus placing their 

air defense artillery in the well-lit population centers reduced one of the 

Iraqi’s major weaknesses—the lack of night-capable air defense artillery. 

What Captain Hobart and others did not know was that the Iraqis planned 

to use city lights as an early-warning system, turning an entire town’s 

lights off and on to signal the approach of helicopters.16

All aviators and intelligence personnel “knew” of the theoretical risk 

of small arms in an air defense role. But with the exception of Somalia 

in 1993, the Army had no contemporary experiences to weigh the actual risk, and very few of the aviators who flew that night had flown in 

Vietnam, where ground fire took an awful toll on helicopters. So the 11th 

AHR—and its supporting intelligence soldiers—seriously underestimated 

the small-arms and light ADA cannon threat to attack aviation operations. 

The commanders, pilots, and planners generally tried to avoid flying over 

urban terrain where possible, but after years of training on benign live-fire 

ranges and in computer simulations that did not adequately represent the 

small-arms threat, no one really understood that small-arms and light ADA 

cannon could be showstoppers.

Coordinating deep artillery fire for suppression of enemy air defenses 

(SEAD) along the routes is a critical element of any deep strike. SEAD 

missions are historically among the most complex and challenging to 

execute, as ideally the artillery hits suspected air defense sites along the 

planned route only minutes before the aircraft traverse the area. Timing 

and accuracy are critical, made all the more difficult by typically imperfect 

knowledge of exactly where the air defense systems are. For this mission, 

the corps planned to fire 32 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 

missiles.17 The corps also planned joint SEAD, primarily coming from 

electronic warfare aircraft and air strikes on suspected air defenses.18
164

The 11th AHR Attack: The Preparation

Based on the pace of 3rd ID’s advance, the corps ordered the regiment to attack the Medina a day earlier than originally planned. Adding 

to the sense of urgency, a severe sandstorm was bearing down on the 

region, expected to hit on the 24th. Many in the regiment felt that if the 

attack didn’t occur on the 23rd, the 11th AHR might not get into the war 

in a meaningful way.19

The regiment failed to meet several of the doctrinal conditions for the 

attack. First, it operated from an unsecured assembly area on Objective 

RAMS. Some Iraqis appear to have driven around the flight line during 

mission preparation.20 Second, the MSE Small Extension Node (SEN) 

that would have provided high-bandwidth digital communications for 

the tactical command post (TAC) could not be sling-loaded forward due 

to weight and atmospheric conditions. Finally, less than half of the regiment’s refueling and rearming capability made it to RAMS in time for the 

mission preparation. The rest of the fuel and ammunition handlers crossed 

the berm on 21 March and were still making their way north.21 Nonetheless, against the pressure of the looming sandstorm and despite a shortage 

of fuel, communications, and security, the regiment prepared to execute. 

Aircraft started landing at 1400. As the regiment assembled into a 

mile-long line of aircraft, the implications of the lack of security were 

quickly apparent. Pilots watched as one group of Iraqi civilians traveled 

throughout the area in a pickup truck. This scene repeated itself several 

times as Iraqi civilians moved about unimpeded and in plain view of the 

assembled attack helicopters. This raised concerns that the regiment’s impending attack would be reported to Iraqi combatants in the surrounding 

villages and along the attack routes.22

Moreover, with less than half of the planned fuel trucks on hand, the 

regiment could not refuel all of the attack helicopters, the command and 

control aircraft, or for that matter the CH-47s that needed fuel for their 

return trip south.23 Although only two battalions were scheduled to go, getting the right amount of fuel in the right place proved difficult. The regiment 

had enough fuel to refuel fully 1-227th AHB, but could only partially refuel 

6-6th CAV. With 31 aircraft refueled the regiment leadership believed they 

had adequate resources to attack the Iraqi 2nd Armored Brigade.

The 11th AHR Attack: The Go/No Go Decision

Doctrinally the first step in the decision to launch is to confirm that 

there is a target to strike. Forward at RAMS and without the mobile sub-
165

scriber digital communications, Captain Hobart could not contact her staff 

at the main regimental command post in Kuwait. She used her only communications means, a satellite telephone, to contact Captain Bret Woolcock, her liaison officer, whom she had embedded with the V Corps Fires 

and Effects Coordination Cell. Once in contact, Hobart, Colonel Wolf, the 

operations officer, and a few others stood around the satellite telephone 

out in the open, intently listening to receive the latest intelligence verbally. 

Woolcock could only provide 1,000-square-meter estimates of the center of mass of company-size units. Exacerbating the problem, the Hunter 

UAV—the V Corps’s only dedicated UAV—was not available. It was being moved by air and ground convoy up to Objective RAMS and would 

not support the deep attack. The theater’s Predator UAV was also unavailable, as it was still busy flying for the Air Force.24 Taking Woolcock’s 

report, Hobart reported to Colonel Wolf that she had a 75-percent picture 

on the enemy disposition.25

Surprisingly, Woolcock also passed three Iraqi communications intercepts. Until that point, the Iraqis had made infrequent use of their communications to avoid detection. Subsequent to the attack, Hobart thought that 

the increased communications might have been related to the regiment’s 

pending attack, which she believed the Iraqis were expecting. While the 

Iraqis did not know the timing or the targets, they did know American 

tactics. The US Air Force had been attacking Iraqi forces for days, and 3rd 

ID was pressing the Iraqi army and paramilitary forces hard in the west. 

The enemy knew that the US almost always led ground forces with the Air 

Force, followed by attack aviation.26

At this point, Wolf and the 11th AHR had a partial intelligence picture 

as well as some fuel and were postured at Objective RAMS, secure or not. 

At 2200, Wolf assembled his battalion commanders to present the final 

GO/NO GO analysis to the V Corps chief of staff via the tactical satellite 

radio.27 Wolf, with grids to “20 or 25” targets generated from signals intelligence and updated imagery, believed he had enough to find and attack the 

2nd Armored Brigade, but only by “search and attack techniques.”28 The 

go-no go briefing included Wolf, Brigadier General Dan Hahn, the corps 

chief of staff, G3, G2, effects, and air support representatives. Despite fuel 

problems, delayed liftoff, and uncertainty about the precise location of the 

enemy, there was no dissent.29

The 11th AHR Attack: The Execution

Delayed 2 hours and 15 minutes as the troops sorted out who got 

fuel, helicopters began lifting off at 0115 on 24 March.30 From the start, 
166

things did not go well. Colonel Wolf returned to his command and control 

aircraft to find that he lacked the fuel to make the mission. He waited an 

additional 45 minutes to get more fuel. He was not the only one having 

problems. Some crews swapped aircraft to assure that key leaders boarded aircraft that had fuel. In the end, only 30 of the 31 Apaches left the assembly area, as one crashed on takeoff due to severe brownout conditions 

caused by the “moon dust.”31

Poor communications plagued the regiment throughout the mission 

with obvious effects on execution. When Colonel Wolf delayed the launch 

by 2 hours and 15 minutes, the regiment could not alert supporting fixedwing units. The ground SEAD fired at the adjusted time and in accordance 

with the corps standard of 30 minutes before the helicopters’ time on target. Even this success proved a mixed blessing since many of the pilots 

considered 30 minutes too early and wondered if it acted more as a warning to the Iraqis than a suppression. Worse still, the fighters assigned to 

support the mission never received the adjusted mission time and departed 

as originally scheduled, which meant they were not on station during the 

actual attack. The corps Fire Effects Coordination Cell and air liaison officer did obtain some help. For example, B-52s dropped 26 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs in support of the effort to rescue the pilots 

of the lone downed aircraft. Reportedly, some ground-attack aircraft engaged targets in a supporting kill box, but there are no specifics available.32

Whatever problems the regiment experienced with the SEAD and close 

air support (CAS) execution, the Iraqi air defense “system” was arguably 

not vulnerable to traditional SEAD operations—26 Army Tactical Missile 

System (ATACMS) and 26 JDAMS could not realistically suppress several hundred Iraqis distributed throughout a densely populated urban area 

firing small arms and light air defense artillery.33 Fundamentally, the attack 

helicopters attacked alone and effectively unsupported.

As they traveled up the route, the lead troop of 6-6th CAV had no 

contact but 1-227th AHB was already reporting enemy fire. En route 

to the target, when B/6-6th CAV oriented west at approximately 0100, 

all of the lights in the area—to include the cities of Al Haswah and Al 

Iskandariyah—blinked out for approximately two seconds.34 Immediately thereafter, the sky erupted with all manner of ground fire, which was 

apparent by the red, yellow, and white tracers. Initially unaimed, the fusillade of fire created a “wall” between the aircraft and their objectives. 

Although the Apaches were running with lights out, the lights from farms 

and town silhouetted the attack helicopters against the night sky. Crews 
167

reported damage to their aircraft and difficulty maneuvering due to the 

volume of enemy fire.35

In the Apache, one of the two crewmen wore helmet-mounted night 

vision goggles to see things thermals could not, including, for example, 

wires and tracers. The second crewman flew with thermals and the 30-

mm chain gun slaved to his head-up display. When the sky “lit” up with 

tracers, the aviator with goggles could see them but the aviator who had 

immediate control of the gun could not. Therefore, to add to their problems, one crewman had to verbally describe the source of fire so the other 

could suppress it.

The following account drawn from the battle summary of 6-6th CAV 

details how difficult this mission became and conveys a sense of what flying that mission was like for one crew: 

Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Tomblin and First Lieutenant Jason 

King were in the second aircraft to depart and when they finally 

took off to the north, the aircraft shuddered from the weight of 

the ammunition. The crew monitored radio traffic that an A Troop 

aircraft had crashed on takeoff. Along the 53-nautical mile route, 

Palerider 16 received very little small-arms fire. As they began 

to turn into the objective area, they noticed how bright the lights 

were in the nearby town; it seemed odd considering it was midnight [unit reports suggest time was 0100]. As they climbed to 

clear a set of 200-foot wires, the lights went out for two seconds. 

When the lights came back on, they started receiving AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] fire. It had been a coordinated ambush directed 

at taking out the aircraft. Palerider 16 conducted evasive maneuvers and returned fire. The aircraft had been hit when he smelled 

electrical equipment burning. Tomblin saw a man on ground with 

a rifle shooting at the aircraft so he engaged with the 30-mm, killing the man and hitting a nearby fuel tanker which resulted in a 

tremendous explosion that lit up the sky. As Tomblin maneuvered 

the aircraft, King was calling in a report that they had taken fire. 

In the middle of his report, a bullet entered the cockpit and went 

through his throat. His transmission stopped and Tomblin asked, 

“Sir, are you ok?” There was no response. King’s throat had filled 

with blood, and although he could hear everything that was going 

on, he was unable to answer. Tomblin turned the aircraft to the 

south and reported that his front-seater had been hit, condition unknown. Tomblin continued to ask King if he was OK—still no answer, although he could hear him breathing. Chief Warrant Officer 
168

4 Robert Duffney and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Neal served as their 

wingman. Tomblin pulled in behind them and noticed a tremendous amount of smoke coming from one of Duffney’s engines. 

A hydraulic line on Duffney’s aircraft had been severed and fluid was flowing into the engine. This same hydraulic system controlled the weapons on his aircraft; Duffney was unable to return 

fire. Tomblin pulled back and, as Duffney’s aircraft received fire, 

he laid down suppressive fire in the enemy’s direction. Earlier, 

before the flight, King had taken his pressure bandage out of his 

load-bearing equipment and placed it on the dash of the aircraft. 

Usually this would be placed in the rear storage bay of the aircraft, 

unreachable by its owner. Then he was applying pressure to the 

wound and was finally able to speak. “I am ok, I am ok; you’re 

taking fire from the right.” King could see tracer fire through his 

night vision goggles and continued to direct fire for his back-seater and other aircraft. Together the two aircraft continued down the 

route, receiving heavy fire. They would fly back to the assembly 

area and load King into a waiting vehicle that would take him to 

a MEDEVAC aircraft. As they approached the assembly area, the 

small-arms fire stopped. Now they had to land the crippled aircraft at an assembly area that had several other damaged aircraft 

attempting to land. Both aircraft flew past the assembly area and 

allowed landing aircraft to touch down while locating the awaiting transport vehicle. While they were waiting, numerous reports 

from other aircraft could be heard on the radio. One from their 

sister battalion was transmitting on the emergency guard frequency; this aircraft was badly damaged and lost all navigation and 

night vision equipment. [Airborne Warning and Control System] 

was vectoring the aircraft to the south; the crew was noticeably 

shaken up. Once on the ground, King was loaded into the waiting 

vehicle and was moved to the MEDEVAC aircraft. The bullet had 

just missed his windpipe and trachea, and he very easily could 

have permanently lost his voice or bled to death. King’s wife was 

notified that her husband had been shot and was in critical condition. As King’s condition improved, he was to be transported to 

Germany, where his wife would meet him. Instead of flying home, 

he convinced a sergeant major to coordinate a ride for him back to 

his unit. When he rejoined the unit, the Soldiers could not believe 

their eyes. King continued to fly security missions in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom north of Baghdad.36
169

The 6-6th CAV reached its objective but had to abort before engaging 

any ground targets due to the heavy fires. The 1-227th AHB made it to its 

objective and engaged some targets but eventually had to break off and 

return for fuel. They never found the 30 T-72 tanks they hoped to find. One 

of 1-227th AHB’s helicopters made an emergency landing after taking serious damage. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ball attempted to provide support 

to the crew as it sought to evade capture, but he took heavy fire that set a 

weapons pod alight. Ball finally had to jettison the pod and return home, 

unable to rescue his crew.37

Returning shot up and in some cases with wounded aboard, the 

Apaches had to land on the same plowed ground that had dried to dust, 

which the pilots found vexing even during daylight the afternoon before. 

Having positioned himself at the center of the flight line, the operations 

officer, Major John Lindsay had a ringside seat as aircraft returned alone 

or in small groups, turned into the wind and did their best to avoid mid-air 

collisions and wrecking their aircraft as they sought the ground in a haze 

of blinding dust. The pilots executed running landings to give themselves 

some hope of staying just ahead of the dust cloud they generated. Lindsay 

recalled that it was terrifying to watch as aircraft rolled “100, 200, 300 feet 

right toward us,” attracted to light and heat sources generated by Lindsay’s 

little command post group.38

Of the 30 aircraft that departed Objective RAMS for the mission, 29 

returned with small-arms and some antiaircraft artillery damage. One aircraft force-landed due to ground fire and was subsequently destroyed to 

prevent compromise. The Iraqis captured both pilots. On average, 1-227th 

AHB aircraft returned sporting 15 to 20 bullet holes each, and one had a 

total of 29 holes. The unit performed an average of 70 small-arms damage 

repairs per day until all damaged areas were repaired in accordance with 

applicable aircraft technical manuals. If nothing else, the Apache demonstrated how tough an aircraft it was. As one pilot put it, “that airplane is 

resilient. It is amazing! We got back and looked at all the airplanes and it 

is incredible that we were able to fly those things home. It is an amazing 

aircraft.”39 On the other hand, no one was claiming a victory that night.

The 11th AHR Attack: Battle Damage 

Assessing battle damage is always difficult, but fundamentally aside 

from killing some air defense systems, a few gun trucks, and a number of 

enemy firing small arms, the regiment achieved very little. 
170

That all but one of the US Apaches returned to RAMS is a testimony to 

the aircraft’s durability and survivability. The pilots owed their lives to engineers who designed the Apache and to those who built and maintained them.

Despite significant damage, all of the aircraft were repaired well forward in the field and returned to service. On 24 March three CH 47s came 

forward, bringing the regiment’s executive officer, maintenance officer, 

and others. The aircraft also brought spare parts carried as sling loads. En 

route Iraqis engaged the CH 47s. Two of the helicopters jettisoned their 

loads, including all of 1-227th’s spare parts.40 Despite that latest bit of bad 

news, mechanics returned two aircraft to service within 24 hours, 12 of 17 

within 96 hours, 15 of 17 within a week, and the remaining two within 30 

days.41 The 2-6th CAV, which had not flown the mission due to the fuel 

shortage, remained fully mission capable. The corps assigned 2-6th to support 3rd ID.42 The 11th AHR flew its first battalion-size mission only nine 

days after the ill-fated attack.

The 11th AHR Attack: Adaptations

Following the attack, Army aviators took a collective step back to assess what had happened and to determine the causes and develop solutions. To be sure, the Iraqi air defense technique clearly proved effective 

in countering the helicopters as they were employed. After 12 years of experience with the Americans targeting their air defense systems, Iraqis had 

adapted. They developed a simple yet sophisticated air defense “system” 

virtually impossible to detect and suppress. 

Because US forces are very effective at destroying air defense radars 

that radiate and missile/gun systems, the Iraqis avoided using these as 

cornerstones in their network. Rather than using radar, the Iraqis appear 

to have relied on ground observers who reported on cellular phones and 

low-power radios. Finally, flickering the city lights warned the shooters to 

be prepared to engage. Rather than relying on easily targetable missile or 

gun systems, the Iraqis’ main weapon systems were the small arms widely 

distributed among the general population.

At the time of the 11th AHR’s attack, the Iraqis in the area had not been 

subjected to any coalition ground or air actions. As a result, shooting up 

into the sky at the American helicopters could be viewed as a no-risk proposition, even for the most reluctant armed Iraqi civilian. With rudimentary 

training on where to shoot (at the apex over power lines), even paramilitary 

troops could contribute to an air defense engagement area. Moreover, with 

no visible concentration of air defense equipment prior to mission, SEAD 

was ineffective. Once the fight started, the fires were so dispersed and dis-
171

tributed among populated areas that they were virtually impossible to suppress. The American pilots’ restraint in returning fire into the urban areas to 

avoid civilian casualties also hampered their response. For Colonel Wolf, 

this point loomed as particularly important. His crews needed to identify 

a target before returning fire, “because there were people out there we did 

not want to kill.”43 They could not, as he put it, “spray indiscriminately.”44

Consequently, the Iraqis executed an air defense operation in which 

the early warning and tracking systems operated below the US ability to 

detect and destroy; equally important, the Iraqis distributed their air defense weapons so widely that they could not be tracked or suppressed; 

and they decentralized their command and control so that it could not be 

effectively disrupted. The Iraqis, in this instance at least, used the decade 

between the wars to develop tactics that produced a highly survivable and 

effective air defense capability that, in turn, forced adaptation in Army 

aviation tactics.

In addition to reviewing the enemy’s actions, Army aviators reviewed 

mission planning, tactics, techniques, and procedures to determine what 

they could learn from this. The next day while maintenance crews repaired 

the aircraft, the command group conducted a conference call with the 101st 

Airborne Division aviators to share lessons learned and discuss countermeasures. 11th AHR presented its assessment in 11 major areas ranging 

from internal security while airborne to the rules of engagement (ROE). 

The ROE in effect prevented the aviators from using rockets to suppress 

targets given the possible proximity of civilians. On another topic, the 11th 

advised its colleagues that go/no go briefings focused on target fidelity 

inadequately accounted for en route air defenses—doctrine requires an 

assessment of en route air defense, and the 11th attempted to do that, but 

the defenses it faced were outside the model they anticipated.

Conclusion

This deliberate effort to learn from the first deep attack of the war paid 

off, as evidenced by the successful 101st Aviation Brigade, deep attack on 

28 March, after the sandstorm cleared. The 101st Aviation Brigade had 

done its homework on the 11th AHR’s experience.45 That experience suggested that the enemy was using observers linked by cell phones to provide early warning to a dispersed air defense. Pilots, planners, and commanders had a frank and detailed exchange to share insights, observations, 

and recommended changes in tactics and procedures.46 Whatever else the 

aviators learned, they were reminded that small arms and light cannon 

were effective against attack helicopters. After the fact, the decision to go 
172

seems incomprehensible on the basis of inadequate fidelity in target locations. On the other hand, even with absolute accuracy on the 2nd Armored 

Brigade, it is hard to see how the regiment could have overcome the fierce 

resistance it encountered. 

The deep attack that occurred on 28 April was very successful. In this 

attack, Army, Air Force, and Navy pilots destroyed six armored personnel 

carriers, four tanks, five trucks, and a fiber-optic facility. They also killed 

approximately 20 troops. Although not a high count by “exercise standards,” the attack marked an effective use of deep-strike Army attack aviation against a highly adaptive enemy. Moreover, it illustrates how quickly 

Army and fixed-wing aviators adapted to an enemy that had caused significant damage to the previous deep strike. Applying the hard lessons 

learned from the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s unsuccessful operation demonstrated the importance of building “confident and cohesive 

units able to adapt to their environment and defeat the enemy.”47
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Notes

* This chapter is an excerpt from Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David 

Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 179–95.

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017) 1–17.

2. Colonel Bill Wolf, Commander, 11th AHR, interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 13 November 2003.

3. Captain Gary Morea, S3 planner, 11th AHR, interview by Major Jonathan 

Gass, 13 May 2003.

4. Major John Lindsay, S3, 11th AHR, interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 11 December 2003; Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Pearman, executive 

officer, 11th AHR, telephonic interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 

17 December 2003.

5. “Battle summary, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

9 June 2003.

6. Captain Karen E. Hobart, S2, 11th AHR, interview by Major Daniel 

Corey, 31 May 2003.

7. Lindsay, interview by Fontenot.

8. Battle summary, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry.

9. This estimate was in the original plan and confirmed by telephone conversation between Major John Lindsay and Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 

10 February 2004.

10. Major John Lindsay, S3, 11th AHR, interview by Major Jonathan 

Gass, 11 May 2003; “Battle Summary, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom,” 9 June 2003, 13; Captain Gary Morea, S3 Planner, 11th AHR, 

interview by Major Jonathan Gass, 13 May 2003; Major Kevin Christensen, S3, 

6-6 CAV, interview by Major Jonathan Gass, 15 May 2003; Lieutenant Colonel 

Trent Cuthbert, effects coordinator, Fires and Effects Cell, V Corps, email to 

Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, 13 September 2003.

11. 1-227th AHB, 11th AHR, pilot interviews by Major Jonathan Gass, 22 

May 2003.

12. 1-227th AHB pilot interviews by Gass.

13. Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

14. Wolf. See also 11th AHR OPLAN 1003(V), Annex B (Intelligence), 

Appendix L (Intelligence Estimate).

15. Some prisoners of war have reported defenses of this kind as present 

and designed to take on Apaches. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 

Joint Forces Command is doing some of this work and analyzing other reports, 

but their work is neither complete nor declassified, so it will be some time before 

anecdotal reports from tactical units can be collaborated. The resistance the 11th 

AHR fought through cannot be explained solely as a consequence of dispersed 

air defense teams. It is likely that the defenses included “less formal” air defenses raised by troops in the area and perhaps paramilitary forces as well.
174

16. Hobart, interview by Major Daniel Corey.

17. The ATACMS is a precision engagement weapon that integrates standoff delivery accuracy with a submunition that can kill moving armor columns.

18. Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

19.. Battle summary, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry.

20. B/2-6th CAV group interview by Major Ike Wilson, 2 May 2003; pilots 

reported the area was not secure. See also Lieutenant Colonel Mike Barbee, 

Commander, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, 11thAHR, interview by Major Ike Wilson, 2 May 2003. Barbee asserted that his crews observed a white pickup truck. 

Major John Lindsay, on the other hand, saw only a single van departing the area. 

Lindsay believed the reports of Iraqis around the flight line to be exaggerated. 

There is no way to verify whether Iraqis on and around the flight line compromised the mission.

21. To prevent total loss or delay, the regiment sent its fuel trucks on two 

different routes. The movement, scheduled to take 48 hours, eventually took 72 

hours due to congestion and enemy contact on the roads. As it was, only half of 

the fuel made it to Objective RAMS in time to support the attack. See Lindsay, 

who discussed the fuel situation at length.

22. B/2-6th CAV, group interview by Major Ike Wilson, 2 May 2003. See 

also Barbee, interview by Wilson.

23. Lindsay, interview by Fontenot.

24. Major Mathew R. Littlejohn, Collection Manager, V Corps, interview 

by Major David Tohn, 9 May 2003.

25. Hobart, interview by Corey.

26. Hobart.

27. Lindsay, interview by Fontenot.

28. Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

29. Hobart, interview by Corey. See also Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

30. Barbee, interview by Wilson.

31. Wolf and Lindsay interviews. See also Barbee, who returned to find 

his aircraft also had no fuel. Like Wolf, he missed takeoff time while waiting to 

get fuel.

32. Major Michael Gabel, fire support officer, 11th AHR, email to Major 

Jonathan Gass, 9 August 2003.

33. Major Michael Gabel, email to Major Jonathan Gass. See also interviews with Wolf, Lindsay, and Hobart.

34. Battle summary, 6-6th CAV.

35. Battle summary.

36. First Lieutenant Jason King and Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Tomblin, 

crew of Palerider 16, interview by Major John Gass, 16 May 2003.

37. Major John Lindsay, S3, 11th AHR, interview by Colonel (Retired) 

Gregory Fontenot, 11 December 2003. Colonel Wolf and Major Lindsay indicated that Lieutenant Colonel Ball showed great courage that night as he sought to 

find a way to rescue the downed aircraft’s crew.
175

38. Major John Lindsay, S3, 11th AHR, interview by Colonel (Retired) 

Gregory Fontenot, 11 December 2003.

39. 1-227th AHB, 11th AHR, pilot interviews by Major Jonathan Gass, 22 

May 2003.

40. Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Pearman. See also interviews with Wolf and 

Lindsay. Unit AARs detail the effort. Pilot interviews for 1-227 noted they were 

ready and back in the fray in six days.

41. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ball, Commander, 1-227th AHB, interview 

by Major Jonathan Gass, 22 May 2003. Pilot interviews for 1-227th noted they 

were ready and back in the fray in six days. Obviously they flew shorthanded 

until the all of the aircraft were repaired and the one they lost was replaced.

42. Captain john Cochran, battle captain, 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, 

interview by Major Brashear, undated.

43. Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

44. Wolf, interview by Fontenot.

45. Many innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were 

employed that resulted in a successful mission. These TTPs were adopted from 

prior experience in Afghanistan and AAR discussions with the 11th Regiment. 

Areas addressed included route planning, use of Eagle I, FalconView, BFT, and 

Topscene, actions on contact, movement techniques, use of deception, and integration of CAS and artillery.

46. 101st Airborne Division After Action Report, 30 April 2003.

47. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-272.
176
177

Chapter 10

Task Force Viking: Conventional Forces-Special Operations 

Forces Synergy in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations

Daniel E. Stoltz, Stephen E. Ryan, and Joseph A. Royo

The Joint Force Commander, using special operations forces 

(SOF) independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains 

an additional and specialized capability to achieve objectives that 

might not otherwise be attainable. Integration enables the Joint 

Force Commander to take fullest advantage of conventional and 

SOF core competencies.1

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

Coalition operations in northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF) provide relevant insights for today and implications for future warfare. Of note, the relevant insights for today reflect synergy between Conventional Forces (CF), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and indigenous 

forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels through the combination of their respective capabilities. The study of operations conducted 

in northern Iraq in early 2003 provides an opportunity to learn from the 

past to prepare for tomorrow.

Geo-Strategic Context

As the world entered the new millennium, a renewed form of threat 

metastasized in full force, surprising the continental US homeland on 11 

September 2001. Non-state terrorism tilted the balance of national security from an uncertain future to one that would certainly confront global 

terror.2

 That shift was noticeable. The 2002 National Security Strategy

specifically oriented the United States toward “a war against terrorists of 

global reach.”3 It also identified the country’s primary geopolitical objective: “The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion 

or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated 

violence perpetrated against innocents.”4

At the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia the force of 

US hard power confronted Al Qaeda and a rogue government in Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. The United States raised an international 

coalition of NATO partners to enter Afghanistan shortly after Al Qaeda’s 

attack and partner with indigenous Afghan forces. US Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) initiated a campaign to forcefully stop the threat of nonstate terrorism. USCENTCOM’s theater responsibilities grew as threats 
178

from nearby Iraq added to an already complex mixture of volatile political 

forces in the region. By 2003, pressure was building to prevent the threat 

of terrorism from metastasizing to a point that rogue groups could acquire 

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). A sense of urgency compelled the 

US to adapt concepts of deterrence and imminence in a way that demanded action against potential rogue states and terrorists.5

 Thus, the US expanded its regional campaign consisting of Operation Enduring Freedom 

in Afghanistan to include a new front—Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Theater Context 

Preparing for possible operations against Iraq continued in the years 

following Operation Desert Storm and accelerated following the attacks of 

9/11. USCENTCOM planning, theater infrastructure improvement, training, exercises, logistics pre-positioning, and buildup of forces set conditions for future options.6

 Ongoing Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch preserved control of the air.7

 The final Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC) plan called for an attack from Kuwait on 

Baghdad with the V Corps along the west bank of the Euphrates River and 

the I Marine Expeditionary Force up the Tigris-Euphrates river valley.8

Special operations task forces in the north and west would conduct operations to provide threats from multiple directions. In late 2002, the U.N. 

passed Resolution 1441 which stated: “the Council has repeatedly warned 

Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”9

 Four months later, the president of the United 

States issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, and the deadline passed. 

OIF commenced on 19 March 2003. 

The theater-level operational design included creating a northern front 

by establishing a coalition task force north of the “Green Line,” that separated the Kurdish autonomous zone from the rest of Iraq. Forcing the 

Iraqis to address this threat from the north would support the CFLCC main 

effort in the south by preventing Iraqi reinforcement toward Baghdad. 

However, in the first months of 2003, the plan for OIF in the north 

changed due to Turkey not authorizing the use of its land or air space 

to support the invasion. Therefore, the 4th Infantry Division, originally 

slated to lead operations in the north would no longer attack from Turkey 

as originally planned, and now necessitated an alternate lead force for the 

northern mission. The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (10th SFG(A)) was ordered to assume this role for all operations in the north. The 

10th SFG(A) would form the nucleus of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force—North (CJSOTF-North) known as Task Force (TF) 
179

Viking. The SOF-led task force would conduct operations to fix and disrupt significant numbers of enemy units to support the CFLCC main effort. 

TF Viking successfully accomplished its mission. From March to May 

2003, TF Viking engaged in numerous battles and three distinctly different operations, each incorporating the capabilities of conventional forces, 

indigenous forces, and Special Operations Forces. They include the defeat 

of conventional Iraqi armor, mechanized forces, and infantry at the battle 

at Debecka crossroads; the destruction of the terrorist organization Ansar 

al-Islam; and the liberation of two major cities, Kirkuk and Mosul. TF 

Viking’s success required CF-SOF operational synergy and integrating the 

combat power of indigenous forces. The synergistic effects spanned from 

Figure 10.1. Iraqi Military and Militia Positions in March 2003. Map created by 

Army University Press.

N Military and Militia Positions

March 2003

0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles
180

the tactical to strategic levels and highlight how CF and SOF can produce 

exponential results when their capabilities are effectively combined. 

Order of Battle: Enemy Forces 

The Iraqi I, II, and V Corps were deployed along the Green Line to 

defend Iraq against the Kurdish Peshmerga and any US forces that may 

attack from Turkey (see Figure 10.1). The Iraqi III and IV Corps were 

deployed south in the Al Basrah province and along the Iranian frontier—

with the exception of the 11th Infantry Division, which was deployed in 

the An Nasiriyah area. The Republican Guard divisions were deployed 

around Baghdad, except for the Ad Adnam and Nebuchadnezzar Divisions, who were deployed in the north along the Green Line. 

The enemy in the north consisted of 13 Iraqi Army Divisions with over 

150,000 enemy soldiers. It included two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions, 

two mechanized infantry divisions, one armor division, and eight infantry 

divisions. The Iraqi II Corps included the anti-Iranian regime group, the 

Mujahedin-E-Khalq’s (MEK).10 Other threats in the north included the Fedayeen Saddam militia and the terrorist group Ansar al Islam.11

Order of Battle: Friendly Forces

The CFLCC ground forces included the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), Task Force Tarawa, a 7,200-man force of Marines and sailors from 

the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and the 1st Marine Division. They 

would attack from the Iraq-Kuwait border and advance into Iraq.12 These 

units comprised the CFLCC main effort, which would attack toward Baghdad while Task Force Viking disrupted and fixed enemy forces to the north. 

TF Viking consisted of variety of SOF, conventional, joint, combined, 

and indigenous forces. At its core was the 10th SFG(A) Headquarters and 

its 2nd and 3rd Battalions as well as the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG(A), 

(3-3 SFG(A)). The task force also consisted of other joint and coalition 

special operations units: 404th Civil Affairs Battalion; D Company, 96th 

Civil Affairs Battalion; A Company, 9th Psychological Operations (PYSOP) Battalion; the 352nd Special Operations Group (Air Force Special 

Operations Command); and Task Force 7 Special Boat Service from the 

United Kingdom. Conventional Army and joint forces that also contributed to TF Viking were the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain 

Division; elements of the 26thMarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the 

173rd Airborne Brigade. At its peak, Task Force Viking consisted of approximately 5,200 personnel and over 52,000 Kurdish Peshmerga forces.13
181

Together, these forces prevented three Iraqi Corps from moving south 

to reinforce Baghdad, which supported conventional forces in their movement north toward Baghdad. 

Task Force Viking—Operations in Northern Iraq

On 20 March 2003, the 10th SFG(A) infiltrated via special operations 

aircraft to partner with indigenous forces and lead them in combat. Due to 

the regional dynamics, US SOF had to be rapidly inserted via air circumventing Turkish airspace. Having established the lodgment, SOF then enabled the introduction and buildup of conventional elements. Over a brief 

period of time, SOF created the foothold and enabled the operational-level maneuver of CF to build the coalition combat power in northern Iraq. 

CF-SOF operational synergy maximized the various and complementary 

capabilities to achieve decisive operational results. 

Figure 10.2. Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 

Boundaries. Map created by Army University Press.

WASIT

NINEVAH

AL ANBAR

KIRKUK

DIYALA

DAHUK

SALAH AD DIN

AS SULAYMANIYAH

IRBIL

Mosul

Kirkuk

Samarra

Irbil

BABIL

Turkey

 Sulaymaniyah

N

Iran Syria

Iraq

Baghdad











 Ramadi

Babaqua BAGHDAD

Kurdistan Depmocratic Party (KDP)

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

KDP and PUK Boundaries

March 2003

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles
182

Once on the ground, TF Viking created a combined force with the 

52,000-man strong Kurdish Peshmerga that comprised two factions; the 

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party 

(KDP). Although historical antagonists of one another, the PUK and KDP 

would work toward a combined goal with the US Special Forces to fight a 

common enemy. The 10th SFG(A) success was due in part to many senior 

officers and NCOs of TF Viking having built trust and rapport more than 

a decade prior when the 10th SFG(A) helped save the lives of thousands 

of Kurds during Operation Provide Comfort following Operation Desert 

Storm.14 It was the long-term persistent partner engagement that helped 

the Task Force understand the cultural and political nuances of this particular mission. 

The Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) that TF Viking established 

in northern Iraq encompassed over 173,000 square kilometers and was 

bordered by Turkey to the north, Iran to the East, and to the south by the 

Green Line, which separated Iraq proper from the Kurdish autonomous 

zone (see Figure 10.2). 

The JSOA was subdivided in half with two Special Operations Areas (SOA): East and West. The 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group 

(Airborne) (3-10 SFG(A)) and the PUK Peshmerga operated in SOA East 

while 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (2-10 SFG(A)) 

and the KDP Peshmerga operated in SOA West. 

The TF Viking commander understood the Peshmerga were fighting 

on their “home field” and although the Peshmerga approached warfighting 

very differently than US forces, they were nonetheless effective. The SF 

Teams built rapport, trust, and confidence by not trying to change how the 

Peshmerga fought but rather by allowing them to fight their way and to 

support their approach with US technology, airpower and planning.15 This 

dynamic synergy produced decisive results.

Battle of Debecka Crossroads

In late March 2003, 2-10 SFG(A), occupied the western half of TF 

Viking’s area of responsibility. Situated along the Green Line, 2nd Battalion faced four dug-in and well-equipped divisions of the Iraqi V Corps. 

Covering a 200-kilometer front with little more than light antitank weapons, limited close air support (CAS), and assistance from their Peshmerga

allies, 2-10 SFG(A) dual mission was to defend the north, and to keep as 

many Iraqi troops as possible focused on them and not on Baghdad.16

During the first few days of April 2003, 2-10 SFG(A) and their Peshmerga counterparts took the offensive and steadily drove the enemy to-
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ward the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul. Perhaps the most intense resistance faced by the 2nd Battalion was in Debecka on 6 April 2003.17 The 

town of Debecka is located 40 kilometers southwest of Irbil, and further 

to the northeast is Zurqah Ziraw Dagh Ridge, referred to by Americans as 

“Dog Ridge.” On the side of the ridge is a small village named Pir Da’ud, 

where Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 044 established an observation post (OP) during the initial stages of OIF.18 From their OP, ODA 044 

could see Iraqi soldiers manning mortar, heavy machine gun, and antiaircraft artillery positions.

In preparation for the offensive, ODAs 044 and 043 from 10th SFG(A) were joined by ODAs 391, 392, 393, and 395 from 3rd SFG(A) (see 

Figure 10.3) who brought Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMVs) with M2 .50 

caliber machine guns and MK19 40mm automatic grenade launchers. The 

plan was to soften the ridgeline with close air support during the evening, 

and at sunrise launch four simultaneous assaults against the ridgeline and 

Figure 10.3. ODA Disposition during Battle for Debecka Crossroads. Map created by Army University Press. 

ODA Disposition During

Battle for Debecka Crossroads

6-7 April 2003

N

Road

Trail

Stream

Contour Line

Village

Destroyed Village

Military Objective

SF Team
184

two separate objectives. Prior contact with brigades of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Infantry Division made the outcome of the attack far from certain.19

The morning of the attack, the assault forces quickly reached the base 

of the ridge. The two independent Peshmerga columns met only limited opposition, and reaching their objective first, swarmed across the central portion of the ridgeline. However, the two flank columns faced much 

greater resistance and the assault became a battle.20 The ODAs then closed 

to within 1,700 meters and began to engage the enemy with MK19 40mm 

automatic grenade launchers and M2 .50 caliber machine guns. 

Before long, the Iraqis responded with their own heavy machine guns 

and mortars. ODA 043 was able to employ both US Air Force B-52s and 

US Navy F-18s, and the assault force quickly seized the objective. The 

Peshmerga captured several prisoners, mortars, and heavy machine guns.21

The ODAs maneuvered operating in two-vehicle sections each of which 

possessed its own forward air controller. Once the assault force reached 

the reverse slope on the southeast side of the road, it encountered dugin troops supported by heavy weapons. During a brief skirmish, Special 

Forces (SF) and Peshmerga soldiers captured approximately 30 enemy 

prisoners, including several officers and two Republican Guardsmen. One 

Iraqi lieutenant colonel confirmed that the aerial bombardments had demoralized his soldiers. In the end, the Iraqis on the ridge welcomed the 

opportunity to surrender.22

After the ridge was secure, the Peshmerga continued to advance, 

and the SF teams quickly established control over the area. The teams 

maintained dominance for approximately 45 minutes until the situation 

quickly deteriorated. The ODAs began to receive direct fire from the tanks 

and quickly withdrew to an intermediate ridgeline. ODAs 391, 392, and 

044B established a hasty linear defense at the intermittent ridge. As they 

continued to receive tank, mortar, and heavy machine gun fire, at least 

five Iraqi tanks, four armored personnel carriers, two troop trucks, several 

command vehicles, and a company of infantry approached the intersection. The ODAs decided to defend the ridge and returned fire with Javelin 

missiles and heavy machine guns, forcing the enemy tanks to halt behind 

an embankment. Dismounted infantry from the armored personnel carriers 

sought cover in an abandoned hamlet.23

However, as the Iraqis began to hit the ridge with smoke, the ODAs 

realized that the enemy had ranged their positions, and the teams decided to pull back. But by now, the Iraqis were reeling from the combined 

air-ground onslaught, and their second counterattack faltered badly. By 
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the end of the first day, the ODAs and Peshmerga had driven the enemy from Zurqah Ziraw Dagh Ridge, repelled three successive armored 

counter-attacks, and broken the enemy critical line of communication at 

Debecka. The intense battle for the crossroads had itself lasted for two and 

a half hours, and when it was over, the small force of SF and Peshmerga

fighters had destroyed five T- 55 tanks, three armored personnel carriers, 

eight cargo vehicles, and had neutralized 90 enemy troops.24 The battle 

for Debecka crossroads was a tactical victory in every sense to include 

the CF-SOF operational synergy between the ground forces and the close 

air support provided by the US Air Force and Navy. But it also served 

a larger operational purpose. Besides dealing a significant blow against 

conventional Iraqi forces, the victory facilitated future SF and Peshmerga

advances toward Mahkmur and Al Qayyarah as well as buying time for a 

larger US force buildup in the north and the advance of the coalition main 

effort from the south.

Operation Viking Hammer

Meanwhile, in the eastern SOA, 3-10 SFG(A) needed to gain the full 

trust and cooperation of the PUK Peshmerga in order to persuade them 

to fully commit men and equipment against the Iraqi divisions along the 

Green Line. 

In preparing his campaign plan for Northern Iraq, the Commander of 

the 10th SFG(A) faced a two-pronged dilemma. His primary opposition in 

the region came in the form of three Iraqi Corps massed along the Green 

Line. To confront this force, his 300 Special Forces Soldiers joined with 

more than 52,000 Kurdish fighters arrayed against Iraqi forces. Yet, prior 

to engaging the Iraqi frontline forces, he determined he needed to eliminate the threat to the Kurdish rear area (see Figure 10.4) posed by the 

Ansar al-Islam (AaI) terrorist organization.25

AaI routinely skirmished with the Kurdish troops from its stronghold 

above the town of Halabjah near the Iranian border. With well-developed 

defensive positions on the high ground, the 700-man strong AaI was a 

formidable threat to any Kurdish operations. An additional threat was a 

suspected Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) site located in the village 

of Sargat at the foot of the Shandahari Ridge. The mission to defeat Ansar 

al-Islam was assigned to 3-10 SFG(A) and the mission was named Operation Viking Hammer. While 3-10 SFG(A) was already engaged along the 

Green Line, Viking Hammer was assigned to a reinforced Charlie Company, 3-10 SFG(A) to counter the AaI threat in the east. 
186

The principal allies in the fight against AaI were the 6,500 Peshmerga

fighters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK leadership 

looked to the American Special Forces to provide the firepower and close 

air support for an attack against AaI. The PUK also realized that having 

US forces by their side would deter Iran from openly backing AaI. The 

Commanders of 3rd Battalion, and the PUK Peshmerga formulated a sixpronged attack to drive AaI out of the valley and seize the suspected WMD 

site at Sargat. Before the attack commenced, however, a demonstration of 

US firepower and resolve was in order.26 

ODA 081 occupied a small house in Halabjah, looking down the valley toward the AaI stronghold. On the evening of 21 March, the 3-10 SFG(A) Commander and the Peshmerga Commander stood on the roof of the 

house watching in anticipation of the first missile attack on the AaI forces. 

An anxious 25 minutes after the scheduled strike time, the first Tomahawk 

Land Attack Missile (TLAM) impacted on the AaI positions. Every few 

minutes for the next three hours, another TLAM struck the target. By the 

end of the bombardment, 64 TLAMs had impacted in the region of the AaI 

base of operations, though with minimum effectiveness, since the enemy 

took shelter in their caves. Missiles detonated around the WMD facility 

at Sargat, and throughout the targeted sector, but did not significantly degrade Aal’s defensive positions.27 Defeating AAI would require a well-coordinated ground assault.

At 0600 on 28 March, the ground assault commenced. Operation Viking Hammer began with the six-pronged attack up the valley. Each of the 

assault forces consisted of 900-1500 Peshmerga fighters, accompanied by 

members of an SF ODA. In order to command the fight, the 3-10 SFG(A) 

headquarters co-located with Advanced Operating Base (AOB) 090 on 

Hill 654 where they could see almost the entire valley. 

The combined force made considerable progress along all the assault 

routes. As they swept through the valley, SF and Peshmerga soldiers observed the AaI fighters fleeing higher up the valley from the Biyara area 

to more heavily fortified positions on the slopes of Shram Mountain. The 

northern element of ODA and Peshmerga headed to Sargat, which was 

secured at approximately 1000 hours. 

Once darkness fell, the PUK troops regrouped and consolidated their 

positions. Four AC-130 gunships maintained pressure on the scattered AaI 

fighters and prevented them from regrouping. The attack continued on 29 

March with the forces advancing northeast and seizing the high ground. 

Other forces pushed out from Sargat and expanded their perimeter to in-
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clude the villages of Hanidind and Daramar. Throughout the rest of the 

day and into the next, the PUK chased AaI towards the Iranian border, 

where many crossed without difficulty, while others were met with fire 

from the Iranians and forced back toward the Peshmerga.28 By 30 March, 

the PUK was in control of the formerly AaI-dominated valley and held the 

high ground. Operation Viking Hammer had eliminated AaI as an effective fighting force, and removed the threat to the PUK rear area. With this 

accomplished, the mission transitioned to supporting the rest of the PUK 

forces on the Green Line. The presence of the SF teams helped the Peshmerga in numerous ways, from providing close air support and indirect 

Figure 10.4. Task Force Viking Operations in March–April 2003. Map created 

by Army University Press.

N

1st RG Corps

• 1 x Mech Div

• 1 x Inf Div

V RA Corps

• 1 x Mech Div

• 3 x Inf Div

I RA Corps

• 1 x Mech Div

• 3 x Inf Div

II RA Corps

• 1 x Arm Div

• 2 x Inf Div

Task Force Viking

Operations

March–April 2003 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

Coalition Units

Iraqi Units
188

fire, to assisting with command and control and combined planning before 

the attack. The SF presence was important in less quantifiable ways, as 

well. As the 3-10 SFG(A) Commander remarked, “the morale boost for 

the PUK of seeing US SF in their ranks cannot be understated. The ODA 

members attacking with them were tangible proof that the US was committed to providing them assistance.”29 With the Aal threat gone, C/3-10 

SFG(A) and the PUK were free to join the rest of the Kurdish and TF Viking forces in attacking the Iraqis on the Green Line and opening the way 

for coalition control of the north.

Liberation of Kirkuk and Mosul

After the defeat of Ansar al-Islam to the east, the 3-10 SFG(A) consolidated with their PUK Peshmerga and continued operations in the eastern 

SOA along the Green Line. As they seized the town of Chamchamal, they 

forced the Iraqis to withdraw to the outskirts of Kirkuk. With the attached 

forces of ODAs from the 3-3 SFG(A) who were supported by 2-14 Infantry from the 10th Mountain Division, they could secure the oil fields 

around Kirkuk. As the TF Viking units advanced, Iraqi positions along the 

Green Line were weakened by air strikes from coalition aircraft. Wave 

after wave of US airpower destroyed enemy formations and supported 

the ground attacks. The aerial bombardment coupled with indigenous networks deep in denied areas within the city facilitated the relatively quick 

defeat of the Iraqi forces and facilitators in and around the city. Kurdish 

networks and covert manpower working with the PUK Peshmerga enabled 

effective targeting thus hastening the Iraqi withdrawal. 30

Following the seizure of Kirkuk by the Special Forces and Peshmerga 

and the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces on 10 April 2003, troops and tanks 

from the 173rd Airborne Brigade were brought forward from Bashur airfield 150 kilometers to the north to occupy the city and surrounding oil 

fields, allowing the ODAs and PUK Peshmerga to move back north of the 

Green Line. It was critical to regional strategic partnerships that the PUK 

Peshmerga be kept out of Kirkuk after they helped liberate it. 

 The Commander of 3-10 SFG(A) and his staff were keenly aware of 

the strategic impacts and they required the 173rd to take over occupation 

of the city.31 The battle to seize Kirkuk was significant in that it kept the 

Iraqi Army divisions engaged in battle so as to not retreat south in defense 

of Baghdad (see Figure 10.5). The CF-SOF operational synergy proved effective as the elements of the 10th Mountain Division worked seamlessly 

with the 3rd SFG(A) ODAs and the 173rd Airborne Brigade being brought 

forward to occupy the city and the surrounding oil fields. 
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The day after Kirkuk was liberated, ODAs from 2-10 SFG(A) with 

their KDP Peshmerga moved towards the city of Mosul in the western 

SOA. As they advanced toward Mosul, they seized and relinquished 

ground in a series of hard fought skirmishes with Iraqi forces. Whereas Kirkuk had a predominantly Kurdish population, Mosul was mostly 

Arab and strongly supported the Iraqi army. Resistance in the city was 

much more significant and the arrival of Kurdish Peshmerga only served 

to aggravate the situation. However, there was also a Kurdish population 

in the city and the Peshmerga had a strong interest in reuniting. The 2-10 

SFG(A) Commander was in an awkward situation. While he needed the 

Kurds to fight the Iraqi forces, he could not allow them to advance into 

Mosul, due to the regional strategic alliances with Turkey. After the Special Forces and Peshmerga seized Mosul, the battalion would struggle to 

Figure 10.5. Liberation of Kirkuk and Mosul 10–11 April 2003. Map created by 

Army University Press.

Task Force Viking

• March–April 2003

• 5,200 Coalition

• 52,000 Peshmerga

Iraqi Army Divisions

• 2 Republican Guard Div

• 2 Mech Infantry Div

• 1 Armor Div

• 8 Infantry Div

Liberation of Kirkuk

and Mosul

10–11 April 2003 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

Coalition Units

Iraqi Divisions

Peshmerga Units

Green Line

N
190

keep all of the Peshmerga out of the city. A city of two million people is 

difficult for an SF battalion to secure alone. Task Force Viking developed 

a plan to introduce the 26thMEU to occupy the city and satisfy US, Kurdish, and strategic interests. As the 26th MEU occupied Mosul on 11 April 

2003, the SFODAs moved their Peshmerga forces back north of the Green 

Line.32 Without the CF-SOF synergy between the Marines and the ODAs, 

Mosul would have been challenging to secure and maintain order.

Key Findings of TF Viking Operations

An ad hoc CF-SOF Task Force came together in a place and time 

that larger, less flexible units could not infiltrate due to regional politics. 

Through years of persistent partner engagement, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was able to partner with a 52,000-man indigenous 

force and fixed, disrupted and in some cases, defeated an overwhelming 

150,000-man strong enemy comprising 13 Iraqi divisions including Armor, Mechanized Infantry, and Republican Guard as well as the Fedayeen 

Saddam, the MEK, and Ansar al Islam. 

At the tactical level, CF-SOF achieved results that could only have 

been produced by combining their respective capabilities. To destroy enemy formations, Task Force Viking relied heavily on US Air Force and 

Navy airpower. Airpower provided the overmatching capabilities against 

armor, mechanized formations, and reinforced positions. When combined with the amassed Peshmerga dismounted forces, Task Force Viking 

achieved decisive tactical results in eliminating Iraqi threats and supporting the offensive to the south. The tactical integration of airpower, indigenous forces, CF and SOF reveal the synergistic effects of CF and SOF 

when their capabilities combine.

Fixing and disrupting 13 Iraqi divisions, and defeating the MEK and 

AaI enabled the CFLCC main effort to achieve its end state. The combined CF, SOF, and indigenous efforts provided an effective, alternative 

solution to build combat power in the north and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy high command. By infiltrating into northern Iraq, SOF 

turned denied areas into contested space. From that contested space SOF 

harnessed the power of indigenous forces to support strategic outcomes. 

Furthermore, SOF clearing and securing key cities and CF occupation facilitated post-conflict transition. In both Kirkuk and Mosul, the transition 

from Phase III combat operations to Phase IV stability operations occurred 

quickly and in Kirkuk occurred nearly overnight. This was due in large 

part to linkages between SOF, the Peshmerga forces, and the Kurdish elements in the cities. Illustrating the power of the Indigenous Approach, the 
191

SOF teams and the Peshmerga quickly activated the local populace who 

immediately came back to their jobs helping establish local governance 

and establishing basic services such as power, water, and trash removal.33

TF Viking adroitly employed both indigenous combat power and indigenous civil capacity during the conduct of their operations.

The battles TF Viking waged across the extended Green Line were 

highly decentralized. Key to victory was the aggregated effort of the 

ODAs working with the Peshmerga. The ODAs were operating on commander’s intent and broad guidelines. Subordinates, down to the Team 

Leaders executed the plans, exploited success, and kept the Kurds at the 

forefront of the effort.34 When combined with US air power and technology, decentralized mission command enabled the Peshmerga’s indigenous 

way of fighting to achieve success.

Subordinating the 173rd Airborne Brigade to Task Force Viking, while 

unique in the integration of special operations forces and conventional 

forces during OIF, proved essential. The conventional forces provided the 

TF Viking commander the increased ability to retain more ground than 

would have otherwise been possible with Special Forces battalions alone. 

Further, the 173rd served as a highly visible indicator of US presence and 

resolve—reassuring to both the Turks and Kurds. This was crucial after 

SOF and Peshmerga forces liberated the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. The 

173rd provided the TF Viking commander the ability to occupy the key 

oil production facilities, a specified strategic goal.35 The command relationship between CF and SOF facilitated achieving the operational goals. 

The success of Task Force Viking is a testament to CF-SOF operational 

synergy and should be incorporated into joint and combined training to 

preserve these valuable gains from the past two decades.36

Multi-Domain Operations and Army Special Operations 

Forces (ARSOF) Implications

The maturing Multi-Domain Battle concept reflects a deeper internalization by the Joint Force of how different forms of maneuver can exploit 

various types of terrain and gain positional advantage. It also creates an 

opportunity to advance principles of unified land operations, specifically 

combined arms, through a greater appreciation of multi-domain operational synchronization and CF-SOF operational synergy.

The Multi-Domain Battle concept posits several multi-domain battle 

challenges. To contribute to the Joint Force response to address these challenges, ARSOF has four pillars of capabilities. ARSOF provides strategic 
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value through indigenous approaches, precision targeting operations, developing understanding and wielding influence, and crisis response. 

The first multi-domain battle challenge asks: how do US forces deter the escalation of violence; defeat threat operations to destabilize the 

region; and turn denied spaces into contested spaces should violence escalate? The ARSOF indigenous approach develops resilient and resistant 

partners to prevail against adversary threats short of armed conflict and 

maintains cohesive networks of people and organizations that condition 

the environment against sudden shocks. ARSOF persistent global presence and expeditionary capabilities enable the joint force to seize early 

initiatives by setting theaters and frustrating adversaries’ direct and indirect strategies. 

In this regard, the MDB concept may benefit by accounting for indigenous maneuver. The potential effects created by indigenous mass in both 

the competition space and armed conflict are a force multiplier that cannot be created overnight and should be a doctrinal long term investment. 

Equally, the Human Domain must be considered for the success of MDB. 

The most prevalent forms of conflict include insurgency, rebellion, civil 

war, or resistance movements. MDB should consider incorporating indigenous maneuver and aspects of the Human Domain as the concept matures.

Second, how do US forces maneuver from contested strategic and 

operational depth, with sufficient combat power in time to defeat enemy 

forces? Through ARSOF crisis response, a small number of operators can 

rapidly address emergencies to enable host nation solutions to local or regional security challenges. ARSOF conduct precision targeting operations 

against uniquely difficult, high-value targets. ARSOF can rapidly infiltrate 

austere, remote locations and quickly mass combat power—from individual operators to regimental-size formations—to seize, destroy, capture, or 

recover designated targets in contested and denied areas. 

Third, how do US policies and leaders allow ground forces to defeat the 

enemy in the close area? During armed conflict, indigenous mass developed 

by ARSOF during competition provides combat power to create physical, 

virtual, and cognitive effects in the close, deep maneuver, and strategic fires 

areas. ARSOF support major combat operations through direct action (DA) 

in the form of precision targeting, deep-penetration raids or interdiction operations and special reconnaissance (SR) against targets of strategic or operational significance. ARSOF deploy tailorable mission command nodes and 

scalable force packages to conduct independent, dispersed, cross-domain 
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operations at the tactical and operational levels in lethal, contested, and denied environments either unilaterally or with partner forces. 

Future Operating Environment (FOE) Considerations

How do battles that occurred almost two decades ago help prepare our 

force for competition and conflict two decades in the future? Significant 

challenges will emerge in the FOE over the next 20 years. Globalization 

will continue to accelerate the spread of technology and its exploitation. 

The environment will be comprised of adversaries and competitors both 

known and yet to be realized. Conflict will emerge in many nascent forms 

and across multiple domains. Nation states have watched non-state actors 

impose huge costs on the United States. The United States represents a 

threat to its enemies and their autocratic systems of government which 

will continue to use proxies and internally subversive campaigns to undermine and make the United States vulnerable to defeat. The following 

aspects of the environment are significant for ARSOF capability development and their implications on the future force.

Technology’s proliferation and rate of change will empower state actors, non-state actors, and even individuals with competitive advantages. 

A globally connected world will have pervasive human-machine connectivity, allowing for unprecedented ease of communication and access to 

information. Adversaries will need minimal investment to employ social 

media and informational technologies to influence vulnerable populations, 

spread their ideologies, gather support, fund operations, crowd-source intelligence, and share techniques. Adversaries will likely challenge the stability of regions and US interests through indirect means and approaches. 

Implications for the Future Character of Warfare

Identifying the FOE is challenging, but determining how to prepare to 

compete and win is an even more daunting task. Looking through the lens 

of the past with an assessment of the future allows for the formulation of 

implications for future warfare. Five implications emerge with relevance 

to future competition and conflict: 

1. The value of persistent partner engagement and the indigenous approach.

2. Beyond I3 (integration, interoperability, and interdependence); CF-SOF 

operational synergy.

3. Purpose-built units.

4. The empowered Soldier.

5. Physical, virtual, cognitive mass
194

The first implication deliniates persistent partner engagement and the 

indigenous approach, ARSOF Soldiers and units provide commanders options to condition the OE favorable to policy objectives.37 Hence, ARSOF 

envisions persistent partner engagement to orchestrate partnered activities 

around a continuously responsive OE framework that expands operational 

maneuver options.38

Persistent partner engagement enables ARSOF to develop long-term 

relationships necessary to resist negative influences and remain resilient 

in adversity.39 They will provide physical, cognitive, and virtual support 

to resistance movements as a means to alter an adversary’s cost calculus. 

Persistent partner engagement takes advantage of relationships to respond 

to security changes in environments where operational reach is strained 

and the ability to mass forces is constrained. It is part of a campaigning 

approach using the advantage of operational time, particularly during security contexts outside of combat operations.40 Such campaigning to engage partners expands the strategic start point and anticipates strategic 

risks earlier in their development. Global relationships also enable crisis 

response. ARSOF positions its force globally to respond with partners to 

crises. In effect, “Persistent engagement helps nurture relationships to the 

left of the bang that build trust, increase understanding, facilitate stability, 

buy time to prevent conflict, and shape the environment for the use of 

short-notice direct action should it become necessary.”41 These options to 

escalate or de-escalate security conditions are a way that ARSOF can harness the power of partners when competing below armed conflict.

The second implication demonstrates I3: For years, the conventional Army and Army special operations have placed tremendous effort on 

strengthening the relationship between the two. The current characterization of that CF and SOF relationship leans on integration, interoperability, 

and interdependence (I3). These terms capture the essence of interaction, 

cooperation, and compatibility. The efforts to date regarding these aims 

toward compatibility must continue. However, the element of acting together coherently, which is synergy, has been oriented toward the ability for CF and SOF to operate together. CF and SOF should elevate that 

foundation to confront future challenges, particularly in the competition 

space with a synergy that synchronizes the effects of the two formations 

over time. Achieving synergy by combining conventional and SOF operations aims for greater effectiveness of long-term campaigns and theater 

operations. It is not an end to itself. It is an operational methodology to 

synchronize complementary capabilities for amplified effect on physical, 
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virtual, and cognitive objectives. CF-SOF operational synergy is a way to 

expand maneuver options at the operational and strategic levels.

The third implication shows that the ARSOF unit is configurable, 

purpose-built to deploy and conduct ARSOF activities and operations. It 

leverages capabilities in all domains at tactical, operational, and strategic 

levels, including cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and space. It requires access to some of those capabilities based on purpose but without necessarily 

owning them as organic elements. The purpose-built, integrated ARSOF 

unit is linked with internal and external entities and networks to achieve 

robust awareness and to exercise mission command. A tailorable unit of 

action would be composed of a range of capabilities, either permanently 

organized, or formed on an ad hoc basis. It would also harness traditionally 

non-military talent and expertise based on particular mission requirements. 

Within ARSOF, one such unit is the 1st Special Forces Command 

(Airborne). As a 2-star, Special Operations, deployable headquarters, it 

deploys and may become a Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) 

to provide mission command of all joint and combined special operations 

activities in a Theater or JSOA. 

ARSOF also redesigned a battalion in each of its five active duty Special Forces Groups to fill identified gaps and increase capability and lethality. Known as the 4th Battalion Redesign, these battalions were changed to 

support a broader, worldwide mission of assessing, training, and advising 

partner nation forces. The Army realized its own requirement to fill gaps 

in training and advising foreign partners and developed the Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFABs). 

The fourth implication involves the empowered Soldier. Army special operations will continue to embrace the first SOF truth: “Humans are 

more important than hardware.”42 This truth will be even more relevant 

in a future environment that relies heavily on technological advantages. 

In the future, the Soldier will remain the organizational centerpiece, and 

the Soldier will remain a master of the human domain. Therefore, ARSOF 

will purposefully focus on its efforts to understand and influence human 

aspects of military operations as it increases its lethality.43

The empowered ARSOF Soldier is a self-contained battle director of 

human, machine, and information systems. The ARSOF Soldier garners 

these unique skills, which provide an edge when operating in politically 

sensitive or austere conditions. The ARSOF Soldier is a balanced person 

possessing innate characteristics and learned competencies. The Soldier 
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can operate comfortably with current technologies and can rely on physical discipline to overcome the harshness of austere environments and combat.44 Awareness tools and lethal systems that are all enabled seamlessly 

by artificial intelligence augment the empowered Soldier. He or she is able 

to thrive in complex and ill-defined environments. The ARSOF Soldier 

will be optimized by harnessing the Soldier’s competency, cognition, and 

performance, and the totality of the Soldier’s health. 

The fifth implication involves physical, virtual, cognitive mass: ARSOF can generate altogether different forms of mass that can be transferred 

into use by joint forces as combat power. In a conflict context, mass translates to combat power. Alternative forms of mass also provide options to 

consider applying alternative forms of combat power. ARSOF’s ability to 

build and develop effective partner capability around the world is a function of their physical and virtual proximity to those partners. USASOC’s 

experience conducting special operations is that proximity in training and 

operations equates to greater gains in partner abilities. ARSOF live among, 

train, and fight alongside partner forces and will continue to do so in the 

future. However, the nature of those partnering relationships will adapt to 

account for the relative aspect of proximity in virtual spaces. 

Through indigenous approaches, ARSOF provide the joint force access to alternative forms of combat power resident within the operational 

environment. Not only is ARSOF able to complement and compound the 

effects of its capabilities, but it is able to also capitalize on the potential 

power from the Internet of Things (IoT) and civil society. These abstract 

resources are a kind of non-military reserve of data, talent, and expertise 

that is resident outside of the ARSOF institutional architecture. These resource pools are the everyday flows of data, the technologists, scientists, 

academicians, expatriates, and others with information and specific skill 

sets beyond the ability of ARSOF Soldiers to own themselves. ARSOF 

will need to balance the practicality of leveraging its own capacity and 

leveraging that of others. Examples of such resources might include mapping information, marketing data, social media data, or skillsets such as 

app development and coding, bioengineering, and virtual product design. 

These resources constitute abstract sources of power that can be optimized 

as new forms of mass.

Insights

Addressing the implications for future warfare cannot occur in isolation. Joint and inter-organizational partners will need to move forward 

together. Challenges from bureaucratic, organizational, legal, cultural, or 
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financial aspects could jeopardize an integrated effort. Maximizing the full 

scope and potential of future capabilities from across all domains will require a broad, collective approach. 

Policies and regulations must keep pace to address the challenges of 

modern warfare. Adversaries not bound by limits in authorities may be 

able introduce operational dilemmas faster than our own institutional abilities to apply innovative security solutions. Policies and regulations must 

enable future ARSOF and conventional forces to leverage capabilities in 

all domains and to expand the ability to operate not only in physical space, 

but also to operate in cognitive and virtual spaces. 

The ARSOF enterprise could miss the opportunity to seize advantages 

and mitigate risks in the future by moving slowly and failing to adapt. An 

institution trapped by archaic processes would constrain ARSOF’s ability 

to deliver its capabilities for the nation. ARSOF must pursue the rapid, 

operational integration of technology and commercial innovation at a rate 

to outpace adversaries. 

Developing solutions to address the implications for future warfare 

carries a risk of unintended consequences. The solutions could create unintended consequences and unanticipated second and third order effects. 

Leveraging capabilities from all domains, incorporating emerging technology, operating in physical, virtual, and cognitive spaces requires rigorous integration of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes, prototyping, 

and testing to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences. 

Implementing the solutions to address future warfare could disrupt the 

enterprise’s ability to recruit, train, and equip personnel and units ready 

for employment. Recognizing the SOF truth that humans are more important than hardware and that the Soldier is the primary weapon system 

of ARSOF, the enterprise will need to reevaluate the necessary attributes 

of its personnel to meet the requirements of the future. More broadly, incorporating the solutions could result in potential adjustments to current 

processes, organizational structures, capabilities, standards, and perhaps 

the way the enterprise sees itself. 

Conclusion 

Task Force Viking’s operations in northern Iraq provide lessons for 

today and implications for future warfare. Harnessing the combat power 

of the Kurdish forces demonstrates the value of approaches that incorporate partner and ally capabilities. It underscores the need in the future to 
198

conduct persistent partner engagement over time, build capabilities, and 

grow relationships through indigenous approaches. The CF-SOF synergy 

at tactical, operational, and strategic levels which produced decisive results reflects the synergy required tomorrow. Incorporating multi-domain 

capabilities against the diverse range of adversaries of the future will necessitate synergy among many mission partners and their capabilities. 

The rapid aggregation of a variety of units under Task Force Viking 

reflects the agility and flexibility required to form purpose-built units for 

the future. Comprised of a range of capabilities, they will form, reform, 

and harness talent and expertise based on particular mission requirements. 

The Soldiers who possessed the skills to lead and advise large-scale indigenous forces and disrupt armor and mechanized forces exemplify the Empowered Soldier of tomorrow. The Empowered ARSOF Soldier will have 

the competencies and skills to prevail in the future, including cross-cultural proficiency within our Special Forces, technology, and digital fluency, 

and the ability to succeed without digital capabilities. Finally, Task Force 

Viking created significant combat power through the physical mass of the 

Peshmerga. In the future, ARSOF will create and orchestrate physical, 

cognitive, and virtual mass in the conduct of campaigns. 

To gain and maintain an enduring competitive advantage over our nation’s adversaries, ARSOF will be compelled to adapt and change in an 

accelerated fashion. As part of the Joint SOF Force, ARSOF will be ready 

to prevent, deter, and defeat adversary strategies both below the level of 

armed conflict and if that fails—during armed conflict. The United States 

Army Special Operations Command is ready to move from the force of 

today to the force of tomorrow to ensure we remain—Without Equal.
199

Notes

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 5-7.

2. The National Security Strategy of 2001 attempted to orient the country toward what it deemed was an “uncertain future.” For more see US White 

House, “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,” December 2000, 

accessed 7 July 2018, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=460717, 4.

3. US White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America,” September 2002, 5, accessed 7 July 2018, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.

4. US White House, 5. 

5. US White House, 15.

6. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point. The United 

States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 29–40.

7. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 47.

8. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 55.

9. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 2002, 8 November 

2002, 5.

10. Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, Commanding General, USASOC 

interviewed by Dan Stoltz, Fort Bragg, NC, 2 May 2018.

11. Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special 

Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 299.

12. Bruce R. Pirnie, “Land Operations,” in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Decisive War, Elusive Peace, ed.Walter L. Perry (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015), 64.

13. Major Isaac J. Peltier, “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of US Army Special Forces,” School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 2004, 24.

14. History of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), accessed 20 

March 2018, https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Groups/10th/history.html.

15. Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles T. Cleveland interviewed by Bob 

Warburg, Fort Bragg, NC, 4 May 2018.

16. Charles H. Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad, Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 

251.

17. Briscoe et al., 252.

18. Briscoe et al., 252.

19. Briscoe et al., 253.

20. Briscoe et al., 254.

21. Briscoe et al., 254.

22. Briscoe et al., 256.

23. Briscoe et al., 257.

24. Briscoe et al., 258–59.

25. Briscoe et al., 194.
200

26. Briscoe et al., 195.

27. Briscoe et al., 195.

28. Briscoe et al., 197.

29. Briscoe et al., 198.

30. Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, Commanding General, USASOC 

interviewed by Dan Stoltz, Fort Bragg, NC, 2 May 2018.

31. Major Isaac J. Peltier, Surrogate Warfare: The Role of US Army Special 

Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004), 31.

32. Peltier, 32.

33. Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, Commanding General, USASOC 

interviewed by Dan Stoltz, Fort Bragg, NC, 2 May 2018.

34. Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles T. Cleveland, interviewed by Bob 

Warburg, Fort Bragg, NC, 4 May 2018.

35. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 224.

36. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, xviii.

37. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: 16 June 2017), III-4.

38. Derek Eaton, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, and William IV 

Welser. Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

Operations: Insights from Forward-Deployed SOF Personnel, Research Report, 

International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation, 2017, 

accessed 27 April 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_

reports/RR1300/RR1333/RAND_RR1333.pdf.

39. Paul Tompkins and Robert R. Leonhard, “The Science of Resistance,” Small Wars Journal, 24 February 2017, accessed 27 April 2018, http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-science-of-resistance.

40. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 specifically addresses the need to take campaign approaches, even to “daily operations outside of combat.” 

41. Eaton et al, Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations, 1.

42. “SOF News: Special Operations from Around the World,” accessed 24 

April 2018, https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

43. The “Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO)” concept describes these human aspects as “the interactions among 

humans and between humans and the environment that influence decisions.” See 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations 

(JC-HAMO),” 19 October 2016, 1.

44. Todd South, “Hackers wanted: Special ops leaders seek soldiers who 

can fight the enemy up close and online,” Army Times, 3 October 2017, accessed 

27 April 27 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/10/03/

hackers-wanted-special-ops-leaders-seek-soldiers-who-can-fight-the-enemy-upclose-and-online.
201

Chapter 11

Maintaining Capability and Options: Dismounted 

Reconnaissance in the Division and Corps Deep Area

Major Brendon E. Terry

Our expanding technology has given us the employment of satellites for reconnaissance, specially designed aircraft, sophisticated 

infrared techniques, and many others. While these are all important, the man on the ground—well-trained and alert—still remains 

an important element in our reconnaissance structure. Only he 

can go places where the infrared or the aerial camera cannot go.1

—Colonel Harold R. Aaron

Corps headquarters play a significant role in physical and temporal deep area operations. Temporally, corps planners must project 

into the future and decide what conditions can be created and 

exploited to defeat the enemy and accomplish the corps mission. 

Corps deep operations are those activities which are directed 

against enemy forces not currently engaged in the close operation, 

but capable of engaging or inflicting damage in future close operations. Information collection, fires, EW, cyberspace operations, 

and tactical deception (TAC-D) focus on high-pay off targets in 

the corps deep area. Many of these capabilities are not resident in 

the corps. As such, the corps headquarters coordinates for these 

through planning and the targeting process for joint support (including joint fires; EW; cyberspace operations; and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance).2

—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

The conventional US Army currently lacks an organic capability at 

the division and corps level, or Echelon Above Brigade (EAB), to conduct 

ground reconnaissance operations without task-organizing forces from 

subordinate units. In addition to the division cavalry squadron and corps 

cavalry regiment, the US Army historically possessed a long-range surveillance detachment or company (LRSD/C) to provide a deep dismounted reconnaissance or surveillance capability for the division and corps.3

 As 

of 2017, the US Army has deactivated all of these units in both the active 

and reserve components.4

 While the dedicated unit may no longer exist in 

the conventional force, the need for the capability endures and could be 

needed in future large-scale combat operations against peers challenging 

and disrupting other reconnaissance methods.
202

This chapter begins by examining the doctrinal role of the EAB 

headquarters, the deep fight, and doctrine of a necessary capability to 

fulfill that purpose, reconnaissance. It presents a force management summary of historic dismounted reconnaissance units to set the stage for 

case studies of Long-Range Patrol (LRP) units in Vietnam and LongRange Surveillance Units (LRSU) in Operations Desert Storm (ODS) 

and Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I). The conclusion analyzes the continuities 

of those case studies and summarizes the case for conventional force 

dismounted reconnaissance capability.

The Purpose of the EAB Headquarters: The Deep Fight

The following analysis focuses on EAB headquarters—a division or 

corps—conducting a mission at the upper tactical or operational level in 

a near-peer hybrid threat environment. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, Theatre 

Army, Corps, and Division Operations, lists roles and tasks of the division 

and corps. These include serving as a tactical headquarters commanding 

two to five divisions or brigades, a joint task force, a joint force land 

component command, or an army forces headquarters—to integrate joint, 

army functional, and special operations capabilities. The purpose of this 

integration is to shape the environment for subordinate units with capabilities they do not possess. The corps and division differ in scope, scale, and 

time horizon. The corps “shapes throughout an operational environment 

to set the conditions for the tactical success of subordinate divisions . . . 

shaping and sustaining in preparation for the next phase of operations.”5

The division focuses on a shorter time horizon, synchronizing joint and 

Army capabilities with brigade maneuver while planning branches and 

sequels to the current tactical phase.6

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-94.2, Deep Operations, and the 

newly published FM 3-0, Operations, reinforce this focus on deep operations for both the corps and division. Operations notes that corps headquarters “play a significant role in physical and temporal deep operations” 

to “project into the future and decide what conditions can be created and 

exploited;” Division deep operations nest with and are reinforced by corps 

capabilities to identify gaps, seams, and opportunities beyond the range of 

their subordinate brigades.7 Deep Operations refers to the responsibility to 

shape operations for subordinate units in the close area through deep operations as “fundamental” for a corps or division headquarters in a tactical 

role.8

 The aggregation of this doctrine illustrates the importance of EAB’s 

focus on operations in the deep area.
203

Reconnaissance Doctrine Review

To create effects in the deep area, the EAB headquarters must collect 

information through reconnaissance and requesting or controlling appropriate targeting assets. Assets typically under the direct, exclusive control of 

an EAB headquarters—both to conduct reconnaissance and place effects—

consist almost exclusively of army aviation and long-range fires assets. The 

division headquarters typically controls a combat aviation brigade, which 

has remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and manned attack-reconnaissance aviation assets organic to its formation.9

 With the transformation of battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSB) to expeditionary military intelligence 

brigades in 2014, no organic or routinely assigned ground reconnaissance 

force falls under direct control of the EAB headquarters.10 Instead, such 

capability requires ad hoc task organization out of forces from other subordinate units. FM 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling 

Tasks, shows the typical forces available at each echelon. Dated 2013, it 

still lists the LRSU and BFSB as assets, and further classifies the dismounted cavalry troop organic to the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) as 

an LRSU equivalent.11 FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, acknowledges the commonality in many aspects of infantry reconnaissance units, but clarifies the focus for special operations forces (SOF) 

at the strategic level, LRSU at the operational level, and infantry battalion 

scout platoons and dismount reconnaissance troops at the tactical level.12

Having reviewed the assets available to the EAB headquarters, the next 

necessary discussion is their doctrinal employment.

The fielded force should possess the capability to fulfill requirements 

and principles defined in doctrine. This chapter shows the capability of dismounted assets to accomplish reconnaissance in the EAB deep area through 

their contribution to the fundamentals and management of reconnaissance 

described in FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations. The fundamentals and management of reconnaissance inform the commander’s 

integration of the forms and methods. Army doctrine lists seven fundamentals of reconnaissance: Ensure continuous reconnaissance, gain and maintain enemy contact, do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve, orient 

on reconnaissance objectives, report all information rapidly and accurately, 

develop the situation rapidly, and retain freedom of maneuver.13 Specific 

circumstances can place these principles in tension with others, and it is the 

art of reconnaissance management to find the optimal balance in execution. 

Achieving this balance of the fundamentals is the goal of reconnaissance management— cueing, mixing, and redundant employment of as-
204

sets to address critical information requirements in priority at the appropriate time. Cueing refers to using one form or method of reconnaissance to 

initiate follow-on or more detailed collection by another form or method; 

mixing involves using different types of reconnaissance or assets concurrently to develop the most complete picture possible; redundancy means 

making use of multiple similar assets or techniques against the same requirement.14 Successful management achieves the maximum possible 

breadth and depth of collection by prioritizing intelligence requirements 

and creating synergy between the different capabilities and limitations of 

each form, asset, and method using the strengths of one to counterbalance 

the limitations in the others.

LRP, Ranger, and LRSU DOTMLPF-P Summary

The US Army first published doctrine for infantry long-range patrols 

in 1962 as FM 31-18, Long Range Patrols, Division, Corps, and Army. 

The manual’s title updated in 1965 to Infantry Long Range Patrol Company, and then in 1968 to Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company. The 

manual focused on a conventional ground war with units only authorized 

at the corps or field army level, and provisionally at the division level.15

The 1968 version defined the role of the company to operate in the “area 

of interest” so as to “not duplicate organic unit reconnaissance,” in language of the period relating to the deep area defined in current doctrine. 

The 1968 edition also included a new chapter on stability operations and 

the formation of provisional units based on lessons learned in operations 

in Vietnam.16 The doctrine reflected understanding of the need for the capability, but the actual organization of units to execute it would not occur 

for several years after the conflict in Vietnam began.

The LRSU doctrine recreated in the 1980s AirLand Battle process was 

“an artful amalgamation” of the prior doctrine and experiences in the Vietnam War. 17 It maintained their employment in the “area of interest,” but 

focused the purpose on intelligence collection with LRSU organic to military intelligence units. 18 LRSU doctrine maintained the heliborne method 

as primary insertion, but also accounted for other airborne, amphibious, 

ground, or stay-behind methods; a later edition included sections on vehicular movement, personnel selection, and operations other than war. 19

US Army Special Forces, followed by conventional units like the 

173rd Airborne Brigade and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (ABD), 

recognized the need and formed provisional LRP units with on-hand personnel and equipment.20 General William Westmoreland, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commander, recognized the suc-
205

cess of these units. In 1966, he directed all divisions and separate brigades 

to organize LRP units provisionally prior to the forthcoming Department 

of the Army approval.21

In the 1980s, provisional LRSU again preceded officially authorized 

units; in this case, the 9th Infantry Division (ID) and the 82nd ABD. Initially, two corps fielded LRSCs and all 18 divisions formed LRSDs in 

the late 1980s. As part of the post-ODS force drawdown, heavy division 

LRSDs inactivated and remaining LRSUs realigned to support different 

headquarters.22 This force structure remained largely the same until 2009, 

when all LRSDs inactivated and LRSCs organized under BFSBs, including all reserve component units.23

In Vietnam, units at all echelons used LRPs; SOF teams worked directly for MACV headquarters while each field force (FF), division, and 

separate brigade possessed LRP capability.24 LRP company location varied within each unit. Often, the division cavalry squadron provided administrative control, while LRP units received operational assignments from 

the intelligence section.25 A similar arrangement emerged at the brigade 

level, with the LRP detachment under the air cavalry troop for support 

and coordination of aviation assets.26 LRP units or sections often operated 

under the control of subordinate units based on mission requirements at 

the corps and division level.27

Doctrinally, the corps and army-level companies had three platoons 

of eight, five-man teams. The company totaled 230 personnel, including a 

communications platoon, a support section with parachute riggers, and an 

operations section. Doctrine described a standard team size of five personnel, subject to mission requirements: patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, 

two radio operators, and one scout observer. 28

In Vietnam’s operations, however, LRP structure was slightly different. The field force companies, when formed, had an authorized strength 

of 230 like the doctrinal company, but with six-man teams. The division 

and brigade level companies or detachments possessed a similar structure 

at the individual team level, but had fewer platoons with fewer teams and 

a less robust support, communications, and headquarters section. Brigade 

units had 61 personnel while the division units had 118.29 A team of four 

personnel—considered the minimum feasible size—sometimes conducted 

LRP missions. However, more often teams operated with an additional 

scout, increasing the team size to six personnel. Teams also often included indigenous personnel or combined into “heavy teams” if planning a 

deliberate ambush, prisoner capture, or similar operation.30 The LRSUs 
206

reorganized in the 1980s had a similar team, platoon, and company or 

detachment structure, scaled appropriate to their echelon.31

LRP personnel in Vietnam took nontraditional paths to train for their 

unit mission. The provisional units consisted initially of volunteers already assigned to subordinate units. As the units remained and individuals 

rotated on tours, replacements included a mix of experienced Soldiers and 

raw recruits. Doctrine suggested a timeline of “eight months to produce 

a long-range patrol”—an unachievable goal for units with personnel who 

rotated individually every 12 months.32 LRP training was a continuous internal program within each organization. After completing individual and 

collective training, units would then use progressively more difficult combat patrols to build each new Soldier’s experience and capability. To augment raw recruits, units took in as many repeat tour personnel and Ranger 

School graduates as possible. Soldiers ideally attended the MACV Recondo School before assignment as a team leader or assistant team leader.33

Personnel for LRSUs were largely second-assignment Soldiers, drawn 

through internal unit selection processes unique to each installation. This 

created varying difficulty in recruiting personnel based on the available 

population. Units such as those at Fort Hood and in Europe with large 

mechanized forces did not have a large pool of light infantry soldiers to 

draw from.34 These units successfully cross-trained mechanized and anti-armor infantrymen, among others, but it was one more hurdle to overcome.35

There was some use of the Q6, which later became the 6B, skill identifier 

to identify LRS personnel trained for these units, but stability and repeat 

assignments were not guaranteed.36 The manning of these units was also 

subject to the level of emphasis the senior commander placed on allowing 

the desired type of personnel outlined in the doctrine to be made available 

for the LRS units—prior successful company commanders, platoon leaders, 

scouts, and other specialties who were de facto, if not de jure, leaders in the 

larger units. Concentrating this quality of personnel in one location would 

tend to lower the proficiency of the larger general population units.

While LRSUs benefited from the establishment of the Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course (LRSLC), later renamed the (still existing) Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC), they had difficulty maintaining the specialized insertion skills called for by doctrine. This difficulty 

primarily manifested in dive and military free-fall (MFF) parachute proficiency, but also in overall team proficiency. Eventually, the US Army removed 

the dive insertion method because the units could not maintain certified dive 

masters to maintain a baseline of proficiency. A combination of factors caused 

this inability—including personnel turnover and longevity, and a variance 
207

caused by unit proximity to facilities and equipment to train in these skills that 

conventional forces, unlike SOF, do not typically employ.37

Case Study 1: Vietnam Long-Range Patrol Units

The US combat action in Vietnam has strong relevance as a case study 

for the future operating environment. The enemy threat was composed 

of a mix of guerilla forces and conventional force units operating in conjunction on the battlefield, much as expected in the potential future operating environment. The terrain of Vietnam also presented, in many ways, 

the ideal case for the use of dismounted, stealthy reconnaissance as it inhibited many other methods. US forces used technology most effectively 

in conjunction with other, traditional collection methods. The only thing 

lacking in the scenario of Vietnam that would apply directly to an analysis 

of future use is the lack of contestation in the air domain; in South Vietnam where US forces waged ground combat, only low-altitude direct fire 

threatened US forces in the air domain. 

LRP teams conducted very small-scale tactical actions whose individual results and aggregation of patterns developed significant information 

at the upper tactical and operational levels. Senior leaders in multiple after-action reviews credited these long-range patrols with developing the 

information that drove major operations. I Field Force Commander Lieutenant General William R. Peers stated at the August 1968 Long-Range 

Patrol Conference that in 1967, “every major battle that the 4th Infantry 

Division got itself into was initiated by the action of an LRP. Every single 

one of them.”38 In his Vietnam Studies monograph, Tactical and Material 

Innovations, US Army Lieutenant General John H. Hay Jr., a division and 

field force commander, also noted the significance of LRPs through their 

increasing frequency of use and effects at the division and higher level.39

Operation Cedar Falls in January 1967 is one example. Beginning in 

late 1966, MACV conducted Operation Rendezvous, a comprehensive 

plan for intelligence collection and pattern analysis. It included all means 

of information collection, including agent reports, overhead infrared collection, airborne radar, radio direction-finding equipment, and long-range 

patrols to feed a pattern analysis of enemy activity. The MACV intelligence officer, Brigadier General Joseph McChristian, used this information to conclude that a strike in the Iron Triangle area of military region 

IV would severely disrupt enemy operations. Operation Cedar Falls then 

led to a significant setback for both North Vietnamese and Vietcong operations.40 In particular, both US Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN) troops found that the enemy locations plotted using pattern anal-
208

ysis prediction correlated very closely with the actual locations discovered 

during the operation, with 156 of 177 predicted enemy locations in the 

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (ACR) area found within 500 meters 

of the predicted position.41 While multiple assets enabled achieving this 

success, it would have been significantly less effective without LRP teams 

because of the key role they played in the intelligence collection.

The 101st ABD and 1st Cavalry Division (CD) operations integrated 

LRP operations with their companies attached to the division air cavalry 

squadron, 2-17th Cavalry and 1-9th Cavalry respectively. The senior officer debriefings of Major Generals Melvin Zais, John Hennessey, and John 

Wright—the three 101st ABD commanding generals from July 1968 to 

January 1971—all mention significant contributions to success by LRP 

and Ranger units.42 Similarly, 1st CD used their LRP company in conjunction with their division reconnaissance squadron assets to pull subordinate 

brigades into an area of operations. Major General Elvy B. Roberts, the 

commanding general from April 1969 to May 1970, outlined use of H Co 

(Ranger), 75th Infantry in detail combined with the scout helicopters, lift 

helicopters, and aero-rifle platoons of 1-9th Cavalry to pinpoint enemy 

supply lines along trail networks. The division committed battalions and 

brigades based on that reconnaissance to disrupt enemy supply operations, 

attack uncommitted forces, etc., in the Phuoc Long province.43 Both units 

reported LRPs enabling disruption of large-scale enemy attacks and integration with other technical reconnaissance measures.44

LRP operational success varied based on their position relative to 

enemy units. If dismounted patrols were close to friendly lines near the 

enemy’s known line of contact, they found enemy forces in a very high 

state of alert, and thus greatly increased the risk of friendly unit compromise and mission failure. However, when patrols infiltrated what current 

doctrine calls the enemy’s support area, enemy units were much less alert 

and the patrols had much more freedom of maneuver, time, and ability to 

collect useful intelligence.45

In both unit employment and the conduct of individual operations, 

LRP units often conducted missions other than reconnaissance or surveillance. Especially later in the conflict and after the name change from LRP 

to Ranger, the units conducted more offensive, deliberate ambush operations as the purpose for the patrol, rather than as an opportunity taken 

close to the planned extraction time. These missions sometimes grew even 

beyond the “heavy team” into full platoon- or company-sized operations. 

Given their association with the air cavalry units, LRP units also common-
209

ly served as a downed aircraft reaction team or as pathfinders for airborne 

and air assault operations.46

Commanders at all echelons generally supported the idea of LRPs. 

They resourced them appropriately with personnel and other assets needed for successful operations like aviation, sometimes assuming significant 

risk in their employment. In several instances, enemy forces eliminated 

entire teams, with all personnel killed or captured. While LRP recruiters 

at replacement depots advertised that the individual LRP mission was less 

risky than being a line infantryman, the risk of catastrophic danger to a 

team was far higher.47 If circumstances delayed or made unavailable indirect fire support, a reaction force, or helicopter gunship support, a small 

recon team could do little to mitigate the risk. While this situation was not 

a common occurrence, nor something deliberately planned, it was a risk 

that high-level commanders accepted when conducting these operations.48

N

Vietnam

 









Ben

Suc

Lai Khe

Rach Bap

Phu Hoa

Dong

Phu Cuong

Trang Bang

Cu Chi

To

Dua Tieng

IRON

TRIANGLE

2nd Bde

To

Saigon

3rd Bde

(Elms)

1

XX

25

3

X

2

3rd Bde (-)

173rd ABN

 Ben Cat

Ho Bo

Woods

Boi Loi

Woods

Thanh Dien Forestry

Reserve

Cau Dinh Jungle



Filhol Plantation

Blocking Position

YANKEE

Blocking Position

ZULU

S&D

Operations

S&D

Operations

S&D

Operations

S&D

Operations

QL

1

QL

13

LTL

14

Cedar Falls Concept

of the Operation

January 1967 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

Ground Assault

Air Assault

S&D Search & Destroy

Figure 11.1. Cedar Falls Concept of the Operation. Map created by Army 

University Press.
210

The support varied between units and even within units as commanders 

changed, but it remained generally positive.

Analyzing LRP operations in Vietnam against the fundamentals of 

reconnaissance reveals their operations most significantly impacted gain 

and maintain enemy contact, maintain freedom of maneuver, and focus 

on the reconnaissance objectives. Adherence to these fundamentals of reconnaissance enabled all aspects of effective reconnaissance management. 

Without the options LRPs provided, reconnaissance management would 

have been much less effective.

A significant contribution, particularly early in the conflict, was the 

ability for LRPs to collect information about the enemy movement in areas where conventional unit action would not suffice and the US Army 

had not yet developed reliable technology-based means. Organic conventional reconnaissance units did not have the equipment or organization to 

conduct the extended foot patrolling required to gain and maintain enemy 

contact in the dense vegetation of Vietnam.49 LRP units provided this essential capability to US forces in Vietnam.

LRPs also had a significant impact on maintaining freedom of maneuver 

for the supported force. As described by General Roberts, the use of 1-9th 

Cavalry with the LRP unit attached allowed the 1st CD to maintain most 

forces out of contact at fire support bases or conducting local security and 

stability missions in their area of operations. When their reconnaissance—

combined with intelligence and other assets—provided information on the 

movement of enemy units or supplies, the division had the flexibility to position its main combat units to conduct the attack. Reconnaissance by main 

force units would likely have been less effective and reduced flexibility.

LRPs had mixed results within the fundamental focus on the reconnaissance objective. One could argue that the deliberate ambush and larger size unit operations misused the capability in methods of employment 

needed to obtain necessary information. The use of LRPs in non-reconnaissance or surveillance missions, such as downed aircraft recovery, does 

violate this principle, but understandably so. The LRPs were an available 

and capable force used to achieve a necessary task. Viewing this principle 

as an absolute, use of LRPs for anything but a stealthy surveillance patrol 

is a misuse of the organization and an unachievable, unrealistic extreme. 

The most significant impact in the framework used for this analysis is 

the LRP’s ability to provide flexibility in conducting effective management 

of reconnaissance. LRPs were most effective when used in conjunction 

with other methods and means of reconnaissance. LRPs provided a criti-
211

cal ability to verify reports from emerging technology such as the “people 

sniffer,” infrared sensors, and ground radar reports. LRPs often emplaced 

these technical assets, later cueing their own reconnaissance missions. 

LRP operations further cued operations by a localized reaction force or 

collectively larger scale battalion and brigade operations. The ability to 

cue, mix, and provide redundancy to other reconnaissance operations was 

the greatest contribution of the LRP units in Vietnam.

Four major factors contributed to LRP success in Vietnam: They occupied optimal locations relative to the enemy’s battlefield framework; 

terrain and the character of the enemy created a dense battlefield favorable for their use; the tempo of the conflict allowed the time necessary for 

stealthy reconnaissance operations to gain necessary information; and the 

chain of command at the highest echelons resourced their formation appropriately and deemed the inherent risk acceptable. LRP use in the Vietnam conflict represents a high point in the breadth and depth of stealthy 

reconnaissance use and integration at all echelons from battalion to corps. 

It provides many templates for what is necessary for their effective formation and employment. The remarks of Colonel Aaron at the 1968 LRP 

Conference, displayed in the epigraph, best summarize utility of these patrols in Vietnam: No matter what new technology comes along, at some 

point a force may have the need to insert ground assets to cover gaps in 

capability and coverage. 50

Case Study 2: Long-Range Surveillance Units in ODS/OIF I

Dedicated dismounted reconnaissance units for the EAB returned 

to the US Army as part of the transition to AirLand Battle doctrine that 

evolved in the 1970s and 1980s.51 These units looked much like the LRP 

units of the Vietnam War, but had broadened in their designed capabilities and purpose to enable the deep disruptive fight that US Army leaders 

envisioned necessary to defeat a Soviet offensive in Europe. The reconstituted reconnaissance force participated in numerous actions, spanning a 

spectrum from close alignment with the doctrinal mission to no alignment 

at all. This analysis focuses on the larger-scale conventional operations in 

Iraq, both in 1990–91 and 2003, as these most closely address the elements 

germane to a division or corps deep fight in a peer or near-peer conflict.

Some consider Operation Desert Storm as the culmination and validation of the AirLand Battle Doctrine revolution that began in the 1970s and 

came to fruition in the 1980s.52 Since the recreation of LRSUs was part 

of this doctrinal revolution, it is logical to examine LRSU performance in 

ODS. LRSU operations divided in two categories based on the decisions 
212

of the two corps commanders, Lieutenant General Gary Luck commanding XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC) and Lieutenant General Frederick Franks 

commanding VII Corps. The VII Corps largely did not employ the LRSUs 

in accordance with doctrine, while XVIII ABC did. This variation was due 

to differences in commander personality, level of comfort with the mission 

profile, and the size of the assigned areas. Both commanders made decisions with risk as a significant factor: General Luck’s guidance was to use 

the corps and division LRSU only if needed information was unobtainable 

by other means, while General Franks decided not to attempt any cross-forward line of own troops (FLOT) ground reconnaissance missions with LRSU.53 LRSU employment had mixed results. It generated no spectacular 

successes but provided solid intelligence in some cases, while there were 

also outright failures to achieve necessary information in others.

The XVIII ABC possessed five LRS organizations in ODS: Each subordinate division had its LRSD organic to either the military intelligence 

battalion or cavalry squadron. The corps lacked an organic LRSC and 

received the LRSD from the inactivating 2nd Armored Division (AD), 

D/522nd Military Intelligence Battalion. The LRSDs from the 101st 

ABD and 24th ID both conducted successful cross-FLOT reconnaissance 

missions onto initial objectives. They communicated effectively, using 

high-frequency radios to both division and brigade headquarters, and provided effective surveillance on initial cross-border objectives for the 24 to 

48 hours before the invasion. These units were overtaken by advancing 

forces and had no opportunity for reinsertion due to the rate of advance.54

The 82nd ABD LRSD, F Troop, 1-17th Cavalry, acted in support of squadron operations with downed aircraft recovery, damage assessment of Talil 

airbase, and surveillance of pro- and anti-Saddam forces in An Nasiriyah.55

The 24th ID and 101st ABD teams avoided compromise and provided positive communications on Iraqi units back to their respective brigades and 

divisions, proving successful but not spectacularly so.56

The XVIII ABC LRSD failed to obtain coverage in the necessary period to provide early warning of an Iraqi advance. Three teams inserted 

beyond division LRSD teams. In two cases Bedouins compromised the 

teams, and Iraqi soldiers compromised the third, forcing extraction less 

than 24 hours after insertion. These teams were not in place in the window 

expected for Iraqi movement south, 24 to 48 hours after the XVIII ABC 

attack.57 Five US Army Special Forces teams inserted eight observation 

posts even deeper than the corps LRSU. They faced similar compromise 

issues that forced extractions; of the eight, only three remained in operation 
213

more than 24 hours. They were, however, in place long enough to confirm 

that Iraqi strategic reinforcement was not moving south from Baghdad.58

VII Corps employed LRSUs in relatively close border security missions 

prior to the ground invasion. In accordance with the corps commander’s guidance, it did not reinsert them across the border prior to the ground invasion. 

Poor communications with adjacent units plagued the operations of F/51st 

Infantry, the VII Corps LRSC, and D/101st Military Intelligence Battalion, 

the 1st ID LRSD. The observation posts emplaced were within visual range of 

the main units, causing multiple instances of confusion between LRSUs moving and potential Iraqi army forces, creating conditions for fratricide. 59 This 

employment of LRSUs in a non-doctrinal manner, within visual range of the 

FLOT, created unresolved communication and coordination issues.

Despite the less-than-spectacular successes, much of the after-action 

review comments advocated retention of the capability and modification to 

its organization. Likely from the use and coordination issues experienced, 

N

Saudi Arabia

An Najaf

Kuwait

Iraq

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















As Samawah

Ash Shatrah

An Nasiriyah

Tallil

Jalibah

Ar Rumaylah

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Lake Hawr al Hammar

Sabkhas

Rafha

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Corps LSR Teams

101st ABN Div

24th Infantry Div

5th Special Forces GP

Sand Dunes

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XVIII Airborne Corps

Surveillance Missions

0 10 20 30 Miles

ODA511

ODA532 ODA525

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OBJ WHITE

OBJ COBRA OBJ

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Figure 11.2. XVIII Airborne Corps Surveillance Missions. Map created by Army 

University Press. 
214

coupled with the unexpectedly rapid rate of advance, common suggestions 

were to move the LRSU from the military intelligence unit to the division 

cavalry squadron or corps cavalry regiment and to eliminate the LRSD 

from the heavy divisions.60 At least one heavy division commander, Major 

General Barry McCaffrey of the 24th ID, objected to the deactivation of 

V Corps and I MEF

Maneuver to Baghdad

0 10 20 30 Miles

N

Figure 11.3. V Corps and I MEF Maneuver to Baghdad. Map created by Army 

University Press.
215

the LRSD after Desert Storm.61 Most LRSUs conducted operations under 

the corps or division reconnaissance unit, but were temporarily attached; 

neither had great experience working with the other. The 82nd and 101st 

ABD LRSDs had garrison relationships with the cavalry squadrons. In 1st 

ID, D Company (LRS),101st Military Intelligence Battalion, conducted 

most operations under the control of 1-4th Cavalry, the division cavalry 

squadron. However, the more successful heavy division LRSD, D Company (LRS), 124th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 24th ID, operated 

directly through the division G2 and used the SOF experience of the assistant division commander to develop and employ teams against targets.62

Ten years later, part two of the Persian Gulf War in the form of Operation Iraqi Freedom had similarly mixed results. The Coalition force 

employed LRSUs in two areas during the 2003 invasion. One supported 

the 3rd ID attack north from Kuwait in advance of the attack. The second 

N

LRS Team Positions

Around Objective RAMS

0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

Figure 11.4. LRS Team Positions Around Objective RAMS. Map created by Army 

University Press.
216

supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade airborne assault into Bashur airfield in a pathfinder-type role.63

3rd ID attacked north to Baghdad and employed the attached corps 

LRSC, E Company, 51st Infantry (LRS). Three teams inserted on Objective Rams, southwest of the city of Najaf, which was two-thirds of the 

distance between Kuwait and Bagdad. E/51st IN was organic to the 165th 

MI BN, part of the V Corps MI brigade. V Corps inserted the teams early in the morning of G-Day and expected them to be in place for the 48 

hours it expected 3rd ID to need to advance that far. Of the three teams 

inserted, enemy forces compromised one team within hours, forcing it to 

break contact to an alternate hide site, concealing themselves in a ditch for 

48 hours while Iraqi soldiers actively searched for them within 10 feet of 

their location. The other two teams successfully established observation 

posts and communicated Iraqi unit locations to the advancing 3rd ID.64

The rate of advance was much faster than expected: The division cavalry 

squadron, 3-7th Cavalry, reached Objective Rams on G+1 and linked up 

with the teams.65 The speed of advance and length of the planning cycle 

for insertion of 48 to 72 hours precluded any subsequent use of the LRS 

teams in the south in their doctrinal surveillance role.66

The 74th Infantry Detachment (LRS), organic to the 173rd Airborne 

Brigade, supported the airborne assault into Bashur air base. Their initial 

role, supporting the brigade S-1 and enabled by attached Air Force combat 

control personnel, was to form the drop zone support team necessary for 

the airborne operation to take place. The team air-landed into the airfield 

the night prior to the airborne assault on 25 March 2003, linking up with 

a Special Forces team already on the ground. They established communications and verified weather conditions for successful execution of the 

assault.67 Over the days and weeks following the airborne assault, the 74th 

Infantry Detachment integrated into reconnaissance operations as the airhead expanded, using their long-range communications capability to assist 

in command and control of the brigade in the mountainous terrain.68

By examining deep dismounted reconnaissance actions in ODS and 

OIF I how the deep capability is an important role in future warfare. The 

salient fundamentals of reconnaissance for this case study are to gain and 

maintain enemy contact, retain freedom of maneuver, report information 

rapidly and accurately, develop the situation rapidly, and orient on the 

reconnaissance objective. Within the management of reconnaissance, all 

three elements of mixing, cueing, and redundancy are germane. The difference in employment and effectiveness between the two corps areas in 

Operation Desert Storm also provides opportunities for contrast.
217

Regarding maintain continuous reconnaissance and maintain enemy 

contact, despite reservations especially expressed in ODS, commanders had 

information requirements that other means could not better or sufficiently 

meet. Even though RPAs were available in Desert Storm, and even more 

so in Iraqi Freedom, they were in limited supply. This limited their ability 

to provide continuous coverage to those reconnaissance objectives that required it, such as the 24th ID G-Day objectives in Desert Storm or Objective 

Rams in Iraqi Freedom. In both cases, advancing forces moved more quickly than expected, preventing reinsertion following initial objectives.

On the other hand, LRSUs had issues with reporting information rapidly 

and accurately, most notably during the VII Corps border security missions 

prior to the Desert Storm ground invasion with 1-4th Cavalry and 2nd ACR. 

There were also successes with the 24th ID and 101st ABD in their G-Day 

objectives, units whose headquarters planned effectively for LRS employment from the outset. An aspect of LRS employment apparent in the Desert 

Storm accounts was the variance in use according to the level of knowledge 

and comfort by the commanders. XVIII ABC, and 24th ID, even though 

they were a heavy unit, made much more deliberate and doctrinal use of the 

LRS units than did VII Corps. This was also partly due to the much greater 

terrain in the west assigned to XVIII ABC, but also due to the background of 

the leaders and varying knowledge and comfort with this type of operation.

Under the orient on the reconnaissance objective, commanders employed LRSUs outside their primary doctrinal surveillance role. In OIF I, 

it was effectively so in another task outlined in FM 7-93, as a pathfinder 

unit for an airborne operation. On the other end of the spectrum, some 

headquarters in both conflicts employed LRSUs in a manner not leveraging any of their unique capabilities, riding in trucks along the advance and 

securing prisoners of war in ODS were examples.69

A factor in the non-doctrinal employment of LRSUs was each commander’s decreasing tolerance for risk. Lesser confidence in team and staff 

proficiency, disadvantageous terrain, and other needs that the units were 

available to fulfill influenced this trend. The LRSUs of the Cold War and 

later era were a conventionally owned and resourced unit whose doctrine 

called for SOF-type techniques. Without the specialized manning and training procedures available to SOF, the dispersion over a wide area prevented a 

critical mass of expertise to form. These units faced an uphill battle to maintain proficiency that ebbed and flowed in the level of success attained and 

was highly dependent on leader knowledge and support of their operations. 

In the OIF I examination in On Point, the editors concluded “the Army 

should assess long-range surveillance units. . . . [They] did not produce 
218

great effect for the investment of talent and the risk to those involved.”70

The editors speculate there may be nothing unsound with LRSU structure 

and organization, but leaders are unwilling to accept the risk posed by using 

these “fragile units” in “fast-moving, ambiguous situations.”71

In the management of reconnaissance, dismounted reconnaissance 

still provided a needed capability. The persistent surveillance emplaced on 

high-priority locations enabled other assets, such as RPAs, to be available 

for other missions. Dismounted reconnaissance enabled the art of management in mixing, cueing, and redundancy.

Cross-Case Analysis

Several continuities emerged through the examination of both case 

studies through the framework of reconnaissance fundamentals and reconnaissance management techniques. These continuities fall into three 

categories: the requirement for options to enable reconnaissance management, the decrease in risk acceptable in operations, the requirements for a 

dismounted reconnaissance organization to mitigate risk, and limited SOF 

capacity to support conventional units. These continuities show the need 

and necessary form for a dismounted reconnaissance force to operate in 

the EAB deep area.

The first continuity emerging is that no single method or type of reconnaissance can meet all information requirements. Both case studies 

show that integration of all methods and forms of reconnaissance enabled 

success in the deep area. Future operations may require all forms and 

methods even while terrain and tempo considerations make each more 

useful in specific circumstances. The restricted terrain gave dismounted 

reconnaissance a dominant role in Vietnam, while the open terrain of the 

Iraqi desert drove an operational tempo dictating increased use of aerial 

assets and fighting for information. In neither case, however, was the role 

so dominant to eliminate the need for the other.

The second continuity is that circumstances enabling successful execution of deep, stealthy reconnaissance declined. Specifically, operational tempo increased due to the open terrain but without a corresponding 

increase in acceptable risk, lowering the “stealth threshold.”72 However, 

battlefield density has not decreased but increased and, therefore, aerial reconnaissance is unable to meet all requirements. There is tension between 

the need for detailed information only available through dismounted reconnaissance and the level of acceptable risk.

The third continuity is that mitigating the risk of dismounted operations requires significant and specialized resource application. Successful 
219

dismounted reconnaissance requires selectivity in personnel beyond initial-level training, especially in a deep area, and significant if not dedicated support assets from aviation and artillery to mitigate the risk. The personnel of successful dismounted reconnaissance units are not initial-entry 

soldiers, but those demonstrating the necessary mental and physical capacity to accomplish a high-risk mission. The specialized assets are not 

typically available in sufficient quantity at the brigade level to permit successful mitigation.

The last continuity is that requirements exceeded the capacity of SOF 

dedicated to supporting conventional units. In all three conflicts, SOF operated near and coordinated with conventional force headquarters but had 

a different mission focus that precluded their focus on information and 

other requirements for the conventional force. This led to the creation of 

conventional units for this mission in Vietnam and their employment in 

both ODS and OIF I.

Conclusion

Based on these continuities, the conventional EAB headquarters 

should have the ability to employ stealthy, dismounted reconnaissance in 

the deep area to enable proper management of reconnaissance assets and 

execution within the fundamentals of reconnaissance. Future operations 

in restricted terrain such as those in the Pacific or Africa, much closer to 

the terrain examined in the Vietnam case study, may increase the need for 

this capability. Two broad options are available to fill this capability gap: 

Modify the conventional force structure or increase interoperability with 

similarly capable SOF units. This capability exists within SOF, but at insufficient capacity. It also exists in the IBCT; but insufficient resourcing of 

personnel, training, and equipment make employment of this force in the 

EAB deep area disadvantageous. 

Maintenance of a dismounted stealthy reconnaissance capability is essential to provide options to the future force commander. It is an integral 

part of the reconnaissance system our doctrine envisions. The 2016 elimination of these specialized units at the EAB level constrains options potentially necessary to the EAB commander in the future fight and continues 

the trend of degrading basic field craft and Soldier skills foundational to 

unit capabilities. The terrain of recent conflict enabled an operational tempo that broke the “stealth threshold” for large-scale use of stealthy reconnaissance but did not eliminate it entirely. The US Army must maintain 

this critical skill to enable commander flexibility and options at all levels.
220

Notes

1. William R. Peers et al., “USARV Long-Range Patrol Conference Summary, United States Army Vietnam” (Combined Arms Research Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, Special Collection, 9 August 1968). Colonel Aaron, who was 

5th SFG commander, oversaw the MACV Recondo School many LRP/Ranger 

soldiers attended and presented at the US Army Vietnam Long Range Patrol 

Conference, 9-10 August 1968.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 1–152 to 1–153.

3. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, DC: 2009), 1–2.

4. “Army Structure Memorandum 2019–2023,” 11 October 2016, i. Excerpt 

provided by XVIII Airborne Corps G37.

5. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, 

and Division Operations (Washington, DC: 2014), 5–1.

6. Department of the Army, FM 3-94, 1–7 to 1–8, 7–1.

7. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1–34.

8. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-94.2,

Deep Operations (Washington, DC: 2016), iii.

9. Department of the Army, FM 3-94, 6–7.

10. Andrew Fowler, Brian Fitzgerald, and Pete Rose, “Retaining Army 

National Guard Long Range Surveillance Companies” (TCM-Reconnaissance, 

CDID, Maneuver Center of Excellence, 26 February 2015), 1. Document provided by Mr. Pete Rose through email correspondence.

11. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, 

Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks (Washington, DC: 2013), 1–4.

12. Department of the Army, FM 3-55.93, 1–4.

13. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and 

Security Operations (Washington, DC: 2015), 5–1 to 5–6.

14. Department of the Army, FM 3-98, 5–4.

15. Shelby L. Stanton, Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam (New 

York: Orion Books, 1992), 46; Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 

31-18, Infantry Long Range Patrol Company (Washington, DC: 1965), 2; Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-18, Long-Range Reconnaissance 

Patrol Company (Washington, DC: 1968), 3.

16. Department of the Army, FM 31-18 (1968), 3, 21–25; Michael Lee 

Lanning, Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1988), 

70–71.

17. James F. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long Range 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units, Global War on Terrorism Occasional 

Paper 10 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 117.

18. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 112; Department of the Army, Field 

Manual (FM) 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, 

DC: 1987), 1–2.
221

19. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, DC: 1995), iv; FM 7-93 (1987), 3–6.

20. Lanning, Inside the LRRPs, 47, 51–59.

21. Stanton, Rangers at War, 30.

22. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 135.

23. Department of the Army, FM 3-55.93, 1–7.

24. Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965–1967, 

Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 105; 

Lanning, Inside the LRRPs, 62; Stanton, Rangers at War, 209.

25. William R. Peers, “LRRP Briefing - Commander’s Conference” (Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Special Collection, 24 

September 1967), 4; Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 62.

26. “Operational Report - Lessons Learned (1 November 1966–31 January 

1967), 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)” (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 February 1967), Tab C, 12.

27. “Operational Report - Lessons Learned (1 November 1966–31 January 

1967), 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate),” 17.

28. Department of the Army, FM 31-18 (1965), 5–6; Department of the 

Army, FM 31-18 (1968), 6–7.

29. Lanning, Inside the LRRPs, 211, 225.

30. Stanton, Rangers at War, 20–21; George L. Mabry, “Combat Lessons 

Bulletin Number 4 - Ranger Operations, US Army Vietnam,” Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 February 1970, 2.

31. Thomas M. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” Infantry 80, no. 1, 

February 1990, 11–12; Department of the Army, FM 7-93 (1995), 1–6, 1–8.

32. Department of the Army, FM 31-18 (1965), 24.

33. Stanton, Rangers at War, 20–21, 316.

34. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 121.

35. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 11.

36. Interview by author with Mr. Gary Fox, Office of the Chief of Infantry, 

United States Army Infantry School, Maneuver Center of Excellence, 8 December 2017; Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 124.

37. Interview by author with Mr. Gary Fox; Mark R. Meadows, “LongRange Surveillance Unit Force Structure in Force XXI” (US Army Command 

and General Staff College, 2000), 49–51.

38. Peers, “USARV Long-Range Patrol Conference Summary,” 12.

39. John H. Hay Jr., Tactical and Material Innovations, Vietnam Studies 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 123.

40. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965–1967, 18–19, 

124–25.

41. Bernard William Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point, 

Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), 18.

42. Melvin Zais, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Melvin Zais, 

CG 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period 19 July 1968–25 May 1969, 

Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)” (Center for Army Lessons 
222

Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 1969), 14; John J. Hennessy, “Senior 

Officer Debriefing Report - MG John J. Hennessy, CG 101st Airborne Division 

(Airmobile), Period 19700525–19710115, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)” (Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 

January 1971), 3, 4, 23; John M. Wright Jr., “Senior Officer Debriefing Report 

- MG John M. Wright Jr., CG 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period 15 

May 1969 to 25 May 1970, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)” 

(Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 1970), 14, 

15, 17, 29; S.H. Matheson, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG S.H. Matheson, CG 1-101st Airborne Division, Period 15 March 1967 to 2 March 1968, 

Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division,” Center for Army Lessons 

Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 March 1968, E-2.

43. Elvy B. Roberts, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Elvy B. Roberts, CG 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period 23 April 1969 to 5 May 1970, 

Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),” Center for Army Lessons 

Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 1970, 6–7.

44. Roberts, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 9; Stanton, Rangers at War, 

78; “Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),” Center for Army Lessons Learned, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 November 1969, 75; “Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam,” Center 

for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 May 1967, 41.

45. Gary Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces: The Story of a LRP in 

Vietnam (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Book & Music Clubs, 1991), 277; Stanton, Rangers at War, 89.

46. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 51.

47. Linderer, Black Berets, 10.

48. Stanton, Rangers at War, 80–86, 139, 142, 315.

49. Stanton, 30.

50. Peers, “USARV Long-Range Patrol Conference Summary,” 15.

51. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 113.

52. Robert Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993), 35–36.

53. Charles Lane Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps in Desert Storm, From 

Planning to Victory (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2004), 293; Stephen A. 

Bourque, JAYHAWK: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War, CMH Publication 

70-73-1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 204; Gebhardt, 

Eyes Behind the Lines, 131.

54. Toomey, XVIII ABC in Desert Storm, 293; Richard M. Swain, “Lucky 

War” Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command 

and Staff College Press, 1994), 206–7.

55. Mark S. Leslie, “E Troop 1/17 Cavalry, Long Range Surveillance Troop 

(LRST), 82nd Airborne Division’s Training and Operations During Operations 

Desert Shield / Desert Storm” (United States Army Infantry Center, Donovan 

Research Library, ICCC Monograph Collection, 2000), 11, http://www.benning.
223

army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Donovanpapers/other/STUP5/LeslieMarkS%20

1LT.pdf.

56. Toomey, XVIII ABC in Desert Storm, 294.

57. Toomey, 294–95.

58. Scales, Certain Victory, 196–97; Toomey, XVIII ABC in Desert Storm, 299.

59. Stephen A. Bourque and John W. Burdan III, The Road to Safwan: The 

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2007), 76, 84.

60. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 153.

61. David P. Anders, “Long-Range Surveillance Unit Application in Joint 

Vision 2010” (US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 10.

62. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 128–29.

63. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United 

States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 162, 225.

64. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 162–64, 456.

65. Jim Lacey, Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day 

Assault on Baghdad (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 62.

66. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 164.

67. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 225.

68. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 230; Blair Ross, “A Transformed Force in 

Legacy Clothing,” Infantry 92, no. 2, Winter 2003, 8.

69. Gebhardt, Eyes Behind the Lines, 131.

70. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 423.

71. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 423.

72. Curtis D. Taylor, Trading the Saber for Stealth: Can Surveillance 

Technology Replace Traditional Aggressive Reconnaissance? The Land Warfare 

Papers 53 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the US 

Army, 2005), 14–16.
224
225

Chapter 12

The Future of Army Aviation in Deep Maneuver

Major General William K. Gayler

Troops used in the enemy’s rear cannot be used against his front; 

that is to say, that the effect of an action on the rear or flanks will 

not in itself multiply our forces. Rather it will raise their potential 

to a higher power—higher as to possible success, but also higher 

to possible danger.1

—Carl Von Clausewitz

Throughout the history of modern warfare, commanders at echelon 

desire to conduct deep operations to interdict an adversary’s lines of communications, restrict the employment of their uncommitted forces, and 

gain positions of advantage physically and psychologically. Operations in 

the deep area ultimately set conditions for the close fight or future operations by reducing an adversary’s relative combat power, will to fight, and 

freedom of action.2

 Those operations are cross-domain focused to enable 

that freedom of action when commanders commit maneuver forces. Army 

aviation, as the combined arms team third dimension maneuver force, employs intelligence, fires, electronic warfare (EW), maneuver, and mission 

command to give commanders the flexibility to exploit successes in the 

deep area that enables close operations. To retain this capability in the future, US forces must continue to develop and refine training and doctrinal 

concepts that are supported by technological innovation and advancement. 

A Historical Perspective

Over the last century, the expansion in vertical lift capability transformed maneuver warfare particularly within the deep area. Multiple historical examples illustrate Army aviation’s success in shaping operations 

in the deep area in both continuous and noncontiguous areas of operations. 

World War I (WWI) saw the first application of aviation to shape the deep 

area from the air through reconnaissance, limited bombing, and artillery 

spotting. World War II and Korea expanded the application of concepts 

identified in WWI, but included strategic bombing, close air support, and 

employment of ground forces in the deep areas to shape the close fight 

through the use of airborne forces. It wasn’t until the Vietnam War did rotary wing aircraft assume many of the roles fixed wing held up to that point. 

Expanded doctrinal concepts and technological advancements allowed for 

the practical application of rotary wing aircraft employment deep in enemy 

territory to give the Army the operational reach with organic assets. 
226

The late 20th Century and into the early 21st Century saw further 

advancement in aircraft and support system technology. Simultaneously, 

doctrinal developments and employment considerations capitalized on 

that technological advancement with concepts for aviation deep operations. Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) all saw the practical application of the new technology with supporting doctrine and tactics with revolutionary success. 

Task Force Normandy, where the 1/101st Aviation Regiment partnered 

with US Air Force Pave Low helicopters, led the Desert Storm air war by 

destroying an Iraqi early warning station. Army Aviation then executed air 

assaults and deep attacks throughout the four-day ground war destroying 

significant Iraqi forces. The Army further refined aviation maneuver in the 

deep area in the open battles of OEF and OIF with limited success. Unfortunately, near-peer adversaries of the United States have watched and 

learned from those successes. They have subsequently invested heavily in 

multi-domain capabilities to enable their anti-access/area denial concepts 

to counter the employment of US joint forces.3

The Operational Environment

As near-peer adversaries continue to develop and refine their strategies 

while also deploying advanced, multi-domain capabilities at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic levels, they create an even more complex and 

contested environment. This strategy specifically challenges Army aviation’s ability to conduct forcible entry and Joint Combined Arms Maneuver (JCAM) in the deep area due to the development of integrated defense 

capabilities consisting of robust integrated air defenses, long-range fires, 

and sophisticated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

assets. Combined with offensive and defensive information technologies, 

electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities this presents a formidable, but 

not insurmountable challenge.4

Our potential adversaries can now challenge US and allied reliance on 

space-based ISR and Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT), network-centric mission command systems and capabilities, such as the global positioning system (GPS), and secure satellite communications (SATCOM). With 

the propagation of technology comes the escalation of machine learning 

and artificial intelligence resulting in detection and observation of forces 

in all domains. Those developments coupled with the increased range and 

lethality of enemy systems leads to the very real probability of precision 

attacks on our forces. Subsequently, the manifestation of risk to the execution of operations in the deep area increases significantly in the future 

operational environment. Considering the current and future operational 
227

environment, US forces must pursue Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions for the operational employment of aviation while integrating the warfighting functions to enable forces to regain an asymmetric 

advantage and retain the ability to operate throughout the battlespace.

Intelligence 

The force must improve its intelligence collection and dissemination 

of information. It is well known that intelligence drives maneuver, particularly when executing operations in the deep area. Intelligence must 

continue to develop and refine in capabilities as the enemy becomes more 

sophisticated. Intelligence officers must support the targeting process and 

plan for the employment of all ISR assets to support maneuver forces.5

The collection apparatus for deep operations will require an array of sophisticated sensors that not only detect, identify, and geo-locate enemy 

weapon systems and formations, but also must rapidly disseminate critical 

information and react to lethal or non-lethal target threats by spoofing, 

jamming, swarming, or attacking them. Additionally, sensors should provide an understanding of the terrain and environment. 

It is important that the focus of reconnaissance and collection not only 

include the target area but also collection and targeting within the battlespace that enables maneuver from the forward line of friendly troops 

throughout the route of flight to the deep operations area. The 11th Aviation Regiment learned this lesson the hard way when it attacked the Iraqi 

Republican Guard Medina Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.6

En route intelligence and enemy disposition in the objective was inadequate and ambiguous which forced aviation attack formations to conduct 

a movement to contact to locate and destroy the enemy. Couple that with 

the Iraqi preparedness for aviation deep attacks and the 11th Aviation Regiment suffered significant damage to all but one aircraft while inflicting 

minimal damage on the Iraqi force. Had intelligence provided the attacking aviation unit with refined enemy positions both along the route and in 

in the objective area, that force would likely have seen different results.7

Future aviation forces must not only utilize intelligence assets from 

the entire joint force, but must also detect, identify, and geo-locate targets 

and hazards with fused sensors within the degraded visual environment 

whether due to adverse weather (clouds, fog, haze, dust, and precipitation) 

or battlefield obscurants (multi-spectral smoke, chaff, aerosols, etc.). This, 

coupled with autonomous and cooperative targeting for both line of sight 

and beyond line of sight engagements, will increase lethality and surviv-
228

ability enabling aviation maneuver in the deep area. Advances in manned 

and unmanned teaming to include autonomous control of unmanned aerial 

systems coupled with information sharing among aerial platforms are just 

two ways technology can improve the situational awareness of aviation 

forces. Peer-to-peer combat operations are dynamic and require increased 

and committed integration between intelligence and maneuver forces, especially when conducting operations in the deep area.

Fires

The force must continue to develop maneuver in the deep area through 

the integration of long range precision indirect fires and electronic attack 

(EA) capabilities. If intelligence drives maneuver, then fires enable maneuver. In contrast to the unresponsive, unsynchronized, and unsuccessful 

fires employed during the 11th Aviation Regiment’s March 2003 failed attack on the Iraqi Republican Guard’s Medina Division, the 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault) was able to employ robust, synchronized, responsive, and effective fires that enabled the aviation formation to maneuver 

in the deep area and attack the Iraqi forces with minimal aircraft damage 

while inflicting significant enemy loses.8

 Arguably firepower alone did not 

lead to a decisive victory; it was a balance and synchronization of combat 

power in which fires and maneuver complemented one another on the battlefield enabling success.

In the future, cross domain teaming of Army aviation forces with other 

elements integrating electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and long-range 

precision fires can create temporary windows of domain superiority and 

enable freedom of action for the Joint Force in the deep operations area. The 

rapid transfer of information for targeting creates opportunities for dynamic 

targeting to disrupt and destroy enemy forces while increasing the protection of employed aviation assets. This approach presents the enemy with 

a multitude of dilemmas to overcome. The US Army force must balance 

requirements development for increased range, mass, precision, responsiveness, and dedicated fires to ensure survivability and success in the deep area. 

Maneuver

Aviation is an essential maneuver force to the joint force commander. 

During the American Civil War, J.E.B. Stuart conducted deep maneuver 

in the form of raids on Union communications and logistics nodes with 

dramatic effects. In fact, J.E.B Stuart was able to utilize maneuver deep to 

encircle General George McClellan’s forces in June of 1862.9

 Because of 

his unit’s agility, survivability, and lethality, J.E.B. Stuart’s formation was a 

constant deep threat to Union commanders. Army aviation also demonstrat-
229

ed these traits in Vietnam. The 1st Cavalry Division could air assault over 

great distances, maneuver organic helicopter and tubed fire support assets, 

and rapidly mass forces to overwhelm the enemy deep on their territory.10

Future aviation systems, tactics, doctrine and training must enable 

operational maneuver. The Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) 

and Future Vertical Lift will support expansion of the maneuver envelope 

for Army aviation, particularly in the deep area. The scope and scale of 

change will be much like that experienced by the Army entering the Vietnam War. Maneuver tactics and doctrine must evolve with the material 

changes to have the holistic impact of the next generation aviation system. 

Army aviation leaders must then apply the evolved systems, tactics, and 

doctrine to training programs that increase the pace and rigor of training to 

not only mitigate risk, but also prepare Army aircrews for the complex and 

dynamic environment in a Large-Scale Combat Operation. 

Mission Command 

The correct application of mission command is essential to enable 

effective maneuver in the deep area. It is the warfighting function that 

integrates the others into a coherent whole of particular importance for 

Large-Scale Combat Operations.11 The Army provides the framework 

for executing mission command through the operations process, and the 

planning, preparation, execution and assessment activities that help enable success. Deep maneuver operations utilizing rotary wing aviation, 

especially those “out of contact” of friendly forces, must be viewed, resourced, and executed as division level or higher operations in order to 

ensure all war-fighting functions are integrated and synchronized to set 

the conditions for success. Briefly mentioned earlier in this paper, the Task 

Force Normandy mission at the beginning of Desert Storm is an excellent 

example of effective mission command and the proper integration of Army 

Aviation, which resulted in a successful deep maneuver mission enabled 

by collection and dissemination of intelligence, movement and maneuver, 

and sustainment. Apaches from 1/101st Aviation Regiment, with MH-53J 

Pave Low helicopters from the US Air Force’s 20th Special Operations 

Squadron, attacked the Iraqi Early Warning radar station to open an attack corridor for coalition forces. The mission was conducted over long 

distances with minimal communications to higher headquarters against 

a refined target deep in enemy territory.12 The Task Force executed the 

mission to the highest levels, ultimately leading to the initial onslaught of 

coalition air attacks.
230

Army aviation currently contributes to effective mission command 

by extending communication ranges, providing essential intelligence, and 

employing fires and maneuver to allow commanders to balance the art of 

command with the science of control. In the future, aviation formations 

will further enable mission command as it operates deeper with better sensors while still providing the necessary information for commanders to 

make the best decisions. The increased lethality and targeting effectiveness of enemy forces will require dynamic action by subordinate leaders. 

Therefore, commanders must be comfortable in ambiguous situations relying on subordinate leaders who have the training, systems, and guidance 

to execute decisive operations to defeat our adversaries in the absence 

of further direction. As the complexity of the battlefield continues to increase, in any Large-Scale Combat Operation utilizing Army Aviation, 

the most important aspect remains the inclusion into the overall ground 

scheme of maneuver from the beginning of the operations process, and 

not as an after-thought. Like Task Force Normandy and other successful 

missions of its kind, Army Aviation will always achieve its greatest effect 

for the supported component or ground force when it is planned in detail 

as a maneuver element as part of a combined arms team. As US Army 

General Donn A. Starry stated, “Deep attack is not a luxury; it is an absolute necessity to winning. . . . It is essential to winning because it creates 

opportunities to seize and retain the initiative.”13

The Army must continue to develop, refine, and execute procedures 

to dominate across all domains throughout the battlespace. By the continued pursuit for solutions to counter adversary technological advances in 

weapons and tactics, Army aviation must also develop doctrine, tactics, 

and training strategies to support its own advances in aviation systems. 

New technology will not ensure success alone. Conscious development of 

DOTMLPF-P solutions and the application of the warfighting functions 

will support regaining overmatch in the deep area. While doctrine is a 

starting point, training in the application of that doctrine as units prepare 

for Large-Scale Combat Operations is a must. Army aviation will fight a 

much more capable and technologically superior adversary than they have 

in the past. Therefore, the Army, and Army aviation in particular, must be 

able to project combat power rapidly in all domains to defeat that enemy 

through a trained and ready force capable of executing the most complex 

operations in all environments.
231

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 465.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: 2017), 1-150.

3. Jeffrey M. Reilly, “Multi-domain Operations, A Subtle but Significant 

Transition in Military Thought,” Air and Space Power Journal 30, no. 1, Spring 

2016, 67.

4. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-303.

5. Michael T. Flynn, “Intelligence Must Drive Operations: How Intelligence Can Clear the Fog of War,” Military Intelligence 26, no. 1, January–

March 2000, 43.

6. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant 

Colonel David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 89.

7. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 179–81.

8. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 89, 192–95.

9. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants Volume 1: Manassas to 

Malvern Hill (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), 282–302.

10. James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation, From Its Beginnings to 

the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), 130–31.

11. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-116.

12. Williams, A History of Army Aviation, 251–53.

13. Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield,” Military Review 61, no. 3, 

March 1981, 32, 38.
232
233

Chapter 13

Disrupted, Degraded, Denied, but Dominant: 

The Future Multi-Domain Operational Environment

Major General Gary M. Brito and Major Keith T. Boring

No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate 

precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so 

far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that 

character is revealed.1

—Sir Michael Howard

Army forces in the future will face enemies more capable than ever to 

disrupt degrade, or deny the advantages of American and Coalition land 

power. Yet, future US and Allied forces can maintain dominance by maintaining an edge in effective operations across the multi-domain: land, air, 

maritime, space, and cyberspace.

Future enemies will manifest as state and non-state, insurgent, nearpeer, or peer forces. They will adapt to gain more parity against Army 

forces as they seek to defeat US and Allied interests. Adversaries will attack Army forces not only on the land domain, but all domains of land, 

air, maritime, space and cyberspace. Such forces will use new or maturing 

technologies to include Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) or Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). They will fight in environments disadvantageous to US forces, such as dense urban environments, subterranean 

environments, or the cyberspace domain. These future enemies will have 

long studied American capabilities to coordinate technical reconnaissance, 

satellite-based communications, and air and maritime power to enable 

ground freedom of maneuver and overmatch.2

 They will be more adaptive—employing combinations of traditional, unconventional, and hybrid 

strategies to threaten US interests.3 Army forces will face future battlefields that are more lethal, and fight through degraded conditions.

US and Allied forces in the future will not forfeit overmatch and dominance as a fait accompli.

4

 Future success of Army forces and their ability to 

meet the greater challenges of future enemies relies on executing four critical components. Army forces will project combat power beyond land into 

the five domains as they conducting cross-domain operations. Formations 

will operate semi-independently. They will integrate reconnaissance and 

security operations in all domains. Army forces commanders and leadership will better realize the Army’s mission command philosophy. With the 
234

continued technological advancement and innovations of American industry—and application of cross-domain operations—US and Allied forces 

will continue to remain dominant in battle through the 21st Century.

Historical Review

Contemporary and future rapid advancement of new technologies; maturation of older technologies; and the opening of new warfare domains has 

similarities to another transformative era in warfare; World War I. In that 

war from 1914 to 1918, the most advanced Industrial Age powers fought 

mostly on land. The Industrial Revolution of the previous century led to 

a dizzying pace of technological advancements that transformed warfare. 

Armies were revolutionized with magazine-fed weapons, rapid-fire machine guns, more advanced howitzer artillery, radio communications, and 

internal combustion engines leading to the development of aircraft and 

tanks.5 During the war, aircraft and tanks were first introduced to warfare 

and advanced exponentially to gain an advantage. The battlefields of World 

War I were among the bloodiest in history, as armies failed to adapt doctrine and tactics to the new deadly weapons of the era. Air became the new 

warfare domain as the first aircraft for war conducted reconnaissance, airto-air combat, and ground attack through bombing and strafing.

The first half of the 21st Century, much like a century before, shows 

a similar rapid advancement of warfare technologies. The advances of the 

Space Age in the mid-20th Century and the Information Revolution of 

the late-20th Century are shaping warfare in the future. New technologies 

are emerging, such as RAS. Less-new technologies are maturing, such as 

UAS. Warfare is also extending to new domains—space and cyberspace—

as state and non-state forces seek to gain an advantage. Like the armies of 

the World War I battlefield, today’s armies face the challenge of adapting 

doctrine and tactics with the rapid transformations of the near future. As 

was the case a century earlier, the costs of failure in the future are extremely lethal scenarios.

The New Emerging Operational Environment

Adversaries are increasingly more advanced and capable as they attain 

inexpensive and more available new or maturing technologies to counter 

US advantages in all domains. UAS for reconnaissance and attack are less 

expensive for non-state and state militaries to procure. US forces can no 

longer assume that all UAS are friendly. Near-peer militaries such as Russia and China are developing RAS for land, air, and maritime domains. 

A current example is the Russian Uran-9 multifunctional reconnaissance 

and fire support system. The Uran-9 is a small tracked armored vehicle 
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operated autonomously and armed with a 30-mm turret. The Uran-9 was 

confirmed by the Russian military as being fielded in Syria.6

Army forces operate with advantages in effective information networks, enabling rapid information sharing and understanding as well as 

joint and combined arms capabilities. These capabilities are coupled with 

network-assured positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) and availability of precision munitions. US forces no longer monopolize these capabilities. Enemies already are capable of synchronizing space and cyberspace 

means to locate and attack forces with precision weapons and use electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to disrupt or degrade Army information 

networks. Adversaries already outnumber and outrange Army indirect fire 

capabilities and are adept at linking manned and unmanned platforms with 

effectively massed indirect fires.7

 American capabilities that allow current 

overmatch are due to a growing dependence on digital and electromagnetic systems. Army formations can become more vulnerable to enemy attack 

in cyberspace and EW, while threatening PNT and the Army’s information network. Adversaries possess capabilities to degrade US situational 

awareness, shared understanding, and common operating pictures. US 

use of precision munitions can be threatened. Vital space-based capabilities can be attacked from cyberspace, or destroyed physically. US forces 

should expect periods of degradation in current and future operations.8

Future enemies will seek to deny Army forces advantages on land by 

contesting them in the physical domains: land, air, and maritime. They 

will disrupt and deny access of air and maritime forces and reduce support 

to land operations. Enemies will also disrupt and degrade land operations 

through the domains of space and cyberspace.

In the air domain, future threat forces will further reduce US air superiority through the use of integrated air defense capabilities. Man-portable 

systems—difficult to detect—can particularly threaten Allied air. Adversaries will also gain access to advanced unmanned air and ground systems. 

Such systems allow the enemy to threaten US formations at lower cost. 

Long-range integrated air defenses could defeat or limit US dominance 

in aerial reconnaissance capabilities. Enemies will use unmanned air systems—once monopolized by US and Allied forces—to inexpensively target US formations and critical nodes. Enemy capabilities will be resistant to electronic suppression and use passive sensing technology such 

as infrared search and track to deny effective US air-ground integration 

of movement, maneuver, and fires.9

 Land forces will be less protected or 

supported by the air domain.
236

In the maritime domain, Army and Navy forces will operate more 

jointly than ever as maritime assets provide lift, sustainment, and ship-toshore fires to support maneuver. Ground forces project land-based combat 

power via direct and indirect fires into littoral areas to support maritime 

operations. Enemies will employ anti-access area denial (A2AD) against 

maritime and air assets to deny land forces access to theater.

The space domain is not a physical domain like land, air, and maritime. The opening of the space domain was originally peaceful, with few 

nations economically capable of accessing the domain. Spacefaring nations agreed to keep the space domain peaceful—more for exploration and 

not for weapons systems. Instead, the space domain was used to support 

the physical domains through the use of satellites for weather, reconnaissance, and PNT. Future warfare will see an increase of military activity 

into the space domain as more nations gain access. Future enemies will 

seek to deny US and Allied space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and 

PNT capabilities, such as the global positioning system and secure satellite 

communications. Disrupting space-based capabilities would better enable 

adversaries to degrade US forces in the physical domains.

In the cyberspace domain, technology advancements will allow adversaries to attack the Army information network and degrade effectiveness. 

Cyberspace offers other state and non-state actors the capacity to delay US 

and partner responses to a nonlethal attack by implanting malicious code 

in advance on US and partner logistics, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance, and commercial support 

networks.10 The United States can expect similar advancement and challenges from the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). For example, the Chinese strategy—known as integrated network electronic warfare—combines EW, computer network operations, and nonlethal strikes to disrupt 

battlefield information systems that support an adversary’s warfighting 

and power-projection capabilities.11

How US Forces Maintain Overmatch and Dominance

US forces in the future will need to maintain, improve, and adapt 

the human factors of leadership and training while continuing to pursue 

technological innovations that help ensure American overmatch and dominance. Future success of Army forces will rely on executing four critical 

components: dominate cross-domain maneuver in all domains, operate 

semi-independently, integrate reconnaissance and security operations, and 

make the Army’s mission command philosophy real.
237

Dominate cross-domain operations. Army maneuver forces must expand the concept of combined arms to include employing capabilities in 

all five domains. Cross-domain maneuver is the employment of mutually 

supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to create a synergistic effect that increases relative combat power and provides 

Army maneuver forces with the overmatch necessary to destroy or defeat 

enemy forces.

Operating semi-independently. The future operating environment 

will require Army forces to operate dispersed with the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly at decisive points, and in spaces (domains) 

to achieve operational objectives. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) operating semi-independently possess sufficient mobility, firepower, protection, 

intelligence, mission command, and sustainment capabilities to conduct 

cross-domain maneuver at extended supporting range and distance for up 

to seven days while achieving operational objectives. Operating semi-independently will allow BCTs to infiltrate along multiple axes, evade enemy attacks, achieve surprise, and gain positions of advantage to isolate, 

envelope, or destroy enemy forces.

Integration of reconnaissance and security in all domains. The complexity of the operating environment requires an integrated combined arms 

approach to reconnaissance and security beyond traditional air-ground 

screen, guard, and cover missions conducted by dedicated reconnaissance 

forces. Semi-independent operating BCTs will use their organic cavalry 

squadrons and cross-domain capabilities to develop tactical and operational depth and create reaction time and maneuver space.

Make mission command real. A cluttered and hyperactive battlefield 

limits higher commanders’ ability to manage all decisions in a timely manner. To generate the tempo of operations desired and best cope with the 

uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own 

initiative based on their understanding of their higher command’s intent 

rather than passing information up the chain of command and awaiting 

decisions. The potential for enemies to degrade communications will force 

commanders to realize the Army’s mission command philosophy. Under 

dispersed and degraded conditions, the Army’s ability to seize, retain, and 

exploit the initiative will depend on empowering leaders to exercise disciplined initiative consistent with the commander’s intent when mission 

command systems become degraded, fail, or are not used in order to conceal operations and reduce digital signature.12
238

Conclusion

US Joint and Allied combined forces in the future will fight more capable enemy forces—both state and non-state across all domains: land, 

air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. These more capable adversaries 

will use traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to narrow US 

forces overmatch. Army forces in the future will fight more lethal battlefields in degraded conditions, as enemy adaptations and procurement 

of advanced technologies will allow successful disruption and denial of 

American advantages. The Army must be capable of effectively projecting 

combat power beyond land into all domains as cross-domain maneuver. 

Army forces in the future will fight semi-independently—better integrating reconnaissance and security operations and empowering leaders with 

disciplined initiative to fully realize mission command. These synergistic 

advances, with American technological innovation, will best ensure US 

forces overmatch and dominance against the worst of any future enemy.
239

Notes

1. Sir Michael Howard as quoted in Department of the Army, Field Manual 

(FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 6 October 2017), 1-4.

2. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, “The U.S. Army 

Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020-2040,” 11–12; overmatch is defined as the application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly 

or indirectly, with the intent to prevent or mitigate opposing forces from using 

their current or projected equipment or tactics.

3. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, “The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win 

in a Complex World,” 10–12.

4. Fait accompli: A thing that has already happened or been decided before 

those affected hear about it, leaving them with no option but to accept it.

5. Williamson Murray, “Military Adaptation in War,” Institute for Defense 

Analyses, June 2009, 2–25.

6. Kelsey Atherton, “Russia confirms its armed robot tank was in Syria,” 

C4ISRNET, accessed 10 May 2018, www.c4isrnet.com.

7. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, 11.

8. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, 11–12.

9. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, 10–11.

10. Jeffrey M. Reilly, “Multi-domain Operations, A Subtle but Significant 

Transition in Military Thought,” Air and Space Power Journal 30, no. 1, Spring 

2016, 66.

11. Reilly, 67.

12. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, 23–26.
240
241

About the Authors

William E. Bassett

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William E. Bassett is Chief, Accreditation Coordination Division, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). During 22 years of active service (1978–2000), he served 

as a tank company commander and armor battalion operations officer 

(S3) in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and as a mechanized infantry battalion executive officer in the 2nd Infantry Division (Mechanized). Bassett also developed curriculum at the Armor School (1981–

83), taught American history at the US Military Academy at West Point 

(1990–1993), and taught military history and led staff rides in CGSC’s 

Combat Studies Institute (1995–1997). In 1996, he was CGSC’s Military 

Instructor of the Year. Bassett has done doctoral work at the University 

of Kansas in Education Policy and Leadership Studies and has an MA in 

History from the University of Michigan and a BA in Public Management 

from the University of Kentucky.

Robert F. Baumann

Robert F. Baumann has been Director of Graduate Degree Programs 

for the Command & General Staff College since April 2004. He joined 

CGSC in 1984 and served 19 years as a member of the Department of Military History/Combat Studies Institute. He received a BA in Russian from 

Dartmouth College (1974), an MA in Russian and East European Studies 

from Yale University in 1976, a Master of Philosophy in History from Yale 

University in 1977, and a PhD in History from Yale University (1982). In 

addition to more than 20 scholarly articles and book chapters, Baumann is 

the author of Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Combat Studies Institute, 1993), as well as coauthor of Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the US 

Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Combat Studies Institute, 1998), 

My Clan Against the World: A History of US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992–1994 (Combat Studies Institute, 2004), Armed Peacekeepers 

in Bosnia (Combat Studies Institute, 2004). He also wrote “Soviet Media 

Performance during the Afghan War: STRATCOM Utopia or Dystopia?” 

in the Proceedings of the CSI 2009 Symposium on The US Army and the 

Media in Wartime published in 2010. In addition to teaching at CGSC, Baumann has frequently served as an adjunct faculty member at the University 

of Kansas and Kansas State University, where he has served on numerous 

thesis and dissertation committees. He continues to teach graduate courses 
242

in Russian and Eurasian Military History, The Balkans, Peacekeeping Operations, and The Evolution of Military Thought. Since 2009, Baumann has 

also served as a Peer Reviewer for the Higher Learning Commission of the 

North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.

Paul E. Berg

Colonel Paul E. Berg is an active duty aviation officer currently serving as Director of Academic Affairs at Army University at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has more than 23 years of active duty and four combat 

deployments. He has a BBA and MBA from the University of North Texas 

and an MS and PhD in Adult Education from Kansas State University. 

Keith T. Boring

Major Keith T. Boring is a Strategic Planner at the Maneuver Center 

of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia. He received a BA in Peace, War, 

and Diplomacy and History from Norwich University; a Master of Arts in 

Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics; 

and master’s of Military Science from the US Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General 

Staff College and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. 

Gary M. Brito

Major General Gary Brito, a native of Hyannis, Massachusetts, was 

commissioned an Infantry Officer through Penn State University and 

entered active duty in March 1987. He most recently was Commanding 

General, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Fort Polk. Previous assignments include Deputy Commanding General for Sustainment 

then later Operations, 25th Infantry Division; Director, Force 2025 and 

Beyond, US Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC), Training 

and Doctrine and Command (TRADOC); and Operations Officer (G3) for 

III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. In that capacity, he deployed and served as 

the Deputy Director, Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) Development, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command in Kabul, Afghanistan. Brito has served in a variety of command 

assignments, including Commander, 120th Infantry Brigade, First Army; 

Commander, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Community Studies from Penn State University, a master’s in Human Resource Management from Troy State University, and a second master’s in Joint Strategy 

and Campaign Planning from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. He 

is also a graduate of the MIT Seminar XXI Program.
243

Ronnie L. Coutts

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Ronnie L. Coutts, MBE, is a graduate 

of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He graduated from the US 

Army Command and General Staff College in 2003 and was the recipient 

of the General Dwight D. Eisenhower Award for the Outstanding International Officer Graduate and the General George S. Patton Jr. Award for the 

Distinguished Master Tactician. He served in multiple key positions in the 

British Army.

Edmund J. Degen 

Colonel (Retired) Edmund J. “EJ” Degen has commanded artillery 

units at all levels through brigade and served as the V Corps Chief of 

Plans during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has a Master of Military Arts 

and Science degree from the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and a Master of Science degree in Strategic and Operational Planning 

from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. He is co-author of On Point: 

The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) along with numerous journal 

articles. He presently works for the Chief of Staff of the Army as the Director of the Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group and is writing the 

Army’s first official history of OEF.

Gregory Fontenot

Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, commissioned Armor in May 

1971 in the Regular Army as Distinguished Military Graduate of Kansas 

State University. He served in armor units in the United States and Germany. He commanded 2-34 AR 1989–1990, including more than 4 months in 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, as well as 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division 

in Germany, including a tour in IFOR 1 from December 1995–November 1996. His other important assignments included Director Wargaming 

and Experimentation, TRADOC G2, lead author for On Point: The United 

States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom ((Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute Press, 2004), and Director University of Foreign Military 

and Cultural Studies.

William K. Gayler 

Major General William K. Gayler is Commanding General at the US 

Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama. He was a 

Distinguished Military Graduate of North Georgia College in Dahlonega, Georgia, where he was commissioned as an Aviation Officer in 1988. 
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Gayler’s key command assignments include C/2-227th Aviation Regiment 

in Hanau, Germany; D/2-227th Aviation Regiment in Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina; A/1-14th Aviation Regiment in Mesa, Arizona; 3-101st 

(Eagle Attack) Aviation Regiment in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Iraq; 

101st Combat Aviation Regiment (Destiny) in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 

and Afghanistan; Deputy Commanding General (Support), 7th Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; Director, Officer 

Personnel Management Directorate, Human Resources Command, Fort 

Knox, Kentucky; and Deputy Commanding General, US Army Europe. 

Gayler has master’s degrees in Military Arts and Sciences and in National 

Security Strategy. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff 

College and the National War College. He is a Master Army Aviator and 

Standardization Instructor Pilot in the AH-64D Longbow Apache and also 

rated in the OH-58A/C Kiowa. 

Timothy G. Heck

Major Timothy G. Heck is a graduate student at King’s College, London, in the Department of War Studies. An artillery officer by training, his 

previous assignments include 5th Battalion, 10th Marines, Marine Corps 

Embassy Security Group, and 4th ANGLICO. He is a graduate of Georgetown University and several military command and staff schools. He is 

working on several projects on the Red Army during and after the Great 

Patriotic War. He lives and works in Southeast Asia.

Jack D. Kem

Colonel (Retired) Jack D. Kem is Associate Dean of Academics and 

Professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College. A retired 

Military Intelligence colonel, he previously served in the Senior Executive Service as the Deputy to the Commander, NATO Training Mission–

Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011. He is a graduate of the Air Command 

and Staff College and the Army War College. His dissertation from North 

Carolina State University studied the role of public ethics in Russia, Poland, and the United States.

Dean A. Nowowiejski

Colonel (Retired) Dean A. Nowowiejski is the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War, Command and General Staff College. 

He has directed the Art of War Scholars Program since 2013. He is a retired Colonel of Armor, former III Corps G3 and Chief of Initiatives for 

CG USAREUR. His dissertation from Princeton University analyzed the 
245

American military governors of Germany, and he is finishing a book on 

the American military occupation of Germany from 1918 to 1923.

Joseph A. Royo

Joseph Royo is a Senior Defense Research Analyst with Booz Allen 

Hamilton. He is a retired Army Special Forces officer with 20 years of 

military service. He has a Master of Arts in Diplomacy from Norwich University, a Master of Arts in International Studies from Kansas University, 

and a Master of Military Arts and Science from the School of Advanced 

Military Studies (SAMS).

Stephen E. Ryan

Stephen E. Ryan is a Booz Allen Hamilton Senior Defense Research 

Analyst and retired Special Forces officer with 37 years of active duty 

service. He has an MA from the University of Connecticut.

Glen L. Scott

Colonel (Retired) Glen L. Scott is a retired Infantry officer living in 

Colorado Springs, Colorado. During his active duty career, he led Infantry 

units from platoon through brigade level; was an Observer/Controller at 

both the JRTC and BCTP programs; served on the DA Staff, and was a 

Division and Installation Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of SAMS and the 

Army War College. His civil education includes an MMAS and a Doctorate of Management. 

Edward P. Shanahan

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Edward P. Shanahan served as a military 

history instructor and member of the Staff Ride Team at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College. He received 

his commission in Armor from Eastern Kentucky University and an MS in 

geography from Pennsylvania State University. He served as a scout pilot 

in Vietnam and was an instructor in geography and assistant professor of 

history at the US Military Academy.

Christopher J. Shepherd

Major Christopher J. Shepherd is an Armor officer and a planner for 

the US Army, Pacific. He has served on the staffs of battalion through theater Army, and served and deployed in operations across the CENTCOM, 

EUCOM, and PACOM areas of operation. He has an MA from Louisiana 

State University, a MMAS from the Command and General Staff College, 

and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies.
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Daniel E. Stoltz

Daniel E. Stoltz is a Senior Defense Research Analyst with Booz Allen Hamilton. He served 26 years in the active Army with the Infantry, 

Rangers, and Special Forces. He has a Master of Arts degree from the US 

Army War College.

Brendon E. Terry

Major Brendon E. Terry is an active duty infantry officer and a plans 

officer in the US Army Africa Future Operations Cell. He has experience 

in mechanized, air assault, and airborne infantry units and as a Ranger 

Instructor at 5th Ranger Training Battalion. He is a 2018 graduate of the 

School of Advanced Military Studies with an MA in Military Operations, 

a 2017 graduate of the Command and General Staff College, and a 2004 

graduate of the University of North Georgia with a BS in Political Science.

Kenneth E. Tilley

Kenneth E. Tilley became the Army Aviation Branch historian at Fort 

Rucker, Alabama, in October 2016. Previously an Army logistics officer, 

he has been in three different components of two branches of service. In 

1991, he ran the air marshalling area for US helicopters returning from 

Desert Storm to aviation units in Germany. As an Air Force historian, he 

deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, along with numerous other deployments. Most significant of these was as the JSOC historian forward in 

2004. He also was a civilian historian at JPAC, where he researched and 

investigated cases of World War II missing in the China-Burma-India Theater. His work there led to the identification of remains of several aviators 

from that conflict. He also started the US Army Cyber Branch history.

David W. Tohn

Colonel (Retired) David W. Tohn is a retired Military Intelligence officer who served for more than 24 years in the US Army. A graduate of the 

School of Advanced Military Studies, he graduated from Gettysburg College and was a National Security Studies Fellow at Harvard University. 

He was co-author of On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) 

along with numerous journal articles.
 
 
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center