SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0859-22 

RONDELL HADDOCK, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

TOWN OF CLINTON, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

_________________________

Argued January 29, 2024 – Decided July 11, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson, DeAlmeida, and BishopThompson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. L-0119-21. 

Charles Z. Schalk argued the cause for appellant (Savo, 

Schalk, Corsini, Warner, Gillespie, O'Grodnick & 

Fisher, PA, attorneys; Charles Z. Schalk, of counsel and 

on the briefs). 

Stefani C. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent

(Hatfield Schwartz Law Group, LLC, attorneys; Stefani 

C Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief; Andreya 

DiMarco, on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM 

In this employment discrimination action, plaintiff Rondell Haddock 

appeals from a November 9, 2022 order granting summary judgment to 

defendant Town of Clinton (Clinton). We affirm. 

I.

We summarize the following facts from the record, viewing the facts in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party. Statewide Ins. 

Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 119, 125 (2023). In January 2021, defendant 

posted a job vacancy for the full-time position of laborer with the Clinton 

Department of Public Works (DPW). The job posting stated, in relevant part, 

"[u]nder supervision, the successful applicant will perform public works tasks, 

including but not limited to facility maintenance . . . and any other duties 

assigned." The job posting stated "at a minimum" applicants were required to 

have a high school diploma or equivalent. 

Service Master, a third-party vendor, terminated janitorial services for 

Clinton in April or May of 2020 because of COVID. Thereafter, DPW 

employees temporarily assumed the responsibility for facility maintenance 

services in municipal buildings. Beginning in mid-2020, Clinton posted the job 

vacancy for a part-time janitorial/cleaning position. That posting described, 
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among other responsibilities, the duties as "clean[ing] and maintain[ing] several 

small municipal buildings." The posting also stated a high school diploma or 

equivalent was required. 

On January 8, 2021, plaintiff saw the postings for laborer and janitor 

positions. Plaintiff applied for the laborer position and misrepresented that he 

had a high school diploma. Thereafter, on February 4, 2021, plaintiff 

participated in a group interview with defendant's Business Administrator 

Richard Phelan, the Water and Roads Division superintendent and Roads 

Division foreman, and the Sewer Division superintendent and foreman. At the 

conclusion of the interview, when asked if he had any questions, plaintiff 

responded: "No." Plaintiff claims Phelan did not state facility maintenance was 

a job responsibility. However, during his deposition, plaintiff admitted Phelan 

had explained that the responsibilities of the laborer position included facility 

maintenance and the maintenance of municipal buildings. 

 On February 25, 2021, Phelan called plaintiff and offered him the labor 

position. Phelan also informed plaintiff that the DPW needed two laborers: a 

laborer in Water and Roads and a laborer in Sewer. Phelan asked which position 

plaintiff would be interested in and plaintiff replied Water and Roads. Based on 

plaintiff's response, Phelan then explained that as a Water and Roads laborer, 
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plaintiff's main responsibilities would be facility cleaning and maintenance. He 

restated the job responsibilities, included sweeping, scrubbing, mopping, and 

vacuuming of municipal buildings. Plaintiff accepted the position. 

A series of emails subsequently exchanged when plaintiff notified Phelan 

that he could commence employment on March 12, 2021, and requested a copy 

of the laborer job description. That day, Phelan replied and provided a start date 

of March 15, and attached an offer letter for the laborer position. However, in 

the offer letter, Phelan provided a March 25 start date. The offer letter restated 

the "primary responsibilities would be facility cleaning and maintenance for 

municipally owned buildings," and that the laborer would be "required to 

provide assistance with trash collection, road/signage maintenance and repair, 

snow removal, as well as water related issues, as needed." Phelan requested 

plaintiff sign and return the offer letter by March 3. 

On February 25, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the offer letter and 

sought clarification, stating that at the interview "there was no mention of 

janitorial cleaning of municipal buildings," then considered the primary job 

responsibility for a laborer. He told Phelan that he would be "more interested" 

in the laborer position because he did not apply for the posted part-time janitorial 

position. 
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 Phelan responded the next day and acknowledged plaintiff had applied for 

the laborer and not the part-time janitorial position. Phelan restated that during 

the interview the "clear" expectations for facility cleaning and maintenance 

duties were presented to all applicants. He also confirmed that plaintiff did not 

have any questions regarding the roles and responsibilities of the laborer 

position. Consequently, Phelan withdrew the employment offer for laborer. 

Phelan sent a letter later that day confirming the withdrawal of the employment 

in response to plaintiff's notification that the job responsibilities were not to his 

"liking." 

 In a reply email to Phelan, which was copied to the mayor and several 

council members, plaintiff expressed his disappointment with the offer letter and 

restated the job responsibilities were not included in the job posting or discussed 

during the interview. He further alleged that he believed "racism" was "a major 

deciding factor" after being offered a "janitor position" because "[Phelan] [did] 

not consider [him] worthy of the [l]aborer [p]osition in the [Water and Roads] 

Division of the [DPW]." Plaintiff also included both the job postings he alleges 

he responded to, iterating that facility maintenance was not a listed job 

responsibility for either laborer or part-time janitorial/cleaning positions. 
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 Following these emails, plaintiff was notified that outside counsel had 

been hired to conduct an investigation. Plaintiff, however, declined to 

participate. Instead, in March 2021, plaintiff filed a single count complaint 

alleging unlawful employment practices, harassment, and unlawful 

discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 

(LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 50. 

In July 2022, defendant moved for summary judgment. In support of its 

motion, defendant argued (1) plaintiff applied for the laborer position, (2) 

plaintiff was offered the position, and (3) plaintiff would have been required to 

perform the same duties as the existing DPW laborers. In opposition, plaintiff 

asserted that defendant's refusal to hire him was based on his race and the color 

of his skin. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff relied on his certification and 

offer letters addressed to other DPW laborers between 2013 and 2021, with at 

least two containing the same language regarding the primary responsibilities of 

facility maintenance and cleaning. 

The motion judge heard oral argument. On November 9, 2022, the motion 

judge court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's claim with 

prejudice. The judge explained the reasons for his decision on the record. The 
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judge concluded plaintiff had not met his burden of proof in establishing 

discrimination under the LAD. The motion judge stated: 

I can't find any weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies[,] or contradictions in 

this record. Nothing . . . that was available . . . and that 

the plaintiff can point to during the interview process, 

or after the interview process, or in the way the job was 

presented to him. And certainly nothing in the record 

after the lawsuit was filed could support it. All that 

does is establish, corroborate that other union workers, 

other [l]aborers were doing this type of work on a 

regular basis before [plaintiff] was offered the position 

and obviously after he declined the position . . . . I just 

don't think that there is, as I said earlier, a fact issue 

that could be presented to a jury here. 

That same day, the motion judge issued a supplemental statement of 

reasons. The judge found Service Master's termination of the janitorial cleaning 

services provided defendant with a "legitimate business reason for [its] decision 

to routinely assign union laborer's facility maintenance responsibilities" and 

other duties. The judge stated: "Those facts could well explain why both the 

oral and written offer provided to plaintiff underscored that, at the outset of his 

employment, plaintiff's primary responsibility would be facility maintenance." 

Citing to the relevant case law, the motion judge restated plaintiff had not 

met his burden of establishing discrimination. The judge further reasoned 
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plaintiff had failed to establish an adverse employment action. This appeal 

ensued. 

II. 

Plaintiff challenges the motion judge's granting of defendant's summary 

judgment motion. Plaintiff argues racial discrimination can be established by 

the assignment of menial tasks that "invoke outdated stereotypes" to the African 

American application offered employment by Clinton. He further argues 

summary judgment was inappropriate because there are material facts in dispute 

and defendant's state of mind or intent requires determination by a jury. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). That 

standard requires us to "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch 

v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). 

"Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" 
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Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not defer to the trial court's legal 

analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 

234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014). 

To establish a prima facie case for a failure to hire under the LAD, a 

plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he "(1) belongs to

a protected class, (2) applied and was qualified for a position for which the

employer was seeking applicants, (3) was rejected despite adequate 

qualifications, and (4) after rejection the position remained open, and the 

employer continued to seek applications for persons of plaintiff's 

qualifications." Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 210 (1999) 

(internal quotations removed) (citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 

N.J. 539, 550 (1990)). Once plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a 

presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant 

to show a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its employment action. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Zive v.

Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005). A plaintiff must then show that 

this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 

at 804.
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Before us, plaintiff renews the arguments presented before the motion 

judge. There is no dispute that plaintiff satisfied the first prong, race, to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff, however, has failed to 

satisfy the remaining prongs. In sum, plaintiff was qualified for the laborer 

position but he "perceived" it as a janitorial position and as "demeaning, menial 

work without any upside potential." After plaintiff rejected the employment, 

defendant ultimately filled the janitorial position. Here, the undisputed facts 

establish that plaintiff had not and could not prove the three remaining elements 

to establish discrimination under LAD. Plaintiff was offered the position as 

laborer. He was not rejected; rather the offer was withdrawn after plaintiff stated 

that he did not want to do some of the required job functions. Moreover, the 

laborers were doing those job functions. 

The record also establishes that defendant's decision to withdraw the offer 

was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. In that regard, defendant 

explained that after Service Master's stopped providing janitorial services it 

added those responsibilities to the responsibilities of a laborer. It is undisputable 

that defendant then explained those duties to plaintiff in both the oral and written 

employment offers. In response, plaintiff offered "no proof of pretext" by 
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defendant and he did not, therefore, support his allegation of a discriminatory 

motive or intent. 

Plaintiff also failed to present facts overcoming the presumption of nondiscrimination. See Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Schs., 323 N.J. Super. 

490, 503 (App. Div. 1999). The record shows plaintiff proffered a self-serving

certification claiming race was a "major factor" in defendant offering a 

"perceived" janitorial position. That "'conclusory and self-serving assertion by 

[plaintiff was] insufficient to overcome' [a motion for] summary judgment." 

Dickson v. Cnty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2019) 

(quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)). 

Plaintiff also advanced a disparate impact claim, asserting that defendant 

has no black employees in the Water and Roads Division. Yet, plaintiff did not 

retain a statistical expert to support his disparate impact claims with scientific 

analysis; rather, he relied upon the U.S. Census Bureau. "Population Estimates, 

July 1, 2021 – Hunterdon County. Quick Facts." Thus, the record lacks any 

evidentiary support because those data points in isolation were insufficient to 

establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. See Wards Cove Packing Co. 

v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58(1989). 
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We conclude no genuine issue of material fact exists, and those facts 

which are material do not constitute support for plaintiff's causes of action. 

Accordingly, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of racial 

discrimination and summary judgment was correctly granted to defendant. 

Affirmed.