Filed 12/4/14 Rosado v. Hendricks CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MICHAEL ROSADO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
PIERRE STEPHANE HENDRICKS et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B252484
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MC024189)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Randolph Rogers, Judge. Affirmed. Michael Rosado, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Herzfeld & Rubin, Vadim Braslavsky, for Defendant and Respondent Pierre Stephane Hendricks, M.D. Prindle, Amaro, Goetz, Hillyard, Barn es & Reinholtz, Jack R. Reinholtz and Cynthia A. Palin, for Defendant and Re spondent Steven N. Brourman, M.D.2 Plaintiff Michael Rosado, appearing in propia persona, filed the instant appeal after the trial court entered judgment in fa vor of two of the defendants on anti-SLAPP grounds. Rosado also appears to challenge the denial of his request for entry of default as
to one of these defendants. For the reasons stated below, we deem waived Rosado’s underdeveloped challenges to the anti-SLAPP judgments and affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the entry of default. 1
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND We have cobbled together the followi ng chronologic recitation from the parties’ appendices, supplemented as necessary by review of the trial court’s docket. PlaintiffMichael Rosado (Rosado), appearing in pr opia persona, filed a complaint against defendants Pierre Stephane Hendricks (He ndricks), Roberta Hykes (Hykes), and Steven Brourman (Brourman) (collectively Defend ants) on April 24, 2 013. The complaint alleged that defendants engaged in imprope r conduct while participating in Rosado’s worker’s compensation proceed ings. On May 6, 2013, Ro sado filed self-prepared documents asserting that an individual na med Ralda Pineda serv ed the complaint, summons, assignment of judge, and notice of case management conference “in person,”
“on” Hendricks’s and Brourman’s addresses. No such document pertaining to Hykes is in the appellate record. The only indications that Rosado attempted to serve Hykes are an
assertion to that effect in Rosado’s brief and a notation on the trial court docket that Rosado’s proof of service as to Hykes was “faulty.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a); Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 89.) The trial court docket also deems “faulty ” Rosado’s other proofs of service. Brourman appeared and demurred to th e complaint on May 24, 2013. The trial
court sustained Brourman’s demurrer on June 27, 2013, and ordered Rosado to file an amended pleading no later th an August 16, 2013.

1 The acronym SLAPP refers to Strategic La wsuits Against Public Participation. (See Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.Ap p.4th 809, 817.)3 The same day that the trial court sustained Brourman’s demurrer, Rosado submitted an incomplete form requesting entry of default ag ainst Hendricks and Hykes to
the clerk’s office. Rosado also submitted a proposed judgment form, on which he checked a box indicating that judgment wa s obtained by default. Rosado further requested that the clerk remove Hendricks an d Hykes from his “injury case,” attached a three-page note explaining the “context” for his request (namely that Pineda had served Hendricks on April 26, 2013), and furnished a June 11, 2013, letter he had received from Hendricks’s insurance company as “proof that, Pierre Hendr icks; received the summons, complaint, case management.” The clerk’s office issued a Notice of Reje ction-Default/Clerk’s Judgment on July 8, 2013. The clerk did not check any boxes i ndicating that there were defects in Rosado’s proofs of service. The cl erk checked only the box labe led “other” as the reason for denying Rosado’s request for entry of cler k’s judgment. The clerk provided the following explanation in the space next to the checked box: “Court or dered you to file an amended complaint on 6-27-13. You need to seek legal assisstance [ sic ]on how to properly prepare a default ju dgment. This case is not a clerk judgment case. A clerk cannot order defendants removed, only a judge can. Seek legal assisstance [ sic ].” Nothing in the record suggests that Rosado revised or resubmitted his request for entry of default, and it is unclear whether he s ought legal assistance at any point. On July 9, 2013, Hendricks appeared and filed a special motion to strike Rosado’s original complaint pursuant to Code of Civ il Procedure, section 426.15 (to “anti-SLAPP” motion). Hendricks also demurred to the original complaint, which we presume remained operative as to him. ( See Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 889 (“[O]n appeal we presume the trial court’s order is correct, indulge all presumptions in favor of that correctness, and resolve all ambiguities in favor of affirmance.”).) The appellate reco rd does not indicate that Rosado filed any documents in opposition to Hendricks’s anti -SLAPP motion or demu rrer. According to4 the trial court’s order, Rosado argued only th at his request for entry of default against Hendricks had been improperly denied. The trial court rejected Rosado’s contentio n that he was entitled to entry of default against Hendricks. It reasoned that entry of default was not warranted because “the proof of service filed by plaintiff indicates that de fendant [Hendricks] was not properly served with the summons and complain t.” The trial court was un able to ascertain whether Pineda served Hendricks personally or via substitute service, but found the proof of
service deficient in either in stance because it stated neither the time of service (required for personal service) nor the name of the person on whom service was effected (required for substitute service). The trial court also granted Hendricks’ s anti-SLAPP motion. It concluded that
Hendricks had carried his bur den of demonstrating that the allegations against him
stemmed from conduct he had un dertaken “in furtherance of [his] right of petition or free speech under the United States or Californi a Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Specifically, the trial court found th at Rosado’s claims re lated to Hendricks’s alleged filing of false documents while serv ing as a “Qualified Medical Evaluator” in Rosado’s worker’s compensatio n case. The trial court determined that Hendricks’s showing shifted the burden to Rosado to demonstrate a pr obability of prevailing on the merits of his claims, and concluded that Rosa do failed to carry that burden in light of his failure to submit evidence supporting his clai ms or countering the claim of litigation privilege asserted by Hendricks. Accordingl y, the trial court granted Hendricks’s antiSLAPP motion and dismissed his demurrer as m oot on August 14, 2013. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hendricks on September 5, 2013 . Our review of the trial
court’s docket indicates that the notice of en try of judgment was filed on September 25, 2013. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a); Luckey v. Superior
Court , supra , 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.)
Rosado filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2013 . The amended complaint asserted twelve claims agains t all three defendants.5 On September 19, 2013, Brourman filed an anti-SL APP motion to strike and
demurred to Rosado’s amended complaint. Rosado filed a strongly worded opposition brief on October 9, 20 13. The trial court held a he aring on Brourman’s motions on October 17, 2013. A few days later, the tria l court ruled that Brourman had carried his burden of showing that Code of Civil Pr ocedure section 425.16 applied to Rosado’s
claims and that Rosado had failed to de monstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. The trial court granted Brourma n’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed his demurrer as moot. The trial court entered ju dgment in Brourman’s favor on November 1, 2013, and notice of entry of judgment was filed on November 12, 2013. Rosado filed the instant appeal on Novemb er 8, 2013. On his notice of appeal form, Rosado checked boxes indicating that he was appealing from “Default judgment,” “Judgment after an order granting a summary judgment motion,” “Judgment of dismissal
under Code of Civil Procedure sections 581d , 583.250, 583.360, or 583.430,” “Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a de murrer,” “An order after judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(2),” “A n order or judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)-(13),” and “O ther.” Rosado added the notation, “See
attached forms.” No attach ments appear in the record . Rosado named all three Defendants as Respondents.
In a corrected case information statem ent filed on January 8, 2014, Rosado checked boxes indicating that he was appealing from “Defau lt judgment,” “Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer,” and “Other.” Rosado stated that he was appealing from judgments or orders date d August 14, 2013, August 27, 2013, and November 6, 2013. He attached the orde rs granting Hendricks’s and Brourman’s antiSLAPP motions to the corrected case information statement. He also attached the Notice of Rejection-Default/Clerk’s Judgment a nd a note averring that Hendricks and Hykes were in default and that his request for entry of default against them had been timely.
The trial court docket indicates that notic e of order to show cause was filed in the trial court on December 13, 2013. Neither the docket nor the parties’ appendices indicate6 who filed the notice or requested an order to show cause, but counsel for Brourman appears to have been the sole participant at the Janua ry 15, 2014, hearing. Because Rosado failed to appear at the hearing, the trial court dismissed his remaining claims for want of prosecution pursuant to Code of Ci vil Procedure section 583.410, subdivision (a). The dismissal was without prejudice. Rosado included the order of dismissal in his appellate appendix but did not amend his no tice of appeal to encompass it or file a separate notice of appeal attacking it.
DISCUSSION We begin our analysis on appeal with the presumption that the trial court’s judgments were correct. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Ca l.3d 557, 564; Gonzalez
v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 976.) To overcome this presumption, Rosado must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error. ( Denham
, supra , at p. 565; Gonzalez
, supra , at p. 976.) He must “present argument and authority on each point made” ( County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591; Cal. Rules of Court, 2 rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)), and cite to pe rtinent evidence or other matters
in the record that demonstrate reve rsible error (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115). “[F]ai lure of an appellant in a civil action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible lega l argument in an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an abando nment of the appeal justifying dismissal.” ( Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Rosado is not excu sed from these obligations or co nsequences by virtue of his propia persona status. “The rules of civ il procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation,” ( Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-85); litiga nts proceeding without counsel are “‘entitled to the same, but not greater, consider ation than other litigants and attorneys.’” ( Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056.)

2 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.7 Hendricks contends that dismissal of this appeal is warranted in light of Rosado’s failure to comply with the California Rules of Court 3 and other rules of civil procedure. Rosado’s eight-page submission indeed disr egards numerous requirements imposed by rule 8.204(a). It lacks a table of contents , (rule 8.204(a)(1)(A)), argument headings and subheadings, (rule 8.204. (a)(1)(B)), and referenc es to the record (r ule 8.204(a)(1)(C)). It also fails to provide a coherent summary of the significant facts, (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)), neglects to discuss or even clearly identif y the judgment(s) or order(s) appealed from (rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) & (B)), and omits any citation to legal authority. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) We agree with Hendricks that the deficien cies in Rosado’s brief fatally undermine his challenge to the entry of judgment in favor of Hendricks and Brourman on antiSLAPP grounds. Nothing in Rosado’s brief can fa irly be read to challenge or even allude to either pertinent trial court judgment. Th e closest the brief comes to doing so is an assertion that “[t]hese judgments in favor of two of the defendants and one defendant who did not even respond to the summons an d civil complaint [ ] must be reverse for justice must prevail.” “We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court
to treat the contentions as waived. [Citations.]” ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Berger v. Godden
, supra , 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1119.) We therefore treat as waived any and all of Rosado’s challenge s to the anti-SLAPP rulings. We nonetheless conclude, however, that Rosado has provided us with a minimally cognizable argument as to what appears to be his central contention on appeal: that his request for default as to Hendricks was imprope rly denied. We addre ss this intermediate

3 Ironically, Hendricks emphasizes Rosado ’s failure to comp ly with former California Rule of Court, rule 14, which no longer exists. Rule 14 was renumbered to California Rule of Court, rule 8.204, as of January 1, 2007. (See California Rules of Court, rule 8.204.)8 ruling pursuant to our authority under California Code of Ci vil Procedure, section 906. (See Sweeting v. Murat (2013) 221 Cal.App. 4th 507, 511 fn. 6.) 4 Rosado disputes the trial court’s conc lusion that default properly was denied because his proof of service as to Hendri cks omitted information required by California
Code of Civil Procedure sections 415.20 and 417.10, subd. (a). Rosado emphasizes that the clerk accepted and filed his proof of serv ice and “did not chec k off, line proof of service” on the notice rejecting Rosado ’s request for entry of default. The clerk’s acceptance of Rosado’s filing is of no moment. So long as a filing complies with the formatting requirements set fo rth in Rules 2.100-2.119, “the clerk has a ministerial duty to file it.” ( Carlson v. State of California Department of Fish & Game (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276 .) Accordingly, the filing of a defective paper does not negate or cure its deficiency. To the contra ry, “the filing of a defective paper may bring later adverse consequences if time ly corrections are not made.” ( Carlson v. State of California Department of Fish & Game, supra. , at p. 1276.) Moreover, the filing of a proof of serv ice creates a rebuttable presumption of proper service “only if the proof of servic e complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs,” ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1442), and the trial court correc tly concluded that the proof of service as to Hendricks did not satisfy the statutory requirements. The pr oof of service as to Hendricks failed to articulate the “time, place, and manner of serv ice and facts showing that the service was
made in accordance with” the California Code of Civil Procedure, as required by
California Code of Civil Procedure section 417. 10. The proof of service states only that Pineda “served these foregoing documents in person, on Hendricks address,” on an unspecified date and at an unspecified time. Although “strict complia nce with the code’s

4 Rosado also appears to challenge the denial of default as to Hykes. This intermediate ruling is not properly before us because Rosado has not filed a notice of appeal challenging the January 15, 2014, final judgment dismissing his claims against Hykes. (See Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1315-1316; Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 906.)9 provisions for service of process is not required” as a general matter, ( Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1443 (citing Pasadena MediCenter Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778 )), “‘the rules leading to [default judgment] are precise and should be follo wed to the letter’” because of the substantial consequences that flow from an entry of default. ( Pelayo v. J.J. Lee Management Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App. 4th 484, 497 (quoting Jones v. Interstate Recovery Service (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 925, 928).) Those rules require the filing of a proper proof of service with the clerk. ( Pelayo v. J.J. Lee Management Co., Inc
., supra , at pp. 495-497.) Rosado did not fulfill this requirement. Finally, we are not persuaded by Rosado’s suggestion that the clerk’s failure to check the “proof of service” box on the re jection notice prevented the trial court from upholding the clerk’s decision on that basis. Just as we may affirm a correct decision of the trial court “regardless of the considerati ons which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion,” ( D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19), so too may the trial court “affirm” the clerk’s well-fo unded rejection of a request for entry of
default.

DISPOSITION The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. Respondents Hendricks and Brourman are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J. MANELLA, J.