FILED 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 July 29, 2004 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 03-14932

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency Docket No. A79-346-908

JOANA CLAUDIA SEPULVEDA,

MAURICIO SEPULVEDA,

Petitioners,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

__________________________

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

_________________________

(July 29, 2004)

Before BLACK, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joana C. Sepulveda, a Colombian national, petitions for review of the final

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming without opinion the
Sepulveda does not raise any challenge in her brief to the denial of relief under the 1

Convention Against Torture (CAT). When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that

issue is abandoned. See United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998); see

also Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that

passing references to issues are insufficient to raise a claim for appeal, and such issues are deemed

abandoned).

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Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of her requests for asylum and withholding of

removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1

1231(b)(3). Sepulveda argues the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of her

application demonstrates an adversarial tone and a unilaterally-heightened

standard of adjudication for Colombian asylum claims, in violation of the Supreme

Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S. Ct. 1207

(1987). Sepulveda asserts she established a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of her political opinion and activity. Sepulveda also challenges the IJ’s

finding that internal relocation was a viable option. Substantial evidence supports

the IJ’s decision. We deny the petition. 

I. BACKGROUND

Sepulveda and her husband entered the United States on September 11,

2000, as visitors with permission to remain until March 10, 2001. On August 16,

2001, the INS served Sepulveda with a notice to appear, charging her with

removability for having remained in the United States beyond the time allowed. 

Sepulveda admitted the allegations of the notice to appear and conceded
 The National Liberation Army, or ELN, is one of Colombia’s two major guerilla groups. 2

 The State Department’s 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Colombia 3

described this kidnaping as the abduction of 170 people from La Maria church by the ELN. 

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removability. Sepulveda requested asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the CAT on behalf of herself and her husband.

Sepulveda testified her pro-democracy ideology conflicted with that of the

ELN guerilla group, which advocated class struggle, Marxism, and dictatorship. 

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Sepulveda, a resident of Cali, Colombia, belonged to a group at her university that

initially organized political debates, and later organized marches and peace

demonstrations. Sepulveda participated in approximately ten peace marches. 

When the “La Maria” massive kidnaping occurred, Sepulveda and group 3

members cooperated with a priest to negotiate between the kidnapers and the

hostages’ families. After becoming involved in the kidnaping negotiations,

Sepulveda received three threatening telephone calls at her home, and the group

received similar calls at the office. The callers, identifying themselves as ELN

members, called Sepulveda by name, used profanity, directed her to stop her peace

activities, and made death threats. Many of the group members quit, and the

group’s membership ultimately dwindled from 35 to 5. The group also placed

“mailboxes” within restaurants to facilitate communication between the kidnapers,

their hostages, victims’ families, and the public. One of the mailboxes was located
 Sepulveda testified that in Colombia, such threats extend to family members.

4

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in the restaurant where Sepulveda was employed, and a bomb placed in that

mailbox exploded just after she finished her shift. Sepulveda believed the bomb

was related to her political activities. Before coming to the United States,

Sepulveda relocated to her parents’ home in Hamondi, Colombia, and her in-laws’

home in Cali, Colombia.

Sepulveda testified she feared the ELN guerilla group would kill her or her

family if they returned to Colombia. Thirteen years earlier, Sepulveda’s uncle, a

judge, received death threats related to a drug trafficking case. The uncle’s wife

was killed when the couple disregarded the threats. Sepulveda believed the

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Colombian authorities would not assist her unless she had money or the names of

the specific individuals issuing the threats. 

In support of her application for relief, Sepulveda submitted an asylum

application setting forth the basis of her claim generally consistent with her

testimony. Sepulveda particularly noted in her application that her brother

received threats from ELN members with regard to her political activity. 

The record before the IJ also included the State Department’s 1999 Country

Report on Human Rights Practices for Colombia. The 1999 Country Report stated

that Colombia’s two major guerilla groups, FARC and ELN, exercised significant
5

influence in nearly 1,000 of the country’s 1,085 municipalities. It described the

abduction of 170 people from La Maria church by the ELN, and a demonstration

in Cali by 70,000 to 250,000 people protesting the mass kidnaping. The 1999

Country Report also noted that as many as six million people marched in antiwar

protests in October of that year.

The State Department’s 2000 Country Report on Human Rights Practices

for Columbia described the ELN’s common abuse of noncombatants, including the

use of kidnaping as a primary source of money, and employment of bombs to

destroy facilities and intimidate targeted individuals. The 2000 Country Report

indicated that as many as one million people have been displaced within Colombia

since 1996, and noted the flood of displaced persons has overwhelmed the

capacity of smaller municipalities and larger cities to provide services, leaving

displaced individuals without health care, education, or employment. 

The IJ denied Sepulveda’s application for asylum, withholding of removal

and CAT relief. The IJ found the following: (1) neither Sepulveda nor her

husband had suffered past persecution, (2) Sepulveda failed to establish she

suffered past mistreatment on account of any protected ground, or that anyone had

the inclination to persecute her, and (3) Sepulveda failed to meet her burden to

show that internal flight alternatives were unavailable to her. Having determined
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that she failed to meet the lower burden of proof for asylum eligibility, the IJ

concluded that Sepulveda was ineligible for withholding of removal. Finally, the

IJ rejected Sepulveda’s CAT relief claim on the grounds she failed to show she

would likely suffer torture upon her return to Colombia, or that the Colombian

authorities acquiesced to the guerilla action. Sepulveda appealed the BIA’s

decision, which affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion, the

IJ’s decision became the final removal order subject to review. See Mendoza v.

U.S. Attorney Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003). The IJ’s findings of

fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, and we “must affirm the

[IJ’s] decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence

on the record considered as a whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284

(11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this highly

deferential standard of review, the IJ’s decision can be reversed only if the

evidence “compels” a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise. INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 n.1 (1992). 

III. ASYLUM
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An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for

asylum, which the Attorney General has discretion to grant if the alien meets the

INA’s definition of a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1). A “refugee” is 

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,

in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in

which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or

unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or

herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion. 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The asylum applicant carries the

burden of proving statutory “refugee” status and thereby establishing asylum

eligibility. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. If he or she meets that burden, the actual

grant of asylum is a matter of discretion. Id. The Attorney General’s discretionary

judgment whether to grant asylum “shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary

to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). 

To establish asylum eligibility based on political opinion or group

membership, the alien must, with credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution

on account of her political opinion or group membership, or (2) a “well-founded

fear” that her political opinion or group membership will cause future persecution. 

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b). “[A]n applicant must demonstrate that his or her fear of

persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Al Najjar, 257
8

F.3d at 1289. Although the INA does not expressly define “persecution” for

purposes of qualifying as a “refugee,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), in Gonzalez v.

Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations

omitted), we discussed other circuits’ holdings that “persecution” is an “extreme

concept,” requiring “more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or

intimidation,” and that “[m]ere harassment does not amount to persecution.” 

A showing of past persecution creates a presumption of a “well-founded

fear,” subject to rebuttal by the INS. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1). A “well-founded

fear” of persecution may also be established by showing a reasonable possibility

of personal persecution that cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject

country. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(2)(ii). To establish the necessary causal connection

between the political opinion and the feared persecution, “the alien [must] present

specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled

out for persecution on account of such an opinion.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287

(quotation marks and citations omitted). We have stated that “where the alleged

persecutors are not affiliated with the government, it is not unreasonable to require

a refugee who has an internal resettlement alternative in his own country to pursue

that option before seeking permanent resettlement in the United States, or at least
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to establish that such an option is unavailable.” Mazariegos v. Office of U.S.

Attorney Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001). 

As a preliminary matter, there is no indication in the record that the IJ

applied an incorrect standard in adjudicating Sepulveda’s claim. Thus,

Sepulveda’s argument that the IJ’s decision violated the Supreme Court’s decision

in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987), is without merit.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Sepulveda did not

establish she suffered past persecution on account of her political opinion or group

membership. The evidence merely permits, but does not compel, the conclusion

the restaurant bombing was directed at Sepulveda on account of her political

activity. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 815 n.1. Likewise,

the menacing telephone calls and threat to her brother do not necessarily rise to the

level of past persecution. See Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355. 

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Sepulveda did not

establish a reasonable possibility of personal persecution that cannot be avoided

by relocating within the subject country. The evidence does not compel the

conclusion that the ELN retains an inclination to single out Sepulveda for

persecution. Although the evidence shows that Sepulveda exercised leadership in

the nonviolence movement while a university student, particularly in 1999, the
 To the extent the IJ based his decision on a finding that Sepulveda could viably relocate 5

to an area where the ELN presence was nonexistent or minimal, the evidence does not support such

a finding. The 1999 and 2000 Country Reports, on which the IJ ostensibly relied, make clear that

guerillas exercise influence throughout Colombia, and that small and large municipalities are already

overwhelmed by the huge populations of displaced persons, who are consequently without access

to health care, education, or employment. Nevertheless, Sepulveda’s inability to demonstrate she

has a well-founded fear that she will be singled out for persecution on account of any protected

ground is fatal to her asylum claim. 

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evidence does not indicate that her notoriety as an activist would outlast her nearly

four-year absence from Colombia. Rather, the 1999 Country Report indicated 

Sepulveda’s opposition to guerilla violence was shared by hundreds of thousands

of people in Cali, and millions around Colombia, who marched in protest.5

The record evidence does not compel a finding that Sepulveda established

her prima facie eligibility for asylum. Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s

denial of asylum.

IV. WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

An alien is entitled to withholding of removal under the INA if she can

show that her “life or freedom would be threatened [on account of] race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The alien bears the burden of demonstrating that it is

“more likely than not” she will be persecuted or tortured upon being returned to

her country. Fahim v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002)

(quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a more stringent standard than for
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asylum. Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1325 n.2. “[I]f an applicant is unable to meet

the well-founded fear standard for asylum, he is generally precluded from

qualifying for either asylum or withholding of deportation.” Id. (quotation marks

and citation omitted). 

Sepulveda failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account

of political opinion or group membership to support her asylum claim, and thus

she cannot establish she is entitled to withholding of removal under the INA. The

IJ’s decision denying asylum and withholding of removal is supported by

substantial evidence.

PETITION DENIED.