IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2015 WY 105

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2015

August 14, 2015

ELECTRICAL WHOLESALE SUPPLY 

CO., INC., an Idaho Corporation,

Petitioner,

v. 

ALANE FRASER, an Individual; and M.J. 

BISHOP CONCRETE &

CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming 

Corporation,

Respondents.

S-14-0260

Original Proceeding

Petition for Writ of Review

From the District Court of Teton County

The Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge

Representing Petitioner:

Mitchell H. Edwards and Julie M. Wickett of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 

Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Edwards.

Representing Respondent Alane Fraser:

Bret F. King of King & King, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. No appearance.

Representing Respondent M.J. Bishop Concrete & Construction, Inc.:

William R. Fix, Jackson, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

* Justice Kite retired from judicial office effective August 3, 2015, and pursuant to Article 5, 

§ 5 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 2015), she was 

reassigned to act on this matter on August 4, 2015.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made 

before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

KITE, Justice.

[¶1] Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. (EWS) filed this action in circuit court, seeking 

payment for electrical materials it supplied to a commercial building remodel in Jackson, 

Wyoming. The circuit court denied EWS’s claims, and we granted a writ of review 

pursuant to W.R.A.P. 13.01, et seq. after the district court affirmed the circuit court’s 

rulings. EWS asserts the circuit court erred by declaring its lien against Alane Fraser’s1

property invalid for failing to follow the statutory notice requirements. EWS also 

challenges the circuit court’s denial of its unjust enrichment claim against Ms. Fraser and 

the general contractor, M.J. Bishop Concrete & Construction, Inc. (Bishop Construction).

[¶2] We conclude the circuit court applied the wrong statute to the lien notice issue and 

erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Ms. Fraser on the lien claim. However, 

we agree with the circuit court that EWS did not prove its unjust enrichment claim. We, 

therefore, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

ISSUES

[¶3] The dispositive issues in this case are:

1. Whether the circuit court applied the correct lien notification statute under 

the circumstances of this case.

2. Whether EWS provided timely notice of its filed lien to the property owner.

3. Whether EWS proved the elements of unjust enrichment.

FACTS 

[¶4] Ms. Fraser hired Bishop Construction to remodel her commercial property in 

Jackson, Wyoming. Bishop Construction subcontracted with Jackson Hole Electric, Inc., 

also referred to as JHE 2, Inc., (hereinafter JHE) to perform electrical work on the 

project. Dusty Jones, vice-president of JHE, opened a general account with EWS, an 

electrical materials supplier, in July 2010. He also opened a job account for the Fraser 

project, called the Rafter J Café, in November 2010. JHE’s application for the job 

account listed and provided addresses for Ms. Fraser as the owner, Bishop Construction 

as the general contractor, and JHE as the electrical contractor. 

 

1 Alane Fraser is named as a defendant/respondent in this case. She did not, however, file a brief on 

appeal and the record indicates that, during the pendency of this litigation, she sold the property. No issue 

is raised regarding the proper parties to this appeal, so while we note this development, we will not further 

address it. 
2

[¶5] On November 30, 2010, EWS notified Ms. Fraser and Bishop Construction that it 

was providing materials for the project. In the notice, EWS provided its contact 

information, including the address and telephone number for making payments. The 

notice also stated:

6) This document hereby constitutes notice of Electrical

Wholesale Supply Co., Inc.’s right to claim a lien against the 

building or improvements upon the real property for materials 

furnished.

In the even[t] that this job constitutes a “single family 

dwelling unit” as also described by the Wyoming statutes,2

the following additional notice is also given:

NOTICE TO OWNER

FAILURE OF THIS PRIME CONTRACTOR OR 

SUBCONTRACTOR TO PAY THOSE PERSONS 

SUPPLYING MATERIALS OR SERVICES TO 

COMPLETE THIS CONTRACT CAN RESULT IN THE 

FILING OF A MECHANIC’S LIEN ON THE PROPERTY

WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS CONTRACT 

PURSUANT TO W.S. 29-2-101 THROUGH 29-2-110. TO 

AVOID THIS RESULT, WHEN PAYING FOR LABOR 

AND MATERIALS YOU MAY ASK THIS PRIME 

CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR FOR “LIEN 

WAIVERS” FROM ALL PERSONS SUPPLYING 

MATERIALS OR SERVICES FOR THE WORK 

DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT. FAILURE TO 

SECURE LIEN WAIVERS MAY RESULT IN YOU 

PAYING FOR LABOR AND MATERIALS TWICE.

[¶6] EWS sent the notice to Ms. Fraser and Bishop Construction by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, as then required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-2-110 and 29-2-111 

(LexisNexis 2010). Although the mailing addresses used by EWS were incorrect in some 

respects, the notices were delivered by the post office and signed for by representatives of 

 

2 By its plain language, the “notice to owner” applied to jobs involving “single family dwelling units.” 

That language was presumably intended to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-110 (LexisNexis 2010). 

The Rafter J Café project was a commercial building, not a single family dwelling unit. This distinction 

was not recognized by the circuit court or any of the parties. In fact, Ms. Fraser testified that she believed 

the provision applied to her, as owner of the Rafter J Café project. Given everyone involved proceeded as 

if the provision applied, we will not consider the legal effect of the limitation contained in the notice 

language. 
3

the respective addressees. Ms. Fraser and Mr. Bishop specifically acknowledged 

receiving the notices. 

[¶7] EWS supplied materials to JHE for use on the Rafter J Café project and regularly 

submitted invoices to JHE for payment. JHE paid the invoices for the first several 

months of the project, but in June 2011 began falling behind in its payments. The unpaid 

principal amount was $18,495.94. 

[¶8] In the meantime, JHE submitted bills of over $92,000 to Bishop Construction for 

electrical work and materials on the job, and Bishop Construction paid JHE in full. 

Bishop Construction then billed Ms. Fraser over $1,000,000 for work on the project 

(including the electrical work), which she paid in full. Neither Bishop Construction nor 

Ms. Fraser requested lien waivers from EWS or JHE when they made their payments. 

JHE consolidated its revenue from all of its jobs and used the money to pay outstanding 

bills. With regard to its EWS accounts, JHE tended to pay those that had been in arrears 

the longest. 

[¶9] In accordance with its policy, EWS suspended JHE’s Rafter J Café account in 

September 2011 because it was more than sixty days past due. The café opened on 

November 11, 2011, and a few days later, November 16, 2011, EWS’s legal counsel 

mailed a letter to Ms. Fraser, with copies to Bishop Construction and JHE, giving notice 

of its intent to file a lien against her property if the outstanding balance was not paid. 

The letter was certified and Ms. Fraser’s teenaged son signed for it on December 6, 2011. 

Although Ms. Fraser could not recall when she first saw the letter, she did review it at 

some point and learned that EWS had not been paid. Mike Bishop of Bishop 

Construction did not remember receiving the letter, but became aware of it when he met 

with Ms. Fraser and Mr. Jones in late November or early December 2011 to discuss the 

situation. Ms. Fraser offered to pay EWS $15,000 to resolve the issue, but EWS rejected 

the offer. Mr. Jones assured her and Mr. Bishop that he would make arrangements to pay 

the bill, but he did not. On December 22, 2011, EWS recorded a lien against Ms. 

Fraser’s property. It sent notice of its lien to Ms. Fraser on December 29, 2011. 

[¶10] On May 31, 2012, EWS filed an action in the circuit court in Teton County, 

naming Ms. Fraser, Bishop Construction, JHE, and Mr. Jones as defendants.3 The 

complaint included causes of action for foreclosure of a construction lien, breach of 

contract, unjust enrichment, and third party beneficiary. Mr. Jones and JHE failed to 

respond to the complaint and default was entered against them; however, JHE is defunct 

and EWS was unable to collect its judgment against either the company or Mr. Jones. 

EWS’s third party beneficiary claim was dismissed with its consent. 

 

3

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a)(i) and (vi) (LexisNexis 2013), the circuit courts have exclusive 

jurisdiction over civil actions seeking $50,000 or less and to foreclose statutory liens of the same value. 
4

[¶11] Ms. Fraser filed a motion for summary judgment on EWS’s lien claim. She 

argued the lien was not effective because EWS had not complied with the statute which 

required it to send her notice of the lien within five days after it was filed. The circuit 

court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion and concluded the statute required 

mailing of a notice of the lien within five calendar days after recording and EWS had not 

complied with its obligation. The circuit court, therefore, granted summary judgment in 

favor of Ms. Fraser, declaring the lien invalid. It subsequently denied EWS’s motion for 

reconsideration of its summary judgment decision. The circuit court held a bench trial on 

EWS’s unjust enrichment claim and entered judgment in favor of Ms. Fraser and Bishop 

Construction, concluding they did not have notice that EWS expected them to pay for the 

materials. 

[¶12] EWS appealed to the district court, which affirmed the circuit court decisions. 

EWS then filed a petition for writ of review with the Wyoming Supreme Court, and we 

granted the petition.4 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[¶13] Two orders are at issue in this case and each requires application of a different 

standard of review. First, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. 

Fraser, declaring EWS’s lien against her property invalid. Summary judgments are 

governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A summary judgment is subject to de novo review, meaning this Court reviews the same 

materials and applies the same standards as the lower court. “We examine the record 

from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 

party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.” 

Baker v. Speaks, 2014 WY 117, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Wyo. 2014), quoting Hasvold 

v. Park County School Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 645, 637-38 (Wyo. 2002) 

(other citations omitted). 

 

4

Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 13.01 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-119, a decision of a court of limited jurisdiction 

is appealed in the first instance to the district court. The district court’s decision may be appealed to the 

Wyoming Supreme Court only when it grants a petition for writ of review or certiorari agreeing to hear 

the appeal. 
5

[¶14] The circuit court conducted a bench trial on EWS’s unjust enrichment claim. In 

general, we apply the following standard when reviewing a district court’s decision after 

a bench trial:

“The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited 

review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are 

presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of 

the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 

given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 

credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail reweighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set 

aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

With regard to the trial court’s findings of fact,

“we assume that the evidence of the prevailing party 

below is true and give that party every reasonable 

inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. 

We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a 

finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless 

they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a 

matter of law.”

The district court’s conclusions of law, however, are subject 

to our de novo standard of review.

Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, ¶ 12, 227 P.3d 325, 330 (Wyo. 2010), 

quoting Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 40, 208 P.3d 1296, 1308 (Wyo. 2009)

(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Which statute governed notification to the property owner of the lien 

filing?

[¶15] Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-101 (LexisNexis 2010), “every person performing 

any work on or furnishing any materials or plans for any building or any improvement 

upon land shall have for his work done or plans or materials furnished a lien upon the 
6

building or improvements.”5 Under the statutory lien provisions, a claimant is required to 

comply with certain notice requirements. The lien in this case was filed in the county 

clerk’s office on December 22, 2011, and EWS’s counsel mailed notice of the lien to Ms. 

Fraser on December 29, 2011.

[¶16] Ms. Fraser argued that EWS’s lien was invalid because it did not send notice to 

her within five calendar days after the lien was filed in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 29-1-312(c) (LexisNexis 2012): 

(c) Notice shall be sent by the lien claimant to the last record 

owner or his agent in the case of a real property lien within 

five (5) days after the lien statement is filed.6

[¶17] EWS claimed W.R.C.P. 6(a) applied to make its notification timely. Rule 6(a) 

provides:

(a) Computation. – In computing any period of time 

prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or 

by any applicable statutes, the day of the act, event, or 

default from which the designated period of time begins to 

run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 

computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a 

Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is 

the filing of a paper, a day on which weather or other 

conditions have made the office of the clerk of the court 

inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end 

of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned 

days. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is 

 

5 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-101 (LexisNexis 2014) continues to provide the right to a lien, although it has 

been revised. 

6 The legislature has since amended § 29-1-312(c) to require that notice of the lien be sent to the property 

owner within 30 days after filing and to specifically state that failure to send the notice will not affect the 

validity of the lien:

(c) Notice shall be sent by the lien claimant to the last record owner or his agent in the 

case of a real property lien within thirty (30) days after the lien statement is filed. The 

notice shall be in substantially the same format and contain the same information as the 

form of notice specified in W.S. 29-10-103. The notice forms shall be made available and 

may be obtained at the county clerk’s office of each county. Failure to send the notice 

required under this subsection shall not affect the validity of the lien.

Section 29-1-312(c) (LexisNexis 2014). 
7

less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, 

and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 

computation. As used in this rule, “legal holiday” 

includes any day officially recognized as a legal holiday 

in this state by designation of the legislature or 

appointment as a holiday by the governor.

 

(Emphasis added).

[¶18] In 2011, Christmas was on Sunday, so Monday, December 26, 2011, was the 

recognized legal holiday. Under Rule 6(a), if the holiday and the weekend days are 

excluded from the calculation, December 29, 2011, was the fourth day after filing and a 

notice sent that day would have been timely. The circuit court rejected EWS’s argument 

about application of Rule 6(a) to the calculation of time under § 29-1-312(c). 

[¶19] On appeal to the district court, EWS argued, in part, that § 29-1-312 did not apply 

to its lien filing and insisted that an earlier version of the statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-

301(c) (LexisNexis 2009), applied instead. That statute included the following notice 

provision: 

“(c) Notice shall be given to the last known owner in the case 

of a real estate lien by certified mail and made by the lien 

claimant promptly after the lien statement is filed.” 

Section 29-1-301(c). EWS claimed it sent notice of its lien “promptly” as required by the 

statute. 

[¶20] Section 29-1-312 went into effect July 1, 2011; however, the session law stated: 

The provisions of this act shall apply to all projects 

commenced on or after July 1, 2011. Any projects 

commenced prior to July 1, 2011, shall be governed by the 

lien procedures in title 29 that existed prior to July 1, 

2011.

2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 92, § 4, p. 425 (emphasis added). Given the Rafter J Café 

project commenced in late 2010, it is clear the former notice statute, § 29-1-301(c), 

applied to this case. Nevertheless, the district court refused to apply the earlier version of 

the statute because EWS had not specifically presented the argument to the circuit court. 

[¶21] In general, 
8

“issues raised for the first time on appeal . . . will not be 

considered by this court unless they are jurisdictional or 

issues of such a fundamental nature that they must be 

considered.” Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 10, 78 P.3d 

671, 674 (Wyo.2003).

Gjertsen v. Haar, 2015 WY 56, ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Wyo. 2015). EWS represents 

that it was not aware of the provision making the revised statutory lien act applicable 

only to projects commenced on or after July 1, 2011, because that part of the law was not 

included in the printed version of the statute. We have confirmed that the printed 

versions of the 2010 supplement and the 2011 edition of the Wyoming Statutes did not 

include 2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 92, §4, p. 425.

7

 Consequently, anyone using the 

printed versions of the revised statute was missing critical information about its 

effectiveness. 

[¶22] 2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 92, § 4, p. 425 is, obviously, part of the statute. We 

interpret statutes de novo. Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2014 WY 133, 

¶ 10, 336 P.3d 151, 153 (Wyo. 2014). Our usual rules of statutory interpretation provide:

[The] paramount consideration is to determine the 

legislature’s intent, which must be ascertained initially and 

primarily from the words used in the statute. We look first to 

the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if 

the statute is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous 

if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 

on its meaning with consistency and predictability. 

Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague 

or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.

Barlow Ranch, Ltd. Partnership v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, ¶ 18, 301 

P.3d 75, 83 (Wyo. 2013), citing Michael’s Constr., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 2012 WY 76, 

¶ 12, 278 P.3d 701, 705 (Wyo. 2012). “When the language is clear, we give effect to the 

ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature.” Horning, ¶ 13, 

336 P.3d at 154. We apply our rules of statutory construction only when a statute is 

ambiguous. Id. 

[¶23] The Wyoming Legislature was careful to include, in the enacted legislation, the 

provision limiting the applicability of the revised statute to projects commenced on or 

after July 1, 2011. The legislature’s clear intent was for § 29-1-301 to apply to projects 

under construction prior to the effective date of § 29-1-312. In accordance with the 

 

7

Interestingly, the on-line versions of the 2010 supplement and the 2011 edition do contain Laws 2010, 

ch. 92, § 4. 
9

principle that courts are charged with enforcing the legislature’s actual intent, enrolled 

bills govern over incorrect or incomplete printed versions. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 

39 (2015); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 78 (2015). 

[¶24] Application of the correct law to the Rafter J Café project implicates a 

fundamental matter that warrants consideration of EWS’s argument. Furthermore, the 

circuit court actually discussed § 29-1-301(c) in its detailed decision on EWS’s motion 

for reconsideration of its summary judgment, although it did not recognize the provision 

limiting the effectiveness of § 29-1-312. We will, therefore, apply the correct rule of law, 

as set out in the former statute, to determine the timeliness of EWS’s lien notification. 

B. Did EWS comply with the notification requirement of § 29-1-301(c)?

[¶25] As we stated above, § 29-1-301(c) required the lien claimant to give notice to the 

property owner “by certified mail . . . promptly after the lien statement is filed.” 

Although the circuit court did not actually apply the earlier statute to EWS’s lien, it stated 

that “[a]rguably, the plaintiff ‘promptly’ mailed the lien notice to the defendant.” 

[¶26] “Promptly” is not an exact term. The plain meaning of “prompt” is “at once,” 

“without delay,” or “quick to act as occasion demands.” Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary 1816 (2002). As the definition recognizes, what is “prompt” depends upon 

the situation. The Teton County Clerk recorded EWS’s lien on December 22, 2011, and 

EWS’s counsel, who practiced in Laramie, Wyoming, sent certified notice to Ms. Fraser 

that a lien had been recorded against her property on December 29, 2011. The week that 

passed between the date of filing and the date notice was sent included a weekend and 

Monday, December 26, 2011, a legal holiday, which obviously affected EWS’s counsel’s 

efforts to learn about the lien recording from the county clerk’s office and to send the 

notice by certified mail. Under these circumstances, EWS promptly notified Ms. Fraser 

of the lien by certified mail. The circuit court erred by declaring the lien invalid and the 

district court erred by affirming the circuit court’s decision. 

C. Did the circuit court properly conclude that EWS was not entitled to a 

judgment on the theory of unjust enrichment?

[¶27] In addition to its lien claim, EWS presented a cause of action for unjust 

enrichment against the defendants. 

Unjust enrichment (or quantum meruit) is an equitable 

remedy which implies a contract so that one party may 

recover damages from another. One seeking damages based 

on unjust enrichment must prove four elements:

(1) Valuable services were rendered, or materials furnished,
10

(2) to the party to be charged,

(3) which services or materials were accepted, used and 

enjoyed by the party, and,

(4) under such circumstances which reasonably notified the 

party to be charged that the plaintiff, in rendering such 

services or furnishing such materials, expected to be paid by

the party to be charged. Without such payment, the party 

would be unjustly enriched.

Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc., 847 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wyo. 1993) (citations 

omitted).

[¶28] Bishop Construction moved for summary judgment on EWS’s unjust enrichment 

claim, asserting that as a matter of law EWS could not satisfy the fourth element of unjust 

enrichment because it did not give Bishop Construction and Ms. Fraser notice that it 

would look to them for payment. The circuit court denied Bishop Construction’s motion, 

finding there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The 

circuit court then held a bench trial on EWS’s unjust enrichment claim. After the trial, it 

issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order denying EWS’s unjust 

enrichment claim because it had failed to prove the fourth element of the cause of action. 

[¶29] As we stated in the standard of review section, above, a district court’s factual 

findings after a bench trial are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. In 

addition, given unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, the trial court had considerable 

discretion in ruling on the claim. We will not interfere with the lower court’s decision 

unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Windsor Energy Group, LLC v. Noble 

Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, ¶ 23, 330 P.3d 285, 291-92 (Wyo. 2014) (discussing standard 

of review applicable to the district court’s decision after a bench trial on a claim based 

upon the equitable doctrine of laches).

[¶30] The circuit court and, to some extent, the parties focused on the notice portion of 

the fourth element of unjust enrichment at trial, i.e., whether EWS reasonably notified 

Bishop Construction and Ms. Fraser that EWS expected to be paid by them. The circuit 

court ruled that neither Bishop Construction nor Ms. Fraser received adequate notice 

from EWS that it was looking to them for payment for the electrical supplies purchased 

by JHE on its account. The circuit court relied upon Bowles, 847 P.2d 1002, in arriving 

at its decision.

[¶31] Bowles was the owner of a construction project, Homestead was the original 

general contractor, and Sunrise supplied materials for the job on an account opened by 
11

Homestead. Homestead did not complete the job in a timely manner, so Bowles hired a 

second contractor, Thompson, to finish the project. Homestead, Bowles and Thompson 

all charged items to the job account with Sunrise. The account was not paid in full and 

Sunrise filed a lien against Bowles’ property and then filed an action against Homestead, 

Bowles and Thompson. The action included counts for foreclosure of the lien and unjust 

enrichment. Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1003-04. 

[¶32] The lien foreclosure claim was dismissed because “Sunrise failed to follow the 

strict statutory requirements of Wyoming’s mechanic’s lien laws.” Id. at 1004. The 

district court held a bench trial on Sunrise’s unjust enrichment claim, but Homestead 

declared bankruptcy so the only remaining defendants were Bowles and Thompson. The 

district court entered judgment in favor of Sunrise. On appeal, this Court reversed in 

part, concluding that Sunrise had not given sufficient notice to Bowles and Thompson 

that it expected them to pay for the materials purchased by Homestead for the project. 

However, we affirmed the judgment as it pertained to the items charged by each of them, 

concluding they had sufficient notice that they were expected to pay for those materials. 

We explained:

Because Homestead: (1) alone opened the account, (2) was 

the sole signatory on the account application, (3) was the only 

entity billed by Sunrise on the account, and (4) was bound 

contractually to supply material and construct Bowles’ office 

building, we find that Bowles and Thompson were not 

reasonably notified that Sunrise expected to be paid by them 

on this account. However, we limit this finding to the 

amounts specifically charged by Homestead and its 

employees because when Bowles and Thompson charged 

supplies themselves they had reasonable notice that Sunrise 

expected to be paid for those charges.

 

Id. at 1005. 

Applying Bowles to the circumstances of this case, the circuit court stated:

48. Based upon Bowles, the court concludes that Fraser 

and Bishop Construction were not reasonably notified that the 

plaintiff expected to be paid by them for electrical supplies 

purchased by Jackson Hole Electric on its job account, 

because (1) Jackson Hole Electric, through its owner, Dusty 

Jones, alone opened the account, (2) Jones was the sole 

signatory on the account application, (3) Jones’ entity, 

Jackson Hole Electric, was the only entity billed by the 

plaintiff on the account, and (4) Jones and Jackson Hole 
12

Electric were bound contractually to pay the plaintiff for the 

electrical supplies provided for the Rafter J project. Fraser 

and Bishop Construction therefore are not liable to the 

plaintiff on the theory of unjust enrichment.

The circuit court specifically found that the pre-lien notice sent by EWS on November 

30, 2010,

did place Fraser and Bishop Construction on notice that the 

plaintiff intended to get paid for providing electrical supplies 

for the Rafter J project; but it placed Fraser and Bishop 

Construction on notice that the plaintiff intended to get paid 

by Jackson Hole Electric, not by Fraser and Bishop 

Construction. 

 

(footnote omitted). 

[¶33] We have concerns about the circuit court’s analysis of the notice provided by 

EWS when it began providing materials for the job in late 2010. The notice, quoted in 

Paragraph 5 above, clearly placed the owner and general contractor on notice that, if JHE 

did not pay for the materials, they were at risk of having to pay for them. It warned them 

that they should obtain lien waivers prior to paying JHE in order to prevent having a lien 

placed on the property. The Bowles opinion does not describe the notice sent by Sunrise 

to the owner or second contractor, stating only that it failed to comply with the lien 

statutes. By contrast, we do know the contents of the lien notice in this case. It informed 

Ms. Fraser and Bishop Construction that EWS expected to be paid; EWS had the right to 

a lien on the property to secure payment for the electrical materials; and the owner was at 

risk of having to pay twice for the materials if lien waivers were not secured from the 

general contractor, the subcontractors and/or the materialmen.

[¶34] Although we have misgivings about the circuit court’s rationale, we do not need to 

make a definitive ruling on the adequacy of EWS’s notice for purposes of the unjust 

enrichment claim because the record does not demonstrate that either Bishop 

Construction or Ms. Fraser was unjustly enriched by the electrical materials supplied by 

EWS. The second part of the fourth element of unjust enrichment requires a showing that 

the party to be charged would be unjustly enriched if it were not required to pay. 

Element four is the heart of an unjust enrichment claim. 

The receipt of a benefit must be unjust as to the party to be 

charged. Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that is 

appropriate only when the party to be charged has received a 

benefit that in good conscience the party ought not retain 

without compensation to the party providing the benefit. “The 

words ‘unjust enrichment’ concisely state the necessary 
13

elements of an equitable action to recover money, property, 

etc., which ‘good conscience’ demands should be set over to 

the appellee by appellants pursuant to an implied contract 

between them.” Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216, 218 

(Wyo.1991). As stated at 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and 

Implied Contracts § 8 (2001):

The phrase “unjust enrichment” is used in law to characterize 

the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, 

property or benefits received under such circumstances as to 

give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor. 

It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 

and remedies, that one person should not be permitted 

unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but 

should be required to make restitution of or for property or 

benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just 

and equitable that such restitution be made, and where such 

action involves no violation or frustration of law or 

opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly.

Boyce v. Freeman, 2002 WY 20, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d 1062, 1065-66 (Wyo. 2002). See also, 

Symons v. Heaton, 2014 WY 4, ¶ 16, 316 P.3d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 2014); Redland v. 

Redland, 2012 WY 148, ¶ 146, 288 P.3d 1173, 1205-06 (Wyo. 2012). 

[¶35] The evidence in this case clearly established that Bishop Construction paid JHE 

for all of the electrical services and materials billed on the Rafter J Café project. In turn, 

Ms. Fraser fully paid Bishop Construction for all of the labor and materials it billed on 

the project. JHE applied its business revenues as it saw fit and chose not to use the 

proceeds of the Rafter J Café project to pay off the EWS account. Given the general 

contractor and the owner paid all amounts due to JHE, it cannot be said that ‘good 

conscience’ demands they pay EWS for the materials JHE installed in the project. They 

were not unjustly enriched by the materials from EWS. The party who was unjustly 

enriched by EWS’s materials was JHE because it received full payment and did not apply 

the funds to pay off the job account. 

[¶36] In Bowles, we discussed a case with facts very similar to the case at bar, 

Morrisville Lumber Co. v. Okcuoglu, 148 Vt. 180, 531 A.2d 887 (1987). We described 

the facts and holding of the Vermont case as follows: 

The Okcuoglus had contracted with a builder to construct a 

vacation home. The builder opened two accounts, a general 

account and a job account, with a materials supplier 

(Morrisville) and then purchased supplies for the Okcuoglu 
14

project. Problems arose between the Okcuoglus and the 

builder which resulted in termination of the builder before the 

home was complete. Okcuoglu paid the builder only twothirds of the contract price but was forced to expend 

additional funds, beyond the contract price, to have the home 

completed. Unable to collect on the accounts from the 

builder, Morrisville sued the Okcuoglus based on unjust 

enrichment. Morrisville, 531 A.2d at 888. The Vermont 

Supreme Court declined to permit damages based upon unjust 

enrichment because the Okcuoglus paid for all the benefits it 

received; therefore, they were not unjustly enriched. 

Morrisville, 531 A.2d at 889.

Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1005. Like the Okcuoglus, Bishop Construction and Ms. Fraser paid 

for all of the benefits they received. Consequently, the circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion by ruling that EWS was not entitled to relief under the equitable doctrine of 

unjust enrichment. 

[¶37] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.