### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 364 -CV

Terr y and Phyllis Pric e, Mic haela Watson, and RobertL. Mays, Jr. , Appellan ts
v. P hili p Sc hr oe de r , Bi ll Sm it h, J e r r y Be e ne , Le r oyHar r ing to n, R e ag an H ill , J e r r y M it c he ll, G ar y M oo r e , To ny Si lva , M ar ti n Ra m sa y, Jo hnnie Te r r az as , R ayWa inne r , J ohn W at so n, David Beene, A. V. We lsh, an d Fir st Baptist Church of Bul verde , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C2005 -13 86A , HO NORAB LE JACK H. RO B ISO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Terr y and Phy llis P rice sued their f ormer c hurch, the Fir st Baptist Church of B ulverde (“the Church”) , for a cce ss to the Church’s books and r ecor ds. See Tex. Rev. Civ. S t at
. Ann. art. 1396-2.23 (West 2003) (member s of nonprofit cor poration have rig ht to inspect corpor ation’s bo ok s and

re c or ds ). Th e Pr ic e s a lle g e d th a t w hil e the Chu rc h a llo we d th e m limite d a c c e ss t o it s books and records, it did not allow them sufficient a cce ss to conduct a f ull audit. The Church filed a spec ial appea

ranc e and ple a to the jurisdiction, argu i n g t hat the Price s lacke d standing and the Price’s suit implicated ec clesiastica l matters beyond the trial cour t’s jurisdiction. The Prices subsequently added Michaela Watson, a per sonal frie nd and ac tive member of the Church, a s a copla int if f. Th e tr ia l court g ra

nte d the Chu

rc h’ s ple a to t

he jur isd ic tio n r e g ard ingthe Pr ic e s’ c la ims but allowed Watson’s claims to pr ocee d. The Prices then filed a new suit ag ainst individual deacons2

of the Churc h, se e kin g dama g e s und er vari ou s to rt the or ie s. Th e Churc h in te rv e ne d in the su it ag ainst the deac ons beca

use it ha d ag ree d to indemnify them. The two suits were consolidated, a nd the Chu rc h a nd the de a c on s e ve ntu a lly

mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt o n a ll c la ims ag a ins t th e m. The trial c ourt gra nted the summary judgme nt motions and also g rante d defe ndants’ motions for sanctions ag ai n s t t h e P rice s and their attorney . The Price s, their attorne y , and Watson appea l the
su mma ry jud g me nts and

sanc tio ns awa

rd s. We w ill a ff

ir m in pa rt and va c a te in p art
.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND The Price s were members of the Church for se vera l y ear s. They eventua lly

disag ree d wi th v ari ou s e c c le sia sti c a l and se c ula r C hurc h p oli c ie s, inc lud ingho w t he Churc h h and le d it s financ es. In September 2004, the Prices re quested a cce ss to t h e Church’s f inancial books a

nd
re c or ds , wh ic h the Pr ic e s we re e nti tle d to re vie w be c a us e the Churc h wa s a re g ist e red n on -pr ofit corpor ation. Se e id . (member s of cor poration have rig ht, on written demand a nd for pr oper pur

pose, to e xami ne and

c op y c or po ratio n’ s b oo ks and

re c or ds ). Th e Pr ic e s ma de a second requ e st t o examine the Church’s books a nd rec ords on Marc h 31, 2005, this ti me thro u gh a l ett er dr afte d by their attorne y , Robert L . May s, J r. (“ May s”).

On April 3, 2 0 05, in acc ordanc e with its by laws and Constitution, t he Church terminated the Prices’ membership. The Church maintains that this action wa s not the result of the Price s ’ f in a n c ia l i n qu ir ie s , b u t r a th e r o f th e Pr ic e s ’ lo n g s ta

n d in g an d

in c r e a s in g ly

v e hement disag ree ments with the Church’s e ccle siastical doctrine s. The Church a lleg es i t h ad m ade ma ny
e ff or ts o ve r the y e ars to ad dr e ss the Pr ic e s’ c on c e rn s, inc lud ing arr ang ing fo r spe c ia l me e tin g s w ith an indepe ndent mediator, but ultimately these e f f o r ts f ailed. The Church’s membe rs voted to re moveThe Churc h asser ts that May s made this admission in a letter he se nt to Bena vides on 1 Apri l 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 , b u t that letter is not in the rec ord. The r ecor d does show, howe ver, that on Marc h 31, 2005, May s sent Be navides a letter that stated: “Mrs. Price
. . . . is conce rned that funds that ha ve be e n d on a te d fo r the bu ild ing fu nd have be e n sp e nt fo r oth e r p ur po se s. ” Simi larl y , in

his Ap ri l 12 le tte r su mma

ri zing the “ sig nif

ic ant dis c re pa

nc ie s” a lle g e dly dis c ov e re d duri ngthe Ap ri l 5 inspection, May s stated t hat “Mrs. Price . . . was and re mains conce rned that funds that have be en donated f or the building fund have been spe nt for other purposes.” 3 the Prices a s members on April 3, 2005. The Church allowed the Prices and Ma y s to ex amine the Church’s books and rec ords on April 5, 2005, two day s after the Prices’ membership wa s terminated. On Ap ri l 12 , 2 00 5, May s se nt a le tte r t o th e Ch urch ’s a tto rn e y , A my B e navid e s, statin g that th e Ap ri l 5 e xami natio n c on vin c e d h im that a “ c omp le te a

ud it o f t he c hurc h r e c or ds is
nece ssary .” May s reques t ed t h at the Church turn ove r financ ial rec ords for the period fr om 200 2 thr o u g h 2 0 0 5 s o th a t M ay s c o u ld s u b mi t th e m to an a c c o u n ta n t f o r a c o mp lete audit. On April 14, 2005, May s alleg edly told B enavide s that the Prices’ main conce rn wa s how the Church had disposed of a

donation the Prices made to the Church’s building fund in 1997. A c c o r d i n g l y, 1
on Ap ri l 28 , 2 00 5, B e navid e s se nt M ay s a le tte r s ta tin g that th e Pr ic e s’ a ud it r e qu e st w a s “ no t on ly bey ond what is requir ed by [Tex . Rev. Civ. St at. ar

t. 1396-2.23], but would f ai l to shed light on Mrs. Price’s stated conce rn.” Be navides’s letter s tated that the Church would be willing to attempt to loc a te r e c o r d s r e late d

to th e Pr ic e s ’ 1 9 9 7 b u il d in g - f u n d d o n a ti o n , b u t o th e r

w is e th e Chu r ch believed that it had discharg ed its leg al duties.

The Price s did not take the Church up on its offe r t o locate a dditional recor ds relate d to t he Pr ic e s’ 19 97 bu ild ing -f un d d on a tio n. Ra the r, on Ap ri l 26, 200 5, the Pr ic e s f ile d s uit a g a ins t the Church. Their petition a lleg ed that while they had bee n allowed to view the Church’s r ecor ds
on April 5, they had not be en allowed to c opy them. Their pe tition i nitially reque sted that the cour

t4

order t h e C h u rc h to produce its 2003, 2004, and 2005 rec ords for c opy ing, but it later reque sted sim ply that th e Court

“ or de r a n a ud it” of tho se re c or ds . T he pe tit ion va ri ou sly state d th a t th e purp os e of the a ud it w a s “ to v e ri fy

that [th e Churc h’ s] e xpe nd it ures are fo r C hurc h- re la te d p ur po se s, ” “ to deter mine whether

or not the ac ts of the pastor and the Boar d of De acons a re illeg al, oppre ssive, or fra udulent,” and “to deter

mine whether or not c orporate assets have been misapplied o r w as t ed.” The Price s serve d their petition on Cheryl H allonquist, the Church’s f ormer tr easur er and re g istered a g ent for se rvice of proc ess. Hallonquist had stopped attendin g t he Church a fter moving f rom Bulve rde to San Antonio some y ear s ear lier. The P ri ce s we re persona l friends of Hallonquist and serve d her at a San Antonio a ddress rathe r than the B ulverde addre ss that was listed in the Secre tary

of State’s re cords due to an over sight by the Church. The C h u rc h maintains that Hallonquist did not i nform anyone at the Church about the lawsuit and that it did not le arn a bout the lawsuit until af

ter a visiti ng trial court judge enter ed a defa ult or der on Ma

y 25, 2005 g ranting the relief reque sted by the Prices’ petition. The defa ult order r equire d the Church to produc e fina ncial
rec ords for 2002 thr oug h 2005 as we ll as other information, including “the audio tape r ecor ding on April 3 , 2 0 0 5 i n which Te rry Price a nd Phy llis P rice wer e purpor tedly excommunicated from the Churc h. ” Th e Pr ic e s se rv e d th e or de r o n th e Churc h’ s d e a c on s at th e ir ho me s. On J une 6, 2005, the Churc h filed a spe cial appe ara nce that argued the Churc h was not subject to the court’ s jurisdiction because it had never bee n proper ly serve d with the petition. On the same day , the Church a lso filed a motion to vacate the May 25, 2005 audit order and a ple a to the jurisdiction that arg ued (1) the information soug ht by the Prices wa s ecc lesiastical and there fore outside the court’ s jurisdiction and (2) the Price s lacke d standing beca use their church
me mbe rs hip wa s te rm inate d b e fo re the y fi le d s uit
.5 On J uly 5, 2005, the Prices filed an amende d petition that added Watson, a friend of the Pr ic e s and

me mbe r o f t

he Churc h, a s a c o- pla int if f. I n a dd iti on

to t he fa c ts a lle g e d in

the Pr ic e s’ orig inal petition, the amended pe tition allege d that on April 4, 2005, Watson ha d orally reque sted
acc ess to the Church’ s books and rec ords and was told that she had to submit a written re quest. See id . (re quest for a cce ss to c orporation’s books a nd rec ords must be in writing) . The amended pe tition also al leg ed that “[a]s of J une 25, 2005, Plaintiff Watson had not been g rante d inspection of the Church re cords.” The pe tition attached an a ffidavit, sig ned by Watson on J une 29, 2005, that stated: “I reque st a c c e s s to th e Chu r c h r e c o r d s an d Ir e qu e s t t

h a t t h e c o u rt o r d e r

ana u d it o f th e f in a n cial aff airs of the Church for

the past three (3) y ear s.” On J uly 22, 2005, the Church withdre w its special appe ara nce. On Aug ust 26, 2005, Church counsel se nt a letter to May s proposing that rathe r than producingits financial re cords, the Churc h could turn over its financ ial rec ords to an indepe ndent
acc ountant to be audited at t he C hurch’ s expense. May s reje cted this proposal in a le tter he se nt the same da y , calling it “completely unacc eptable” and threatening to f ile a motion to compel production and a motion for sa

nctions if the Church did n o t h an d o v er “all of [ its] rec ords” within a we ek. On Aug ust 31, 2005, the trial court g rante d the Church’ s motion t o vacate the May 25, 2005 audit order and also g rante d the Church’ s plea to the jurisdiction. Wit hout expl aining the basis of its orde r, the court dismissed the Prices “ for wa nt of jurisdiction” but left Watson’s cause s of a c tio n in ta c t. T he same da y , th e pa rt ie s f ile d an a g re e d pro te c tiv e or de r that r e qu ir e d Watso n to keep c onfidential any

financ ial rec ords produced by the Church. Amongother thing s, this protective order preve nted Watson from sharingthe Church’ s financia l rec ords with non-par ties.6 On September

1, 2005, the Church sent a letter to Ma y s in w hich it ag ree d to make its recor ds available to Watson for copying. N eve rt heless, on September 9, 2005, Watson filed a mot ion to c omp e l th e pr od

uc tio n o f t

ho se re c or ds . T he mot ion re qu e ste d a wi de ra

ng e of re c or ds , inc lud ingthe Churc h’ s c on sti tut ion . O n Se pte mbe r 2 6, 20 05 , th e Chu rc h p ro du c e d a

pp ro xima te ly 1400 pag es of f

inancial recor ds. Finding this production inade quate, Watson filed a se cond motion to compel on Oct o b er 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 that also included a reque st to diss olve the August 31, 2005 protec tive order
.

Around this time, the Church alleg es that the Prices made out a chec k to the Church
and ha d s ome on e pla c e it und e r a de sk in a Chu rc h o ff ic e . Th e Chu

rc h r e tur ne d th e c he c k to the Prices. On Dec ember 15, 2005, a visiting judg e g rante d Watson’s moti o n t o compel production and a lso modified the parties’ protec tive order to a llow Watson to disclose the Church’ s finan cia l re c or ds to a

ny oth e r C hurc h me mbe r. Th e vis iti ngjud g e ’s or de r g a ve the Chu rc h unti l J anuar y 15, 2006 to produce the re cords. I t als o gav e Watson permission to join t he dea cons as parties if the Church fa iled to produce the re cords by J anuar y 15. On Dece mber 27, 2005, the Price s, with May s still actingas their attorney , filed a second lawsuit, this time naming the individual de acons of the Churc h as def endants. The second suit alleg ed that (1) the dea cons themselves ha d denied the Pric es ac cess to the Churc h’s books and
rec ords; (2) the Pric es’ moneta ry donations to the Church “w ere not used for the ir intended purp os e s” ; (3 ) t

he de a c on s, joi ntl y

and se ve ra lly , h a d “ mis a

pp ro pr ia te d a nd c on ve rt e d” the Pr ic e s’ donations of money

and prope rty ; a

nd (4) the deac ons had “e x communicated” the Prices f or see king7

acc ess to the Church’ s financia l rec ords. The lawsuit listed cause s of ac tion for conve rsion, brea ch of fiducia ry duty , misapplication of fiducia ry proper ty , and fr aud. On J anuar y 13, 2006, the Church f

iled a motion in the first lawsuit that asked the trial court to re consider the visiti ng judge ’s Dec ember 15, 2005 order . The Churc h argued that the or der was unduly

burdensome be cause the Church ha d proposed a simpler alternative t o the re quired production, name ly , an indepe ndent audit, and ove rly broad be cause Watson had not identified specific g aps in the rec ords produce d by the Church on September 26, 2005. The Church also a rg ued that the Dec ember

15 order violated Tex as R evised Ci vil Statutes article 1396-2.23 i n that the way it modified the parties’ pr otective or der w ould allow non-par ty Church membe rs t o re view the Church’s f

inancial r ecor ds without first making a writ t en demand f

or them and statinga prope r purpose. Se e id . ( re qu e st f or a c c e ss t o co rp or a tio n’ s boo ks and re c or ds mus t be in w ri tin g and state proper purpose)
. On J anuar

y 17, 2006, Watson filed a motion requesting sanctions for the Church’s failure to produce documents in ac corda nce w ith the Dece mber 15, 2005 order . Watson’s moti on al s o re qu es t eds an ct i o n s aga i n s tt h e C h u rc h ’s p as t o r an d d ea co n s “b ec au s e th e C h u rc h ac t s t h ro u gh its pastor and dea cons.”

Also on J anuar

y 17, 2006, the individual deac ons, repr esente d b y at t o rney J oseph Ma str og iov ann i, Jr ., fi le d a n a ns we r i n th e se c on d la

ws uit . T hey

g e ne ra lly

de nie d th e Pr ic e s’
a lle g a tio ns and

a sse rt e d ( wi th ou t e la

bo ratio n) that th e Pr ic e s la c ke d c a pa c ity to s ue . T he y

a lso
coun t er cl aim ed for

sanctions under

chapte r 10 of the T exas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code,The de acons’ answe r ac tually cited “Rule 13 of

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedie s 2 code.” That wa s cl early

a ty pog raphic al er

ror; the Civil Practice a

nd Remedies Code c ontains c ha pte rs a nd sec tio ns , n ot “ ru le s, ” and c ha pte r 1 3 d e a ls w itha ff

ida vit s o f i na

bil ity to p ay c os ts, which have nothing to do with this case. Cha p t er 10, on the other ha

nd, deals with sanc tions for improper plea dings. A lternatively , the deacons m ay have intended t o cite Rule 13 of t he Te x as Rules of C ivil Procedur e, which also dea ls with sanctions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. I n any event, the Pric es did not object to the deac ons’ er ror, a nd, as discussed be low, the dea cons eve ntually moved for sanctions under both c hapter 10 of the Civil Practice a nd Remedies Code a

nd Rule 13 of the Rules of Civ il Pr oc e dure . T hu s, the de a c on s’ mis take wa s im ma te ri a l. 8 a lle g ing that the Pr ic e s ha d su e d in ba d fa ith and so le ly fo r h ara ssm e nt. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. 2 Code Ann. § § 10.001 (cla ims must be pre sented for proper purpose) , .002 (cour

t may awa rd sanctions for violations of § 10.001) (West 2002).

On Janu ary 30 , 2 00 6, the Churc h f

ile d a mot ion to i nte rv e ne in the se c on d la ws uit , a sse rt ingthat in te rv e nti on wa s p ro pe r b e c a

us e it h a d a g re e d to ind e mni fy the de a c on s. On F e br ua ry 1, 20 06 , the tr ia l c ourt he ld a he ari ng on the mot ion s p e nd ingin t he fi rs t lawsuit (namely , Watson’s moti on for sa nctions and the Churc h’s motion for re consideration of the Dec ember

15, 2005 order ). The c ourt indicated that it would d eny Watson’s moti on, g rant the Church’s motion, and order the case abate d while an independe nt a udit wa s conducte d. The c ourt
a lso ind ic a te d th a t it

wo uld ini tia lly

re qu ir e the Churc h to pa

y fo r t he a ud it b ut m ig ht s hif

t th e c os t to Watson i f the a

udit uncovere d no wrong doing. The c ourt did not enter or ders f ormalizing these or al ruling s for some time. Be fore it did so, t he Church a

mended its answe r in the first lawsuit to include counte rcla ims for libel and slander, c onspiracy

to interfer e with business relations, business dis para g ement, and sa nctions. The Church alleg ed that the Price s continued to be the driving for ce be hind Watson’s suit , even pa y ing he r l e g a l bi lls , a

nd that Wa tso n w a s me re ly

a c tin g a s th e ir

a g e nt i n c on tin

uin g to p re ss t

he su it.9 On Marc h 8, 2006, the trial cour t en t ered an orde r for

malizi ng sever al of its bench ruling s from the Fe bruar

y 1 hear ing. The Marc h 8 order fully reinstated the parties’ protec tive order , denied Watson’s motion for sanctions, order ed an independe nt a udit of the Chu rc h ’s fi nancia l
rec ords, and or dere d that Watson would pa y fo r t h e audit if it did not revea l fraud. O n May 10 , 2 00 6, the Court

e nte re d a

c omp le me nta

ry or de r t hat a bated the laws uit

un til the a

ud it
was c ompleted.

On Aug ust 3, 2006, the audit was complete d. I t reve aled some g aps in the Church’ s
rec ords but no fra

ud. Consequently , on November 13, 2006, the Church f iled a motion to require Watson to reimburse its a udit e x penses, which totaled $21,380.08. The same day , the Church f iled
a motion for summary

judgme nt ag ainst Watson. The Church sty led its moti on as both a tra ditional and no-e vidence motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P . 166a(c ), (i). The Church ar g ued that (1) the trial cour t la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r Watso n’ s su it b e c a us e it i mpl ic a te d e c c lesi ast ical matte rs ; (2) the a udit conclusively established that the Church ha d not eng ag ed in wrong doing; ( 3) Watson had produc ed no evide nce that she suffe red a n injury or that the Churc h had violated a ny duty ; and (4) Watson lacke d standing and fa iled to alleg e a via ble ca use of a ction. On Novembe r 20, 2006, the Churc h and the individual dea con s jointly moved for summary judgme nt in the second lawsuit. They ag ain sty led the motion as both a traditional and noevidenc e motion. Se e id
. They alleg ed that (1) the trial court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction over the Prices’ second la

wsuit beca

use it implicated ecclesiastica l matters; (2) the P rice s lacke d standing beca use t heir Church membership was terminated before they filed suit; (3) the Price s produce d no evidenc e to support t h ei r conversion claim; (4) the Prices produc ed no evide nce that the deac ons held, much less bre ache d, a fiduc iary responsibility

to the Prices; (5) there is no civil cause of actionThe pe tition m ade this denial even t houg h, as di scussed above, t he C hurch ha d produce d 3 ro ug hly 14 00 pa g e s o f fi na

nc ia l do c ume nts and

g ra nte d unf e tte re d a c c e ss t o it s f

ina nc ia l r e c or ds to an indepe ndent auditor. Thoug h the t rial court initially order ed the a udit as part of Watson’s lawsuit, it ended up 4 holding both Watson and the Price s liable for the cost of the a udi t af ter the two la

wsuits were consolidated. 10 for misapplication of fiduciar y proper ty ; (6) the Prices produce d no evidenc e to support any element of their f

raud c laim; and (7) the a udit conclusively

establi s h ed t h at t he Church ha d not committed fraud.

On Novembe r 28, 2006, just day s before the c ourt was to hold a he aringon the pending summary -judg ment motions, t he Price s and Watson jointl y filed a second a mended pe tition that was intende d to operate in both lawsuits. The petition asser t ed that Watson had bee n denied
a c c e ss t o th e Churc h’ s boo ks and re c or ds
. I t also asserte d that the audit had “ reve aled numer ous

3 irregularities.” The second a mended pe tition s oug ht a decla ration that the Church a

nd the dea cons had violated Te x as Revised Civil St atutes ar ticle 1396-2.23(A ). I t a lso a lleg ed cause s of action for brea ch of c ontrac t, neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, c onversion, bre ach of fi duciar y duty , and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On Dec ember

26, 2006, the individual deac ons and the Churc h both filed amende d summary judgme nt motions in response to the se cond ame nd ed p et i tion. L ike their pre vious mot ion s, the ir

ne w m oti on s w e re sty

le d a s b oth

tr a dit ion a l and

no -e vid e nc e mot ion s. On J anuar

y 8, 2007, the Prices and Watson filed sever al motions that we re intende d to operate in both lawsuits. First, they filed m otions to set aside or rec onsider the or der that require d the m to pa

y fo r t he a ud it. Second, they

moved to consolidate the f irst and second lawsuits, stating 411

that “[t] he issues of f

act a nd law in both district court ac tions are the sa me, namely

the conduc t of the financ ial matters of the Church and the acc ess of Church members to the information.” Third, the y re qu e ste d a

c on tin ua nce o f th e he ari ngon

the de fe nd ants ’ s umm ary -j ud g me nt m oti on s to conduct a dditional discovery . Four th, and related, t hey moved t o resume disc overy , which the tria l court ha d abate d while the audit wa s being conducte d. Fifth, they filed a r esponse to the Churc h’s and individual deac ons’ summary -judg ment motions. They argued that (1) their lawsuits did not implicate ecclesiastica l matters; (2) the e vidence submitt ed in support of the summar y -judg ment mot ion s w a s in a dmi ssi ble he ars ay ; ( 3) the a ud ito r o f t he Churc h’ s r e c or ds ha d n ot f ile d a n a ff ida vit
as re quired by

Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 172; (4) no- evidenc e summary judgme nt was improper because ther e h a d b e e n in s u f f ic ie n t ti me f

o r d is c o v e r

y ; an d ( 5 ) th e Chu r c h an d d e a c o n s h a d not conclusively

established a r ight to judg ment as a matter of law . I n support of t his response, the Prices and Watson attache d aff idavits by Terr y and Phy llis P rice that purported to support the c auses of ac tion contained in the sec ond amende d petition.

On Janu ary 11 , 2 00 7, the ind ivi du a l de a c on s f iled an o bje c tio n to the Pr ic e s’
a ff ida vit s, c ha ra c te ri zingthe m a s c on c lus or y , ir re le va nt, and ins uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e the y fa ile d to diff e r e n ti a te b e tw e e n th e d e a c o n s ( in o th e r w o r d s , b e c a u s e th e y a d dr e s s e d th e d e a c o n s a s a g roup and stated no spe cifics a

bout how any

particula r dea con had a lleg edly

acte d wrong fully). On Fe bruar

y 14, 2007, the trial cour

t he ld a hea ring to enterta in the numerous pending motions. The court g rante d the Prices’ and Watson’s motion to consolidate, see T ex . R . Civ. P. 1 74 (a ), bu t it d e nie d th e ir mot ion fo r c on tin

ua nc e , mo tio n to re sume dis c ov e ry , a nd mot ion s toThe c ourt made the se ruling s at the F ebrua ry 14 hear ing. I t formally

signe d the orde r 5 g ranti n g the summary -judg ment motions and moti on for r efund of audit expenses on Marc h 28, 2007. I t sig ned order s denying the Prices’ and Watson’s motion for continuanc e, motion t o resume disc overy , and motions to reconsider or set aside the orde r shifting audit expenses on April 5, 2007. 12 rec onsider and se t as ide the orde r shifting audit expenses. The c ourt g rante d the Church’ s and ind ivi du a l de a c on s’ mot ion s f or su mma ry jud g me nt a

nd mot ion to r e fu nd a ud it e xpe ns e s. 5 On Marc h 26, 2007, the Church and deac ons moved for sanctions ag ainst the Prices under Te x as Rule of Civil Procedur e 13 and Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code cha pter 10. They argued that the Price s’ lawsuits were frivolous, g roundless, and br oug ht in bad faith as a form of re taliation. They

also argued that the Price s, throug h May s, had used unwar rante d delay

tactics
and mis re pr e se nte d f

a c ts t o th e c ourt . T he Churc h a nd de a c on s r e qu e ste d s anc tio ns e qu a l to the ir costs and attorne y ’s fees. They submitt ed affidavits by the C hurch’ s attorney , Be navides, and the de a c on s’ a tto rn e y , M a str og iov ann i, t hat st a te d th e a mou

nt o f f e e s th e y ha d b ill e d th e ir

c lie nts
. On Marc h 28, 2007, the Prices a nd Watson fil ed a response to the motion for
sanc tio ns , a

rguin g that ( 1) a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w e re no t a statut or ily

re c og nize d me a sure fo r s anc tio ns ; (2 ) t he Churc h a

nd de a c on s d id n ot p re se nt e vid e nc e of the ir a tto rn e y ’s fe e s at th e he ari ngon the ir summary -judg ment motions; (3) many of the e x hibits subm itted in support of t he sanctions moti on
wer e hea rsay , including the audit repor t, which a lso lacked the statutorily require d supporting aff idavit by its author, see Te x. R. Civ. P. 172 (a ); (4 ) as a Churc h mem be r, Wat so n w a s e nti tle d to
s e e k ana c c o u n t i n g ; an d

( 5 ) t h e a f f i d a v i t s o f a t t o r n e y’ s f e e s w e r e d e f

e c t i v e an d

c o n c l u s o r

y. On April 5, 2007 the court held a hear ing on the s anctions m otion. Be navides a nd Ma str og iov ann i te sti fi e d a s to the ir fe e s, and the c ourt awa rd e d the m the ir fe e s a s we ll a s a ll c os ts13

inc ur re d b y the Churc h a

nd de a c on s. Th e c ourt he ld the Pr ic e s and Ma y s, bu t no t Wat so n, joi ntl y and sever ally

liable for the defe ndants’ fe es and c osts. May s objected to be ing he ld liable, arguing that holding him liable alongwith the Prices wa s bey ond t h e scope of relief reque sted by

the
sanc tio ns mot ion . T he c ourt ov e rr ule d h is o bje c tio n b e c a

us e the sanc tio ns mot ion sp eci fi cal ly reque sted “a ll .
. . relief of l aw and equity to which defenda nts may be justly entitled” under

Texas Rule o f Ci v il Pr o c e d

u r e 1 3 ( w h ic h , th e c o u rt n o te d , “ c o n te mp late s s an c ti o n in g o f th e la wy er” ). On April 25, 2007, the Price s and Watson filed a motion for a new tria l. They

alleg ed that ( 1) the Churc h h a d a dd uc e d n o e vid e nc e that Wa tso n’ s suit wa s im pr op e r; (2 ) t

he law s ho uld be cha ng ed so that for

mer members of churc hes (like the Prices) have sta nding to r eview the ir forme r churc hes’ books a

nd rec ords; (3) the Pric es’ law suits did not implicate ec clesiastica l matters; (4) the defe ndants did not carr

y t h ei r s ummary -judg ment burden of demonstrating that there wer e no
ma te ri a l issu e s of fa c t, at a min imum bec a us e wh e the r a dis pu te is s e c ula r o r e c c le sia sti c a l is a

fa c tintensive inquiry ; (5) the court had no authority to make the Prices pay for the a udit of the Church’s bo ok s and rec or ds ; ( 6) pla int if fs we re de nie d a

su ff ic ie nt o pp or

tun ity to c on du c t di sc ov e ry

to
un c ov e r w ro ng do ing ; ( 7) pla int if fs we re de nie d d

ue pr oc e ss by

havin g an in su ff

ic ie nt o pp or

tun ity to c on du c t di sc ov e ry ; ( 8) the Churc h did no t pr e se nt c omp e te nt e vid e nc e of wh a t the a ud it a c tua lly
c os t; ( 9) the Churc h an d de a c on s pre se nte d no ev ide nc e that the y a c tua lly inc ur re d atto rn e y ’s fe e s, beca use their attorney s were paid by an insuranc e compa

ny ; (10) the Church was re quired but fa iled to seg reg ate its attorney ’s fe es betwe en the two law suits; (11) the trial court should not have made May s jo int ly and se ve ra lly lia ble fo r t he Pr ic e ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s b e c a us e the de fe nd ants did

no t na me May s as a tar g et of their sa n ct i o n s m otion; (12) the plaintiffs demonstrated a g ood-fa ith basis for14

their lawsuits under a joint-enter prise theor

y ; and (13) the defe ndants wer e not entitled to sanctions beca use they could have mitigated t h ei r l o s s es by providing the plaintiffs ac cess to the Churc h’s books and re cords. On May 23, 2007, the P rice s and W atson supplemented their motion for a new trial with claims that their constitutional rig hts had bee n violated.

On June 1, 20 07 , the Chu

rc h fi le d a re sp on se to t

he pla int if

fs ’ m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l. The Churc h argued that the motion wa s an at t em pt to relitigate issues that the cour t had alre ady
re so lve d, and

it r e qu e ste d a dd iti on a l sa nc tio ns in a

n amou nt e qu a l to the a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and c os ts incurre d to respond to the motion. On J une 6, 2007, the c o u rt h eld a he aringat which it took the mot ion fo r n e w tr ia l and mot ion fo r sanc tio ns un de r a dv ise me nt. On July 7, 20 07 , 7 5 d ay s a ft e r i t was filed, the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial was ove rruled by

operation of law. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(c). The trial court’ s plenary power expired on Aug ust 8, 2007, 30 d ay s later. See id . 329b(e) . The c ourt neve rtheless issued an order denying the motion for new tria l and g ranting the motion for sanc tions on August 23, 2007.

The Price s , Watson, and May s filed this appea l on J une 25, 2007. The y filed an
a me nd e d a

pp e a l on Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 07 a ft e r t he tr ia l c ourt

iss ue d th e or de r purp or

tin g to d e ny

the ir motion for new tria l and g rant the a dditional sanctions. The ame nded appe al claimed to be appea ling the trial cour

t’s “void” or der of

Aug ust 23, 2007.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A “tra ditional” motion for summary judgme nt is proper ly g rante d when the movant
e sta bli sh e s th a t th e re are no genui ne is su es of ma te ri a l f

a c t and that it is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
ma tte r o f l aw. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Lear Siegler, In c. v. Perez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 47115

(T e x. 19 91 ); Holmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Austin 2 000, no pet.). A defe ndant s eeking summary judgme nt must neg ate as a matter of l aw at least one element of eac h of the plaintiff’ s theories of r ecove ry or prove as a ma t t er o f law ea ch ele ment of an a ffirmative defe nse. Centeq Realty, I nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). A party seeking a “no-evidenc e” summary judgme nt, on the ot her ha nd, does not bea

r the burde n of establishing its rig ht to judgment by proving a def

ense or claim, but instead asse rts that the re is n o e vid e nc e of on e or mor e e sse nti a l ele me nts of a c la im on whi c h the op po sin g pa rt y wi ll have the burd e n o f p ro of a t tr ia l. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); Holmstrom , 2 6 S. W. 3 d a t 5 3 0
. I f the nonmovant fails to produce more than a s ci n tilla of probative e vidence raising a g enuine issue of materia l f act as to e ach challeng ed element on which he has the burde n of proof , summary

judgme nt is proper. Id
. I n revie wing a g rant of summar y judgme nt, we take as true evidenc e fa vorable to the nonmovant, making ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and resolving all doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Ce nte q R e alt

y , 899 S.W .2d at 197. I f the trial c ourt’s orde r does not spe cify the g rounds for g ranting summary j u d g ment, we must aff irm the summary

judgme nt if any

of the theor ies prese nted to the tri al co u rt ar e mer itorious. Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). We r eview de novo the g rant of a plea to the jurisdiction. See Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 20 0 4 ). W h et her a court ha s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Id
.16 We reviewsanctions awa

rds for abuse of

discretion. Low v . H

e nr y , 221 S.W .3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). We may reve rse a sanctions awa

rd o n ly if the trial cour

t that imposed it acted without refe renc e to any g uiding r

ules and princ iples, such that its ruling was arbitra ry or
unrea sonable. Id
.
DI SCU SSIO N

As the fa c tua l and

pr ocedura l hi sto ry

of thi s c a se mig ht s ug g e st, thi s a pp e a l is
c omp lic a te d. Th e Pr ic e s, Wat so n, and Ma y s in iti a lly

a ll f ile d a joi nt b ri e f. Th e Pr ic e s su bs e qu e ntl y fi le d a n a me nd e d br ie f, bu t it a

pp e ars that Wat so n and Ma y s int e nd e d fo r the or ig ina l br ie f to r e ma in op e rativ e a s to the m. T he br ie fs ov e rl a p in c e rt a in r e g ard s, and

W ats on ’s and

May s’ s b ri e f i s dif fi c ul t to fo llo w. As we un de rs tand the argume nts , th e re are fi ve ba sic iss ue s b e fo re us : (1) whether summary

judgme nt ag ainst Watson in t he first law suit was proper ; (2) whe ther dismissal of the Pr ic e s fr om the fi rs t law su it wa s pro pe r; (3 ) wh e the r sum mary jud g me nt ag a ins t the Pr ic e s in the sec ond lawsuit was prope r; (4) whether sanctions ag ainst the P rice s and May s wer e proper; and (5 ) w he the r ta xing the Pr ic e s and Wat so n for the c os t of the a ud it wa s p ro pe r. We w ill a dd re ss t he se issues in turn. We will not , howeve r, addr ess all of the issues a nd arguments raised in Watson’s and May s’s brief that are not supported with citations to applicable la w and to the r ecor d. See W oodside v. W oodside , 154 S.W .3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (appellant waives issues that
are acc ompanied only

by “attenua ted, unsupported a

rg ument”). B e fo re a dd

re ssi ng a pp e lla nts ’ pr op e rl y ra ise d iss ue s, tho ug h, we wi ll b ri e fl y a dd re ss
an over ar ch i n g m at t er: the “ ecc lesiastical abste ntion” doctrine. It is ax iomatic that courts have no jurisdiction over ec clesiastica l matters. Se e In re Go dwi n , 293 S.W .3d 742, 747-4817

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pe t.). The Church and deac ons contend, as they did below, that summary judgme nt w a s proper

beca use appe llants’ claims wer e ec clesiastica l in nature a nd there fore outside the court’ s jurisdiction. O u r re v i ew of case law sug g ests that while this contention might be cor rec t with reg ard to most of appe llants’ claims, see, e .g. , id . at 748-50, it is incorre ct with reg ard to appellants’ c laim for inspec tion und er Texas Revised Civi l Statutes article 1396-2.23. See Lac yv . B as se tt , 132 S.W .3d 119, 125-26 (Te x . Ap p . — Ho u ston [ 14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (inspection of c hurch books a nd rec ords under

Tex. Rev. Ci v. Stat. Ann. art. 1396-2.23 doe s not imp lic a te e c c le sia sti c a l a

bs te nti on do c tr ine ). Thus , fo r the sake of c on du c tin g a

tho ro ug h a

na ly sis , we wi ll a ssume tha

t th e e c c le sia sti c a l- a

bs te nti on do c tr ine do e s n ot app ly

to b ar a ny of a pp e lla nts ’ claims. Doing so allows us to ex plain why all of appe llants’ claims fail eve n if they are not jurisdictionally

barr ed by

the ec clesiastica l-abstention doctrine
. Sum m ary Judgm ent Again st Watson

Watson arg ues t hat her suit was not subject t o summary judgme nt beca

use she wa s statutorily entitled, as a member of the Church, to e x amine the Churc h’s books and re cords. Watson made a written dema

nd for inspec tion in an affidavit appended to the f irst amended petition. The second amended petition, however, whic h was Watson’s oper ative plea ding a t the time of summary judgme nt, r equeste d not a n inspection of the Church’s books and rec ords but a dec laratory judgme nt that the Church had violated Texas Re vised Civil S tatutes article 1396-2.23. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 65 (a me nd e d ple a din g su

pe rs e de s p ri or

ple a din g ); Zock v. Bank of the Sw. Nat’l Ass’n , 464 S.W .2d 375, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14 th D is t. ] 1 9 7 1 , n o wr it ) (amended plea ding supe rsede s both earlier ple a din g and

a ff ida vit su pp or tin g it) . In o the r w or ds , th e se c on d ame nd e d p e tit ion did no t a c tua llyI n a related matter, as discussed above, the Prices and Watson a rg ued th at s ummary 6 judgme nt was improper b ec au s e the Church’s 1400-pa g e produc tion contained irre g ularities that sug g ested fur

ther invest i gat i o n wa s warr anted. B ut beca use the sec ond amende d petition did not actua lly reque st further investigation (i.e., did not actua lly reque st inspection of the Church’ s books and re cords) , those irre g ularities could only have be en re levant to the cause s of ac tion that the second amende d petition actually did contain. As explained be low, howeve r, all of those ca uses of a ction fa il f or ind e pe nd e nt l e g a l r e a so ns . Thus , e ve n if we a ssume that th e Chu rc h’ s p ro du c tio n d id a c tua lly contain irre g ularities, that fa ct does not sug g est that summary judgme nt was improper. In other wor ds , bec a

us e e a c h c a

us e of a c tio n a c tua lly

c on ta ine d in

the se c on d ame nd e d p e tit ion fa ils a s a matter of la

w, any irregularities in the Church’ s production ar e leg ally irrele vant. 18 pursue the r elief to whic h Watson now asserts she wa s entitled. Mo re imp or tantl y , Wats on

a lso 6 failed to r aise her purported rig ht to inspection in he r response to the Church’s summary judgme nt motion. As a result, we cannot now treat the rig ht to inspection as g rounds to reve rse the summar y judgme nt. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ) (“I ssues not expressly prese nted to the trial cour t by written motion, answer or

other re sponse shall n o t b e considered on a ppeal a s g rounds for r ever sal [of
su mma ry jud g me nt]. ” ); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 5 8 9 S. W. 2 d 671, 678 ( T e x. 1979) (pa rt y appea ling f

rom summary

judgme nt may

not raise g rounds for r ever sal that it did not raise in wr iting in tr ial court). I n any event, the Churc h conclusively established that it had satisfied the statutory

require ments under a

rticle 1396-2.23 by

offe ri n g W at s on the rig ht to ex amine, producingdocuments i n d i scover y , and coope ratingwith the audit. See Te x. Re v. Civ . St a t. art. 1396-2.23. Watson’s request for decla ratory relief i tself fa res no be tter. Watson’s second amende d petition asked the trial c ourt to decla re that the Church and de acons violate d Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 1396- 2.23(A) by failing to keep acc urate and complete books and re cords. B ut whetherthe Church ke pt acc urate and complete books and re cords wa s the very issue underlying19

Wat so n’ s oth e r c a

us e s of a c tio n. Th a t is to sa y , Wat so n’ s br e a c h- of

-c on tr a c t, ne g lig e nce, grossneg lige nce, and brea ch-of -fiducia ry -duty claims all hinge d on the Church’s alleg ed failure to keep
acc urate and compl et e b o o ks and re cords. Watson’s dec laratory -re lief cla im, then, conce rned a n issue otherwise before the court. Dec laratory relief is not available to settle issues alre ady befor e the court. Se e Ho we ll v. Ma uz y , 899 S.W .2d 690, 706-07 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1994, writ denied) . As
a re sult, W atson’s dec laratory -re lief cla im was s u b j ec t t o summary

judgme nt. Se e id . at 707 (t ri a l c ourt sh ou ld h a ve g ra

nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t de c la

ra tor y -reli ef cla im b e c a

us e it
conce rned issue a lrea dy

befor e the c ourt). Th e re ma ini ngcaus es of a c tio n in the se c on d ame nd e d p e tit ion we re a lso c le a rl y subject to summary

judgme nt on no-ev i d ence g rounds. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i). The se cond amende d petition alleg es bre ach of contra ct, but the re cord co n t ai n s no evidenc e of a ny contra ct be tw e e nW a t s o nan d

t h e C h u r c h , l e ta l o n e e v i d e n c e o f a c o n t r a c tb r e a c h r e s u l t i n g i nd a m a g e s to Watson. S

e e R o u n d v il leP a r tn e r

s , L. L. C. v . Jones , 118 S.W .3d 73, 82 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (ele ments of bre ach of contra ct claim are (1) ex istence of valid contra ct; (2) pe rfor mance by plaintiff; (3) b reach by defe ndant; and (4) damag es to plaintiff re sulting fr om brea ch). Wat so n s ug g e sts that th e Churc h ha d “ c on tr a c tua l dutie s” un de r T e xas R e vis e d Ci vil Statut e s art ic le 1396-2.23, but the statute say s nothing a bout contrac ts; it m er el y imposes bookkeeping responsibilities on corpor ations. We w ill not rea d more into statutes than the y plainly contain. See Lee v. City of Houston , 807 S.W .2d 290, 295 (Tex. 1991) (“Acourt may not judicia l l y am en d a statute and a dd words that ar e not implicitly contained in the la

ng uag e of the statute.”).The Prices, on the other ha nd, alleg ed in af

fidavits attache d to the second a mended pe tition 7 that they experience d emotional distress as a r esult of their c onflicts with the Church. 20 The sec ond amende d peti t i o n al s o alleg es that the Churc h and individual deac ons
wer e neg lige nt and g rossly neg lige nt in keeping their books and r ecor ds. Watson failed, howeve r, to present a

ny evidenc e that the Churc h or dea cons owed her a duty , let alone that they brea ched that duty and ther eby

damag ed her
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); D. H o u s t o n , Inc. v . Love , 92 S.W .3d 450, 454 (Tex. 2002) (elements of neglig ence claim are (1) brea ch of (2) a leg al duty owed to anothe r
and (3 ) r e su lti ngdama g e s p ro xima te ly c a us e d b y br e a c h) ; Col um bia Me d. Ctr

. of L as Co linas , Inc. v . Hogue , 271 S.W
. 3 d 238, 248 (Tex. 2009) (ele ments of g ross-neg lige nce c laim are (1) objec tively

high r isk of serious i njury to plaintiff and (2) defe ndant’s subjec tive awa rene ss of that risk). Any duty to ke ep ac curate books and re cords would have existed for the be nefit of the Churc h i t s el f, not its m ember s. See Tex as Soc’y v. Fort Bend Chapter , 5 9 0 S. W. 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 3 ( T e x. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (suits a g ainst non-profit cor porations by

their member s are
rea lly for c orporation’s benef

it). Th e se c on d ame n d e d

p e t i t i o n s t a t e s t hat it s c a us e of a c tio n f or c on ve rs ion

a pp lie s o nly to t he Pr ic e s, so we wi ll no t add re ss t hat c a us e of a c tio n h e re . T he pe tit ion do e s n ot s ta te tha

t it s
cause of ac tion for i ntentional infliction of emoti onal di stress applies only to the Prices, but nowher e in the re c or d doe s Wa tso n s ug g e st that sh e su ff e re d e mot ion a l di str e ss. Even if we a ssume that the 7 int e nti on a l- inf

lic tio n- of -e mot ion a l- dis tr e ss c a

us e of a c tio n a lso a

pp lie d to Wat so n, Wat so n c le a rl y failed to produc e any evidenc e to c reate an issue of mater ial fac t. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); Texas Fa rm Bu re au Mu t. I

ns . Co . v . S

e ar s , 84 S.W .3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2 0 0 2) (e lements of cla im of21

i n t e n t i o n a l i n f

l i c t i o no f e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s ar e ( 1 ) d e f e n d an ta c t e d

i n t e n t i o n a l l y

o r r e c k l e s s l y; (2) de fenda

nt’s conduct was ex t re me and outra g eous; (3) de fenda nt’s actions ca

used plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) pla intiff’s emotional distress was se vere ). Fo r ex ampl e, ther e is no evidenc e th a t Wats o n s u f f e r e d e mo ti o n a l d is tr e s s , le t a lo n e s e v e r e e mo ti o n a l d is tr e s s , o r th a t the Church’s or

deac ons’ conduc t was extreme or outra g eous towar ds Watson. Finally , the sec ond amende d petition alleg es that the Churc h and dea cons bre ache d a fiduc iary

duty to Watson. This cause of ac tion necessa rily fails bec ause ch u rc h es d o not have fiduciar y duties to their members. See H awkins v. Trinit

y Baptist Church , 30 S.W .3d 446, 453-53 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2000, no pe t.). And eve n if churc hes cou l d h av e such duties under specia l
c ir c ums tanc e s, Wat so n p re se nte d no ev ide nc e that suc h c ir c ums tanc e s e xiste d h e re . Ind e e d, the on ly
e vid e nc e a lle g e dly su

pp or tin g Wat so n’ s fid

uc ia ry -d uty c la im wa s af

fi davit s exec ute d by

the Pr ic e s, attache d to the second a

mended pe tition, t hat conc lusorily asser ted that all Church member s were joint venturers a

nd there fore owed e ach othe r fiduciary duties. Such conclusory asser tions are, howeve r, not evidenc e at a ll, s e e I n r e A m e r ic a n H

o m e Prods. Corp. , 9 8 5 S. W. 2 d 6 8 , 7 4 ( T e x. 19 98 ), and

the re wa s n oth inge lse in t he re c or d to su

pp or t th a t Chur c h me mbe rs we re joi nt v e ntu re rs . I n sum, eac h of Watson’s cause s of actions fails as a matter of la

w. Watson arg ues that the trial cour

t should have allow ed h er more time to conduc t discovery befor e ruling on the Church’s summ ary -judg ment motion, but Watson’s cause s of action failed as a matter of law unde r circ umstances indicating that further discovery would have been pointl ess. The trial court there fore proper ly enter ed summary

judgme nt ag ainst Watson.22

Di smissa l of

the Pric es f ro m the Fi

rst La wsui t The trial c ourt g rante d the Church’ s plea to t h e j u ri s d iction in the first lawsuit and dismiss ed the Price s. On appe al, the Price s argue that this dismis sal was e rror . We decline to re ach this iss ue, howe ver, be cause it is m oot.

Af te r t he Pr ic e s w e re dis mis se d f ro m th e fi rs t la

ws uit , th e y fi led a

se c on d la

ws uit
a g a ins t the de a c on s whi le Wat so n co nti nu e d the fi rs t law su it ag a ins t the Churc h. Th e tw o la ws uit s
wer e eve ntually

consolidated, a

nd the Prices a

nd Watson joi ntly

filed a se co n d am en d ed petition. As a res ul t, th e e ff

e c t of the Pr ic e s’ dis mis sa l f

ro m th e fi rs t la

ws uit wa s null if

ie d; i nd e e d, in t

he ir motion to consoli date, the Pric es admit t ed that “[t] he issues of f act a nd law in both district
co u rt ac t i o ns are the same.” There fore , the Prices’ dismiss al from the f irst lawsuit is moot
. See Zipp v. W uemling , 218 S.W .3d 7 1 , 7 3 (T ex . 2 0 07) (issue is moot “whe n a cour t’s action on the merit s ca n n o t af

fe ct t he rig hts of the par

ties”). We ca

nnot consider moot issues. See Camare na v. Texas Em

ployment Comm’n , 754 S.W .2d 149, 1 5 1 (T ex . 1988). As a r esult, we do not re ach whether the Prices’ dismiss al from the f irst lawsuit was er

ror.
Sum m ary Judgm ent Again st th e Price s Th e Pr ic e s , li k e Wats o n , ar g u e th a t th e y w e r e e n ti tl e d to mo r e ti me f o r discover

y befor e summary

judgme nt. We have alr eady explained why

this arg ument fails for the ir brea ch-of

c on tr a c t, n e g lig e nc e , g ro ss- ne g lig e nc e , a nd fi du c iary -d

uty c a us e s o f a c tio n. Here we w ill e xpla in why it also fails for thei r

c o nv e r s io n

a n d in te nti o n a l- infliction-of-e motional-distress cause s of ac tion. To maintain a c ause of

action for conver sion, “ a plaintiff must show (1) title, (2) rig ht to possession, and (3) a

demand f or re turn of the pr operty

unless the possessor’s acts m anife st a cle ar23

repudiation of t he plainti ff’ s rig hts.” El Paso Prod. Co. v. ValenceOperating Co. , 112 S.W .3d 616, 625 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)
. I n the sec ond amende d petition, the Prices
a dmi t th a t th e y

“ do nate d” the ir

a lleg edl y conve rt e d p ro pe rt y to t he Churc h. As a

re su lt, the y

los t tit le to a nd the ri g ht t o p os se ss t

he pr op e rt

y , a nd the ir c on ve rs ion

c la im is cle arl y

un su sta ina

ble on traditional or no-e vidence g rounds. Se e Kle in v . H ar tze ll , 43 S.W .2d 131, 131 (Tex. C iv. App.—San Antonio 1931, writ ref ’d) ( proper

ty donor loses title to and rig ht to possess property ). As alre ady

discussed, to m ai n t ai n a cla im for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffe red se vere emotional distress beca use of the defe ndant’s intentional or re ckless eng ag eme n t i n ex t reme and outra g eous beha vior. Se e Se ar

s , 84 S.W .3d at 610. The only evidenc e of emotional distress offe red by the Prices wa s self-se rving statements containe d in the aff idavits that they

attache d to the second a

mended pe tition. Even taking these stateme nts as true, these statements do not cre ate a materia l fac t issue bec au s e t h er e was no evidenc e to support that the Church’s and deac ons’ behavior was e x treme or outrag eous. See Kroger T ex. Ltd . P ’s hip v . S

ub e ru , 216 S.W .3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006) (conduc t is ex treme a nd outrag eous

“ on ly i f i ti s s o o u t r a g e o u s i nc h ar a c t e r , an d s o e xtr e m e i nd e g r e e , a s t o g o b e y o n d a l l p o s sib le bounds of dec ency , and to be r eg arde d as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a

civiliz ed community ”) ( quotation marks and citations omitted). “Mer itorious claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress ar e re latively rar e p recisely

beca use most human conduct, e ven that which
cause s injury to othe rs, cannot be fairly char acte rized as extreme and outra g eous.” Id
. Thus, the trial court did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt on the Prices’ cause of a ct i o n fo r i ntentional infliction of emotional distress. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i).24 I n sum, summary

judgme nt was prope r on ea ch of the Prices’ c laims in the second amende d petition.
Sanction s Again st th e Price s and Mays The Churc h and deac ons soug ht sa nctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 13 (“Rule 13” ) and Te x as Civil Prac tice and Remedies Code chapte r 10. The trial court a war ded them
sanc tio ns in an a mou

nt e qu a l to the ir c os ts and a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e c ourt ma de the Pr ic e s and

the ir attorney , May s, jointl y

and seve rally

liable for the sanctions
. T h e P rice s and May s appea l that decision. Rule 13 allows a court, “ upon motion or upon its own ini tiative,” to impose sanctions on a par ty , its attorney , or both for filing a g roundless i nstrument in bad fa ith or for the pur pose of hara ssment. Tex. R . Civ. P . 13. Under the Rule, the sig natures o f attorney s or par ties constitute a ce rtificate by them that they

have rea d the pleading , motion, o r o t h er paper ; that to the best of their knowle dg e, information, and be lief for med aft er rea sonable inquiry the instrument is not g roundless and br oug ht in bad faith or g roundless and br oug ht for the pur pose of ha ra ssm e nt.
Id . T he Rul e de fi ne s “ g ro un dle ss” a s havin g “ no ba sis in l aw o r f a c t and no t w arr ante d b y

g oo d f a ith argument for the extension, modification, or re versa l of exist ing la w.” Id
. The sanc tions that may be imposed ar e enume rate d in Texas Rul e of Civil Procedure 215.2(b), se e id ., and the y inc lud e c os ts and attorne y ’s fe es incurr ed to def end ag ainst the g roundless suit. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 215.2(b)(8). Cha pte r 1 0 o f t

he Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e and Re me die s Co de a lso a llo ws a c ourt to sanction both parties a

nd their attorne y s. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e § 10 .0 04 (a ). I t st a te s:25

Th e sig nin g of

a ple a din g or

mot ion a s r e qu ir e d b y

the Te xas R

ule s o f C ivi l P roce dure c on sti tut e s a

c e rt if ic a te by the sig nator

y that to the sig nator

y ’s be st kn o w l e d g e , i n f

o r m a t i o n , an d

b e l i e f , f o r m e d a f t e r r e a s o n a b l e i n qu i r y: (1) the ple ad i n g or motion is not being pre sented for any improper pur

pose, including to ha

rass or to c ause unne cessa ry delay or needless incre ase in the c ost of litigation; (2 ) e a c h c la im, de fe ns e , o r o the r l e g a l c on te nti on in t he ple a din g or

mot ion is war rante d by exis ting law

or by a nonfr ivolous arg ument for the e x tens i on, modification, or re versa l of exist ing la w or the e stablishment of new law ; (3) e ach a lleg ation or other f actua l contention in the pleadingor motion has evidentiar y support or, for a specific ally identified alleg ation or fa ctual conte ntion, is likely to have e videntiary

support af

t er a reasonable opportunity for f urther investigation or discovery ; and (4) each denial i n the pl eadingor motion of a fa ctual conte ntion is warra nted on the evidenc e or, f

or a spe cifica lly

identified denia l, i s re as o n ably based on a

lack of information or be lief.
Id . § 10.001. The c ourt may issue sanctions under

chapte r 10 upon motion or upon its own init iative. Id . § 10. 0 0 2(b). The sanctions may include “a

n order to pay to the other pa

rty the amount of the
re as o n ab l e ex p enses incur red by the other pa

rty beca use of the f

iling of the pleadingor motion, including r easona

ble attorne y ’s fe es.” Id . § 10.004(c) (3). We ho ld that the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

awa rd ingsanc tio ns a g a ins t the Prices unde r Rule 13 as we ll as under c hapter 10 of t he C ivil Practice and Remedie s Code. See Low , 2 2 1 S
. W
. 3 d

at 6 1 4
. T h e t ri al co u rt re ci t eds ev er al b as es fo r t h e s an ct i o n s aw ar d , i n cl u d i n g:

• I n t h e fi rst lawsuit, the Prices fa lsely claimed that they

had bee n denied a cce ss to the Churc h’ s f

ina nc ia l r e c or ds ;

• Th e Pr ic e s e xploi te d th e Churc h’ s la c k o f k no wl e dg e that the fi rs t pet iti on ha d be e n fil e d to obtain a def

ault Orde r of Audit on May 25, 2005;26

• The Price s joined Watson in t he first law suit solely t o d ef ea t t h e C hurch’ s plea to the jurisdiction;

• Th e Pr ic e s’ laws uit a g a ins t th e ind ivi du a l de a c on s c on sis te d o f a “ c on ste llatio n o f h op e le ssl y inapplicable le g al theorie s”;

• The Price s sued the dea cons who we re active at the time the Prices we re e x pelled fr om the Church, not the dea con s wh o we re a ctive at the time of the Church’ s alleg ed fina ncial imp ro pr ie tie s;

• Th e c la ims c on ta ine d in the Pr ic e s’ se c on d ame nd e d p e tit ion ha d n o b a sis in l aw o r f

a c t;

• The c ourt-orde red a udit of the Church’s f

inance s uncover ed no evide nce of fraud or mis mana g e me nt;

• The sec ond amende d petition alleg ed that the Price s had bee n denied a cce ss to the Church’s bo ok s and

re c or ds wh e n in

fa c t th e Churc h h a d p ro du c e d r ou g hly 14 00 pa g e s o f r e c or ds ;

• The Price s made fa lse alleg ations in the aff idavits that they attache d to the sec ond amende d petition;

• Th e Pr ic e s tr ie d to tr ic k the Churc h int o a c c e pti nga do natio n c he c k in

Oc tob e r o f 2 00 5, we ll afte r their f

irst suit was under wa

y ; and

• The Price s’ lawsuits wer e a pr etense , desig ned to m ake g ood on threats of hara ssment that the Pr ic e s ma de a g a ins t th e Chu rc h b e c a us e of e c c le sia sti c a l di sa g re e me nts
. These f indings justify

the impositi on of sanc tions under Rule 13 bec ause the y show that the pleading s the Prices filed w er e gro u n d l es s and filed in ba d faith and f or the purpose of ha ra ssm e nt. Th e se fi nd ing s als o ju stify the imp os iti on

of sanc tio ns un de r c ha

pte r 1 0 o f t

he Civ il Practi ce a nd Remedies Code be cause they show that the Prices ( 1) filed plea dings to ha rass a nd
cause needle ss increa se in the cost of litig ation; (2) made claims that wer e not war rante d by exis ting law or by nonfrivolous arguments for the extension, modification, or reve rsal of exis ting law or the establishment of new law; and (3) made alleg ations and fac tual contentions that lacke d evidentiar yTh e se e ff or ts b e lie May s’ s arg ume nt t hat th e Churc h d id n ot atte mpt to m iti g a te its 8 lit ig a tio n e xpe ns e s. Th e Pr ic e s and

May s argue that th e Churc h’ s and de a c on s’ a tto rn e y s d id n ot p ro pe rl y 9 substantiate their fe es, but “proof of the ne cessity

or re asonable ness of attorney ’s fe es is not r e qu ir e d w h e n th e f

e e s ar e a s s e s s e d a s s an c ti o ns.” In r e A .S.M. , 1 7 2 S. W. 3 d 7 1 0 , 7 1 8 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2005, no pet.). I n any event, the Church’ s and dea cons’ a ttorney s testified and su bmi tte d a ff

ida vit s a s to the fe e s th e y

c ha rg e d th e ir c lie nts
. 27 support. Thoug h the finding s listed above are sufficie nt to justify the i mpositi on of sanctions, we also note that the Prices and Watson, throug h May s, rebuf fed multipl e eff

orts by the Church to end the par ties’ dispute. F or

e xamp le, on Apr il 28 , 2 00 5, the Churc h o ff e re d to a llo w the Pr ic e s to 8 inspect and c opy

the re cords that we re r el evant to their e x presse d conce rns. The Price s did not respond, nor

did they inform the Church or

its attorney s that they

had filed suit just two day s ear lier. And in a letter

dated Septembe r 1, 2005, the Churc h offe red Watson unre stricted inspec t i o n and
c op y ingof

its re c or ds
. Wat so n ig no re d thi s of fe r and fi le d a

mot ion to c omp e l pr od

uc tio n o f t

ho se
rec ords roug hly

one wee k later. Thus, the rec ord sug g ests not only that the Prices and Watson lac ked any leg al basis for va

rious alleg ations and claims, but a lso that the y wer e more interested in litigating than they wer e in ac tually

inspecting the Church’ s financia l rec ords. Under such circ umstances, the tr ia l c ourt wa s w e ll w ith in i ts d isc re tio n to imp os e sa nc tio ns . The Price s and May s argue not only that sanctions should not have be en imposed, but also that the amount of sanc tions im posed wa s excessive. We disag ree . The c ourt imposed
sanc tio ns e qu a l to the Churc h’ s and de a c on s’ c os ts a nd a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Rule 13 and cha pter 10 of 9 the Ci v i l Practice and Remedie s Code both allow for c osts and attorney ’s fe es as a measure of sanctions. See Te x R. Civ . P. 13 (i nc or po ra tin g Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 15 .2 (b) ); Tex
. R. Civ. P.The trial c ourt expli citly noted that it was impo s i n g sanctions to discourag e the Price s 10 fr om f ili nga dd iti on a l f

ri vo lou s la

ws uit s. 28 215.2(b)( 8); Tex
. C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code § 10.004(c) (3). In fac t, the Texas Supreme Court has stated that the deter mination of the amount of a pe nalty to be assesse d under Chapte r 10, which is not li mited to attorney ’s fe es and costs, should neverthele ss beg in with an a c kn ow le dg me nt o f t

he c os ts a nd fe e s in c ur

re d b e c a us e of the sa

nc tio na ble c on du c t. This provides a moneta

ry g uidepost of the impact of the conduct on the party seeking sanc tio ns and

the burd e ns on

the c ourt sy ste m.
Low , 221 S.W .3d at 621. Thus, the amount of sa nctions the trial cour

t imposed was prope r. The Prices and May s also contend that the Churc h was not entitled to rec over a ny of its attorney ’s fe es bec ause the Church did not seg reg ate its att o rn ey ’s fe es betwee n the first and
se c on d la ws uit . F or

thi s argume nt t o b e a va ili ng , s anc tio ns wo uld have ha d to have be e n a pp ro pr ia te in o nly on e of the laws uit s. As dis c us se d a bo ve , h ow e ve r, the Pr ic e s a nd Ma y s f iled pl e a din g s in both lawsuits (as well as the consolidated suit) t h at t h e trial c ourt could re asonably view as sanctionable
. I n any event, this argument is waived beca use i t was not raised in the t rial court. See Hr us k a v . F irs t St ateBa nk of D e an v ill e , 747 S.W .2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988). Additionally , the Prices a

nd Watson argue that the Church was not entitled to rec over
a ttorne y ’s fe e s b e c a

us e its ins ur e r a c tua lly

pa id i ts l e g a l bi lls . Sa nc tio ns may

be imp os e d to discourag e fur

ther fr ivolous li tigation, though, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 10.004(b), not 10 only to compensate a par

ty for its out-of-poc ket leg al expenses, so it is irre levant that the Churc h’s insurer pa id the Church’s attorney ’s fee s. Fur thermore , attorney ’s fe es ar e in fa ct re cover able e ven if paid by

an insurer
. See Av ile

s v . A gu irr e , 292 S.W .3d 648, 649 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). Finally , May s contends that he did not re ceive adequa te notice be fore being29

sanctioned. See T e x. R. Ci v . P. 1 3 ( s an c ti o n s ma y b e im p o s e d o n ly a f te r n o ti c e an d

h e ar in g ) ; T e x. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code § 10.003 (same)
. At the hear ing on the sanctions motion, after the Churc h
s o u g h t t o a d mi t t

h e A u gu s t 2 6 , 2 0 0 5 le tt e r in w h ic h it o f f e r e d to p ay f o r ana u d it , th e f

o ll o w ing exchang e occ urre d:
THE COURT: Are y ou seeking persona l sa nctions ag ainst the lawy er as well as the c lie nts he re ? Rul e 13 a llo ws that. I ' m ju st c ur iou s. MS. BENAV I DES: Your Honor, w e’r e see king a ll sanctions that are available to the c hurc h, y e s. THE COURT: Then [the letter is] admitted to show the cor responde nce be tween the attorney s in the case
. (Movant’s Exhibit 10 admitted) MR. MAYS: Your Honor, we would object. This i s bey ond the s cope of the motion for sa nctions. We do not waive the plea dings of counsel with re spect to the re lief which it has—it has re quested in the motion for sanctions. And so for the r ecor d, we would like t he re cord to show that we would not waive our objection to the re lief which is reque sted in the motion for sanctions or the f i rst amende d motion for sanctions. We intend to hold the defendants to proof of the relief which—for which they have r equeste d. TH E CO UR T: Wel l, l e t me se e . T he y did c ite Rul e 13 , d id t

he y no t? Did you

fi le any specia l exceptions to their citation of Rule 13 conce rning who the par ties of the Rule 13 sanction would be? MR. MAY S: The response w hich I filed, Your H onor, is the re sponse which I have pr ov ide d to the Court
. MS. B EN AV I DE S: Y our H onor, P age 1 4 of the mot ion

in t he pr ay e r a sk s f

or a ll other re lief of law

or equity to which def

endants may

be justly entitled. THE COURT: 13 or 14? MS. B EN AV I DE S: I

be lie ve it’ s Pa g e 14 of

the a me nd e d mo tio n, the ve ry la st sentenc e.30

THE COURT: I t might be, a nd it’s cover ed up by

y our b i g old plant here . No, there ’s nothing on Pag e 14 of w hat I ’m looking at. No, it’s on 13. MS. BENAV I DES: I t is the very last substantive pag e. THE COURT: Yes, I ’m rea din g i t
. Al l other re lief of law and equity

to which plaintiffs are justly entitled. Rule 13 contemplates sanctioning of the lawy er. A nd there is no special exception. Your obje ction is overrule d.

. . . . MR. MA YS: Yo ur

Ho no r, fo r t

he re c or d, pla int if

fs wish to a sse rt

surp ri se a t th is point. Request t hat this hearingbe re cesse d and g ive us an opportunity to respond to the modification to the plaintiffs’ amended motion for sa nctions which— THE COURT: Ididn’t hear any modifications. They

didn’t ask for a

trial amendment. The y ’re relying on the plea d i n gs t h at ar e bef ore the Court. Idon’t be lie ve y ou ’r e e nti tle d to a c on tin ua nc e on that. MR. MAYS: Aga in, Your Honor, f or the re cord, w e would re quest a c ontinuance a t thi s p oin t. THE COURT: Denie d.
As this ex chang e shows, May s d id not clear ly and spec ifically

complain that he
rec eived inade quate notice that the Church was seeking sanctions ag ainst him personally . I ndeed, it is not even c lear

on whose be half May s is attempting to obj ect; May s repe atedly uses the pronoun

“ we ” rathe r t

ha n “ I ,” and

he state s th a t “

pla int iff s wish to assert surpr ise.” (E mphasis added.) Moreove r, May s does not sp ec i fi ca l l y tie that purported sur

prise to a lac k of notice, nor does he explain how the sanctions motion provided inadequate notice. We ther efor e t h i nk May s failed to object t o the purported lack of notice with sufficie nt specific ity to preser ve it as a point of e rror . See Tex. R. App. P
. 33.1(a) (1)( A) (to prese rve complaint for appellate revie w, appe llant’s trial-cour t objection must be sufficie ntly specific to make trial c ourt awa re of complaint). Cf. VargasMay s cites two ca ses, City of A us tin v . Ca sti llo , 2 5 S. W.3 d 3 09 , 3 14 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 11 2000, pet. denied) , and Texas Indus., Inc . v. Vaughan , 919 S.W .2d 798, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h d ist .] 19 96 , w ri t de nie d) , th a t are no t on po int
. For example, May s signe d all the pleading s tha t the Church a nd deac ons considere d 12 fr ivo lou s. 31 v. Vargas , 930 S.W .2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1996, no writ) (attorney waived objection to persona l sanctions wher e he obje cted only on client’s beha lf, not his own). But e ven if we assume that May s objected with sufficient spec ificity to his purported la c k o f n oti c e , w e sti ll think M ay s r e c e iv ed su ff ic ie nt n oti c e to r e nd e r h is o bje c tio n me ri tle ss. May s’s argum en t that he re ceive d insufficient notice turns on the fa ct that the sanc tions mot ion
name d o nly

the “ pla int if

fs ” a s it s ta

rg et. I n h is b ri e f, Ma

y s argue s th a t “ [d]e fe nd ants mus t sp e c if ic a lly imp le a d c ouns e l f

or pla int if fs in t he bo dy of the mot ion

fo r s anc tio ns ,” rathe r t

ha n ju st the plaintiffs themselves, to be able to r ecove r sanctions ag ainst him. May s cites no ca se law that supports this propositi on. He is of c ourse corre ct t hat he was entitl ed to notice that he was subject 11 to the pe nd ingsanc tio ns mot ion , b ut, a s th e tr ia l c ourt no te d, the sanc tio ns mot ion sp e c if ic a lly invoked Rule 13 and c hapter 10 of the Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code and the n reque sted “a ll . . .
re lie f o f l aw a

nd e qu ity to wh ic h de fe nd ants may be jus tly e nti tle d. ” Rul e 13 and c ha pte r 10 b oth
e xplic itl y pr ov ide fo r s anc tio ns a g a ins t a ttor ne y s w ho fi le g ro un dle ss p le a din g s o n b e ha lf of the ir clients. Fur

thermore , sever al of the grounds for sanctions ex plicitly listed in the s anctions motion
wer e ac ts perfor

med b y M ay s himself. Thus, we be lieve May s had suffic ient notice that he w as 12 a tar g et of the sa

nctions motion. Cf. Braden v. South Main Bank, 837 S.W .2d 733, 738 (Tex. App.—Houst on [14t h Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (attorne y had notice that his conduct duringZ ep Mf g . Co. v. Anthony , 7 5 2 S
. W
. 2 d 6 8 7 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n[ 1 s tDi s t
. ] 1 9 8 8 , o ri g. 13 proce eding ) (pe r cur iam), c i t ed b y the Prices, is not to the contra ry . The “ sole issue” in Zep was “ wh e the r a

tr ia l c ourt

may su a sp on te or de r s anc tio ns whe n the re is n o m oti on for sa nc tio ns be

for e thec ou rt , and no notice ha s been g iven that s an ct i ons may be imposed.” Id . at 68 8 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . He re , of co ur se , a motio n f or sa nc tio ns was befor e the c ourt, it specifica lly discussed many a c ts that Ma

y s h a d p e rf

or me d, and it w a s d uly se rv e d o n M ay s. Th e Churc h c on c e de d th is p oin t in or a l argume nt. 14 32 dis c ov e ry su bje c te d h im to sanc tio ns e ve n tho ug h mot ion se e kin g sa nc tio ns fo r dis c ov e ry

a bu se s d id not specifica lly

name him as tar g et). 13 May s also claims that his lack of notice violated his r ight to due proce ss. H is entire argument in support of this contention is the following br ief pa ssag e: “Counsel for plaintiffs was
never g iven notice a

nd an opportunity

for a hear ing on the sanctions ass es s ed ag ainst him. The actions of th e Co u rt v io late th e A me n d me n ts , A rt. X I V , Se c ti o n1 , th e Co n s ti tuti o no f th e United States of Amer ica.” We deem this ar gu m en t waived beca use it is inadequately

briefe d. See W oodside , 154 S.W .3d at 691 (a ppellant waive s issue s t h at are ac companied only by “attenuated, unsupported ar g ument”). F or the same rea son, we deem waived the argument that sanctions wer e
un wa rr ante d b e c a

us e the de a c on s nev e r pr op e rl y “ hir e d” the Churc h’ s c ouns e l f or the se c on d s uit
. This “ argument” consists e ntirely of a thre e-line quotation from the re cord in May s’s and Watson’s b r i e f t h a ti s a c c o mp a

n i e d b y n e i t h e r

e x p l i c a t i o nn o r

c i t a t i o nt o a

u t h o r i t y. I n sum, the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in i s s u i n g the April 26, 2007 sanctions orde r. I t did, however , exceed its power in issuing the Aug ust 23, 2007 sanctions order beca use, as d i s cu s s ed above, the cour t’s plenar y power had expired by

then. Se e Sc ott

& W hit e 14 Mem ’l Hosp. v. Sc hexnide r , 940 S.W .2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (“ A trial cour t’s power to decide a mot ion for sanctions
. . . is limit ed to when it reta ins plenary jurisdiction.”). That or derTh o u g h w e h a v e n o t f o u n d a c a s e i n w h i c h a c o u rt a p p o i n t e d an a

u d i t o r s p e c i f

i c a lly to 15 resolve a suit brought unde r Texas Revised Civil S tatutes article 1 3 9 6 -2
. 2 3 , we note that (1) ap p e ll an ts d o n o t c h a ll e n g e th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s a u th o r it y to o r d e r th e a u d it , an d ( 2 ) o u r h o ld ing acc ords with the p o rt ion of the statute that re quires the pa rty seekingan inspec tion to pay the associate d costs. See Tex. Rev. Ci v. Stat. Ann. art. 1396-2.23( B) (West 2003). 33 is theref ore void, so the Churc h and deacons are not entitled to re cover the sanc tions that the Au g us t 23 , 2 00 7 o rd e r p ur po rt e d to awa

rd the m. Taxing Au dit Cost

s Again st th e Price

s and Wats on The trial court held the Prices a nd Watson joi ntly

and seve rally

liable for the cost of the audit of the Churc h’s re cords. The P rice s and W atson argue that this was error be cause (1) the
a ud it d id n ot c on clu si vely e sta bli shthat th e Chu

rc h d id n ot c omm it f

ina nc ia l f ra ud , ( 2) the a

ud it
re p o rt w a s n o t p r o p e r e v id e n c e b e c a u s e it d id n o t s ati s f

y th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f Texas Rule of Ev ide nc e 70 6 a

nd Te xas R ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 17 2, and (3 ) t he c os t of the a ud it w a s n ot p ro pe rl y substantiated. T h e Pr ic e s an d Wats o nc it e n o a

u th o r it y in d ic a ti n g th a t a tr ia l c o u rt m ay o n ly tax a plaintiff for the cost of an audit if the audit reve als wrong doing by the defe ndant. I n fac t, courts have discretion in allocating c osts, see Te x. R. Civ. P. 141 , an d the ir de fa ult po sit ion is to all oc a te c os ts to the losing pa

rty
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 31 (“ Th e su c c e ssfu l part y to a su it sha ll r e c ov e r o f h is
a dv e rs ary a ll co sts inc ur

re d the re in, e xce pt wh e re oth e rw ise pr ov ide d. ” ). Th is r ule a pp lie s to the c os t of a c ourt-appointed a

uditor. See V

i l l i er s v. Re public Fin. Servs., Inc

. , 602 S.W .2d 566, 571-72 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1980, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.) . Thus, the t rial court did not err in taxing the Prices and Watson for

the cost of the audit, reg ardle ss of whether or not the audit established fr aud to their satisfac tion. 1534 Reg ardingthe Prices’ and Watson’s se cond argument, we do not be lieve that Texas Rule of Evidenc e 706 and T exas Rule of Civil Procedur e 172 apply here . Evidence Rule 706 applies only when Rule 172 a

pplies, see Tex. R. Evid. 706, and Rule 172 applies whe n “an inve stigation of
acc ounts or examination of vouchers a ppear s nece ssary fo r t h e purpose of justice betwe en the pa rt ie s. ” Rul e 17 2 g oe s o n to c lari fy that “ a c c ounts ” me ans “ the a c c ount b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. ” Th is indicates that a

udits occur pur suant to Rule 172 only when parties dispute a debt betwee n them, not when a party mere ly seeks r eview of

a cor poration’s re cordke eping pract i ce s. Moreove r, the trial court did not indicate that it was order ing an audit pursuant to Rule 172, and no party reque sted an audit pursuant to Rule 172. I ndeed, the Prices and Watson did not invoke Rule 172 until afte r the audit was c ompleted.

Re g ard ing the Pr ic e s’ and Wat so n’ s th ir d a

rgume nt, the a

ud it’ s c os t w a s u lti ma te ly proper ly substantiated. The rec ord shows that befor e the a udit occurr ed, the Churc h paid $18,750 int o th e c ourt ’s re g istry

to c ov e r t he a ud it’ s est imate d co st. Th e re c or d o ri g ina lly su bmi tte d to thi s court did not substantiate that the audit actua lly cost that much or that the a uditors ever

rec eived that money . Rather, the only rele vant documentation in the re cord w as an a udit invoice for $2,630.08. After oral a rg ument, howeve r, we rec eived a supplemental re cord fro m the trial court c lerk that substantiated the audit’s c ost and showed that the m o n ey in the court’s r eg istry

had ac tually

been paid out to the auditors. See Tex. R. App. P
. 34.5(c) (trial court cler k may file suppl emental r ecor d containing rele vant omitted items with appellate c ourt). The supplemental re cord c ontained copie s of invoices submi tted by the auditors to the court a nd a che ck fr om the court to the a uditors in the amount of $18,700. The Pric es and Watson object to the submission of the s upplemental re cord, arguing that it represe nts an impermissible attempt to enlar g e the trial court re cord. See D isco Mach.35

of Liberal Co. v. Pay ton , 900 S.W .2d 71, 74-75 (Te x . App—Amar illo 1995, wr it denied) (“ L eave to supplement merely

encompa sses permission to aug ment the appe llate re cord w ith the existing trial court re cord; it does not allow the cre ation of a newtrial court r ecor d.”). The y also claim, without supporting a

rg umentation or citat i o n to authority , that the Church is estopped by lache s from supplementing the re cord. F inally , they state t hat because they

had neve r see n the documents in the
su pp le me nta l r e c or d b e fo re the c le rk fi le d it , th e Church must h a ve vio la te d T e xas R ule of Civ il Procedur e 21. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21 (copy of “[ e]very pleading , plea, motion or application to the court for an orde r” must be se rved on a ll parties). These a rg uments do not persuade us to deny the C hurch le ave to f ile the supplemental
re c or d. F ir st, the su

pp le me nta l r e c or d c on ta ins ite ms that we re a lr e a dy on fi le wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ; thus, i t d o es not repre sent an impermissible “e nlarg ement” of the trial cour

t rec ord. Second, the lache s contention is waived beca u s e it is unsupported by argument or citation to authority
. See W oodside , 154 S. W
. 3 d at 6 9 1
. Third, Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 21 doe s not apply to the do c ume nts in t

he su pp le me nta l re c or d be c a

us e the y are inv oic e s and a c he c k, no t ple a din g s, ple a s, motions, or applications to the court for order s. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21. Moreove r, t he auditors, not the Church, fi l ed the invoices with the c ourt, so it is hard to see how the filing of those invoices could have imposed duties on the Church pursuant to Rule 21. But even if Rule 21 did apply to the documents in the supplemental r ecor d, the Prices, Watson, and May s have of fer ed no ar g ument or authority explaining why

exclusion of the documents from the recor d is the proper reme dy for the Church’s a lleg ed violatio n o f R u l e 2 1
. Thus, we g rant the Churc h’s motion to admit t he supplemental re cord, a

nd on the basis of the documents in that rec ord we aff irm the order

requiring th e P ri ce s and Watson to reimburse the Churc h $21,380.08 for the a udit. Se e Sil

k v . Te rri ll ,36

898 S.W .2d 764, 766 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam ) (a p p ell ate c ourt has broa d discretion to allow supplementation of re cord)
. CO NC LU SION

For the re asons stated a

bove, we aff

irm the summa

r y ju d g me nts a g ainst the Prices a nd Watson. W e af

firm the trial court’s April 26, 2007 sanctions order and vacate its August 23, 2007 sanctions order
. Finally , we aff irm the court’s Marc h 28, 2007 order requiringthe Prices a

nd Watson to reimburse the Church for the full cost of the a

udit.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med in part; Va cate d in part Filed: May

20, 2010