SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3612-21 

 A-3613-21

 A-3614-21

 A-3616-21

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

1979 INTER VIVOS TRUST 

OF ALFRED AND MARY 

SANZARI, GRANTORS, 

DATED JUNE 1, 1979. 

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF BEN F. 

SANZARI TRUST, ALFRED 

F. SANZARI, GRANTOR, 

DATED OCTOBER 11, 1994. 

_________________________

Argued May 13, 2024 – Decided July 1, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson, DeAlmeida, and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket Nos. 

P-000562-19 and P-000029-20.

 

Jane A. Grinch argued the cause for appellant/crossrespondent Carl Sanzari (Cullen and Dykman, LLP, 

attorneys; Jane A. Grinch, of counsel and on the briefs; 

Steven Siegel, on the briefs). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3612-21

Cynthia A. Cappell argued the cause for 

appellant/cross-respondent Ben Sanzari (Law Offices

of Cynthia A. Cappell, LLC, attorneys; Cynthia A. 

Cappell and Christina Cooper, of counsel and on the

briefs). 

Joseph B. Fiorenzo argued the cause for 

respondents/cross-appellants David Sanzari and Frank 

Huttle (Sills Cummis & Gross, PC, attorneys; Joseph B. 

Fiorenzo, of counsel and on the briefs; Stephen M. 

Klein, on the briefs). 

PER CURIAM 

In these four consolidated appeals, defendants Ben1 and Carl Sanzari 

appeal from orders that excluded Carl, Ben's adopted son, as a beneficiary of 

two family trusts. Plaintiffs, David Sanzari and Frank Huttle, in their capacity 

as trustees of two trusts created by Alfred Sanzari for the benefit of Ben, brought 

two declaratory judgment actions against Ben and his adopted son Carl to 

exclude Carl from class gifts intended for Ben's children. The central dispute 

before us is whether the trust language, which includes the term "adopted 

children" in the class gifts, encompasses Carl, who was adopted as an adult. 

The trial court denied defendants' summary judgment motions and 

concluded the "stranger to the adoption" doctrine applied a presumption against 

1

 Because of the common surname, we refer to some the parties by their first 

names. We intend no disrespect. 
3 A-3612-21

an adult adoptee's inclusion in a class gift. Consistent with the doctrine, it placed

the burden on defendants to overcome that presumption with evidence of 

probable intent on the settlors' part to include Carl. Accordingly, at trial, 

defendants presented their evidence first. At the end of defendants' case, 

plaintiffs moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and Rule 4:40-1. The 

trial court granted plaintiffs' motion. 

Defendants appeal, arguing the trial court erred in denying them summary 

judgment and in granting a directed verdict to plaintiffs. Additionally, Ben, who 

is deaf and legally blind, argues his disabilities were not adequately 

accommodated at trial, in violation of his due process rights. 

Plaintiffs, who sought to demonstrate a "scheme" by Carl's mother, (Ben's 

second wife) and Carl's biological father to have Carl included in the trust class 

gifts, cross-appeal from orders granting motions to quash various subpoenas and 

from related trial rulings excluding evidence of the motive for Carl's adoption 

as an adult. 

Having reviewed the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we 

affirm all the trial court's orders because defendants' motion for summary 

judgment was correctly denied, and the "stranger to the adoption" doctrine 
4 A-3612-21

placed the burden of probable intent upon defendants. Defendants failed to meet 

their burden and the trial court correctly granted judgment to plaintiffs. 

I.

We glean the following facts from the record. Alfred founded a successful 

real estate business, Alfred Sanzari Enterprises (ASE), in 1945. Alfred and his 

wife, Mary "wanted nothing more than this business . . . to be carried on by their 

family." Alfred and Mary had three children: "Freddie," Ben, and David. Alfred 

and Mary began estate planning as early as 1976, when Alfred first met with 

attorneys to discuss placing ASE's properties into an inter vivos trust. They 

executed the first trust (the 1979 Trust) on June 1, 1979. Alfred and Mary 

continued to revise their estate plan over the years, resulting in the 1992 Last 

Will and Testament of Mary A. Sanzari, the 1992 Last Will and Testament of 

Alfred Sanzari, and a second trust (the 1994 Trust), which also held ASE assets. 

Only Alfred, not Mary, was the grantor of the 1994 Trust. 

The 1979 and 1994 Trusts provide a residuary class gift to each child of 

Ben and to each grandchild of Ben as a secondary beneficiary. In relevant part, 

the 1994 Trust provides:

2.2 Trust Estate.

The Trust Estate shall be administered as one 

trust during the life of the Settlor's son, BEN F. 
5 A-3612-21

SANZARI, (hereinafter "BEN") and continue upon his 

death until the youngest of his children living on the 

date of this indenture reaches the age of twenty-five 

(25) years old, (hereinafter referred as the "Division 

Date"), and shall be administered as follows:

. . . .

(d) Division Date. Upon the Division Date as 

defined in Section 2.2, the balance of property 

remaining in the Trust Estate, subject to the adjustment 

set forth in Section 2.2(c)(ii), shall be divided into as 

many equal shares as shall be necessary to create one 

such share for the Surviving Spouse and for each child 

of BEN who shall be then living or who is then 

deceased [(hereinafter "Beneficiary" or 

"Beneficiaries")], but has left one or more living 

descendants (hereinafter referred to as "Second 

Beneficiary" or "Second Beneficiaries").

Section 6.8 of the 1994 Trust, governing the trust's construction, states: "As 

used herein, wherever this context requires or permits . . . the words 'children' 

and 'issue' shall include adopted children as though they were Settlor's natural 

born children and/or issue." 

The 1979 Trust provides:

(d) Upon the death of the Beneficiary [(Ben)] and 

the death or remarriage of BARBARA SANZARI, the 

present wife of the Beneficiary, the balance of the trust 

property, including any accumulated income and corpus 

accretions, shall thereupon be divided into as many

equal shares as there are children of the Beneficiary 

then living . . . and deceased children of the Beneficiary 

leaving issue then living. . . . Such shares of deceased 
6 A-3612-21

children leaving issue then living shall be further

divided per stirpes. The children and the issue of

deceased children entitled to shares hereunder are all 

hereinafter collectively referred to as "Secondary 

Beneficiaries" and individually referred to as "Second 

Beneficiary".

. . . . 

(f) All references herein to "issue", "child" or 

"children" shall be deemed to refer only to issue, child 

or children born of lawful wedlock or legally adopted.

The trusts did not expressly address whether they included adopted adults. At 

the time the 1979 Trust was executed, Ben was thirty-two years-old and had 

three young children with his then-wife Barbara. By 1994, Ben was forty-seven 

years-old and had a fourth child with Barbara. 

The parties agree the trusts were created to keep ASE in the family. Ben 

conceded at trial that his "father would not provide any interest in his business 

to someone who was not sufficiently connected with the Sanzari family." 

Additionally, Alfred's firstborn, Freddie, who had "his own businesses with his 

wife," was not given any interest in the trusts, and neither was Freddie's wife or 

daughter. Notes from Alfred and Mary's estate planning admitted at trial 

indicate Alfred intended that "control of the properties should always be kept 

away from the wives of Ben and David." And although Ben's three daughters 

were given interests in ASE, Ben testified Alfred insisted that one of David's 
7 A-3612-21

sons, or Ben's youngest biological son, Alfred Louis, "be the successor trustee 

who would be involved in managing the business assets." 

The trusts were also intended to ensure that Ben, who is legally blind and 

was born deaf, would remain financially secure notwithstanding his physical 

limitations. Huttle and David were appointed trustees to carry out those tasks.

From 2002 until mid-2005, Carl's mother Karina worked as a nurse's 

assistant for Alfred and Mary. Before Alfred's death on December 11, 2005, 

Alfred interacted with the minor Carl approximately five times, and knew him 

only as his nursing assistant's son. Ben did not meet Carl until two years after 

Alfred's death. 

Karina began working as an aide and housekeeper for Ben in 2007. That 

same year, Ben's first wife Barbara filed for divorce. The divorce was finalized 

on December 6, 2007. Ben and Karina married six months later, and Carl moved 

in with the couple. Prior to the wedding, Karina and Ben entered into a 

prenuptial agreement pursuant to which Karina waived any interest in the trusts 

or trust-owned property. The agreement states Ben "has four children," Karina 

"has one child," and provides "[t]he parties mutually intend that each shall be 

free to provide for his or her child(ren) from Separate Property as each deems 
8 A-3612-21

fit, both during the parties' lives and in their estate plans, freely and without 

consideration of interests or claims of the other spouse."

Ben testified Carl spent time with his step-grandmother, Mary, prior to her 

death. He testified Carl and Mary "interact[ed] a lot," he visited Mary with Carl 

every Sunday and "[s]ometimes Saturdays," and they would go out to eat 

together. Ben described Mary as "affectionate" toward Carl, "always greet[ing] 

him good morning and hug[ging] him," and said Mary had told Carl she loved 

him.

Ben testified Mary treated Carl as she did her other grandchildren, 

including making a monetary Christmas gift to Carl in 2009 from the 1979 Trust. 

However, on cross-examination, Ben admitted the $20,000 gift to Carl was made 

at his own suggestion and decision, and David — not Mary — as trustee of the 

trust, accepted his suggestion and signed the check. Carl testified he did not 

know whether Mary "had any role whatsoever with respect to the" check. Ben 

testified 2009 was the first time Carl received one of the Christmas checks. 

Mary, who had suffered several serious health problems for years — 

including vision problems necessitating multiple eye surgeries and a liver 

transplant — became "very sick" by the end of 2009 with heart and lung 

problems. Mary died on February 23, 2010. 
9 A-3612-21

Ben alleged for the first time at trial that shortly before Mary's death, in 

December of 2009, he told Mary he wanted Carl to become a "part of the trust," 

and she agreed. He claimed the only person he ever spoke to around that time 

about adopting Carl or including him in the trust was Mary. 

Ben testified Alfred and Mary created trusts for each of Ben's children, 

and either Alfred and Mary together, or Mary alone after Alfred passed, created 

trusts for the benefit of each of Ben's grandchildren within a couple months of 

their births. However, in the twenty-one-month span between Ben's marriage to 

Karina and Mary's death, Mary did not create a trust for Carl. Nor did she amend 

her will to bequeath anything to Carl.

On October 13, 2017, Ben, at age seventy, adopted Carl, then eighteen 

years-old. Plaintiffs filed two verified complaints, one for each of the trusts, 

seeking declaratory relief.

II.

Initially we note defendants claim to appeal from the orders denying 

them summary judgment prior to trial. However, all of the notices of appeal 

and case information statements filed by defendants under all relevant docket 

numbers identify only the May 5, 2022 orders of judgment as the orders being 
10 A-3612-21

appealed. Although the orders denying summary judgment are not identified, 

we address them for the sake of completeness. 

The Trial Court's Order Denying Summary Judgment to Defendants. 

In reviewing summary judgment orders, we employ a de novo standard of 

review and apply the same standard employed by the trial court. Samolyk v. 

Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Accordingly, we determine whether the moving 

party has demonstrated there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact and, 

if so, whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c); 

see also Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014); 

Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). 

"A dispute of material fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden of 

persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together 

with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would 

require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Gayles by Gayles v. Sky 

Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Grande 

v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)). 

In its written opinion, the trial court rejected defendants' argument that the 

trusts were clear on their faces, Carl automatically qualified as a beneficiary 
11 A-3612-21

because of the "adopted child" language, and there was no need for the court to 

consider the doctrine of probable intent. The court found genuine issues of 

material fact existed as to the probable intent of Alfred and Mary, noting in 

particular that Huttle, who drafted the 1994 Trust, testified at deposition, based 

on his discussions with both settlors, they "did not want anyone who is not a 

blood relative of the Sanzari family to control any of the real estate then owned 

or thereafter acquired by the [t]rusts." The court also rejected defendants' 

argument that plaintiffs were seeking to have the trusts reformed, rather than 

interpreted, to exclude Carl. We agree. 

 The plain language of both trusts refers only to adopted "children." In the 

legal context, "child" refers to "[a]n unemancipated person under the age of 

majority." Black's Law Dictionary 299 (11th ed. 2019).2 More colloquially, 

"child" refers to a "recently born person." Mirriam-Webster's Collegiate 

Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2020). The plain language of both trusts provides that 

a child adopted by Ben would constitute a "child" or "issue" within the meaning 

2

 New Jersey statutes generally compare children to individuals who have 

reached the age of majority, noting the disaffirming effect minority has on the 

ability to transact, contract, or participate in certain enumerated activities. See, 

e.g., N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1 to -4 (the age of majority statute, which governs legal 

capacity to contract, sue and be sued, serve on juries, marry, and adopt children; 

and disallowing children from participating in those activities). 
12 A-3612-21

of the trusts. Ben testified there was only one adoption known in the family 

prior to his adoption of Carl as an adult, which occurred when Alfred's brother 

Gene and his wife adopted an infant after they were unable to conceive. Ben 

testified he had no insights into the purposes of either trusts. He testified he did 

not "know the reason behind [his] parents establishing a trust for [him]" and 

"they never talked to [him] about it." Defendants offered no evidence regarding 

Alfred's or Mary's purpose in including the term "adopted children" in the trusts. 

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to 

defendants.

The Stranger to the Adoption Doctrine. 

Defendants further argue the court erred in applying the "stranger to the 

adoption" doctrine to place the burden of proving probable intent on them. 

When interpreting a trust our aim is to ascertain the probable intent of the 

testator or settlor. In re Est. of Payne, 186 N.J. 324, 335 (2006). In doing so, 

courts "employ presumptions," In re Tr. Under Agreement of Vander Poel, 396 

N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007), established by "impulses . . . common to 

human nature," Fidelity Union Tr. Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 565 (1962). 

 "The 'stranger to the adoption' doctrine is a well-established, judiciallycreated doctrine." In re Tr. for the Benefit of Duke, 305 N.J. Super. 408, 427 
13 A-3612-21

(Ch. Div. 1995). Historically, New Jersey courts acknowledged "a presumption 

that an adopted child could not take property under an instrument created by 

someone other than the adoptive parent unless the instrument itself indicated a 

specific intent that the adopted child should take." Id. at 427-28. "In 1953, the 

Legislature eliminated the 'stranger to the adoption' doctrine as it related to 

minors," but not "as it relates to the adult adoption statute." Id. at 429. 

 The adult adoption statute, provides, in relevant part: 

c. All rights, privileges and obligations due from the 

parents by adoption to the person adopted and from the 

person adopted to them and all relations between such 

person and them shall be the same as if the person 

adopted had been born to them in lawful wedlock, 

including the right to take and inherit intestate personal 

and real property from and through each other. 

Except, however, that: 

a. The person adopted shall not be capable of taking 

property expressly limited by a will or any other 

instrument to the heirs of the body of the adopting

parent or parents, nor property coming on intestacy

from the collateral kindred of the adopting parent or 

parents by right of representation; . . . . 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:22-3.] 

Although the latter provision provides that an adopted adult cannot take if the 

trust is limited to "heirs of the body," otherwise referred to as "[t]he 'stranger to 

the adoption' provision," Duke, 305 N.J. Super. at 427, the judicial doctrine is 
14 A-3612-21

broader than the statute and includes situations in which an instrument executed 

by a stranger to the adoption does not make specific provision for a specific 

adoptee. 

 In In re Estate of Griswold, the court observed the distinction between an 

adopted child and an adopted adult: "[t]here was at the time no reason for 

testator or his counsel to think about the possibility of either of his sons" – both 

of whom were beneficiaries – "adopting an adult." 140 N.J. Super. 35, 47 (Cnty. 

Ct. 1976). Although it could be presumed the testator would not have drawn a 

distinction between a natural child and an adopted child, the court thought it 

"clear" the testator would have strongly disapproved of diverting the assets of 

the trust by allowing an adopted adult to have a share "even though a stepsonin-law." Id. at 47-48. The Griswold court explained the rationale for 

distinguishing between adult and child adoptees: 

The adoption of children and the adoption of adults

involve quite different considerations and different 

factors of policy and require and receive different

treatment. The basic purpose of child adoption is to 

provide and protect the welfare of children, to provide 

homes and families and security for homeless children, 

and to provide children for couples who desire to have 

children to love and raise and maintain. A substantial 

factor here is the duty and obligation of support and 

maintenance. 
15 A-3612-21

In an adult adoption the relation between the parties is 

different, the motivation can be quite varied, and such 

adoptions are treated differently in the statutes. 

Adoption of adults is ordinarily quite simple and almost 

in the nature of a civil contract. . . . The complete 

severing of the relation to natural parents is not 

accomplished in an adult adoption; the relation remains 

in New Jersey as to inheritance in case of intestacy of 

the natural parents. 

[Id. at 51-52.] 

 

In In re Estate of Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308, 319 (App. Div. 1977), we 

"thoroughly agree[d]" with that reasoning, stating:

 It is one thing to ascribe to a testator a 

contemplation of the possibility of that which has come 

to be relatively commonplace, namely, the adoption of 

a child at some time in the future by a member of the 

family or other relative, or any other prospective 

beneficiary under a will. Frequently, in such cases, the

child is acquired in infancy, although the child may be 

older where a spouse adopts a stepchild. In both 

instances, however, the child is reared as one's own by 

the adopting parent and is recognized as such among

the family and friends. 

 But it is quite another matter where the adopted 

person is an adult. . . . One would be hard-pressed to 

ascribe to a testator, in the absence of any expression 

thereon or of clarifying attendant circumstances, a

probable intent to include an adopted adult among the 

children or issue of a testamentary beneficiary. It is 

extremely unlikely that a testator would foresee the 

likelihood that his or her child, or any other prospective 

beneficiary, might at some time in the future adopt an 

adult. It is equally improbable that an adopted adult 
16 A-3612-21

would be embraced in the bosom of the family members 

other than the adopting parent, as would an adopted

child. 

Notably, although Nicol suggests an "older" adopted stepchild would normally 

be seen as the adoptive parent's "own" child, id. at 319, the "stranger to the 

adoption" doctrine applied nonetheless where the stepchild was a minor when 

the stepparent-stepchild relationship began, but an adult when adopted. Id. at 

311, 320. 

 In Vander Poel, we considered the circumstance of a stepchild, Jane, later 

adopted as an adult, and her entitlement to proceeds from a trust created for her 

adoptive father by his mother. 396 N.J. Super. at 222-26. The trust in question 

provided that after the father's death, trust income was to be distributed to the 

settlor's living issue, which the trust defined "only as 'lawful issue.'" Id. at 222. 

When the trust was created, Jane's father was single and childless. Ibid. Soon 

after, he married Jane's mother, who had Jane from a prior marriage, and the 

couple later had biological children. Ibid. Her father discussed adopting Jane, 

and consulted with an attorney, but struggled to identify the best jurisdiction in 

which to effectuate the adoption, because the family had emigrated. Id. at 223-

24. The adoption did not occur until several years after Jane turned eighteen. 

Id. at 224. 
17 A-3612-21

 As in Nicol, we determined Jane was "subject to the 'stranger to the 

adoption' presumption." Id. at 232. In analyzing the settlor's probable intent, 

we observed the settlor "never established a separate trust for Jane as she did 

with each of the other children" and subsequent to Jane's adoption "specifically 

excluded adoptees from sharing in [a second] trust and her will." Id. at 234. 

Thus, not only did Jane not overcome the "stranger to the adoption" 

presumption, but the facts affirmatively "point[ed] to the probable intention by 

[the settlor] to keep [her family] fortune within bloodlines." Ibid. 

 Ben and Carl both argue the "stranger to the adoption" doctrine does not 

apply pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:22-3(c)(a) because 1) the trusts did not limit class 

beneficiary status to Ben's "heirs of the body"; and 2) because they specifically 

included adoptees. We are unpersuaded. Whether a trust specifically uses the 

term "heirs of the body" is not the controlling language. As previously noted, 

the "stranger to the adoption" doctrine is judicially created and is broader than 

the statute. The presumption is not limited to cases where the trust explicitly 

uses the term "heirs of the body." For example, in Vander Poel, the term used 

was "issue" and we concluded the presumption still applied. 396 N.J. Super. at 

232.
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 Defendant's second contention arguably creates a question of first 

impression: whether the "stranger to the adoption" doctrine applies to adult 

adoptees in cases where "child," "issue," and the like expressly includes child 

adoptees, but neither the trust itself nor the surrounding circumstances suggest 

the settlor contemplated adult adoption. 

 In arguing "the [t]rusts expressly authorized beneficiary status to Ben's 

adoptees" and that this "should end the judicial inquiry," defendants rely on In 

re Estate of Fenton, 386 N.J. Super. 404, 416 (App. Div. 2006). Their reliance 

is misplaced. Fenton concerned the validity of an adult adoption, not the 

probable intent of a testator. Id. at 412-13, 421-22. The plaintiffs, adult 

adoptees seeking to take pursuant to a trust, filed suit against defendant trust 

beneficiaries for a declaration that the judgment pursuant to which they were 

adopted remained in effect "and was valid for all purposes." Id. at 411. The 

trust indirectly at issue in Fenton expressly defined "child, children and issue" 

to include "an adopted child." Id. at 408. The trial court held the adult adoptions 

were valid, recognizing that was "the only real issue before the trial court," but 

also concluded the trust "conferred on each trust beneficiary, including [the 

plaintiffs' adoptive parent], the right to adopt children, which included both 

adults and minors, as provided by Maryland law." Id. at 412-13. 
19 A-3612-21

 On appeal, we affirmed. Id. at 422. With respect to the trust, we reiterated 

it was governed by Maryland law, which, unlike New Jersey, "presume[s] all 

adult adoptees are included in class gifts to children." Id. at 421. 

 Fenton is inapplicable because we had no occasion to decide or apply New 

Jersey law regarding the rights of adult adoptees. As we have made clear, when 

applying New Jersey law adult and child adoption are two different processes, 

with different purposes, requirements, and consequences. Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 

at 319; Griswold, 140 N.J. Super. at 51-52. New Jersey's statutes, unlikely 

Maryland's, expressly presume a lack of intent to include adult adoptees because 

of the legal and social differences between adult and child adoptions. 

 In sum, the trust language regarding adopted children cannot on its face 

be read as an expression of intent to include adult adoptees. Nothing else in the 

language of either trust or the surrounding circumstances suggests adult 

adoptees were meant to be included in the class. 

Defendants' Proffered Evidence of Probable Intent. 

 Motions for judgment at the close of a plaintiff's case, R. 4:37-2(b), and 

motions for judgment at the close either "of all the evidence or at the close of 

the evidence offered by an opponent," R. 4:40-1, are governed by the same 

standard: "[I]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of 
20 A-3612-21

the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all 

inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, 

reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." Verdicchio v. Ricca, 

179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Est. of Roach v. TRW, 

Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)). "The trial court is not concerned with the worth, 

nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, 

viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion." Perez v. 

Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 407 (2013) (quoting Dolson v. 

Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 (1969)). 

 Again, the aim of a court interpreting a trust is to ascertain the probable 

intent of the settlor or testator. Payne, 186 N.J. at 335. By statute, 

[t]he intention of a settlor as expressed in a trust, or of 

an individual as expressed in a governing instrument, 

controls the legal effect of the dispositions therein and 

the rules of construction expressed in N.J.S. 3B:34

through N.J.S. 3B:3-48 shall apply unless the probable 

intent of such settlor or of such individual, as indicated 

by the trust or by such governing instrument and 

relevant circumstances, is contrary. 

[N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1(b).] 

When interpreting a trust or similar instrument, courts must give "primary 

emphasis to [the settlor's] dominant plan and purpose as they appear from the 

entirety of [the trust] when read and considered in light of the surrounding facts 
21 A-3612-21

and circumstances." Payne, 186 N.J. at 335 (quoting Fidelity Union Tr. Co., 36 

N.J. at 564-65). 

 "The settlor's probable intent deserves vindication to bar unintended 

takers, as well as to protect intended beneficiaries." In re Tr. of Nelson, 454 

N.J. Super. 151, 164 (App. Div. 2018). We reject a plain meaning approach to 

trust interpretation and may engage in the probable intent inquiry even where a 

document is clear on its face, and will consider extrinsic evidence to aid in 

determining probable intent. Id. at 163; Payne, 186 N.J. at 335. Extrinsic 

evidence the court may consider is "not limited to what was known to the testator 

at the time of the execution of the" instrument. In re Est. of Baker, 297 N.J. 

Super. 203, 210 (App. Div. 1997). Our Supreme Court instructs us to "strain 

toward effectuating the testator's probable intent to accomplish what he would 

have done had he envisioned the present inquiry." Payne, 186 N.J. at 335 

(quoting In re Est. of Branigan, 129 N.J. 324, 332 (1992)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Here, in its written decision granting plaintiffs' motion for judgment, the 

court had shifted the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate Carl, an adult 

adoptee, was an intended secondary beneficiary to the trusts. The court 

concluded defendants did not meet that burden, noting Ben and Carl were not 
22 A-3612-21

able to provide any testimony as to the meaning of the term "adopted children" 

as set forth in the trusts. Alfred knew Carl only as his nurse's assistant's son, 

when Karina was employed to care for him and Mary; defendants' assertion that 

Mary treated Carl as a grandson was based largely on a single monetary 

Christmas gift from Mary to Carl in 2009, which Ben acknowledged was 

actually made by David at Ben's request; Mary's will made specific bequests to 

all of her grandchildren but not to Carl, even though he was known to her; and 

Mary created trusts for each of her biological grandchildren but not for Carl. 

 The court also found defendants' testimony about the loving and genuine 

relationship between Ben and Carl not relevant, ruling that "such love and 

affection is not attributable to Alfred and Mary and does not support defendants' 

contentions regarding the probable intention of Alfred and Mary." Finally, the 

court rejected Ben's testimony that he told Mary in 2009 he intended to adopt 

Carl and wanted him to be included as a secondary beneficiary, finding it 

inconsistent with Ben's testimony that he never reviewed the trusts prior to 

Mary's death, and as legally insufficient, "self-serving" testimony pursuant to 

the Dead Man's Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2. Thus, the court concluded defendants 

"failed to present evidence as to the probable intent of Alfred and/or Mary 
23 A-3612-21

sufficient to overcome the presumption of the 'stranger to the adoption' 

doctrine." 

 Ben argues on appeal the trial court failed to give reasonable inferences 

to defendants, and thus, did not appropriately apply the standard applicable on 

a motion for judgment. Ben contends the trial court improperly disregarded

similar language regarding child adoptees in other testamentary instruments 

executed by Alfred and Mary, as well as notes and draft documents recorded by 

their attorneys. None of Ben's examples specifically include adult adoptees or 

mention adult adoption. Moreover, the trusts make no mention of adult 

adoptees. Although Ben posits this evidence as conspicuously missing any 

proof of a "secret intention to limit or restrict beneficiary status to only certain 

types of adoptees," we view it as the absence of an expression of intent to 

specifically include adult adoptees in a class gift. 

Ben also argues the trial court ignored evidence of "Carl's personal 

interactions with Alfred and Mary and, in particular, Mary's treatment of Carl 

as a member of the Sanzari Family." Ben contends this evidence permitted an 

inference that "Alfred and Mary not only intended any legal adoptee of Ben be 

treated as a class beneficiary under the [t]rusts . . . but also that Alfred and Mary 
24 A-3612-21

intended that Carl, in particular, be treated as a class beneficiary under the 

[t]rusts." 

 Defendants are entitled to the benefit of only "reasonabl[e]" inferences. 

Roach, 164 N.J. at 612. It is not reasonable to infer from their interactions any 

intent by Alfred to specifically include Carl as a class beneficiary when Alfred 

knew Carl only as his employee's son. It likewise is not reasonable to infer Mary 

treated Carl like Ben's other children, when the undisputed evidence 

demonstrates Mary did not create a trust for Carl or bequeath anything to Carl 

in her will, as she did for Ben's other children. And not all Sanzari family 

members were included in the two trusts: Freddy, his wife, and children were 

specifically excluded. Even if Mary "treat[ed] Carl as a member of the Sanzari 

family," that fact is insufficient to support an inference that she intended Carl to 

become a secondary beneficiary. 

 Finally, Ben argues the court discounted undisputed evidence of a "loving 

relationship" between Ben and Carl in finding that "such love and affection is 

not attributable to Alfred and Mary and does not support [d]efendants' 

contentions regarding the probable intention of Alfred and Mary." Ben contends 

"the existence of a loving parent-child relationship is highly relevant to the 

'stranger to the adoption' inquiry" because the doctrine considers whether the 
25 A-3612-21

adoptive parent's "sole purpose" in adopting is to secure financial benefits for 

the adoptee, citing In re the Est. of Comly, 90 N.J. Super. 498, 503 (Cnty. Ct. 

1966), and Fenton, 386 N.J. Super. at 418, itself discussing Comly. 

 The Comly court held that "[w]hile undeniably it is the policy of the 

Legislature to place adopted children on a level with natural children, such a 

policy should not be used to permit the adoption of adults for the sole purpose 

of giving them an interest in property." 90 N.J. Super. at 503. The court also 

said more generally that: 

If any adult that [the adoptive parent] chose to adopt 

qualified as a "child" under the will [at issue], then, in 

effect, [the adoptive parent] would have a power of

appointment over the property and could lessen the 

shares of his natural children as much as he pleased 

without any obligation on his part to provide and care

for the adopted "child." 

[Id. at 503.] 

This, the court said, was "obviously" not the intent of our Supreme Court in 

deciding In re Est. of Coe, 42 N.J. 485 (1964), when it held adopted children 

qualified as "children" within the meaning of an instrument. Comly, 90 N.J. 

Super. at 503. Comly and Fenton do not support Ben's argument. A genuine, 

loving basis for an adult adoption alone is insufficient to overcome the 
26 A-3612-21

presumption against adult adoptees. Nothing in our decision today precludes 

Carl from inheriting from Ben. 

 The Trial Court's Accommodations. 

Finally, Ben argues the trial court failed to provide reasonable 

accommodations to him during trial for his known disabilities, which he alleged 

affected his ability to understand the proceedings. Ben's contention is not 

supported by the record, and he does not state what specific accommodations 

the trial court failed to afford him. The record demonstrates the court limited

trial testimony to approximately two and a half hours each day at Ben's request, 

so as not to exhaust him, and provided four ASL interpreters at all times. It also 

granted trial adjournments twice to accommodate Ben so he could vacation and 

ensured he had visibility of his interpreters. We discern no merit in Ben's 

argument regarding a lack of accommodation by the trial court. 

Plaintiffs' appeals are rendered moot by our affirmance. To the extent we 

have not addressed a parties' argument, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.