IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Labor and Industry, : No. 980 C.D. 2015

: Argued: March 9, 2016

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Kathryn Simpson, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: August 30, 2016

The Department of Labor and Industry (Department) petitions for 

review of the May 15, 2015 Final Determination of the Office of Open Records 

(OOR) granting in part and denying in part the request filed by Kathryn Simpson, 

Esq., (Requester) under the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL),1for information related 

to workers’ compensation claims filed on or after January 1, 2014. For the reasons 

that follow, we reverse.

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.
2

On February 24, 2015, Requester submitted a RTKL request to the 

Department’s open-records officer, asking for the following information:

1. Names and addresses of all workers’ compensation 

claimants who have filed claims on or after January 1, 

2014; 

2. Date of injury; 

3. Claim number assigned; and 

4. Name and address of workers’ compensation carrier. 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a-2a. In the request form, Requester stated that the 

purpose of the request was not to obtain medical records but “only information 

sufficient for the employer or insurance company who made payments to or on 

behalf of these claimants to seek subrogation from the appropriate party before the 

workers’ compensation judge or board.”

2

 R.R. at 2a. 

 

2

In relevant part, Section 319 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, 

P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §671, states:

Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the 

act or omission of a third party, the employer shall be subrogated 

to the right of the employe, his personal representative, his estate 

or his dependents, against such third party to the extent of the 

compensation payable under this article by the employer . . . .

Where an employe has received payments for the disability or 

medical expense resulting from an injury in the course of his 

employment paid by the employer or an insurance company on the 

basis that the injury and disability were not compensable under this 

act in the event of an agreement or award for that injury the 

employer or insurance company who made the payments shall be 

subrogated out of the agreement or award to the amount so paid, if 

the right to subrogation is agreed to by the parties or is established 

at the time of hearing before the referee or the board.
3

On March 3, 2015, the Department denied the request, citing Sections 

708(b)(5)3and 708(b)(28)4of the RTKL, and asserting that the records requested 

relate to the disability status of individuals and would identify individuals who 

have applied for workers’ compensation benefits. R.R. at 3a-4a. 

 

3

Section 708(b)(5) states that the following records are exempt from access:

A record of an individual's medical, psychiatric or psychological 

history or disability status, including an evaluation, consultation, 

prescription, diagnosis or treatment; results of tests, including drug 

tests; enrollment in a health care program or program designed for 

participation by persons with disabilities, including vocation 

rehabilitation, workers' compensation and unemployment 

compensation; or related information that would disclose 

individually identifiable health information. 

65 P.S. §67.708(b)(5).

4

Section 708(b)(28) exempts from disclosure:

A record or information:

(i) identifying an individual who applies for or receives social 

services; or

(ii) relating to the following:

 (A) the type of social services received by an individual;

 (B) an individual’s application to receive social services, 

including a record or information related to an agency decision to 

grant, deny, reduce or restrict benefits, including a quasi-judicial 

decision of the agency and the identity of a caregiver or others who 

provide services to the individual; or

 (C) eligibility to receive social services, including the 

individual’s income, assets, physical or mental health, age, 

disability, family circumstances or record of abuse. 

65 P.S. §67.708(b)(28) (emphasis added).
4

Requester appealed to the OOR, arguing that the requested records are 

not exempt under Section 708 of the RTKL, protected by any privilege, or 

protected by any other federal or state law. More specifically, Requester asserted 

that Section 708(b)(5) of the RTKL does not provide a blanket exception for all 

workers’ compensation records, but rather, is applicable only to medical or 

disability status information. Additionally, although Requester acknowledged that 

Section 708(b)(28) of the RTKL exempts from disclosure records relating to an 

individual’s receipt of social services, including workers’ compensation benefits,5

she nevertheless argued that application of that exception precludes employers and 

insurers from obtaining information necessary to assert their rights under workers’ 

compensation law. R.R. at 5a-7a. 

The Department filed a response to Requester’s appeal, asserting that 

the plain language of Section 708(b)(5) restricts access to any records reflecting an 

individual’s enrollment in a workers’ compensation program and that Section 

708(b)(28) precludes access to records that relate to an individual’s application for 

workers’ compensation benefits. The Department also noted that whether the 

requested information would be useful in workers’ compensation cases is 

irrelevant.6

 

5

Section 102 of the RTKL, defines the term ‘social services’ as including workers’ 

compensation benefits. 65 P.S. §67.102.

6

In Hunsicker v. Pennsylvania State Police, 93 A.3d 911, 913 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), we 

explained: 

Under the RTKL, whether the document is accessible is based only 

on whether a document is a public record, and, if so, whether it 

falls within an exemption that allows that it not be disclosed. The 

status of the individual requesting the record and the reason for the 

request, good or bad, are irrelevant as to whether a document must 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

The OOR issued a Final Determination on May 15, 2015, granting the 

appeal in part and denying it in part. The OOR first concluded that the records are 

not exempt under Section 708(b)(5), observing that the Department presented no 

evidence to demonstrate that any of the items requested would reveal the type or 

nature of an individual’s injury or any individually identifiable health information. 

The OOR also stated that while items 1 and 2 of the request (a claimant’s name 

and address and date of injury) may generally reveal the fact that an individual was 

injured, such records do not reveal the type or nature of the individual’s injury. 

Finally, the OOR concluded that there is “no plausible basis” to find that the 

records responsive to items 3 and 4 (claim numbers and names and addresses of 

workers’ compensation carriers) reveal individually identifiable health 

information. Therefore, the OOR concluded that none of the requested information 

falls within the exception to disclosure in Section 708(b)(5). R.R. at 14a-15a.

The OOR next determined that a claimant’s name is exempt under 

Section 708(b)(28) because revealing a claimant’s name would identify a recipient 

of social services. However, the OOR further concluded that the exemption did 

not apply to the records requested in their entirety. Relying on Housing Authority 

of the City of Pittsburgh v. Van Osdol, 40 A.3d 209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), the OOR 

reasoned that records responsive to the remainder of the request, the claimants’ 

addresses, dates of injury, claim numbers, and the names and addresses of workers’ 

compensation insurance carriers, would not identify an individual who applies for 

 

(continued...)

be made accessible under Section 301(b). See 65 P.S. §67.301(b)

(stating that an agency ‘may not deny a requester access to a public 

record due to the intended use of the public record by the requester 

unless otherwise provided by law.’).
6

or receives social services and, therefore, were not exempt under Section 

708(b)(28). R.R. at 15a-18a.

Accordingly, the OOR directed the Department to provide all 

responsive records, with the exception of the names of workers’ compensation 

claimants, within thirty days. The Department now appeals to this Court.7

The Department argues that the OOR erred in ordering the redaction 

of claimants’ names and disclosure of the remainder of the requested information

when the requested record in its entirety is not a public record.8 We agree.

A party seeking access to information under the RTKL must establish 

that the information sought is a “record” of the agency. Pennsylvania Office of 

Attorney General v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 127 A.3d 57, 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

Section 102 of the RTKL defines a “record” as “information, regardless of physical 

form or characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and 

that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a 

transaction, business, or activity of the agency.” 65 P.S. §67.102. Under the 

RTKL, a determination of whether information is accessible is based on whether it 

is a “public record.” Clinkscale v. Department of Public Welfare, 101 A.3d 137, 

140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Section 102 of the RTKL defines a “public record” as

[a] record, including a financial record, of a 

Commonwealth or local agency that:

 (1) is not exempt under section 708;

 

7

In reviewing a final determination of the OOR, this Court’s standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary. Clinkscale v. Department of Public Welfare, 101 A.3d 

137, 139 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

8 We have reordered the arguments raised by the Department. 
7

 (2) is not exempt from being disclosed under any 

other Federal or State law or regulation or judicial order 

or decree; or

 (3) is not protected by a privilege.

67 P.S. §67.102 (emphasis added). 

A Commonwealth agency bears the burden of proving that a record is 

exempt from disclosure under the RTKL. Section 708(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. 

§67.708(a). If a record is exempt under Section 708(b), it is not a public record 

subject to disclosure under the RTKL. 67 P.S. §67.102; Saunders v. Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections, 48 A.3d 540, 543 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). If a record is 

not exempt from disclosure, but contains information that is not subject to access, 

the agency may discharge its duty by providing redacted records. Section 706 of 

the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.706. Conversely, if a record is exempt from disclosure 

under the RTKL and thus is not a public record, it need not be redacted in 

accordance with Section 706 of the RTKL. Department of Corrections v. St. 

Hillaire, 128 A.2d 859, 865-66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

In determining that the requested record was not exempt in its entirety 

and ordering redaction, the OOR erred in two respects. First, the OOR failed to 

recognize that the subsections of Section 708(b) set forth separate and distinct

exemptions from public access. Additionally, the OOR erred in ordering redaction 

of information from a record that is exempt from disclosure and therefore not a 

public record under Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B). 

In doing so, the OOR relied on Van Osdol, which involved a RTKL 

request by reporter Paul Van Osdol (Van Osdol) asking the Housing Authority of 

the City of Pittsburgh (Authority) to provide the addresses and owner names for all 
8

Section 8 properties administered by the Authority.9 The Authority denied the 

request, asserting, inter alia, that the information was exempt from public access 

under Section 708(b)(28)(i) (“identifying an individual who applies for or receives 

social services”) and 708(b)(28)(ii)(A) (“relating to the type of social services 

received by an individual”). Van Osdol appealed to the OOR, alleging that he 

sought only the addresses of Section 8 properties and the names of such property 

owners, not the names of housing subsidy recipients. The Authority responded 

that disclosure of Section 8 property addresses would identify thousands of 

households participating in the Section 8 program and the disclosure of the 

landlords’ names would enable Van Osdol to search county real estate records and

identify persons receiving assistance. 

In its final determination, the OOR directed the Authority to provide 

the requested information to Van Osdol, on the ground that disclosure of the name 

of the owner of a Section 8 property or the property’s address does not, by itself, 

identify an individual who receives social services.

The Authority appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction but considered the merits of the appeal nonetheless; the trial 

court concluded, inter alia, that the Authority failed to establish that the 

information requested was exempt from public access under Section 708(b)(28)(i),

as information identifying individuals applying for or receiving social services or

Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(A), as information relating to the type of social services 

received by an individual. 

 

9

The “Section 8 Program,” which is funded by the federal government and administered 

by local housing authorities, provides rental assistance to low-income families. Section 8(a) of 

the Housing and Community and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §1437(f). 
9

On further appeal to this Court, we noted that the exemptions from 

disclosure under Section 708(b) must be narrowly construed. Van Osdol, 40 A.3d 

at 215. We determined that the requested information, addresses of Section 8 

properties and names of individuals who owned them, did not, itself, identify 

individuals who applied for or receive social services or the type of social services 

those individuals receive. Narrowly construing the exemptions to disclosure, we 

held that the information requested in Van Osdol did not fall within the exemptions

set forth at Section 708(b)(28)(i) and (ii)(A).

10

 

In applying Van Osdol to this case, the OOR reasoned that “[a]ny 

claimant’s name is exempt under Section 708(b)(28) as it would clearly identify 

the name of a recipient of social services.” (OOR Final Determination at 6.) The 

OOR also determined that “the home addresses of the recipients of social services 

are subject to public access because without the corresponding name of the 

recipient, the address will not identify an individual who applies for or receives 

social services. Id. 

However, the OOR failed to distinguish the exemptions at issue in 

Van Osdol, at Section 708(b)(28)(i) and 708(b)(28)(ii)(A), from the specific 

exemption at issue in this case, which exempts from access a record or information 

relating to “an individual’s application” to receive social services. Section 

708(b)(28)(ii)(B), 65 P.S. §67.708(b)(28)(ii)(B). In contrast to Section 

708(b)(28)(i) and 708(b)(28)(ii)(A), this provision does not require that the 

requested information identify any individual, or relate to the type of social 

 

10 The court also rejected the Authority’s assertion that, given the ease of the county’s 

electronic records search capabilities, the disclosure of the requested information would allow 

Van Osdol to ascertain the identity of social service recipients and the type of services they 

receive, as unsupported by evidence of record.
10

services received by any individual, in order to be exempt from public access. 

Instead, and in addition to those specific exemptions, the plain language of Section 

708(b)(28)(ii)(B) applies to any record or information relating to an individual’s 

application to receive social services.11 

Without question, every element of this request, for names and 

addresses of all workers’ compensation claimants who have filed claims on or after 

January 1, 2014; date of injury; claim number assigned; and name and address of 

workers’ compensation carrier, has the same genesis, an individual’s claim for 

workers’ compensation benefits. In the context of workers’ compensation law, a 

“claim” is an “application” for benefits. Thus, on its face, the request seeks 

information “relating to . . . an individual’s application” for workers’ 

compensation, and such information is exempt from public access under Section 

708(b)(28)(ii)(B). The OOR erred in failing to separately consider and apply this 

provision. 

Because the requested information is exempt under Section 708(b), 

the information is not a “public record” and is exempt from disclosure in its 

entirety. Department of Health v. Office of Open Records, 4 A.3d 803, 814-15 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2010). In Department of Health, we rejected the OOR’s argument that, in 

 

11 “In determining whether a record is exempt from access under [Section 708], an 

agency shall consider and apply each exemption separately.” Section 708(e) of the RTKL, 65 

P.S. §67.708(e). Various exemptions are based on the consequences of disclosure. See, e.g., 

Section 708(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), applying to a record, “the disclosure of which . . . ,” or “which, if 

disclosed . . . .” Several exemptions specifically protect the identity of an individual. See, e.g.,

Section 708(b)(6), (13), (23), (30), applying to “personal identification information,” or a record 

“identifying . . . .” Other exemptions, such as the provision at issue here, apply more broadly 

and protect from access records “relating to” or “pertaining to” a specific matter. See, e.g., 

Section 708(b)(16), (17), (18), (28). 
11

addition to proving that the records requested might be exempt under Section 708, 

the state agency was required to make every effort to provide as much information 

as possible from the records through redaction. Id. In that case, the agency relied 

on Section 706 of the RTKL, which states in relevant part:

If an agency determines that a public record . . . contains 

information which is subject to access as well as 

information which is not subject to access, the agency’s 

response shall grant access to the information which is 

subject to access and deny access to the information 

which is not subject to access. If the information which 

is not subject to access is an integral part of the public 

record, legislative record or financial record and cannot 

be separated, the agency shall redact from the record the 

information which is not subject to access, and the 

response shall grant access to the information which is 

subject to access. The agency may not deny access to the 

record if the information which is not subject to access is 

able to be redacted.

65 P.S. §67.706 (emphasis added). We explained that the agency’s reliance on this 

provision was misplaced; under the plain language of Section 706, the redaction 

requirement only applies to “public records,” and if a record falls within one of the 

exemptions set forth in Section 708, that record is not a public record as defined by 

Section 102 of the RTKL. We held that the requested documents, which were 

exempt under Section 708(b)(17) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.708(b)(17), were 

excluded from the definition of public record in Section 102, and, as such, were 

exempt, “in their entirety,” from disclosure. Department of Health, 4 A.3d at 815-

16. See also Heavens v. Department of Environmental Protection, 65 A.3d 1069, 

1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“records that are exempt under Section 708 or 

privileged are not considered public records and are therefore not subject to the 

redaction requirement contained in Section 706, which applies only to records that 
12

are public and contain information that is not subject to access”); Saunders, 48 

A.3d at 543.12

Because the requested information is exempt under Section 

708(b)(28)(ii)(B), the information is not a “public record,” and the record is 

exempt from disclosure in its entirety. Department of Health. Therefore, the OOR 

erred in ordering the Department to redact the names of workers’ compensation 

claimants and provide all responsive records. 

Accordingly, the order of the OOR is reversed.13

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

 

12 As we explained in Saunders:

Petitioner’s argument that the Department was required to produce 

the requested records subject to redaction of the exempt 

information is without merit. Section 706 provides that if an 

agency determines that a public record contains information that is 

both subject to disclosure and exempt from the disclosure, the 

agency shall grant access and redact from the record the 

information which is subject to disclosure. Pursuant to Section 

706, the redaction requirement only applies to records that are 

determined to be “public records.” A “public record” is defined in 

part as “[a] record, including a financial record, of a 

Commonwealth . . . agency that: (1) is not exempt under section 

708.” Section 102, 65 P.S. §67.102 (emphasis added). Thus, a 

record that falls within one of the exemptions set forth in Section 

708 does not constitute a “public record.” 

Id. at 543 (emphasis in original).

13 Having determined that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under 

Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B) and consequently, are not “public records” as defined by Section 102, 

we need not address whether the records are exempt under Section 708(b)(5) of the RTKL. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Labor and Industry, : No. 980 C.D. 2015

: 

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Kathryn Simpson, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30thday of August, 2016, the order of the Office of 

Open Records is reversed.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Labor and Industry, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 980 C.D. 2015

: Argued: March 9, 2016

Kathryn Simpson, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

DISSENTING OPINION

BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 30, 2016

I respectfully dissent as I would affirm the Office of Open Records (OOR). 

The Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1“is remedial legislation designed to promote 

access to official government information.” Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 

367 (Pa. 2013). Finding a blanket exemption in RTKL Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B), 

65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(28)(ii)(B), as posited by the majority, is not consistent with 

this purpose. Moreover, “[a]s the [RTKL] is remedial legislation designed to 

promote access to official government information in order to prohibit secrets, 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101–67.3104.
RCJ - 2

scrutinize the actions of public officials, and make public officials accountable for 

their actions, the exemptions from disclosure must be narrowly construed.” 

Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 990 A.2d 813, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en 

banc), aff’d, 75 A.3d 453 (Pa. 2013). Therefore, I would not construe the 

exemption in Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B) as broadly as the majority, particularly 

when it is read in pari materia2 with the whole of Section 708(b)(28)

3

and with 

 

2 As our Supreme Court stated in Levy:

As with any question of statutory interpretation, our object is to “ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly” and “if possible, to give effect 

to all [a statute’s] provisions.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a 

statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). When 

the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we may ascertain the intention of 

the General Assembly by considering such things as “[t]he occasion and necessity 

for the statute,” “[t]he mischief to be remedied,” “[t]he object to be attained,” and 

“[t]he consequences of a particular interpretation.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c). In 

interpreting a statute, we presume that the General Assembly does not intend an 

absurd result, to violate the Constitution, nor to favor a private interest over the 

public interest. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922. Additionally, we interpret remedial legislation 

liberally to effect its object and promote justice. See, e.g., 1 Pa. C.S. § 1928(c). 

Statutes and parts of statutes that relate to the same persons or things must be read 

in pari materia. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932.

Levy, 65 A.3d at 380.

3

Section 708(b)(28) exempts from disclosure:

A record or information:

(i) identifying an individual who applies for or receives social services; or

(ii) relating to the following:

(A) the type of social services received by an individual;

(B) an individual’s application to receive social services, including a record or 

information related to an agency decision to grant, deny, reduce or restrict 

benefits, including a quasi-judicial decision of the agency and the identity of a 

caregiver or others who provide services to the individual; or

(C) eligibility to receive social services, including the individual’s income, assets, 

physical or mental health, age, disability, family circumstances or record of abuse.

(Continued...)
RCJ - 3

other RTKL sections including Section 706, 65 P.S. § 67.706.

4

 See, e.g., Pa. State 

Troopers Ass’n v. Scolforo, 18 A.3d 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (supplemental 

employment records must be disclosed in redacted form as redacted records pose 

no security risk.)

OOR, in concluding that the records sought in the request5contained both 

public and non-public information subject to redaction, relied on our decision in 

Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh v. Van Osdol, 40 A.3d 209 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012), in which we narrowly construed the exemption in RTKL Sections 

708(b)(28)(i) and 708(b)(28)(ii)(A), 65 P.S. §§ 67.708(b)(28)(i) and 

67.708(b)(28)(ii)(A). As we stated in Van Osdol:

Although the general provisions of the Law must be liberally 

construed to effect its objects, the exemptions from disclosure under 

 

65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(28).

4

 Section 706 provides the following:

706. Redaction

If an agency determines that a public record, legislative record or financial record 

contains information which is subject to access as well as information which is 

not subject to access, the agency’s response shall grant access to the information 

which is subject to access and deny access to the information which is not subject 

to access. If the information which is not subject to access is an integral part of 

the public record, legislative record or financial record and cannot be separated, 

the agency shall redact from the record the information which is not subject to 

access, and the response shall grant access to the information which is subject to 

access. The agency may not deny access to the record if the information which is 

not subject to access is able to be redacted. Information which an agency redacts 

in accordance with this subsection shall be deemed a denial under Chapter 9.

65 P.S. § 67.706.

5

The Requester sought: 1) the names and addresses of all workers’ compensation 

claimants who have filed claims on or after January 1, 2014; 2) the date of injury; 3) the claim 

number assigned; and, 4) the name and address of workers’ compensation carrier.
RCJ - 4

Section 708(b) must be narrowly construed. Section 1928(c) of the 

Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1928(c); Allegheny 

County Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 

1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Van Osdol sought to obtain only the 

addresses of Section 8 properties and the names of the individuals 

owning those properties. The requested information does not itself 

identify individuals who apply for or receive social services or the 

type of social services received by those individuals. Nor does such 

information directly identify the name, home address or date of birth 

of children who are 17 years of age or younger residing in Section 8 

properties, or the home address of a law enforcement officer or judge 

who may own Section 8 properties. When the exemptions under 

Section 708(b)(6)(i)(C), (28)(i) and (ii)(A) and (30) of the Law are 

narrowly construed, as we must do, the requested information does 

not fall within those exemptions.

Van Osdol, 40 A.3d at 215-16.

I believe that the majority’s construction of Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B) and 

our analysis in Van Osdol represent a distinction without a difference between the 

RTKL sections analyzed. Indeed, if the exemption in Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B) is 

as broad as posited by the majority, it would appear that Van Osdol effectively is 

overruled.

Because the majority construed Section 708(b)(28)(ii)(B) as providing a 

blanket exemption, there was no need to evaluate the evidence presented by the 

Department. However, because I disagree with this interpretation, I would 

evaluate the evidence presented, and, as OOR pointed out, the Department failed to 

produce any evidence tying the requested items to the exemption instead relying 

only on legal argument. Without evidence to the contrary, it would appear that the 

addresses sought would not be exempt under Van Osdol, and that the date of 

injury, claim number and address of the carrier also would appear not to be exempt 

as we have no affidavits or other evidence tying this information to the two 
RCJ - 5

sections under which the Department asserted the exemption. For these reasons, I 

respectfully dissent and would affirm OOR.

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge