NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS
D IVISION O NE

K RYSTLE M.
, Appell ant ,

v.

D EPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.M., G.M.
, Appell ees

.
No. 1 CA- JV 19 -0013

A ppeal from the Superior Court in M ohave County No. L8015JD201707014 The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle
, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC
, Scottsdale By Alison Stavris Counsel for Appell ant

A rizona Attorney General’s Office
, Mesa By Tom Jose C ounsel for Appell ee Department of Child Safety

FILED 11-14-2019KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

T H U M M A , Judge:

¶1 Krystle M. (Mother) challenges the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights to her biological childr en C.M. and G.M

. Because Mother has shown no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother has a history of behavioral health issues and suffers from complex posttraumatic stress (PTSD) and attention

deficit/hyperactivity (ADHD) disorders. Mother and the children lived in Oregon, where Mother pursued mental

- health counseling through the New Perspectives Center. Despite her counseling, Mother refused medication for PTSD
, anxiety and depre ssion. When triggered, Mother become s aggressive and hostile, vacillating between intense anger
, frustration and hopelessness

. Before 2016, Mother learned C.M. was being harassed at school, which triggered a major PTSD episode for Mother , and due to

severa l other stressors, Mother’s mental health declined.

¶3 In April 2016 , Mother’s counselor recommended reducing her college workload , and i n June 2016 , Mother was fired from her job because she was “volatile and argumentative and used profanity . . . during th e training

. ” At that time, Mother was also facing charges of reckless driving and child endangerment ( stemming from a feud with her neighbors ) and a related child neglect investigation by the Oregon Department of Human Services. 1 Around this time, Mother sent the children to live with their grandmother in Arizona

. Mother remained in Oregon. A few months later, Mother lost her housing and had to stay with various friends or , at times, lived in her car.

¶4 In Arizona, w hen Mother had n ot sought custody of the children by April 2017, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) investigated.

1 The charges were eventually dismissed, and the neglect allegations determined to be unsubstantiated.KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

3 Mother admitted prior methamphetamine use and a lack of income or housing

. B ased on disclosures by C.M., DCS also expressed concerns that Mother was not ade quately treating her mental health. Consequently, DCS took custody of the children and filed a dependency petition in April 2017

. In March 2018, after several days of evidentiary hearings, the court found the children dependent as to Mother and adopted a family reunification case plan

. ¶5 Meanwhile, DCS provided Mother with services, including substance

- abuse testing
, a psychological evalu ation and visitation. DCS also asked Mother to continue engaging in mental

- health services in Oregon. Regarding substance abuse, Mother refused to submit to a rule

- out drug test until 2018. Mother refused a hair follicle test in February and tested positiv e for methamphetamine in May and June 2018

. Mother then stopped testing. Despite her positive tests , admissions to her counselor and failing to test, Mother denied any recent use to DCS and the court.

¶6 Mother’s mental health did not improve during the dependency. A lthough her mental

- health providers repeatedly recommended antidepressant medication, Mother consistently refused it. She continued to struggle with severe anger, frustration and hopelessness and remained combative and verbally abusive in stre ssful situations

. She also periodically struggled with suicidal thoughts. A fter getting fired in June 2016, Mother did not obtain another job , and she did not establish stable housing after October 2016.

¶7 In May 2018 , Mother completed two psychological evaluation s, one with Dr. Martha Wang and another with Dr. Paul Stoltzfus

. Dr. Wang diagnosed Mother with PTSD and major depressive disorder. Dr. Stoltzfus diagnosed Mother with PTSD; major depressive disorder; persistent depressive disorder ; generalized anxiety disorder; somatization disorder; ADHD; and schizoid, masochistic, paranoid, and schizotypal personality traits. Dr. Stolzfus concluded that Mother’s mental disorders would “have a significant negative impact on her ability to parent h er children
, ” and he recommended that she take psychotropic medication.

¶8 In July 2018 , the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on neglect, mental illness, substance abuse and nine

- and fifteen

- months time

in

- care

. A contested severance adjudication followed , resulting in the court grant ing the motion on all grounds alleged, except neglect

. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8

- 235(A), 12

-KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

4 120.21(A)(1),

- 2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A) (2019). 2

DISCUSSION

¶9 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground articulated in A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B) has been proven and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M ., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); see also Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep ’ t of Econ. Sec

. , 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm an order terminating parental righ ts so long as it is supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec ., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports t he Superior Court’s Finding t hat Termination w as Proper Based o n Fifteen

- Mont hs Time

- In

- Care

. ¶10 When seeking termination based on fifteen

- month s time

- in

care, DCS must prove that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services” to the parent. A.R.S. § 8

- 533 (B) (8). DCS must show that it provided the parent with “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS

- 501904 , 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS need not “provide every conceivable service or . . . ensur e that a parent participates in each service it offers.” Id. DCS must also prove that (1) “ the child has been in an out

- of

- home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer, ” (2) “ the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstance s that cause the child to be in an out

- of

- home placement, and [ (3) ] there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. ” A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8)(c). The “circum stances” are those “existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide” for her child. Jordan C. , 223 Ariz. at 96 ¶ 31 n.14 (citation omitted)

. ¶11 Here, Mother was unable to remedy her substance

- abuse, mental

- health, income and housing issues by the termination hearing. Mother knew that these were the issues she needed to remedy before the

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

5 court would reunify her and the children. Although DCS provided, and Mother agreed to participate in, drug testing
, she ref used to submit to a drug test until 2018

— almost a year into the dependency. When she finally
test ed
, she tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother then refused to submit to further testing, and she did not pursue substance

- abuse
treatment , despite encour agement by DCS

. Instead, Mother consistently denied to DCS that she had any substance

- abuse issues.

¶12 Mother admitted methamphetamine use during one of her psychological evaluations and to her counselor in Oregon. In February 2018, Mother told her counselor that “she sometimes has to use meth to be able to focus and get anything done
, ” but denied being addicted, stating instead that methamphetamine was “just a stronger version of my ADHD medicine.” At trial, however, Mother testified that she had not used methamphetamine since 2008 and that her positive tests resulted from allergy or ADHD medication.

¶13 Mother failed to adequately address her mental

- health issues

. As early as June 2016, Mother’s therapist “expressed genuine concern that [Mother’s] mood and men tal equilibrium [was] spiraling out of control,” and Mother agreed but “place[d] the blame outside of herself.” Her therapist emphasized the need for antidepressant medication, but Mother told her “she will never yield on th[at] issue.” A few weeks later, Mother’s therapist noted “how close to truly losing

- it [Mother] seems to be

. ” Over the next twenty months, Mother’s therapists repeatedly urged her to consider antidepressant medication as part of her ongoing treatment
, but she refused; consequently, her m ental

- health and behavioral issues did not improve

. ¶14 The record shows Mother had significant conflict with many in her life after 2015, including her neighbors, children’s school district, employers, mother, boyfriends, DCS, the court and her attorneys

. In times of hopelessness, Mother often had suicidal thoughts and periodically threatened to kill herself. She was still expressing suicidal intent at the time of the termination trial

. ¶15 Finally, Mother was unable to maintain stable housing or income. She rem ained unemployed after June 2016. Mother ’s only income at the time of the termination hearing came from selling items on line

. Mother’s counselor described her condition as of May 2018 as “too distraught and overwhelmed to work” and “homeless,” emphasizing Mother “has gotten involved in a couple of unhealthy and [] unsafe relationships, to keep from being a homeless woman.” Mother lost herKRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

6 housing around August 2016 , and by November, she was sleeping in her

car. Between November 2016 and August 2018, Mother lived out of her car and with friends or boyfriends, many of whom had mental

- health or substance

- abuse issues and criminal records. By the time of trial , Mother was living in a basement in exchange for performing maintenance on the home.

¶16 Reasonable evidence also supports the court’s finding that a substantial likelihood exists that Mother will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. At the time of trial , Mother’s substance

- abu se, mental health, and instability were ongoing issues, each of which placed the children at risk of physical, emotional, or mental harm if returned to her care

. Citing these reasons , the DCS case manager concluded that Mother would be unable to safely par ent the children in the foreseeable future. The case manager’s opinion coincides with that of Dr. Stolzfus , who concluded that
[Mother] is far from minimally capable of parenting her children at this time. Her own personal life is in chaos. She is able to talk rationally for a period of time, but quickly slips into a completely paranoid and irrational mindset, along with significant emotional decompensation. Without adequate treatment, to which she is adamantly opposed, it is doubtful she is able to parent her children at this time , or in the foreseeable future.
He further explained that the children would be at risk of harm in her care, especially because she “is often irrational and agitated” and although she “can have times of normal and logical thinking , she triggers easily and immediately trips into a mental state characterized by paranoia, distortion, and fear.”

¶17 Mother next argues the court erred in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide her with appropriate reunification services, citing DCS’s failure to refer her for substance

- abuse treatment in Oregon or a psychiatric evaluation
, the short

- lived Skype visits between her and the children , and DCS’ failure to timely obtain her counseling records

. ¶18 The record does not support Mother’s contention s. Based on her refusal to acknowledge her methamphetamine use, the court found that offering Mother substance

- abuse treatment would have been futile.KRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

7 T hroughout the dependency
, Mother refused to participate in almost all drug testing, and she adamantly denied any substance abuse (other than marijuana) , even after multiple, positive methamphetamine test result s. Additionally, after admitting her methamphetamine use to her counselor in Oregon, Mother minimized her substance abuse, denying that sh e was addicted or that it caused any issues in her life.

¶19 Mother waived any objection to DCS’ failure to provide her with a psychiatric evaluation because she failed to raise this issue in superior court. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 234 A riz. 174, 178 ¶ 13 (App. 2014). E ven if she had not waived this argument, Mother suggests only that the psychiatric evaluation may have suggested helpful medication for her conditions. While true, Mother received medical management services for most of the dependency through New Perspectives in Oregon, and consistently refused to take any medication other than Adderall for her ADHD. Mother also expressly rejected Dr. Stoltzfus’ assessment and voiced to her counselor her “refus[a l ] to jump through any more o f [DCS’] ‘ridiculous hoops’ including random [urinalysis tests] and psychiatric treatment in AZ.” Thus, reasonable evidence supports the finding that additional mental

- health services would have been futile based on Mother’s “refusal to remedy her mental i llness with medication. ”

¶20 Finally, Mother argues that technical difficulties with Skype prevented her from having visits with her children and that DCS was “less than diligent” in obtaining her counseling records from New Perspectives. However, the case man ager testified that DCS offered Mother options other than Skype, such as phone visits and in

- person visits in Arizona. Moreover, Mother fails to show how technical difficulties with her Skype visits contributed to the court’s termination order , which was based on Mother’s substance abuse, mental illness and instability, not on her lack of a bond with the children. Regarding her counseling records, Mother refused to sign a release allowing DCS access to most of her New Perspectives records until very la te in t he proceedings

. At the termination hearing, the court received all of Mother’s counseling records, and therefore had the full benefit of that information in making its determination. Mother has thus shown no error in the finding that DCS proved the fifteen

- month time

- in

- care statutory ground

. 3

3 Mother also challenges the termination order under the r emaining grounds. However, this Court need only find that reasonable evidenceKRYSTLE M. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

8 II. Mother Has Shown No Error i n t he Court Finding Severance Was i n t he Best Interests o f t he Children

. ¶21 Mother argues the court erred in finding that severance was in the children’s best interests. Mother a sserts she properly cared for her children through the inception of this case and has been ready to parent them since that time. Mother’s arguments essentially ask this Court to reweigh the evidence, which it will not do. See Castro v. Ballesteros

- Suarez
, 222 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 11 (App. 2009). Moreover, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding.

¶22 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018) (citation omitted). Although “the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best

- interests finding,” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F.
, 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016) , the court “mus t consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,” Alma S.
, 245 Ariz. at 150

- 51 ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶23 T he DCS case manager testified that severance would provide the children with stability and permanency. The children were in a safe and stable home with their grandmother, who was meeting their needs and wished to adopt them. There is no question that Mother loves her children, but as the case manager testified, grandmother is able and willing to provide th e children with the stability that Mother could not.

CONCLUSION

¶24 The order terminating Mother’s parental rights to C.M. and G.M. is affirmed

.

supports one termination ground to affirm the order. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, 49 ¶ 14 (App. 2004).