alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1
                                  ------------

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            -------------------------
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                  ---------------------------------------------

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer of Troy Financial Corporation (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that to his knowledge on the date hereof:

         (a)   the Form 10-Q/A of the Company for the three month and nine month
               periods ended June 30, 2003 filed on the date hereof with the
               Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report") fully complies
               with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
               Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (b)   information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and the results of
               operations of the Company.

                                  /s/ Daniel J. Hogarty, Jr.
                                  --------------------------
                                      Daniel J. Hogarty, Jr.
                                      Chairman of the Board, President
                                      and Chief Executive Officer
                                      August 21, 2003



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Troy Financial Corporation and will be retained by Troy Financial
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
# Number of Persons 65+

# Marital Status

# Living Arrangements

# State Percent 65+

# State Increase 65+

# Pop by State

# Family Income

# Personal Income

# Poverty

# Employment

# Health Insurance

# Disability

# Aerobic & Muscle-strengthening

# Overweight & Obese

# Overweight & Obese 1988-2016
#### § 784.109 Manufacture of supplies for named operations is not exempt.

Employment in the manufacture of supplies for the named operations is not employment in the named operations on aquatic forms of life. Thus, the exemption is not applicable to the manufacture of boxes, barrels, or ice by a seafood processor for packing or shipping its seafood products or for use of the ice in its fishing vessels. These operations, when performed by an independent manufacturer, would likewise not be exempt (*Dize* v. *Maddix,* 144 F. 284 (C.A. 4), affirmed 324 U.S. 667, and approved on this point in *Farmers' Reservoir Co.* v. *McComb,* 337 U.S. 755).
March 10, 2015

Mr. Michael Joseph Indovina VI

8000 West Manchester Avenue 222 Playa Del Rey CA 90293

Dear Mr. Indovina:

This letter is to inform you that we are unabl e to process your request for an exemption. It explains why we cannot proce ss your request and what you s hould do in the next 30 days.

Why We Cannot Process Your Request

We entered your February 10, 2015, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA2015-0331), but we are unable to pr ocess your request any further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or ar guments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any fu rther, you must send the information described earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requi res you to send your petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days , we will close the docket without notifying you further. If you have any questions or require additiona l time, you may call (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Nia Daniels Program Analyst, Airmen and Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 159 (Wednesday, August 17, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 51038]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-20862]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2007-D-0068; formerly Docket No. 2007D-0290]


Draft Guidance for Industry: Cell Selection Devices for Point of 
Care Production of Minimally Manipulated Autologous Peripheral Blood 
Stem Cells; Withdrawal of Draft Guidance

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice; withdrawal.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing the 
withdrawal of a draft guidance entitled ``Draft Guidance for Industry: 
Cell Selection Devices for Point of Care Production of Minimally 
Manipulated Autologous Peripheral Blood Stem Cells (PBSCs)'' dated July 
2007.

DATES: August 17, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tami Belouin, Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration (HFM-17), 1401 
Rockville Pike, suite 200N, Rockville, MD 20852-1448, 301-827-6210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a notice published in the Federal 
Register of July 26, 2007 (72 FR 41080), FDA announced the availability 
of a draft guidance entitled ``Draft Guidance for Industry: Cell 
Selection Devices for Point of Care Production of Minimally Manipulated 
Autologous Peripheral Blood Stem Cells (PBSCs).''
    FDA has carefully considered the comments received on the draft 
guidance and, since that document issued in 2007, has gained additional 
experience with point of care devices and the autologous cells selected 
by them. Based on these comments and experience, FDA believes that the 
draft guidance would not, if finalized in current form, reflect FDA's 
current thinking. For these reasons, FDA is withdrawing the draft 
guidance entitled ``Draft Guidance for Industry: Cell Selection Devices 
for Point of Care Production of Minimally Manipulated Autologous 
Peripheral Blood Stem Cells (PBSCs).''

    Dated: August 10, 2011.
Leslie Kux,
Acting Assistant Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2011-20862 Filed 8-16-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-P
#### Elisha EDWARDS, Appellant, v. PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 21020.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 10, 1967.

Jack H.. Werchick, Arne Werchick, Werchick & Werchick, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Alan C. Furth, John J. Corrigan, Donald 0. Roy, Corrigan & Roy, San Francisco; Cal., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS, HAMLEY and MERRILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a district court determination that Pacific Fruit Express Company (P. F. E.) is not a “common carrier by railroad.” Appellant, an injured P. F. E. employee, claims that P. F. E. is such a common carrier. At stake is appellant’s attempt to proceed under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq.

P. F. E. is a large refrigerator car company. It owns approximately 25,000 refrigerator cars and carries-about 28% of all refrigerated goods moving by rail. P. F. E. deals directly with the shipper and, among other activities, maintains a service by which it keeps the shipper posted as to the whereabouts of its goods in transit, thus allowing the shipper to order goods diverted from one destination to another.

In asking this court to decide that P. F. E. is a “common carrier by railroad,” appellant necessarily asks that we overrule the case of Gaulden v. Southern Pac. Co., 78 F.Supp. 651 (N.D.Calif.), aff’d 174 F.2d 1022, which construed the term narrowly to exclude refrigerator car companies.* Were the slate clean, we might well be convinced by appellant’s argument for a broader definition, but, *55as it is not, we choose to follow the unanimous line of authority and affirm. We note that since *Gaulden,*supra, was decided in 1949, Congress has not acted to bring refrigerator car company employees under *F.*E. L. A. protection.

*

*Gaulden,*supra, has been followed in Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 3 Cir., 346 F.2d 947; Moleton v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 118 Utah 107, 219 P.2d 1080, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932, 71 S.Ct. 495, 95 L.Ed. 672; Aguirre v. Southern Pacific Co., 232 Cal.App.2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73.
§ 788.16 Employment relationship. ( a ) In determining whether individuals are employees or independent contractors, the criteria set forth in §§ 795.100 through 795.110 of this chapter are used.
( b ) At least in one situation it is possible to be specific: ( 1 ) Where the sawmill or concentration yard to which the products are delivered owns the land or the appropriation rights to the timber or other forestry products;
( 2 ) the crew boss has no very substantial investment in tools or machinery used; and
( 3 ) the crew does not transfer its relationship as a unit from one sawmill or concentration yard to another, the crew boss and the employees working under him will be considered employees of the sawmill or concentration yard. Other situations, where one or more of these three factors is not present, will be considered as they arise on the basis of the criteria mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section. Where all of these three criteria are present, however, it will make no difference if the crew boss receives the entire compensation for the production from the sawmill or concentration yard and distributes it in any way he chooses to the crew members. Similarly, it will make no difference if the hiring, firing, and supervising of the crew members is left in the hands of the crew boss. (See *Tobin* v. *LaDuke,* 190 F. 2d 977 (C.A. 9); *Tobin* v. *Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co.,* 196 F. 2d 547 (C.A. 8).)
[34 FR 15794, Oct. 14, 1969, as amended at 89 FR 1741, Jan. 10, 2024]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           4,111
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      138
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,366
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  10,420
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              230
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           600
<OTHER-SE>                                       8,889
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    10,420
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,002
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   950
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     52
<INCOME-TAX>                                        18
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 34
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        34
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01


</TABLE>
#### Ex Parte Spurling’s Guardian.

(Decided June 10, 1915.)

Appeal from McCreary Circuit ■ Court.

Appeal and Error — Insufficient Record. — Where the record filed ,in this court does not contain the exhibits or evidence upon which the lower court acted, the judgment will he affirmed.

R. L. POPE and W. P. HINKLE for appellant.

*350Opinion op the Court by

Judge Carroll

Affirming.

This is an *ex parte*proceeding begun in the Mc-Creary County Court by W. H. Meadors, guardian of Charles Spurling, the purpose of which was to have the county court set aside an order removing Meadors as guardian of Charles Spurling.

The petition filed in the county court sets out, in substance, that Meadors was appointed guardian on the motion of Charles Spurling, who was then an infant, over fourteen years of age, and also upon the written request of H. C. Spurling, his father. That he accepted the appointment and qualified as guardian. That in 1913 he was illegally and wrongfully removed as guardian by the county court, which removal was void because he had no notice that he was about to be removed and there was no statutory ground for his removal.

Neither the infant, Charles Spurling, nor the guardian appointed in the place of Meadors, if there was one appointed, was made a party to this proceeding. The county court, as appears from the record, overruled the motion of Meadors to have the order removing him set aside, and thereupon he appealed to the circuit court, and that court, upon “the pleadings, proof and exhibits filed for judgment upon the appeal from the McCreary County Court, after considering the same, and being advised, is of the opinion and it is so adjudged, that the judge of the McCreaiy County Court had the right to remove said W. H. Meadors as statutory guardian of the infant, Charles Spurling, at the time and for the reason assigned in the order and judgment of the county court removing said Meadors as guardian of said infant, and therefore the judgment of the McCreary County Court is affirmed.”

Prom this judgment' Meadors prosecutes this appeal. There is not filed with the record the order appointing Meadors as guardian, or the order removing him, nor is there any exhibit or evidence.

"With the record in this condition, the only thing we can do is to affirm the judgment appealed from, and it is so ordered.
III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 386 

To authorize testimony and legal representation in State of Nebraska v. 

Pamir J. Safi. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 16, 2007 

Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. MCCONNELL) submitted the following 

resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

To authorize testimony and legal representation in State 

of Nebraska v. Pamir J. Safi. 

Whereas, in the case of State of Nebraska v. Pamir J. Safi, 

No. CR05–87, pending in Nebraska District Court for 

Lancaster County in Lincoln, Nebraska, testimony has 

been requested from Dorothy Anderson and Blayne 

Garth Glissman, Jr., former employees in the office of 

Senator Chuck Hagel; 

Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(2) of the 

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(a) 

and 288c(a)(2), the Senate may direct its counsel to represent employees of the Senate with respect to any subpoena, order, or request for testimony relating to their 

official responsibilities; 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

SRES 386 ATS 

Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States 

and rule XI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate may, by the judicial or administrative process, be 

taken from such control or possession but by permission 

of the Senate; and 

Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or 

in the possession of the Senate may promote the administration of justice, the Senate will take such action as will 

promote the ends of justice consistent with the privileges 

of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That Dorothy Anderson and Blayne Garth 

2 Glissman, Jr. are authorized to testify in the case of State 

3 of Nebraska v. Pamir J. Safi, except concerning matters 

4 for which a privilege should be asserted. 

5 SEC. 2. The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to 

6 represent Dorothy Anderson and Blayne Garth Glissman, 

7 Jr. in connection with the testimony authorized in section 

8 one of this resolution. 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
09/11/2009 

Administration on Aging (AoA)

FY 2009 Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP) Grant Awards for the States

FY Type Grantee Name Cash Allocation

2009 State Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of Columbia

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

Territory Guam

Northern Mariana Islands

Puerto Rico

Virgin Islands

Total

$2,892,540

$315,215

$2,173,561

$2,738,372

$12,400,914

$1,349,057

$1,532,747

$518,746

$645,836

$7,528,758

$2,661,160

$473,298

$694,061

$7,038,908

$1,581,342

$1,833,873

$1,899,012

$1,890,964

$3,239,049

$580,104

$1,828,155

$4,291,946

$7,308,594

$2,104,664

$1,901,968

$4,276,556

$877,154

$1,342,273

$796,959

$1,095,668

$3,966,134

$2,074,623

$16,168,318

$3,412,386

$847,273

$5,749,933

$2,645,114

$1,760,732

$6,313,825

$528,195

$1,624,682

$1,021,836

$1,718,371

$11,711,830

$1,390,525

$709,225

$2,344,353

$1,977,265

$1,820,272

$2,792,400

$799,996

$317,908

$51,765

$2,673,689

$170,877

$154,402,981
§ 870.57 Exemptions. Pursuant to section 305 of the CCPA (82 Stat. 164) and in accordance with the provisions of this part, it has been determined that the laws of the following States provide restrictions on garnishment which are substantially similar to those provided in section 303(a) of the CCPA (82 Stat. 163); and that, therefore, garnishments issued under those laws should be, and they hereby are, exempted from the provisions of section 303(a) subject to the terms and conditions of §§ 870.55(a) and 870.56: ( a ) *State of Virginia.* Effective June 30, 1978, garnishments issued under the laws of the State of Virginia are exempt from the provisions of sections 303(a) and 303(b) of the CCPA under the following additional conditions: ( 1 ) Whenever garnishments are ordered in the State of Virginia which are not deemed to be governed by section 34-29 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, and the laws of another State are applied, sections 303(a) and 303(b) of the CCPA shall apply to such garnishments according to the provisions thereof; and
( 2 ) whenever the earnings of any individual subject to garnishment are withheld and a suspending or supersedeas bond is undertaken in the course of an appeal from a lower court decision, sections 303(a) and 303(b) of the CCPA shall apply to the withholding of such earnings under this procedure according to the provisions thereof.
[35 FR 18527, Dec. 5, 1970, as amended at 43 FR 28472, June 30, 1978]
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      Exhibit 24


                            SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY



                  KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that I, Frank E. Melton,
Director of The Liberty Corporation, do hereby appoint Martha G. Williams and
Sophia G. Vergas, or either of them, Special Attorney for me and in my name and
on my behalf to sign the Annual Report on Form 10-K and any amendments thereto
for The Liberty Corporation to be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for each fiscal year ended
December 31, and generally to do and to perform all things necessary to be done
in the premises as fully and effectually in all respects as I could do if
personally present.


                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this
7th day of March, 2001.


                                               Frank E. Melton             /s/
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Director, The Liberty Corporation
                                        A South Carolina Corporation






       Myra T. Pepper              /s/                        (SEAL)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Notary Public for State of Mississippi At Large
My Commission Expires:  December 22, 2003




                                       42
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6353

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

COREY ANTOINE TABOR,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, 

District Judge. (5:03-cr-00012-RLV-CH-5; 5:12-cv-00172-RLV)

Submitted: June 18, 2015 Decided: June 23, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Corey Antoine Tabor, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina; Rebecca Taylor 

Menerney, Kenneth Michel Smith, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Corey Antoine Tabor seeks to appeal the district court’s 

orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and 

his motion for reconsideration. The orders are not appealable 

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate 

of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable 

jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Tabor has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED