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EXPORT CONTROLS, ARMS SALES, AND REFORM:

BALANCING U.S. INTERESTS, PART II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 7, 2012

Serial No. 112–127

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Marion C. Blakey, president & chief executive officer, Aerospace Industries Association ................................................................................................... 11

Mr. Mikel Williams, chief executive officer, DDi Corp. ........................................ 20

Ms. Patricia A. Cooper, president, Satellite Industry Association ...................... 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Marion C. Blakey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 13

Mr. Mikel Williams: Prepared statement .............................................................. 22

Ms. Patricia A. Cooper: Prepared statement ......................................................... 29

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Letter submitted for the record ............................................................................................ 59

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and the Honorable Howard L. Berman, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Letter submitted 

for the record ........................................................................................................ 61

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 65

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Letter submitted for the record ................................................... 67

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 69

(1)

EXPORT CONTROLS, ARMS SALES, AND REFORM: BALANCING U.S. INTERESTS, PART II 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. The committee will come to 

order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, 

for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the 

chairman and ranking member of our Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade Subcommittee for 3 minutes each for their statements. 

I will then recognize members who wish to speak for their 1-

minute opening statements. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that you 

summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before we 

move to the question-and-answer segment with members under the 

5-minute rule. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Today our committee continues our examination of the Executive 

Branch’s unilateral proposals to create a new framework for U.S. 

strategic export controls. Many of us on this committee want to 

help make commonsense improvements in our export control system that will enhance U.S. national security, protect critical technologies, and make our system easier to navigate for our American 

businesses. 

In this regard, there are some constructive elements of the current reforms. One of the most notable is the development of a 

shared information technology platform across our export control 

agencies. 

However, these initiatives have been peripheral to the main 

focus of the administration’s efforts, which has essentially been a 

complete rewrite of the entire United States Munitions List 

(USML) and the transfer of a large number of defense articles to 

the Department of Commerce. This reform is supposed to lead to 

the creation of a single control list and a single licensing agency. 

2

There are elements of the USML review that have merit. However, its many complexities also demand close congressional scrutiny. 

First, a word about the process. Under Section 38(f) of the Arms 

Export Control Act, the President is required to give notice to the 

Congress of any item or items that are recommended for removal 

from the USML and to describe how they would be regulated under 

any other provision of law. However, because the administration 

has focused only on identifying what technologies are to remain on 

the USML, not what is to be removed, the administration has not 

identified nor informed Congress of the full range of items it seeks 

to transfer to Commerce. 

The ranking member and I have repeatedly stated that we are 

ready to work with the Executive Branch to reach an agreement. 

However, we will not accept unilateral actions that substantially 

infringe on or ignore congressional oversight over these important 

national security matters. 

I have proposed that the Executive Branch prioritize removal of 

the least sensitive parts and components, nuts, bolts, cable, and the 

like, which have been treated as defense articles only because they 

were modified for military end-use. One major defense contractor 

agrees with this approach, stating, ‘‘Focusing on the numerous lowlevel parts and components could yield significant near-term benefits to U.S. manufacturers.’’

I have also introduced legislation, H.R. 2122, the Export Administration Renewal Act, that would help accomplish this goal of removing the least sensitive items from the USML and provide immediate relief to some of our companies. Provided that manufacturing for such items will not be outsourced to China for later introduction into the U.S. military supply chain, Congress could 

reach a quick agreement to approve their removal from the USML. 

The administration also proposes transferring to Commerce numerous military end-items, as well as thousands of other, more 

sensitive parts and components, including software source code and 

manufacturing know-how. These items would be regulated under 

the new Commerce Munitions List within the larger Commerce 

Control List (CCL). 

This proposed arrangement raises a number of questions, including the lack of a statutory basis for the proposed CML, the relationship of the CML to U.S. security assistance authorities, and the 

elimination of congressional notification and reporting requirements for the export or retransfer of such defense articles. 

While CML-controlled items would require a license for export 

and would be denied to countries subject to a U.S. arms embargo, 

they would also be eligible for a broad new license exemption to 36 

countries deemed as friendly. To be effective, however, country exemptions for the export of defense articles must incorporate critical 

safeguards, including agreement on which foreign parties can have 

access to controlled items and on foreign cooperation in enforcement. These appear to be missing from the process set out by the 

administration. 

History has shown that, without such safeguards, country exemptions for defense articles are vulnerable to exploitation by gray 

market brokers, by foreign intelligence entities, by front companies, 

3

and even terrorists. China and Iran pose especially grave concerns. 

Both countries are actively seeking to acquire a wide range of U.S. 

technology through a myriad of illegal schemes that span the globe. 

Iran, in particular, is dependent on the illicit acquisition of a 

vast range of military spare parts for its inventory of U.S.-origin 

military equipment. These include fighter aircraft, tactical airlift, 

helicopters, corvettes, patrol ships, tanks, artillery, and trucks. 

With few exceptions, these spare parts and components will be eligible for the proposed new license exemption—with increased risk 

of diversion. 

More broadly, as the U.S. Congress assesses U.S. control on commercial satellites, it is crucial to recall that the European Union 

and China have launched an expansive space technology partnership, one that appears to include the illegal transfer of U.S.-controlled parts and components. 

We must also heed the lessons of the Loral-China case to avoid 

another situation where we have armed our enemies. Indeed, the 

reports this morning of a launch of an Iranian satellite using a 

missile launcher reminds us of the sophistication of their illegal 

procurement networks and the perils of loose controls on sensitive 

dual-use and military technologies. 

Lastly, we also await further details on a number of critical licensing issues, including the preparedness of the Executive Branch 

to implement and enforce such regulations and plans for outreach 

to industry. The committee shares concerns with industry regarding the length and the complexity of the process. 

We look forward to the expert testimony this morning of our distinguished witnesses, as we seek to develop legislative action to reform our export control mechanisms to balance security and trade 

interests. 

I now recognize the ranking member for his opening statement, 

Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

The reform of U.S. export controls on defense and defense-related 

items is long overdue. Our current system of export controls was 

born amid the tensions of the Cold War when the United States 

was the dominant provider of defense-related technology. The Cold 

War is now a subject for the history books. Yet, the U.S. maintains 

the same fundamental export control system, one that inefficiently 

responds, if it responds at all, to changes in the international environment and the breakneck pace of technological innovation and diversification. Our out-of-date export controls are more unilateral 

and, therefore, less effective than they were in the past and are 

fast becoming a burden on our defense industrial base, our scientific leadership, and our national security. 

Three years ago, the National Research Council published a report which concluded that America’s national security is highly dependent on maintaining our scientific and technological leadership. 

In stark terms, this report stated, ‘‘The current system of export 

controls now harms our national and homeland security, as well as 

our ability to compete economically. The United States now runs 

the risk of becoming less competitive and less prosperous. We run 

the risk of actually weakening our national security.’’

4

The Obama administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative 

has taken on the Herculean, some would say Sisyphean, task of 

being the reform of the U.S. export control system. After 3 years 

of work, the administration is now beginning to publish the draft 

changes it seeks to make in the U.S. Munitions List. These 

changes, once enacted, will mean that literally tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of defense items that the administration deems 

to be less militarily sensitive would be moved to a new sublist of 

the Department of Commerce’s Commerce Control List. 

There is much that Congress can do to help this effort. The first 

would be to pass a new Export Administration Act to replace the 

lapsed EAA of 1979. Because Congress has failed over the course 

of two decades to enact a new statute, the EAA exists only as a 

result of the President’s invocation of the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act. It is a Cold War relic and on potentially 

shaky legal grounds for enforcement since it doesn’t really exist. 

Last May I introduced H.R. 2004, the Technology Security and 

Antiboycott Act, to succeed the EAA. In contrast to the old EAA’s 

focus on economic warfare against long-gone adversaries, my bill 

focuses on the current threats to U.S. security. It provides the 

President with the authority to regulate the transfer from the 

United States of goods, services, software, and technological information that could pose a threat to U.S. national security if obtained by hostile governments, terrorist groups, or threatening persons. 

Unlike the old EAA, my bill defines national security to include 

strengthening scientific and technological leadership, high-technology manufacturing, and the U.S. defense industrial base. In today’s world, sustaining our cutting-edge universities, research establishments, high-tech companies, and skilled workforce is as essential to our security as is military superiority. Export controls 

must be calibrated to serve academic and technological excellence 

and support U.S. high-tech jobs. 

The second thing Congress can do to restore the President’s authority is to move less sensitive satellites, related components, and 

technology from the U.S. Munitions List. In 1998, in response to 

unlicensed technical assistance to China’s Space Launch Program 

by two U.S. companies, Congress mandated that all U.S. satellites 

and components were to be moved from the Commerce Control List 

and become subject to licensing as weapons under the State Department’s United States Munitions List, regardless of whether the 

proposed export was to China or a NATO ally. This well-intended 

restriction is now causing unintended consequences. 

European satellite manufacturers believe that U.S. Munitions 

List restrictions are too onerous to include U.S. components. Consequently, U.S. manufacturers are currently in danger of having 

their products designed out of foreign satellite systems. That has 

serious implications for the health of our space and defense industrial base. If smaller satellite component manufacturers lose market share and perhaps go out of business, then the Department of 

Defense will not be able to buy their products to meet our national 

security needs. 

Along with my colleagues Don Manzullo and Gerry Connolly, I 

introduced H.R. 3288, the Safeguarding United States Satellite 

5

Leadership and Security Act, last November. This bipartisan legislation would help restore America’s global competitiveness in hightech satellite technology and protect vital U.S. national security interests. It would also prohibit outright any such exports to China, 

the original concern that caused Congress to legislatively transfer 

all satellites to the Munitions List, and to Iran, North Korea, Syria, 

Sudan, or Cuba, the countries that pose the biggest risks to our national security. The bill would also prohibit any foreign satellite 

with a U.S. component from being launched on a Chinese rocket. 

This latter provision is actually tougher than current law, including the Tiananmen Square sanctions, which allow such exports. 

In closing, let me say that I think the administration’s export 

control reform efforts are moving in the right direction. My only 

concern is that there may not be enough time to complete the review of all 21 categories on the U.S. Munitions List, publish the 

draft changes for comment, receive and reflect upon those comments, publish final changes, and, as the chairman mentioned, ensure that our committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committees of jurisdiction, are able to conduct the necessary oversight of these changes. 

My preference would be for the administration to set priorities 

to make sure that two of the most important categories, aerospace 

and space systems, which now comprise Categories 8 and 15 of the 

U.S. Munitions List, could be completed in this Congress. I would 

like the witnesses’ thoughts on this point. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I 

yield back my—no time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman, and I appreciate it. 

Before I recognize the members for their opening statement, I 

would like to welcome to our committee a 2-week intern, Susan 

Ruby Paxton, who is the offspring of two former Members of Congress, Bill Paxton and Susan Molinari. She will be working under 

the direction of Eugene Patrone, who is the foreign policy expert 

of Congressman Turner. So, we welcome her. She used to be Suby, 

but now she is 15 and all grown up and goes by Susan Ruby. 

Thank you. Welcome. We will keep an eye on you. Behave. 

[Laughter.] 

And it is pleasure to recognize Chairman Royce, the chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

The Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee has 

examined export control reforms over the years, and it is very important, of course, to our economic well-being and, also, to our national security. As you noted, Madam Chair, this process now has 

been running for some time. We have had reforms under the Bush 

administration. Those have continued under the Obama administration. And I think there is a bipartisan consensus that the system certainly is not efficient, that it is a legacy of a different era, 

and that our economy and national security is suffering as a result 

of this. 

6

We are waiting for specifics of the current administration’s ambitious reform efforts, but, Madam Chairman, you raised some concerns in your statement that I share. Let me try to articulate those. 

The goal here in simple terms is to focus on the truly dangerous 

items. We have enemies determined to hurt us with our own technology. The challenge is establishing that focus, making a more 

workable system, bringing some measure of efficiency to this system. And we are operating in an ever more competitive and fastpaced world economy that, frankly, is leaving our bureaucracy far 

behind. So, I share our witnesses’ sense of urgency about reform. 

Whether satellites are treated as a military or commercial export 

is an important issue that I have raised. The committee had hoped 

that the Defense Department’s final report on the security implications of satellite exports would have been released by now. We are 

still awaiting that release. 

Finally, I would like to second one witness’ point that printed circuit boards be treated as ITAR-controlled, whatever the reform 

process brings. This is a very important point. The bureaucracy has 

not understood how the central nervous system for all electronics 

is a unique part of critical defense systems here in the United 

States. To have such PCBs loosely controlled is to move this industry overseas and needlessly compromise our national security. 

So, I would like to close with that point, Madam Chairman, and 

I thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on that subcommittee, is recognized for his opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

During the 110th and 111th Congress, the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee held five hearings concerning export controls, beginning in July 2007, where we focused 

primarily on the massive backlog the State Department’s licensing 

agency, the DDTC, was laboring under. In late 2006, the State Department had more than 10,000 pending license decisions on backlog. 

We found that the State Department had too few licensing officers. Licensing decisions that should have been resolved in weeks 

dragged on for months, and the number of licensing decisions made 

per individual officer was averaging several thousand. We found a 

system where massive defense firms paid the same $1,200 registration fee as tiny parts manufacturers that may not even have applied for a single license. 

I introduced, with Don Manzullo, the Defense Trade Controls Improvement Act of 2009, which called for a top-to-bottom review, a 

mandate that the DDTC hire licensing officers to ensure that there 

was one officer for every 1200 applications, and a mandate that the 

agency collect larger fees from those that submit more licenses. 

I also introduced other legislation, the Export Control Improvement Act, also cosponsored by Don Manzullo, which both of those 

have basically been adopted administratively. The system has been 

improved. 

In early 2010, the President announced that he would tackle the 

substantive issues involved in export control. I have urged the administration to be very diligent in examining the ramifications for 

7

our industrial base. We need to be certain that when we move 

something from the USML to the CCL, for example, we don’t make 

it easier for multinationals to offshore the production. 

When we deny a license, we preserve secrecy. When we grant a 

license to export finished goods, we create jobs, we build the infrastructure here in the United States, and we prevent that purchase 

from building infrastructure in another country. But if, instead, we 

export technology, tools, dies, and blueprints, then we lose the secrecy; we lose the jobs; we don’t build an infrastructure in this 

country, and we do build an infrastructure in another country 

which, even if it is a friend of ours, may disagree on who, then, 

they should sell those weapons to. 

That is why I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record 

here a letter showing the concerns of the International Association 

of Machinists. Without objection, I would hope so. Okay. 

We have to design a system where licenses necessary to export 

equipment are treated differently than licenses for the export of 

technology, tools, dies, blueprints, and manufacturing permission. 

The former should be processed quickly; the latter should be processed slowly, if at all, because there is a difference between exporting products and offshoring jobs. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And now we will recognize members for their 1-minute opening 

statement. 

Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner of New York. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. Paxton, pay attention, please. 

Like the rest of my colleagues, I recognize the need to reform our 

export control system. Arms and the defense industry as well as associated industries account for billions of dollars in exports and 

comprise one of the largest parts of our industrial base and thousands of jobs. 

Our system is designed for the Cold War, and we all recognize 

it needs to be changed. But we must ensure the exports remain in 

line with our national security and strategy, and we must be flexible and fast. We must be able to respond to world events. The capture of a drone, the loss of a stealth helicopter has maybe many 

impacts that are just not accounted for. By the time we get around 

to it, it is far too late. 

I am interested in hearing what our expert witnesses have to 

say, and I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Bass of California, Speaker Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Berman. 

I want to offer my appreciation today for the panel and their upcoming remarks. I hope that the hearing will help clarify current 

efforts by the administration to strengthen policies regarding the 

United States Munitions and Commerce Munitions List and further spotlight the interest of these industries in these reforms. 

The Export Control Reform Initiative should take the time it 

needs to ensure that our national security is not compromised durVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020712\72788 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

ing the process and that we have future policies that improve upon 

what currently exists. 

I will be particularly interested in hearing the perspective of today’s panel, how these reforms will create new opportunities for 

business, and where challenges still might exist. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

My deepest apologies to Mr. Mujaha Dana Rohrabacher. How 

could I miss you, of all people? So, thank you. You are recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I submit my opening statement for the record 

and ask unanimous consent. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to go along with Mr. Royce, we are talking about dangerous items going to dangerous countries. We have 

to remember that there are some countries that should be treated 

differently, and that has been one of the biggest hang-ups that we 

have had, because a lot of American business is making huge 

money with China and various human rights abusers who may 

well be an enemy of the United States in the future. They want to 

make money from those countries with the same rules as they 

make money and deal with friendly countries and democratic countries. We should not be treating dictatorial potential enemies like 

China in the same way we treat Belgium or Brazil, for Pete’s 

sakes. That has been one of the biggest stumbling blocks. 

Let me note we also need to be concerned about selling munitions and deadly pieces of equipment to even friendly countries. So 

that, for example, Mr. Maliki over in Iraq, who supposedly is a 

friendly country now, those weapons are not being used against the 

Kurds, as the weapons that we have already given them were used 

to murder people at Camp Ashraf who were unarmed. So, we have 

two levels of reasons for control here. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And I apologize again. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member 

Berman. 

And thank you to our panelists for being here to discuss this very 

important issue today. I look forward to hearing your testimony 

and really learning how we can continue to improve this process, 

and particularly how we can help to streamline the notification 

process. This is especially important to my District in Rhode Island 

where several of the companies that are in my District are adversely affected by this very long and sometimes cumbersome process. I am deeply concerned about the economic consequences that 

this long and drawn-out process has on businesses in my District 

in Rhode Island. 

I think, like many of my colleagues here, I am, of course, interested in working to find a solution that expedites this process while 

also allowing Congress to exercise appropriate oversight in order to 

protect our national security. 

I want to apologize in advance that I am not going to be able to 

stay for the entire hearing, but I look forward to continuing to 

work with my colleagues and with all of you as we address this 

very important issue. And thank you again for being here today. 

9

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Duncan. 

Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

For nearly 50 years, Houston, Texas was the center of the world 

space exploration. The first word on the moon was ‘‘Houston.’’ But 

our export regime has made it harder and harder for the space industry to compete with companies around the world. They have too 

much to process. There is too much paperwork to process. The wait 

is too long to get approval of legitimate business. And this puts 

them at an unfair disadvantage with their competitors. Now we are 

also threatened with losing our space superiority. It is clear the 

system is broken and something needs to be done to fix it. 

At the same time, we don’t want our enemies to get sensitive 

technology. They love to steal American technology, especially what 

I call the Chinese Government’s organized crime syndicate. They 

copy it and then they pretend they did it all by themselves. That 

hurts our companies who are trying to compete. It hurts our national security. 

Our goal when it comes to export control should be simple: Make 

sure our competitors/our enemies don’t get our technology and help 

our businesses compete in a global way. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking 

Member, Mr. Berman. 

I want to associate myself with the opening statement and sentiments expressed by our ranking member, Mr. Berman, concerning 

the issue that we are discussing this morning. 

In the 23-years-plus that I have served as a member of this committee, I know no one, in my humble opinion, who understands 

more the implications of the seriousness of these issues of export 

controls, arms controls than Mr. Berman. I certainly am very 

happy that he is here to express that and those concerns. 

There is no question, Madam Chair, of the implications, just as 

we are confronted with whether or not we should be selling $6 billion worth of arms to Taiwan. One of the contradictions and some 

of the ironies that I observe, and I will ask certainly our panel of 

witnesses, it seems that we are either the No. 1 or the No. 2 largest seller of arms to other countries. The dangers and the implications of that issue, I am certainly looking forward to asking our 

witnesses for answers. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, sir. 

Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I am glad we are having this hearing because I know back in my 

District quite a few of the companies that are involved in this are 

also wondering about how difficult it is and how more difficult it 

is going to become for them to compete in the future. So, as we look 

into these things, it is great to have oversight on this. It is great 

to have the knowledge of it. But it is also important to understand 

10

how difficult we have made it for our people to compete in the global market. 

So, I thank you for having this and look forward to the testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to 

thank you for holding this hearing and advocating for the measures 

to streamline the notification process. The topic is extremely important, not simply for the well-being of the industry and for preserving their competitiveness in the international arena, but for 

our national security as a whole. 

I know in Massachusetts that nearly 45,000 people rely on the 

aerospace and aviation industries for their employment. So, I am 

not just speaking for myself when I say that I thank you all for 

your attendance today and for the significant impact you will have 

on the Aerospace Industries Association. 

So, with that, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

The Chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First, we will 

hear from Marion Blakey, who is the president and chief executive 

officer of the Aerospace Industries Association. AIA is the leading 

voice of the aerospace and defense industry, representing more 

than 150 leading manufacturers along with a supplier base of nearly 200 associate members. 

Ms. Blakey became the eighth full-time chief executive of the Association in 2007. Before that, she served a 5-year term as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 

We are honored to have you here. 

Next, we would like to welcome Mr. Mikel Williams, who has 

served as president and chief executive officer of the DDi Corp. 

since November 2005. Mr. Williams served as senior vice president 

and chief financial officer of the company from November 2004 to 

October 2005. Before joining, Mr. Williams served as the sole member of Constellation Management Group, providing strategic, operational, and financial capital advisory consulting services to companies in the telecom, software, and high-tech industries. 

Welcome, Mr. Williams. 

And finally, we would like to welcome Patricia Cooper, who 

joined the Satellite Industry Association as its president in November 2007 and has more than 17 years in the satellite industry and 

in government. 

Patricia joined SIA following a 5-year tenure in the Federal Communications Commission, where she managed the FCC’s bilateral 

relationships with regulatory agencies across the world. She served 

as the lead author of the FCC’s inaugural competition report to 

Congress on the communications satellite industry, and was Senior 

Satellite Competitor Advisor in the International Bureau. 

A high-level set of witnesses. 

We would like to remind our witnesses, as high level as they are, 

to keep their testimony to no more than 5 minutes. 

Without objection, your entire written testimony will be made a 

part of the record and will be inserted therein. 

Ms. Blakey, we start with you. Thank you. 

11

STATEMENT OF MS. MARION C. BLAKEY, PRESIDENT & CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION 

Ms. BLAKEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I must say that I am 

delighted, also, Ranking Member Berman, and members of the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be here. The Aerospace Industries Association of America Appreciates the opportunity to testify today. 

Our industry consistently generates America’s largest manufac- turing trade surplus, projected to be more than $57.4 billion in 

2011, but continuing this track record of success cannot be taken 

for granted. Aerospace and its exports create and sustain highskill, high-wage manufacturing jobs. These exports also preserve 

and increase the capacity of cutting-edge innovation and a robust 

industrial base that enables the U.S. military to be capable and 

valiant on the battlefield. 

With such uncertainty now surrounding the U.S. Federal budget, 

exports can be an important part of how we maintain our Nation’s 

critical defense and aerospace industrial base. I would, therefore, 

like to particularly emphasize that the reauthorization of the U.S. 

Export-Import Bank prior to May 31st is of paramount importance 

for exporters to complete on a level playing field in the commercial 

market, where current and future competitors continue to enjoy 

support from their country’s export credit agencies. 

I would particularly like to thank you, Madam Chairman and 

Ranking Member Berman, for your leadership over the years trying 

to modernize our export control system. 

Another example of bipartisan leadership is H.R. 3288, a bill 

being championed by a number of members, including Ranking 

Member Berman and Congressmen Connolly and Manzullo. H.R. 

3288 aims to initiate practical, commonsense legislative reforms to 

address the issues that are outlined in AIA’s new report, which I 

have before me, ‘‘Competing for Space: Satellite Export Policy and 

U.S. National Security.’’ With your permission, I would like to also 

submit that with my written testimony today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Ms. BLAKEY. The report surveys manufacturers of U.S. satellite 

systems and components about the challenges the space industrial 

base faces as a result of U.S. export policies; in particular, the legislative mandate to treat commercial satellites and related components as military technology, even though the rest of the world 

does not. 

We calculate a cumulative loss of $20.8 billion in U.S. satellite 

manufacturing revenue from 1999, the year COMSATs were moved 

to the U.S. Munitions List, to the year 2009. The direct job loss totals 8,710 jobs annually and 19,183 jobs in indirect and induced job 

losses. That is a total of 27,893 jobs lost annually because, in part, 

we have our current regime of export control policies. 

We urge the timely completion of the U.S. Munitions and Commerce List control reviews, including returning the authority to determine the jurisdiction of COMSATs back to the administration. 

The process should not change currently denied exports to approved exports. Instead, transactions that would be approved in the 

current system would be processed faster by deciding in advance 

that less sensitive items do not require ITAR-level scrutiny. 

12

Export licensing would also be cheaper since companies that 

manufacture USML technologies must pay an annual $2,250-a-year 

registration fee, plus $250 charge per export license. And this is 

really something. On that latter point, 68 percent of companies 

that have to register with the State Department because they 

make a product that is captured on the USML never export. I suspect many of them make the kinds of parts and components that 

we can all agree should be moved to Commerce control. Those parts 

and components manufacturers that do export have to incorporate 

that license charge of $250 per export license into their pricing. For 

small and medium-sized companies, there would be significant benefits in helping them minimize these regulatory burdens of the existing system. 

And finally, I must say this should be the first of many steps for 

reform, not the last. Previous reform efforts have met with varying 

degrees of success, as previously noted. Experience suggests that 

critical factors at enabling meaningful reform include sustained 

oversight by senior administration officials as well as effective consultation with Congress and the private sector. 

We stand ready to work with you and the administration to ensure that we continue to make meaningful progress toward a predictable, efficient, and transparent export control regime. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Blakey follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Williams. 

She did it even in 5 minutes with a southern drawl. That’s pretty 

good. [Laughter.] 

If you could punch the button there? 

STATEMENT OF MR. MIKEL WILLIAMS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, DDI CORP. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Okay. Thank you. Members of the committee, I 

thank you for inviting me here today to testify. 

As introduced, I am Mikel Williams, CEO of DDi Corporation, a 

printed circuit board manufacturer headquartered in Anaheim, 

California, and founded more than 30 years ago. We have over 

1600 employees in six U.S. factories and one in Canada. Although 

the majority of our printed circuit boards go into commercial products, we are a trusted supplier to the U.S. Government. 

I am also on the Board of Directors and chairman of the Government Relations Committee for the IPC—Association Connecting 

Electronics Industries. IPC is a U.S.-headquartered global trade organization, representing all facets of the electronics industry, including companies that design, manufacture, and assemble printed 

circuit boards. The IPC has over 3,000 member companies, 1900 of 

which are here in the United States. 

I am here today on behalf of IPC to underscore the critical importance of establishing clear and proper U.S. export controls on printed circuit board designs for our military defense systems and 

equipment. But, first, it may be helpful to the committee if I briefly 

describe a circuit board and its role in the electronic system or endproduct. 

The printed circuit board is the foundation of all electronic products. It mechanically holds and electrically-connects a variety of 

components, semiconductors and transistors, for example, allowing 

that device to serve its intended function. In wireless applications, 

as an example, the printed circuit board for a radio-frequency and 

microwave designs contain printed components such as an antenna. 

And thus, the printed circuit board actually becomes part of the 

working product itself. 

Now using this catalog, if I can show this here, I can buy virtually any piece of electronic item except for one, and that is a 

printed circuit board. You won’t find printed circuit boards in this 

catalog. Each and every printed circuit board needs to be custom 

designed and manufactured to meet the specific requirements of 

the end-item. Moreover, you can’t design and manufacture a printed circuit board without access to sensitive information about the 

workings of the end-product. I cannot overstate this point. 

For example, improvised explosive devices, also known as IEDs 

or roadside bombs, have caused most of the American casualties in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The design of U.S. military IED jammers 

and detectors, if they fall into enemy hands, would allow our enemies to shield their IEDs from our detection or jamming systems. 

This underlying technical data is not the kind of information we 

want our adversaries to have. Yet, current regulations fail to clearly control printed circuit board design and manufacturing. The 

21

complexity of the rules leads to interpretations that are far more 

liberal than the spirit and letter of the law. 

My company takes great pains and great expense to fully comply 

with U.S. export control laws. However, it is understood by many 

in the industry that foreign-made electronics, including printed circuit boards, are making their way into U.S. military applications. 

A recent IPC study reported that one-third, approximately onethird, of the printed circuit boards purchased by the Defense Department were made outside of the U.S. This threatens U.S. national security. 

First, there is the potential for intentional or unintentional sabotage of printed circuit boards and, thus, our defense systems. 

Second, it raises the possibility that the printed circuit boards for 

critical and classified defense systems can be reverse-engineered. It 

also enables the theft of our country’s intellectual property, and 

this regularly occurs in the commercial markets. 

We are working with the State Department’s DDTC, or the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, to educate the manufacturing 

community about the existing controls on printed circuit boards, 

but more needs to be done. Given the confusion about these controls and the importance of printed circuit boards to military electronics, printed circuit boards should be explicitly addressed in a 

revised USML. If a defense article merits inclusion on the USML, 

so, too, should the printed circuit board designs. The draft revisions 

released by the DDTC appear to reflect this position, but not explicitly. 

Absent explicit regulations or guidance, confusion about export 

controls on printed circuit boards is likely to continue. The rulemaking for Category XI, which is the electronics category, offers 

DDTC the opportunity to clarify proper controls on printed circuit 

boards, and we urge the DDTC to seize this opportunity to bolster 

national security. 

IPC recognizes the health of our defense industrial base generally does not factor into export controls. However, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize the vital importance of the printed circuit board industry to the Nation’s defense. In the last 5 years, the 

number of manufacturers in North America has fallen by close to 

40 percent, even as worldwide production increased by 28 percent. 

The center of gravity for the global printed circuit board industry 

has shifted from the U.S. to China over the past decade. Further, 

industry pressures from low-cost regions mitigate the ability to invest in research and development for future technologies required 

for our Nation’s defense. 

Without greater attention to the defense industrial base, our 

military in the years ahead may be forced to rely to a great degree 

on overseas manufacturing for sensitive electronics. There is no 

question that such a development would pose considerable risk to 

our national security. 

In closing, I would like to reaffirm IPC’s support for reforming 

export control regulations. The current system neither adequately 

protects our national security nor facilitates export opportunities. 

We need to grow our economy. Reform is long overdue, but reform 

must safeguard our national security. 

22

On this issue, national security is the IPC’s highest priority. It 

is the reason I am here today and the reason that the IPC has 

called on the U.S. Government to put in place clear and appropriate restrictions on the export of printed circuit board designs 

and manufacturing. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to answering any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, sir. We appreciate 

it. 

Ms. Cooper is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MS. PATRICIA A. COOPER, PRESIDENT, 

SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 

Ms. COOPER. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Berman, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting the 

Satellite Industry Association to testify today on U.S. export control reform. I commend the committee for your continued focus on 

improving the Nation’s export control regime. 

As the president of SIA, I represent here the unified voice of the 

Nation’s diverse satellite industry. Our members build and launch 

spacecraft for both the commercial and U.S. Government sectors, 

operate hundreds of commercial satellites ringing the globe, and 

provide voice, video, and data services for the U.S. military, public 

safety, media, and enterprise sectors. The industry represents 

about 60 percent of the overall space sector and operates one-third 

of all satellites currently on orbit. Our last statistics from 2010, our 

industry posted $168 billion in global revenue with an average annual growth rate of around 11 percent over the last 5 years. 

SIA speaks when our industry holds a common view on issues of 

importance to the satellite sector. Our members agree that the 

time is ripe for Congress to revisit and reform the U.S. export control laws governing satellites. 

I will address three themes here in my testimony. First, the existing satellite export control regime mandates overregulation by 

requiring that all satellites and related items be treated uniformly 

as munitions without regard to their technological sensitivity. 

Second, our export control regime harms the national security 

goals it was designed to fulfill by undercutting the satellite industry’s competitiveness and injuring the underlying space industrial 

base. 

Finally, the time is ripe for Congress to restore to the Executive 

Branch the full authority to regulate satellites that they exercise 

for every other technology area. 

Satellites are the only category of products where Congress has 

mandated blanket inclusion under the U.S. Munitions List. Since 

1998, every item in the satellite category has been legally required 

to be regulated as a munition. There is no mechanism to differentiate between items of the highest national security interest and 

those that are benign or widely available. It is this required overregulation that SIA asks Congress to correct. 

Appropriate restrictions, however, should be sustained for satellite exports to countries of concern, including China. SIA and its 

members do not seek any erosion of the substantial safeguards that 

have effectively prohibited satellite technology exports for sale to or 

launch by China. Violations should be vigorously enforced. Sensible 

satellite export control reform is fully consistent with the Nation’s 

goal of protecting our most advanced technologies. 

There are persistent signs of warning of the unintended harmful 

consequences of the current satellite export control policies. While 

statistical smoking guns remain difficult to pinpoint, trends in 

market share show a troubling loss of U.S. dominance. The U.S. 

28

share of the global market for satellites dropped from around 

three-quarters before the 1998 rules to around one-half today. 

International buyers of spacecraft parts and components see ITAR 

regulations and licensing requirements as adding unnecessary 

time, cost, and risk. 

In fact, ITAR has become a market differentiator for our competitors. Since 2008, European manufacturers have sold 20 satellites 

marketed as ITAR-free, up from just six when I testified in 2009. 

While I understand that questions have arisen about whether these 

ITAR-free satellites are truly without U.S. content, their marketplace success, often despite prices higher than our U.S. equivalents, 

underscores the powerful impact of the mandated ITAR treatment 

on our ability to compete internationally. 

I would also reiterate the concerns voiced by Ms. Blakey and the 

Aerospace Industries Association’s recent study about the harms of 

overregulation to the U.S. space industrial base that supplies both 

the commercial satellite sector and the government space community. ITAR has deterred investment and innovation in critical space 

manufacturing capabilities, and the intelligence and national security space communities are voicing increasing alarm. 

Finally, SIA is concerned about the chilling effect that expansive 

ITAR rules have had on our universities’ willingness to teach 

space-related subjects and on our research labs’ ability to conduct 

cutting-edge space research. The U.S. age in space technology will 

surely erode if indiscriminate ITAR treatment forces the next generation of space engineers to learn, research, and experiment 

abroad. 

SIA has been gratified to see bipartisan support for satellite legislative reform. We applaud Ranking Member Berman’s introduction last year of H.R. 3288, which SIA supports like AIA. We note 

that 12 additional Members, both Republicans and Democrats, 

have cosponsored this bill, including many members of this committee. 

SIA acknowledges that Congress still awaits this administration’s expert guidance on the national security risks of moving satellites off the USML, as requested in Section 1248 of the 2010 

NDAA. Although an interim report has already identified six categories of satellite items that could safely be moved off the USML, 

SIA members eagerly await the full analysis that a final report 

would provide from our national security intelligence and export 

control experts. SIA urges the administration to deliver the final 

Section 1248 report to Congress expeditiously in order to pave the 

way for critical reforms. 

Our industry will not reap the benefits of export control reform 

without satellite-specific legislation. The 1998 congressional mandate has regulated too broadly and eliminated discretion. It has 

harmed the satellite industry’s international standing, dampened 

investment and innovation in our Nation’s space manufacturing, 

and deterred training and advanced research. It is time to regulate 

satellites as we do for every other high-tech industry, and we look 

to this committee to act on needed satellite reform legislation. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Berman. 

This concludes my testimony. On behalf of the members of the SatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020712\72788 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ellite Industry Association, thank you again, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooper follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Excellent testimony from our three witnesses. 

I will start the question-and-answer period where members are 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned about 

the wisdom and enforceability of a proposed new exemption for the 

export of U.S. defense articles to our European allies and other 

friends abroad, because we must take into consideration: The refusal of the Government of France and a French company to cooperate with the U.S. in investigating illegal retransfer of U.S.-controlled space parts and components to the People’s Republic of 

China; also, the fact that our European friends have been the most 

important source of high technology needed for China’s military 

modernization program, and that Europeans have been providing 

technology to China that it cannot obtain from the U.S. or Japan; 

and, also, the findings of the unclassified 2011 report of the Defense Security Service which states that Europe and Eurasia are 

moving increasingly toward the pursuit of illegal or unauthorized 

access to U.S. defense technologies. To the extent that the region 

is a major arms exporter, third-party transfer of U.S. technology 

will likely be a concern. And I wanted your views on these issues. 

Related to that, the intersection of military and civilian interests 

in China’s space program is well-known. What is also well-known 

is the extensive space relationship between the European Union 

that they share with China, including the sharing of considerable 

European technical expertise. So, I ask, how can the commercial 

satellites and related parts and components be transferred to the 

Commerce Control List without the risk that such technology 

would be retransferred by our friends to Beijing? 

So, anyone who wants to answer those questions? 

Ms. COOPER. I will be happy to respond, Madam Chairwoman. 

The Satellite Industry Association, our members do not seek any 

change in the considerable prohibitions that already exist to govern 

especially trade of satellites with China, both sale to Chinese customers and also transfer of satellites to China for launch by their 

launch vehicle. Although not a prohibition, the collective effect of 

these rules since 1998 has been an effective prohibition. No U.S. 

satellites have been launched from China since those days. 

We don’t ask for any changes in those rules. We expect that any 

change in the export control reform structure overall, as well as 

satellite-specific legislation, would uphold those rules for China 

specifically. 

The question you raise of European manufacturers with thirdparty transfer from my perspective is an enforcement and prosecution question. If there are violations of laws, they should be vigorously enforced. It is our expectation that such third-party transfers 

of satellite items to China would remain illegal under a revised export control reform system and following any subsequent satellite 

legislation. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Blakey. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I would certainly echo Ms. Cooper’s comments about 

that. I agree something that is illegal is illegal, and it should not 

be changed under the guise of reform. We don’t see evidence that 

that would be the case at all. 

37

What we are looking for, of course, is a system that is more efficient and transparent and will ultimately, then, enable us to put 

more resources, both in terms of scrutiny initially and enforcement, 

behind the illegal activities and the bad actors out there. 

The kind of concern that you are voicing is certainly something 

that can happen under the current regime. I think we need more 

focus on the real risk that export control reform will give us. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

I don’t have enough time for my next question, but let me just 

bring it up. That includes the close coordination, or lack thereof, 

between the Department of State and Commerce. The success of 

the proposed Export Control Reform Initiative is so dependent on 

significantly improved management measures for implementation, 

including close coordination between these two Departments. Some 

of us are concerned that, without this coordination, the anticipated 

benefits of the Export Control Reform Initiative may not outweigh 

the risk of unintended consequences and business disruption. We 

will leave that for another round. 

I am so pleased to recognize Mr. Berman for his questions and 

answers. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. Blakey, the AIA report ‘‘Competing for Space’’ and your organization quotes a report by the National Reconnaissance Office, 

which operates our national intelligence satellites. That government agency says that ‘‘second- and third-tier satellite vendors 

have an insufficiently diverse business and that this limited supplier base may compromise long-term availability of some critical 

components for national security needs.’’

It goes on to say that, ‘‘Since many second- and third-tier vendors are responsible for highly specialized components, low-volume 

government satellites do not provide sufficient market stability, especially when government acquisition plans fluctuate from year to 

year.’’

From that, basically, what I gather it is saying is, if our commercial satellites industry is not viable, the critical components we 

need for our military satellites become less and less available, both 

the raw materials and the component parts. Does the current process make this situation worse? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We surveyed our members and we found that they 

are representing 70 percent of the industry. Approximately 70 percent said that, yes, they were losing significant sales opportunities 

because of the current requirements and the current USML control. 

The fact is that, with the defense budgets going down, with national security funds diminishing, this situation is going to get 

worse because small companies who have only one possible customer, and that customer can buy less and less, will not be able 

to stay in business unless we do give them some relief. Our technology is such that it can compete, if we allow for it. 

Mr. BERMAN. Isn’t the logical conclusion, if the National Reconnaissance report is right, that we are going to end up having to import raw materials and components for our military satellites if we 

lose the commercial satellite manufacturing markets? 

38

Ms. BLAKEY. That certainly is a possibility, and one we should 

guard against. 

Mr. BERMAN. Part of your testimony says that we shouldn’t stop 

just at the reforming of the U.S. Munitions List and the Commodity Control List, but there should be new management models 

for licensing. What does that mean? What specific kinds of changes 

would you like to see? 

This process of going through these lists and changing them is 

a laborious, as we have seen, process. Should the management licensing reforms be done first? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I think both are important. Certainly, this review 

of these lists, you’re right, it has been very labor-intensive and I 

think will ultimately produce a good end-product. 

But the kind of changes that are also possible that could really 

make a major difference for some of our programs and weapons 

systems were attempted as far back as the Clinton administration, 

and this committee and others tried to help with licensing of programs and making a decision at one point that would then hold for 

repeated transactions. This is known as program licensing, and 

somehow the paperwork aspects of that got ahead of the good intentions. So, unfortunately, this has not been effective yet. 

But we do need to look at where you are going to be over and 

over again. The joint strike fighter, there is a great example of exporting that by intent. You don’t want to have to license on a 

transaction-by-transaction, one-at-a-time basis. That is a sensible 

reform that we really could put into place. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, why didn’t it take hold? 

Ms. BLAKEY. You know, sometimes the bureaucracy stands in 

front of itself, and what was the intent in this did not get translated——

Mr. BERMAN. Not in our Government. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I think it is one of those things that implementation 

can be hard. Sometimes people lay on a lot of paperwork requirements when you could make it really simple. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. Royce, the chair of the subcommittee, is recognized. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Williams, as I said in my opening statement, I concur with 

your recommendation that printed circuit boards be treated as 

ITAR-controlled. I wanted to focus a little bit on the 2005 National 

Research Council study on your industry. Could you explain the 

conclusion of that study? 

Just push that button. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you for the question, Congressman Royce. 

For anybody else, I have a copy of the executive summary here. 

It is interesting. When I came into the industry, having previously worked in the telecommunications sector, and having lived 

and worked in Europe and been in China quite a bit, I had the benefit of having a recently completed study that was put together by 

a broad group of participants, including members from the DoD, 

from academia, from industry. It was a study entitled, ‘‘ManufacVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020712\72788 HFA PsN: SHIRL
39

turing Trends in Electronics Interconnect Technology,’’ which specifically focused on the interconnect technology embedded in circuit 

boards. 

The conclusions there were simply that, given the state of the industry and the migration of the commercial markets to Southeast 

Asia, China in particular. Back in 1984, as a matter of fact, 42 percent of the global market was serviced out of U.S. factories. Today 

over 40 percent of the market is serviced by Chinese factories, and 

our market share here is about 6 percent. 

So, we have seen a massive migration, the impact of which has 

been fairly devastating to the industry. There are several critical 

concerns that they cite: (1) the ability to continue to fund research 

and development, both today as well as in the future; and (2) the 

ability to continue to meet the requirements of the defense industry 

to build their products, both today and in the future. 

It put forth a few recommendations. Unfortunately, I have to report that it has had little, if any, attention since then. The study 

was completed in 2004 and published in 2005. 

So, it highlighted the critical concern that, again, we may need 

to go into foreign countries to source important elements of our 

supply chain, like cited here. But certainly the circuit boards are 

not components per se; they are commonly referred to as components, but every circuit board is unique. It has the electrical blueprints, if you will, of the device and how it works. Not to have a 

defense industrial base to support our requirements is really what 

the report focused on and made several recommendations about 

how to go forward. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I think in your testimony you said the health 

of the U.S. defense industrial base generally does not factor into 

export controls. My question is, should it? And how should it, if the 

answer is yes? What can we learn from your industry? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, specifically, let me reiterate that the IPC, 

and DDi as well, supports export control reform. We support opening the global markets more liberally to our manufacturers here in 

the states. 

My understanding is the export control reform is focused on export reform controls, and other issues, such as sustaining a defense 

industrial base, might be effectively addressed through other initiatives, whether they are coming out of the Department of Defense 

or elsewhere. 

It has sat for quite some time not part of the export control reform discussion. So, maybe there could be some linkages to connect 

the issues, but I understand that that is not the primary motivation behind export control reform. We do agree that the reforms 

need to be streamlined, made more efficient, enabling of our members at the IPC and my customers at DDi to be able to sell into 

the global markets in a manner that is appropriate. 

Mr. ROYCE. But in the meantime, you have mentioned that the 

current export control rules are ambiguous regarding printed circuit boards. Of course, that ambiguity is a problem throughout the 

system. 

But you have had meetings, I suspect, with export control officials to lay out the case of what is happening here. Do they fully 

understand your industry? What could we do here to try to make 

40

certain that that industry doesn’t dissolve here in the United 

States? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. A good question. One of the problems with printed 

circuit boards is that they get mentally lumped in with other components—screws, nuts, bolts. In fact, we have met with the Department of Commerce. As we have talked to them, I have realized 

that, as an example, there are many in government who don’t really understand what the circuit board is. 

In fact, I will hold up an example here. This is a circuit board. 

They look fairly routine, not unlike anything you would find in 

your laptop or BlackBerry or anything else. But, really, this includes the schematic design of the electrical device or component 

or part. So, again, it is not a general component. 

So, getting everybody to understand that has been a huge effort 

of ours. I don’t think that we are finished yet, but that is part of 

why I am here, and we would continue to do that. 

I think, as people in government at Commerce or the Department of Defense or elsewhere start to realize that this is really the 

schematic design of the device from which something can be easily 

copied, it is how we begin to lose our proprietary intellectual property, I think that it can start to be understood that it needs to be 

viewed differently than screws and nuts and bolts and things like 

that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to thank our witnesses for their presentations. I think 

they were very comprehensive and certainly welcomed. 

Claiming no expertise whatsoever in the aerospace, in the global 

electronics industry, and even our satellite industries, but I am 

aware of the fact that we are talking about hundreds and thousands of our fellow Americans who are employed under these three 

major areas of industry that we are discussing this morning. 

I guess I would like to generalize the whole picture by saying 

that in your involvement you are talking about economic benefits 

to our working people. We are also talking about national security 

implications and then our foreign policy as to whether or not the 

sales and the commercial basis, and even on national security 

issues, are in compliance with our foreign policy issues. 

Mr. Williams, I noticed that you mention about the printed circuit boards. I have no idea what you mean by printed circuit 

boards. But when you mentioned IED, it kind of bothers me, the 

fact that for years our men and women are killed in this terrible 

war in Iraq. Somehow it seems to me, why did we never take immediate action to go into this problem of IED explosions, which the 

vast majority of our men and women in uniform were killed by? I 

wonder if, commercially, were your printed circuit boards ever involved in trying to resolve the issues? And I am very curious why 

the military has taken years to try to figure out how to counter 

these IEDs. It is just simple to itemize what it is. But what was 

the problem? 

41

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I can’t speak for the speed with which our 

military operates, but I can assure you that our company, as an example, is in the quick-turn business. So, two-thirds of our business 

is focused on the commercial markets, servicing companies that 

need of new boards in 2, 3, 4 days. So, we can respond quickly as 

an industry. 

We do build products that go into the devices that are being used 

to jam the IEDs to protect our soldiers. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is my point. Why has it taken us years 

to do this while our men and women are dying in the field for the 

last 7 years? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, and I can’t address the process that came to 

the point that DoD decided that that was a product they wanted 

to build. But when they want a circuit board or a built device, our 

industry can respond very, very quickly. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Does it just simply mean that we do not 

have the expertise in addressing the issues that are so basic? I 

don’t think you have to be a rocket scientist to build an IED and 

just put it out in the dirt somewhere, and our soldiers get killed. 

As you said, the vast majority of our soldiers are killed and 

harmed by these IEDs more so than in the field of combat. I don’t 

think you have to be a space scientist to figure this out. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I share your concern. I would like to see our products get to their intended use more quickly. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And, Ms. Cooper, I enjoyed your comments. 

Again, as a non-specialist in this area, you have commercial satellites and, then, we have military and spy satellites. You know, 

one of the satellites, a couple of years ago there was such a public 

outrage how it was possible for China, they had this satellite running around at 18,000 miles per hour, and trying to somehow figure out how to fire a missile to kill, or not to kill, but to dismantle 

the satellite. It was such an uproar in the public saying, how dare 

that China was doing this? And they said, well, they are just simply trying to catch up with the industry in terms of how the Russians and the Americans have far advanced in understanding the 

idea of getting rid of these space military and spy satellites. 

My question, how many spy satellites do we have up there anyway? [Laughter.] 

Ms. COOPER. I am probably not the best one to answer and probably wouldn’t be permitted, if I knew. I will say that about a third 

of the satellites that are on orbit are commercial. Our point here 

is that the rules that govern the space orbit and the value of the 

commercial sector has a direct relationship on the health of the 

U.S. space industry and, also, has a linkage with our military, civil 

space, and intelligence space communities. 

I think my colleague, Ms. Blakey, was underscoring that, when 

a commercial satellite is purchased for manufacture, it engages 

many of the same companies to build parts, components, and subassemblies, in some cases the final——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have got 7 more seconds. I know the chairlady is very strict on this. 

Ms. Blakey, I wanted to ask you a question, but, unfortunately, 

I appreciate the fact that we need to modernize our export/import 

rules on this. 

42

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I apologize for missing the guts of the hearing here. I was at a markup at the Science Committee. But I will 

read your testimony and take it to heart. 

I live in Southern California where we have so much to be grateful for to the aerospace industry. All of us know that the standard 

of living that ordinary people have in California can be tied directly 

to that industry. Without it, people wouldn’t be able to have the 

value of homes that they have or the lifestyles that we have. 

Building high technology builds the economy, but it really helps 

people, is what we need to understand. And we also understand 

that the satellite part of the aerospace industry is a vital component of that industry and one of the major parts of the industry 

in which we are competitive overseas. We have got to make sure 

that we don’t lose that industry. 

Let me just note that I know that some people suggest, well, we 

should be more open with technology transfers or the sale of those 

satellites. I believe that is true when it comes to democratic countries. That is not true when it comes to countries, especially like 

China that is a potential enemy and an adversary of our country. 

People are dumbfounded when they see the growth rate and the 

actual progress that China is making economically and technologically. I am not astounded at all. They have gotten all of their 

fundamentals from us. We have educated their children and PhDs. 

They come to our universities and they go home and they create 

economic entities that put us out of work. What’s going on there? 

We are giving them all of our secrets, even right through their PhD 

programs at our major universities. 

Number 2, we are giving them our R&D. Our major corporations 

are going to China now, and some of them having received government grants from the American taxpayer to develop certain technologies. And what do they do? They start manufacturing plants in 

China. Well, of course, China is going to be able to progress if it 

is getting a subsidy for all of its R&D. 

We have got to make sure that, number 1, our satellite industry 

is the best satellite industry in the world, and we have got to make 

sure that we are not laying the foundation for our competitors 10–

20 years down the road. I am appalled to see that General Electric 

and other aerospace companies are making their way toward Communist China. 

And so, Madam Chairman, we have with us a very perplexed 

issue because we do need to make sure that these companies are 

not weighted down and can actually compete in that two-thirds of 

the world where people are free and the countries they live in are 

not potential adversaries. But in that other third where you have 

got, whether they are North Korea or Iran or China, we have got 

to make sure that what the American taxpayer is paying for is not 

something that will come back and put our people out of work or 

come to threaten our national security. 

Maybe you would have a comment on some of those comments. 

43

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, certainly, the Aerospace Industries Association believes that we have a vital national security asset and an 

economic asset in the kind of companies and facilities that are 

right there in your District and around the country. But they do 

have to have opportunities to innovate, to advance technology, and 

to sell that technology. That is what our Export Control Reform 

Initiative that we share across the Executive Branch and with the 

Congress and industry really is all about. It is not about changing 

the rules of the road, the rules of the game, for countries that are 

not those that we should be sharing technology and providing hightech resources to. 

So, we certainly are not advocating a change in our posture toward China, as far as that goes. What we do need, though, is a 

more streamlined and efficient process for working with our allies 

and friends and creating a much more robust trade, especially as 

resources here at home are going down. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 

Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

A lot of companies come before Congress and wrap their agenda 

in jobs or the national interest. And then, sometimes you find that 

the agenda they are fighting for is carefully tailored to maximize 

profits and that they fight tenaciously for provisions that maximize 

profits, even if they don’t create jobs or otherwise serve the national interest. I am hoping very much that this panel is very different from that. 

When we transfer manufacturing technology, we transfer our 

most valuable secrets, how to make the materials involved. We lose 

the jobs. We hollow out our own defense plants, and we build up 

defense plants in other countries. 

Even if that country is a close ally, a few years down the road 

when we think Iran shouldn’t get a particular weapons system, 

even one of our close allies might disagree or might think that they 

need the jobs involved in that manufacturing. 

So, let me ask each witness, would you support or would you oppose a reform where, whatever licensing agency it is, it has two 

separate standards, an expedited standard, perhaps slightly more 

liberal, for the export of American-made equipment and a separate 

queue, a separate timeline, and a separate, more stringent standard for permission to offshore manufacturing and export the capacity to make these items? 

Ms. Blakey? 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, certainly, as we have looked at the shift of 

items from the USML to the Commerce List, we have actually advocated that there will be greater scrutiny of more sensitive items 

that may have come off the USML. So, we do think it is possible 

within the same list to have differing scrutiny for that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Blakey, I am not sure you—I may not have 

phrased the question as well as I should have. Do you support a 

tougher standard where one of your members is not trying to export a product, but is trying to export blueprints, tools and dies, 

44

manufacturing technology, so that they can set up a factory overseas to actually make the product? 

Ms. BLAKEY. If they are militarily-sensitive items, we support the 

greatest scrutiny on that. If these are commercial items that are 

widely available, then that becomes a much more commercial consideration. The question of scrutiny, again, you can have greater 

scrutiny within both of those lists, gradations of scrutiny. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Williams? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, I would echo that. Frankly, for the commercial market, that is already gone. They are building the most sophisticated products offshore in China and elsewhere now. For the 

military, certainly we would recommend protecting our capability 

as well as the actual product itself. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So, you would support a tougher standard for exporting manufacturing knowhow, as opposed to the manufactured 

product? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. In fact, we are actually asking to have, with 

respect to circuit boards, again, the fundamental building block of 

all electronic devices, to be explicitly addressed in that regard. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Cooper? 

Ms. COOPER. Yes, it is a little hard for us to extrapolate how to 

draw the line when we don’t have the right to draw the line in the 

satellite area. But I do think there are different gradations of technology. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. Just so I clarify my question, the issue isn’t 

are there more important and less important technologies; that is 

obvious. And more military and less military technologies; that is 

obvious. 

Do you support drawing a distinction between exporting manufacturing technology and tools and dies, on the one hand, and exporting finished products on the other? 

Ms. COOPER. I don’t know. I haven’t checked with my members 

on whether they have any expectation to do that. I do think there 

is a difference in manufacturing capability from other technological 

data. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Now that I have clarified the question, does 

anybody want to clarify their answer? 

[No response.] 

Seeing no further response, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Judge Poe——

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. The vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight, is recognized. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

As I mentioned earlier, I am from Houston and we still consider 

it to be the space capital of the world. I am a little irritated that 

now for manned spacecraft we have to get a taxi from the Russians 

and pay them $60 million to $70 million to fly up in space. It seems 

to me we have yielded the space exploration over to the Chinese 

and the Russians, but that is a different issue—sort of. 

I want to talk about the little tyrant from the desert, 

Ahmadinejad, and his regime. Back in the days of the Shah when 

the United States left after the overthrow of the Shah, and he hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020712\72788 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

pened to have about 79 F–14s, the good Americans who left were 

smart enough to take the spare parts with them back to the U.S. 

Apparently, since those days, those F–14s have still been used in 

the Iraq-Iran war. Twenty of those planes were cannibalized for 

spare parts. Now we are coming up on another still crisis with the 

Iranian Government. 

My question is, do you believe that Iran could use items that end 

up on the Commerce Munitions List to get spare parts to repair not 

just the F–14s that they still have, but F–5s, C–130s, helicopters, 

and other military equipment or not? Is that a concern or not? 

I will start with you, Ms. Blakey. 

Ms. BLAKEY. What you would be talking about would be patently 

illegal, certainly something that while there undoubtedly are bad 

actors out there that from time to time pass equipment that should 

not be passed, at the same time at this point the Commerce Control List really would not be the place for the kind of equipment, 

for the most part, that you are talking about. Most of this is militarily-controlled and it is on the USML. 

Mr. POE. I understand that it is, but is it a concern or not? Do 

you think this is not a concern that we should have? You know, it 

is Iran getting spare parts from other entities. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Iran is an incredible bad actor. And with that said, 

I think we should be concerned about all sorts of problematic and 

dangerous activity that they may try to engage in. That is why I 

put a great deal of emphasis on effective enforcement and scrutiny 

in all of this, because I think that is critical. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Williams, did you want to weigh-in on that? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, I agree. I think we do need to be concerned 

about that. I think we need to be concerned about our military 

product designs being copied. I think we need to be concerned 

about them being available to offshore manufacturing, with China 

now being the center of gravity for the electronics industry. 

And I think it is not just on the high-tech stuff, but also legacy 

programs that are kind of long in the tooth and old with respect 

to spare parts. A situation like you are describing is one that we 

should be concerned about, protecting our Nation’s IP. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Cooper? 

Ms. COOPER. I will say that spare parts for repair are not as big 

of an issue for on-orbit spacecraft, but I would echo the importance 

of enforcement for violations of any rules, particularly for countries 

where we have a sense of their bad-faith action. 

Mr. POE. Let me ask you one more question, and I will go in reverse order. Down the road, China; Mr. Rohrabacher made a lot of 

comments about the Chinese, how they are professional thieves. 

Where do you see them going in space technology in the future 

with all of the IP issues, technology, satellite technology? How do 

you see this playing out, unless we do something on this end, say, 

in 5 years? 

Ms. COOPER. I would, first, start by saying that the Chinese 

space program has been starved of U.S. satellite technology by the 

regulations that have been in place specific to China since 1998. 

That having been said, the Government of China certainly has 

voiced strong interest in space exploration, in commercial satellite 

manufacturing, and they have a robust satellite launch program. 

46

So, we would expect them to continue to be an aggressive player 

in the international marketplace. 

Our interest is in the areas, where U.S. satellite technology is 

not of national sensitivity, to ask that U.S. companies can return 

to the U.S. market, to the international marketplace elsewhere, 

and compete, then, head-to-head with the Chinese companies. 

Mr. POE. So, you would echo, once again, what Ranking Member 

Sherman said earlier, that you need two different standards for 

private and military technology? 

Ms. COOPER. That is the foundation of our export control structure. 

Mr. POE. I am out of time. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, 

Judge. 

Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you to 

our panelists for being here today. 

I guess the first thing, I would be interested in hearing your honest opinion, but as somebody who worked in the private sector subject to export controls, every year I had to take a course, as an officer of the company, to try to glean the meaning of the Export Control Act and what was and what wasn’t subject and what the penalties were, and what you had to do if you suspected something 

might possibly fall within the penumbra of questionable export 

items, and so forth. 

I will just say to my colleagues and this panel, I wish everybody 

had to take that course in Congress to better understand what a 

Byzantine world we have created with the best of intentions in 

terms of export controls. 

It led me, and certainly being here in this committee over the 

last 3 years has led me, to ask the question about efficacy. With 

the best of intentions to protect national security, with the best of 

intentions to protect sensitive technology, are we doing that? Because I believe that the nature of today’s technology and the pace 

of technological change, frankly, make it extremely difficult, except 

in some rare cases, to protect anything. Wish we could. 

I think the United States, as we look at reforms to this regime, 

we have to ask ourselves the painful and honest question, is it efficacious, what we are proposing? Because if it isn’t, then it is a feelgood measure that is not, in fact, performing the desired function 

and we are presenting, not willfully, but a false security to the 

American public. 

So, that is a long-winded preference, but I would honestly be interested in your reactions to the whole question of the current regime’s efficacy, protecting U.S. sensitive technology. 

Ms. Blakey? 

Ms. BLAKEY. Certainly I think it is fair to say that the current 

regime for the most sensitive technologies, the most dangerous if 

they fell into the wrong hands, has been effective. The problem is 

it is becoming increasingly less effective because there is the needle-in-the-haystack phenomena. You are trying to control so much 

that you cannot, as technology proliferates and innovates, continue 

to do it that way. 

47

Meanwhile, I mean, it is interesting to hear your comments 

about having to take that kind of course. Because what we haven’t 

talked as much about this morning is the burden on small and medium-sized businesses, which are the source of a great deal of innovation. But, frankly, they can’t afford the kind of costs that go into 

learning all of that and, then, their real cost, which is 68 percent 

of the companies that have military product have to register with 

the DDTC. They pay $2,250 a year and then never export because 

the difficulties, the barriers, are so great. So, they are real cashout-of-pocket, small-margin businesses. 

And again, are we benefitting the system that is supposed to control the highest technology when you are also trying to keep in 

bounds all of that on the same list, the same scrutiny? I don’t think 

so. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Williams? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, if you are asking about kind of the effectiveness and the intent of the parties, I think everybody means well. 

I agree it is very confusing when you get below the program level 

and into the component level. And again, I hate to refer to a circuit 

board as a component, but think of it for the moment as such. It 

gets very confusing on whether or not that specific item needs to 

be sourced in compliance with ITAR requirements, for example. 

As an association, we educate on ITAR requirements. We do that 

in our companies as well. It is with a cost and burden. It is part 

of doing business; fair enough. But we need to recognize our foreign 

competitors aren’t so burdened. So, it is, in a sense, unfair on one 

plane, but on another I do think it is required. We want to be part 

of complying with the——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But, Mr. Williams, with due respect, that was 

not my question. My question was, is it efficacious? With all good 

intentions and the desire to be patriotic and to comply, what if we 

find ourselves unintentionally supporting a regime that, in fact, is 

not achieving its purposes? In fact, quite the opposite, it is filled 

with unintended consequences. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I’m sorry. Again, that is why we are here supporting export control reform. Because we see examples of the ineffectiveness of the way it is being administered today, and we do believe that it could be significantly improved and support that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the chairman indulge this Democratic 

ranking member to allow Ms. Cooper to answer this? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I will collect later. [Laughter.] 

Ms. COOPER. I agree that the current system can be improved. 

I agree that it should not be focused on complexities that yield 

‘‘gotcha’s’’ for folks that are well-meaning and slip up because the 

rules are too complex. 

But I would point to, at least in our sector, another area where 

I think the rules have allowed technology to slip beyond control. 

That is by encouraging our competitors to invest and build capabilities that they did not previously have in order to capture the ITARfree market. We have placed, actually placed, a target on certain 

technologies where U.S. companies had led the global marketplace, 

48

and now both European and other governments have incentives to 

develop competing technologies. That is not only an erosion of our 

international competitiveness, but it also means that that capability has proliferated, not been controlled. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair for her graciousness. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I prefer dark chocolate. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is on its way, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks for the 

timeliness of this oversight and the policies. As a freshman Member, it is definitely educational to me to understand what the U.S. 

is doing or not doing with regard to selling technology around the 

world that could be used by our enemies to harm the U.S. interest 

or thwart our efforts to defend ourselves. 

So, the question I have is for Mr. Williams. Just this week, it 

was reported that the North Koreans were possibly using drones 

that were 1987 variants of MQM–107D Streakers, possibly using 

those to attach some sort of ordnance package and possibly use 

those in the South. 

And so, I think about the sales of items such as this, and taken 

with your testimony about printed circuit boards in your written 

testimony—I am not sure how much in your verbal testimony you 

touched on that—but what I would like for you to do is expound 

on the possibilities of our potential foes getting access to items 

which could, indeed, be used against either U.S. allies, U.S. assets, 

or thwart our efforts to defend ourselves, and possibly taking a 

printed circuit board or anything and reverse-engineering it to figure out the weapons system, integration, and how they may come 

up with things that would thwart our efforts. I am trying to learn. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, it can be done. I mean, there are many 

cases of foreign competitors taking circuit boards and grinding 

them down layer-by-layer to expose the logic of the circuitry. There 

are so-called Gerber files, which are three-dimensional files that 

lay out all of the interconnect scheme. While it doesn’t necessarily 

give somebody all the answers, it is certainly a head-start to how 

we build our systems and products. 

In fact, when I met with the Commerce Department, I provided 

what I personally pulled off the internet for one of our weapons 

systems. With a circuit board, one could get a pretty good set of 

roadmaps on how to replicate the part and the product. So, it is 

very important that we control the designs as well as the endboards themselves. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Chairman, there was a committee hearing 

in the Homeland Security Committee with Chairman King where 

we looked at U.S. vendors that were selling circuit boards and 

other computer hardware to the U.S. military, but also an ability, 

some of these old circuit boards would be sold outside of the military channels. 

The questions asked during that committee hearing were, could 

China possibly take and lift information off of some of those computer components? I guess my concern is, would they have the ability to utilize that technology that is freely out there to somehow 

49

figure out a way to implement or put a virus into U.S. military 

hardware? Is that a possibility? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, with respect to components, semiconductors 

and things like that, it is possible that they could put non-compliant parts in there that might have such devices. 

For circuit boards per se, since they don’t hold any software inside themselves, for example, the greater threat is that you could 

have a circuit board inserted into a weapons system that is specifically designed to not support the type of performance that it should 

have. 

So, for example, if it is in a rugged mission and under stress, the 

board would fail. Okay? And so, potentially, one could design a 

board that would not be reliable. 

When we build for DoD requirements, we are building to a standard that is going to last 20–30 years, right? And that is not what 

is typical in the consumer electronics field. 

So, it could happen if counterfeits are inserted into the supply 

chain that don’t even have an intended sabotage effect. It could be 

inadvertent, but it is certainly possible to render our weapons systems as not reliable, certainly not within the spec of how they have 

been designed. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate the testimony. 

Madam Chairman, as you think about the Iranians capturing a 

drone, you think about the assault on Bin Laden’s compound and 

the fact that they held the tail rotor of that helicopter, you think 

about what China did when they held a U.S. spy plane for a long 

period of time to investigate it, and how they are taking that and 

integrating normal sales of these components, it is alarming to me. 

I think it is important that the United States and this Congress 

continue to look at this. 

I will yield back the balance. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, sir, I agree. 

Mr. Kelly, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

This is a difficult situation. We talk about the effects of reverseengineering and people taking technology from the United States 

and using it against us and some of the advanced technology that 

we are able to produce, but, yet, maybe not want to export. 

It goes back to the Oklahoma City bombing, where somebody can 

rent a Ryder truck, fill it with fertilizer and some other chemicals, 

and blow up a building and kill 169 people. 

So, I know that we are all very concerned with what it is that 

we allow to go outside our country and technology that is allowed 

to go out. I guess, Ms. Blakey, it would come to you because this 

is a member of your group. It is Rod Smith who has the Acutec 

Precision Company up in my District, Meadville, Pennsylvania. 

He wrote me. He said, ‘‘In general, the rules and regulations of 

the U.S. Government have made it far easier to import from China 

than to export to anywhere from the U.S. Even exporting to Canada is a mountain of paperwork. The only companies that can succeed at exporting in the aerospace industry are those large enough 

to have the staff to deal with the paperwork, and then you can 

imagine the extra cost they occur.’’ He says, ‘‘Our export controls 

50

are based on assumptions of manufacturing and technology and the 

political framework of the fifties.’’

Now you mentioned small businesses, and I think this is where 

the difficulty comes in. Because when we enact these rules and we 

place this legislation into effect, we really don’t understand the unintended consequences for those who actually do this. 

Mr. Smith’s example, he makes shims. He told me he has to be 

so careful of where he sends these shims because it comes back to 

him. It is his responsibility to make sure that at some point in the 

supply chain or the link that it doesn’t fall into somebody’s hands 

who could use it against us. 

If you could just expand a little bit more on the costs involved 

in this? Looking at your figures, I mean, maybe again talk about 

the advantage we have in exporting, the billions of dollars advantage that we have now, but we may not have in the future, if we 

continue to make it more difficult for us to operate in a global market. So, if you could just expand on that a little bit and the cost, 

I would appreciate that. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I would be happy to, because Mr. Smith’s experience, you can multiply his experience thousands and thousands 

and thousands of times, and the cost is enormous. The fact of the 

matter is that a lot of small businesses simply do not attempt to 

export at all because they are so afraid of the paperwork and inadvertently making a mistake which has real consequences. There 

are teeth in this enforcement program. 

People say all the time, why is our Government putting up barriers to having U.S. products compete? Shims are available worldwide. This is not something that is a unique product that could not 

be obtained elsewhere. So, why make it difficult for the American 

quality and technology to get out there when others can supply it? 

And yet, we see this over and over again. It is the cost of the actual licensing. It is the cost of the registration fee. It is the cost 

of the lawyers. Because, remember, smaller companies simply don’t 

have people on staff who can make all this determination. 

It is interesting because, when you go to the State Department 

and you ask, is my item controlled or not, they won’t give you a 

straightforward interpretation. They refer you to the regs, which 

have catchall clauses in them. Those, then, require either going out 

on a limb with your interpretation or submitting a request for them 

to give you a determination, a CJ on this. And the paperwork can 

be 4 or 5 inches high, most of it documents that lawyers generate. 

Now tell me what is right about that system. 

Mr. KELLY. And I understand that. I think that is where the disconnect is. As we continue to bring forward legislation and we continue to regulate businesses at every level, it is the overall cost of 

being able to compete that is now taking us out of the game. We 

have raised the cover charge so much that nobody wants to come 

into our place anymore to do business. 

Why don’t we say we are going to develop a global strategy so 

that we compete, knowing that 95 percent of what we can achieve 

is outside our own borders and that is what we are going after? 

Then, on the other hand, we over regulate and make it so difficult 

that only a certain few can compete. 

51

So, I appreciate your testimony. Does anybody else want to 

weigh-in on that, because I know how difficult it is? Yes, Ms. Cooper. 

Ms. COOPER. I would like to make two points. One is that the 

satellite industry, the customers for completed spacecraft is an incredibly international community. It is not just about China. There 

are customers all around the world. Our ability to sell U.S.-made 

products, U.S.-made spacecraft to them is certainly affected by our 

ITAR designation, the ITAR designation that makes no differentiation between a satellite that delivers satellite TV and one that carries UAV traffic. 

I would also point to a study that the Department of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, commissioned just this year. 

They identified five new satellite technology areas at high risk, 

those that have only one or no U.S. suppliers, and an additional 

nine areas with the potential to create bottlenecks or cost increases 

for government space programs. Companies are leaving the marketplace, and that leaves our military, civil space, and intelligence 

space programs at a disadvantage when they try to source domestically. 

Mr. KELLY. So, would it be fair to say, then, that we are going 

to start relying on people outside our own borders to supply us 

with technology that we need? 

Ms. COOPER. It is already happening. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and 

the Pacific, is recognized. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would like to echo, unfortunately, the story of what happened 

on the U.S. world share of machine tools, and it is also happening 

in satellites. Rockford, Illinois, the largest city in the District I represent, at one time was known as the machine tool center of the 

world. Unfortunately, with the Commodity Control List controlling 

any machine tool that has an excess of four axis to Tier 3 countries, 

we have gone to a market share now that is in the single digits. 

Sometimes you wonder what the export control people do when 

they even take a look at a machine with a mandrel and consider 

that to be an axis if it turns or moves in any degrees. 

What is particularly bothersome is the Tier 3 countries are 

China, Israel, India, Pakistan, et cetera. It is not that difficult to 

build a five-axis machine. The guys that are left in the United 

States—you have got Haas, you have got locally Bourn & Koch, 

and a handful of others—are always facing this situation where 

you don’t have to worry about a license if you buy it from us. 

A German company that can establish a U.S. manufacturing facility can still manufacture five-axis machines and sell them anywhere, but a U.S. company cannot build a facility in Germany and 

sell because it is still bound by the Commodity Control List. This 

is insanity. 

What has happened is that the superiority that our Nation has 

had in machine tools is gone. We have to rely upon the Japanese, 

the Swiss, and the Italians, for those precision machines. 

52

The question I have of Ms. Cooper is twofold. If you think that 

is the same analogy that is going to happen to the satellite industry? And the second question would be, what happened to the satellite report that continues to be delayed? 

Ms. COOPER. I have heard references to the satellite industry’s 

cautionary tale for overregulation. By regulating and requiring regulation that doesn’t differentiate between the most sensitive and 

the most mundane, our industry has been hamstrung significantly 

in international marketplaces. It has drawn a target on technologies that had been U.S. lead items for our international competitors. 

I understand that there are some 50 studies that have been done 

on the space industrial base. I don’t know of a single one that 

hasn’t shown some level of alarm. The statistics that the AIA study 

underscores show lost jobs and lost revenues. The question is, at 

what point do you consider the harm is self-evident and act to 

allow differentiation? 

I am enormously proud of the innovation and investment that 

U.S. companies bring to the satellite sector. I believe that their 

work with the U.S. military, civil space, and intelligence community certainly has allowed them a technological sophistication that 

their competitors may not enjoy. 

I would also say that the commercial satellite industry has required quite a lot of innovation in order to be able to bring consumer services and services to enterprises that require sophisticated spacecraft as well. 

I don’t see U.S. companies, the U.S. sector, leaving the global 

marketplace, but I do see harms if we don’t allow them to compete 

where their items are widely available. 

Mr. MANZULLO. It is a similar question to Ms. Blakey. You will 

recall about 3 years ago I think I worked for 2 years on two sentences on Section 17(c)of the Export Administration Act. It was 

really absurd because we finally got that regulation changed, and 

that resulted in billions of dollars of additional exports of U.S.-

made aircraft parts. 

Can you take that example, just one example, and show that as 

the need to reform these outdated export control laws? 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, I think there is no question about the change 

that you all successfully made in Section 17(c) has made a significant difference. It is the sort of thing that was a commonsense, logical shift that, if the FAA is certifying these parts, that this indicates that they really do and should be considered under the commercial rubric. That has made a big difference. 

It would be a shame, however, to have to tackle on a onesy-twosy 

basis reform in this system. What we need is a systemic reform. 

We need the kind of across-the-board changes that the three of us 

really are here advocating today. 

And it is critical from the standpoint of preserving our industrial 

base and U.S. capabilities. It is also critical for national security 

because we are not focusing adequately right now on the most sensitive technologies because the system is creaking under the weight 

of old regulation that really is forcing it to try to do too much. That 

does not make sense, certainly not anymore. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Indeed. 

53

Ms. BLAKEY. Thank you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Could I have 10 seconds? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. And the bill on which Mr. Berman and I are cosponsors to return the satellite industry back to the United States, 

that could only occur with a change in the regulations, is that correct? 

Ms. COOPER. That is correct. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Manzullo. 

Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. My questions have been 

addressed. So, I will yield back my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And I want to thank excellent witnesses for their testimony. 

Thank you to the audience for participating and our members as 

well. 

The committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE HONORABLE HOWARD L. BERMAN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


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[NOTE: The AIA Report, ‘‘Competing for Space,’’ dated January 2012, submitted 

for the record by Ms. Marion C. Blakey, president & chief executive officer, Aerospace Industries Association, and the Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, is not reprinted here but is available 

in committee records.]

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