### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 391 -CR
Ang e l M ar ti ne z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-06 -30 2188 , HO NORAB LE MI CHAEL LY NCH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Ang el Martinez appeal s h i s co n v i ct i o n s fo r b u rgl ary wi t h i n t en tt o co m m i taggr avate d sexual assault and burg lary with intent to commit theft. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 30.02(a) (West 2003). He rece ived a forty -y ear sentenc e for the forme r convic tion and twenty y ear s for the latter. In two points of error , Martinez contends that his two c onvictions, which wer e base d on the same incide nt in whic h h e ente red a residenc e, violate his rig ht to be fre e of double jeopar dy , and that th e c ha

rg e e na ble d th e jur

y to c on vic t hi m ba se d o n le ss t ha n a un anim ou s v e rd ic t. We su sta in Martinez’s first point of err or but overr ule his second. Ma

rtinez further a

rg ues that our r emedy

for the do ub le -j e op ard

y vio la tio n s ho uld be to va c a te his c on vic tio n f or burg lary wi th i nte nt t o c omm it
a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult and a ff ir m hi s c on vic tio n f

or bu rglary with i nte nt t o c omm it the ft
. Concluding that curre nt law re quires the opposite, we wi ll vacate Martinez’s conviction for2

burg lar y wi th in tent

to c omm it the ft

and a ff ir m hi s c on vic tio n f

or burg lary wi th i nte nt t o commit sex ual assault.

Mart ine z do e s not ch a lle ng e the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su pp or tin g e ith e r o f h is convictions. For

our purpose s here , we ne ed only note that it is undi sputed both convictions wer e ba se d o n a

sin g le inc ide nt i n w hic h M art ine z ha d e nte re d th e ho me of an e lde rl y

wo man. Th e vic tim testified at tri al that Martinez broke into her house dur ing the ear ly morning hours of September 28, 2006, se x ually assaulted or

attempted to sexually assault her, then stole some of her persona l property

befor e depa

rting
. Martinez was indicted on two c ounts of burg lary . Eac h count of the indictment contained two pa

rag raphs. Count I , para g raph 1 a lleg ed that on or a bout S ep t em b er 28, 2006, M arti n e z “ w it

h in te n t t o c o mm it

th e f e lo n y o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a te d

s e xu a l a ssau lt

e n te r [e d ] a habitation without the effe ctive conse nt of [t he victim,] the owner there of.” Par ag raph 2 a lleg ed that Martinez, on or about the sa me date, “intentionally

or knowing ly

enter [ed] a habitation, without the ef fe ct i v e co nsent of [the victim,] the owner there of, and attempted to commit or committ ed the f e l o n y o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d

s e x u a l a s s a

u l t
. ” P a r a g r a

p h s 1 an d 2 c o r r e s p o n d e d

t o , r e s p e c t i v e l y, subsections (a) (1) a

nd (a) (3) of

section 30.02 of the pe nal code
. See T ex . P en al C ode Ann. § 30.02(a) (1) & (3). Count I Iof the indictment wa s para llel to count I , with two para g raphs containing alleg ations corr esponding to subsections (a) (1) a nd (3) of section 30.0 2 , but instead ref ere ncing the under ly ing of fense of theft r ather

than ag g ravated sexual assault. The jury char g e esse ntially

trac ked the indictment, with a se parate g ener al ver dict fo rm fo r e a c h c ount. Ho we ve r, the jur y wa s in str uc te d to fi nd

Ma rt ine z g uil ty

on e a c h c ount i f i tThe a pplication para g raph r eg ardingcount I stated: 1 Now bea

ring in m i n d the fore g oing instruc tions, if y ou believe f rom the evidenc e beyond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant, Ang el R oel M artinez, on or about the 28th day

of September

28, 2006, in the County of Tra vis, and State of Texas, did then and there , with intent to commit the fe lony offe nse of a ggravated sexual assault, enter a habitation without the ef fec tive consent of [victim] , the owner there of; or I f y ou believe from the evide nce be y ond a re asonable doubt that on or about the 28th day

of September

28, 2006, in the County

of Tra vis, and State of Te x as, that Angel Roel Martinez, did then and there intentionally or knowing ly

enter a habitation, without the effe ctive conse nt of [victim ], t he owne r there of, and a tte mpt e d to c omm it o r c omm itt e d th e fe lony of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult
. You will find the defe ndant g uilty of the off ense of burg lary

of a ha bitation (ag g ravated sexual assault) as a lleg ed in count one of the indictment . . . . Th e a pp lic a tio n p ara g ra

ph s f or c ount I I we re su

bs tanti ve ly ide nti c a l exce pt that “th e fe lony of fe ns e o f a g g r a v a t e d

s e x u a l a s s a

u l t ” w a s r e p l a c e d w i t h “ t h e f t ” i n t h e f i r s tp ar a g r a

p h an d “ t h e f to f p r o p e rt y” in the second. Similarly , the third para g raph r efe rre d to “. . . burg lary of a h ab i t at i o n (t h eft) a s alleg ed in count two of the indictment.” 3 fo un d th a t either Martinez had enter ed a habitation without the victim’s e ffe ctive consent with intent to c ommit t he under ly ing of fense (subsec tion (a)( 1)) or Martinez had ente red a

habitation without the vic tim ’s e ff

e c tiv e c on sen t and

c omm itt e d o r atte mpt e d to c omm it the un de rl y ingof fe ns e (subsec tion (a)( 3)). Althou gh t h e j u ry was inst ructe d that its verdicts had to be una nimous, the 1 dis jun c tiv e su

bmi ssi on of e a c h c ount ena bl ed th e jur y to f ind g uil t w ith ou t e a c h ju

ro r n e c e ssa

ri ly ag ree ing on the same a lternative the ory supporting that finding. The jury fou n d M ar t i n ez guilty

on both counts. The district cour t assessed punis hme nt at f

or ty y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt o n c ount I and tw e nty y e ars ’ imp ri so nme nt o n c ount I I , to
run conc urre ntly
.Martinez did not raise a jur y -unanimity

objection to the cha

rg e at tria l. Consequently , any 2 char g e er ror is not reve rsible unless M ar t i n ez incurre d eg reg ious harm. See Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on re h’g ). 4 Martinez’s cor e conte ntion of appea l is that subsections (a) (1) a nd (a) (3) of section 30.02 establish separ ate criminal offe nses. I n his vie w, “[o] n its fa ce, the indictment alleg es four c rimes in two counts—burg lary of a ha bitation with the i ntent to commit the felony offe nse of ag g ravated sexual assault; burg lary of a habitation and the n attempted commission or commission of ag g ravated sexual assault; burg lary of a habitation with the intent to commit t heft; burg lary of a habitation and then attempted commission or commissi on of theft.” Ba sed on this view, Martinez argues in h i s second point of e rror that the cha

rg e er roneously enable d the jury

to rende r nonunanimous verdicts in ea ch count r eg arding“sepa rate offe nses” unde r subsec tions (a)(1) and (3) , a nd that this co ns tit

ute d e g re g iou s h a

rm . At the same time, Ma rtinez a lso urg es in his first point of error 2 that his convictions for both counts I and I I —which he se ems to view as subsuming duplicative convictions for both a

n offe nse of bur g lary

with intent to co m m i t either se x ual assault or the ft (subsec tion (a)( 1)) a

nd a sepa rate offe nse of burg lary of a ha bitation with attempted commission or commission of either ag g ravated sexual assaul t o r t heft (subse ction (a) (3)) —violates doublejeopar dy
. See E

x parte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (convictions for bo th b ur g lary

of a ha bit a tio n w ithint e nt t o co mm it sex ual a ssa ult and burg lary of ha bit a tio n w ith intent to commit t heft a

rising f rom single entry

incident violated double jeopa rdy ). Th e State re sp on ds tha

t, i n e sse nc e , M art ine z’s c on vic tio ns we re ba se d o n a sin g le of fe ns e for bo th d ou

ble -j e op ard

y and jur y -u na nim ity purp os e s. As to d ou

ble je op ard

y , th e Sta te acknow ledg es that “[t] he victim descr ibed only one inc i d en t i n which her home was bur g larized”5

and that “ the re is n o e vid e nc e in the re c or d su g g e sti ng that the a pp e lla nt e nte re d th e vic tim ’s ho me more than one time.” Consequently , the Sta t e co n ce d es that double jeopar dy bars Ma rtinez’s convictions on tw o co u n t s o f burg lary that differ ed only

with respec t to whether the underlying
o f f e n s e w a s a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l a s s a u lt o r theft. See Cav azos , 2 03 S.W. 3d a t 33 7. As we e xpla in below, the St at e i s co rr ec t that the rec ord establishes a double-jeopa

rdy violation. However , the State i n s i s ts that subsections (a)( 1) and ( 3) of se ction 30.02 do not establish separa te cr iminal offe nses, but mere ly

alternative manner s and mea ns by which the of

fense o f burglar

y can be committed or proven. T h u s , t h e S tate re asons, the disjunctive submission of these alter natives wi thi n e a c h c ount d id n ot d e pr ive Mart ine z of a un anim ou s v e rd ic t. “Unde r our state constitution, j ury unanimity is r equire d in felony case s, and, under our st ate statutes, una

nimity is require d in all criminal ca ses.” Ngo v . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 738, 745 (Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); see T e x. Co n s t. art. V , § 1 3 ; T e x. Co d e Cr im
. Pr o c . A n n . art. 3 6
. 2 9 ( a) (West Supp. 2007), arts. 37.02, 37.03, 45.034-.036 (West 2006)
. This me ans “the jury must ag ree [unani mo u s ly

] t h a t the defe ndant committed one spec ific cr ime.” Lan dr ian v . S tat e , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. PD-1561-07, 2008 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 1183, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2008) (citing Stu hle r v . S

tat e , 218 S.W .3d 706, 717-19 (Tex
. Crim. App. 2007)). “T hat does not mea n, howeve r, that the jury

must unanimously

find that the def

endant c ommitt ed that cr ime in one spec ific wa y or even with one spec ific ac t.” Id
. “ To dis c e rn wh at a jur y mus t be un anim ou s a

bo ut, a pp e llate c ourt s examine the statute definingthe offe nse to deter mine whether

the leg islature cr eate d mu l t i p l e,
s e p ar a te o f

f e n s e s , o r a s in g le o f

f e n s e w it hd if f e r e n t m e th o d s o r

me an s o f

c o mm is sion.” Pi zzo v . S tat e , 23 5 S. W.3 d 7 11 , 7 14 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ) ( c itatio ns and qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; see6

als o M ar tin e z v . S tat e , 212 S.W .3d 411, 416 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref ’d) ( “allowinga jury to c hoose betwee n alternative theories of how an of

fense was c ommitt ed does not run a foul of the unanimous-ver dict require ment.”).

I n numerous re cent c ases, the court of criminal appea ls ha s addre ssed the distinction betwee n separ ate of

fense s and “manner or

means” in the context of jury -unanimity challeng es
conce rning nominally

single offe nses submitted disju n c ti v e ly a n d th e ir counter

part, double-

jeopar dy challeng es t o m u ltiple convictions for sepa rate ly -submitted, nominally differ ent offe nses. See Hu ffm an v . S

tat e , ___ S.W .3d ___, ___, No. P D-1539-07, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 1180, at * 4 (Tex. Crim App. Oct. 1, 2008) (“O ur jury unanimity opinions a nd sever al of our double jeopa rdy op ini on s a dd

re ss t he same ba sic qu e sti on : do dif fe re nt le g a l the or ie s of cr imi na l li a bil ity c omp ri se d i f f e r e n to f f e n s e s , o r d o t h e y c o mp r i s e a l t e r

n a t i v e m e t h o d s o f

c o m m i t t i n g t h e s a m e o f

f e n s e . ” )
. In g e ne ra l, t he c ourt ha s at temp te d to a sc e rt a in w he the r p art ic ula r f a c tua l c omp on e nts of

the of fe ns e
are essential ele ments, which a jury must find unanimously , as opposed to “pr eliminary ” or “under ly ing” fac ts that are me ans by which an e lement ca

n be met o r p ro v en. See Stuhler , 21 8 S. W.3 d at 71 8- 19 ; Ngo , 175 S.W .3d at 745-47. I n this connec tion, it has also soug ht to identify the “g rava

men” or “foc us” of the offe nse—the primar y conduct or

evil the leg islature wa s intending to preve nt or punish—includ i n g whether the off ense is foc used on a pa

rticular r esult, a par

ticular nature or ty

pe of c onduct, o r particula r circ umstances surr ounding c onduct or a result. Huffman , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1180, at *10-11 (“[t]he common thread in all of these case s [di stinguishing separ ate of fense s from mere manner

and mea ns] s eems to be ‘ focus’ . . . I f the foc us of the off ense is the re sult—that is, t he off ense is a ‘ result of c onduct’ c rime—then diff ere nt ty pes7

of re sults are c onsidered to be separ ate offe nses, but dif fer ent ty pes of conduct are not. On the other ha nd , if the fo c us of

the of fe ns e is t he c on du c t—t

hat is , th e of

fe ns e is a ‘n a tur e of

c on du c t’
c ri me —th e n d if

fe re nt t y pe s of c on du c t are c on sid e re d to be se pa rate of fe ns e s. ” ); Landrian , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1183, at *14-15 (dete rmining that g rava men of off

ense of ag g ravated
a ssa ult wa s “ c a

us ing bo dil y inj ur

y ” and that “ [t]he pr e c ise a c t or natur e of c on du c t in th is res ultor ie nted offe ns e is i nc on se qu e nti a l.” ); Pi zzo , 235 S.W .3d at 717 (de termining that “commits . . . sexual contact with a c hild by touching . . .” denote d a natur e-of -conduc t of

fense and that alter

native sites of touching denoted diff ere nt offense s); Stuhler , 2 18 S.W. 3d a t 71 8- 19 (c ha

ra c te ri zingof

fe ns e of injury to a child as a

“re sult of conduct” of

fense , such that ca

using “ serious bodily

injury ” to a child was a

separ ate of

fense from ca

using “serious mental defic iency , impairment or i njury ”). F or further g uidance , the cour

t has also looked to what it terms “e ighth- g rade g rammar .” Pi zzo , 23 5 S. W.3 d at 71 7 ( dia g ra min g the se xua l c on ta c t wi th a c hil d s ta tut e and de te rm ini ngthat st a tut e fo c us e d on

natur e of c on du c t) ; Stuhler , 2 18 S.W. 3d a t 71 8- 19 (d e te rm ini ngthat in jur y to a c hil d is
a re sult-oriented off

ense ba sed on fa ct that offe nse has “ main verb” of “causes” and alter native dire ct ob je c ts de sc ri bin g the pr oh ibi te d r e su lts ); see also Ngo , 1 7 5 S
. W
. 3 d at 7 4 5 n . 2 4 (“ A h an dy , t h o u gh
no t de fi nit ive , r

ule of thumb is to look

to t he statut or

y ve rb de fi nin g the c ri min a l a c t [wh ic h] . . . is g ener ally the cr iminal act upon which a ll jurors must unanimousl y ag ree .”). Se c tio n 3 0. 02 of

the pe na l c od e , ti tle d “ B ur g lary ,” pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : A per son commits an offense i f, wi thout the effe ctive conse nt of the owne r, the pe rs on : (1) enter s a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a fe lony , theft, or a n assault; or“Althoug h no g ener al culpable mental state is set for th in the statute, it is s ettled that the 3 entry must be intentional or knowing .” De Va ug hn v . S tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d

62 , 6 4 n.3 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1988). 8 (2) rema ins conce aled, with intent to commit a felony , t h ef t , o r an assault, i n a building or ha

bitation; or ( 3 ) e n t e r s a

b u i l d i n g o r

h a b i t a t i o nan d

c o m m i t s o r

a t t e mp t s t o c o m m i ta

f e l o n y, the ft , o r a n a ssa ult
. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 30.02(a) . The c ourt of cr iminal appeals ha s identified the elements of burg lary , a s d e fi ne d in

su bs e c tio n ( a )( 1) , a s ( 1) int e ntion all y or kn ow ing ly (t he g e ne ra l c ulp a

ble mental state re quired by

the pena l code ) (2) enter ing a habitation or building ( or portion there of) not 3 the n o pe n to the pu

bli c (3 ) w ith ou t th e e ff

e c tiv e c on se nt o f t

he ow ne r, and

(4 ) w iththe int e nt t o commit a felony , theft, or a ssault. De Va ug hn v . S tat e , 749 S.W .2d 62, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). T h e S t a t e m u s tp r o v e t h a ti n t e n tt o c o m m i ta f e l o n y, t h e f

t , o r a s s a u l te x i s t e d

a tt h e m o m e n to f

e n t r y. Id
. at 65. Thus, under subsection (a) (1), the g ener al culpable mental s tate of intentional or knowing entry is subsumed within the element of specific i ntent to commit a felony , theft, or a ssault. Id . at 64 n.3. Another impl ication i s that “the offense is complete upon e ntry ; a completed f elony or theft [or assault] is unnece ssary .” Id. at 65.

As sug g ested by

the g rammatica l structure of subsection (a)(1), its primary focus or g rava men i s t h e verb a

nd direc t object—“e nters a ha bitation or a building” —modified by the prepositional ph ra s e “without the ef fec tive consent of the owner ” (a circ umstance disting uishing burg lar io us ent ry

fr om t he me re a c t of

e nte ri nga

ha bit a tio n o r b uil din g , w hic h is no t inhe re ntl y ill e g a l) , an d

a c c o mp an ie d

b y th e r e qu is it e me n ta l s tate a tt a c h in g to th e e n tr y ( ane lementSee, e .g. , Da yv . S tat e , 532 S.W .2d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 4 9 dis tin g uis hin g burglary fro m tre sp a ss ). Se e id . at 65 . T he fa c t th a t th e re qu ir e d me nta l st a te 4 attache s to the act of entry is a n indicator that this a ct was intended to be the foc us or g rava men of the offe nse. Cf

. Huffman , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1180, at *13 ( fac t that leg islature re quired culpable me ntal state to attac h to a par ticular circumstance and not a pa rticular r esult or par

ticular nature of conduc t indicated that the c ircumstance was the g rava men of the of

fense ). The statute’s focus on entry is also rec og nized in other cour t of criminal appe als opinions chara cter izi ng burg lary
as a c rime ag ainst proper

ty , as opposed to an a ssaultive crime, whose “harm results from the e ntry itself.” Cavazos , 2 0 3 S
. W
. 3 d at 3 3 7 (c i t i n g Ri c ha rd

so n v . S tat e , 8 88 S.W. 2d

82 2, 82 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 )) . Mor e g e ne ra lly , the c ourt ha s expla ine d tha t “[o]ur burg lary statut e s a re int e nd e d to protec t the sancti t y o f p ri vate a rea s, be they

habitations, buildings not open to the public, or vehicles,” and the e ntry

itself cause s the harm “beca use the intrusion violates the occ upant’s
rea sonable e x pectation of privacy .” Richardson , 888 S.W .2d at 824
. Thus, in Cavazos , the cour t held t hat convictions for both burg lary with intent to commit ag g ravated sexual assault and burg lary wi th i nte nt t o c omm it the ft ari sin g fr om a sin g le a c t of e nte ri ng a re sid e nc e we re ba rr e d b y do ub le je op ard y , e ve n w he re e a c h c ount h a d a dif fe re nt c omp la ina

nt, a s “ the a llo wa

ble un it p ro se c uti on

in a burgla ry is the unl awf

ul entry .” Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d at 337. For this reason, the State, w ith good
rea son, conce ded Mar

tinez’s first point of error
. The e lements of burg lary , as def ined in subsection (a )(3) , are : (1) intentionally or kn ow ing ly

(2 ) e nte ri nga

ha bit a tio n o r b uil din g (o r p or tio n th e re of

) n ot t he n o pe n to the pu

bli c ( 3 ) w i t h o u tt h e e f

f e c t i v e c o n s e n to f

t h e o w n e r , an d

( 4 ) c o m m i t t i n g o r

a t t e mp t i n g t o c o m m i ta

f e l o n y,10

the ft , or an a ssa

ult . T e x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 3 0. 02 (a )( 3) ; DeVaughn , 749 S.W .2d at 65. W ith the exception of the prepositional phrase “without the eff ective consent of the owner ,” eac h element of burg lary a s d e fi ne d in (a )( 1) and (3 )— and (a )( 2) , for that matt e r— a pp e ar in the ir

re sp e c tiv e se pa

rate subsections. The court of criminal appea ls has appeare d to sug g est that the leg islature’s plac ement of diffe ring alternative statutory components of a

n offe nse in separ ate sections or subsections may signa l leg islative intent to create sepa rate o ff en ses. Cf

. Huffman , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1180, a t *14-15 (c oncluding that leg islature “w as appa rently neutra l” about whe ther de fe nd ant i nte nti on a lly , k no wi ng ly , o r r e c kle ssl y

c a us e d b od il y in

jury “ be c a us e a ll thr e e c ulp a

ble mental states ar e listed tog ether in a sing le phra se within a sing le subsection of the statute.”). O n the oth e r h and , th e de fi nit ion of burg lary un de r sub se c tio n (a )( 3) is sub sta nti ve ly ide nti c a l to th a t in (a )( 1) , w itha

sin g le e xce pti on : in ste a d o f h a vin g to pr ov e sp e c if ic int e nt to c omm it a

fe lony , th e ft , or assa ult at t he ti me of entry , the S tate can prove the def endant, a fter e ntry , proce eded to ac tua lly

c om mi t or atte mp t to c om mi t a f e lon y , th e ft, or as sa ult . Subsection (a) (3) thus “inc ludes as burg lary the c on du c t of

on e wh o e nte rs wi tho ut e ff e c tiv e con sent

bu t, l a c kin g int e nt t o c omm it a ny c ri me up on his e ntr y , s ub se qu e ntl y

fo rm s tha t inte nt an d co mmi ts or a tte mpt s to com mit a fe lony or the ft
. [I t] dispenses with the nee d to prov e intent at the time of the entry when the a ctor is ca

ug ht in the act.” DeVaughn , 749 S.W .2d at 65 (quoting Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 30.02, Practice Commentary ). We must decide whe ther the le g islature intended, thr oug h this single substantive distinction betwee n burg lary a s d e fi ne d und e r s ub se c tio ns (a )( 1) ve rs us (a )( 3) , to c re a te tw o dist inc t c ri min a l of fe ns e s. Gu ide d b y

the c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls’ pr ior

ana ly sis of

se c tio n 3 0. 02 , w e c on c lud e it d id n ot.We a lso note that the DeVaughn court ter med the thre e subsec tions of (a) a s “three distinct 5 way s in which one may

commit the offense of burg lary .” 749 S.W.2d at 64-65.

11 I n DeVaughn , a case involving the sufficie ncy of a burg lary indictment, the court of
c ri min a l a pp e a ls c ha

ra c te ri zed the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n s ub se c tio n ( a )( 1) and (a )( 3) a s f

oll ow s:
the a tte mpt e d o r c omp le te d th e ft or fe lony re qu ir e d by § 3 0. 02 (a )( 3) , s up ra , me re ly supplants the specific intent w hich acc ompanies entry in §§ 30.02(a) (1) and (2).
. . . The gr a v a m e n o

f th e o ff e n s e o f b u r g la r y c le a r ly r e m a in s e n tr

y o f a b u il din g or habitation w ithout the effective c onsent of the o w n er , a ccompanied by e ither the re qu ire d m e nta l st

ate , u nd e r § § 3 0. 02 ( a) ( 1) an d ( 2)

. . . or thefur the r re qu isi te ac ts or omissions, under § 30.02( a) ( 3)
. Id . (empha sis added). Rely ing on DeVaughn , at least two of our sister courts, a lbeit in unreported 5 opinions, have conc luded that subsections (a) (1) and (3) are essentially alternative means of pr oving a sing le mens re a ele ment and not sepa rate offe nses. Ra mo s v . S tate , No . 04- 05 -0 05 43 -C R, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 5139, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—S an Antonio J une 14, 2006, pet. r ef’ d) (mem. op.,
no t de sig nate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) ; Y

ate s v . S tat e , No. 05-05-00140- CR, 2005 Te x . App. L EXI S 9468,
a t * 6

- 9 ( T e x. A p p . — D a ll a s N o v . 1 0 , 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t. ) ( me m. o p . , n o t de s ig n a te d f o r p u b li c a ti o n )
. We ag ree with the essenc e of their re asoning . Subsection (a) (1)’ s specific -intent requir ement and
su bs e c tio n ( a )( 3) ’s fu

rt he r- a c ts r e qu ir e me nt f

un c tio n a s a lte rn a tiv e me ans of pr ov ing wh a t amou

nts to a n a g g ra vatin g fa c tor that e le vate s a c ts c on sti tut ingtr e sp a ss t o th e of fe ns e of burg lary . A t le a st for purp o s es of 30.02, the two a lternatives, thoug h contained in se parate subsections, func tion as
c o n ceptua l and moral e quivalents. See Landrian , 2 00 8 T ex . C ri m. App . 1 18 3, at * 15 -19 (i nt enti on a l, knowing , and re ckless bodily injury assault func tioned as equiva lents and we re not separate cr imes). W h e t h e r a b u r g l ar y d e f e n d an ta c tu a l l y c o m m i t t e d o r a t t e mp t e d t o c o m m i tt h e u n d e r l yi n g f e l o n y,12

theft, or a ssault versus merely intending it when entering may have implications for

a def endant’ s
overa ll criminal liabilit y , but these would stem from other penal pr ovisions rather than a ny thing the leg islature intended w ithin section 30.02. W e over rule Mar tinez’s second point of er ror. Our disposition of Ma rt i n ez ’s p o ints of error require s us to vacate one of his two convictions but aff

irm the other. Bi

gon v. Sta te , 252 S.W .3d 360, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d at 337. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals ha s instructed us that when two convictions violate double jeopar dy , we must retain the convic tion for the “most ser ious” offe nse. Bigon , 2 5 2 S
. W
. 3 d a t 37 2; Ca va zos , 203 S.W .3d at 337. The “ most serious” offe nse is the conviction for w hich t h e greatest sentenc e wa s assessed. Bigon , 2 52 S.W. 3d a t 37 3; Cavazos , 20 3 S. W.3 d at 33 8. I n th is c a se , w e c an d isc e rn that th e di st ri c t c ourt

a sse sse d f

or ty y e a rs ’ imprisonment as punishment on count I , burg lary of a habitation with intent to commit ag g ravated
se xua l a ssa

ult , a nd tw e nty y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt on co un t I I , bur g lary of a ha bit a tio n with int e nt t o commit theft. There is no dispute that forty y ear s is g reater than twe nty y ear s and that burg lary

of
a ha bit a tio n w ith int e nt to c omm it a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult is the re fo re the “ mos t se ri ou s” of fe ns e of convic tion.

Martinez, howeve r, urg es that we should instea d vacate his most serious conviction and re tain his less serious offe nse of conviction to de ter the State in the future f rom over- char g ing
case s and co mm it

ti n g “ c lear ” or “ obvious” double-jeopa rdy violations, as he contends oc curr ed her e. Counsel asserts that Tra

vis County

prosec utors have pe rsistently eng ag ed in such practices a nd that thi s so rt of pr op hyla c tic me a sure is n e c e ssa ry to p ro vid e me anin g fu l pr ote c tio n to de fe nd ants ’ r ig hts to be fre e of double jeopar dy . Martinez insists that his c oncept finds support in what he ter ms the13

“implicit rule of L a nd

e rs , ” t h e case in which the c ourt of cr iminal appeals he ld that the “most serious” of

fense con ce p t would g overn the reme dy for double-

jeopar dy violations. See Lan de rs v . S

tat e , 957 S.W .2d 558, 559-61 (Tex
. Crim. App. 1997). Specifica lly , Martinez observe s that one of the Lan de rs court’s policy rationale s for adopting the “most serious” of fense rule wa s that

“ [b] ecause pursuing both offenses i s proper in this context , the State should have the benef it of the most serious punishment obtained.” Id . at 56 0 ( e mph a sis a dd e d)
. Ma rt ine z dis tin g uis he s Lan de rs , which invo l v ed two offe nses that wer e “not invar iably the ‘same offe nse’ f

or double jeopa

rdy purposes,” from the prese nt c ase, in w hich he urg es “the prosec ution . . . sought convic tions for what is t he same of

fe ns e as a mat ter of law .” On thi s b a sis , M a

rt ine z “i nv ok e s Lan de rs ’ i mpl ic it exception to its reme dy : where the prosec ution alleg es two off enses in one indictment whic h are the
same a s a matter of

law, the r emedy

for unc onstitut ionally -obt ained multiple punishments will be to vacate the most serious punishment and convic tion.”

Ev e n if we c ou ld a g re e that Lan de rs ( m u c h l e s s i t s p r o g e n y Bigon and Cavazos ) ar e dis tin g uis ha

ble and tha t the “ mos t ser iou s” of

fe ns e c on c e pt doe s not g ov e rn thi s ca se , w e wo uld sti ll find n o s u p p o rt fo r t he re medy Martinez advocates. Absent fur ther guidance from the c ourt of criminal appe als, we w ould not be fre e simply to impose the prophylactic p ro cedural mea sure Martinez advocates, but would instead look to the re medies for double-jeopa

rdy violations that the court of c riminal appea ls had applied prior to Lan de rs . These inc luded “‘ [choosing] the offe nse that the defendant was convicted of first,’ ‘affirm[ing] the conviction that had the lowest number in the char g ing instrument,’ and ‘[choosing ] t he off ense that was alleg ed first in the indictment.’” W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 2 4 0 S
. W
. 3 d 2 9 3 , 3 0 0 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 7 , n o p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g Ex parte Pena ,14

820 S.W .2d 806, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (plurality op.)). Apply ing the se re medies would lea d to the same result as with the “most serious off ense” rule—we would reta in Martinez’s conviction fo r b ur g lary

wi th i nte nt t o c omm it a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssault
. I n shor t, M art ine z’s argume nts reg arding the appropriate remedy for the double-jeopa rdy violation are more appropr iately direc ted to the court of c riminal appea ls or the leg islature rather than this Court.
CO NC LU SION We v a c a te the jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n f or burg lary of a ha bit a tio n w ithint e nt t o
c omm it the ft . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n f or burg lary of a ha bit a tio n wi th int e nt t o commit ag g ravated sexual assault.

__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med in part; Va cate d in part Filed: Nove mber 14, 2008 Pub lis h