IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01405-SCT GROUND CONTROL, LLC d/b/a GROUND CONTROL OF ALABAMA, LLC AND FRANK BEATON

v. CAPSCO INDUSTRIES, INC., W.G. Y ATES & SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY , HARRAH’S ENTERTAINMENT, INC., AND CHRISTOPHER KILLION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/16/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROGER T. CLARK TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: BLEW ETT W . THOMAS RODERICK MARK ALEXANDER, JR. MATTHEW W ARD McDADE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: BLEW ETT W . THOMAS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: RODERICK MARK ALEXANDER, JR. MATTHEW W ARD McDADE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED; ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 03/09/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. W h en this case was bef ore this Court o n interlocutory appeal, we reversed i n p a r t

. Groun d Control, LLC v. C apsco Indus., Inc. , 120 So. 3 d 3 65, 367 (Miss. 2013) ( GroundControl I

). Because it was undisputed that n either sub-subcontractor Ground C ontrol, LLC, (Ground Control) nor subcontractor Capsco Industries, Inc., (Capsco)—both Alabam a

com panies—had a s tatutorily required certif i cate of responsibility to work in this State, this
Court agreed that t he subcontra c t was void. But we f ound, d espite the void contract, “Ground Control should not be precluded f r om h aving the opportuni t y t o proceed in court under a claim f

or the value of what it e xpended in labor and supplies on the project.” Id. at 371. S o we rem anded this case to the trial court s o Ground Control could pursue the nonbarred “claim s of

unjust enrichm e nt and quantum meruit .” I d. a t 367. ¶2. Despite this clear holding, Ground Control argues i n this a ppeal that the trial co u r t erred by lim iting its claim s on rem and to unjust e nrichm ent and quantum meruit

. But we f ind

no error. I nstead, the trial c ourt properly lim ited the i ssue at trial to Ground C o ntrol’s claim f or quantum meruit dam a ges. ¶3. W e do, h o w e v e r , f ind W

. G. Yates and Sons Construction C o m pany (Yates) and Capsco h ave raised reversible errors in their cross-appeals. Based o n the evidence presented

at trial, we f

ind Yates was entitled to a directed verdict b ecau s e Ground Control f ailed to
prove Yates’s liabi l i t y f

o r quantum meruit dam ages. W e a lso f ind t he quantum meruit dam ages a ward a gainst Capsco was against the overwhel mi n g weight o f the e vidence. Consequently , Capsco is entitled to a rem i ttitur. ¶4. W e af

f irm on Ground C ontrol’s and Ground Control owner Fra n k Beaton’s direct appeals. On cross-appeal, we reverse the $36,644.69 judgm ent against Yates and render a judgm ent in Yates’s f

avor. W e also reverse the $825,583.31 judgm e nt against Capsco. W e

2rem and the q uantum meruit claim against Capsco, i nstructing the trial court to conduct a new

trial on d am ages alone, unless a rem ittitur of $626,407.31, m a kin g the dam age award $199,096, is accepted by

Ground Control and Capsco.
B ackground Facts and Procedural History
I. Interlocutory Appeal ¶5. This is the second tim e this case has com e bef ore this Court on appeal. ¶6. In 2009, sub-subcontractor Ground C ontrol s ued subcontractor Capsco over work perf orm ed on the Margaritaville H otel in B iloxi. Ground C ontrol also sued the project’s general contractor, Yates, and owner, Harrah’s Entertainm ent, Inc. (Harrah’s). But the trial

c o u r t d iscovered Ground Control’s subcontract with Capsco was v oid by statute, beca u s e neither party had a certif

icate of responsibility

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-15 (Rev. 2010).
So the t rial court g ranted the def endants s um m ary judgm e nt on a ll of Ground Control’s claim s, because they

stem m ed f

rom the void subcontract. ¶7. On interlocutory a ppeal, we reversed i n part. Ground Control I , 120 So. 3d at 367. “Although we agree[ d] with the trial court’s f i nding that the lack of certif icates of responsibility rendered the parties’ contract n ull a nd void, we f [ ou]nd that G round Control’s claim s f o r u n j u st enrichm ent and quantum meruit w ere n ot barred by Mississippi Code Section 31-3-21.” Id. a t 373. W e also r eversed the g rant of sum m ary judgm ent in f avor of
H a r r a h’s and Yates on purely procedural grounds—nam e ly , the “ f ailure to g ive proper noti c e of the conversion o f t h e R u l e 12 m otion to dism iss to a Rule 56 m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent.” Id

. at 371 (citing M.R.C.P. 12 and M.R.C.P. 56).

3II. Supplem ental Com plaint

¶8. On Septem

ber 24, 2013, the m andate issued on the interlocutory appeal. ¶9. Despite the clear directive in Ground C ontrol I —rem and f

or f urther proceedings on the issue of unjust enrichm ent and quantum meruit

— Ground Control im m ediately m oved to “supplem e nt” its com

p l aint with claim s against Capsco a nd its p r i n c i p a l, Christopher Killion, 1 based on a panoply of equity -based and nonequity

- based theories, such a s contract, statutory rights, and tort. 2 A gainst Yates and Harrah’s, Ground Control sought statutory relief under Missis s ippi Code Section 85-7-131 or Section 85-7-181 ( Rev. 2 011), 3 as well

as c ontract d am a ges b ased on its claim that it was a “ third-party benef iciary ” to the contract between Harrah’s and Y ates. Ground Control also asserted a c laim f or quantum meruit

—as well as other unspecif

ied “ equitable claim s”—seeking Yates a nd Harrah’s be jointly and severally liable with Capsco. I n total, Ground Control requested $1.16 m illion in dam ages. ¶10. Operating under the assum ption that its prior grant of sum m ary judgm ent had been reversed in full , t he trial court granted Ground Control’s m otion t o s upplem ent its c om plaint.

1 Ground Control also sought to ho l d C a p s c o of f icers Loy e McIlveene and Jason Dollar, as individuals, jointly and severally

liable.

2 In ad d itio n to assertin g “ex tra-co n t ractu al” claim s ag ain st C ap sco , G ro u n d C o n tro l ad d ed t o rt claim s f

o r f rau d , f ailu re to co rrect w o rk , n eg lig en t su p erv isio n o f em p lo y ees, in terf eren c e wi t h b us i ne s s r e l a tio n s, co n v e rsio n , b a d f aith , an d self

-d ealin g . G ro u n d C o n tro l also alleg ed C a

p sco v io lated sto p -p ay n o tices an d co mmi t t ed “o th er w ro n g s.” G ro u n d C o n tro l req u ested an acco u n tin g b y C ap sco an d p u n itiv e d am a g e s.

3 S in ce th e f

ilin g o f th is su it, S ectio n 8 5 -7 -1 3 1 h a s b een am e n d ed to restrict ap p licatio n to w ater, o i l, a n d g as w ells an d f ix ed m ach in ery . M iss. L aw s 2 0 1 4 , ch

. 4 8 7 , § 1 8 , ef f

. f ro m A p ril 1 1 , 2 0 1 4

. S

ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 8 5 -7 -1 3 1 (S u p p . 2 0 1 6 ). A n d S ectio n 8 5 -7 -1 8 1 h as b een rep e aled in i ts en tir e t y . M iss. L a w s 2 0 1 4 , ch

. 4 8 7 , § 2 4 , ef f

. f ro m an d af ter A p ril 1 1 , 2 0 1 4

. 4C a psco responded with a third-party claim f or f raud against Ground Control’s principa l , Frank Beaton. Beaton then asserted third-party counterclaim s against Capsco a nd its of f icers f or abuse of process, tortious i nterf erence with business relations, and re p a y m e nt of a $75,000 construction loan, which Beaton had personally guaranteed.
III. Pretrial Motions ¶11. Bef

ore trial, severa l p a rties m oved f o r s um m a r

y judgm e nt. Harrah’s and Yates’s

m otion was denied, as was Ground Control’s. But Beaton’s m otion f or sum m ary j udgm ent on the claim s against him p e rsonally was granted. So the trial court dism issed Beaton as a third-party

def endant. 4 This lef

t Killion as the only

individual def

endant. ¶12. Also bef

ore trial, Capsco f

iled a m otion in limine requesting Ground Control’s dam ages claim s be lim ited to the costs expended and m aterials purchas e d f o r t he Margaritaville p roject. The t rial court granted t his m otion. Specif i c ally , the trial court ordered that Ground Control was lim ite d t o p resenting e vidence under a quantum meruit
t h e o r y , based on this Court’s m andate i n Ground Control I

. Consequently , the trial court ordered that “[ a]ny

alleged tort claim s are dism issed and will not be presented at trial.”
IV. Trial and Verdict ¶13. A six-day trial w as held i n October 2014. Beaton testif ied G r ound Control had expended $920,252.80 in unpaid labor and m aterials. But o n cross-exam ination, h e adm itted

som e expenses were counted twice o r d i d n o t a p ply to the Margaritaville p roject. He also adm itted that his com

pany had been paid m o re t han a h alf -m illion d ollars bef

ore it stopped

4 By Ground Control’s ore tenus m otion, McIlveene and Dollar also were dism issed as individual def

endants. 5working on the project. W hen p ressed, Beaton conceded that, once the f igures were added up, Ground Control’s claim f o r unpaid labor and services was only $199,096. ¶14. At the e nd of Ground Control’s case-in-chief , Killion m oved f

or a directed verdict in his f avor individually

. The trial court granted this m otion, f i nding Ground Control h ad f ailed
to present any evidence supporting its c laim Killion was individually liable. The t rial court al s o d i r e c ted a verdict in Y ates’s and Harrah’s f avor on Ground Control’s statutory -based claim s, as well as i ts claim that it was a third-party benef iciary to the contract between Yates and Harrah’s. ¶15. At the end of trial, o n October 21, 2014, the jury was instructed that any recovery by Ground Control f

rom Capsco, Y ates, a nd/or Harrah’s would be based on quantum meruit only and lim ited to t he value of u npaid l abor and services rendered. The jury f ound Ground Control w as entitled to $862,228. And using the a greed-to f orm supplie d t o i t , t h e jury apportioned 95.75% liability ($825,583.31) to Capsc o , 4

. 2 5 % l i a bility ($36,644.69) to Yates, and 0% liability

($0) to Harrah’s.
V. Post-trial Motions ¶16. Wh a t s h o uld h ave signaled the end of this case at the t rial level a ctually se t o f f protracted post-trial l itigation. As the trial court noted in one of i ts m any post-trial orders, there were ninety -nine docket entries f ollowing trial. ¶17. Am ong these volum i nous m otions w e r e Ground C ontrol’s m otion t o am end t he verdict t o “rem ove surplusage” (i.e., the apportionm ent of l iability ), its m otion f or pre- and post-judgm ent interest, and a m otion f or a new trial on the lim ited issue of Killion’s personal

6liability

. 5 All o f G round Control’s m otions were denied, 6 except that in its f inal order, the trial court awarded p o st-

judgm ent interest. This interest was set to accrue f rom the date of the f inal order, which was entered eleven m onths af ter t h e j u r y ’ s verdict, due t o Ground Control’s m

ultiple post-trial f

ilings. ¶18. Capsco, Yates, and Harrah’s f iled a m otion f

o r judgm ent n otwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Alternatively , Capsco requested rem i ttitur. These m o tions were denied. ¶19. Beaton, individually , also f iled a post-trial m otion. On Septem ber 9, 2015—the date of the f inal judgm ent 7

— Beaton m oved f or entry of a scheduling order or, alternatively , f or

a f i nal judgm ent on his third-party cla im s. The trial court denied t his m otion, f inding “no f urther action is required

. . . as all claim s alleged by a n y P a r t y i n this Cause have been adjudicated in the Final Judgm ent entered herein[ .]”
VI. Appeal and Cross-Appeals ¶20. W i th the f

inal judgm ent b eing entered, f inally , Ground Control and Beaton a ppealed. Capsco and Yates cross-appealed. 8 Harrah’s is part of this appeal as appellee only

.

5 Wh ile th o s e mo t i o n s w ere p en d in g , Ground Control also f iled a m otion to am end the pleadings to conf

orm to the evidence presented at trial, f o llowed b y an am ended m otion to am end the pleadings. It also f iled a m otion f

or a trial setting of its tort claim s . 6 Wh en its m o tio n s w ere d en ied , G ro u n d C o n tro l f i led a m o tio n f

o r a c o r rectio n o f th e o rd er d e n y in g a tria l s e t t i n g o n th e d ism issed to rt claim s an d d en y in g p re-j u d g m en t in terest. Wh en th ese m o tio n s w ere d en ied , G r o u n d C o n tro l i n ex p licab l y f iled a m o tio n f

o r p artial su m

m ary j u d g m en t o n its “to rt claim s u n d er M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 8 5 -7 -1 8 3 .”

7 A w e ek later, o n S ep t em b er 1 8 , 2 0 1 5 , th e trial co u rt e n tered a c o rrected f i n al j u d g m en t, clarif

y i n g ad d itio n a l claim s h ad also b een d ism i ssed o n d irected v erd i ct.

8 In Jan u ary

2 0 1 6 , G ro u n d C o n tro l an d B eato n m o v ed to strik e th e n o tice o f cro ssap p eal as u n tim ely

. B u t a p an e l o f t h i s C o u r t d en ied th e m o t io n . It seem s th at G ro u n d 7Issues on Appeal / Cross-Appeal

¶21. Ground Control raises six issues on appeal—prim a rily challenging the lim itation of its recovery to quantum m eruit dam ages, the special verdict f orm apportioning liability , and the denial of

pre-judgm ent interest. 9

C o n tro l an d B eato n w ere t ry in g to h av e it b o th w ay s— o n th e o n e h an d arg u in g to th is C o u rt th at th e j u d g m en t in th i s c a s e h a d b eco m e f in a l an d ap p e alab l e o n S ep tem b er 9 , 2 0 1 5 , trig g erin g th e t h irty -d ay w in d o w to ap p eal, b u t o n th e o t h e r h an d arg u in g to th e trial co u rt th at th e j u d g m en t w as n o t f in a l o n S ep tem

b er 9 , 2 0 1 5 , b ecau se B eato n ’s th ird -p arty claim s h ad n o t b e en d i sp o sed o f

. 9 Specif ically , Ground Control argues:
I. T h e c i r c u i t c o u r t c om m itted reversible error by d e n y i n g G r o u n d Control’s m otion to delete surplusage f r om verdict.
II. Should the apportionm ent o f the verdict not be stricken as surplusage, Ground Control subm its that the circuit c o urt com m itted rev e r s i b l e error concerning the claim s alleged against Yates and Harrah’s.
III. The Corrected Final Judgm ent contains inaccurate statem ents of both the claim s that w e r e presented to the jury and d ism issed by directed verdict.
IV. T he c ircuit court com m itted r ev e r s i b l e e r r o r b y d e n y i n g G r o u n d Control’s m otion f

or the a ssessm ent of pre-judgm e nt interest. F urther, t h e assessm ent of post-judgm e n t interest should a ccrue f rom Octob e r 21, 2014.
V. The circuit c ourt com m itted r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r b y d ism issing Ground Control’s claim s alleging ultra v ires a cts by Capsco’s o wner Christopher Killion.
VI. The circuit court com m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e error by deny ing Ground Control a trial on i ts tort claim s against Capsco and Killion that were pled in the Supplem e ntal Com

plaint. 8¶22. On cross-appeal, Capsco attacks the $825,583.31 judgm e nt against it, arguing it was

entitled to a JNOV, alternatively , a rem ittitur. Yates also c ross-appeals, sim ilarly asserting its m otion f

or sum m ary j udgm e nt, m otion f or directed verdict, a nd m otion f or JNOV should have been granted. ¶23. Fina l l y , Beaton appeals in his capacity as third-party plaintif f

. He claim s his dueprocess r i ghts were v iolated when the trial court denied him a jury trial on his third-party claim s against Capsco and Capsco’s owner, Killion.
Discussion ¶24. Due to the m

ultiple, of t en overlapping issues raised in t he a ppeals and cross-appeals,

we approach the questions raised ca t e g o r i cally , i nstead of going through each party ’s appellate issues one-by -one. I. Did Ground Control forfeit its r i g h t to appeal w h en it seized $36,644.69 from Yates in satisfaction of the judgm ent? ¶25. The f

irst question c oncerns a prelim inary m atter. In its brief , Yates sugges t s that Ground Control f

orf eited its right to appeal when it garnished $ 36,644.69 f r om Yates’s bank
account to satisf

y Yates’s portion of the judgm ent. 10 But this Court has long h eld that “when the plaintif

f a c c e p ted m o n ey paid, h e may still a ppeal, where the object o f the appeal is simply to have a judgment modified b y increasing his demand, as where sufficient damages had not been allowed , o r where proper interest had not been allowed.” Inv’rs Prop. Mgm t.,

10 In O cto b er 2 0 1 5 , af

ter f ilin g its n o tice o f ap p eal, G ro u n d C o n tro l f iled a su g g estio n o f g arn ish m en t w i th Y ates’s b an k s. A f ter th e $ 3 6 ,6 4 4 .6 9 w a s g arn ish ed , Y ates m o v ed f o r a satisf actio n o f j u d g m en t o n N o v em b er 6 , 2 0 1 5

. T h i s mo t i o n w as g ran t ed o n D ecem b er 2 , 2 0 1 5

. 9Ltd. v. W

atkins, Pitts, Hill & Assocs. , 5 11 So. 2 d 1379, 1 383 (Miss. 1987) ( quoting Adam s

v. C arter , 92 M iss. 579, 5 90- 9 1 , 4 7 S o . 4 0 9, 410 (1908)). Here, the object of Ground Control’s appeal is a larger judgm e n t a nd pre-judgm ent i nterest. So we f ind it still m ay appeal, d espite accepting Yates’s p ay m ent. See Davis v

. Noblitt & Capers E

lec. C o. , 594 So. 2d 610, 613 (Miss. 1992) ( clarif y ing “that t he acceptance of t he f ruits o f a judgm ent at law does n ot preclude appeal”). But because it accepted pay m ent w hile its a

p peal was pending,
G r o u n d Control “holds the f unds subject to any judgm e nt which is rendered on appeal or possible cross appeal.” Id. ¶26. The sam e i s true f

or Yates. Its pay

m ent was n ot voluntary but instead m ade through

an execution of a writ of g arnishm ent. So the pay m ent does n ot r ender Yates’s cross-appeal

m oot . See In re Estate of Pethan , 475 S.W .3d 722, 727-28 (Mo. 2015).
II. Was Ground Control’s potential recovery properly l im ited to quantum m eruit dam ages? ¶27. The next question is the m ost crucial to this appeal—Did the trial court properly lim it the trial to Ground Control’s claim f or quantum meruit d ama g e s ? Ground C ontrol asserts that the trial court “com m itted reversible error by deny ing Ground Control a trial on its tort claim s against Ca p s c o and K illion that were pled i n the Supplem ental Com p laint.” It also “subm its that the circuit court c om m itted r eversible e rror concernin g t h e claim s alleged against Yates and Harrah’s.” But based on o ur clear m andate i n Ground Control I , we f ind no reversible error.

A. Claim s Against Capsco and Killion

1 0¶28. Ground Control I was not a blanket r ev e r s al of the grants of sum m ary j udgm ent.

Instead, we a greed with the trial court that the subcontract between Capsco and Ground Control was void b y statute. Ground Control I , 120 So. 3d at 3 68-69. S till, we r eversed the grant o f s um m a ry j udgm ent “ in part .” Id. a t 367 (em pha s i s a dded). Despite the void contract, w e f

ound Ground Control could proceed with its lawsuit “ u n d e r a claim f or the value of what it expended in labor and supplies on the project.” I d. at 372. ¶29. Despite this clear, narrow holding, the trial court i nitially proceeded post-rem and as if its g rants o f s u mma ry judgm ent had been reversed in full

. The court perm itted Ground Control, over the def

endants’ o bjection, to supplem ent its c om plaint t o add v arious theories of recovery bey o nd unjust enrichm ent and quantum meruit

. But bef ore trial, the trial court properly recognized t he lim ited scope of Ground Control I ’s m andate and granted Capsco’s

m otion in limine , thereby dism issing t he initially g ranted supplem ent a l c l a i ms . T he court
perm itted Ground Control to proceed solely on its c l aim that it was entitled to recover quantum meruit dam ages. ¶30. Under the law-of

-the-case doctrine, the trial court was bound to f o llow Ground Control I ’s m andate. See Moeller v. Am . Guar. & Liab. I ns. , 812 So. 2 d 953, 960-61 (Miss. 2002) (discussing the law-of -the-case doctrine). And that opinion f ound G round Control’s lawsuit based on the Margaritaville project survived sum m ary judgm e nt only a s to its “claim f or the value o f what it expended in labor and supplies on t he project.” Ground Control I , 120 So. 3d at 371. Ground C ontrol’s original c o m plaint, like its supplem ental com plaint, had brought m ore than just contract claim s. Id. at 367. But in rem anding this case, we did not

1 1authorize G round Control to pursue those dism i ssed claim s. Rather, we expressly rem anded

f o r “proceedings on w hether Ground Control [ was] entitled to recover b ased on cl a i ms o f unjust enrichm ent and quantum meruit .” Id. at 367. Ground Control could not m ake an end

run around our clear m andate b y f iling a “supplem ental com plaint” b ased on the sam e f acts alleged in the original com plaint. ¶31. Nor could Ground Control rely on Ground Control I ’s “ other penalties” language to

s u p p o r t i ts argum ent i t i s entitled to r ecover m ore than unjust-enrichm e nt and quantum
meruit dam ages. In Ground Control I , at the end of its discussion on G round Control’s ability t o recover i n light of its clear violation of Section 31-3-15, t his Court s tated, “W e do
not address the issue of other penalties, if any , that m ay be appropriate f or the trial court to

a d d r ess.” Id. at 371. On appeal, Ground Control claim s these “ other penalties” i n c l u d e f inding the def

endants liable in t ort. B ut placed in i ts context, it is ob v ious that “other penalties” ref

ers to the s tat u t o r

y p e nalties im

posed by Sections 31-3-15 and 31-3-21 in addition to the penalty of voiding the c ontract. S ee Ground Control I

, 120 So. 3d at 368 (noting the statutory “penalties that s erve to deter parties f rom entering illegal contracts—such as voiding the contract and im posing f ines—apply t o both parties”); see also
Ace P ipe Cleaning, Inc. v. Hem phill Constr. Co., Inc. , 134 So. 3d 799, 806 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ground Control I , 120 S o. 3d at 3 68) (f

i nding the p ublic policy behind Section
3 1 -3-15 “ w as adequately p rotected by the statute’s provision f or f ines and penalties”). So the r ef erence to “other penalties” did not open t he door f or Ground Control to recover under other theories bey ond unjust enrichm ent and quantum meruit

. Rather, it m erely provided the

1 2trial court discretion t o consider whether other statutory penalties applied. See Miss. Code

Ann. § 31-3-21. ¶32. Based on Ground Control I , we f ind the trial c ourt properly granted C apsco’s m otion in limine , which lim ited Ground Control’s evidence to quantum meruit dam ages only

. B. Claim s against Harrah’s and Y ates ¶33. In Ground Control I , we also held that the trial court erroneously converted Harrah’s and Yates’s m otion to dism iss t o a m otion f or s um m ary j udgm ent without f irst giving Ground Control proper notice. Id. at 373. For this reason, the grant of s um m a ry judg me nt in Harrah’s and Yates’s f

avor was dism issed. Following rem and, Harrah’s and Yates renewed their m otion f

or sum m ary judgm ent—this t im e ensuring proper notice. But the tria l c o urt ruled Ground C ontrol should be perm itted to present its claim s against these def endants at trial. However, once Ground C ontrol m ade its case-in-chief , the trial court granted Harrah’s and Yates’s m o tion f

or a directed verdict o n all but Ground Control’s quantum meruit claim

. Specif ically , Ground Control’s contractual and statutory claim s were dism issed. ¶34. W e f

ind n o error. Ground Control I ’ s holding about the v oid subcontract im pacted
not only sub-subcontractor’s claim s against Capsco, b ut also against Yates and H arrah’s. In

o t h e r words, the law of the c ase dictated t hat G round Control w a s lim i ted to unju s t enrichm ent and quantum meruit c laim s against Yates and Harrah’s as well. ¶35. But even if Ground C ontrol’s non- quantum meruit claim s against Yates and Harrah’s had survived Ground Control I , we f ind the trial court’s grant o f a d i rected v erdict at the close of G r o u n d C o ntrol’s evidence was still proper. W e review the grant of a m otion f or

1 3a d irected verdict de novo, viewing the evidence in the sam e light as the t rial c ourt—i.e., in

the light m ost f

avorable to the nonm oving p arty

. Fulton v. Robinson Indus., Inc. , 664 So. 2d 170, 172 (Miss. 1995). A directed verdict is p roper when “the p laintif f ’s evidence is so lacking that reasonable jurors would be unable to reach a v erdict i n f avor o f that party .” Id. ¶36. Ground Control’s evidence against Yates and Harrah’s was clearly l acking. Ground
Co n t r o l had contended it was a “third-party benef iciary ” to the contract between Harrah’s and Yates. But to be a third-party benef iciary , t he rights of t he third-party m ust spring f

orth f rom the term s of t he c ontract itself

. Tram m ell v. State , 6 22 So. 2 d 1257, 1260 ( Miss. 1993). And here, Ground Control f a iled to prove it had any right in t he H arrah’s and Yates contract placed there f

or its benef

it. See id . Ground Control also a s s e r t e d statutory rights under Section 85-7-131 and Section 85-7-181 of the Mississippi Code. But recovery under Section
85-7-131 r equired Ground C ontrol to prove it was in a contractual relationship with Harrah’s

or Yates—som ething Ground Control did not p rove and f urther could not prove based on its lack of a certif

icate of responsibility voiding any contract. See Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-15. And Section 85-7-181, which has since been repealed, 11 had been declared unconstitutional by the Fif th Circuit. Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Houston, L.L.C. , 7 32 F .3d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). So its statutory claim s also f

ailed as a m atter of

law. 12

11 M iss. L a w s 2 0 1 4 , ch

. 4 8 7 , § 2 4 , ef f

. f r o m a n d a f

t e r p assag e (ap p ro v ed A p ril 1 1 , 2 0 1 4 ).

12 I n i t s a p p ellan t’s b rief

, G ro u n d C o n tro l arg u e s th e trial co u rt’s C o rrected F i n al Ju d g m en t d o es n o t “co rrectly rep resen t th e claim s d ism issed b y d irected v erd ict.” T h e f i n al j u d g m en t stated th at G ro u n d C o n tro l h ad b ro u g h t statu t o ry claim s u n d er S ectio n 8 5 -7 -1 3 1 , -1 8 1 , a n d -1 8 3

. B ecau se G ro u n d C o n tro l n ev er asserted S ectio n 8 5 -7 -1 8 3 in its co m p lain t, it arg u es th e trial co u rt “co u ld n o t h av e g ran ted a d irected v e rd ict o n an issu e th at w as n o t 1 4¶37. Thus, we af f irm the grant of

a partial directed verdict in Yates and Harrah’s f avor. III. Could Groun d C o ntrol, the sub-subcontractor, bring a c laim for quantum m e ruit d am ages against Yates, the p rim ary c o ntractor, or Harrah’s, the project ow n e r? ¶38. On cross-appeal, Yates asserts the trial court did not go f ar enough when granting the directed verdict. Instead, Yates a r g u e s , t h e court should have dism issed the contractor completely through sum m ary judgm ent, directed verdict, or JNOV. ¶39. Yates argues our opinion in Redd v. L & A Contracting Co. , 246 Miss. 548, 556, 151 S o . 2 d 2 0 5, 208 (1963), controls. Af ter review, we a g ree. In Redd , the contractor hire d a subcontractor, who in turn hired a sub-subcontractor. W hen the s ubcontractor, who becam e insolvent, f

ailed to pay f

or sub-subcontrac t o r’s s ervices, the s ub-subcontractor sued the general contractor. It reasoned that, because the general contractor had accepted the benef its of its w ork, it should be able to recover f rom the contractor “under the com m on l aw on the ‘theorem of quantum m eruit.’” Id. at 554, 151 So. 2d at 207. ¶40. This Cour t rejected t he sub-subcontractor’s claim

. Because q uantum meruit is an im p lied contract theory , available only when there is no express contract, “[ w]here there is

a contract, parties m ay not a bandon sam e and resort to quantum meruit .” Id. a t 556, 151 So. 2d at 208. In R edd , this C o u r t e x t e nded t his p rohibition to f ind “that a sub-subcontractor
cannot sue on quantum meruit against a prim ary contractor f or work done u nder an express
contract with another person.” So because the sub-subcontractor in Redd had a n express

raised .” Wh ile th at m ay b e so , th ere is o b v io u s l y n o th in g “rev ersib le” ab o u t th is erro r. S o w e f ail to co m p reh en d w h y

G ro u n d C o n tro l raised th is as a d i stin c t issu e o n ap p eal.

1 5contract with t he insolvent subcontractor, i t c o u l d n ot sue the general contractor under a

quantum meruit

theory

. Id. ¶41. Here, the f

acts are d if

f erent—the express c o ntract between Ground Control and Capsco w as void f

or public p olicy

. But the principle is t he sam e. Ground Control could not

sue general contractor Yates f or q u a n t u m m eruit f

or work done under the voided (i.e., im p lied) contract with Capsco. ¶42. Redd reinf

orced t he “general rule [ that], in o rder t o recover f or work and labor on the theory of an im

plied contract, it is ordinarily deem ed essential to show t hat the services were rendered under the r easonable expectation that they would be paid for by t he person sought

to be charged , a nd the person sought t o b e charged knew that the services were being perf orm ed with t he expectation that he would p ay f or such work.” Id. at 558, 1 51 So. 2d at 209 (em phasis added). In Redd , it was undisputed that the aggrieved sub-subcontractor had dealt with the subcontrac t o r o nly

. Id. at 5 55, 151 So. 2d at 208. Thus, it could only reasonably

expect to be paid by

the subcontractor. ¶43. Here, Beaton contended that Yates negotiated change orders directly with Ground Control. I n other words, Ground Control p r e s e n t ed evidence Yates knew Ground Control

was perf orm ing t he s ervices u n der the change orders with t he reasonable expectation it would b e paid f

or them

. See id. at 558, 151 So. 2 d at 2 09. But Ground C ontrol presented

no evidence it reasonably expected Y a tes would be the o ne to pay Ground Control f or these services. See id. Instead, both in his deposition and at trial, Beat o n t e s tif ied that his

com pany looked s olely to Capsco f or pay m ent f or its s ervices. S pecif

ically , at trial, Beaton

1 6adm itted Ground C ontrol “ worked f or C apsco” a n d any pay

m ent f or its services “was going
to com e f rom ” Capsco. ¶44. Even whe n v i e w i n g G r o u nd Control’s evidence f

avorably , it f

ailed to s upport its claim that Yates was liable under quantum meruit , because it adm itted its “services were rendered under t he r easonable expectation t hat they would be paid f or by ” Capsco , and not “ the person

sou g ht t o be charged,” Yates. Theref ore, Y ates’s m otion f

o r a directed verdict on the quantum m eruit claim should have been granted. S ee F ulton v. R obinson Indus., Inc. , 664 So. 2 d 170, 172 (Miss. 1995) (holding the grant o f a d i r e c t e d verdict “is proper if the plaintif f ’s evidence is so lacking that r e a s o n a b le jurors w ould be unable to reach a verdict in f a vor of that party ”). W e reverse the dam ages award against Yates and render a j udgm ent in i ts f avor. Consequently , Ground Control m ust repay Y ates the $ 36,644.69 it seized prior to the outcom e of

this appeal. S

ee Davis , 594 So. 2d at 613. ¶45. W e are o f t h e sam e v iew f or the jury ’ s apportionm ent of zero liability t o Harrah’s.
In i t s a p p e a l, Ground C ontrol challenges the jury ’s f inding as not being supported by the evidence. But Ground Control of f e red no testim ony that Harrah’s knew Ground Control was working on the project or that Ground Control expected Harrah’s to pay f or it. See Redd , 246 Miss. at 555-58, 151 S o. 2 d at 208. So the jury ’ s f i nding of zero liability was not against the overwhelm ing weight of the e v i d e n c e . And G round Control’s m otion f or a new trial or JNOV against Harrah’s was properly denied.
IV. Should su b c o ntractor C apsco, contractor Yates, and ow ner Harrah’s have been jointly and severally l iable?

1 7¶46. Shif ting f rom the l egal basis f

o r dam ages to the d am ag e s a w a r d itself , Ground Control’s prim ary challenge on appeal is that t h e dam ages award should not have been apportioned b e t w e en C apsco (95.75%) and Yates ( 4.25%). I nstead, it m akes the bold assertion that the j ury intended Capsco, Yates, and H arrah’s to be jointly and severally liable.
It describes the special verdict f orm used by the jury as “surplusage.” And it a r gues the trial court erred by not granting its m otion to “rem ove” this surplusage f rom the verdict. ¶47. This argum ent f

a ils f or three reasons. ¶48. First, this argu me n t i s c learly waived. Ground Control m ade n o objection to the special verdict f

o rm during trial. Instead, i t raised i ts “surplusage” argum ent f or the f irst t im e in a post-trial m otion. And as t his Court has said, “Objections to jury instructions m ade af ter the jury has returned a verdict and been discharged [ a re] sim p ly too late.” Barnett v. State , 725 So. 2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1998). ¶49. Second, even if not waived, this argum e n t f ails as a m atter of law. As discussed in the previous section, this Court i n Redd rejected Groun d C o n trol’s contention that every entity i nvolved in a construction project is j ointly a nd severally liable to a sub-subcontractor f or quantum meruit dam ages. See Redd , 2 46 Miss. at 5 55-58, 151 So. 2d at 2 08. Instead,

a sub-subcontractor can recover only quantum meruit dam ages f rom the person to whom it reasonably

looked f or pay m e nt. Id . So by instructing the jury to apportion liability

based

on who was reasonably expected to pay Ground C ontrol, the trial court provided the jury with
an accurate statem ent of

the law.

1 8¶50. Third, this argum ent i s m o ot. Because we f ind Ground Control f

ailed to present

e v idence that i t r easonably e xpected either H arrah’s or Yates to pay it f or serv i c e s i t perf orm ed on the Margaritaville project, neither owner nor general contractor could be liable at all —let alone jointly

and severally

liable with Capsco.
V. Was the jury ’ s verdict against Capsco supported by the evidence? ¶51. Capsco also c hallenges the jury ’s verdict o n cross-appeal. It argues dam ages awarded
to G round Control should have been lim ited to restitution dam a ges (the value of the labor and supplies expended on the project) a nd not expectation d am ages (what Ground Control would have earned if the subcontract h ad not been void). A nd despite the m otion in limine

e xpressly lim iting Ground Control’s evidence to restitution dam ages, Capsco c o n t e n d s “Ground Control nevertheless proceeded to introduce its expectation dam a g es at trial.”

A. Inapplicable Quasi-Estoppel Doctrine ¶52. Capsco’s c ontention that Ground Control—in clear c onf lict with Ground Control I ’s

m andate—was seeking breach-of

- contract dam ages instead of quantum meruit dam ages is bolstered by

Ground Control’s own argum ent on appeal. ¶53. In an ef

f ort to obtain pre-judgm ent interest, Ground C ontrol insists its dam ages claim

was liquidated and b ased on quasi-estoppel, n ot quantum meruit

. Ground Control claim s this

case is just like T.C.B. Construction Co. v. W.C. F ore T rucking Co. , 1 34 S o. 3d 752 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2012) (reversed in p art on other grounds), where t he contractor was estopped f rom deny ing t he existence of a m odif ied contract w ith the subcontractor based on the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. There, because the contractor h ad clearly accepted the benef it of the

1 9s u

b c o n t r a c t o r ’ s w o r

k o u tside the originally agreed-to geographical area, t he Court of Appeals held the c ontractor could not d eny the contract had been m odif ied. T h us, t he subcontractor

was owed the contract price. I d. a t 762-64. And because this price was f ixed, o r liquidated, the subcontractor was also entitled to pre-judgm ent interest. Id. at 766-67. ¶54. In an e f

f o r t a lso to obtain pre-judgm ent interest, Ground Control insists that its judgm ent, like that in T.C.B. , was base d o n q u a s i -estoppel, a nd not quantum meruit

. But quasi-estoppel, as a

pplied in T.C.B. , is the doctrine that “ [ w]here one having t he right to accept or reject a transaction takes and retains b enef its t hereunder, he r atif

ies the transaction, is bound by it, and cannot a void its o bligation o r ef f ect by taking a position i nco n s i s t e nt therewith.” T.C.B. , 134 S o. 3d at 759 (quoting Wood Naval Stores Exp. Assen v. Latim er , 220 M i s s . 6 5 2 , 6 6 4 , 71 So. 2 d 4 25, 430 (1954)). And here, as m atter of public policy , Capsco “did not have the right to accept or reject the t ransaction, because the s ubcontract was void a n d unlawf

ul under [ Section 31-3-15].” Ace Pipe Cleaning, Inc. v . Hem phill Constr. Co. , 134 So. 3d 7 99, 805 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). So “the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not apply .” Id. I ndeed, this Court has already held that the contract between Capsco and Ground Control was void under S ection 31-3-15. Ground Control I , 1 20 So. 3d at 367. So Ground Control’s argum ent—that C apsco was estopped f rom deny ing the existence of a contract that this Court f

ound never existed—def

ies logic. ¶55. It also d ef

ies t he ma n d ate of Ground Control I , which specif

ically f ound that the applicable equitable doctrine f or w hen a contract is void u nder Section 31-1-15 i s “ quantum
meruit or u njust enrichm ent,” and not quasi-estoppel. Ground Control I , 120 So. 3d at 369.

2 0See a lso T.C.B. , 134 So. 3d at 760-61 (noting q uantum m eruit and unjust e nrichm ent are not

s y n o n y m o u s with quasi-estoppel ). This is because “[ u ]njust enrichm ent a p p l i e s t o s i t

u a t i o n s ” like the one here “‘where there is no legal contract ’ and ‘the person sought to be charge is in possession of m oney or p roperty which in good c onscience and justice he should not retain but should deliver t o another.’” Groun d C o n t r ol I , 120 So. 3d at 371 (quoting Powell v. Cam pbell , 912 So. 2d 978, 982 (Miss. 2005)).
B. Unsupported Quantum Meruit Dam a ges Award ¶56. Despite t his Court’s clear pinpoint of unjust enrichm ent or quantum meruit as the appropriate equitable doctrine, G round Control g oes so f ar as to argue “no evidence at trial would substantiate an award of quantum meruit dam ages under Mississippi law.” Ground
C o ntrol then doubles down in its cross-appellee brief , reasserting that it “did not alleg e a claim f or q uantum meruit recovery against Capsco in the Supplem ental Com plaint.” ¶57. In response, Capsco requests on cross-appeal that we reverse the jury ’s award and render a judgm e nt in its f avo r . C apsco points out that the sole claim presented t o the jury

was dam ages based on quantum meruit

. And since Ground C ontrol insists t h e r e w as no evidence to support a quantum meruit award, then the judgm e nt m ust be reversed entirely

. ¶58. Though w e d e c l i n e to im pose s uch a harsh result, we do take Ground Control’s
argum ent of no eviden c e o f quantum meruit dam ages i nto account when reviewing the record evidence on dam a g e s . I n other words, Ground Control’s assertion has prom p ted us to consider caref

u lly whether its dam ages evidence f ell u nder the c ategory of quantum meruit dam ages or—as Capsco c ont e n d s

— a c t ually ref lects what it e

xpected to earn u nder the

2 1contract. A nd having done so, we f ind, based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could have awarded $825,583.31 in quantum meruit dam ages against Capsco. ¶59. The jury had been instructed “ that any recovery by Gro u n d C o n trol, LLC based in quantum m eruit , is lim ited t o the value of the labor and services rendered by Ground Control,
LLC to the def

endants f or which pay

m ent has not been tendered y et

. ” A n d t h e jury heard
Beaton concede t hat, af

ter subtracting the half

-m illion dollars in pay

m ents Capsco had already t endered to h i s com pany , Ground Control’s claim f or unpaid labor and services was only $ 199,096. Thus, t he jury had n o evidentiary basis f or f inding Capsco liable f

or m ore than f our tim es that am ount. ¶60. For this reason, w e f ind the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Capsco’s

m otion f or rem ittitur. S

ee Gatewood v

. Sam pson , 812 So. 2 d 2 1 2 , 2 22 ( Miss. 2002) (reviewing the denial of a m o tion f or r em ittitur f

or abuse of discretion). W hile the am ount of dam ages is prim arily a question f or the jury , Mississippi Code Section 11-1-55 (Rev. 2014) authorizes a trial court to grant a rem ittitur when “the dam ages awarded were contrary
to the overwhel mi n g weight o f credible evidence.” Such is the case here—the dam ages awarded went against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence. ¶61. Of course, Section 1 1-1-55 also provides, in the c a se where a rem ittitur is warranted, the parties m ay accept the rem ittitur or proceed o n a new trial on dam a ges. S ee D edeaux v. Pellerin Laundr

y , I n c . , 947 So. 2d 900, 908 (Miss. 2 007) ( clarif y ing t hat a “grant of an additur o r rem i ttitur shall take ef f ect only i f accepted b y all the p arties,” s o “ [ i]f all parties do not agree to t he additur or rem ittitur, then each party shall have the right to . . . dem and

2 2a n ew trial on d am ages”). S o o n rem a nd, G round Control and Capsco have two

options—agree to a $ 6 2 6 , 4 07.31 rem ittitur, m aking the d am age award a gainst Capsco $199,096, or proceed to a new trial on quantum meruit dam ages against Capsco only

. VI. Was G r ound Control entitled to pre-judgm e nt interest? Alternatively , should post-judgm ent interest h ave accrued from an earlier date? ¶62. Though we reverse t he dam ages award against Y ates and C a p s c o , w e still f ind it prudent to address Ground Control’s i nterest-based claim s, l est Ground Control t ry to seek

on rem and interest it is not entitled to.

A. Pre-judgm ent Interest ¶63. As m entioned in the previous section, b ecause pre-judgm ent interest m ay be awarded in b reach-of

-contract cases, w hen t he am ount of dam ages i s certain, i.e. , l iquidated, 13 Ground
C o n t r o l argues its dam ages c laim was liquidated and based on breach of c o ntract, n o t quantum meruit

. B ut as already discussed, this argum ent f ails in light of Ground Control I ’s clear holding. The only dam ages available were f o r quantum meruit

. As this Court has held, where—as is the case here—there is a bona f i de dispute as to whether the plaintif f is entitled
to a quantum meruit award a nd, if so, what am ount, t hen pre-judgm ent interest is not warranted. In re Estate of Gillies , 830 So. 2d 640, 647 (Miss. 2002).

B. Post-judgm ent Interest ¶64. Alternatively , Ground C ontrol claim s the post-judgm ent interest it was awarded did
not start accruing early enough. The t rial court awarded post-judgm ent interest in its f inal

13 S ee, e.g
. , W

a rw ick v. M a th en ey , 6 0 3 S o . 2 d 3 3 0 , 3 4 2 (M iss.1 9 9 2 ).

2 3judgm ent, ent e r e d S e p tem b e r 2015. Ground Control claim s i nterest should h ave begun to

accrue i n October 2014, when the jury entered its verdict. But we f ind the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ¶65. Because the judgm ent was not b a s e d o n a contract with a set interest r ate, the trial
court had discretion to set t he r ate of interest, as w ell a s the date f rom which i nterest would

accrue. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev. 2016). 14 See also U .S. F id. & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis ex rel. Francis , 825 So. 2d 38, 50 (Miss. 2002) (f inding the trial court’s decision

a b out post-judgm ent interest f ell “within t he bounds of his discretionary authority ”). The trial c o urt decided to im pose an eight-percent rate f rom the date of the f

inal j udgm ent (Septem ber 18, 2015). C onsidering the eleven-m onth delay between the jury ’s v erdict and the f inal judgm ent was alm ost entirely attributabl e t o G r o u n d Control’s volum inous post-trial

m otions, there was nothing unf air about the trial court’s judgm e nt, so f ar as post-judgm ent interest is concerned. ¶66. Thus, if the p arties a ccept the $626,407.31 rem ittitur, Ground Control is n ot entitled
to p ost-judgm ent interest bef o r e the f inal judgm ent date of Septem ber 18, 2015. If the parties elect to have a n e w t r i al o n d am ages, the i ssue of post-judgm ent interest, i f a n y , will be soundly w ithin the trial court’s discretion.

14 Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7 provides— All judgm ents or decrees f o unded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the sam e rate as the contract evidencing the debt o n w h i ch the judgm ent or decree was rendered. All other judgm ents or decrees shall bear interest a t a per annum rate s et by the judge hearing the com plaint f rom a date determ ined by such judge to be f

air but in no event prior to the f iling of the com plaint. 2 4VII. Were the individual claim s properly dism issed?

¶67. There are two f

i nal m atters to address.
A. Claim s Against Killion Individually ¶68. T h e f

i r s t i s t h e t r i a l c o u r t’s dism issal of Capsco of f i cer Killion as an i n d i v i d u a l def endant. On appeal, Ground Control m akes the broad assertion that Killion used Capsco

a s h i s “ alter ego” and, thus, should be personally liable f or its debts. But Ground Control f ails to c i t e a n y a p p l i cable case law about p iercing t he corporate veil to f ind a corporate of f icer personally liable. Instead, it cites irrelevant cases about undoing f raudulent transf

ers. But that w as not at issue. The issue concerning K illion was w hether Ground C ontrol could reasonably look to Killion personally to recover quantum meruit dam ages. And Ground Control f a iled to present evidence that his Alabam a com pany ’s separate corporate identity should be disregarded. Ground Control presented no evidence that Killion incorporated Capsco “solely to avoid personal liability of t he owner w h i l e r e s e r v ing to the owner the benef its gained through use of t h e c o r p o rate nam e.” Bon Secour Fisheries, Inc. v. Barrentine , 408 So. 2d 490, 491 (Ala. 1981). Nor did it s how that Capsco w as so organized and controlled a s to m ake i t a m e re instrum entality of Killion. See i d. Based on this lack of evidence, the trial court properly dism issed Killion as an individual def endant.
B. Claim s by Beaton as a Third-party Plaintiff ¶69. The second issue is the sole claim raised in the appeal brought by B e aton in his capacity as third-party plaintif f

. He claim s his c onstitutional r ights were violated when the trial court denied him a jury trial on his pending third-party claim s. But we f ind the trial

2 5court did not reversibly err by deny ing Bea t o n ’ s p o s t-trial m otion and declaring all

outstanding issues had been resolved in its f inal judgm e nt. ¶70. This is because, with the exception of his abuse-of

- process claim , the claim s asserted in Beaton’s third-party com plai n t h a d b e e n resolved. Prior to trial, Beaton h ad been dism issed as a third-party def e ndant because the trial court agreed that he had acted solely in his c apacity a s G round Control ’ s o w n er, not individually

. Consequently , h e had no personal claim s related to the Margaritaville project. Instead, these claim s belonged to his

com pany —Ground Control—which had been f ound to be the only “person” who dealt with Capsco. So the trial court was right to hold that “no f urthe r a c t i o n i s r e q u i red

. . . as all claim s a lleged b y any Party i n this C a u s e h a v e been adjudicated in the Final Judgm ent entered herein[

. ]” ¶71. The only personal claim t hat arguably was not adjudicated was the abuse-of -process claim

. But we f

ind the trial court did not reversibly err by dism issing this claim

. The crucial elem ent of an a

buse-of -process claim is “the intent to abuse the privileges of the legal
sy stem .” McLain v. W. Side Bone & J oint C t r . , 6 5 6 S o . 2d 119, 123 (Miss. 1995). But here, in b ringing claim s against Beaton i nd i v i d u a lly , Capsco was s i m ply responding to sim ilar claim s m ade by G round Control against Capsco’s of f icers individually

. So we f ail to see how the third-party com plaint, in and of

itself , was abusive. ¶72. Moreov e r , it was Beaton who m oved pretrial to sever all claim s against individual def endants due to his w anting to keep unsavory details a bout his and the o f

f icers of Capsco’s b e h a vior during their work on the Margaritaville project. Having successf ully kept thi s

2 6e v i d ence out of t he trial, B eaton then waited eleven m onths af ter trial—until the f

i n a l judgm ent was e ntered on Septem ber 9, 2015—to request a trial o n his t hird-party claim s. At this p oint, the t rial court had the authority t o deem abandoned any o utstanding claim s, thus f inally clearing this pro tracted litigation f rom its docket. See Cox v. Cox , 976 So. 2d 869,
874 (Miss. 2008) ( “The p ower to dism iss f o r f ailure to prosecute is granted not only by Rule 41(b), b ut is part of a trial court’s inherent a u thority and is necessary f or “the orderly expedition of

justice and the court’s control of i ts own docket.”).
Conclusion ¶73. On all issues raised on Ground Control’s a p peal, w e af

f irm

. O n the issu e r a i s e d in
Beaton’s appeal, we also a f f irm

. But o n t he issue of quantum meruit recovery raised in
Yates’s cross-appeal, w e reverse the $36,64 4

. 6 9 j u dgm ent against Yates and render a judgm ent in Yates’s f

avor. Thus, Yates is entitled to the $36,644.69 it involuntarily paid to Ground Control through a writ of garni s h me n t

. Finally , on the issue of the am ount of quantum meruit dam ages against Capsco, raised in Capsco’s cross-appeal, w e r e verse the $825,583.31 j udgm e nt against Capsco and rem and the dam a ges issue to the trial court. On

rem and, we instruct t he trial court t o g rant Capsco a $626,407.31 rem ittitur, m aking the dam ages award $199,096. If Ground Control and Capsco do not agree to rem ittitur, then the trial court should proceed with a new trial on dam ages against Capsco. ¶74. Based on w hat transpired f ollowing our m andate in Ground C o n t r o l I , we f eel

com pe l l e d t o ma ke ourselves very clear. The o nly plaintif f on rem and is Ground Control. The only def

endant is C apsco. The only issue is quantum m e ruit dam ages. And the only

2 7options available to Ground Control and C apsco are to agree to a $ 199,096 dam ages award

or proceed to a new trial on q u antum meruit dam ages. ¶75. ON DIRECT APPEAL: A F F I R M E D ; O N C R O S S
- A P P E A L : R E V E RSED AND RENDERED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, KING, COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.

2 8