2023 IL App (1st) 221369-U 

No. 1-22-1369 

Order filed March 24, 2023 

 Fifth Division

 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN RE FORMER MARRIAGE OF, ) Appeal from the

JEFFREY JONES, ) Circuit Court of

 ) Cook County.

 Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 2015 D 7065 

 ) 

EMILY JONES, ) 

) Honorable 

) Lloyd James Brooks, 

 Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

 

JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err when it granted Respondent’s petition 

 for vaccination of minor child against COVID-19 and modified the 

 parties’ allocation of decision-making responsibilities because the 

 evidence was not against the manifest weight; affirmed. 

¶ 2 Petitioner Jeffrey Jones (Jeffrey) appeals from the trial court’s order that granted

Respondent Emily Jones’s (Emily) petition for vaccination of minor child against COVID-19. In 

granting Emily’s petition, the trial court modified the parties’ final custody judgment such that 

she had sole decision-making authority only with respect to the minor child receiving the 

COVID-19 vaccination and any appropriate boosters. Jeffrey contends on appeal that the trial 
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2 

court erred when it denied his motion for directed finding and that it also erred on a number of 

grounds when it granted Emily’s petition for vaccination of the minor child and modified the 

parties’ allocation of decision-making responsibilities. He argues, among other things, that the 

court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that it applied the incorrect 

standard under section 610.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) 

(750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West 2022)). For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Emily and Jeffrey were married on October 20, 2009, and had one minor child, H.J., 

in March 2013. The parties’ judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on December 5, 

2016, and it incorporated the Final Custody Judgment, which provided that substantial medical 

decisions were to be “resolved by the consensus of the parents.” As for medical care, it stated, 

among other things, as follows:

“Each parent shall at all times conduct himself or herself in a manner which promotes 

the cooperation and involvement of the other parent on any matters which concern the 

medical and health care of their child, keeping in mind that the cooperation and 

involvement of both parents on issues regarding medical and health care of their child is 

in the child’s best interests.”

¶ 5 Emily’s Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

¶ 6 On December 14, 2021, Emily filed a petition for temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction, in which she asserted that Jeffrey intended to travel with H.J. to Costa 

Rica even though he refused to allow H.J. to get vaccinated against COVID-19. She asserted that 

a travel alert from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) had classified Costa Rica as a “level 4 

warning” destination and advised individuals not to travel there. She contended that Jeffrey was 
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3 

subjecting H.J. to dangerous conditions by taking him to Costa Rica while he was not vaccinated. 

Emily asserted that the matter was an emergency and requested a temporary restraining order and 

preliminarily injunction to prevent Jeffrey from traveling to Costa Rica with H.J. during the 

COVID-19 pandemic while H.J. was not vaccinated against the virus. 

¶ 7 In the court’s December 15, 2021, written order, it found that Emily’s petition was 

not an emergency and concluded that it would not restrict Jeffrey from traveling to Costa Rica 

with H.J.

¶ 8 Emily’s Petition for Vaccination of Minor Child Against COVID-19 

¶ 9 On April 21, 2022, Emily filed the petition for vaccination of minor child against 

COVID-19 at issue here. Emily asserted that in October 2021, the United States Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) authorized the COVID-19 vaccine for children ages 5 through 11, and that

in November 2021, the CDC recommended that everyone over the age of 5 years old receive the 

COVID-19 vaccine. She also stated that H.J.’s healthcare providers recommended the vaccine. 

Emily requested Jeffrey to consent to H.J. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine, but he refused. She 

asserted Jeffrey was putting H.J.’s safety and well-being at risk and that his vaccination status 

was impeding his ability to socialize with his friends. The parties mediated the issue but could 

not reach an agreement. Emily requested the court grant her sole medical decision-making 

responsibilities for H.J. such that he could be vaccinated against COVID-19. 

¶ 10 In response, Jeffrey argued that based on surveillance reporting in the United States, 

the risk of myocarditis after receiving the second dose of the mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccine 

was highest in adolescent and young men. To support his assertion, Jeffrey stated that he 

attached an article from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). We note that 

the record shows that the article attached to Jeffrey’s response included only the first two pages 
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4 

of a JAMA article entitled “Myocarditis Cases Reported After mRNA-Based COVID-19 

Vaccination in the US From December 2020 to August 2021.” Jeffrey argued that he was “taking 

extra precautions” regarding his decision on the COVID-19 vaccine. He stated that H.J.’s 

vaccination status had little impact on H.J.’s social life, noting that he had participated in Boy 

Scouts, Jiu Jitsu, a school field trip, a birthday party, a sleepover, and a family trip. 

¶ 11 Hearing on Petition for Vaccination of Minor Child Against Covid-19 

¶ 12 In June and July 2022, the trial court conducted a three-day hearing on the petition. 

Emily and Jeffrey were the only witnesses at the hearing. 

¶ 13 Emily Jones

¶ 14 Emily testified that she was a general dentist, and that H.J. was nine years old at the 

time of hearing. In November 2021, all children five years and older became eligible for the 

COVID-19 vaccine, so H.J. became eligible. Jeffrey would not consent to the COVID-19 

vaccination for H.J. The parties’ final custody judgment required joint decision-making, so she 

needed Jeffrey’s consent for H.J. to get the vaccine. Jeffrey had allowed H.J. to receive all other 

government recommended vaccines and Emily believed it was in H.J.’s best interest to get the 

COVID-19 vaccine. 

¶ 15 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, H.J. attended virtual school from home for some of 

first grade, second grade, and some parts of third grade. She testified that school from home had 

a “serious negative” effect on H.J., who was an only child and received a lot of his social 

interaction from school. Emily testified about various emails she received from school officials 

between January 2022 to June 2022, all of which were admitted into evidence. Emily identified 

an email sent from H.J.’s principal to all parents on January 1, 2022, which stated as follows: 
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5 

“Families with unvaccinated students should pay careful attention to the Chicago 

Department of Public Health (CDPH) travel advisory guidance. Additionally, students 

who have been in close contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19 

should get tested on Day 5 after exposure. Unvaccinated students must stay home and 

quarantine for 10 days from their last exposure, regardless of negative testing, while 

vaccinated students may attend school as long as they are not experiencing symptoms.” 

(Emphasis in original.)

Emily testified that the email also stated that “research has also shown the most important thing 

to do for their health and safety is to get children vaccinated.”

¶ 16 Emily identified a March 24, 2022, email from an academic interventionist at H.J.’s 

school sent to Emily and Jeffrey informing them that H.J. had been exposed to COVID-19 and 

that he would have to learn from home from March 25 to March 29, 2022. The letter stated that 

students who were fully vaccinated “may safely learn in person and do not require a shift to 

remote learning.” The letter also stated that “[t]he best way to keep you and your child safe from 

COVID-19 is to get vaccinated.” The court stated that to the extent the letter contained medical 

information, it would not accept it as evidence of the truth of the statement. 

¶ 17 Emily identified three emails sent from school officials at H.J.’s school to Emily and 

Jeffrey in April 2022 regarding three different times that H.J. was exposed to COVID-19 and had 

to stay home from school as a result. Specifically, in the April 7, 2022, email, the assistant 

principal at H.J.’s school informed Emily and Jeffrey that H.J. would need to quarantine and stay 

home from school on Friday, April 8, 2022, and that he could return to school on Monday, April 

11, 2022. During this period, H.J. did not have to miss school, as spring break was scheduled to 

start on April 8, 2022. In an email dated April 21, 2022, an academic interventionalist informed 
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6 

Emily and Jeffrey that H.J. would need to stay home from school on Friday, April 22, 2022, and 

that he could return on Monday, April 25, 2022. In an email dated April 25, 2022, H.J’s principal 

informed Emily and Jeffrey that H.J. had to quarantine and that he could return to school on 

Thursday, April 28, 2022. Emily testified that H.J. missed a total of about one week of in-person 

learning at school as a result of not being vaccinated. 

¶ 18 Emily also identified a June 2, 2022, email from the school sent to Emily and Jeffrey 

informing them that H.J. had been exposed to COVID-19 and that the school had a new “Test to 

Stay” program. The letter explained that under the new program, unvaccinated children could 

return to school after being exposed to COVID-19 if they complete a test on day three, receive a 

negative test result, and self-report the result. The letter also informed the parents that the child 

would still have to wear a mask around others and could not participate in extracurricular 

activities or sport competitions for 10 days following exposure. Emily was concerned that the 

mask requirement would single H.J. out. 

¶ 19 Emily testified that she worried that H.J. was not protected from the virus and could 

spread it to others and that she limited his interactions with others due to him being 

unvaccinated. H.J. could not attend some events due to his vaccination status, including a trip to 

the Museum of Science and Industry, a play date, and a birthday party. In January 2022, he could 

not go to restaurants or movies because he did not have a vaccination card. Other families wore 

masks when H.J. was around, and Emily did not have children in her home because she did not 

want to put them at risk. Emily was concerned with H.J. spending time with his grandparents 

while he was unvaccinated and, when H.J. had to quarantine at home due to exposure at school, 

his grandparents could not spend time with him. H.J.’s grandparents did not hug or kiss him as 

much as they did before COVID-19. 
No. 1-22-1369 

7 

¶ 20 Emily identified a document from the CDC’s website dated May 25, 2022, and 

entitled “COVID-19 Vaccine Recommendations for Children and Teens” (CDC 

recommendations), which recommended that everyone H.J.’s age get vaccinated against 

COVID-19. Emily testified that, according to the CDC recommendations, the Pfizer-BioNTech 

vaccine was authorized for children 5 to 11 years old, but the Moderna and Johnson and Johnson 

vaccines were not recommended. The court admitted the exhibit, stating that it was from a 

“government-related website” and “the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the 

information contained in this document.” 

¶ 21 Emily also identified an 11-page document from the Illinois Department of Public 

Health’s (IDPH) website entitled “COVID-19 Vaccination for Young People” with the header 

“Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)” (IDPH document). Jeffrey’s counsel objected to the 

exhibit, stating that it was cumulative, a “voluminous publication,” he could not “cross-examine 

pieces of paper,” and the “prejudice is outweighing the probative value.” Jeffrey’s counsel also 

stated, “[w]e all know what the government said, that they recommend it.” The court sustained 

the objection as cumulative, noting that the parties stipulated that “various government agencies 

have recommended vaccinations to a child the same age as [H.J].” Emily’s counsel informed the 

court that he wanted to use the document to address an issue that Jeffrey had raised regarding 

myocarditis, after which the court stated it would permit the IDPH document limited to the issue 

of myocarditis and subject to any ability that Jeffrey might have to show that it was not an 

authentic government publication. 

¶ 22 Emily’s counsel then asked Emily about the IDPH document. Emily agreed with her 

counsel that under the “Frequently Asked Questions” section of the IDPH document, it stated 
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“Will the vaccine make children sick with myocarditis?” She agreed with counsel that the answer 

to the question stated as follows: 

“Based on the latest evidence, the condition appears to be a rare side effect of the 

vaccine. Experts, including the American Academy of Pediatrics and CDC, continue to 

recommend COVID-19 vaccination for everyone five years of age and older because the 

known and potential benefits of COVID-19 vaccination outweigh the known and 

potential risks, including the possible risk of myocarditis and pericarditis.”

Asked “what does that mean?” Emily responded “[t]hat although there may be a rare side effect, 

it’s very rare. And the good of the vaccine outweighs the risk of a possible rare side effect.” 

Emily further testified that according to the IDPH document, the risk of myocarditis applied to 

teenagers between the ages of 16 and 18. The court admitted the exhibit into evidence. 

¶ 23 Emily next identified an FDA News Release entitled “FDA Authorizes PfizerBioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for Emergency Use in Children 5 through 11 years of Age.” 

Emily testified that under the section “Key Points for Parents and Caregivers,” the document 

stated that the COVID-19 vaccination was 90.7% effective in preventing COVID-19 infections 

for children ages 5 through 11 and there were no serious side effects. Asked what the document 

said, “concerning the benefit versus the risk of the COVID-19 vaccination for children 5 years of 

age?” Emily responded, “[t]he benefits outweigh the known and potential risks for this age 

group.” She testified that the document also stated that the risk of myocarditis was highest for 

males between the ages of 12 and 17. The court took judicial notice of the IDPH document, 

noting it was from the fda.gov website, and Jeffrey’s counsel could argue about the weight the 

court should give the document. 
No. 1-22-1369 

9 

¶ 24 On cross-examination, Emily acknowledged that, at the time of the hearing, the 

restrictions that were in place in January 2022 were no longer in effect, and H.J. was not 

restricted from going anywhere due to not having a proof of vaccination card. H.J. missed seven 

in-person school days, but he participated in virtual school on those days. H.J. received straight 

A’s, and virtual learning did not impact his school performance. She agreed with Jeffrey’s 

counsel that two of the vaccines that were previously recommended were no longer permitted for 

children in certain age groups. She testified that H.J. was more at risk for being unvaccinated 

than he would be if he received the vaccine. She testified that children generally had mild 

symptoms if they got COVID-19 but that they could also get very sick. 

¶ 25 Jeffrey’s Motion for a Directed Finding

¶ 26 Following Emily’s testimony, Jeffrey moved for a directed finding, which the court 

denied. In doing so, the court stated that it “looks to Section 610.5, [of the Act] which 

specifically speaks to the Court’s ability to make modifications to the Allocation Judgment.” The 

court then stated that “[u]nder 610.5(c), the Court merely needs to find, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the requested modification is in the best interests of the child.” The court 

concluded that Emily “put forth sufficient evidence in the record that having the child be 

vaccinated may be in the child’s best interest.” The hearing then continued with Jeffrey’s casein-chief, in which Jeffrey testified and called Emily as an adverse witness. 

¶ 27 Jeffrey Jones

¶ 28 Jeffrey testified that H.J. was healthy and happy. H.J. was current with all

immunizations other than the COVID-19 vaccination, which was the only medical care 

disagreement he had with Emily since the final custody judgment was entered in 2016. He 

testified that he had “a lot of concerns” with the COVID-19 vaccination and he knew co-workers 
No. 1-22-1369 

10 

and family members who did not feel well for a few days after receiving the vaccination. He 

testified that there was “a mixture of medical opinions, research, guidance, often changing, often 

contradictory, side effects, reports of many people having adverse reactions,” and he did not 

have any confidence in the “rapid development” of the vaccine. Through his own research, he 

learned about adverse reactions that some children in H.J.’s age group had experienced from the 

vaccine and that the long-term side effects were unknown. He testified there was “a lot of 

potential risk for a healthy child” to get the vaccine and he saw “no reason to apply this 

procedure to [H.J.] when there are so many unknown risks.” Jeffrey testified that he felt that 

vaccines that were around for many years were safer than the COVID-19 vaccine, which was 

around for only a few years. He was also concerned that new COVID-19 strains could not be 

addressed by the current vaccine.

¶ 29 Jeffrey identified the article from JAMA that he referred to in his response to the 

petition as one of the articles he read in his research.1 Following Emily’s counsel’s hearsay 

objection, the court stated it would not stop Jeffrey from “pointing out that he may have gotten 

some information from this article” and that it would allow Jeffrey to testify about the article to 

show what went into his decision-making. The court however stated it would not “pick out any 

information from this article and say that’s true” and would not allow the exhibit into evidence 

because the author of the article was not testifying about it and Jeffrey was not an expert who 

could rely on the information. Jeffrey testified that the article “matched” his concerns regarding 

the potential impact the COVID-19 vaccine could have on a child in H.J.’s age group, including 

that the vaccine could cause myocarditis and severe heart failure.

1 As previously noted, the record shows that only the first two pages of the JAMA article were included in Jeffrey’s 

response to the petition. The full JAMA article is not included in the record on appeal. 
No. 1-22-1369 

11 

¶ 30 Jeffrey testified that the CDC hosted a website entitled “Vaccine Adverse Event 

Reporting System” (VAERS), which contained reports regarding side effects and adverse 

reactions from vaccinations, including the COVID-19 vaccine. Jeffrey identified datasets that he 

downloaded from the VAERS website, including one entitled “VAERS 2022 – Reports for Boys 

aged 8-10.” The court admitted the dataset into evidence with the instruction that it was “not 

taking any of the information contained within it for the truth of the matter.” Jeffrey testified that 

his review of the dataset caused him concern about the safety of the vaccine, as there were 

reports of adverse reactions made to a government entity. He also identified a bar chart he 

downloaded from the VAERS website entitled “CDC VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Event 

Reporting System) Database 2018-2022.” The court admitted the report “for what it’s worth” but 

stated that Jeffrey could not testify about his interpretation of the data. Jeffrey testified that he 

reviewed the VAERS website for hours and it would keep him up at night. Jeffrey did not 

believe the COVID-19 vaccine was safe for H.J. If more testing and research was done, he would 

reconsider his decision. 

¶ 31 Jeffrey identified a document entitled “Order from the Commissioner of Health of the 

City of Chicago” dated January 3, 2022, which set forth regulations regarding COVID-19 

protocols in public places. He testified that this order did not have a big impact on H.J. He also 

identified a February 22, 2022, news release from the City of Chicago entitled “City to Remove 

Mask and Vaccine Requirements for Certain Public Settings on February 28 in Response to 

Continued Improvement in COVID-19 Metrics.” He identified a document regarding the mask 

protocol at H.J.’s school that he received in March 2022, which provided that starting March 14, 

2022, the Chicago Public Schools was moving to a mask optional model for students and staff. 

The court admitted these documents into evidence. 
No. 1-22-1369 

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¶ 32 Jeffrey testified that H.J. had about seven days of remote learning due to him being 

exposed to COVID-19 at school. H.J. did very well with remote learning and was a straight A 

student. Jeffrey identified a calendar showing H.J.’s social activities in April 2022, including his 

Jiu-Jitsu lessons and Boy Scouts trips. H.J.’s vaccination status did not prohibit him from 

attending Jiu-Jitsu, Boy Scouts, family trips, a school field trip to the zoo, or sleepovers with his 

friends. He testified that H.J. had recently completed a Boy Scouts trip, which did not require 

proof of a COVID-19 vaccination, and was attending summer camp and meeting with friends on 

the weekends. H.J.’s vaccination status did not limit his social life while he was with Jeffrey nor 

his summer activities. 

¶ 33 Jeffrey and Emily have cooperated in all other medical decisions other than the 

COVID-19 vaccination, including the decision for H.J. to have hernia surgery in 2019. Jeffrey 

and Emily researched the surgery, discussed the risks and benefits together, and attended 

physician consultations. He testified that Emily, as a practicing dentist, had medical knowledge 

he did not have, and he respected her opinions regarding H.J.’s health. As for Jeffrey’s trip to 

Costa Rica, he investigated the risks before taking H.J. there, he did not have any indication it 

was a “hot spot” for COVID-19, and there were no travel restrictions based on vaccination 

status. It was beneficial for H.J. to travel to Costa Rica. 

¶ 34 On cross-examination, Jeffrey testified that H.J.’s pediatrician recommended hernia 

surgery for H.J., and he read many articles about it. The risks with the surgery included infection 

or loss of potential nerve connectivity. He agreed that there were risks for all the vaccinations 

that H.J. had previously received and that no vaccine was 100% effective. He testified that the 

long-term side effects from getting a severe COVID-19 infection could include heart problems, 

heart failure, myocarditis, and skin rashes. He also testified that it was his understanding that 
No. 1-22-1369 

13 

children experienced mild symptoms and recovered quickly from a COVID-19 infection. As for 

the Costa Rica trip, Jeffrey agreed that there was a travel advisory warning in an October 26, 

2021, document issued by the U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica entitled, “Alert: New CDC 

Requirements for Entry to the United States Beginning November 8, 2021.”

¶ 35 Emily Jones

¶ 36 Jeffrey called Emily as an adverse witness. She testified that H.J. missed a total of six 

in-person school days in March and April 2022. H.J.’s vaccination status caused her stress and 

anxiety and put her family and dental patients at risk. She believed some parents felt 

uncomfortable with H.J.’s vaccination status. According to an email from H.J.’s principal, about 

90% of the students were vaccinated against COVID-19. In April 2022, Emily traveled by 

airplane with H.J. to North Carolina after he had been exposed to COVID-19 at school. 

¶ 37 On cross-examination,2 Emily testified that at all times when she traveled with H.J. to 

North Carolina, there were no warnings against traveling on airplanes, and she followed the 

government guidelines that were in effect at the time. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 

pandemic, the school had changed its policies multiple times and they were subject to change in 

the future. She believed it was in H.J.’s best interest to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Emily’s 

counsel attempted to introduce a June 8, 2022, letter from H.J.’s pediatrician regarding the 

COVID-19 vaccine, but the court sustained Jeffrey’s counsel’s objection based on it being

inadmissible hearsay. 

¶ 38 Trial Court’s Ruling on Petition for Vaccination of Minor Child Against COVID-19 

¶ 39 On August 8, 2022, the trial court granted Emily’s petition. In the court’s oral ruling, 

it noted that the parties disagreed on which standard applied. The court then concluded that 

2 The court allowed Emily to combine her rebuttal testimony with her cross-examination in Jeffrey’s case-in-chief. 
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14 

“what the Court is being asked to do is to modify the current Allocation Judgment with respect to 

this particular decision” and “therefore, the Court is going to be applying the standards under 

610.5 [of the Act], which permits the Court to make a modification upon a showing of a change 

in circumstances necessitating the modification regarding the best interests of the minor child.” 

The court further concluded:

 “And so, with that being said, the Court certainly looked for an analysis of what is in 

the best interests of the minor child. So, the Court then looks to all of the factors under 

the statute as to what’s in the best interests of the minor.” 

The Court certainly believed that after listening to testimony on three separate days 

from both parents, that both parents have the child’s best interest at heart, which always 

makes these decisions a little tougher. 

But it is not necessarily obvious that one parent is doing something out of spite or 

something along those lines. But I truly believe both parents believe that they’ve got their 

child’s best interests at heart. 

Nonetheless, after considering all the factors and evidence that I heard on those three 

days, I do believe that it is in the minor child’s best interests to receive the COVID-19 

vaccine.”

The court modified the allocation judgment such that Emily had sole decision-making authority 

only with respect to H.J. receiving the COVID-19 vaccination and any appropriate boosters. On 

the same day, the court issued a written order, in which it stated it found “by a preponderance of 

the evidence, after considering all testimony and relevant factors, that it is in the minor child’s 

best interest that the minor child be vaccinated against Covid-19.” It stated that pursuant to 

section 610.5 of the Act, the parties’ final custody judgment was modified such that Emily “shall 
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15 

have sole decision-making authority over the limited issue of the minor child being vaccinated 

against Covid-19, in accordance with government guidelines, and any booster vaccinations that 

may be appropriate, thereto.”

¶ 40 The court subsequently granted Jeffrey’s motion to stay the judgment. This appeal 

follows. 

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 42 On appeal, Jeffrey contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motion 

for a directed finding. He also contends the court erred when it granted Emily’s petition for 

vaccination of the minor child against COVID-19 on several grounds, including that the court’s 

ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 43 Standard of Review

¶ 44 The trial court must allocate decision-making responsibilities according to the best 

interests of the child. Jameson v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. “The trial court is in 

the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the 

child.” In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24. This court will not reweigh 

evidence or assess the witnesses’ credibility. Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 51. We will 

not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the allocation of decision-making responsibilities unless that 

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 47. A trial court’s decision is 

considered to be against the manifest weight of the evidence “only if the opposite conclusion is 

clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re 

Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16. Under this standard, “the evidence will be reviewed in 

the light most favorable to the appellee” (In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 2013 IL App 

(1st) 122145, ¶ 45), and we may “affirm the trial court’s ruling if there is any basis in the record 
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to support the trial court’s findings” (In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24). “It 

is no small burden to show that a circuit court’s ruling on decision-making responsibilities is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 50.

¶ 45 Section 610.5 of the Act sets forth the standards for modifying parenting time and 

judgments allocating parental decision-making responsibilities. 750 ILCS 5/610.5 (West 2022). 

Section 610.5(c), which is relevant here, states as follows:

“the court shall modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment when necessary to 

serve the child’s best interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

on the basis of facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or 

allocation judgment or were not anticipated therein, a substantial change has occurred in 

the circumstances of the child or of either parent and that a modification is necessary to 

serve the child’s best interests.” 750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West 2022). 

¶ 46 Accordingly, under the Act, the court may modify an allocation judgment if (1) a 

substantial change has occurred since the entry of the existing allocation judgment and (2) the 

modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests. In re Marriage of Burns & Lifferth, 

2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 26. To determine a child’s best interest for purposes of allocating 

significant decision-making responsibilities, the court must consider all relevant factors, 

including those set forth in section 602.5(c) of the Act. Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. 

The trial court need not make explicit findings as to each factor nor is it required to refer to every 

factor. Id.

¶ 47 Trial Court’s Denial of Jeffrey’s Motion for a Directed Finding

¶ 48 We first address Jeffrey’s contention that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion for a directed finding after Emily’s case-in-chief because Emily did not meet her burden 
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17 

of proving that it was necessary for H.J. to be vaccinated against COVID-19. There was a trial on 

the merits here, so the trial court’s denial of Jeffrey’s motion for a directed finding merged into 

the court’s final judgment that granted Emily’s petition and modified the final custody judgment. 

Thus, Jeffrey’s claim that the court erred when it denied his motion for directed finding is not 

subject to review. See Taylor v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 

123744, ¶ 32 (concluding that, “as there has been a trial on the merits in this case, the denial of 

the Board’s motions for summary judgment and direct verdict have merged into the final 

judgment”); Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 592 (1993) (where the court concluded that “a 

denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to review on appeal after a trial has been 

held, as any error in the denial merges into the subsequent judgment,” it stated that “[t]his same 

reasoning applies equally to the plaintiff’s issue on denial of his motion for a directed verdict as 

to liability”); In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497, 513 (1990) (where the court found that the fatherrespondent waived a challenge to the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment at the close of 

the State’s case-in-chief because he produced evidence following the denial of that motion, the 

court noted, “[t]he obvious reason for that result is the trial court’s ruling on the motion becomes 

merged into the judgment”). 

¶ 49 CDC Recommendations, IDPH Document, and FDA News Release

¶ 50 Jeffrey contends that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of three of Emily’s 

exhibits, including the CDC recommendations, the IDPH document, and the FDA news release. 

He also claims the court abused its discretion when it admitted these exhibits into evidence.

¶ 51 This court has previously held that information on government websites is 

sufficiently reliable such that the court may take judicial notice of the information. Leach v. 

Department of Employment Security, 2020 IL App (1st) 190299, ¶ 44 (“Information on websites 
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and in public records are sufficiently reliable such that judicial notice may be taken.”). Here, the 

trial court took judicial notice of the CDC recommendations, the IDPH document, and the FDA 

news release, all of which are from official government websites. Thus, the trial court properly 

took judicial notice of the information provided on these websites. See Krewionek v. McKnight, 

2022 IL App (2d) 220078, ¶ 36 (where the court stated that it may take judicial notice of legal 

authority that recognized that COVID-19 vaccines were intended to prevent the contraction and 

transmission of COVID-19, it cited the CDC’s website and explained that the website instructed 

that “COVID-19 vaccines are effective at preventing you from getting sick” and “Getting 

vaccinated is the best way to slow the spread of [COVID-19]”); People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App 

(4th) 200081, ¶ 90 (where the defendant cited two articles from official governmental 

publications, including one article from the CDC, the court concluded that it could have taken 

judicial notice of the information had the information been presented in the trial court); Edward 

Sims Jr. Trust v. Henry County Board of Review, 2020 IL App (3d) 190397, ¶ 26 n.6 (“It is 

generally accepted that a court may take judicial notice of the information on a government 

website.”); Ashley v. Pierson, 339 Ill. App. 3d 733, 739 (2003) (the court took judicial notice of

information provided on the Illinois Department of Corrections website). 

¶ 52 We next address Jeffrey’s assertion that the court abused its discretion when it 

admitted these exhibits into evidence. “A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission 

of evidence, and we will not disturb the court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” Union Tank 

Car Co. v. NuDevco Partners Holdings, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 172858, ¶ 31. We will only 

reverse a trial court’s decision if it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or no reasonable person would take 

the view adopted by the trial court. Id. 
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¶ 53 Jeffrey asserts that the court allowed Emily to testify as if she had expert knowledge 

of the three exhibits. However, the record does not show that the court allowed Emily to testify 

as if she was an expert. Rather, the record shows the court allowed her to recite certain parts of 

the information contained in the exhibits, of which, as previously discussed, the court properly 

took judicial notice. The court stated it was taking judicial notice of the information contained in 

the exhibits, not Emily’s testimony about her interpretation of the information contained in the 

exhibits. Further, the court stated that it would allow Jeffrey to present evidence regarding the 

authenticity of and the weight the court should give the exhibits. Accordingly, from our review 

of the record, we cannot find the court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the 

CDC recommendations, the IDPH document, and the FDA news release. 

¶ 54 Trial Court’s Judgment on Petition for Vaccination 

¶ 55 Jeffrey contends that the trial court’s ruling that granted Emily’s petition for 

vaccination of the minor child against COVID-19 is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

He argues that Emily failed to present sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the 

COVID-19 vaccination was necessary to serve the best interests of H.J. He asserts that Emily 

presented only her own testimony and did not present an expert witness. 

¶ 56 As previously discussed, the court may modify an allocation judgment if (1) a 

substantial change has occurred since the entry of the existing allocation judgment and (2) the 

modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests. In re Marriage of Burns & Lifferth, 

2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 26. We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the allocation of 

decision-making responsibilities unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. 
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¶ 57 Here, Jeffrey does not dispute that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a substantial 

change in circumstances, as he asserts in his opening brief that, “[f]acts had arisen since the entry 

of the Final Custody Judgment or were not anticipated therein, specifically the global Covid-19 

pandemic” and the “introduction of a new vaccine for Covid-19 for the child was not 

anticipated.” Rather, Jeffrey argues that Emily failed to present evidence to show that the 

COVID-19 vaccination was necessary to serve H.J.’s best interests. 

¶ 58 Applying the principles discussed above, we find that the trial court’s ruling that 

granted Emily sole decision-making authority only with respect to H.J. receiving the COVID-19 

vaccination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court heard both parents 

testify about the reasons that formed their decisions about the COVID-19 vaccination for H.J. as 

well as about their disagreement regarding whether H.J.’s vaccination status impacted his 

education and social experiences. 

¶ 59 Emily testified that as a result of H.J.’s vaccination status, H.J. missed about one 

week of in-person learning and that school from home had a “serious negative” effect on him, as 

he received most of his social interaction from school. She testified that he also missed a play 

date, a birthday party, and a trip to the Museum of Science and Industry. Emily was concerned 

that H.J. was not protected from the virus as much as he could be and that he could spread it to 

others. She testified that while H.J. was unvaccinated, she was concerned with him spending 

time with his grandparents and limited his interactions with others. Emily also presented 

documents from the government websites of the CDC, the IDPH, and the FDA, which all 

recommended that everyone H.J.’s age be vaccinated against COVID-19. These documents 

provide support for the trial court’s ruling that granted Emily sole decision-making authority 

over the COVID-19 vaccination. Accordingly, based on this evidence, the record supports the 
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trial court’s ruling and we cannot find that an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or that the 

decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Thus, the court’s decision that 

granted Emily sole decision-making authority only with respect to the COVID-19 vaccination is 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 60 We acknowledge that Jeffrey testified that he was concerned about the long-term side 

effects of the vaccine, including that it could cause myocarditis and heart failure in children in 

H.J.’s age group. He testified that his concerns were based on a JAMA article, which was not 

admitted into evidence, and his review of datasets and reports of adverse reactions obtained from 

the VAERS website. Jeffrey also testified that H.J. did well very with remote learning, and that 

his social life while he was with Jeffrey was not limited. However, as a reviewing court, we may 

not reweigh the evidence, assess witness credibility, or set aside the trial court’s decision simply 

because a different conclusion may have been drawn. See Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 

51 (“It is well settled that a reviewing court’s function is not to reweigh the evidence or assess 

witness credibility and set aside the circuit court’s decision simply because a different conclusion 

may have been drawn from the evidence.”).

¶ 61 We note that Jeffrey asserts that Emily’s evidence lacked expert testimony to support 

her contention that the vaccine was necessary and that if we affirm the trial court’s ruling, our 

decision will set the precedent of granting medical decisions to a sole parent without the need for 

expert testimony. However, Jeffrey does not direct us to any authority that has held that when a 

court is determining whether a modification of a parties’ allocation of decision-making 

responsibilities regarding a medical decision is necessary to serve the child’s best interest, the 

movant must present an expert witness. Further, as previously discussed, the trial court properly 
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took judicial notice of the documents from the CDC, the IDPH, and the FDA, all of which 

recommended the vaccine for children in H.J.’s age group. 

¶ 62 The Standard the Trial Court Applied and Best Interest Factors

¶ 63 Jeffrey contends that the court applied the incorrect standard under section 610.5 of 

the Act when it granted Emily’s petition and modified the final custody judgment. He claims the 

court applied section 610.5(a), the section that addresses, in part, modifying parental time, rather 

than section 610.5(c), the section relevant here on modifying an order allocating decision-making 

responsibilities. In arguing that the court applied the section addressing modifying parenting time 

in section 610.5(a), Jeffrey cites the court’s statement that it was “applying the standards under 

610.5, which permits the Court to make a modification upon a showing of a change in 

circumstances necessitating the modification regarding the best interests of the minor child.” 

¶ 64 The part in section 610.5(a) that addresses modifying parenting time provides that 

“[p]arenting time may be modified at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, 

upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best 

interests of the child.” 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a) (West 2022). As previously discussed, under section 

610.5(c) of the Act, which is relevant here, the court may modify an allocation judgment if (1) a 

substantial change has occurred since the entry of the existing allocation judgment and (2) the 

modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests. In re Marriage of Burns & Lifferth, 

2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 26.

¶ 65 A trial court is “presumed to know the law and apply it properly, absent an 

affirmative showing to the contrary in the record.” In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 345 (2000). 

Although the trial court did not recite the exact language from section 610.5(c) in its oral ruling, 

we cannot find that the record affirmatively shows that the trial court incorrectly applied section 
No. 1-22-1369 

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610.5(c), or that it applied, as Jeffrey contends, the standard applicable to modifying parenting 

time set forth in section 610.5(a). Rather, when the court orally pronounced its ruling, it stated it 

was being asked to modify a current allocation judgment. The court’s ruling then discussed

whether the modification, i.e., whether to grant Emily decision-making authority regarding the 

COVID-19 vaccine such that H.J. would receive the COVID-19 vaccine, was in H.J.’s best 

interests. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Jeffrey’s argument that the court did not apply the 

correct standard when it granted Emily’s petition for vaccination of H.J. 

¶ 66 Jeffrey also claims that the court failed to mention the statutory best interest factors 

and did not provide a summary of the evidence as it relates to those factors. However, as 

previously stated, the court need not make an explicit finding on nor reference each factor. In re 

Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 43. Here, the court heard testimony and argument 

from both parties about H.J.’s best interests, and when it issued its oral ruling, it expressly stated 

that it considered the evidence and factors, as it stated, “after considering all the factors and 

evidence that I heard on those three days,” it was in the minor child’s best interests to receive the 

COVID-19 vaccine. It also stated that it “certainly looked for an analysis of what is in the best 

interests of the minor child” and that “the Court then looks to all of the factors under the statute 

as to what’s in the best interests of the minor.” Accordingly, the court stated that it looked to and 

considered the evidence and all the factors under the statute, and we presume the court followed 

the law, as the record does not affirmatively show that the court failed to do so. See In re N.B.,

191 Ill. 2d at 345 (“The circuit court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, absent 

an affirmative showing to the contrary in the record.”).

¶ 67 Due Process Argument 
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¶ 68 Jeffrey contends that the trial court’s ruling infringed on his fundamental due process 

rights to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his minor child. He argues 

that the trial court’s errors in its interpretation and application of the law resulted in a violation of 

his procedural due process rights.3 

¶ 69 “The federal and Illinois Constitutions protect persons from state governmental 

deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Village of Vernon Hills v. 

Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 31 (citing U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). 

“Procedural due process concerns the constitutional adequacy of the specific procedures 

employed to deny a person’s life, liberty, or property interests.” Id. “Procedural due process 

generally refers to notice and the opportunity to be heard.” Fischetti v. Village of Schaumburg, 

2012 IL App (1st) 111008, ¶ 16. “Procedural due process rights include a right to present 

evidence and argument, a right to cross-examine witnesses, and impartiality in rulings upon the 

evidence which is offered.” Id. We review de novo a claim that a party’s procedural due process

rights were violated. In re Todd K., 371 Ill. App. 3d 539, 541 (2007). 

¶ 70 Jeffrey asserts that his due process rights were violated because the court made 

numerous errors in its interpretation and application of the law and that it relied on improper 

evidence. However, our supreme court has stated that “procedural due process is not a guaranty 

against erroneous or unjust decisions, or the incorrect interpretation of statutes or rules of law” 

and “[n]either an abuse of discretion nor an erroneous rule of law will support a reversal for a 

deprivation of procedural due process.” Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 

218, 246 (2006). Further, Jeffrey had the opportunity to present evidence and argument, to make 

3 We note that Jeffrey asserts in his reply brief that he was not required to send notice of his claim to the Illinois 

Office of Attorney General under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(a), (c) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006)) 

because he is “not challenging the constitutionality of any statute.” He also asserts that although Rule 19 does not 

apply, he sent copies of the briefs filed in this case to the Office of the Attorney General, Civil Division. 
No. 1-22-1369 

25 

objections, and to cross-examine witnesses. In addition, the court reviewed the evidence and 

arguments presented by the parties and then applied section 610.5 of the Act and, as previously 

discussed, the court’s ruling is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also note that 

under section 602.5(a) of the Act, it states that “[n]othing in this Act requires that each parent be 

allocated decision-making responsibilities.” 750 ILCS 5/602.5(a) (West 2022). Accordingly, the 

trial court’s ruling that modified the parties’ allocation of decision-making responsibilities and 

gave Emily sole decision-making authority only on the COVID-19 vaccination did not violate 

Jeffrey’s due process rights. 

¶ 71 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 72 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook 

County. 

¶ 73 Affirmed.