THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Argonaut Conference: January–February 1945 

The Argonaut Conference, which lasted from January 30 to February 11, 1945, took place in two 

locations: the island of Malta and Yalta in the Soviet Union. This important conference marked 

the second occasion that the Big Three leaders—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime 

minister Winston S. Churchill, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin—and the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff (CCS) conferred on the progress of the war. The first part of the conference (sometimes 

called the Malta Conference) occurred in Malta from January 30 to February 3. It was an 

opportunity for American and British leaders to plan for the final campaign against the Germans 

and to prepare for the Yalta meeting with Stalin and Soviet leaders. The second part of the 

conference, also known as the Yalta Conference, was hosted by Stalin in the Soviet resort town 

from February 4 to 11. These highly significant meetings focused mainly on postwar plans for 

Europe, and Argonaut was the last wartime conference attended by Roosevelt, who would die on 

April 12, 1945. 

Reflecting the Big Three’s emphasis on postwar Europe, the most sweeping agreement at 

Argonaut concerned the occupation zones in Germany and Austria, including the creation of a 

French zone in Germany. The Allied leaders also discussed new German “superweapons” such 

as V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets. The U-boat threat was again assessed, primarily because 

of the introduction of the schnorkel, which allowed for longer submerged periods and the 

recharging of a submarine’s battery without surfacing. Operations for the defeat of Japan were 

also extensively considered, including conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific war and 

actions in Southeast Asia. 
Argonaut was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British leaders 

in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate 

the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader 

Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, position 

papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were taken at the 

accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents address virtually every policy 

and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates about the location and timing 

of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, they record 

the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an indispensable primary source on the 

planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Argonaut, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, 

and PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 
Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

January-February 1945 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, U.S. SECRETARY 

OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1945 
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TABLE! OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE

320135 

320137 

417111 

452137 

452138 

625114 

66013 

74618 

746110 

746/11 

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany .... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany .... (Note by the Secretaries) 

Operations for the Defeat of Japan. ........ (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command ....... (Note by the Secretaries) 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command ...... (Note by the Secretaries) 

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters 

(Report by a Combined ad hoc Committee) 

Estimate of the Enemy Situation -Europe 

(as of 23 January 1945) ............. (Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee) 

Shipping Agreement ............... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Over-All Review of Cargo Shipping ......... (Report by the Combined Military Transportation 

Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment 

Board) 

Over-All Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position 

for the Remainder of 1945 ............. (Report by the Combined Military Transportation 

Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment 

Board) 

1 

9 

11 

15 

18 

21 

27 

45 

54 

57 

i 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

747/7 Allocation of Resources between India-Burma and China 

ARGONAUT Theaters ................... 

75513 

75514 

76113 

76116 

76511 

76514 

76518 

76811 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean ....... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean ....... (Memorandurn by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

SCAEF Report on Strategy in Northwest Europe .... (Note by the Secretaries) 

Strategy in Northwest Europe ........... (Note by the Secretaries) 

Subjects for Consideration at the Next US.-British-U.S.S.R. 

Staff Conference ................ (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Subjects for Consideration at the Next US.-British-U.S.S.R. 

Staff Conference ................ (Memorandumby the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

Agenda for Next US.-British Staff Conference ..... (Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces ...... 

PAGE 

101 

103 

105 

107 

122 

125 

128 

129 

131 

ARGONAUT (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

ii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

76812 Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces ...... 134 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

772 Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany . . 135 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

77312 Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF . 139 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

77313 Operations in the Mediterranean .......... 141 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

77411 U-Boat Threat During 1945 ............ 145 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

77413 U-Boat Threat During 1945 ............ 152 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

775 Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic 

Concept ................... 155 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

77613 Report to the President and Prime Minister ..... 157 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

77712 Reciprocal Agreement onPrisonersof War. ...... 175 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

77811 Liaison with the Soviet High Command over AngloAmerican Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany .... 181 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

iii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MESSAGES 

PAGE 

COSSEA Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia . 200 

FAN 477 Bombline in Eastern Europe and the Balkan Area between 

the Allied and Soviet Armies ........... 185 

FAN 501 Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean ................ 142 

NAF 841 quipping Additional Greek Farces ........ 188 

SCAF 179 Development of Operations in Northwest Europe ... 109 

SCAF 180 Appreciation and Plan of Operations in Northwest Europe 116 

SCAF 194 Revised Paragraphs (A) and (B) to Plan of Operations 

in Northwest Europe .............. 123 

5-77211 General Eisenhower's Confirmation and Amplification 

of SCAF 194. .. .............. 124 

iv 

19 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 182d Meeting (Malta) ............... 191 

Procedure for the Conference 

Agenda for the Conference 

German Flying Bomb and Rocket Attacks 

Strategy in Northwest Europe 

Coordination of Operations with the Russians 

The Combined Bomber Offensive 

Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany 

Planning Date for the End of the War with Japan 

The U-Boat Threat 

C.C.S. 183d Meeting (Malta) ............... 205 

Operations in the Mediterranean 

Strategy in Northwest Europe 

Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Allocation of Resources between the India-Burma and 

China Theaters 

Estimate of the Enemy Situation -Europe 

Bombing of U-Boat Assembly Yards and Operating Bases 

V 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

C.C.S. 184th Meeting (Malta) ............... 

Strategy in the Mediterranean 

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Allocation of Resources between the India-Burma and 

China Theaters 

Pacific Operations 

U-Boat Threat 

Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases 

Strategy in Northwest Europe 

C.C.S. 185th Meeting (Malta) ............. 

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces 

Review of Cargo Shipping 

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and 

Northwest Europe 

Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF 

Provision of LVT's for the Mediterranean 

U-Boat Threat 

Basic Undertakings 

Interim Report to the President and Prime Minister 

PAGE 

215 

225 

vi 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 186th Meeting (Yalta) ............... 233 

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and 

Northwest Europe 

Planning Date for the End of the War against Germany 

Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean 

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany 

Basic Undertakings 

Liaison with the Soviet High Command over Anglo-American 

Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany 

Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff 

C.C.S. 187th Meeting (Yalta) ............... 239 

Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters 

Over-All Review of Cargo Shipping 

Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War 

Equipment for Greek Forces 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Operations on the Western Front 

C.C.S. 188th Meeting (Yalta) .............. 247 

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Liaison with the Soviet High Command with Regard to 

Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany 

Concluding Remarks 

vii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF ARGONAUT 

TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETINGS 

PAGE 

First Tripartite Military Meeting (Yalta) . . . . . . . . . . . 251 

Coordination of Offensive Operations 

European Theater 

Mediterranean Theater 

Movement of German Forces from Norway 

Use of Artillery and Air in Future Operations 

Liaison Arrangements 

Naval Operations in Support of the Land Offensive 

Date of the End of the War with Germany 

Future Business 

Second Tripartite Military Meeting (Yalta) . . . . . . 267 

Bombline and Liaison Arrangements 

Coordination of Offensive Operations 

Exchange of Information with Regard to RiverCrossing Technique and Equipment 

Bases for U.S.Strategic Bomber Forces in the 

Vienna-Budapest Area 

Provision of Soviet Airfields for Damaged 

British Night Bombers 

Enemy Intelligence 

Pacific Operations 

VLR Bomber Operations against Japan 

Operations in Burma and China 

Future Business 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF ARGONAUT 

PLENARY MEETINGS 

PAGE 

First Plenary Meeting, U.S.A.-Great Britain (Malta) ...... 287 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Basic Undertakings 

The U-Boat War 

Operations in Northwest Europe 

Strategy in the Mediterranean 

The War Against Japan 

Second Plenary Meeting, U.S.A.-Great Britain (Yalta) ...... 295 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Entry of Russia in the War Against Japan 

Continuation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Organization after the End of the War 

Tripartite Plenary Meeting (Yalta) ............. 299 

Situation on the Eastern Front 

Probable Enemy Action 

Shifting of Enemy Troops 

Russian Intentions 

Operations on the Western Front 

Bomber Offensive 

Situation in Italy 

Submarine Warfare 

Coordination of Winter Offensives 

INDEX ........... ....... 311 

ix 

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C.C.S. 320/35 

C.C.S. 320/37 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

Reference: 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 5 

On 5 February 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a revised 

draft agreement for the American control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave 

(Enclosure “A” to C.C.S. 320/35) in lieu of the draft agreement proposed in 

the appendix to Enclosure “B.” 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 186th Meeting amended and 

approved the draft agreement proposed in the appendix to Enclosure “B,” 

which was subsequently circulated on 6 February as C.C.S. 320/37. 

1 
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C.C.S. 320/35 5 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCWATION IN GERMANY 

References: 

a. CCS 320133 

b. CCS 320134 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy 

(Enclosure “B”),the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff approve Enclosure “A.” 

2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready’s letter 

it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot 

be agreed to by the local commanders of the Zones of Occupation should be 

referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of St& for decision. There will 

be undoubtedly some problems of overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and 

cooperation. 

3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed 

by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff 

does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. 

Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must 

rest with the American commander of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, as 

subordinate of the American commander of the Southwestern Zone. It is 

intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the 

draft agreement, conform to the general policy pursued in the administration 

of the British Zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement. 

2 
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4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready’s letter it is acceptable to the United 

States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement. 

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed 

before the end of the present conference. 

3 
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EN C L 0S U R E “A” 

(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to 

General Macready’s letter. Underlining and italicizing represent amendments to that attachment.) 

1. The Bremen and - Bremerhaven enclave Area as shown on the attached 

map will be under complete American control including military government 

and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally 

administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general 

policies pursued in the administration of the larger district British Zone, subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration 

of the enclave Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any particular that he may find 

necessary on military grounds. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by 

theBritish to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in 

the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services essential to British 

administration of the British Zone of Occupation. 

2. 3. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven 

Area 6 the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in 

possible movzment througk the American Zone to Austria so evident that 

obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the 

zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy 

Controller for United States (or British) requirementsof Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport 

involved in such essential traffic. 

3. 4. The map referred to is attached is the same asthat attached to C.C.S. 

320/2c 

Words underlined are proposed addltions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

Enclosure “A” 

4 
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ENCLOSURE “B> 

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION 

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WASHINGTON 

General Staff 20 January 1945 

Hon. J. J. McCloy, 

Assistant Secretary of War, 

Room 43886 Pentagon Bldg., 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. McCloy: 

BREMEN ENCLAVE 

1. I am now glad to be able to inform you that the British Chiefs of Staff 

are prepared to accept the formula which was arrived at our meeting in the 

War Department on the 5th January subject to the American Chiefs of Staff 

confirming their interpretation of one or two points. 

For convenience I attach a copy of the formula with two small amendments inserted which I have underlined. These amendments are proposed in 

order to ensure that the British and American interpretations of the formula 

are the same. 

2. I think you will agree that the interpretation by the British Chiefs of 

Staff as indicated by these amendments is correct. With regard to the amendment in paragraph 2 the British Chiefs of Staff understand the “Deputy Controller’’to be an officer deputed to a functional control office situated outside his 

national zone, which controls the agents of that office situated within his national zone. He controls such agents only, and does not, in the absence of the 

“Controller” assume authority over any other portion of the area within the 

sphere of that Controller. 

Enclosure “B” 

5 
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3. The British Chiefs of Staff would also like confirmation that administrative questions such as wage rates, which raise points of principle, will necessarily 

fall into line with the general policies of the Governments or of the Control 

Commission. 

4. The British Chiefs of Staff understand that the proposed formula will 

have to be read in conjunction with paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 320/34* which will 

in practice be modified by the principles enunciated in the formula. 

It would appear that such modification, however, will be in favor of 

American interests and providing that it is understood that paragraph 7 of 

C.C.S. 320/34 is modified by the formula, the British Chiefs of Staff do not 

consider it necessary to amend C.C.S. 320/34. 

5. If you can confirm that the American Chiefs of Staff agree the interpretation of the formula in paragraphs 1 to 4 above, the British Chiefs of Staff 

propose: 

(a) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff respectively issue 

instructions that the United States group, and the British element, of the 

Control Council for Germany should jointly proceed forthwith with the 

detailed planning of the arrangements in connection with the Bremen 

enclave. 

(b) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions that the naval elements of the two Control Council groups should 

examine the extent of the naval command to seaward referred to in paragraph 7 (b) of C.C.S. 320/33* and should submit their joint proposals to the 

Navy Department and Admiralty. 

(c) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now recommend that the 

United States Government ratify the occupation protocol for Germany 

(E.A.C. (44) 12th Meeting). 

(d) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now approve: 

(i) Paragraphs 1to 6 of C.C.S. 320/33. 

(ii) C.C.S. 320/34. 

Not published herein. 

Enclosure “B” 
TOP SECRET 

6. If the United States Chiefs of Staff agree the above proposals, perhaps 

you will initiate the issue by the United States Chiefs of Staff of the appropriate 

instructionsin accordance with paragraph 5 above. 

Yours sincerely, 

Is1 G. N. MACREADY 

1 Attachment 

Enclosure “B” 

7 
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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE “B” 

(ATTACHMENT) 

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE 

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map 

will be under complete American control including military government ­and 

responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization bQt will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood 

that the American military government will conform to the general policies 

pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the 

right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave 

in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds. 

2. The US.interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement 

through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores 

and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other 

is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible service, each military 

zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) 

requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic. 

3. The map referred to is that attached to C.C.S. 320/29. 

(ATTACHMENT) 

Appendix to Enclosure “B” 

8 
ECRET BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE 
TOP SECRET 

C.C.S. 320137 6 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff,in their 186th Meeting on 6 February 1945, 

approved the attached agreement with respect to the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

9 
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ENCLOSURE 

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE 

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map 

will be under complete American control including military government and 

responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the 

American military government will conform to the general policies pursued 

in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the 

American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds. 

2. The U.S.interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement 

through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry 

stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by 

the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each 

military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/ 

British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in 

the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential 

traffic. 

3. The map referred to is that attached to C.C.S. 320/29.* 

* C.C.S. 320/29 is not published herein but reference map is reproduced facing page 8. 

10 
TOP SKRET 

C.C.S. 417/11 

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 5 

2d Tripartite Military Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 15 

C.C.S. 417111, dated 22 January 1945, was circulated by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

and was noted in their 184th Meeting. 

11 
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C.C.S. 417/11 22 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows (C.C.S. 417/9*) : 

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by: 

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea 

and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. 

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis 

for planning in the war against Japan: 

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is 

(C.C.S. 417/10): 

a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to 

intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create 

a situation favorable to: 

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese 

capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and 

further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to 

establish a tactical condition favorable to: 

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the 

Tokyo Plain. 

* OCTAGON Conference book, page 38. 

12 
TOP SKREl 

3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by 

theunited States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:-

Objectives Target Date 

Continuation of operations in 

the Philippines (Luzon,Mindoro, 

byte) 

Iwo Jima 19 February 1945 

Okinawa and extension therefrom in the Ryukyus 1 April-AUguSt 1945 

4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe 

can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in 

the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter 

of 1945-1946. 

5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the 

entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination 

so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for 

that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack 

of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a 

sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined. 

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and 

preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until 

well into 1946. 

13 

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C.C.S. 452137 

C.C.S. 452138 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

References: 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 4 

1st U.S.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item e. 

CCS 74717 (ARGONAUT) 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 16 

In C.C.S. 452135, dated 30 January 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff 

proposed a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff replied on 31 January (C.C.S. 452136) accepting the proposed directive subject to agreement by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff with the policy as set forth therein regarding US.resources in the 

India-Burma Theater. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 184th Meeting considered C.C.S. 

452135, C.C.S. 452/36 and C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT), a memorandum by the 

British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the allocation of resources between the 

India-Burma and China Theaters. After discussion, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff amended and approved the policy contained in C.C.S. 452/36 (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 452/37) ; approved the directive to the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Southeast Asia as amended to draw his attention to the 

agreed policy set forth in C.C.S. 452/37 (approved directive subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 452138) ; and took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw C.C.S. 74717 (ARGONAUT). 

15 
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C.C.S. 452137 1 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

In their 184th Meeting on 1 February 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

approved the policy set forth in the enclosure. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

16 
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ENCLOSURE 

The primary military object of the United States in the China and 

India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will 

permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations 

against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma 

to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources 

participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for 

United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements 

for transport of supplies to China. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA’suse of resources of the U.S. India-Burma Theater in Burma 

when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any 

transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which 

is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion 

of the British Chiefs of Staff,would jeopardize those operations, will be subject 

to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

17 
TOP SECRET 

C.C.S. 452138 20 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. In their 184th Meeting on 1 February 1945,the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 

contained in C.C.S. 452135, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his 

attention to the policy set out in C.C.S. 452137. 

2. The directive, as dispatched, is circulated for information. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

R. D. COLERIDGE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

18 
TOP SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

From: British Chiefs of Staff 

To: Headquarters, Southeast Asia Command 

NO: COSSEA 200 (CM-IN-3376) 

3 February 1945 

Following to SACSEA has been approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Begins 1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. 

(To be known as operation LOYALIST.) 

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object your next main task will 

be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. (To be 

known as operation BROADSWORD.) 

3. In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the 

date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of 

your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the despatch of further reinforcements from the European Theatre 

should circumstances make this possible. 

4. You will prepare a programme of operations for the approval of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theatre 

of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theatre.* 

Ends 

Enclosure to C.C.S. 452/31. 

19 

SECRET 

C.C.S. 625/14 

LEVELSOF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS 

References: 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 776/3,Paragraph 21 

In C.C.S. 625/10 (ARGONAUT), dated 1 February 1945, the British 

Chiefs of Staff requested agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the 

minimum stock levels of supply proposed therein for Northwest Europe. 

C.C.S. 625/11 (5 February) circulated a reply from the Combined 

Administrative Committee in response to a directive from the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff as agreed in their 185th Meeting. 

In C.C.S. 625/12, dated 6 February, the United States Chiefs of Staff 

submitted certain comments on the proposals set forth in C.C.S. 625/10 

(ARGONAUT). 

C.C.S. 625/13 (7 February) circulated the report by a combined ad hoc 

committee appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 186th Meeting. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting amended and 

approved the enclosure to C.C.S. 625/13. The agreement for levels of supply 

of all petroleum products in all theaters as amended and approved was circulated as C.C.S. 625/14. 

21 
SECRET 

C.C.S. 625114 8 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS 

Note Zy the Secretaries 

In their 187th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff amended the 

agreement set forth in the enclosure to C.C.S. 625/13. The agreement as 

amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is enclosed herewith. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

22 
SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

AGREEMENT ON LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL 

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS 

1. The theater level should equal operating level plus emergency reserve 

level. 

2. Each level shall be expressed in days of forward consumption. The rate 

of forward consumption used takes into account the size and degree of activity 

of the consuming forces as estimated by the theater commanders or other 

appropriate authorities. 

3. The operating level provides the working stock required to be in the 

theater to provide for planned operations. It represents the number of days 

of supply to sustain the theater at the expected rate of consumption during 

the maximum interval which may exist between sustaining shipments. Experience has shown that all theaters (except ice-bound ports for which special 

levels must be established) can be assured of such a shipment at least every 

30 days. 

4. The emergency reserve level is intended to provide for unexpectedly 

high rates of consumption, destruction of stocks and handling facilities, and 

interruption of supply due to enemy action. It is based on the number of 

days or average number of days necessary to make emergency replacements 

from the principal port or ports of embarkation to the points of consumption 

in a theater of operation, and it includes loading time, voyage time, unloading 

time, and theater distribution time. Theater distribution time provides for 

the products which are necessarily absorbed and immobilized in the internal 

theater distribution system and takes account of variations in the different 

theaters. 

It is considered that an emergency reserve level based on emergency 

replacement time in each theater is adequate to meet any contingency that 

might arise until special provision can be made for additional supplies. 

5. The theater level of petroleum products shall include all bulk and 

packed stocks in the theater except those products which are (a) en route 

to the theater prior to discharge ashore, unless held as stock afloat, (b) issued 

23 
SECRET 

to civilian garages, retailers and other small consumers, (c) issued to actual 

consuming units (aircraft, vehicles, ships, craft, and so forth) or issued to 

dumps forward of Army rear boundary in combat zone. 

6. The following theater levels expressed in days of forward consumption 

have been agreed upon for the supply of all petroleum products for military 

services and essential civilian me:-

THEATER 

Operation 

-

Level

Emergency

Reserve 

Level 

Northwest Europe and U.K.* 

Admiralty 

Fuels 30 60 

War Office and European 

Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army 

Motor Transport Fuels 30 30 

Air Ministry 

100 Octane 30 35 

Other Grades 30 35 

Others 

Motor Spirit 30 45 

Other White 30 60 

Gas/Diesel 

Fuel Oil 

30 

30 

60 

60 

Lubricants 30 150 

Central Mediterranean 30 40 

Middle East 30 30 

Persia and Iraq 30 30 

South & East & West Africa 30 30 

Southeast Asia Command 

(Including India-Burma) 30 55 

China Theater 30 55 

Southwest Pacific 30 55 

South Pacific 30 45 

Central Pacific 30 50 

Alaska 30 30 

North America 30 25 

Latin America 30 30 

Theater 

Level 

90 

60 

65 

65 

75 

90 

90 

90 

180 

70 

60 ) see para60 ) graph 6 a. 

60 ) 

85 

85 

85 

75 

80 

60 ) see para55 ) graph 6 b. 

60 

Emergency level for this theater takes special cognizance of the complexity of the distributlon 

systems. 

24 
SECRET 

a. In these theaters the theater level for aviation spirit will be 75 days 

instead of 60. 

b. Within the Alaskan, North American, and other applicable theaters 

special levels over and above the theater level will be necessary for ice-bound 

areas. 

c. It is agreed that the above theater levels except as noted for Northwest Europe and U.K. will not apply to stocks of lubricating oils and greases 

which are subject to special considerations, particularly in areas where 

blending or packing takes place. The stocks required consequently vary 

considerably between theaters but normally approximate to 180 days 

consumption needs. 

7. As some theaters have insufficient tankage to accommodate stocks at 

theater level, consideration will be given to the holding of a proportion of the 

reserves for these theaters in other areas which have surplus storage capacity 

available and are suitably placed strategically for this purpose. 

8. Priority for providing supplies and allocating tankers shall be accorded 

to the maintenance of the emergency reserve levels in all theaters with the 

balance of all theater levels to be accumulated as rapidly as practicable thereafter, each theater taking its proportionate share of any shortage in supplies 

and tankers. 

After all theater levels have been attained, any surplus supplies should 

be stored, under the control of the owner or as otherwise agreed upon, in available tankage nearest to the source of supply or where it appears most desirable 

strategically. 

Theater stocks in excess of the theater level, unless permitted by specific 

agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, shall be reduced promptly to 

authorized levels by appropriate allocation of supplies and/or tankers. 

9. If priorities among theaters become necessary they will be determined 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

10. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board and appropriate British authorities 

will be the agencies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with 

the proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of any required revision of the 

levels of supply of petroleum products in any or all theaters and the principles 

governing these levels. 

25 

SECRET 

C.C.S. 660/3 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION-EUROPE 

(asof 23 January 1945) 

Reference: 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 6 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 660/3 in their 183d 

Meeting. 

27 
SECRET 

C.C.S. 660/3 24 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION-EUROPE 

(asof 23 January 1945) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 

1945,prepared by the Combined Intelligence Committee in accordance with 

paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 765/2,* is submitted for consideration. 

A. J. McFAFtLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

* Not published herein. 

28 
SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION-EUROPE 

(asof 23 January 1945) 

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To estimate the enemy situation in Europe. 

DISCUSSION 

2. See “Appendix.” 

CONCLUSIONS 

3. Germany’s fundamental situation is relatively weak and deteriorating 

in comparison with the basic military and economic resources of her enemies. 

However, by skillfully applying available resources in selected efforts, Germany’s leaders can, in favorable circumstances, achieve a local and temporary 

superiority of immediately available strength. 

4. The Germans intend to conduct an active defense on interior lines with 

a view to preventing a concerted attack upon the Reich, and to launch an allout submarine assault against Allied shipping. By this strategy they hope to 

wear out their enemies before exhausting their own resources, to gain time for 

the development of anticipated dissensions among them, and so to gain ultimately an acceptable peace. 

5. In Poland, Silesia, and East Prussia the Germans are now under powerful assault by the Red Army. To avert a fatal collapse of that front they must 

reinforce it with ground and air strength drawn from elsewhere. Withdrawals 

from the West would be dangerous in the face of strong Allied pressure, while 

Enclosure 

29 
withdrawals from Italy would be seriously hampered by continued Allied pressure there. It is evident, therefore, that Germany has most to fear from a fullscale. coordinated Allied assault on all fronts. 

6. Although German resources are inadequate for a prolonged defense of 

the Reich against a determined, simultaneous assault on all fronts and in the 

air, the Germans can postpone the decision by fanatical refusal to accept 

defeat and skillful employment of such resources as they have. This factor and 

the lack of a firm basis for estimating the scale and timing of concerted Allied 

offensive efforts make any estimate of the probable time of German collapse 

highly speculative and probably misleading. 

Enclosure 

30 
SECRET 

APPENDIX 

DISCUSSION 

1. General Strategic Situation. During the summer of 1944 the Germans, 

under concerted attack from the west, south, and east for the first time, were 

compelled to abandon the concept of Festung Europa and were driven back 

upon the Reich itself in such fashion as to put in question their ability to rally 

fop a final stand at or near its frontiers. They succeeded, however, in stabilizing their fronts and even recovered sufficiently to seize a temporary initiative 

in the West. 

This recovery was not the result of any change in Germany’s fundamental situation, which is weak and deteriorating in comparison with the basic 

military and economic resources of her enemies. However, by skillfully applying 

available resources in selected efforts, Germany’s leaders can, in favorable 

circumstances, achieve a local and temporary superiority of immediately available strength. 

The radical reduction of her occupational commitments and lines of 

communication, the diminution in intensity of the pressure maintained against 

her as compared to that exerted during the summer, and the advantage of 

operating on interior lines have enabled the Germans to mobilize and concentrate their resources with the urgency of desperation. The bold and concentrated application of these resources in the Ardennes offensive, although 

achieving no decisive results, did relieve pressure on a vital area, and, in its 

spoiling effect, prevent a full-scale assault in the West in coordination with the 

Soviet offensive in the East. 

The Germans intend to conduct an active defense on interior lines utilizing to the full the Westwall and other strong defensive positions as bases for 

operations designed to engage their enemies in detail with a view to preventing 

a concerted attack upon the Reich. They also intend to launch an all-out submarine assault against Allied shipping. By such strategy they hope to wear out 

their enemies before exhausting their own resources, to gain time for the development of anticipated dissensions among them, and so to gain ultimately an 

acceptable peace. 

Appendix 

31 
SECRET 

In Poland,Silesia,and East Prussia the Germans are now under powerful 

assault by the Red Army. To avert a fatal collapse of that front they must reinforce it with ground and air strength drawn from elsewhere. Withdrawals 

from the West would be dangerous in the face of strong Allied pressure, while 

withdrawals from Italy would be seriously hampered by continued Allied pressure there. It is evident, therefore, that Germany has most to fear full-scale, 

coordinated Allied assault on all fronts. 

2. Political and Psychological Factors. One of the strongest elements in the 

German strategic situation continues to be the political and psychological 

forces which have united the majority of the German people behind the total 

war effort. This support derives from effective Nazi control of every aspect of 

German life, from the strong basic patriotism of the German people in defense 

of the Fatherland and from increased acceptance of the following ideas: 

a. Unconditional surrender involves the destruction of the German 

nation. Only the Nazi regime has the power and determination to prevent 

this. 

b. Continued resistance will permit the emergence of conflicts among 

the Allies and out of these conflicts Germany will obtain an acceptable peace. 

German acceptance of a. above has been strengthened by the publicity 

given to reported Allied plans for post-war treatment of Germany. The effect of 

this upon the German soldier has been to convince him not only that the fate of 

Germany is at stake, but that he must resist or be enslaved. 

The effectiveness of b. above has been strengthened by the following 

developments: 

(1) Allied failure to end the war at early dates publicly announced by 

Allied officials. 

(2) Inter-Allied political friction as evidenced in the Polish and Greek 

situations. 

The German winter offensive did have the effect of stimulating German confidence in the Wehrmacht, but its failure to achieve decisive results and the 

opening of the Soviet offensives are undoubtedly undermining this confidence. 

There is, however, little sign that the mass of the German people has the 

inclination, the energy, or the organization to break the Nazi grip and to take 

Appendix 

32 
active steps to end the war. Since the failure of the attempted putsch of 20 July 

1944,the likelihood of popular revolt has become increasingly remote. The military and conservative opposition represented in the putsch has been disorganized and discouraged by its aftermath, and at present collaboration between the Party and the Army appears to be effective, despite a certain measure 

of mutual distrust. 

Underground opposition of German workers is not strong enough to 

constitute an effective political force prior to German collapse, and conciliatory 

measures toward foreign workers have somewhat lessened the potential threat 

from that group. 

While antagonisms, susceptible to development by Allied psychological 

warfare, clearly exist within the Nazi state, none of these antagonisms is at 

present strong enough to endanger the national cohesion, or to elude the 

strict, efficient Nazi control apparatus. 

3. Economic Factors. Possible expansion of specific items of German war 

production cannot reduce substantially the present marked Allied superiority 

in the production rates of almost all categories of military mathriel. Territorial 

losses, bomb damage, and other factors will continue to cause a decline in the 

general level of German production. 

However, materials in process, and stocks on hand, as well as further 

reduction of long-term uses of scarce materials, may cushion and postpone the 

military effects of Germany’seconomic deficiencies. Moreover,the existence of a 

straitened and inferior economic situation does not necessarily result in a corresponding inferiority in relative military strength at the front. Germany’s 

mathriel requirements are subject to wide fluctuations depending mainly upon 

the length of supply lines and the nature and extent of actual operations. Any 

statement of Germany’s economic ability to meet her military “requirements” 

depends not so much upon comparison with Allied production as upon the 

actual rates of mathriel expenditure which are imposed upon Germany. This 

latter factor is always problematical since it depends largely upon Allied operations and upon the skill of German leaders in resisting with a minimum expenditure of material. 

In most categories of equipment recent wastage rates exceed current 

production levels. However, unless there is an Allied breakthrough with exploitation into a key industrial area, we believe there will be no general critical 

deterioration of Germany’seconomic ability to support her armed forces during 

Appendix 

33 
SECRET 

the next six months, provided that the rate of wastage imposed upon Germany 

is not much greater than that of the last six months of 1944.Should the Red 

Army occupy Upper Silesia, Germany’s position would be greatly weakened. 

Even if, however, the Germans succeed in retaining both Upper Silesia and the 

Ruhr, with over-all production declining and given the continuance of a rate 

of wastage at least equal to that of the last six months, the gap between production and wastage will progressively widen, with the result that in future 

the German Army, except in certain critical items which may even improve, will 

be less well equipped than it is today. 

With these factors in mind, the German economic position in certain 

important categories may be summarized as follows: 

a. Monthly oil production which reached 1,360,000metric tons in April 

of 1944was reduced to 310,000tons in September and has now recovered to 

a rate of more than 400,000tons,without prospect of further substantial 

increase. Only the most drastic reduction of military and civilian commitments, aided by economies resulting from the loss of large occupied areas, 

plus the most extreme conservation measures makes possible the reduction 

of consumption to about the present production level. Although the present 

oil position permits vigorous defensive warfare, including limited counteroffensives, it is equally true that the oil position reduces the effectiveness 

of the German armed forces especially in any situation requiring tactical 

mobility over a broad area. This is one of the major factors which limits 

German strategic offensive capabilities, and their ability to deal with a 

future Allied breakthrough. Germany’s future oil position depends not only 

upon the rate of expenditure, but upon future bomb damage to German oil 

production and storagefacilities and upon the extent to which the Germans 

can recuperate from damage. If they could disperse and protect their 

remaining oil facilities, the Germans might be able in the future to effect 

some reduction in damage from bombing. On the other hand, their ability 

to repair damage is progressively decreasing. 

b. Raw materials shortages, notably in ferro-alloys, which will effect a 

reduction in the quality of some steels, will be felt over an ever-wider field 

of production, even though the military effects of such shortages can be 

partially postponed and minimized by planning production in terms of 

Germany’s most pressing combat needs and at the expense of her longer 

range position. 

Appendix 

34 
c. Aircraft production has continued to increase in spite of bomb damage, which, however, has prevented a much greater planned increase. Because aircraft production has to a large extent been dispersed or placed 

underground, its future reduction by bombing attack will become progressively more diflicult. 

d. Tank production has increased from 450 a month in July, 1944,when 

air attacks on engine and gear works ceased, to possibly 550 a month now. 

e. Production of most categories of weapons and ammunition will face 

growing difficulties. The effects of these difficulties on the fighting fronts 

will depend upon the rate of attrition incurred. 

f. U-boat production is increasing. 

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely 

directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt, but may 

cause some political difficulties and further reduce labor efficiency. 

4. Manpower. Germany’s lack of fully fit men aged 17to 37 constitutes one 

of her critical weaknesses. Her position in regard to older and less fit manpower 

is not so severely strained. As a result of the heavy attrition suffered since 1941, 

the number of fully fit young men remaining in the entire German population is 

substantially less than that required to maintain the German armed forces according to their former standards, and a considerable proportion of them must 

be deferred for occupational reasons. This deficiency in fully fit young manpower has been met to some extent by the maintenance of elite units at standard strength and quality, and by the extensive use of foreigners and less fit 

Germans,not only in rear establishments, but in other combat units and in 

every possible individual role. 

The heavy attrition suffered by the German Army during the summer of 

1944was substantially offset by a contraction of the area of German occupation 

which permitted the absorption of line-of-communications personnel into 

combatant units as replacements. Some further absorption of such personnel 

may occur as a result of further withdrawals but at the maximum would not 

be comparable to the gains of 1943-1944.By the same token, the possibilities of 

further recruitment or impressment of foreigners are now strictly limited. The 

German population itself has already been thoroughly combed over, except 

for German womanpower, which has not yet been fully exploited. 

Appendix

35 
SECRET 

Thus, while the German Army can still find replacements among older 

and less fit Germans, and, directly or indirectly, by the impressment of foreigners, its opportunities in this regard are decreasing. In any case, it cannot 

fully replace in kind heavy losses of fully fit young Germans, and consequently 

its combat effectivenessmust progressively decline in the faceof heavy attrition. 

5. Ground Forces. The estimated divisional composition of German ground 

strength as of mid-October and mid-January is set forth below:-

Panzer-type 

Field 

Limited employment 

Static 

Totals 

October January 

47 50 

127 121 

85 113 

7 7 - ­ 266 291 

The indicated net gain of 25 divisions during the three-month interval resulted 

from the disbandment of 14divisions, the formation of 6 new divisions, and the 

reconstitution of 33 divisions previously destroyed or at least badly mauled 

and out of action. The indications are that, as a general rule, the numerical 

strength of the existing divisions has been brought up approximately to the 

reduced tables of organization. Some 10 additional divisions are believed to be 

now in the process of formation or reconstitution. 

The German Army is experiencing some stringenciesin the provision of 

important items, such as tanks, field artillery, signal equipment, and particularly motor transport and fuel. The effect of these stringenciesis to limit the 

German Army’s freedom of action, but none of them is likely to have a decisive 

effect upon the strategic situation in the predictable future. Although the 

number of tanks and assault guns has declined, new types have shown increased effectiveness. 

In such a situation as has now arisen, imposing heavy attrition of manpower, the Germans face a choice between replacement of casualties in active 

divisions and the formation of new or reconstituted divisions. In the predictable 

future it is probable that they will attempt to keep active and experienced 

divisions up to minimal effective strength, while forming and training new or 

reconstituted divisions so far as the tempo of the war may permit. The over-all 

effect would be a further decline in the actual strength of the Army, whether or 

not there were a decline in the number of divisions. The effective combat 

Appendix 

36 
strength of the German Army will decline to a greater extent than the numerical strength owing to the high proportion of permanent casualties among fit 

Germans of military age. It is probable, however, that so far as manpower is 

concerned, the Army can be maintained as an effective combat force for at 

least six months, provided that it does not meet with military disaster in the 

field. 

6. Air Forces. The operational strength of the German Air Force is approximately the same as that of mid-1944, although some fluctuations have taken 

place in the intervening period. During that period, however, there has been 

a considerable increase in stored reserves. In composition, the German Air 

Force has been expanding the forces equipped with single-engine fighters, 

particularly at the expense of long-range bombers. In disposition, it has been 

assigning an increasing proportion of its fighter strength for operations in the 

West. Until the opening of the German counteroffensive on 16 December, the 

increase in the single-engine fighter force was used to strengthen the air 

defense of Germany against strategic bombing. After 16 December a large 

proportion of this force was transferred and disposed for cooperation with 

ground forces in the western battle area. However, in view of its numerical 

inferiority on the Eastern Front, the German Air Force has already transferred a substantial number of units from the Western Front to meet the new 

Soviet offensive. 

During the last two months the German Air Force has altered its policy 

of conservation and has intermittently put up a considerable effort for short 

periods both in defense of Germany against strategic bombing and in cooperation with the ground forces. However, in face of Allied superiority, it has been 

unable to sustain a high scale of effort and it has only been able Yo put up these 

intermittent bursts of high activity by taking advantage of the restrictions of 

operations by bad weather which have enabled it to replace losses and improve 

serviceability. 

From the long-term point of view, if there is a continuation of present 

production rates and only short intermittent periods of high activity, the 

German Air Force will continue to expand in numerical strength, which will 

be mainly in the single-engine fighter and fighter-bomber categories. There 

will also be an improvement in performance and fire-power. Furthermore an 

increasing proportion of its aircraft will be jet-propelled, which by virtue of 

their superior performance in comparison with conventional types may so increase the effectiveness of German fighter forces as to constitute a serious 

threat to Allied daylight air operations. 

Appendix

37 
SECRET 

These developments,if not offset by other factors, would by the spring of 

1945 increase the effectiveness of the German Air Force beyond that of the 

spring of 1944.We believe, however, that the over-all shortage of fuel, and the 

lack of pilots of a high degree of quality, training and experience will continue 

to impair the operational efficiency of the German Air Force and so prevent its 

effectiveness from surpassing that of the spring of 1944. 

Hence, though the German Air Force will retain the capability of delivering damaging blows, particularly if surprise is achieved or targets are insufficiently defended, it will remain incapable of exercising more than a local and 

limited influence on the course of military operations. 

7. Naval Forces. After the failure of U-boats tointerrupt OVERLORD there 

has been, until recently, a comparative lull in the campaign. Activity in construction has continued and the highest priority has been given to the production by prefabricated methods of two new, improved types with high submerged 

speeds. The enemy has used the lull to work up his new boats, to refit old-type 

boats and incorporate structural improvements in them, and to give his commanders and crews experience during work-up patrols in operating close inshore and in the use of “schnorkel”and other new equipment. 

The number of sinkings by submarines has recently been steadily increasing, probably as a result of: 

a. Increased skill and confidence in the use of “schnorkel” and other 

new equipment; 

b. The improvement in morale, due mainly to the ineffectiveness of our 

anti-submarine countermeasures; and 

c. The wish to embarrass our supply lines during the recent German 

land offensive. 

This increase in sinkingsmust be expected to continue, since the new technical 

developments have increased the U-boats’ potential for offensive action and 

have considerably reduced the effectiveness of our present naval and air 

countermeasures, especially in shallow coastal waters. 

Germany now possesses a growing fleet of new U-boats which, though in 

commission and fully worked up, have not yet been used operationally. It is not 

known why she has not already used these boats, since there is no information 

to suggest that any serious technical delays have occurred. There is evidence 

that she intends to start a major offensive with them not later than mid-March, 

and that she expects to obtain spectacular results. 

Appendix 

38 
SECRET 

In this new offensive the Germans may intend to operate their boats as 

follows: 

a. The new large type in packs with the object of annihilating Atlantic 

convoys. If pack tactics are not successful they will be redeployed in coastal 

waters. 

b. The small type in coastal waters off the east and southeast English 

coast and off Belgium. 

c. The old type boats to be so stationed as to cause the maximum dispersion of our anti-submarine forces. 

The potential U-boat threat must be regarded as severe. It may lead to so 

large an increase in shipping losses as to prejudice the maintenance and buildup of our forces in Europe and to accentuate the existing shortage of shipping 

for other requirements. 

The degree of success achieved in this new offensive will depend on: 

a. Our successin developingnew technique in anti-submarine measures; 

b. The extent to which submarine construction may be disrupted by 

Allied action; and 

c. The morale of U-boat crews as influenced by the general war situation. 

New technical developments in mines and torpedoes may, as in the past, 

also prove of material value to the enemy. Minelaying and the operations of oneman torpedoes, explosive motor boats, and such weapons, will probably continue, especially against our continental ports and their approaches. 

All major surface units are in south Norway or the Baltic. Though these 

units may continue to play some part in delaying further deterioration of the 

situation in this area, it is most unlikely that they will be able to exert any 

appreciable influence elsewhere. German light surface forces in all other areas 

have been reduced to negligible strength. 

8. Long-Range Weapons. Attacks by air-launched and ground-launched 

flying bombs and by long-range rockets are likely to continue on a steadily 

increasing scale. 

Appendix

39 
No radically improved types of these weapons are expected to be used 

for such attacks at any rate during the next few months. 

It is possible that the Germans may increase the scale of long-range 

rocket and flying-bomb attacks against continental targets, particularly Antwerp, at the expense of the effort against the United Kingdom. In any event the 

continuation of long-range rocket attacks against the United Kingdom would 

depend on the retention by the Germans of the Hague area. The remote possibility exists that sporadic attacks might be launched against the eastern 

coast of the United States and Canada, and the Panama Canal. 

9. The Situation by Fronts. 

a. Norway. "he Germans are gradually withdrawing from northern 

Norway. The indicationsare that, after a temporary stand at the Lyngsfjord 

line, they will withdraw to a line covering the Trondheim area and seek to 

hold there. Further withdrawal would jeopardize their U-boat campaign, 

as well as other strategic and economic interests. 

After this withdrawal, and with appreciation that strong Allied operations against southern Norway would be unlikely, the Germans might 

undertake to hold the area from Trondheim southwards with six to eight 

divisions. Eight to six divisions in addition to those already withdrawn 

would thus become available for use elsewhere. However, judged by past 

experience,difficultiesof sea transport would prevent their withdrawal complete with their heavy equipment at a faster rate than two to three a month. 

At best, therefore, Germany could evacuate some six additional fully 

equipped divisions from Norway before 1April. 

b. Western Front. Aided by fixed fortifications, favorable terrain, hastily 

assembled fresh forces, and Allied logistical difficulties, the Germans were 

able to check the Allied pursuit at or near their frontier and to stabilize the 

front. Although subsequently compelled to give ground in certain areas, 

they were able to maintain their front unbroken without employing strategic reserves being prepared for a countereffort. Although that effort, 

when made, failed to achieve decisive results, it did compel the temporary 

diversion of Allied forces from offensive operations in decisive areas and, 

in its spoiling effect, prevented full-scale Allied offensive operations in coordination with those of the Red Army in Poland. 

This attack exemplifies the German doctrine regarding the function 

of such fortified zones as the Westwall. In contrast to the "Maginot complex," the Germansintend such a defensive system and its individual strong 

Appendix 

40 
SKRET 

points to serve as firm bases for tactical counterattack within the system 

or for strategic counterefforts of an offensive-defensive character, such as 

the recent thrust into the Ardennes. Consequently, whenever the Germans 

are able to provide the requisite local reserve strength, the Allies should 

anticipate an active defense including, according to the circumstances, 

vigorous attacks in advance of the fixed defenses or strong counteraction 

to seal off and destroy any penetration. In present circumstances, however, 

the necessity to reinforce the East will probably result in such a reduction 

of German strength in the West as to limit Germany’s capabilities on that 

front to a passive defense. The value of the Westwall in either case, together 

with the vital importance of preventing a closer Allied approach to the 

Ruhr, will cause the Germans to conduct their defense in the West generally 

west of the Rhine. 

The Germans appreciate the logistical factor in Allied capabilities 

and the effects of their previous success in denying the use of continental 

ports. They also attach great importance to the effects of their long-range 

rockets. For these reasons they may be expected to maintain their hold on 

Holland and do all in their power to prevent the full use of the ports now in 

Allied hands, especially Antwerp. They will also do their utmost to deny to 

Allied shipping the approaches to continental ports. 

c. Italy. Allied penetration of the “Gothic Line” did not result in the 

expulsion of the Germans from the Po Valley. Adroit exploitation of water 

barriers has enabled them to maintain a front from Lake Comacchio to the 

Apennines east of Bologna. The Germans are prepared to retire by stages 

tothe Alps if the occasion requires it, but will hold Bologna as long as profitable in order to retain the military, economic, and political advantages of 

the occupation of northern Italy, to keep their communications through 

Istria to the Balkans, to continue to contain Allied forces, and to divert 

Allied shipping and supplies from other vital areas. Their present strong 

position would permit them, unless vigorously pressed, to release on short 

notice some three veteran divisions for use elsewhere. Should they retire, 

comparatively unmolested, to the line of the Adige, they could increase this 

number to a total of ten to eleven divisions; should they retire to the line of 

the Alps, the total could be increased to fourteen to sixteen divisions, if the 

Germans retire in Hungary and Yugoslavia to the Austrian Alps and 

Bratislava Gap. 

d. Southeastern Front (Yugoslavia, Hungary, western Slovakia). The 

Germans, with some Hungarian support and with considerable reinforcement from the Eastern Front, have offered stubborn resistance to the Soviet 

advance across Hungary,but have been gradually driven westward. Despite 

strong efforts, they have been unable to relieve a large force surrounded in 

Appendix 

41 
SECRET 

Budapest and now almost destroyed. Control of Budapest will materially 

strengthen Soviet communications. The Germans may attempt to stabilize 

for the winter on the general line Lake Balaton-Bakony Hills-Hron River. 

Should the Germans withdraw to the Bratislava Gap, however, they should 

be able to make a strong stand in prepared positions covering Vienna, with 

their flanks on the Slovakian mountains and the Austrian Alps. In these 

circumstances they should be able to transfer some divisions northward. 

German forces from the southern Balkans are retreating generally 

northwestward through Yugoslavia under slight pressure, but subject to 

considerable Partisan interruption and harassment. Sarajevo will be held 

as long as necessary as an escape corridor, Vukovar as long as possible in 

order to block Soviet use of the Danube. An eventual retreat to the general 

line Fiume-Zagreb-Lake Balaton, or to the Alps, seems probable. 

e. Eastern Front (Exclusive of the Southeastern Front). This front was 

relatively quiet until mid-January. The strength of the German defense 

based on the fortifications of East Prussia, the Narew, and the Vistula, their 

own logistical difficulties and to some extent the weather caused the Soviets 

to transfer their main effort to the Balkans, where they were able to effect 

easier conquests in an area of great strategic and political importance to 

Germany. This drive into Hungary caused some diversion of German 

strength from Poland, thus facilitating a resumption of the offensive there. 

Nevertheless the Germans, appreciating the decisive character and vulnerability of the Eastern Front north of the Carpathians, kept on that front 

some 40 percent of their total number of divisions, including a third of their 

panzer-type divisions and half of their field divisions. Even so, Soviet 

strength in the Polish and East Prussian sectors is preponderant in a ratio 

of approximately three to one. 

The Narew-Vistula line has now collapsed under the impact of the 

present Soviet offensive and the Red Army is sweeping across western 

Poland. The vital industrial area of Upper Silesia is directly threatened. 

Except for the Eastwall, no strong barrier to the Soviet advance exists between the Vistula and the Oder. As it advances the Red Army must reckon 

with the necessity to neutralize the potential threat to its flanks. In addition 

as it approaches Germany it will be confronted with a railway system never 

adapted for Soviet rolling stock, will meet concrete defenses such as it has 

probably not encountered before, will enter a hostile country where it can 

expect no Partisan assistance, and will face the same fanaticism that has 

been experienced in the West. 

The Germans’ best hope of checking the Soviet advance would seem 

to lie in a vigorous counteroffensive undertaken after the Soviet drive had 

lost its momentum and when the Soviet forces were possibly overextended. 

Appendix 

42 
SECRET 

There is some indication of a possible German concentration in northwest 

Poland and East Prussia for this purpose. Such a countereffort to be effective would have to be launched very soon. 

In any event, the probable onset of adverse weather in March will 

presumably slow up operations on the Eastern Front. Although it is unlikely 

that the Red Army will have accomplished the final defeat of Germany by 

that time, it will probably have reached positions from which to launch a 

decisive effort in May or June. 

9. German Hopes and Prospects. The Germans dread the consequences of 

unconditional surrender and hope for developments which will enable them to 

obtain an acceptable peace. They hope that such developments may arise in 

consequence of cumulative war weariness in one or more of the principal 

Allied Powers, of dissension among them, and of the impact on them of the 

employment of new weapons. This dread and these hopes, in conjunction with 

the continued possession of an unbroken military machine, constitute the 

basis for continued German resistance. 

Although their resources are inadequate for a prolonged defense of the 

Reich against determined, simultaneous assault on all fronts and in the air, 

the Germans can postpone the decision by fanatical refusal to accept defeat 

and by skillful employment of such resources as they have. This factor and the 

lack of a firm basis for estimating the scale and timing of concerted Allied offensive efforts make any estimate of the probable time of German collapse highly 

speculative and probably misleading. 

Appendix 

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C.C.S. 74618 

C.C.S. 746/10 

C.C.S. 746/11 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945 

References: 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 776/3, Paragraph 19 

In C.C.S. 746/8, dated 31 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff 

recommended certain action with regard to the memorandum of agreement 

signed by Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law concerning shipping of 

supplies to liberated countries during the first six months of 1945. 

C.C.S. 746/10, dated 2 February, circulated a report submitted on their 

own initiative by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the 

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board presenting the current dry cargo 

shipping position and certain recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff which, if approved, would serve as a guide for action by the appropriate 

military and shipping authorities. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 185th Meeting amended and 

approved the recommendation in C.C.S. 746/8; amended and approved 

C.C.S. 746/10. C.C.S. 746/8 and C.C.S. 746/10 are published herein as amended 

and approved. 

In accordance with the approved recommendation, paragraph 6 d. of 

C.C.S. 746/10, the report from the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board setting forth the over-all 

review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 was 

circulated as C.C.S. 746/11, dated 8 February 1945. 

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting approved 

C.C.S. 746/11 subject to change of date in sub paragraph (d) of the recommendations, on page 62, from “30 April 1945” to “1 April 1945.” 

C.C.S.746/11 is published herein as amended and approved. 

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C.C.S. 74618 31 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SHIPPING AGREEMENT 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. On 14January 1945 Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law signed a 

memorandum of agreement concerning shipping of supplies to liberated 

European countries during the first six months of 1945 (Enclosure “A”). 

2. On 14 January 1945 Mr. Law sent a note to Mr. Hopkins in which he 

gave his interpretation of paragraph 10 of the above agreement as not changing any current procedures and that the clearance called for in no sense gives 

the power of veto to military authorities on civilian shipping allocations 

(Enclosure “B”) . 

3. The principal points of the agreement are: 

a. That the French import program and other import programs when 

received are endorsed for planning purposes, and the U.S. and U.K. agencies 

concerned should as necessary facilitate through the established procedures, 

procurement against these programs so that supplies will be readily available for shipment. 

b. That, subject to military necessity, 7 ships are allocated in January, 

13 in February, and 13 in March. 

c. That U.S. and U.K. civilian and military authorities should consider 

what recommendations they can make to heads of governments to reduce 

the deficit either by downward adjustment programs or more effective use 

of shipping. 

d. That theater commanders, Allied governments,and combined boards, 

departments and agencies concerned are to be notified. 

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the agreement in 

Enclosure “A” and Enclosure “B” be referred to the Combined Military “ransportation Committee for recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

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for implementation of those parts of the agreement of primary interest to 

Combined Chiefs of Staff agencies and that the recommendations of the 

Combined Military Transportation Committee be coordinated with the Combined Administrative Committee and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. 

Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. 

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ENCLOSURE “A” 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States 

and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945: 

1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified 

his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to 

the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for 

national government import programs separate from and additional to 

military programs. 

2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French 

Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom 

Governments and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force has 

reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French 

Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the 

Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure 

in the near future. 

3. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has 

submitted a program for Italy. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean has endorsed it provided that its implementation does not affect 

his ability to meet his operational and basic civil affairs requirements. 

4. It is expected that in due course import programs will be put forward 

in a similar manner for other liberated European countries by their governments or by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 

on their behalf. 

5. The French import program and the other import programs when 

received are endorsed for planning purposes and the United States and 

Enclosure “A” 

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United Kingdom agencies concerned should as necessary facilitate, through 

the established procedures, procurement against these programs so that 

supplies will be readily available for shipment. 

6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these 

programs for January, February and March loading from North America 

as follows:-

JANUARY 

Total MWT WSA 

France 6 

Belgium 1 

UNRRA 

(Italy) ­ - TOTAL 7 

FEBRUARY 

Total MWT WSA 

10 

2 

1 -

13 

MARCH 

Total MWT WSA 

10 

2 

1 -

13 

7. There is attached a table showing for the period January through 

June 1945 the over-all shipping deficiency.* The deficit cannot be met by 

minor adjustments and calls for decision at the coming conference of heads 

of governments. In the meantime the responsible United States and United 

Kingdom civilian and military authorities should consider what recommendations they can make to the coming conference of the heads of governments to reduce the deficit either by downward adjustment of progrhs 

or more effective use of shipping. 

8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in paragraph 6 

are not to be reduced except in the face of military necessity and not 

without prior discussion with Mr. Harry Hopkins. The appropriate agencies 

should be notified accordingly. 

9. The theater commander, the Allied governments, the combined 

boards and the departments and agencies concerned of the United States 

and United Kingdom Governments are to be notified of the action agreed 

under paragraphs 5 and 6. 

10. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to alter any present procedures whereby the availability of shipping tonnage shall be determined 

Not part of this paper. Identical with table in paragraph 7, page 2, C.C.S.746/6 (published for 

convenience on page 53). 

Enclosure “A” 

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by the appropriate shipping authorities after clearance with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff. It is also understood that the determination of port 

and inland clearance capacity shall be certified by the theater commander. 

/Initialed/ H.H.by D.A. 

R.L. 

H.H.(Mr. HarryHopkins) 

D.A. (Mr. Dean Acheson) 

R.L. (Mr. Richard Law) 

Enclosure “A” 

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EN C L 0s U R E “B” 

14th January 1945 

Dear Mr. Hopkins, 

Memorandum of Agreement 

In initialling this agreement on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in 

the United Kingdom, I must refer to the interpretation of clause 10 which 

I should have liked to see clarified if time had permitted and if all those concerned had been accessible. 

I interpret this clause as a “no prejudice” clause leaving present procedures for the determining of shipping availability as they stand and making

it clear that this document in no way compromises any position or claim of 

anyone as to what those procedures are or should be. I do not interpret it, 

and I feel sure that it cannot reasonably be interpreted, as introducing any 

changewhatever in current procedures. As you know, my understanding is that 

these procedures do not provide for “clearance” in the sense of a veto by the 

military authorities on civilian shipping allocations, but do in practice result 

in the fullest exchange of information and consultation between the shipping 

authorities and the Chiefs of Staff. 

Yours sincerely, 

1 sf Richard Law 

Mr. Harry Hopkins, 

The White House, 

Washington, D.C. 

Enclosure “B” 

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OVER-ALL SHIPPING DEFICIENCY 

The combined deficiencies in terms of sailings disclosed by reports* 

of the U.S.and British dry cargo shipping positions respectively are:­

Feb. March April May June 

Atlantic 

British Ministry of War 

Transport (BMWT) 30 45 50 50 50 

War Shipping Administration (WSA) 43 

- 36 - 40 - 49 -

37 

-

Combined 73 81 90 99 87 

Pacific 

War Shipping Administration 35 51 45 72 56 - - - - - Total 108 132 135 171 143 

-

Appendices “A” and “B”to Enclosure “A,” C.M.T. 66/3. 

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C.C.S. 746/10 2 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING 

Reference: 

CCS 746 Series 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined 

Shipping Adjustment Board on their own initiative submit the enclosed report 

as a supplement to C.C.S. 746/6* to present the current dry cargo shipping 

position and to make recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which 

will serve as a guide for action by the appropriate military and shipping 

authorities. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

* Not published herein. 

54 
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ENCLOSURE 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING 

Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee 

and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To submit changes in the shipping position as given in C.C.S. 746/6, 

to bring it up to date and to make recommendations for action to be taken by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. A considerationof the deficits resulting from a restudy of cargo shipping 

as presented in the following table shows that the shipping position is tight 

and that deficits approach unmanageable proportions, particularly in the 

Pacific, to which theater certain diversions from the Atlantic will probably 

have to be made:-

For US. 

Atlantic deficits 

Pacific deficits 

For British 

Atlantic deficits 

March April May June 

31 24 18 35 

51 38 45 34 

35 35 35 35 

3. Military requirements have been severely cut in keeping with recent 

instructions to theater commanders by the United States Chiefs of Staff and 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff and provide no factor of safety or provision for 

new, expanded, or advanced operations. 

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4. In the event that these deficits materialize some civilian programs will 

have to contribute by cuts towards the management of present deficits. Increased demands, if accepted, can only make deficits unmanageable. 

CONCLUSIONS 

5. It is concluded that: 

a. In the consideration of basic strategic undertakings supplies to liberated areas should be considered only insofar as they contribute to the overall war-making capacity of the United Nations. 

b. In view of presently foreseen deficits, lack of reserves for stepping up 

military operations and increasing civilian demands, there is no alternative 

but to exercise rigid control over all programs and particularly those devoted 

to rehabilitation rather than to the war effort. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

6. It is recommended that: 

a. The appropriate Chiefs of Staff require rigid compliance of theater 

commanderswith their orders relative to the control of shipping. 

b. The appropriate Chiefs of Staff direct their military transportation 

committees in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities to adjust 

deficits in accord with the following principles: 

“In the event of a deficit in shippingresources, first priority should 

be given to the basic undertakings in support of over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT. 

“So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately 

covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without 

prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.” 

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the shipping implications of proposed undertakings before their inclusion in the 

approved basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts 

recommended for adoption at ARGONAUT. 

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff take note that the over-all shipping 

position will be reviewed again in determining the shipping position resulting from decisions made at the ARGONAUT Conference. 

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C.C.S. 746/11 8 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING 

POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945 

Note by the Secretaries 

Pursuant to paragraph 6 d. of C.C.S. 746/10, the Combined Military 

Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board 

have prepared the enclosed report for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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INDEX to C.C.S. 746/11 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945 

PAGE 

Enclosure-Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board . 60 

Appendix “A” _...............Statement by Lord Leathers and Admiral 

Land of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board on the Dry Cargo Shipping 

PositionPriortoV-EDay ...... 64 

Appendix “B” .................Combined Review of Over-all Cargo and 

Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of 1945 ........... 65 

Annex “A” ..................Combined Shipping Review of Dry Cargo 

and Troop Shipping Position from March 

through June, 1945 ........ 66 

Tab “A” .................. British Controlled Dry Cargo Shipping Position (March-June, 1945) ...... 67 

Tab “B” ...................U.S. Dry Cargo Shipping Position (MarchJune, 1945) ........... 74 

Exhibit “A” ........U.S. Dry Cargo Shipping Position Before 

V-E Day-Atlantic and Gulf .... 75 

Tab “C” .................. British Controlled Troop Shipping Position 

(March-June, 1945) ........ 79 

Exhibit “A” ........British Operational Commitments ... a1 

Exhibit “B” ........Section A -Other British Trooping Commitments ............ a2 

Section B -Miscellaneous Commitments 

Other Than Trooping to be Carried Out in 

British Shipping ......... 83 

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Exhibit “C” ........British Assistance to Movement of US. 

Forces ............. 

Tab “D” ...................US.Troop Shipping Position (March-June, 

1945) ............. 

Annex “B” .................Provisional Forecast of Combined Dry Cargo 

and Troop Shipping Position After V-E 

Day on 1 July 1945 ........ 

Tab “A” ................. British Dry Cargo Shipping Position (After 

V-E Day) ........... 

Tab “B” ................... U.S.Dry Cargo Shipping Position (After 

V-E Day) ............ 

Exhibit “A” ........US. Military Dry Cargo Requirements After 

V-E Day of 1 July 1945 ....... 

Tab “C” .................British Controlled Troop Shipping Position 

(After V-E Day) ......... 

Exhibit “A” ........Tentative British Military Requirements for 

Troopships in Second Half of 1945 . . 

Tab “D” ................... U.S.Troop Shipping Position (After V-E 

Day) ............. 

Exhibit “A” ........US. Troop Shipping Position (After V-E 

Day) ............. 

Exhibit “B” ........US. Army Overseas Strengths After V-E 

Day Required by Assumed Redeployment 

Plan ............. 

PAGE 

84 

85 

86 

87 

89 

91 

92 

93 

95 

97 

99 

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ENCLOSURE 

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING 

POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945 

Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee 

and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To review the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption of defeat of Germany 1July 1945. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. A statement by Lord Leathers and Admiral Land of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board on the dry cargo shipping position prior to V-E Day* 

is attached as Appendix “A.” 

3. This review has been prepared in two parts (see Appendix “B”). The 

first part (Annex “A” to Appendix “B”) summarizes the approved scheme of 

allocations, U.S.and British, to operate during the months March through 

June, 1945.The second part (Annex “B” to Appendix “B”)is a planning study 

of some of the problems which will arise on V-E Day and which call for 

urgent policy decisions in order to ensure that essential preliminary action 

is taken with the least possible delay. 

CONCLUSIONS 

4. It is concluded that: 

a. With respect to th position up to th defeat of Germany assumed 

at 1 July 1945:-

Victory Day (Europe). 

Enclosure 

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(1) Thisreview of shipping covering both dry cargo and troop transport shows the following deficits:-

March April Mali June 

Dry Cargo (in sailings) 

For US. 

Atlantic -22 -18 -12 -31 

Pacific -44 -38 -45 -34 

For British 

Atlantic -35 -35 -35 -35 

Troop Shipping (in trooplift) 

For U.S. No deficiency 

For British No deficiency 

(2) As indicated in C.C.S. 746/10the cargo shipping position is tight 

and deficits approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. The 

recommendations given in C.C.S. 746/10 apply and have been approved 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

b. Withrespect to the position after the defeat of Germany:­

(1) The indications are that cargo shipping will be easier for the 

first quarter following V-E Day and will become tight again during the 

second quarter thereafter. In view of that second, more stringent, quarterly period vigilance will be necessary to ensure meeting military requirements. 

(2) It is in the troop shipping position after V-E Day, shown in the 

following table, that the real problems arise:-

Troop Shipping Position 

(in trooplift) 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

For US.: 

With no British assistance -88,500 -148,200 

If British assistance of 

70,000 trans-Atlantic 

lift monthly is assumed No deficit - 59,700 

For British - 3,400 - 60,200 

Enclosure 

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The problem of greatest moment is the use of the combined troop transport pool in the redeployment of our forces to the Pacific and to Malaysia. 

While sharp definition is not given by figures because of lack of firm 

redeployment plans, particularly on the British side, the conflicts of 

interest that will arise are presently apparent. The U.S.position here 

given, even assumingBritish monthly assistanceof 70,000trans-Atlantic 

trooplift shows deficits, as shown in the table above, in meeting the redeployment program as presently planned. On the other hand, present 

British estimates show that the whole of the British trooping lift will 

be required for the deployment of British forces for the continuance of 

the war against Japan concurrently with the inescapable commitments 

of rotational movement and demobilization of forces already deployed. 

The problem will become further aggravated by the great pressures 

that will be exerted to repatriate nationals, both troops and civilians, 

at the fastest rate possible. Allocations of trooplift cannot be properly 

and firmly made for redeployment until the operations, the priorities 

thereof, and the redeployment therefor, are decided on a combined basis. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

4. It is therefore recommended that: 

a. With respect to the position prior to the defeat of Germany: 

Action approved in C.C.S. 746/10 be taken. 

b. With respect to the position after the defeat of Germany: 

(1) The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct as a matter of priority: 

(a) The preparation of a combined redeployment plan. 

(b) The fixhg of priorities for continuance of the war against 

Japan. 

(c) The agency or agencies given the task stated in b. (1) (a) 

above to confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities as to shipping 

possibilities. 

(d) The combined report of these agencies with accompanying 

shipping program be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

not later than 1 April 1945.This report will include also the formulation of a shipping program for continuing the war against Germany 

beyond 1 July 1945should the occasion require. 

Enclosure 

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(2) The combined shipping authorities convert dry cargo shipping 

after V-E Day on a combined basis to augment personnel lift as may 

be practicable. 

Enclosure 

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APPENDIX “A” 

STATEMENT BY LORD LEATHERS AND ADMIRAL LAND OF THE 

COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD ON THE DRY CARGO 

SHIPPING POSITION PRIOR TO V-E DAY 

The combined dry cargo shipping deficiencies for the remainder of the 

first half-year are shown in paragraph 4 a. (1) of the Enclosure. They have 

been reduced well below the levels shown in the recent Washington Over-all 

Review of Cargo Shipping (C.M.T. 66/3,12 January 1945*). Nevertheless, as 

indicated in C.C.S. 746/10the cargo shipping position will be tight and deficits 

will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. Reliance has been 

placed upon a substantial relief to the strained shipping situation through 

economies in the use of tonnage as a result of action by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff (C.C.S. 745/1*). On the basis of Combined Chiefs of Staff decision 

(C.C.S. 184th Meeting, Item 6) loss rates approved in C.C.S. 547/4* have been 

used and no allowance has been made for the threatened increase of losses 

through U-boat attacks, although current sinkings are not fully covered by 

the present loss rate. 

The actual deficiencies will be dealt with month by month in accordance with the recommendations given in C.C.S. 746/10. 

LEATHERS E. S. LAND 

* Not published herein. 

Appendix “A’ 

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APPENDIX “B” 

COMBINED REVIEW OF OVER-ALL CARGO AND 

TROOP SHIPPING POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945 

Appendix “B” 

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ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

COMBINED SHIPPING REVIEW OF DRY CARGO AND TROOP 

SHIPPING POSITION FROM MARCH THROUGH JUNE, 1945 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

66 
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TAB “A” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH CONTROLLED DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

(MARCH-JUNE 1945) 

1. British military sailings required to all existing theatres of war during 

March-June 1945,on the basis of known plans and requirements, and including 

military civil affairs requirementsto purely British zones, are as follows:-

FROM 

India 

Persian Gulf 

MediterraneanC.M.F. 

Malta 

M.E. Maintenance 

M.E. Collier 

Gibraltar 

Total Mediterranean 

Total Mediterranean 

and Indian Ocean 

Internal Mediterranean Services (Combined requirement, of which the British 

share is one half) * 

Australia 

Russian Aid 

OVERLORDB.L.A. ex N.A. 

Maintenance 

Civil Affairs 

Total 

Excluding coasterssee paragraph 2 (b) 

-

-

h! -

Ji .e 

-

U.K. 

-~

N.A S.K. 

- J.K. 

-

N.A.

­

28 40 30 30 40 

2 2 2 2 2 

20 15 18 16 14 

1 1 1 1 1 

6 9 6 6 8 

1 - 1 1 ­ 1 - -

1 1 ­ -­

29 25 27 25 23 - -­

59 67 -

59 -

57 ­

65

, - 60

2 - 2 

4 - 4 

- 8 - 12 

- I 20 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

67 
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N.W. Europe--ex U.K. 40 M.T. ships in service (combined requirement), 

24 British and 16 United States. 

50 store ships in service on British account in 

March and April. 

60 store ships in service on British account in 

May and June. 

500,000 deadweight tons of coastal shipping allocated 

as follows:­

170,000 British stores lift. 

155,000 United States stores lift. 

175,000 Combined coal programme. 

From March onwards the coaster allocation for the combined coal 

programmeislikely to increase to 250,000deadweight tons at the expense of both 

the British and United States general cargo allocations. Provision has therefore 

been included to cover this portion of the coaster cargo lift in ocean-going 

vessels. 

2. The statement of the estimated British-controlled dry-cargo ocean-going 

shipping position during the first six months of 1945 set out in paragraphs 3 

and 4 below should be read in conjunction with the following notes:­

(a) The Fleet Train. For the supply and maintenance of the British 

Fleet in the Pacific, British merchant shipping, existing or building, has 

been allocatedor will have been allocatedby the end of June 1945 asfollows: 

Deadweight 

tons 

(1) Allocated to the Fleet Train while 

under construction (White Ensign) ........... 330,000 

(2) Allocated to the Fleet Train while 

under construction (Red Ensign) ............ 160,000 

(3) Transferred to the Fleet Train from 

other naval services. ........................ 225,000 

(4) Transferred to the Fleet Train from 

other employment,......................... 120,000 

835,000 

Tab “A”to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

68 
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Items (2),(3) and (4) above are allowed for at Serial (5) (b) of the 

statement in paragraph 4; the tonnage for item (1) has been excluded 

both from the inventory and from the statement of requirements as it is 

being transferred direct to the Royal Navy for service under the White 

Ensign. 

The Admiralty have notified further requirements for the Fleet Train 

which would involve the provision of some 200,000 deadweight tons of additional shipping but these have so far not been agreed, and no provision has 

therefore been made for them in the statement in paragraph 4. 

(b) The Mediterranean coastal tonnage combined requirement, assessed at about 350,000 deadweight tons, will continue to be met from British 

resources. Serial (6) of the statement in paragraph 4 includes 250,000 

deadweight tons of these coasters, the remainder being ships of under 1,600 

gross registered tonnage (G.R.T.). 

(c) The Northwest Europe coastal tonnage requirement for British 

Army Stores,United States Army Stores and coal (combined commitment) 

will be provided as shown in paragraph 1. 

The whole of this requirement (one half of which is included at 

Serial (7) of the statement in paragraph 4, the other half consisting of 

shipping of under 1,600 G.R.T.) will be met from British coaster resources. 

(d) The United Kingdom import programme has been taken as 6.0 

million long tons in the first quarter of 1945 and 7.2 million long tons in 

the second quarter. 

(e) Supplies to liberated areas. Provision has been made in the estimate 

for British-controlled shipping sufficient to carry the amuunts set out 

below. These represent the agreed British share of desired import programmes submitted to the Shipping Authorities, phased on the advice of 

the Combined Staff Planners and screened for limitations likely to be 

imposed by reception capacity, or by supply or financial considerations, 

and after making allowance for cargoes carried in tonnage not under W.S.A. 

or B.M.W.T. control or as flatting in ships allocated for military cargoes. 

Civil Affairs 

National Government 

First quarter Second quarter 

of 1945 of 1945 

(million long tons) 

0.6 0.7 

0.4 0.75 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

69 
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The estimated shipping cost set out at Serial (10) of the statement 

in paragraph 4 excludes provision for:­

(1) Supplies within the Mediterranean (which are carried in the 

tonnage referred to in paragraph 2 (b) ) . 

(2) Civil Affairs supplies from the United Kingdom to Northwest 

Europe (which are carried in the tonnage referred to in paragraph 2 

(c) ) . 

(f) The termination of the war in Europe has been assumed as July 1, 

1945. 

(g) Future shipping losses have been estimated at the rates previously 

approved for planning purposes, and now reaffirmed, by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Total shipping available (ships of 1,600 G.R.T. and over) is estimated to 

be as follows:-

Date 

31st December, 1944 

31st March, 1945 

30th June, 1945 

Estimated Estimated Estimated 

losses new con- inventory 

during struction at date 

preceding during 

quarter- preceding 

year quarteryear 

(million deadweight tons) 

... .. 22.09 

0.16 0.36 22.29 

0.12 0.45 22.62 

Average for the first quarter of 1945: 22.20 

Average for the second quarter of 1945: 22.45 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

70 
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4. The estimated requirements against this shipping are as follows:-

First quarter Second quarter 

of1945 of 1945 

Serial (million deadweight tons) 

(1) Estimated tonnage available 22.20 22.45 

(2) Deduct average allowance for tonnage awaiting or undergoing repair -2.30 2.30

~ 

Net amount of tonnage available 19.90 20.15 

(3) Tonnage for United Kingdom 

coastal services 0.60 0.60 

(4) Tonnage engaged permanently abroad 

in maintenance of the war-making 

capacity of areas of British responsibility (see also Serial (11)) 

(5) Non-importing Naval and 

Military tonnage:­

(a) Naval Commissioned vessels 

(b) Vessels for the Fleet Train 

(see para. 2 (a)) 

(c) Other Naval, Military and 

R.A.F. Auxiliaries 

(d) Troopships 

(e) Vessels permanently in the 

Indian Ocean area carrying 

military cargoes 

Tonnage available for voyageby-voyage allocation 

2.20 2.20 

0.50 0.50 

0.40 0.45 

0.25 0.25 

1.20 1.20 

0.25 5.40 0.25 5.45 

14.50 14.70 

(Table Continued on Following Page) 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

71 
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(Continued) 

First quarter Second quarter 

of 1945 of 1945 

(6) Tonnage for Mediterranean internal shipments (including coasters) 0.80 0.55 

(7) Tonnage for shipments from the 

United Kingdom to N.W. Europe 

(including coasters) 

(8) Tonnage for military maintenance 

from the United Kingdom and N. 

America to the Indian Ocean area 

and the Mediterranean,from the 

United Kingdom to N. Russia and 

from N. America to N.W. Europe 

(9) Tonnage for United Kingdom imports (after allowing for imports 

brought in tonnage at Serial 

(8)) (see para. 2 (d)) 

(10)Tonnage for carrying supplies to 

liberated areas other than locally 

(seepara. 2 (e) ) :­

(a) Civil Mairs 

(b) National Government 

(11) Tonnage engaged temporarily 

abroad in maintenance of the warmaking capacity of areas of British 

responsibility (see also Serial (4) ) 

Total tonnage required for allocation 

(12)Deficiency 

72 

1.00 1.05 

5.00 5.30 

6.95 7.35 

0.60 0.75 

0.25 0.65 

1.90 1.85 

16.50 17.50 .- ~ 

2.00 2.80 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 
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5. In the W.S.A. shipping statement (Tab “B” to Annex “A”) provision is 

made for the following sailings from North America:-

March April May June 

(a) to the Indian Ocean area) Eastern 

(b) to the Mediterarnean ) customaries 24 24 24 24 

(c) to South and East )

Africa and the ) Southern 

Anzac area ) customaries 9 8 9 8 

(d) on the North Atlantic* 26 36 38 38 

6. These sailings are insufficient to eliminate the whole of the deficiencies 

shown at Serial (12) of paragraph 4, and there remains an apparent deficit in 

the British-controlled shipping situation equivalent to the following North 

Atlantic sailings*:-

March April Mag June 

35 35 35 35 

The use of North Atlantic sailings as a convenient yardstick does not imply that their number is 

a measure of a deficiency arising exclusively from programmes on that route. They, and all the 

other sailings mentioned, are associated jointly with the British deficiency as a whole, which it is 

impracticable to analyze according to cause. 

Tab “A” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

73 
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TAB “B” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

(March-June, 1945) 

1. The estimated United States dry cargo shipping is given through June 

of 1945in Exhibit “A’ on the assumption that hostilities will be terminated in 

Europe July 1st. In the event of the termination of hostilities at any earlier 

date, the position set forth would apply until that date. 

2. United States military requirements, as stated in Exhibit “A,” include 

provision for maintenance of all deployed forces and for all presently planned 

operations and have been adjusted by the United States Army and Navy as 

far as possible, so as to be within the limits of the availability of cargo and of 

estimated reception capacity in all theaters. Other requirements listed include 

regular W.S.A. allocations to British services, obligations under the Russian 

Protocol, and the programs for liberated areas accepted for planning purposes. 

The latter have been modified downward from the figures included in C.M.T. 

66/3as a result of a re-examination by the appropriate civilian agencies of the 

United States and British Governments. 

3. Allowance has been made in estimating the availability of shipping for 

authorized retentions in all theaters. It has been assumed that any presently 

existing shipping congestion will be immediately cleared and that vessels are 

turned around promptly and used in accordance with directions issued by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to theater commanders. 

Tab “B” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

74 
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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “B” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

US.DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION BEFORE V-E DAY 

ATLANTIC AND GULF 

1945 

March April May June 

1. U.S.ARMY 

ETO 

U.K. Military 30 30 30 30 

Continent -Military 185 185 185 185 

Civil Affairs -

1 1 1 1 ~ 

Sub-Total 186 186 186 186 

S. France -U.S.& French Military 65 65 67 65 

Civil Affairs 6 7 6 6 ~ - - ~ 

Sub-Total 71 72 73 71 

TOTAL-ETO 

ETO & Azores 

Military 

Civil Affairs 

TOTAL 

Persian Gulf 

287 288 289 287 

47 45 45 45 

-

43 -42 -42 42 ~

90 87 87 87 

1 1 1 

India-Burma & China 1 1 1 

Pacific Areas incl. SWPA 20 20 20 20 

2. U.S.NAVY 

Pacific Areas -34 34 34 34 - ___ - ~ .- -~ Sub-Total Military 433 431 432 430 

(Table Continued on Following Page) 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “B” to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

75 

1 

1 
- 

- - 

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(Continued) 

1945 

March April May June 

3. WAR-MAKING CAPACITY OF WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE 12 20 20 20 

4. BRITISH PROGRAMS 

North Atlantic Sailings(2) 26 36 38 38 

Other British Programs 

Military(1) 24 24 24 24 

Civilian -

6 -5 -6 - TOTAL BRITISH LEND-LEASE 56 65 68 67 

5. RUSSIAN LEND-LEASE(3) 38 36 28 28 

6. DESIRED NATIONAL GOW. IMPORT 

PROGRAMS FOR LIBERATED AREAS -28 38 41 44 - - - __ 

- Sub-Total Lend-Lease 

and Civilian 134 159 157 159 

7. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS 567 590 589 589 

8. TOTAL AVAILABLE -545 572 577 558

__ 

9. BALANCE -22 -18 -12 -31 

(1) Includes 1 India-China Defense sailing each month. 

(2) Sailings for Liberated Areas included in sailings entered for 

North Atlantic sailings. 

(3) Does not provide for 275,000 short tonsper month now under 

consideration for trans-Atlantic delivery of Protocol cargo. 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “B” to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

76 

5 
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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “B” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” (Continued) 

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION BEFORE V-E DAY 

PACIFIC 

1945 

March April May June 

1. US. ARMY 

Pacific Ocean Areas 

CPBC 21 24 26 18 

SPBC 10 10 10 10 

Southwest Pacific Area 50 55 60 65 

India-Burma and China 23 24 22 21 

2. U.S. NAVY 

Pacific Ocean Areas 129 132 151 154 

Southwest Pacific Area 32 20 20 20 

3. RUSSIAN 8 7 0 0 

4.BRITISH EMPIRE PROGRAM 3 3 3 3 

5. NON-MILITARY -9 -

9 -9 ­

9

6. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS 285 284 301 300 

7. TOTAL AVAILABLE -

241 246 ­

256 266

8. BALANCE -44 -38 -45 -34 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “B” to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

77 
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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “B”TO ANNEX “A“TO APPENDIX “B” (Continued) 

RETENTIONS OF U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPS ALLOWED FOR 

(All retentions are as of first day of month) 

UNITED KINGDOM 

WSA M.T. 

WSA Stores 

WSA Other 

Total Ocean 

1945 

March A@ May June 

16 16 16 16 

12 12 12 12 

-

0 -0 -0 - 28 28 2a 28 

WSA Coasters (DWT) 70,000 70,000 70,000 70,000 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Inside U.S. Sailings (60) 

WSA Retentions required for 

above sailings 40 29 24 20 

SOUTH PACIFIC a a a a 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 135 122 120 120 

CENTRAL PACIFIC 30 36 45 48 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “B”to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

78 

0 
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TAB “C” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

(March-June, 1945) 

1. In our consideration of the British personnel shipping position the following assumptions have been made:­

(a) That British personnel shipping commitments for operational 

requirements will be as shown in Exhibit “A.” 

(b) That British personnel shipping will be required to carry out troop 

movements (other than operational) and miscellaneous movements as 

detailed in Exhibit “B,” Sections A and B, respectively. 

(c) That British personnel shipping of the “Indian Ocean” type will be 

capable of meeting all local requirements (both normal trooping and operational commitments) in the Indian Ocean. 

(d) That the frequency of the convoy cycle for normal trooping between 

UK/ITALY/MIDDLE EAST/INDIA, will be maintained at 20 days, as at 

present, and that no developments occur which would alter the conditions 

and areas in which fast ships are at present allowed to sail free of escort. 

(e) That the Chiefs of Staff proposal to develop an overland route for 

trooping via France (MEDLOC) will not result in any material benefits to 

long sea voyage troop movements before 1July 1945. 

(f) That internal personnel movements in the Mediterranean (other 

than operational) can be met by allocation of a trooplift of 15,000 during 

the period under consideration. 

(g) That any losses to the troopship fleet, whether by enemy action, 

marine risk or transfer to other service (e.g., hospital ships) cannot be made 

good by new construction or conversion prior to 1 July 1945. The most 

serious effect on British estimates would result from any such loss in the 

unescorted class. 

(h) That the normal capacity of troopships proceeding from the United 

Kingdom to India will be reduced by at least 10% when east of Suez, in 

the interests of the health and morale of the troops, and the capacity of 

ships proceeding to the Antipodes (which have in the past been employed 

on the short Atlantic trip) will have to be reduced by some 20%. 

Tab “C” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

19 
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2. On the above assumptions,it is estimated that existing British personnel 

shipping will be sufficient to provide for the whole of the British commitments, 

shown in Exhibits “A” and “B,” and that it will also be possible to meet the 

assistance as requested by the U.S.authorities 85 indicated in Exhibit “C.” 

Tab “C” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

80 
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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “c” TO ANNEX “A” TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS 

1. Move of five divisions from Mediterranean area to N.W. Europe between 

mid-February and early May 1945 requiring a total lift of the order of 200,000. 

2. Any operational commitments in SEAC. 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “C” to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

81 
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EXHIBIT “B” TO TAB “C” TO ANNEX “A”T0 APPENDIX “B” 

Section A. OTHER BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS 

Area Estimated Numbers 

Canada & North 

America to U.K. 

U.K.to Gibraltar, 

W. Africa, Italy, 

PAIC, India and S. 

Africa 

(iii) Internal Mediterranean movement, 

N. Africa & M.E. 

to Italy, etc. 

Naval forces to 

Australia 

N. Zealand to M.E. 

M.E. to N. Zealand 

W. Indies to U.K. 

(viii) E. Africa to Ceylon 

Italy to India) 

India to Italy) 

PAIC to India) 

India to PAIC) 

10,000per month 

50,000 per month 

4,000 per month 

(3,000 mid-Apr.) 

(3,000 mid-Jun.) 

(5,800 mid-Mar.) 

6,000 RAF recruits 

4,500 in March 

2,000 a month 

1,200 a month 

Remarks 

Covers RAF, Cdn. & misc. 

requirements. 

Includes Army & RAF 

rotational movement 

md reinforcements from 

W. Africa to India. 

Covered by 15,000 lift retained locally. 

Rotational moves of 

New Zealand forces. 

Rfts for 11th ) 

E.A. Div. ) 

Rotational ) Indian 

moves of ) Ocean 

Indian troops. )shipping 

Rotational ) 

moves of )

Indian troops. ) 

(Table Continued on Following Page) 

Exhibit “B” to Tab “C” to 

Annex “A’ to Appendix “B” 

82 
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(Continued) 

Section B. MISCELLANEOUS COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN TROOPING 

TO BE CARRIED OUT IN BRITISH SHIPPING 

Area 

(0 U.K. to M.E. 

U.K. to Malta 

(ii) U.K. )

SE Europe) to 

Italy ) USSR 

M.E. ) 

Estimated Numbers Remarks 

German P.W.)To be 

)fitted in 

Repatriation )as and 

of Soviets. )when 

The figures )shipping 

for UK and SE)available. 

Europe are ) US shiplikely to ) ping may increase. )be able to 

)assist. 

8,000) 

2,000) 

26,000 

21,000 

4,000 

2,500 

83 

Exhibit “B” to Tab “C’to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 
TOP SECRET 

EXHIBIT “C” TO TAB “C” TO ANNEX “A TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES 

(i) NORTH ATLANTIC Feb/May incl. 48,000 per month 

June 36,000 per month 

NOTE: “his will be effected in the main by 20-knot class ships, in order to 

allow of the continuance of assistance to westbound evacuation of 

U.S. casualties as agreed. It will result in the necessity of such U.S. 

troop movement as is destined for N.W. Europe being oncarried 

from U.K. 

(ii) CROSS CHANNEL 

A lift of 10,000 has been allowed for in the estimates which should provide for a daily flow of some 3,000. 

(iii) OTHER AREAS 

Mutual assistance to troop movement in other areas will continue to be 

agreed between the authorities concerned, in order to achieve an overall economy of shipping. 

Exhibit “C’to Tab “C” to 

Annex “A” to Appendix “B” 

84 
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U.S. TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

(March-June, 1945) 

U.S.personnel shipping supplemented by British assistance in the 

Atlantic, which is estimated at 48,000 spaces per month February through 

May and 36,000 spaces in June, is adequate to meet presently estimated deployment requirements up to the defeat of Germany which is assumed at 1 

July 1945.Allowance has been made for the probable U.S.troopship assistance 

to the movement of five divisions from the Mediterranean to southern France 

between mid-February and early May 1945. 

Tab “D” to Annex “A” 

to Appendix “B” 

85 
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ANNEX “B TO APPENDIX “B” 

PROVISIONAL FORECAST OF COMBINED DRY CARGO AND 

TROOP SHIPPING POSITION AFTER V-E DAY ON 1 JULY 1945 

Annex “B” to Appendix “B” 

86 
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TAB “A” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

(After V-E Day) 

1. For the first few months after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, 

maintenance requirements for the theatre as a whole will drop very considerably. On the other hand there will be additional demands of which the principal 

will be:­

a. The rapid occupation of certain European areas, e.g., Norway. 

b. The redeployment of forces from Europe to India and Southeast Asia. 

c. The redeployment of air forces to the Australian area. 

In the absence of any detailed plan for these contingencies it is clearly impossible to give a firm table of the monthly sailings required, but the table following paragraph 2 gives an indication of the way in which current levels are 

likely to vary during the first two quarters after V-E Day. 

2. Tonnage required for military programmes would accordingly show a 

substantial reduction in the first month following V-E Day, and a smaller 

reduction in the second and subsequent months. Other factors,the scale of some 

of which cannot at present be estimated, would tend to improve the Britishcontrolled shipping situation. These include the reduction in sinkings, the 

increase in Allied and Neutral tonnage willing to trade to European liberated 

areas, the tonnage that may be recovered from enemy hands, the additional 

tonnage provided by the continuance of shipbuilding, and the substantial gain 

in performance resulting from the abolition of much of the convoying system. 

On the other hand, it is expected that there will be some increase in ship repairing, the Fleet Train may require additional tonnage, turn-round time in 

ports may suffer some deterioration, and there will be a substantial increase 

in the import requirements of the United Kingdom and European liberated 

areas. It is expected that, on balance, the British-controlled shipping situation 

will show an improvement during a temporary period of up to perhaps two 

months, but that thereafter a stringent situation will again develop. 

TaV‘A” to Annex “B’ 

to Appendix “B” 
---- 

---- 

---- 

-- 

-- 

TOP SECRET 

VE 1mth 

Theater 

UK I NA 

India 1 30 1 45 

P.G. 

Mediterranean 

Mtce. 

Australia 

B.L.A. Maint. 

Civil Affairs 

Russia 

Med. Retentions 

Combined 40 

N.W. Europe RETENTIONS M.T. 

(Combined) 50 

Stores 40 

E2mths VE3mthr 

UK NA UK NA 

50 45 65 45 

1 1 1 1 

--____ 

12 12 15 15 

__-__­

12 - 12 2 

- 3 - 3 

- 15 - 18 

35 I 30 

4th Qtr. 

TJK NA 

180 135 ~~ 

3 3 ____ 

45 45 

-__ 

26 6 

Remarks 

Some U.K. 

sailings will 

in fact originate from 

the Med. 

-~ 

- 10 - 60 

12 ­

20 

20 

25 

NOTE: If the Coaster fleet is partially withdrawn, the ocean tonnage retained 

for stores movement will have to be correspondingly increased. 

Tab“A” to Annex “B” 

to Appendix “B” 

88 
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TAB “B” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

US.DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

(After V-E Day) 

1. United States military requirements for the first and second quarters 

following the cessation of hostilities in Europe are set forth in Exhibit “A.” 

On the assumption of July 1st as the date for the termination of the European 

war Exhibit “A” reflects the military requirements for the third and fourth 

quarters of 1945. On the assumption of any earlier date the requirements for 

months in the last half of 1945 would apply for the appropriate months succeeding V-E Day with only minor adjustments. These requirements are based 

upon present redeployment plans. 

2. No authoritative advice has been forthcoming at ARGONAUT on the 

magnitude of requirements for US. shipping other than those of the United 

States Army and Navy after termination of hostilities in Europe. It is noted 

that some of these requirements are subject to a substantial increase as a 

result of the occupation of numerous additional Continental ports, the opening of access to large Allied populations now inaccessible or under enemy 

control, and the occupation of enemy territories, which demands, if accepted, 

would require more shipping. 

3. The shipping situation during the first quarter following V-E Day will 

be eased by the reduction of military requirements to Europe incident to the 

cessation of hostilities against Germany and improvement in turn-rounds in 

the Atlantic trades, 

4. Consideration of the United States troopship position indicates the desirability of further conversions of approximately 200 dry cargo ships to lift 

500 personnel each. These conversions should be initiated immediately upon 

V-E Day subject to the urgency of other shipyard activity. For planning purposes, it is estimated that conversions should be accomplished at a rate of 50 

the first month following V-E Day and 75 each of the following two months. 

The effect of these conversions has been taken into account in the estimation 

of available sailings. 

Tab “B” to Annex “B’ 

to Appendix “B” 

89 
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5. Estimated military requirements show a large increase beginning in 

the second quarter after the end of hostilities in Europe, as a result of which 

it is expected that a renewed shipping stringency will develop. Non-military 

commitments which would extend into this period should, therefore, be assumed only with the greatest caution, and should be subject to the principles 

enunciated in C.C.S. 746/10. 

Tab “B” to Annex “B” 

to Appendix “B” 

90 
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EXHIBIT “A” to TAB “B” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

US.MILITARY DRY CARGO REQUIREMENTS 

AFTER V-E DAY OF 1 JULY 1945 

1945 

PACIFIC July Aug. Sept. 3rdQtr. 4thQtr. 

POA (Army and Navy) 225 233 235 693 812 

SWPA (Army and Navy) 97 116 129 342 355 

India-Burma & China 10 6 6 22 18 

Less Army Atlantic Sailings -50 -65 -75 -190 -220 

Less Navy Atlantic Sailings -

-45 -50 -55 -150 -240 ~~ 

TOTAL PACIFIC 237 240 240 717 725 

ATLANTIC 

ARIIY-ETO & MTO 170 160 155 485 406 

CBI 15 19 19 53 63 

Minor Areas 2 2 2 6 6 

Pacific ‘Areas 50 65 75 190 220 

Navy -Pacific Areas -

45 50 55 150 240 ____ ~ ~ 

TOTAL ATLANTIC 282 296 306 884 935 

Conversions* 50 0 -50 0 0 

Europe -Pacific Sailings (40) (55) (65) (160) (254) 

Europe -Pacific Sailings Effect - -40 -55 95 232 - ___ __ ~ __ 

TOTAL ATLANTIC ADJUSTED 332 336 311 979 1167 

Retentions in Overseas Theaters 250 250 250 250 250 

Effect of 50 ships continuously under conversion during first quarter after V-E Day to provide a 

total of 200. 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “B” to 

Annex “B”to Appendix “B” 

91 
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TAB “C TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

(After V-E Day) 

1. Exhibit “A” indicates availability of British trooping lift in the second 

half of 1945 with an estimate of military requirements as presently known. 

These are no more than tentative estimates. They include, as presently directed, 

certain allowances for inescapable commitmentssuch as Class A demobilisation 

and rotational leave schemes. They do not, however, include any allowance for 

essential movement of a non-military nature for which it is considered certain 

provision will have to be made. 

2. Apart from variation in the estimated British military requirements 

which have been used as a basis for Exhibit “A,” the following factors may 

affect the problem: 

(a) Conversion of cargo shipping, which is already under investigation 

by M.W.T. 

(b) The achievement in practice of the planning figures assumed for 

air trooping. 

(c) No credit has been assumed for any captured shipping. 

(d) No allowance has been made for losses. 

(e) It has been assumed that convoys will be required east of Aden, and 

between Aden and Bombay these will be every 3 days. 

(f) No allowance has been made for any savings resulting from the 

opening of MEDLOC, but on the other hand no requirement has been included for ocean-going shipping for movement between the United Kingdom and Northwest Europe. 

3. The balance between military requirements and total availabilities as 

shown in Exhibit “A” indicates no surplus in the third quarter and an appreciable deficit in the fourth quarter. To the extent that the requirements of any 

operations in SEAC during the period exceed the capacity of the available 

Indian Ocean shipping, a further deficit will occur. 

Tab “C” to Annex “B” 

to Appendix “B” 

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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “C” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

TENTATIVE BRITISH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR TROOPSHIPS 

IN SECOND HALF OF 1945 

Personnel Troop lift 

to be moved 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

1. TROOPSHIP POSITION 

(a) Average number of spaces 

available 

(b) Estimate for repairs and 

conversions (12% %)

(c) Less Indian Ocean (local) 

(d) Less retentions in Mediterranean 

(e) Availableforlongseavoyage 

2. ARMY FORCES TO BE MOVED 

Availability 

376,000 380,000 

47,000 

49,000 

5,000 101,000 101,000 

275,000 279,000 

Turnround 

in days Requirements 

(a) U.K. to India 146,500 153,000 60 97,700 102,000 

(b) U.K. to Mediterranean 40,000 40,000 30 13,000 13,000

(c) Mediterranean to New 

Zealand 17,000 17,000 120 22,600 22,600 

(d) U.K. to Canada - 20,000 20 - 4,400 

(e) U.K. to Pacific - 8,000 120 - 10,700 

(f) W.Africa to India 6,000 6,000 60 4,000 4,000 

209,500 244,000 137,300 156,700 

3. R.N. FORCES TO BE MOVED 

(a) U.K. to India (incl. M.N.) 28,500 25,500 60 19,000 17,000 

(b) U.K. to Mediterranean 1,000 1,000 30 300 300 

(c) U.K. to Australia 22,500 15,700 120 30,000 20,900 

52,000 42,200 49,300 38,200 

(Table continued on next page) 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “C” to 

Annex “B” to Appendix “B” 

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(Continued) Personnel Troop lift 

to be moved 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

Turnround 

in days Requirements 

4. R.A.F. FORCES TO BE MOVED 

(a) U.K. to India 30,500 40,000 60 20,300 26,700 

(b) U.K. to Mediterranean 17,000 17,000 30 5,600 5,600 

(c) U.K. to Pacific 10,000 20,000 120 13,300 26,700 

(d) U.K. to Canada 52,000 - 20 11,600 ­

(e) Canada to Pacific - 30,000 120 - 40,000 

(f ) India to Pacific 10,000 20,000 90 10,000 20,000 

119,500 127,000 60,800 119,000 

Total to be moved to India 

2(a), 3(a) &4(a) 205,500 218,500 137,000 145,700 

Less estimated air lift 17,000 30,000 

Net to be moved by sea 188,500 188,500 

Add 10% additional spaces 18,800 18,800 

207,300 207,300 138,200 138,200 

5. Net +OT -in troop lift +1,200 -7,500 

6. Excess of 20% required to Australia on 2(c),(e),3(c) & 4(c) 13,200 16,200 

7. REPATRIATION OF VARIOUS 

COMMONWEALTH ez Ps.W. 25,000 25,000 60 16,600 16,600 

8. TOTAL LONG SEA VOYAGE REQUZREMENT 

Items 2 to 7 incl. 278,400 339,200 

9. OVER-ALL DEFICIT 

8 less l(e) 3,400 60,200 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “C” to 

Annex “B” to Appendix “B” 

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TAB “D” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

U. S. TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

(After V-E Day) 

1. Exhibit “A” indicates for the last half of 1945 the US. troop shipping 

requirements compared to availability. The requirements are based upon V-E 

Day of 1July 1945, with the same troop movement following the beginning of 

redeployment as presently planned for a 31 March 1945 V-E Day and do not 

permit of any repatriation for demobilization during this period. Resulting 

United States Army overseas strengths are shown in Exhibit “B.” Trooplift 

capabilities that were considered in determining the trooplift position were 

based on the following assumptions: 

a. Additions to United States troopship inventory resulting from construction now scheduled by the US. Maritime Commission after allowance 

for a six percent repair rate and approved C.C.S. loss rates. 

b. Scheduled use in the Pacific of APA’s not assigned to operations. 

c. Full use of accommodations on cargo ships already converted for return of troops from Europe. 

d. Restoration to use of captured enemy shipping. 

2. The balance between requirements and availability indicates an appreciable deficit during the third quarter increasing to a substantial deficit in the 

fourth quarter based on no British troopship assistance. To the extent that 

these deficits cannot be overcome by various expedients the rate of redeployment to the Pacific, both direct and through the United States will have to be 

slowed down. Acceptance of a reduced rate of troop movement will deny Pacific 

theater commanders desired forces with which to initiate the presently projected large-scale operations against Japan during the period September through 

December 1945 and would probably result in postponement of these operations. 

3. Some of the possibilities which exist for reducing the deficit in troopship availability to meet requirements are: 

a. Double loading of ships during the summer and fall. 

Tab “D” to Annex “B” 

to Appendix “B” 

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b. Conversion of approximately 200 additional cargo ships to lift 500 

troops each involving the acceptance of the attendant inconveniences to 

personnel. These conversions could probably be accomplished at a rate of 

50 the first month following V-E Day and 75 each of the following two 

months. This action would result in having practically all of the cargo ships 

employed between United States and Europe equipped to carry troops. 

c. Greater assistance from British and captured enemy shipping. 

d. Use of landing craft being transferred from Europe to the Pacific. 

e. Full utilization of all available facilities of the Air Transport Command as well as movement by combat and troop carrier planes being transferred from Europe to the Pacific. 

f. Scheduling of greater assistance from APA’s in the Pacific and such 

other naval vessels as can be made available. 

g. Integration of United Nations transport fleet to eliminate cross hauling and maximum use of troopships when returning from their outbound 

trips. 

h. Careful scheduling of the return of sick and wounded so that the 

least interference is made with the quickest turn-round possible. 

Tab “D” to Annex “B” 

to Appendix “B” 

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EXHIBIT “A” TO TAB “D” TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

US.TROOP SHIPPING POSITION 

(After V-E Day) 

TurnPersonnel round Troopship 

to be moved (in days) spaces 

1945 

3rd Qtr. 

1. TROOPSHIP POSITION 

a. Average number of spaces 

available during quarter 

b. Est. spaces in repair (6%) 

c. Net troopship spaces available 

d. Less local retentions 

e. Troopship availability 

2. ARMY TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED* 

a. Europe to the Pacific 287,800 

b. Europe to C.B.I. 32,600 

c. U.S.to Pacific (troops) 147,800 

d. US.to Pacific (replacements) 123,600 

e. US. to C.B.I. (troops) 0 

f. US.to C.B.I. (replacements) 20,200 

g. Minor Areas to US. 16,750 

h. Total 628,750 

3. NAVY TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED 

4th Qtr. 

267,900 90 

23,300 60 

236,800 60 

171,700 60 

0 90 

21,800 90 

13,050 45 

734,550 

1945 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

620,700 685,800 

37,200 41,100 

583,500 644,700 

62,000 62,000 

521,500 582,700 

Requirements 

287,800 267,900 

21,800 15,600 

98,000 157,600 

82,400 114,000 

20,200 21,800 

8,400 6,500 

518,600 583,400 

127,300 146,700 

7,300 3,900 

134,600 150,600 

a. US.to Pacific 191,000 220,100 60 

b. Other Areas to U.S. 17,400 9,400 38 

c. Total 208,400 229,500 

(Table continued on next page) 

* Deployment ta North Pacific to be accomplished in tonnage frozen in the Alaskan pool. 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “D” to 

Annex “B” to Appendix “B” 

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(Continued) 

TurnPersonnel round Troopship 

to be moved (in days) spaces 

1945 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

4. TOTAL TROOPSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR ABOVE MOVEMENT 

a. LessAPA assistance” 

b. Net requirement 

c. Troop spaces available fur use 

between Europe and US. 

(1e. minus 4b.) 

5. TROOP FLOW FROM EUROPE 

TO U.S. FOR REDEPLOYMENT 

TO PACIFIC 217,300 237,000 

a. Less cargo ship assistance 45,000 90,000 

b. Less use of captured enemy

shipping 0 75,000 

1945 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

Requirements 

653,200 734,000 

116,000b 33,300 

537,200 700,700 

-15,700 -118,000 

c. Net troopship requirement 172,300 72,000 38 72,800 30,200 

d. Troopship availability (4 c.) -15,700 -118,000 

e. Over-all deficiency in troopship 

spaces (non-cumulative) -88,500 -148,200 

f. If British monthly assistance 

of 70,000 in terms of transAtlantic lift is assumed, overall deficiency will be 0 -59,700 

e. These Agures represent the theoretical number of troopship spaces which, during a given quarter, 

would accomplish the same personnel movement as the APA facilities which will be available 

during the quarter. 

b Based on scheduled use of APA’s not assigned to operations. 

Exhibit “A” to Tab “D” to 

Annex “B”to Appendix “B” 

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EXHIBIT “B TO TAB “D”TO ANNEX “B” TO APPENDIX “B” 

U.S. ARMY OVERSEAS STRENGTHS AFTER V-E DAY 

Required by Assumed Redeployment Plan 

1945 

3rd Qtr. 4th Qtr. 

EUROPE 

Strength 1 July 1945 3,500,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 2,960,000 2,430,000 

PACIFIC 

Pacific Ocean Areas 

Strength 1 July 1945 600,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 860,000 1,545,000 

Southwest Pacific Area 

Strength 1 July 1945 845,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 1,035,000 865,O00 

India-Burma and China 

Strength 1July 1945 240,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 265,000 280,000 

North Pacific 

Strength 1 July 1945 70,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 75,000 75,000 

Total Pacific 

Strength 1 July 1945 1,755,000 

Cumulative Strength at end of quarter 2,235,000 2,765,000 

Exhibit “B” to Tab “D” to 

Annex “B” to Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT) 

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN INDIA-BURMA 

AND CHINA THEATERS 

References: 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 4 

C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT), a memorandum by the British Chiefs of 

Staff, dated 31 January 1945, was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

in their 184th Meeting together with C.C.S. 452/35 and C.C.S. 452/36. 

In view of their agreement on the policy set out in C.C.S. 452/37, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw 

C.C.S. 747 (ARGONAUT). 

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C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT) 31 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN INDIA-BURMA 

AND CHINA THEATERS 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importanceand magnitude 

of the United States commitments to China, both political and military. 

2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise 

the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in 

Burma. 

3. The circumstancesin which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without 

discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in C.C.S. 308 no 

longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations 

in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand 

such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China 

rather than of warding off dangers. 

4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to 

reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre 

from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied 

Commander,Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing 

to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves. 

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C.C.S. 75513 

C.C.S. 75514 

PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 4 

C.C.S. 75513, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff,dated 

2 February 1945, and C.C.S. 755/4, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of 

Staff, dated 5 February, were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

their 185th and 186th Meetings respectively. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

approved the recommendations in C.C.S. 75514. 

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C.C.S. '75513 2 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR THE MEDITERRA" 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

1. In MEDCOS 238 Field Marshal Alexander expresses concern over the 

delay in shipinent of 600 LVl"s recently assigned to his theater, which he 

states are vital to his spring offensive. In view of the change in strategy in 

the Mediterranean as agreed at the present conference and the tight shipping

situation it would appear that a review of these requirementsis now warranted. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff obtain Field Marshal Alexander's views on this matter. 

104 
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C.C.S. 75514 5 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff 

1. In accordance with the recommendation in C.C.S. 75513, we have asked 

Field Marshal Alexander for his views on the requirement of 600 LVT's for the 

Italian Theatre. The situation is as follows: 

a. SACMED's original requirement was 400 for British, and 200 for 

United States forces, making a total of 600. These have been assigned. 

b. 95, and possibly more, have already been shipped to the Mediterranean 

for the British. 

c. 100 have been diverted towards the urgent requirement of 21st Army 

Group. 

d. 21st Army Group require a further 100 for future operations, which 

include 7 river crossings, 4 of which will be assault crossings involving at 

least one division. These LVT's are required to be available in the theatre 

by mid-February. 

2. Field Marshal Alexander states that in view of the urgent requirements 

of the Western Front he is prepared to surrender 200 LVT's forthwith. 

3. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should: 

a. Approve as an immediate measure the reduction of the assignment 

to the Mediterranean Theatre of LVTs from 600 to 400. 

b. Approve the diversion to 21st Army Group of the 200 LVT's surrendered by Field Marshal Alexander. 

c. Agree that consideration of the final requirements of the Mediterranean Theatre should await the result of detailed study of the position 

by AFHQ in the light of the new directive. 

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C.C.S. 761/3 

C.C.S. 761/6 

STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

References: 

CCS 182d Meeting, ltem 4 

CCS 183d Meeting, ltem 3 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 7 

1st US.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item c. 

Tripartite Plenary Meeting 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 9 

In C.C.S. 761/3, dated 29 January 1945, the report of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force on progress of operations in Northwest 

Europe and his appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and 

spring of 1945 were circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

C.C.S. 761/4, dated 30 January, and C.C.S. 761/5, dated 31 January, 

circulated proposals by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively. 

C.C.S. 761/6, dated 31 January, circulated SCAEF’s plan of operations 

in Northwest Europe as reworded by General W. B. Smith and agreed to by 

General Eisenhower. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 184th Meeting took note of 

SCAF 180 (Enclosure “B” to C.C.S. 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194 (paragraphs (A) and (B) of Appendix “A” to C.C.S. 761/6) and as amplified by 

Appendix “B” to C.C.S. 761/6. 

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C.C.S. 761/3 29 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SCAEF REPORT ON STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The report of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 

requested by FACS 123 (C.C.S. 761/2) is circulated for information. 

2. SCAF 179 (Enclosure “A”) gives an account of the development of 

operations. SCAF 180 (Enclosure “B”)contains an appreciation and plan 

of operations. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE “A” 

SCAF 179 

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS 28 OCTOBER 1944- 20 JANUARY 1945 

From: Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main,Versailles, 

France 

To : War Department 

Nr : S-75872 SCAF 179 20 January 1945 

S-75872to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff from SHAEFMain signed Eisenhower 

cite SHSC TOPSEC this is SCAF 179 

Distribution of this message will be held to the absolute minimum. 

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(FACS 123) I submit herewith an account (supplementary to SCAF 141) 

showing the progress of operations carried out as a result of my directive of 

28 October and the effect of the recent counteroffensive. Development of 

Operations 28 October 1944to 20 January 1945. 

2. In SCAF 114 I gave first priority to the early opening of Antwerp as 

it was abundantly clear that major operations east of the Rhine could not 

be supported without this port. 

Convinced as I was of the advantages of the northern line of approach 

into Germany I directed my main effort against the Ruhr to the protection of 

which major enemy forces were committed. The closing of the Rhine by the 

Northern and Central Groups of Armies north of the Ardennes was an essential 

prerequisite to the latter phases of crossing the river and deploying to the 

east. These attacks were to begin on about 10 November. 

Prior to the opening of the Port of Antwerp, logistical considerations 

limited the scale of the offensive which could be supported north of the 

Enclosure “A” 

109 
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Ardennes. However, Third Army could be supported offensively by the line 

of communications extending east of Paris. Therefore, concurrently with the 

main attack in the North, I decided to press forward with my secondary effort 

towards the Saar hoping to destroy important German forces and as the 

advance progressed to divert further enemy divisions which would otherwise 

oppose my thrust in the North. The Southern Group of Armies astride the 

Vosges was similarly to divert enemy forces. 

OPERATIONS 

Capture of Antwerp. 

3. By 9 November operations by the Northern Group of Armies and 

Second Tactical Air Force, particularly the capture of Walcheren Island in 

which RAF’ Bomber Command played a large part, had rendered the approaches 

to Antwerp secure from land attack and by 28 November the port was open. 

Advance Toward the Rhine. 

4. The eastwards drive by the Northern Group of Armies began on 

15 November, progress was slow over ground made extremely difficult by 

unseasonable weather and it was 4 December before the last enemy pocket 

on the west bank of the Maas was cleared. A direct advance across the Maas to 

the Rhine was judged impracticable and extensive regrouping was required 

for a drive southeast from the Nijmegen area along the relatively dry watershed 

separating the Rhine from the Maas. This would have involved reducing the 

frontage of the Northern Group of Armies at the expense of weakening the 

concentrationof my forces in the Aachen sector,a course which was not acceptable. It was therefore necessary to postpone further major operations by the 

Northern Group of Armies until the drive toward Cologne had made adequate 

progress. 

5. In the Aachen sector the offensive by First and Ninth Armies began 

on 16 November. Fourteen and eventually seventeen divisions were employed 

in this sector and at the height of the offensive no fewer than 10 divisions 

were in line on a 24 mile front, this being the maximum number which it was 

practicable to deploy. In spite of this concentration, and in spite of very large 

scale strategic and tactical air effort, progress was slow and fighting bitter. 

During these operations very heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. 

Throughout this time the relatively static situation on the Russian Front 

Enclosure “A” 

110 
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enabled the enemy to divert the majority of his replacements of men and 

equipment against our front and thus preserve intact his reserves of armor. 

By 3 December Ninth Army had reached the Roer River with First Army 

conforming more slowly, but it was considered imprudent to cross the river 

while the Schmidt dams,which control the flooding of the Roer valley, remained 

intact in enemy hands especially since the Sixth Panzer Army had moved 

west of the Rhine. Efforts to breach the dams by air attack having failed, First 

Army on 13December launched a new attack to capture them. This attack was 

still in progress when the German counteroffensive began. All our operations 

during November and early December were attended by worse weather than 

has been known in these parts for very many years. 

Advance to the Saar. 

6. Meanwhile south of the Ardennes the Third Army offensive towards 

the Saar which started on 8 November had made excellent progress. Metz fell 

on 22 November and by 2 December a substantial stretch of the Saar River 

had been closed. Three bridgeheads were secured in the Saar-Lautern area and 

contact was made with the main Siegfried defenses. While I had hoped that 

Third Army would be able to achieve victory in the Saar I had nevertheless set 

a time limit for these operations. Third Army’s final attack was to begin on 

19 December after which, regardless of results, divisions were to be transferred 

to the North. 

7. Further south the Southern Group of Armies assumed the offensive 

on 13 November and within a week the First French Army had breached the 

Belfort Gap and reached the Rhine, while north of the high Vosges the Seventh 

Army had broken through the Saverne Gap and by 27 November had cleared 

Strasbourg using French armor. After rapid regrouping Seventh Army was 

directed north to breach the Siegfried Line west of the Rhine (SCAF 136). Its 

advance in the West afforded direct assistance to Third Army’s operations 

against the Saar while to the east our troops by 19 December had crossed the 

German frontier on a 22 mile front and penetrated well into the Siegfried 

defenses northeast of Wissembourg. I believe that our progress in the Saar 

and Wissembourg sectors contained 14 enemy divisions and had we been able 

to continue it, must soon have compelled the enemy to divert forces from the 

North and thus have indirectlyassisted our main effort. Meantime enemy forces 

driven from the Vosges maintained a bridgehead west of the Rhine in the 

Colmar area which the First French Army, weakened by their offensive operations and short of infantry replacements, have so far been unable to liquidate. 

Enclosure “A” 

111 
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8. As a result of deploying my maximum effort in the Aachen sector and 

sustaining the successful progress of the Saar-Wissembourg operations with 

the balance of my available forces other stretches of my front were weakly held. 

In particular the Eifel sector of some 75 miles between Trier and Monschau 

was entrusted to no more than four divisions. This was a calculated risk based 

on the absence of strategic objectives or large depots in the area, the relatively 

difficult terrain and my current estimate of the enemy’s intentions. 

The December German Counteroffensive. 

9. The counteroffensive opened by the enemy in the Eifel sector on 

16 December was prepared in very great secrecy and launched in greater 

strength than we had believed likely on this sector at the time although 

evidence of build-up was received. The enemy’s immediate intention was to 

seize the Meuse crossings between Namur and Liege. The Fifth and Sixth 

Panzer Armies supported by the Seventh German Army, in all about 14infantry 

and 10 Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions were employed. 

10. The brunt of the assault was met by three infantry and one armored 

divisions in the line which in spite of being by-passed and divided by the enemy 

penetration denied him the important area of St. Vith during a critical period. 

The momentum of the thrust was further reduced by the arrival of two airborne 

divisions moved from reserve in the Reims area on 18 December. One of these 

(reinforced by armor) although under constant attack and completely surrounded for five days, held the important road center at Bastogne. This was 

made possible by concentrated fighter-bomber effort and a determined and 

hazardous feat of resupply by air, troop-carrying aircraft achieving 911 sorties 

in spite of most unfavorable weather and air opposition. The shoulders of the 

penetration at Monschau and Echtermach were held and the salient gradually 

stabilized by divisions moved both from the North and from the South. Immediate steps were taken to maintain a reserve by hastening forward divisions 

from the United Kingdom, one of these being moved by air. 

11. On 19 December as soon as the magnitude of the enemy’s effort and 

its effect on communications within the Central Group of Armies became 

known, I realized that it would be impracticable for one commander to handle 

the American forces both north and south of the large salient which was being 

created. Moreover it was essential to divert our maximum resources, including 

those of the Northern Group of Armies, to counter the threat which appeared 

greatest on that flank. I therefore fixed a boundary running east and west 

through the breach in our lines and placed all forces north of it, including the 

Enclosure “A” 

112 
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major part of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies and part of the Ninth Air 

Force under operational command of Commander in Chief, Northern Group 

of Armies and Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Second Tactical Air Force, 

respectively, leaving the Commanding Generals, Central Group of Armies and 

Ninth Air Force free and suitably located to command the forces south of the 

salient mainly comprising Third US.Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command 

considerably reinforced. 

12. Meanwhile precautionary measures had been taken to ensure that 

the enemy could not cross the Meuse if he reached it, especially in the LiegeNamur sector where protection of our lines of communication and installations was of vital importance. Extensive regrouping was rapidly effected both 

north and south of the salient to provide forces to check the enemy’s thrust 

and for our subsequent counterattacks. At the same time the main weight of 

German armor thrusting against the northern flank of the salient was held 

and headed away from vital sectors of the Meuse. During this period, fog 

temporarily deprived us of the greater part of our air effort, including air 

reconnaissance,giving the enemy an important advantage in the initial stages. 

13. On 22 December, Third Army, largely relieved from the Saar by the 

Seventh Army, launched an attack on the Arlon-Luxembourg area northeastwards into the gap. On this date the weather began to improve and our air action had a paralyzing effect on movement in and into the battle area. Throughout the period the strategical air forces battered marshalling yards east of the 

Rhine and blocked centers of movement such as St. Vith, while the medium 

and light bombers of the tactical air forces backed up the efforts of the heavies, 

destroyed bridges, headquarters, dumps and other targets in the battle area. 

The fighter-bombersranged far and wide in and beyond the battle area creating 

havoc among enemy rail and road movement, the efficacy of which in starving 

the enemy of fuel, food and ammunition has been amply testified by enemy 

prisoners. A concerted attack on the German Air Force airfields on 24 December 

helped to reduce the activity of the enemy fighters and thus afforded our 

fighter-bombers still greater opportunity for concentration on ground targets 

rather than on air fighting. By 26 December, Third Army had firmly linked up 

with the garrisons in Bastogne and finally checked the enemy’s advance on 

that flank. This attack also drew strong enemy forces away from the north of 

the salient.By the time the enemy’s drive was halted, he had breached a 45-mile 

gap in our front through which elements had penetrated to within four miles 

of the Meuse near Celles. But by 26 December additional reserves were so 

disposed as to relieve anxiety in this area and it was then clear that the enemy 

had failed in his main intention. 

Enc1osure“A” 

113 
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Reduction of the German Salient. 

14. As soon as the enemy’s advance had been checked, my intention, as 

outlined in SCAF 151,was to cut the enemy’s lines of communication into the 

salient and if possible to destroy him by launching coordinated ground attacks 

from both North and South in close coordination with continued heavy air 

attacks concentrated on enemy communication targets to extend paralysis of 

movement over a large area. Simultaneously, the strategic air effort employed 

so effectively in the battle area was released. The attack from the North aimed 

at Houffalize was launched by First Army on 3 January on a two corps front, 

with a corps of Second British Army confronting on the west flank. On 

9 January, Third Army launched a fresh attack from the South also directed 

towards the Houf�dizeroad net. Both these attacks were hampered by adverse 

weather with snow covered minefield and met by stubborn enemy resistance. 

Slow progress was however made and the gap between the attacking armies 

had by 10 January been narrowed to some ten miles. By this time the enemy 

had begun to withdraw from the western end of his salient while still stoutly 

opposing our pressure against his northern and southern flanks. 

Enemy Operations in the South. 

15. Commanding General, Southern Group of Armies has orders to regard 

the eastern slopes of the Vosges as his main position but, because of its political 

and moral importance, to defend the Strasbourg area as strongly as possible 

consistent with the overriding necessity of maintaining the integrity of his 

forces. Since 20 December the Southern Group of Armies has taken over an 

additional 20 miles of front westwards to Saarlautern in order to set free the 

bulk of Third Army for offensive operations. The enemy has not failed to take 

advantage of this by attacking our lines at many points and is likely to continue to do so. 

Effectof German Counteroffensive. 

16. The counteroffensive immediately succeeded in stopping our attacks 

against the Ruhr and the Saar. Operationsto deal with it have already occupied 

a month and are not yet concluded: some regrouping will be necessary before 

offensive operations can be resumed and my present estimate is that the 

enemy’s attack has delayed our offensive operations by at least six weeks. The 

strategic air forces were of necessity drawn into the immediate battle area 

thus leaving oil, jet aircraft and communication targets deeper in Germany 

free of attack for nearly a month. The counteroffensive,however, has not been 

Enclosure “A” 

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without its effect on the enemy. Land and air forces were built up for months 

and supplies,particularly of fuel, were carefully hoarded for this all-out effort. 

At a general estimate, during the month ended 16 January, he has suffered 

120,000serious casualties and lost 600 tanks and assault guns; his air losses 

have been severe, about 620 planes, and his fuel stocks after nearly a month 

of large-scale effort must now be reduced to the bare minimum. Possibly more 

serious in the final analysis is the widespread disillusionment likely to ensue 

from the failure to seize any really important objective and the realization 

that this offensive for which every effort had been brought. to bear and on 

which such great hopes were pinned, has in no sense achieved anything 

decisive. Furthermore the fighting state of his reserve withdrawn from the 

Ardennes salient is likely to preclude offensive action on a comparable scale 

but undoubtedly he will make all efforts to accelerate the refitting of the 

divisions engaged in the Ardennes offensive in the hope of maintaining the 

initiative in the West. 

Please acknowledge. 

End 

CM-IN-19747 (21 Jan 45) 

Enclosure “A” 

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ENCLOSURE “B” 

APPRECIATION AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS 

FOR THE WINTER AND SPRING, 1945 

From: Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, 

France 

To: War Department 

Nr : 5-75871 SCAF 180 20 January 1945 

S-75871to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to AMSSO 

for informationfor British Chiefs of Staff from SHAEFMain signed Eisenhower 

cite SHSC TOP SECRET this is SCAF 180. 

Distribution of this message will be held to the absolute minimum. 

1. In accordance with the instructions of the C.C.S. (FACS 123) I submit 

herewith my appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring 

of 1945. 

2. My object remains, as in my original directive from the C.C.S., to 

undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of 

her armed forces. 

3. These operations fall into three phases:-

Phase I. The destruction of the enemy forces west of the Rhine and 

the closing of the Rhine. 

Phase 11. The seizing of bridgeheads over the Rhine from which to 

develop operations into Germany. 

Phase 111. The destruction of enemy forces east of the Rhine and 

advance into Germany. 

Enclosure “B” 

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4. These three phases form three distinct operations. The destruction 

of the bulk of the enemy forces west of the Rhine is my immediate aim. If this 

can be effected the remaining phases will be immeasurably simplified. Such 

destruction, however, cannot be guaranteed and operations in Phase I must 

thus, to some extent, be designed to facilitate subsequent operations in Phases 

I1and 111. I therefore propose in this appreciation to examine possible courses 

of action in Phases I1 and I11 before discussing Phase I. Before proceeding to 

this examination I wish to emphasize that by all odds the attack north of the 

Ruhr is the one that we must hold in front of us as our principal purpose. In 

all this discussion it is to be understood that other areas are analyzed from 

two standpoints: 

(A) For staging a supporting effort for the northern attack with 

such means as may be left over after concentrating in the North all the 

power that can be sustained and, 

(B) To have the flexibility to switch the main effort if the northern 

attack encounters an impossible situation. 

PHASE III 

5. To consider first Phase 111. On the assumption that serious opposition 

is still to be met east of the Rhine, there are two main avenues of approach 

into Germany by which we can advance and defeat enemy forces. These run 

from the Mainz-Karlsruhe area to Frankfurt and Kassel, and from the lower 

Rhine north of the Ruhr into the plains of North Germany. (I omit the possible

axis of advance into southern Germany in view of FACS 119.) 

6. (A) An advance on the Frankfurt-Kassel axis would secure early 

the important industrial area around Frankfurt. The Germans in the West 

are likely to give priority to the defense of this area second only to the Ruhr, 

and therefore there should be an opportunity of destroying considerable 

German forces although we should have less opposition to our advance than 

would be the case in the North. In addition, the occupation of the FrankfurtGiessen area offers very suitable airfield sites both to support a further advance 

and to assist in the support of operations north of the Ruhr. 

(B) The advance from Frankfurt on Kassel would be over terrain 

less suitable for armored operations than the area north of the Ruhr. But 

once we reached the Kassel area there would be several possibilities of further 

Enclosure “B” 

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developments -a thrust northward to cut some of the communications from 

the Ruhr, a thrust northeast towards Berlin or a thrust eastward towards 

Leipzig. 

7. (A) An advance north of the Ruhr offers the quickest means of 

denying the enemy the Ruhr industries. The eastern exits from the industrial 

area could be cut by enveloping the area on the north and east, and the 

southern exits by air action. The area north of the Ruhr offers the most 

suitable terrain east of the Rhine for mobile operations and it is this type 

of warfare which we want to force upon the enemy because of our superior 

mobility. 

(B) In view of the importance of the Ruhr to German economy, 

and the fact that this route offers the most direct and obvious approach to 

the center of Germany, this area is likely to receive first priority from the 

defense point of view. While I should be glad of an opportunity of defeating 

on favorable terrain the bulk of the German forces, I would have to deploy 

a superior force rapidly across the Rhine to ensure success. It will not, 

however, be possible to maintain more than some 35 divisions across the 

Rhine in this sector until the railway has been extended over the river. 

8. The country between the Ruhr and Frankfurt is very defensible and 

is not suited for offensive operations. 

9. To sum up. An examination of Phase I11 indicates that operations 

across the Rhine north of the Ruhr offer the greatest strategic rewards within 

a short distance, but this area will be most strongly held by the enemy. An 

advance in the Frankfurt area offers less favorable terrain and a longer route 

to vital strategic objectives. Depending on the degree of enemy resistance it 

may be necessary to use either or both of these two avenues. 

PHASE II 

10. To examine next the most favorable areas in which to seize bridgeheads across the Rhine. Bearing in mind the possible routes of subsequent 

development of operations into Germany there are two areas in which both 

bridging and tactical conditions facilitate the seizure of bridgeheads. These 

are the sector north of the Ruhr, and the sector between Mainz and Karlsruhe. 

Enclosure “B” 

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11. North of the Ruhr there are suitable sites for three divisional assaults 

on a 20-mile front; strong defense works already exist in the area. There is, 

in addition, one further possible though difficult site which might be used. 

Flooding conditions west of Emmerich preclude an extension of this front 

unless operations are delayed till about June, in which case sites for an additional two assault crossings might possibly be available. 

12. In the Mainz-Karlsruhe sector there are sites for five divisional 

assault crossings, with the possibility of a further one south of Karlsruhe. 

If the whole of this sector is taken into use it should be possible to maintain 

across the Rhine some 50 divisions, until railways have been extended over 

the river. 

13. In addition to these main crossings there is one site on each side of 

Cologne suitable for a divisional assault crossing, but a crossing in this area 

would be tactically difficult, and after the seizure of a bridgehead, the hinterland is unsuitable for the development of operations against opposition. There 

are two isolated sites between Coblenz and Bonn, but owing to the nature of 

the terrain operations would not be practicable except against very light 

opposition. 

14. Weighing all the climatic conditions, assault operations could be 

carried out in all sectors after early March when the ice menace is over. In the 

sectors south of Mainz, however, where floods occur in summer, there is a risk 

of incurring great difficulties if we do not complete the permanent bridges and 

their approaches before the onset of the flood season in May. 

15. To sumup. 

(A) There are two main areas suitable for forming bridgeheads,

namely between Emmerich and Wesel and between Mainz and Karlsruhe. 

(qAn assault crossing in the North would be on a very narrow 

frontage, and would be opposed by t.he heaviest available enemy concentrations. To effect a crossing in the North it may, therefore, be necessary 

to divert enemy forces by closing and perhaps crossing the Rhine in the 

Frankfurt sector -operations in the Saar would not have a comparable 

effect. 

(C) An assault in the southern sector would be on a wider front 

and would not meet such heavy opposition. It would be desirable to carry 

it out in time to have our permanent bridges completed by May. 

Enclosure “B” 

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Other Factors Aflecting Phase I. 

16. The comparative strength of my own and the enemy forces is a factor 

of the greatest importance in the development of my operations. The enemy 

has now some 80 divisions on the Western Front, not all of them at full strength. 

Provided the Russian offensive is continued with vigor and the enemy maintains his front in Italy, this number is likely to dwindle. Should, however, the 

Russian offensive weaken and the Germans carry out a partial withdrawal 

from the Italian Front there might be a diversion to my front of some ten 

or more divisions from Russia, and a dozen divisions from Italy. Thus I may 

be faced in the spring with about 80 divisions, some understrength, at the 

best and a hundred or more divisions with adequate replacements at the worst. 

17. Moreover, by reasons of the suitability of the terrain for defense and 

his Siegfried fortifications, the enemy will be able to get the maximum value 

even out of his weaker divisions in a defensive role. Only when we too have 

closed the Rhine shall we share with the enemy a strong defensive barrier 

giving us the ability to hold defensive sectors with security and economy of 

effort. 

18. To drive the German forces from their strong positions I have 71 

divisions immediately available, including many below strength. In May 

I should have 85 divisions (including six airborne) with a possibility of five 

to eight more French divisions becoming available during the summer. 

19. My superiority on land on present reckoning is not therefore so very 

great. Before we advance east of the Rhine I must be assured of security in 

other sectors, and as explained above it will probably be essential to close the 

Rhine along its length, leaving only minor bridgeheads in enemy hands from 

which he cannot stage a major counterstroke. In this way only shall I be able 

to concentrate in great strength east of the River. 

CONCLUSIONS 

20. Bearing in mind the above factors and the probable development of 

further operations, it is clear that my operations to destroy the enemy forces 

west of the Rhine must be so designed as to enable me to close the Rhine 

throughout its length. In view of the present relative strengths I am not in a 

position to carry out more than one offensive at a time. I am therefore concentrating at the moment on a series of offensives designed to destroy the enemy 

and close the Rhine in the North. 

Enclosure “B” 

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PLAN 

21. My plan is as follows:­

(A) To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the 

Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north 

of Dusseldorf. South of the Moselle we shall remain on the defensive. 

(B) After closing the Rhine in the North, to direct our main effort to 

destroying any enemy remaining west of the Rhine, both in the North 

and in the South. 

(C) To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South. 

(D) To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum 

number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny 

to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr. 

(E) To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such 

forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the 

North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be to 

draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel. 

22. It will be realized that a crossing of the Rhine, particularly on the narrow frontages in which such crossings are possible, will be a tactical and engineering operation of the greatest magnitude. I propose to spare no efforts in 

allotting such operations the maximum possible support. For this purpose I 

envisage the use of airborne forces and strategic air support on a large scale. 

In addition I foresee the necessity for the employment on a very large scale 

of amphibious vehicles of all types. The possibility of failure to secure bridgeheads in the North or in the South cannot, however, be overlooked. I am, therefore, making logistical preparations which will enable me to switch my main 

effort from the North to the South should this be forced upon me. Please acknowledge. 

End 

Footnote: Receipt of this message has been acknowledged by WD CMC 

CM-IN-19766 (21 Jan 45) DTG 201500A es 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 76116 31 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. Appendix “A” is a copy of General Eisenhower’s plan of operations in 

Northwest Europe, incorporating amendments proposed by General W. B. 

Smith as a result of the discussion of Item 4, C.C.S. 182d Meeting, 30 January 

1945. 

2. Appendix “B” is a copy of a telegram from General Eisenhower to General Smith,accepting the amendments proposed by the latter and incorporated 

in Appendix “A.” 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

My plan is as follows:­

(A) To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the 

Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north 

of Dusseldorf. 

(B) To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the 

Rhine which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine-crossing operations. 

(C) To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South. 

(D) To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum 

number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny 

to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr. 

(E) To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such 

forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for 

the North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be 

to draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and 

advancing on Kassel. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

From : Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main,Versailles, 

France 

To: ARGONAUT 

Nr : S-77211 31 January 1945 

To Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith signed Eisenhower. 

I agree with the rewording of the directive as suggested in your 

CRICKET 18* and will issue the necessary amendment. You may assure the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in my name that I will seize the Rhine crossings in 

the North just as soon as this is a feasible operation and without waiting to 

close the Rhine throughout its length. Further, I will advance across the Rhine 

in the North with maximum strength and complete determination immediately 

the situation in the South allows me to collect necessary forces and do this 

without incurring unreasonable risks. 

CM-IN-99 

Appendix “A”to this paper. 

Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. '76511 

C.C.S. 76514 

C.C.S. 76518 

SUBJECTS FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEXT U.S.-BRITISHU.S.S.R. STAFF CONFERENCE 

Reference: 

CCS 182d Meeting, Item 2 

In C.C.S. 76511, dated 17 January 1945,the United States Chiefs of Staff 

proposed subjects for consideration at the next U.S.-British-U.S.S.R. staff conference. The British Chiefs of Staff replied in C.C.S. 76514, dated 20 January, 

accepting the subjects as proposed. 

In C.C.S. 76518, dated 25 January, the British Chiefs of Staff suggested 

the agenda for discussion at CRICKET.* 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 182d Meeting agreed upon the 

program for business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of StafT on 

each day at CRICKET, as outlined in Annex "A' to the minutes of that Meeting. 

Staff ConferencesinMalta. 

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C.C.S. 765/1 17 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECTSFOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEXT US.-BRITISHU.S.S.R. STAFF CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggest that the following subjects be 

considered at the next U.S.-British-U.S.S.R. staff conference:­

a. The War Against Germany 

(1) Enemy dispositions, capabilities and intentions. 

(A discussion and exchange of information.) 

(2) Coordination of operations in western Europe and Italy with operations in eastern Europe. 

(a) Timing and scope of offensives on the various fronts. 

(b) Establishment of effective liaison at Chiefs of Staff level and 

between Anglo-American-U.S.S.R. field commanders. 

(c) A determination of policy on bombline and air liaison parties 

if not resolved prior to a tripartite conference. 

(3) Shuttle bombing and arrangements for staging and/or basing 

units of Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest area. 

(4) Military aspects of Zones of Occupation in Germany and Austria. 

(Discussion of the necessity that the areas allotted each nation, 

particularly in Berlin and Vienna, contain adequate military administrative facilities and access by rail, road and air, with a view to recommending adoption by the Heads of State of a policy for guidance 

of the European Advisory Commission.) 

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b. War Against Japan 

(1) Japanese dispositions, capabilities and intentions in the Far East. 

(A discussion and exchange of information.) 

(2) Russian participation in the war against Japan. 

2. In this connection General Deane has been asked to present the above 

proposed agenda to the Chief of the Soviet General Staff requesting that he 

indicate any other military subjects the U.S.S.R. may consider desirable for 

discussion by the staff conference. 

3. Aside from discussion at the conference concerning broad strategic objectives of the U.S.S.R. in the Pacific war, the Russians may wish to discuss 

with the US.staff representatives the operational details such as the supply 

project now under way for stockpiles in Siberia and other operational details. 

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C.C.S. 76514 20 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECTS FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEXT US.-BRITISHU.S.S.R. STAFF CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the Representatives 

of the British Chiefsof Stag 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff agree with the subjects proposed by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff for discussion at the next U.S.-British-U.S.S.R. 

staff conference, as set out in C.C.S. 765/1. 

2. With reference to Item a. (4) in paragraph 1of C.C.S. 765/1, the British 

Chiefs of Staff point out that the FYench are now represented on the European 

Advisory Commission and have already expressed their views on French participation in control of Germany and Austria. Thus it would seem to the 

British Chiefs of Staff that any conclusions reached at the conference on 

the military aspects of the Zones of Occupation in these countries, should 

either take into account French aspirations or else be subject to discussion 

with the French after the conference. 

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C.C.S. 76518 25 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT US.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the Representatives 

of the British Chiefsof Staff 

The British Chiefs of Staff suggest the following agenda for the discussions at CRICKET and further suggest that it would save time in starting 

the discussions when we assemble if this agenda could be agreed before the 

United States Chiefs of Staff leave Washington. 

1. The War Against Germany 

(A) Strategy in Northwest Europe 

(i) Discussion with General Eisenhower. 

(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

(B) Strategy in the Mediterranean 

(i) Discussion with Field Marshal Alexander. 

(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

(C) Coordination of Operations on the Three European Fronts 

Bomblines and air liaison with the Russians. 

(D) The U-Boat Threat 

Memorandum may be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

(E) The Combined Bomber Offensive (Unless disposed of separately) 

(F) Planning Date for the End of the German War 

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2. The War Against Japan 

(A) Strategy in Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) 

Draft directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Command will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

(B)Allocation of Resources between SEAC and China 

(C) Pacific Operations 

Proposals tabled by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

(D) Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War 

3. Review of Cargo Shipping 

Consideration of report in the light of discussions on strategy. 

4. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept 

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C.C.S. 768/1 (ARGONAUT) 

C.C.S. 76812 

EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

References: 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 22 

C.C.S. 76811 (ARGONAUT), dated 1February 1945, circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 768/1 (ARGONAUT) in 

their 185th Meeting and agreed to the implementation of NAF 841* subject to 

certain assurances by the British Chiefs of Staff. In their 187th Meeting the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of certain assurances given by the British 

Chiefs of Staff which are set forth in the minutes of that meeting and subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 768/2 on 8 February. 

See page 188. 

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C.C.S. 768/1 (ARGONAUT) 1February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

1. In the 183d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 

the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the forming of a Greek Army to take over 

responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841,25 

January 1945. 

2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations,but that all issues made for this purpose 

will require replacement. 

3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement 

purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a 

short supply position in the United States. 

4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the 

problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. 

This program involves the provision of necessary matkriel for :­

a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions 

and supporting troops. 

b. The Polish 2d Division. 

c. Six Belgium infantry brigades. 

d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units 

(Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops. 

5. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in 

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progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It 

has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for 

liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated 

projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those 

projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this 

latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London. 

6. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments 

necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal. 

7. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower 

has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of 

making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the 

earliest practicable date, as emphasized by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, 

dated 30 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the 

British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem. 

8. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping 

of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs 

of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the 

implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can 

give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated 

forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect 

charges against United States resources. 

9. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated 

forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad 

to review NAF 841 again. 

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8 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. At their 185thMeeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the implementation of the proposals put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean, in NAF 841 in regard to equipping Greek forces upon certain 

assurances by the British Chiefs of Staff, confirmation of which would be obtained from London. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff are now in a position to assure the United 

States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in 

NAF 841, 

(a) will not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces 

in Northwest Europe; 

(b) will not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against 

United States resources. 

3. With regard to the scale of equipment for the Allied and liberated forces 

in Northwest Europe, this will, in general, be British scales but modified in 

some respects in the light of shortages which exist in certain types of 

equipment. 

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C.C.S. 772 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY 

References: 

CCS 182d Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 3 

1st Tripartite Military Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 18 

In C.C.S. 772, dated 3 January 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff submitted 

certain conclusions with regard to a planning date for the end of the war 

with Germany. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 186th Meeting agreed to accept for 

planning purposes the following dates for the end of the war with Germany: 

a. Earliest date, 1July 1945. 

b. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945. 

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C.C.S.772 30 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff 

We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against 

Germany as follows:­

1. In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the 

latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their 

conclusions are:­

a. If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the 

eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, 

the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make 

an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in 

the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 

1945. 

b. On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with 

stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on 

approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the 

loss of industrial Silesia. 

c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished 

armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six 

months by a quarter or more. 

d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping 

the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two 

main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider 

that the over-all decline in Germany’s capacity to resist will be such that 

an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in 

the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November. 

e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German 

withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige. 

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f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat 

campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces 

to hold at least southern Norway. 

2. Based on the above, we have considered three cases: 

a. The best case. 

b. A reasonably favourable case. 

c. An unfavourable case. 

THE BEST CASE 

3. It is clear from paragraph 1a. above that there is a possibility that the 

result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by midApril. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this 

timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the 

earliest date for the defeat of Germany. 

THEREASONABLYFAVOURABLECASE 

4. Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening German resistance may well 

bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant 

Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather 

conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June. 

5. Western Front. Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be 

completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be 

launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating 

the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany. 

6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end 

of organised German resistance by the end of June. 

THE UNFAVOURABLE CASE 

7. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is 

stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the 

combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late 

summer. 

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8. Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve 

any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort 

along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to 

re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be 

launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum 

as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely 

to be felt in the third quarter of the year. 

9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German 

organised resistance by the beginning of November. 

CONCLUSION 

10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, 

Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower 

planning. 

For planning purposes, we consider that:­

a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30th June, 

1945. 

b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1st 

November, 1945. 

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C.C.S. 77312 

C.C.S. 77313 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 5 

1st U.S.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item d. 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 11 

In C.C.S. 773, dated 31 January 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff submitted for approval a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean. 

The United States Chiefs of StafT circulated C.C.S. 77311 on 1February 

suggesting certain amendments to C.C.S. 773. 

In C.C.S. 77312, dated 1February 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff asked 

agreement to certain decisions in principle with regard to withdrawal of 

tactical air forces from the Mediterranean to the Western Front. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, after consideration of C.C.S. 77311 and 

77312, amended and approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean proposed in C.C.S. 77311. The agreed directive was subsequently 

circulated as C.C.S. 773/3. 

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C.C.S. 773J2 1February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRANSFER OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES FROM SACMED TO SCAEF 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. It is recommended that the following decisions in principle should be 

made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and implemented by the Supreme 

Commanders in accordance with the development of the situation in the 

Mediterranean Theatre. 

2. In view of the intention stated in paragraph 5 of the directive to 

SACMED (Enclosure to C.C.S. 773), no substantial reduction should be made 

in the tactical air forces now available for the support of the 15th Group of 

Armies so long as the enemy maintains approximately his present position 

in Italy. 

3. Should the enemy retire from his present positions in Italy, the tactical 

air forces now in the Mediterranean Theatre should be employed to the full 

for the purpose of achieving the object stated in paragraph 6 (c) of the 

directive to SACMED (Enclosure to C.C.S. 773). 

4. If, after retiring, the enemy succeeds in stabilising his position on 

a.line such as the Adige, a substantial withdrawal of tactical air forces from 

the Mediterranean to the Western Front will be desirable and should be proposed by the Supreme Commanders to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 77313 17 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. In their 185th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in 

C.C.S. 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:­

“5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France 

at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the 

near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without 

hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed 

proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 

2. The directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean as 

approved and dispatched (FAN 501 -FACS 151) is attached. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN 

1. It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the 

maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in 

that theatre. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows. 

GREECE 

2. The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be 

your constant aim. 

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that 

part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a 

free Greek Government. 

3. This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need 

for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, 

therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon 

as possible. 

ITALY 

4. In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1,it has been decided to 

withdraw from your theatre to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which 

not more than two should be armoured) as follows:­

(a) At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the 

Allied Armies in Italy. 

(b) Further complete formations equivalent to the forces now in Greece 

as the latter are released from that country. 

(c) It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The 

nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements 

for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The programme will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any 

moves take place. 

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5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at 

once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future 

as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your 

mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for 

confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces. 

7. We recognise that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theatre. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:­

(a) Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor 

adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is 

solidly held. 

(b) Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the 

withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your 

utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by 

the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces 

now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts. 

(c) You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. 

ADRIATIC 

8. Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theatre, you should continue 

to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until 

the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out 

such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources 

allow. 

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C.C.S. 77411 

C.C.S. 77413 

U-BOAT THREAT DURING 1945 

References: 

CCS 182d Meeting, Item 9 

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 7 

1st US.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item b. 

Tripartite Plenary Meeting 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 7 

In C.C.S. 774, dated 31 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff 

submitted a proposal for combatting the German U-boat threat. 

In C.C.S. 774/1, dated 31 January, the British Chiefs of Staff summarized 

the present situation with regard to the U-boat threat during 1945. 

In C.C.S. 77412, dated 1February, the British Chiefs of Staff submitted 

a reply to C.C.S. 774 and suggested alternate proposals to combat the German 

U-boat menace. 

In their 184th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 

77411 and in their 185th Meeting they approved a draft directive prepared by 

the Secretaries,based upon C.C.S. 774 and C.C.S. 71412. The approved directive 

was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 77413. 

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C.C.S. 77411 31 January 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

U-BOAT THREAT DURING 1945 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. By the introduction of the Schnorkel and other technical developments, 

the lack of mobility of U-boats when diving, and the necessity of surfacing 

for recharging batteries, have been overcome. U-boats now remain dived for 

long periods and are enabled to work in inshore waters where detection is most 

difficult and targets are numerous. These methods of operating submarines 

have produced new problems in countering the submarine threat. 

2. "he problem of the U-boat threat during 1945 is discussed below under 

two headings:­

(a) A forecast of future developments in the U-boat campaign. 

(b) An assessment of the effect of increased losses. 

PRESENT SITUATION 

3. After the failure of the U-boats to interrupt OVERLORD a comparative 

lull ensued. The enemy has used this lull to work up his new submarines,refit 

the older types, and to give his commanders and crews experience, during 

working-up patrols, in operating in inshore waters. 

4. The number of U-boats on patrol around the British Isles is now increasing slowly but steadily,and there are 8 to 12 in inshore waters, some of which 

have penetrated into the Irish Sea and Clyde Approaches. Altogether about 

25 U-boats are patrolling in U.K. waters or are on passage. 

COUNTERMEASURES 

5. Both surface forces and aircraft are greatly handicapped by the 

Schnorkel, together with G.S.R.,which makes radar detection extremely 

difficult. Aircraft also find that even if detection is achieved, the U-boat will 

dive below periscope depth and thus leave no visible target for attack. 

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6. By making use of the tactics of bottoming in the presence of escorts, the 

U-boats are extremely difficult to detect by ASDIC’s, due to the number of 

wrecks and other “non-sub echoes” in coastal waters, and to the reduced efficiency of ASDIC’s caused by density layers and bottom reverberations. 

7. An additional complication is the gnat torpedo. Tactical or mechanical 

countermeasures to this further reduce the efficiency of ASDIC’s or the speed 

with which an attack can be delivered. 

8. As a result it has been necessary to examine other methods for countering U-boats. Intensified training has been undertaken, but training at sea in 

the Irish Sea has been interfered with temporarily due to the presence of the 

U-boats. 

9. Other countermeasures in hand include improvement in radar for detection of Schnorkel,laying of deep minefields in areas of U-boat operation,laying of obstructions and methods of indicating the presence of U-boats. In 

addition Bomber Command continue mining of the approaches to German 

bases and working-up areas. Bombing has been carried out with success on 

the U-boat assembly yards by Bomber Command and United States Strategic 

Air Force. 

10. In view of the reduced effectiveness of the ASDIC to detect U-boats in 

inshore waters, a plan for extensive patrolling of the focal points on convoy 

routes by day, and of probable schnorkelling areas by night, is being put into 

force in the inshore waters in the Western Approaches with the object of 

harassing the U-boats and reporting incidents with the least possible delay. 

11. In addition the close approach of the Russian forces to Danzig and 

Gdynia must have a considerable effect on the German U-boat building and 

working-up programme. A third of their U-boat assembly capacity is situated 

in this area. 

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 

12. Two new types of U-boats will shortly come into operation. 

Type 21: 1,600 tons, 26 torpedoes, 15 knots surfaced and submerged, 

with greatly increased submerged endurance. 

Type 23: 180 tons, 2 torpedoes, about 13 knots submerged, and low 

endurance. 

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About 30 Type 21 and 15 Type 23 could be ready for operations during 

February. It is probable that these numbers will be considered suWcient to 

start the campaign in strength. 

13. It is considered that the old and new types will be used simultaneously, 

and an estimation of their likely operational areas has been made as follows:­

(a) Type 21. Possibly in Western Approaches to the United Kingdom

initially, but mainly in operations against ocean convoys. 

(b) Type 23. On the coastal convoy routes on the east and southeast 

coasts of England. 

(c) 740 tonners and U-kreuzers. On the Indian Ocean, Caribbean, West 

African and N. and 5.American coasts. 

(d) 500 tonners. In United Kingdom coastal waters and between the 

United Kingdom and Gibraltar. 

ESTIMATION OF THE SHIPPING LOSSES WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED 

14. Given good morale of the U-boat commanders, on whom success depends, 

sinkings by U-boats may rise to the order of 150 ships a quarter. These figures 

are, however, estimates and the figures may vary greatly, but are on the assumption that each U-boat will sink one ship per month. 

15. These figures are exclusive of the casualties that may be caused by 

midget U-boats, to the destruction of which a proportion of our anti-submarine 

forces are diverted, and other marine losses. 

CONCLUSIONS 

16. The main U-boat offensive in strength could begin to take shape about 

mid-February. 

Although the Russian threat to the Danzig area will seriously reduce the 

enemy’s constructional and training facilities, he should be able to maintain 

a total of 50 boats on patrol, compared with an average of about 60 during the 

height of the U-boat campaign in the spring of 1943. 

The Schnorkel and other new technical developments have increased 

the U-boat’s potential for offensive action and have considerably reduced the 

effectiveness of our present naval and air countermeasures. 

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17. The success of the U-boat is so largely dependent on the morale and 

offensive spirit of its crew that it is impossible to give any firm figures for the 

shippinglossesto be expected. If,however, morale is good, and the enemy is able 

to maintain the optimum number of U-boats on patrol, merchant shipping 

losses of the order of 150 ships a quarter may possibly be expected, compared 

with 183ships a quarter during the spring of 1943. The majority of these losses 

are likely to occur in the inshore waters of the British Isles and in the North 

Atlantic. Account must also be taken of losses which may occur from mines, 

E-boats, air attack and small battle units. The above figures take no account 

of the possible effect of additional countermeasures which may be practicable. 

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECT OF ESTIMATED INCREASED LOSSES 

18. We have been unable accurately to assess the effects of the estimated 

sinkings on the world shipping situation, owing to the many implications and 

complexity of the problem. We have, therefore, attempted to give a broad indication of the potential gravity of the threat with which we may be confronted 

should the U-boat campaign materialise on the scale indicated above. 

ASSUMPTIONS 

19. We have taken, as a basis for calculation, that:­

(a) The sinkings from U-boats alone will be 50 ships a month from 

March onwards. 

(b) In addition, damaged ships will increase the effect of these losses 

by some 20%. 

(c) Two-thirds of the ships lost will be loaded. 

(d) One-fifth of the ships sunk will be tankers. 

(e) The merchant ship construction programme in 1945 will remain 

unchanged. 

DRY CARGO SHIPS 

20. The Over-all Review of Cargo Shipping* forecasts that between February and June, 1945,both inclusive, there will be a total deficiency of 689 sailings on the main ocean routes including the Pacific. In assessing this deficiency 

C.M.T. W3. 

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it was assumed that the ships “locked up” in essential military assignments 

in various theatres, or permanently abroad (amounting to some 33% of the 

total Allied Nations’ tonnage available) are kept up to strength, and that if 

losses occur among these ships they are replaced by ships from the main ocean 

pool. The resulting deficiency amounts to some 8% of the remaining combined 

requirements. 

21. This deficiency figure was based on a low “lossrate” of some 100,000gross 

tons per month from all causes, including marine (this may be taken as some 

13-15ships per month, of which only 6 are attributed to U-boats). 

22. The additional losses from U-boats, together with an allowance for 

damaged ships, produce an additional 3% deficiency on combined requirements, making a total deficiency of sailings for the first half of 1945 of 11%. 

23. We understand that, while a portion of the deficit revealed in the “Overall Review of Cargo Shipping” would be manageable, an apparent deficit of 

8% must entail some reduction in commitments. 

It is clear that an extra 370 deficiency caused by U-boat sinkings would 

entail yet further and more serious reductions. 

It has not been possible to assess the direct effect on the fighting fronts 

caused by the material sunk and by delays in replacing military shipping. 

TANKERS AND OIL 

24. In the first half of 1945,it is possible that the increased submarine activity might result in the loss of oil cargoes amounting to 320,000 tons and 

that up to 35tankersin the United Kingdom service might be sunk or damaged. 

It would, therefore, be essential to transfer tankers from other theatres 

at an early date to replace the lost cargoes and tankers, if the fall of stocks 

to a dangerous level is to be prevented. 

PERSONNEL SHIPS 

25. It is not possible to forecast sinkings of personnel ships and no account, 

therefore, has been taken of the possible loss of these ships, which, as opposed 

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to dry cargo ships and tankers, are irreplaceable. The loss of or damage to a 

Monster, for instance, would have most serious consequences on the trooping 

programme. 

CONCLUSION 

26. We therefore conclude that, while it is not possible to translate the 

effectof the assumed losses due to U-boats into terms of supplies and reinforcements for individual theatres, the additional over-all deficiency in sailingsmay 

bring the 8% already forecast up to some 11%for the first half of the year.

For planning purposes, however, we propose that a figure of 10% should be 

taken. 

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C.C.S. 774p 2 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

U-BOAT THREAT DURING 1945 

Note bI/ the Secretaries 

In their 185th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the enclosed directive and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to 

dispatch it to all appropriate commanders. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DIRECTIVE 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the current German U-boat 

program, if not countered,will present a serious threat to our North Atlantic 

shipping lanes. 

It is therefore directed that the following countermeasuresbe taken by 

all appropriate commanders:­

a. Build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting 

groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons. 

b. Maintain, and if possible increase “marginal” bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and 

Bremen. 

c. Maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready to 

increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete 

pens. 

d. Increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, 

including the training areas. 

e. Mine waters beyond range of d. above by using surface minelayers 

and carrier-borne aircraft. 

f. Intensify operations against enemy minesweepers. 

g. Maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used 

to supply U-boat bases. 

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C.C.S. 775 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

References: 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 8 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 77613, Paragraph 6 

In C.C.S. 775, dated 1February 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff proposed 

a substitute for paragraph h. of the basic undertakings in support of over-all 

strategic concept as shown in Part I11of the OCTAGON report to the President 

and Prime Minister. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the proposed substitute in 

their 185th and 186th Meetings and agreed upon the wording recorded in the 

ARGONAUT report to the President and Prime Minister, C.C.S. 77613, 

paragraph 6. 

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C.C.S. 775 1February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings 

agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in C.C.S. 680/2, paragraph 6,* be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment. 

For existing h. substitute the following:­

“h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in 

Europe to enable them to fWl an active role in the war against Germany 

and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other 

co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance 

against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our 

available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as 

will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United 

Nations.” 

OCTAGON Conference book,page 131. 

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C.C.S. 77613 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

References: 

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 9 

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 188th Meeting, Item 2 

1st U.S.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item a. 

2d U.S.-U.K. Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 776, dated 2 February 1945, the first interim draft report to the 

President and Prime Minister was amended and approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 185th Meeting and circulated as C.C.S. 77611. 

The final draft report to the President and Prime Minister, C.C.S. '77612, 

dated 8 February, was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 188th 

Meeting. Following its acceptance by the President and Prime Minister in their 

Second Plenary Meeting, the final ARGONAUT report was recirculated as 

C.C.S.77613. 

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C.C.S. 77613 9 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Secretaries 

The final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the ARGONAUT 

Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister is enclosed. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF 

THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE “ARCaNAUT’ CONFERENCE 

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at ARGONAUT Conference is submitted herewith:-

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany. 

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to 

maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose 

of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the 

over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

before action is taken. 

5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers 

and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great 

Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender 

of Japan. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic 

concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against 

our resources; subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping 

with the changing situation:­

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a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications. 

e. Continue the offensive against Germany. 

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid 

the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces. 

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in 

Europe ascan fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany 

and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other 

co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against 

the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to 

the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity 

of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan. 

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East 

as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows. 

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of 

Japan. 

IV.EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

THE U-BOAT WAR 

7. We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again 

constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early 

yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we 

propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945. 

Enclosure 

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8. Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:­

a, To build up asmuch as is practicable the strength of surface hunting 

groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons. 

b. To maintain and, if possible, increase “marginal”bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and 

Bremen. 

c. To maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready 

to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete 

pens. 

d. To increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, 

including the training areas. 

e. To mine waters beyond range of d. above by using surface minelayers 

and carrier-borne aircraft. 

f. To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers. 

g. To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping 

used to supply U-boat bases. 

OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

9. In two telegrams, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194, the Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has presented his appreciation and 

his plan of operations for Northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:­

a. To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle 

with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Dusseldorf. 

b. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the 

Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations. 

c. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South. 

d. To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum 

number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 didsions) .The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny 

to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr. 

Enclosure 

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e. To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such forces, 

if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the North 

and essentialsecurityelsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy 

forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on 

Kassel. 

10. We have taken note of SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF’ 194 and of the 

Supreme Commander’s assurance that he will seize the Rhine crossings in the 

North just as soon as this is a feasible operation and without waiting to close 

the Rhine throughout its length. Further, that he will advance across the 

Rhme in the North with maximum strength and complete determination, immediately the situation in the South allows him to collect the necessary forces 

and do this without incurring unreasonable risks. 

STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

11. We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the 

development of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at 

liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed 

that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to build up the 

maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in 

that theater. 

12. In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw certain 

forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at the disposal of 

the Supreme Commander,Allied ExpeditionaryForce, and to redefine the tasks 

of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. 

13. Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix “A.” 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

14. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan 

should be expressed as follows: 

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:-

Enclosure 

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a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and 

air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying 

Japanese air and naval strength. 

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 

15. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/11 (Appendix “B”). 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

16. We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in 

Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the IndiaBurma Theater:­

a. The primary military object of the United States in the China and 

India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that 

will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for 

operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in 

India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces 

and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of 

communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also 

constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently 

increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China. 

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their 

agreement to SACSEA’s use of resources of the U.S. India-Burma Theater 

in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary 

object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of 

communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations 

in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would 

jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

17. We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed 

upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast 

Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix “C.” 

Enclosure 

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PLANNING DATES FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 

AND JAPAN 

18. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates 

for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary 

for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower. 

We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against 

Germany should be as follows:­

a. Earliest date -1July 1945. 

b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue-31 December 

1945. 

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against 

Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany. 

All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course 

of the war. 

SHIPPING 

19. We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the 

remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 

1945. 

For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable 

proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders 

to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be 

adjusted in accordance with the following principles:-

In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should 

be given to the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT. 

So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior 

consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff. 

Enclosure 

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20. For the second half of 1945the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, 

which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have 

agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1April 1945. This report will take account, 

from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1July 1945. 

OIL 

21. We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of all petroleum 

products that should be maintained in all theaters. The text of our agreement 

is attached as Appendix “D.” 

EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

22. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has submitted proposals (NAF 841*) designed to assist the Greek Government in forming their 

own army and so releasing British forces for employment elsewhere. 

We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander’s proposals, on the understanding that 

this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated 

forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges 

against United States resources. 

See page 188. 

Enclosure 

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APPENDIX ‘LA’’ 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN, 

REPEATED TO SCAEF 

1. It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the 

maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in 

that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as 

follows:-

GREECE 

2. The earlier possible discharge o British obligations in Greece must 

be your constant aim. 

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that 

part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of 

a free Greek Government. 

3. This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need 

for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, 

therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as 

soon as possible. 

ITALY 

4. In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to 

withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of 

which not more than two should be armored) follows:­

a. At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the 

Allied Armies in Italy. 

b. Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country. 

Appendix “A” 

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c. It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for 

their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The program will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before 

any moves take place. 

AIR FORCES 

5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at 

once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as 

much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit 

agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces. 

7. We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:­

a. Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is 

solidly held. 

b. Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the 

withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your 

utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and 

by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German 

forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts. 

c. You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. 

ADRIATIC 

8. Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theater, you should continue 

to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until 

the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out 

such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources 

allow. 

Appendix “A’ 

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APPENDIX “B” 

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

References: 

a. CCS 41719 

b. CCS 417/10 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

(See paragraph 1 (3) (f), CCS 765) 

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows (C.C.S. 41719):-

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:­

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea 

and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. 

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a 

basis for planning in the war against Japan: 

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is (C.C.S.

417/10):­

a. Following the Okinawa operation, to seize additional positions to 

intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create 

a situation favorable to: 

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and 

further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to: 

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through 

the Tokyo Plain. 

Appendix “B” 

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3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by 

the United StatesChiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:­

0bjectives Target Date 

Continuation of operationsin 

the Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, 

Leyte) 

Iwo Jima 19 February 1945 

Okinawa and extension therefrom 

in the Ryukyus 1 April-August 1945 

4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe 

can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in 

the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 

1945-1946. 

5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry 

of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far 

has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that 

purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack 

of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a 

sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined. 

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and 

preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation 

of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until 

well into 1946. 

Appendix “B” 

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APPENDIX “C” 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known 

as operation LOYALIST.) 

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your next main task will 

be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. (To be 

known as operation BROADSWORD.) 

3. In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the 

date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of 

your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the dispatch of further reinforcements from the European Theater 

should circumstances make this possible. 

4. You will prepare a program of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theater 

of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater (see paragraph 16 of the Report). 

Appendix “C” 

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APPENDIX “D 

AGREEMENT ON LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL 

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS 

1. The theater level should equal operating level plus emergency reserve 

level. 

2. Each level shall be expressed in days of forward consumption. The rate 

of forward consumption used takes into account the size and degree of activity 

of the consuming forces as estimated by the theater commanders or other 

appropriate authorities. 

3. The operating level provides the working stock required to be in the 

theater to provide for planned operations. It represents the number of days 

of supply to sustain the theater at the expected rate of consumption during the 

maximum interval which may exist between sustaining shipments. Experience 

has shown that all theaters (except icebound ports for which special levels 

must be established) can be assured of such a shipment at least every 30 days. 

4. The emergency reserve level is intended to provide for unexpectedly high 

rates of consumption, destruction of stocks and handling facilities, and interruption of supply due to enemy action. It is based on the number of days 

or average number of days necessary to make emergency replacements from 

the principal port or ports of embarkation to the points of consumption in a 

theater of operation, and it includes loading time, voyage time, unloading 

time, and theater distribution time. Theater distribution time provides for the 

products which are necessarily absorbed and immobilized in the internal 

theater distribution system and takes account of variations in the different 

theaters. 

It is considered that an emergency reserve level based on emergency 

replacement time in each theater is adequate to meet any contingency that 

might arise until special provision can be made for additional supplies. 

5. The theater level of petroleum products shall include all bulk and 

packed stocks in the theater except those products which are (a) en route ta 

the theater prior to discharge ashore, unless held as stock afloat, (b) issued 

to civilian garages, retailers and other small consumers, (c) issued to actual 

Appendix “D” 

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consuming units (aircraft, vehicles, ships, craft, and so forth) or issued to 

dumps forward of Army rear boundary in combat zone. 

6. The following theater levels expressed in days of forward consumption 

have been agreed upon for the supply of all petroleum products for military 

services and essential civilian use:-

Emergency 

THEATER 

Operation 

Level 

Reserve 

Level 

Theater 

Level 

Northwest Europe and U.K.* 

Admiralty 

Fuels 30 60 90 

War Office and European 

Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army 

Motor Transport Fuels 30 30 60 

Air Ministry 

100Octane 30 35 65 

Other Grades 30 35 65 

Others 

Motor Spirit 30 45 75 

Other White 30 60 90 

Gas/Diesel 30 60 90 

Fuel Oil 30 60 90 

Lubricants 30 150 180 

Central Mediterranean 30 40 70 

Middle East 30 30 60 )see paraPersia and Iraq 30 30 60 )graph 6 a. 

South & East &WestAfrica 

Southeast Asia Command 

30 30 60 ) 

(Including India-Burma) 30 55 85 

China Theater 30 55 85 

Southwest Pacific 30 55 85 

South Pacific 30 45 75 

Central Pacific 30 50 80 

Alaska 30 30 60 )see paraNorth America 30 25 55 )graph 6 b. 

Lati America 30 30 60 

* Emergency level for this theater takes special cognizance of the complexity of the distribution 

systems. 

Appendix “D” 

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a. In these theaters the theater level for aviation spirit will be 75 days 

instead of 60. 

b. Within the Alaskan, North American, and other applicable theaters special levels over and above the theater level will be necessary for 

icebound areas. 

c. It is agreed that the above theater levels except as noted for Northwest Europe and U.K.will not apply to stocks of lubricating oils and 

greases which are subject to special considerations,particularly in areas 

where blending or packing takes place. The stocks required consequently 

vary considerably between theaters but normally approximate to 180 

days consumption needs. 

7. As some theaters have insufficient tankage to accommodate stocks 

at theater level, consideration will be given to the holding of a proportion of 

the reserves for these theaters in other areas which have surplus storage 

capacity available and are suitably placed strategically for this purpose. 

8. Priority for providing supplies and allocating tankers shall be accorded 

to the maintenance of the emergency reserve levels in all theaters with the 

balance of all theater levels to be accumulated as rapidly as practicable thereafter, each theater taking its proportionate share of any shortage in supplies 

and tankers. 

After all theater levels have been attained, any surplus supplies should 

be stored, under the control of the owner or as otherwise agreed upon, in 

available tankage nearest to the source of supply or where it appears most 

desirable strategically. 

Theater stocks in excess of the theater level, unless permitted by specific agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, shall be reduced promptly 

to authorized levels by appropriate allocations of supplies and/or tankers. 

9. If priorities among theaters become necessary they will be determined 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

10. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board and appropriate British authorities 

will be the agencies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with 

the proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of any required revision of the 

levels of supply of petroleum products in any or all theaters and the principles 

governing these levels. 

Appendix “D’ 

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C.C.S. 77712 

RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR 

Reference: 

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 4 

In C.C.S. 777, dated 4 February 1945,the British Chiefs of St& expressed 

their concurrence with a draft agreement proposed by the United States 

Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary which was submitted 

for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before pursuing further 

negotiations with the Russians. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff proposed in C.C.S. 777/1, dated 7 

February, certain modifications to the draft agreement. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting amended and approved C.C.S. 777/1. The draft agreement as amended and approved by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff was circulated as C.C.S. 77712. 

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C.C.S. 77712 8 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR 

Note by the Secretaries 

In their 187th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff amended the agreement set forth in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 777/1. The agreement as amended and 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is enclosed herewith. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS 

LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET ARMIES AND US. (BRITISH) ARMIES 

Preamble. 

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the United 

States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to con­

.clude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet 

citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) 

freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting 

mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as 

follows:-

Article 1. 

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under US. (British) 

command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces 

operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, 

be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately 

from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed 

over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places 

agreed upon between those authorities. 

US. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take 

necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from 

enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc. 

Article 2. 

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities 

shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, 

and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and 

U.S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate 

access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or 

subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal 

administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country. 

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Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their 

own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members 

of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration 

will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall 

also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the 

over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned. 

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another 

of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or US. (British) 

authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or 

against any of the United Nations will not be permitted. 

Article 3. 

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected 

by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other 

agreed relief agencies) the competent U.S. (British) and Soviet authorities 

will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from 

time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting 

parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in 

camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until 

they are handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities at places 

agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, 

housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the 

normal practice relating to military rank. 

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or 

other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party. 

Article 4. 

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its 

own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens 

(or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of 

supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. 

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Article 5. 

Soviet and U.S.(British) military authorities shall make such advances 

on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) 

of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and US. (British) 

authorities shall agree upon beforehand. 

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of 

their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation. 

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U.S.(British) Governments will effect, each for advances 

made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their 

currency paid out for this purpose. 

Article 6. 

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of 

each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in 

the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets 

in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on 

other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war 

effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent 

Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions 

of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is 

understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed 

in accordance with military standards and procedure. 

Article 7. 

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable 

means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and 

subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be 

handed over to the Soviet or US. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed 

or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment. 

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Article 8. 

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail 

and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the 

several theatres. 

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C.C.S.77811 

LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND OVER ANGLO-AMERICAN 

STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY 

References: 

CCS 182d Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 188th Meeting, Item 3 

1st Tripartite Military Meeting, Item 4 

2d Tripartite Military Meeting, Item 1 

In their 186th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 

778, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dated 5 February 1945, and 

amended and approved the views expressed therein. C.C.S. 778 as amended 

and approved was circulated as C.C.S. 77811. 

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C.C.S. 77811 21 February 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

LIAISON WITH THESOVIETHIGH COMMAND OVER ANGLO-AMERICAN 

STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY 

Note by the Secretaries 

C.C.S. 778, as amended in the C.C.S. 186th Meeting, 6 February 1945, 

is enclosed for information. 

A. J. McFAFtLAND, 

R. D. COLERIDGE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND OVER ANGLO-AMERICAN 

STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY 

1. Our wishes are:­

a. To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German 

military and economic system. 

b. To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing 

from the East. 

c. To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army. 

2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, it 

is essential to avoid asfar as possible any restriction of strategic bomber action. 

It is not our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude our bombers 

from attacking any targets which are important to the war-making power of 

the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and American forces. 

3. Toachieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with Soviet 

land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to inform the 

British and United States Missions in Moscow of the positions of the Red Army 

from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command to inform the British 

and United States Missions if there are any particular objectives, for example, 

railway centers or centers of road communication close in front of their armies 

which they wish us not to attack. We should require at least 24,and preferably 

48hours’ notice for action upon such requests. 

4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States Missions 

in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff seems to us 

to be essential. 

5. To achieve the third wish, that is, assistance to the Russian advance, we 

should be glad to receive through the British and American Missions in Moscow 

any suggestions from the Soviet High Command. This suggestion would have 

to be considered in the light of other commitments and such factors as the 

distance and the weather. 

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6. To summarize,we suggest:­

a. That there should be no rigid division of Eastern Germany into 

spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers 

respectively; 

b. That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible

officer of the Russian High Command and representatives of the British 

and American Missions in Moscow, in order to exchange information upon

which we can regulate the action of the Anglo-U.S. strategic bombers in 

accordance with the development of Soviet operations on land. 

7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing deep 

into Germany from the East, the coordination of policy should be discussed by 

Soviet, American and British Staff representatives in London or in Moscow. 

Somefurther machinery forthe closer coordination of operations would appear 

to be necessary at that time. 

184 
MESSAGES 

FAN 477 and NAF 841 are reproduced in 

this volume for convenience of reference. 
TOP SECRET 

Combined Chiefs of Stafl 

15 January 1945 

Commanding General 

Allied Force Headquarters 

Caserta, Italy 

U.S.Military Mission 

Moscow, Russia 

Commanding General 

Mediterranean Allied Air Force 

Caserta, Italy 

British Joint Staff Mission 

Washington, D. C. 

Commanding General 

US.Strategic Air Forces in Europe 

St.Germain,France 

Number: WARX 21167 

TOPSEC book message from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Deane, Archer, 

Alexander and Spaatz for action; to McNarney and Eaker for information; to 

British Joint Staff Mission pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Bottomley for 

information. This message is FAN 477 to Alexander. 

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the dispatches concerning the 

bombline in eastern Europe and the Balkan area between the Allied and Soviet 

Armies. 

2. Existing procedure for Anglo-U.S. designation of a bombline in advance 

of Soviet armies is contrary to our accepted operational principles under which 

any army field commander designates his own bombline. The Combined Chiefs 

of Staff therefore recognize the Soviet right to establish bomblines to protect 

their own forces in the Balkans and in eastern Europe, subject to agreement on 

the following:­

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a. Acceptance by the Soviets of the following definition of a bombline: 

“A bombline may be defined as an imaginary line on the ground established by army field commanders setting forth the forward boundary of an 

area in front of their ground forces in which the attack of ground targets 

by friendly aircraft is prohibited. This line must be delineated by terrain 

features easily recognizable to pilots in the air at all altitudes. It should be 

close enough to advancing troops to permit the attack of all vital strategic 

air objectives and tactical targets, air attacks on which will materially assist 

in the advance of ground troops or are necessary to the success of a strategic 

bomber offensive in carrying the war to the enemy. It should not be construed as a boundary for restricting movement of friendly aircraft.” 

b. Establishment of effective liaison parties with the Russian forces in 

the field. Any bombline is subject to frequent and rapid changes in accordance with the moving military situation of the ground forces concerned. 

Such timely changes, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, can be 

effectively disseminated only by the establishment of direct liaison between 

the Russian forces in the field and the US.-British forces concerned. 

c. Acceptance of the right of the Allied air forces to fly over areas occupied by the Soviet ground forces in order to reach target objectives in front 

of any established bombline. (This would be necessary if the current Russian drive in western Hungary should continue westward.) 

3. You should inform the Soviet General Staff that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff feel that in the absence of agreement on the above, including the 

arrangements in paragraph 2 b. and c., the Soviets share responsibility for any 

incidentsof air attacks on their troops which occur as the result of their troops 

over-running a bombline which must be established on the basis of the poor 

liaison which presently exists with the Russian field armies. 

4. Until such time as agreement is reached with the Soviet General Staff 

on the above, 

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean is authorized to 

make changes in the bombline south of the latitude of Vienna, transmitting the informationto the Commanding General, US. Strategic Air Forces 

and Deputy Chief of Air Staff,and the Heads of the U.S.and British Missions 

in Moscow for transmittal to the Red Army Staff, with copies of such communications to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information. 

b. The Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces and 

the Deputy Chief of Air Staff are authorized jointly to establish and make 

changes in the bombline north of the latitude of Vienna; the Commanding 

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General, US.Strategic Air Forces, to transmit such information to the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean and to the Heads of the U.S. 

and British Military Missions in Moscow for transmittal to the Red Army 

Staff, with copies of such communications to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

for information. 

5. This is Combined Chiefs of Staff action on MX-21926, MX-22201 and 

MX-21984 from Deane and Archer and NAF 827 from Wilson. 

End 

ORIGINATOR: Gen. McFarland (C.C./S) 

CM-OUT-21167 (Jan 45) DTG 1523342 ef 

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From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy 

To: War Department 

Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, 

France 

Nr : FX 91225 NAF 841 25 January 1945 

Signed Alexander cite FHGCT. FX 91225addsd AGWAR for Combined 

Chiefs of Staff,rptd AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff,SHAEF. This is NAF 841. 

1. If the withdrawal of British armed forces from Greece is to take 

place expeditiously it is essential to render assistance to the Greek Government 

in forming their army so that they may take over responsibility for internal 

securitywithin Greece without delay. 

2. Proposals for the organization of the Greek National Forces have 

been examined with great care; and set out in paragraphs 3 to 13 below are the 

recommendations which it is considered are the minimum which will allow the 

British armed forces now in Greece to be withdrawn. 

3. Final organization will be an army of three field service divisions 

plus garrison troops on National Guard battalion basis. 

4. Role of field divisions is to provide Greek Government with mobile 

reserve for internal security with National Guard battalions as garrison troops 

for internal security duties in cities and towns. 

5. Recommend that field divisions should be developed from cadres 

drawn from Greek Mountain Brigade and Sacred Regiment and other units 

which have already been formed and have operated in Mideast and Italy. Divisions would then be brought up to strength by transfer of best material from 

Greek National Guard battalions which would be replaced in the latter by 

further call-up. 

6. Field force divisions to be organized armed and equipped on simplest 

possible lines to carry out their role. Each division would consist of approx. 

10,000 all ranks, 30 armored cars, 24 field guns and 770 vehicles. Infantry battalions to be armed on small arms basis plus 3-inch mortars and small number 

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of Piats. Technical vehicles and equipment to be kept to a minimum. Animal 

transport considered most desirable in lieu proportion motor transport but 

resources non-existent after meeting present commitments. 

7. National Guard battalions to be under command static headquarters set up at appropriate centers and woven into eventual general 

military administrative organization of country which will probably be on a 

territorial basis. Anticipate 15 static headquarters will be required each of 

which will command 3 to 7 battalions according to territorial area under their 

control. Minimum number of National Guard battalions required is 60.Each 

battalion will be some 550 all ranks strong equipped with 3 armored carspad 

armed on a small arms basis. Total National Guard commitment will be approx. 40,000 all ranks, 180 armored cars and 500 vehicles. Vehicles to latter 

number essential owing to complete absence of local resources. 

8. Base and training units will require approx. 200 vehicles. 

9. To summarize the total commitment for divisions and National 

Guard organization and to cover base and reinforcement and training establishments will be about 100,000 all ranks, 300 armored cars, 80 field guns and 

3,000 vehicles. Against this existing Greek units have some 900 vehicles and 24 

field guns. 

10. Propose implementing this in 3 phases. 

First phase. Build up of National Guard to ceiling of 80,000on battalion 

basis. Formation of cadres for 3 field divisions from Greek Mountain Brigade, 

Sacred Regiment and existing artillery units. Organization of country into 

military districts and setting up static headquarters in each district. 

Second phase. Progressive build up and training of 3 field divisions by 

transfer of personnel from National Guard. Replacement these personnel in 

National Guard units by further call-up. Completion military district organization aid final allocation National Guard units. 

Third phase. Completion organization and training 3 field divisions. 

11. If you approve proposals difficulty not anticipated in meeting 

phased requirements clothing arms equipment and vehicles from British resources in Mediterranean and dues in over next 3 months except in 3-inch 

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mortars, rifles and “B”vehicles* for which extra provision by you will be necessary. Must stress necessity replacement of all issues from Mediterranean 

stocks and dues in. Your instructions re rations for Greek Army will also be 

required on which commitment separate signal is being sent. 

12. In early stages of formation of Greek Army British assistance in 

shape of liaison personnel must be on a generous scale if Greek forces are to 

replace British troops in Greece at early date, but such liaison should be scaled 

down rapidly as soon as Greek Army can stand on its own feet. Initial estimate 

approximately 300 officers and 1,000 other ranks. 

13. Emphasize that keynote of organization will be simplicity and 

directly related to tasks, terrain and Greek way of life. 

14. Request your earliest approval to these proposals as rapid relief of 

British troops in Greece is essential for success of future operations in Italy. 

15. Cable regarding Greek policy being despatched separately today. 

End 

CM-IN-25346 (26 Jan 45) DTG 251817A da 

Non-combatant vehicles. 

190 
ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 182d Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

THEMAIN CONFERENCE ROOM,MONTGOMERY HOUSE,MALTA,

ON TUESDAY, 30 JANUARY 1945, AT 1200.

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, USA 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Loutzenheiser, USA 

Colonel H. A. Twitchell, USA 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

(For items 4 to 8 only) 

Air Marshal Sir James M. Robb 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it had been suggested by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so.He hoped, however, that a member 

of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff at MAGNETO. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to this proposal. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the meetings of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily. 

ADMIRAL KING, in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations 

in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet daily at 1430,circumstances permitting. 

2. AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE 

(C.C.S. 765/8) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE tabled a note setting out proposals for the business 

to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day. (Annex to these 

Minutes, page 204.) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be 

earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed. 

It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end 

of the Japanese war should be so earmarked. 

3. GERMAN FLYING BOMB AND ROCKET ATTACKS 

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the data made available by the 

British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket 

and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his 

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talk to the Congress he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had 

stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the 

other man’spoint of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb 

and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and 

had made a very strong impression on his audience. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff 

he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this 

connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made 

to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on this matter. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the proposals for air action 

against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided 

to follow. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the difficultieswhich had arisen 

with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against 

industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of 

London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this 

weapon. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then outlined certain discussions he had had at 

Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small 

formations of fighter-bombers to attack communications and particular% for 

attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that 

skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground 

production plant where the rockets were assembled. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was not accurately informed as to 

the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and 

thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was 

probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of 

skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. 

With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the 

possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz,who was 

arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a 

matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the possibility of the Germans 

instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area 

in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target. 

Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack. 

In reply to a question, ADMIRAL KING said that the Japanese suicide 

attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but 

they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. 

The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions 

as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of the above statements. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF adjourned until 1430. 

4. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

(C.C.S.761/3 and 761/4) 

At General Bedell Smith’s suggestion GENERAL BULL outlined the 

projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing 

up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that 

river: the second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the Rhine; 

the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her 

armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Priim-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from 

the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations VERITABLE and GRENADE, the latter of 

which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley’s present attack 

did not proceed with sufftcient rapidity. 

GENERAL BULL then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal 

Montgomery’s forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel 

to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present 

position north of Aachen in the direction of Dusseldorf. A decision would 

shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General 

Bradley’s operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear 

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the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted 

by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable,if it proved possible, 

to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would 

be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive. 

Turning to the second phase-the seizure of bridgeheads across the 

Rhine -GENERAL BULL explained that in the North between Emmerick 

and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. 

In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in 

addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were 

three possible bridging sites. 

Field Marshal Montgomery’s operation VERITABLE would be launched 

between the eighth and tenth of February and operation GRENADE approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was 

therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Dusseldorf 

northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal 

Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented 

itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive. 

GENERAL BULL explained that the Supreme Commander was strongly 

of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. 

It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were 

to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel 

and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery’sdrive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. 

It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain 

more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been 

established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had 

been established. 

The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance 

of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be 

employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for 

the crossings, together with other limiting factors, made it essential to have 

an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The 

forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder 

of the line and to stage diversions and threats. 

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GENERAL BEDELL SMITH explained that the only factor which had 

altered since General Eisenhower’s appreciations and intentions had been 

communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180 

(C.C.S. 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front 

freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth 

Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer 

believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance 

of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view 

of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was 

essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped 

that Field Marshal Montgomery’s attack would start on 8 February. 

Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, GENERAL SMITH 

explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 

21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was 

obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of 

some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed 

that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the 

main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under 

way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort 

should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages 

in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other 

hand this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans 

could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion 

of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower’s view 

the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary 

and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible. 

In reply to a question, GENERAL SMITH explained that it was obviously 

desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme 

Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation 

would delay the main attack until midsummer or would militate against an 

opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the 

northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws 

on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. GENERAL SMITH and GENERAL 

BULL explained that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any 

date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring 

thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explaifled that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that 

there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that 

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therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the 

two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp 

was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the 

advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose 

importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove 

easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the 

Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and 

our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications 

thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort 

being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every 

other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There 

was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and 

thereby weakening the main northern attack. 

Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was 

in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt 

would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared 

up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general 

impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded 

to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much 

strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as 

bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously 

necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as 

many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces 

to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking 

place. 

GENERAL SMITH emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended 

to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained 

logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the 

northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic 

reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used 

for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that 

the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional 

front and might bog down. The southern advance was not intended to compete 

with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German 

forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate 

line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme 

Commander’s view of the differentiation between the main and secondary 

thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he welcomed this explanation. He had 

felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to a point previously made by Field 

Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the 

line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations 

involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, 

that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance 

only; the number of divisions required tomaintain security in the non-active 

parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be 

logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that 

there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve 

should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was 

succeeding. If extremely heavy casualtieswere sustained in the northern attack 

there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight 

of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other 

line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that 

the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid 

of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our 

attacking in that area. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the 

strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and 

rehabilitation of tired units. 

GENERAL SMZTH gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. 

He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would 

not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve 

of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would 

be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively 

quiet sectorsof the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit. 

Turning to the employment of French divisions, GENERAL SMZTH said 

that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. 

Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and 

they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter 

part of April. The French had certain odd brigades and other units available 

at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain 

or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely 

agreed with the Supreme Commander’s plan as set out in SCAF 180. This 

however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith’s 

explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 

180,as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff in C.C.S. 76114. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 

(page 120) which appeared out of keeping with General Smith’s explanation 

GENERAL SMITH said that as he understood it, it had never been 

General Eisenhower’s intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine 

clear of Germans before effecting crossings. 

GENERAL BULL confirmed this view and said that such action had not 

been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. 

However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable 

if it could be achieved without delay. 

GENERAL SMITH said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the 

North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisionsavailable to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 

of SCAF 180 (page 118) also implied equally important lines of advance. 

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to paragraph 22 (page 121) which he 

felt clarified the position. 

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL SMITH said that 

the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried 

Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve 

this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the 

Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general he felt 

that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled through’’ by two or three good 

divisions in 15 days in almost any position. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 

at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith’sexplanation 

at their meeting on the following day. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by 

the British Chiefs of Staff. 

5. COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477. 

GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer 

to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary 

to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to press the Russians to agree at ARGONAUT to the proposals 

in the Appendix to C.C.S. 741/6 (Fan 477,see page 185).* 

6. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

(C.C.S. 166 Series**) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that his object in raising this 

question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views 

on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to 

Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of 

course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters. 

GENERAL KUTER explained that C.C.S. 400/2*** did in effect give 

the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such 

forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had 

been considering the possibility of moving the Fi�teenthAir Force to the United 

Kingdom but had decided against such a course. 

see also C.C.S.778/1. 

**Notpubllshed herein. 

‘SEXTANT Conference book, page 105. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had directed an examhation of the 

possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, 

thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had 

not commended itself to his staffs. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that any large move as between 

theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it 

had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of 

bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility 

of withdrawing ground forces from that theater. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he remembered it, the agreement 

with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit 

the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and 

flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the 

best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent 

move of forces. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it had been felt that temporary moves 

of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view of the difficult 

weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly 

specialized business. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered the permanent allocations of 

forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the 

paper under discussion (C.C.S. 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line 

with this view. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was entirely reassured by General 

Marshall’s statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present 

contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air 

Force from the Mediterranean. 

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7. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY 

(C.C.S. 772) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs 

of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany 

(C.C.S. 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date 

or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on C.C.S. 772 pending consideration by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff. 

8. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as 

recommended in paragraph 32 of C.C.S. 680/2 (OCTAGON Conference 

book, page 138). 

9. THE U-BOAT THREAT 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that at present we were in a 

somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective 

against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected 

the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working 

their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they 

were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even 

penetrated the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the 

extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object 

was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could 

therefore only detect it in calm weather. 

Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel 

which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted 

the schnorkel. 

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In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort 

carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the 

Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, 

two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further 

one south of Land's End. The object was to force the submarines back into 

deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine 

fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea. 

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF explained that from the air point of 

view new devices were being brought into action, and included an infra-red 

device. It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine 

using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, 

found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left 

no swirl at which to aim. 

. SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which 

had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a 

speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, 

a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these 

new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of the foregoing statements. 

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ANNEX 

PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF WORK 

Tuesday, 

30th January 1. A. WAR AGAINST GERMANY 

1. C. CO-ORDINATION OF OPERATIONS 

Bomblimes, etc. 

1. E. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

1. F. PLANNING DATE FOR END OF GERMAN WAR 

Wednesday, 

31st January 1. B. STRATEGY IN MEDITERRANEAN 

2. WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

A. SOUTH-EAST ASIA 

B. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN S.E.A.C. 

AND CHINA 

Thursday, 

1st February 2. C. PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

2. D. PLANNING DATE FOR END OF JAPANESE WAR 

1. D. U-BOAT THREAT 

Friday, 

2nd February 3. REVIEW OF CARGO SHIF'PING 

Additional 

Item. OIL STOCKS 

4. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

CASTILLE, 

30.1.45. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 183d Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

THEMAINCONFERENCEROOM,MONTGOMERYHOUSE,MALTA, 

ON WEDNESDAY, 31 JANUARY 1945, AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA 

(Items 1to 4 only) 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, USA 

(Items 1to 4 only) 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USA 

Maj. Gen. W. A. Wood, USA 

Brig. Gen. C. P. Cabell, USA 

(Items 1 and 2 only) 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Loutzenheiser, USA 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander 

(Items 1and 2 only) 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Air Marshal Sir James M. Robb 

(Items 1 to 4 only) 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Colonel C. R. Peck, USA 

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1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C.C.S. 1820 MEETING 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the record of General Bull’s statement 

contained in the fourth paragraph of item 4 of the minutes. He had not understood that there was any question about operation GRENADE not being 

launched. He had, on the other hand, understood that operation VERITABLE 

was dependent on operation GRENADE. Was it visualized that VERITABLE 

would have to await the launching of GRENADE? 

GENERAL SMITH explained that General Bradley was endeavoring to 

advance on the Priim-Bonn axis. If this advance succeeded in reaching 

Euskirchen quickly, it would be equally effective in assisting operation VERITABLE as would operation GRENADE. VERITABLE was not, however, dependent on either operation. General Eisenhower was at present at General Bradley’s 

headquarters and was now deciding whether or not to cancel General Bradley’s 

operations and shift forces north in order to undertake GRENADE instead. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as 

to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and 

start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE. 

GENERAL SMITH said that it was his personal opinion that it would 

probably be necessary to stop General Bradley’s operations and to launch 

operation GRENADE. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that if General Bradley’s operations 

could achieve their objective in time there were certain advantages since the 

troops were already in position. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 182d Meeting and approved the detailed 

record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments. 

2. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 773) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft directive 

to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, prepared by the British 

Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 773). 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the 

conclusion that the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive Western 

Front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theater which, of necessity, would 

then have to revert to the offensive-defensive in Italy. There was now no question of operations aimed at the Ljubljana Gap and in any event the advance 

of the left wing of the Russian Army made such an operation no longer necessary. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

were not yet in a position to give their final views on the draft directive, particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the Twelfth Air Force. However, 

there were certain United States proposals which he would like to put to the 

British Chiefs of Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the 

following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the word “British” 

for “our” wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4 the substitution of “five” for 

“six”divisions; in paragraph 5,first sentence, the deletion of the words “United 

States” and “in equal proportions.” 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth 

Army intact as a well balanced organic force, and that it would be preferable 

to reinforce France with British and Canadian divisions in order to increase the 

strength of Field Marshal Montgomery’s army. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could 

be released from Greece, since this was the only way of fmding the additional 

forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been 

considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in 

that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two 

of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be 

moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary 

study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at 

least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided 

for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be 

available for operationsin France would be greatly expedited. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff originally 

estimated that six divisions could be spared from the theater. With regard to 

their nationality, there were obviously great advantages in moving the Canadian divisions to enable them to join up with the remainder of the Canadian 

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forces in France. He was prepared to agree that the remaining divisions should 

be British. He felt it right to accept five divisions as a basis and this figure 

could be reconsidered later in the light of the situation. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that the Canadian divisions were 

the easiest to move quickly; one was already out of the line and could be moved 

at once and the other approximately a fortnight later. He pointed out, however, 

that it would be difficult to find suitable British divisions since all were now 

in the line and they had been involved in hard fighting for a long period. He 

had no reserve divisions. He outlined the composition of the forces available 

to him in the Mediterranean Theater. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt it unwise to go into the details of the formations to be moved at this stage. He accepted the United States proposals in 

principle. Two Canadian and one British divisions could be moved first and the 

remaining two British divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had 

in mind to propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the 

Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one light bomber 

group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons of night fighters. These 

air forces would be used to assist the First French Army and the Seventh United 

States Army. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER pointed out that if land formations 

were removed from him it was all the more desirable to keep as much air power 

as possible in the theater. If it was absolutely necessary to withdraw air forces 

from him he was most anxious that the United States medium and light 

bombers should not be taken, since British air forces in Italy were weak in those 

particular types. 

GENERAL SMITH said that he was not asking for light bombers to be 

withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest Europe. 

GENERAL ANDERSON pointed out that the greatest need was for 

fighter-bombers.The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of these in 

order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that if the Mediterranean 

Theater was passing to the defensive and the troops were being transferred to 

Northwest Europe, then the appropriate air components should, if possible, 

accompany them. The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P-47’s 

which could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers. 

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GENERAL KUTER explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light 

Bomber Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was trained 

for night intruder work which it was felt would be of more value in Northwest 

Europe than in Italy. 

GENERAL SMITH said that he would be delighted to accept this group 

but only if Field Marshal Alexander could spare it. He was as concerned as 

Field Marshal Alexander himself as to the security of the Italian Front. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that if General Smith would give 

him his minimum requirements, he would do his utmost to meet them. 

GENERAL SMITH said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his 

minimum requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable, 

were not essential. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER undertook to examine this proposal at 

once and to release these forces if this proved at all possible. He fully realized 

that if his theater was to go on the defensive it was his duty to give up all 

possible resources, provided only that his front remained reasonably secure. 

GENERAL SMITH said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final 

decision to Field Marshal Alexander. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to NAF 841* in which Field Marshal Alexander had requested approval to the equipment of certain additional Greek 

forces. He (Sir Alan Brooke) was most anxious that a decision on this proposal 

should be reached before the Combined Chiefs of Staff left Malta since such a 

decision would greatly accelerate the dates at which the British divisions could 

be released from Greece. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this subject. 

* See page 188. 

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3. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 76113 and 76114) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to 

accept the Supreme Commander’s operations as explained by General Smith 

and recorded in the minutes of the 182d Meeting. This explanation, however, 

was not in complete accord with the proposals put forward in SCAF 180.The 

British Chiefs of Staff therefore were not prepared to approve SCAF’ 180 as 

at present drafted. 

GENERAL SMITH then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander’s plan as contained in paragraph 21 of SCAF 180 (page 121). This redraft was designed to bring the Supreme Commander’s proposals into line with 

his previous explanation of SCAF 180. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this subject. 

4. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY 

(C.C.S. 772) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration 

of this item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of ARGONAUT. 

5. a. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 452135 and 452/36) 

b. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA 

AND CHINA THEATERS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 

452/35 had put forward a new draft directive to the Supreme Commander, 

Southeast Asia. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the question of a directive 

to the Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the allocation 

of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. He drew attention 

to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 452/36) which, 

while concurringin the directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked 

this directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United States resources 

to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the situation was developing 

to a point where the resources of the China and Burma-India Theaters would be 

separated. US. resources required for China would not be available for operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral Mountbatten should be in 

no doubt as to the circumstances under which United States forces were 

available to him. 

General Wedemeyer had recently estimated that some three squadrons 

of fighters would be required to protect the air route to China and had further 

implied that he was prepared to accept the responsibility of protecting with 

Chinese or United States troops the northern part of the Burma Road. This 

would, of course, relieve Admiral Mountbatten of these responsibilities. The 

situation was developing rapidly and the Japanese might well hold out in the 

Rangoon area in order to deny us that port but, in a matter of weeks, the 

Japanese sea communications to Burma, Malaysia and the Netherlands East 

Indies would be cut by air operations out of the Philippines. This would 

materially reduce Admiral Mountbatten’s problems. Further, it would soon be 

possible to transfer more power to China, not so much additional tonnage but 

the alf-important transport vehicles and light and medium artillery. The 

striking power then available to us on the far side of the Hump would be very 

different from that which we now had. 

Summing up, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposed directive 

to Admiral Mountbatten was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff, 

provided it was communicated to Admiral Mountbatten together.with the policy 

with regard to the employment of United States forces outlined in C.C.S.452/36. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the phrase “with the forces at present at your disposal” contained in paragraph 3 of the draft directive was inserted in order to make it clear to Admiral Mountbatten that he should not 

undertake operations which could not be carried out without an increased 

allocation of resources. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked for clarification of the meaning of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C.C.S. 452/36). Did this memorandum imply that, although Admiral Mountbatten could use for approved 

operations in Burma United States forces not required in China, such forces 

would not be available to him for use in Malaya? 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the memorandum was meant to make 

it quite clear that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must 

be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral Mountbatten must not 

be led to assume that they would be available to him. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on C.C.S. 452/36 pending further study by the British 

Chiefs of Staff. 

6. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION-EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 660/3) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of C.C.S. 660/3. 

7. BOMBING OF U-BOAT ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES 

(C.C.S. 774) 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he would prefer to consider this 

memorandum at the same time as the paper he was putting forward with 

regard to the U-boat threat. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on C.C.S. 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of 

Staff. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 184th Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

THEMAINCONFERENCE ROOM,MONTGOMERY HOUSE,MALTA,

ON THURSDAY, 1 FEBRUARY 1945, AT 1430.

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, USA 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Maj. Gen. W. A. Wood, USA 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Loutzenheiser, USA 

Brig. Gen. C. P. Cabell, USA 

(For items 1 and 2 only) 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander 

(For items 1 and 2 only) 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C.C.S. 1830 MEETING 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1of the minutes amended to read as follows:­

“GENERAL MARSHALL said that in recent discussions General 

Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to 

stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching 

GRENADE.” 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S.183d Meeting, and 

approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment 

proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments. 

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 773f 1 and 77312) 

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE referred to the amended draft directive 

contained in C.C.S.773f 1. He suggested that paragraph 4 b. of this directive 

should read as follows:­

“Furthercomplete formations as the forces now in Greece are released 

from that country.” 

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of 

the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three 

divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two 

of the three divisions in Greece to follow them. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. 

He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth 

Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to 

carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7 c., which instructed 

him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security 

of his front,though it might well be possible to release it after the Germanshad 

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withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move 

the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces 

at the same time. 

In reply to a question, SIR CHARLES PORTAL confirmed that it was 

his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in 

the event that the German forces did not retire. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the remainder of the directive 

should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander 

should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth 

Air Force was still under consideration. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he was not in favor of this proposal. 

GENERAL KUTER suggested that General Eisenhower might require 

parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being 

transferred to him. 

GENERAL SMITH said that General Eisenhower’s first requirement, 

before any of the land forces,was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were 

urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the 

front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting. 

3. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

(C.C.S. 768/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on C.C.S. 768/1 until their next meeting. 

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4. a. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 452135, C.C.S. 452136) 

b. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA 

AND CHINA THEATERS 

(C.C.S. 74717 (ARGONAUT) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence 

of paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452136. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he understood that the British Chiefs 

of Staff wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he felt 

fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations 

rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy 

discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China 

arose. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the British Chiefs of Staff 

were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was 

ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might 

well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying 

before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal. 

After further discussion, THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed 

on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452136: 

“Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress 

in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and 

which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those 

operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw C.C.S. 74717 (ARGONAUT). 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 

452135, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy 

recorded in C.C.S. 452136 and amended in the course of discussion. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of 

C.C.S. 452136, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the 

second paragraph as agreed above. (The policy, as amended and 

approved, subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 452137.) 

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast 

Asia contained in C.C.S. 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph 

drawing his attention to the policy set out in C.C.S. 452137. 

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw C.C.S. 74717 

(ARGONAUT). 

5. PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

(C.C.S. 417111) 

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various 

plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September 

of 1945and the invasion of the Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these 

operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from 

Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were 

therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time 

required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on 

whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the 

present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that 

theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved 

there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during 

the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried 

out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There 

were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and 

Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration 

were :­

(1) An attack un the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only 

of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby 

assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations. 

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(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation 

were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that 

area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil 

wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready 

for use. 

(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was 

extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island 

Empire. In addition,it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of 

islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against 

the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us. 

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which 

of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable 

results. At the same time it might be found desirable to capture additional 

islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa. 

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid 

full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties 

and slowing up the conduct of the campaign. 

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized 

that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations 

nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted 

by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that with U.S. troops holding 

certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be 

able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations. 

In view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault 

on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from 

positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon. 

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be 

undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results 

of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in 

Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken. 

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A 

fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved on this base before any work 

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could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed 

in Ulithi which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok which had 

previously been used as a base and staging point. 

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the 

Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces 

would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports 

was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter 

months due to ice conditions. 

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to 

stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect 

the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and 

effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air 

cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such 

an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due 

to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the 

Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type”supplies to the Maritime Provinces. 

To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be 

undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be undertaken, further operations 

would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire. 

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These 

forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short 

supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the 

inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops. 

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained 

that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They 

were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning 

such points as Bouganville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not 

now be used. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417111. 

6. a. U-BOAT THREAT 

(C.C.S. 77411 and 77412) 

b. BOMBING OF ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES 

(C.C.S. 774) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested 

that C.C.S. 77411 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated 

shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed with General Marshall. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, referring to C.C.S. 774,said that he felt the 

proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt 

that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the 

effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in 

Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine targets and explained that 

such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had 

been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented 

visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it. 

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the 

weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets. 

GENERAL KUTER said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record 

their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the 

action to be taken to counter it. 

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the Naval Staff would have 

liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets 

would in fact pay a more valuable dividend. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then considered the summary 

of countermeasures set out in C.C.S. 774 and 77412. It was agreed that the 

action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the 

appropriate authorities in the form of a directive. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of C.C.S. 77411 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 

1945. 

b. Directed the Secretaries todraft and circulate for approval a directive 

based on C.C.S. 774 and C.C.S. 77412. 

7. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 76115 and 76116) 

In closed session, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of SCAF 180,”as amended by SCAF 194** of 31 January, and 

as amplified by Message No.S-77211**of 31 January to General Smith. 

Enclosure “B”to C.C.S. 761/3 (Page 116). 

**Appendices“A” and “B” to C.C.S. 761/6 (Pages 123, 124). 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 185th Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

THEMAIN CONFERENCE ROOM,MONTGOMERY HOUSE,MALTA,

ON FRIDAY, 2 FEBRUARY 1945,AT 1200. 

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

ALSO 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, USA 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Loutzenheiser, USA 

Brig. Gen. C. P. Cabell, USA 

(For items 1to 5 only) 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander 

(For items 1 to 5 only) 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

(For items 1 to 4 only) 

Air Marshal Sir James M. Robb 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C.C.S. 184TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:--

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 184th Meeting 

and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor 

amendments. 

2. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES 

(C.C.S. 768/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General 

Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units 

could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on 

the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale -a commitment 

which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as 

possible. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could 

be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000. 

b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841* upon 

assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation 

from London, this implementation would not :­

(1) Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of 

equipment,on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated 

forces in Northwest Europe, nor 

(2) Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against US.resources. 

* See page 188. 

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3. REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING 

(C.C.S. 74618 and C.C.S. 746110) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested the substitution of the word “some” 

for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure 

to C.C.S. 746110. With regard to paragraph 6 d., he felt that it should be made 

clear that the shipping and resources annex tothe final report by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should be completed before the conference 

ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping 

team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had 

been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs shpuld remain at CRICKET. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5 b. 

Turning to C.C.S. 74618, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British 

Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it 

clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping 

Adjustment Board. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C.C.S. 746110 subject to the substitution of “some” for 

“present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” 

in the fourth line of paragraph 5 b. 

b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff 

in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 74618 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following: 

“Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.” 

c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at 

CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT. 

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4. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U.K.AND 

NORTHWEST EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 625/10 (ARGONAUT) 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for an explanation as to why the British 

Chiefs of Staff felt it essential for stocks in Northwest Europe to be expressed 

in fixed quantities rather than in days of forward consumption. 

GENERAL RIDDELL-WEBSTER said that the British Chiefs of Staff 

were prepared to depart from the principle of expressing requirements in fixed 

quantities except in certain particular items. One of these special items was 

Admiralty fuel oil. Stocks had to be maintained at a large number of points 

in order to maintain the flexibility of naval operations. A cut below the figure 

asked for would result in the necessity for using tankers to transfer stocks 

from one base to another. With regard to aviation fuel, negotiations had been 

in progress and although the Air Ministry were loath to allow stocks to fall 

below 1,150,000tons, it had finally been agreed to accept a figure of 1,000,000 

tons. In this case the same considerations with regard to a fixed figure applied 

as in the case of Admiralty fuel oil. 

GENERAL RIDDELL-WEBSTER, continuing,outlined the position concerning certain other oil products. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the figure 59 days forward consumption proposed for motor spirits seemed reasonable. He felt, however, that the 

requirement for similar fuels in which the War Department was interested 

should be reduced to the same figure. The whole problem had been referred 

to the Combined Administrative Committee in Washington and he felt that 

discussions should not take place on this matter in two places. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the complicated situation in the United Kingdom where the whole economy of the country was affected, but felt that he must point out that dimculties with regard to stock 

levels were also being experienced in other theaters. 

After further discussion it was suggested that the Combined Administrative Committee should be instructed to expedite consideration of the problem and to signal an early report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Directed the Secretaries to call for the report of the Combined Administrative Committee on C.C.S. 625/3,* 625/6,* and 625/9* to reach them 

at ARGONAUT by 1800 hours on 5 February, ARGONAUT time. 

5. TRANSFER OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES FROM SACMED TO SCAEF 

(C.C.S. 77311 and 773/2) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he saw it the British proposal left 

the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that 

the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should move to Northwest Europe, which 

was the decisive theater in which additional air power would produce the most 

valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the 

line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to 

strengthen the northern thrust. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the offensive on the Western 

Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that there was considerable air 

strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult 

and put up agreed proposals. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt a valuable opportunity might 

be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the 

United States’ P-47’s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications 

beyond the limits of the shorter ranged British fighters. He pointed out that 

the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 

9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean. 

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to 

France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander 

concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of 

Not published herein. 

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divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed 

to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present 

fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move 

to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of 

the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 77312. This he 

felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighterbomber groups particularly required by GeneralEisenhower.He understood that 

such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three 

fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important 

that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since 

they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers 

of the Twelfth Air Force. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood that the 6th Army Group 

was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the 

Twelfth Air Force was important to them. 

GENERAL KUTER said that he personally felt that the whole of the 

Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the main effort. 

All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when 

he required it. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the French forces in the South were 

inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were 

urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the 

Allied line in this sector would be very strong. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said he was anxious to retain the 

TweIfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater 

from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air 

headquarters in southern France. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in C.C.S. 77311 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5: 

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“5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to 

France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to 

France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as 

can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 

6. PROVISION OF LVT’S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 755/3) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he thought it essential that Field Marshal 

Alexander should be provided with offensive power in order to take advantage 

of any enemy weakness. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER undertook to re-examine his requirements in LVT’s in the light of the new directive which was about to be issued 

to him and to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at an early date. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to request the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to review his requirements in LVT’s along the 

lines indicated in C.C.S. 75513. 

7. U-BOAT THREAT 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft directive 

prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6 b. of the C.C.S. 

184th Meeting. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited 

the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 774/3.) 

8. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

(C.C.S. 775) 

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL 

outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian 

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goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of 

insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder 

our operations based on that country. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph 6 h. 

of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S.776). 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which 

had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against 

the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread 

ration in Italy had been put forward. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that requirements to prevent 

disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U.S.military manufacturing~-programs - in liberated areas were already included under the military

shipping requirements. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this subject. 

9. INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT VD PRIME !INISTER 

(C.C.S. 776) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed that paragraph 6 h. of 

C.C.S.776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still 

under discussion. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo 

shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of C.C.S. 746/10 

was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6 h. of the interim report 

along the lines indicated in C.C.S.775. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion. 

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1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE 185TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 185th Meeting 

and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor 

amendments. 

2. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U.K. AND 

NORTHWEST EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 625/10 (ARGONAUT) and 625/11) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a telegram reporting the fact that the Combined Administrative Committee had been unable 

to reach agreement on C.C.S. 625/3,* 625/6* and 625/9.* The basis of disagreement lay in the fact that the British considered the absolute minimum below 

which stocks should not fall should be expressed in terms of fixed quantities, 

whereas the U.S. view was that the desirable minimum was the emergency 

reserve level and that this could and should be expressed in days of forward 

consumption. 

Some discussion took place as to whether or not the requirements could 

be stated in terms of days forward consumption, and GENERAL SOMERVELL 

put forward certain suggestions as to the number of days’ stocks required in 

certain categories of oil. 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF said that they would like to see 

General Somervell’s proposals in writing, but meanwhile pointed out that they 

could not accept any reduction in the requirements they had already put forward in respect of Admiralty fuel and aviation gas. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would circulate a 

further paper on this matter. 

b. Agreed to appoint a combined ad hoc committee to consider this subject and put forward recommendations in time for consideration at 

1000 on Thursday, 8 February 1945. 

* Not published herein. 

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3. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 

(C.C.S.772) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for the end 

of the war with Germany:­

a. Earliest date, 1 July 1945. 

b. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945. 

4. PROVISION OF LVTS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 75514) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

Without discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved as an immediate measure the reduction of the assignment 

to the Mediterranean Theater of LVTs from 600 to 400. 

b. Approved the diversion to 21st Army Group of the 200 LVT's surrendered by Field Marshal Alexander. 

c. Agreed that consideration of the final requirements of the Mediterranean Theater should await the result of the detailed study of the 

position by Allied Force Headquarters in the light of the new directive. 

5. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

(C.C.S.320135) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing the acceptance of an agreement 

regarding the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway 

from Bremen to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement 

did not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the fact that the letter at Enclosure 

“B” (page 5) visualized the necessity for making a more detailed form of 

agreement, covering a variety of circumstances. He felt strongly that no such 

detailed agreement was necessary. The broad policy had been decided and the 

good will was there. Details could be left very largely to local commanders and 

any problems of overlapping authority which did arise could be referred to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the time came. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then agreed to the following 

amendments to the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of C.C.S. 320/35:­

a. In paragraph 1delete the words “but will be generally administered as 

a sub-district of a larger British controlled area.” 

b. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, delete the words “larger district’’ and substitute “British zone.” 

c. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, delete the word “responsible” 

and substitute the word “responsive.” 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Endorsed the views expressed by General Marshall above and approved the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of C.C.S. 320/35 as amended 

in discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 320/37.) 

b. Agreed to take no further action on the detailed recommendations 

included in the letter at Enclosure “B” to C.C.S. 320/35. 

6. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

(C.C.S. 775) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the British Chiefs of Staff recommending a substitution for the existing 

paragraph 6 h.in C.C.S. 680/2.* 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were now in a 

position to agree to this subparagraph h.,as it had been amended informally 

in discussion at a previous C.C.S. meeting when this had been discussed. 

OCTAGON Conference book, page 132. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to the following revised subparagraph h.: 

- “h..Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in 

Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against 

Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources 

to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ 

this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having 

regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations 

against Germany and/or Japan.” 

7. LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND OVER ANGLOAMERICAN STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY 

(C.C.S. 778) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the British Chiefs of StafT suggesting a line that might be taken with the 

Soviet General Staff at a meeting which was to be held later the same day to 

discuss the matter of the bombline. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the desirability of putting forward this fresh memorandum in the place of the one recently submitted 

in FAN 477.* 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff should put forward to the 

Russians the views expressed in C.C.S. 778, as amended in discussion. 

8. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8 February

1945,to finish off any outstanding items on the ARGONAUT Agenda. 

See page 185. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 187th Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

CONFERENCE ROOM“A,” BUILDING “A,” L~~ADIA PALACE, RUSSIA, 

ON THURSDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 1945,AT 1200.

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. 5.Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somewell,USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, USA 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Anderson, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Brig. Gen. J. L. Loutzenheiser, USA 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes 

Lord Leathers 

(For items 1 and 2 only) 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 186TH MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 186th Meeting 

and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor 

amendments. 

2. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL 

THEATERS 

(C.C.S. 625/13) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested 

that the footnote under paragraph 6 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 625/13 should 

read: “Emergency level for this theater takes special cognizance of the complexity of the distribution systems.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE accepted this proposal and said that the British 

Chiefs of Staff had two minor amendments to suggest. They would like the 

words “or other appropriate authorities” added to the end of paragraph 2 of 

the enclosure,and the words “of the armed services” deleted from paragraph 5 c. 

There was one further point. The British Chiefs of Staff wished note to be taken 

of the omissions of the following oils which could not be expressed in terms of 

days of forward consumption and which did not appear in the paper: tar oil, 

100,000 tons; and crude and process oils, aviation components, and bitumen, 

400,000 tons. It was understood that these stocks would be provided under other 

agreements. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that Sir Alan Brooke’sproposals were acceptable. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C.C.S. 625/13 subject to the following amendments to the 

enclosure: 

(1) Add to paragraph 2 “or other appropriate authorities.” 

(2) Delete from the seventh line of paragraph 5 the words “of the 

armed services.” 

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(3) Amend the footnote to read: 

“Emergencylevel for this theater takes special cognizance of 

the complexity of the distribution systems.” 

b. •Took note of the omission from the above paper of the following oil 

stocks, for which provision would be made under other agreements:-

Tar oil 

Crude and process oils, 

aviation components, 

and bitumen 

TonS 

100,000 

400,000 

(Agreement as amended and approved subsequently circulated as 

C.C.S. 625/14.) 

3. OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING 

(C.C.S. 746/11) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had 

examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amendment. 

They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4 b. (1) (d) on page 4 of the enclosure from 30 April to 1 April. 

LORD LEATHERS said that this amendment would suit him personally 

very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States staffsbelieved this would 

be possible. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite 

prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned. 

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4 b. (1) of the 

enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks 

referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing of priorities for 

the continuanceof the war against Japan referred to in paragraph 4 b. (1) (b) 

might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrentlywith it. 

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GENERAL SOMERVELL explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily 

be undertaken. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. 

He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative 

Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. 

They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4 b. (1) (c) confer with the 

Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping 

authorities. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C.C.S. 746111,subject to the change of the date in the third 

line on page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945. 

b. •Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b. (1). 

c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined 

in paragraph 4 b. (2). 

4. RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR 

(C.C.S. 77711) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said there were two points the British Chiefs of 

Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion 

Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby 

their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary 

basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words “on a voluntary basis” 

after the words “Theymay also be employed” in the second sentence of Article 6. 

As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by 

the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the 

assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it 

in principle. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with 

the Russians. 

Replying to a question by General Marshall, SIR CHARLES PORTAL 

explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that 

their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For 

political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might 

be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a 

voluntary basis. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the proposed amendment was acceptable. 

Continuing, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the second point which the 

British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. 

They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously 

been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who 

might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands 

of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred 

by one of these powers to the other. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that as he read it, there was nothing in the 

remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded

it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and 

British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 77711 subject to the following amendments: 

Article 6: In the fifth line, after “employed,” insert “on a voluntary 

basis.” 

Article 8: Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as 

Article 8. 

(Amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 77712.) 

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5. EQUIPMENT FOR GREEK FORCES 

(C.C.S. 185th Mtg., Item 2; C.C.S. 768/1; NAF 841") 

SIR ALAN BROOKE reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 

185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would 

undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt 

from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a 

position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of 

the proposals contained in NAF 841: 

a. Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces 

in Northwest Europe; and 

b. Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against 

United States resources. 

The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces 

concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize this matter by 

putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that these assurances were satisfactory. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the 

implementation of NAF 841 would not: 

(1) Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in 

Northwest Europe; 

(2) Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. 

resources. 

b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals 

in NAF 841." 

8. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 776/1) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY raised the question of the preparation of the final 

report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report 

see page 188. 

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would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also 

that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 

9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it might be well for the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any 

final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might 

arise. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945. 

b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the 

hour selected, to consider the final report. 

7. OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

GENERAL MARSHALL read out the latest information available on the 

course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in 

the line with 33 in reserve. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of the above statement. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 188th Meeting 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN 

CONFERENCE ROOM“A,” BUILDING “A,” LIVADIA PALACE, RUSSIA, 

ON FRIDAY, 9 FEBRUARY 1945, AT 1100.

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

PRESENT 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN Admiral Sir James Somerville 

Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Captain A. S. McDill, USN 

Commander R. N. S. Clark. USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. E. I. C. Jacob 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Colonel D. Capel-Dunn 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 187TH MEETING OF C.C.S. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 187th Meeting and 

approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor 

amendments. 

2. DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 77612) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered those paragraphs of 

the draft final report which had been added since they had approved C.C.S. 

77611. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the directive to the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Mediterranean,contained in Appendix “A” of C.C.S. 77612. 

He pointed out that in paragraph 4 c. of the directive it was stated that, “The 

nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements 

for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction.” In order to 

avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense: 

“Reference paragraph 4 c. of the directive issued to you in FAN 501. 

The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under 

plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any 

further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this proposal was acceptable. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister 

on the ARGONAUT Conference (C.C.S. 77612). 

b. Approved the dispatch of the telegram proposed by Field Marshal Sir 

Alan Brooke. (Subsequently dispatched as FAN 504 and FACS 155.) 

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3. LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND WITH REGARD TO 

STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY 

(C.C.S.778, C.C.S. 186thMtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the discussions which had been 

taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation 

Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed 

and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British 

and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself 

from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement. 

This was unacceptable to himself and to General Kuter. 

GENERAL KUTER said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such 

a way as to make them acceptable to the U.S.and British; he proposed putting 

this new draft to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it 

would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the 

previous arrangements. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained the main difference between the 

Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the 

Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours’ notice was given to the Soviet 

High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, 

it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 

24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in 

conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more 

interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than 

they were in protecting their ground forces. 

GENERAL KUTER pointed out that there was one further important 

change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid 

line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff 

whereas in the original agreement the bombline was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the 

difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov’s proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on 

a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General 

Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer 

had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely 

unworkable procedure. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the best method 

of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and 

General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet 

Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that 

which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air 

Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the 

revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States 

High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements 

in force prior to the Crimean Conference. 

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he would like to express on behalf of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. 

He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, 

and that much had been accomplished. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of 

the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was 

convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference. 

250 
MINUTES OF 

TRIPARTITE 

MILITARY MEETINGS 
TOP SECRET 

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE FIRSTTRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING

HELDIN THE SOVIET HEADQUARTERS, YALTA,

ON MONDAY, 5 F’EBRUARY 1945,AT 1200.

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

Major General L. S. Kuter 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Major General J. R. Deane, USA 

Major General H. R. Bull, USA 

Major General F. L. Anderson, USA 

Major General J. E. Hull, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Rear Admiral E. R. Archer 

U.S.S.R. 

Army General Antonov 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Red Army 

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov 

Chief of Soviet Air Staff 

Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov 

Peoples Commissariat for the Navy 

Lieutenant General Grizlov 

Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff 

Vice Admiral Kucherov 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy 

Commander Kostrinski 

Deputy Chief of Foreign Relations 

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SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T.Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D.Coleridge,RN 

INTERPRETERS 

Captain Hill Lunghi 

Captain Henry Ware, USA 

Lieutenant Joseph Chase, USNFt 

Mr. Potrubach 

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At the suggestion of General Antonov, Field Marshal Brooke agreed to 

take the chair. 

1. COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the meeting should begin by considering the coordination of the Russian and US.-British offensives. At the 

Plenary Meeting on the previous day, General Antonov had put forwardcertain 

Russian requirements. He had asked, first, that during the month of February 

the Allied armies in the West should carry out offensives. As General Marshall 

had explained, the Allied offensive in the West would start in the North on the 

eighth of February and some eight days later the Ninth US. Army would also 

start an offensive. These operations would be carried out during most of 

February. In addition to these operations in the North, operations were now 

being carried out by United States and French armies to push the Germans 

back to the Rhine in the Colmar area. It was therefore clear that the immediate 

coordination of Allied and Russian offensives was already being carried out. It 

was necessary, however, to look into the matter of coordination of offensives 

in the spring and summer months. As far as operations in the West were concerned these would be more or less continuous throughout the spring. There 

were, of course, bound to be intervals between operations, though such intervals would not be of long duration. For instance, after clearing the western 

bank of the Rhine on the northern part of the front, preparations would have 

to be made for the final crossing of the Rhine. From a study of conditions of the 

river it was hoped to effect a crossing during the month of March. After establishing the crossing it would have to be widened and improved before the 

final advance into the heart of Germany could be undertaken. 

Should operations in the North aimed at the Ruhr be held up, it was 

the intention to carry out further operations in the South. It was safe to say, 

therefore, that during the months of February, March and April, active operations would be in progress during almost the entire time. 

The actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest difficulties and 

it was during the period of this crossing that the Allies were anxious to prevent 

a concentration of German forces against the armies in the West. It was 

therefore hoped that during March operations on the Eastern Front would be 

able to continue. SIR ALAN BROOKE said he appreciated the difficulties in 

March and early April due to the thaw and mud which would interfere with 

communications. He also realized that after their present great advances the 

Russian armies would want to improve their communications. He would much 

like to hear General Antonov’s views on what operations could be undertaken 

by the Soviet armies during March and April. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that during the Tripartite Plenary Meeting 

on the previous day the number of divisions, the amount of artillery, and the 

number of tanks on the Eastern Front had been enumerated. In considering

the Western Front it was important to bear in mind that operations must be 

conducted to meet the special conditions existing. In the West there was no 

superiority in ground forces. There were delicate lines of sea communications, 

particularly in the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies, however, did enjoy a preponderance of air power, but in this connection the weather was an important

consideration. If the Allies were unable to take full advantage of their air 

superiority they did not have sufficient superiority on the ground to overcome 

enemy opposition. Operations must therefore be conducted on this basis. 

Another restriction arose from the fact that there were only a small number 

of favorable locations for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important 

to insure that the enemy could not concentrate strongly at the point of attack. 

The enemy were now operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried line 

and therefore had great freedom of maneuver. We must therefore arrange to 

occupy the Germans as much as possible to prevent them from concentrating 

against us on the very narrow bridgehead area available to us. 

With regard to air forces, on the Western Ront some 3,000 to 4,000 

fighter-bomber sorties could be undertaken each day. There was about onethird of this strength on the Italian Front. This did not include the power of 

the great four-engine bombers with their escorting fighters. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, the 

Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather 

permitted. There might be interruptions during the offensive and, as Sir Alan 

Brooke had said, there was the need to reestablish Russian communications. 

The Soviet Army would, however, take measures to make such interruptions 

as short as possible and would continue the offensive to the limit of their 

capacity. 

In connection with the western offensive in February, it was not believed 

that the Germans could transfer forces from the Eastern Front to the West in 

large numbers. The Soviet Staff, however, was also interested in the Italian 

Front, from where the Germans had the opportunity of transferring troops to 

the Eastern Front. In view of this, the Soviet General Staff would like to know 

the potentialities of the Allied armies now fighting the Germans in Italy. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the situation on the Italian Front was 

being carefully examined as it developed. Kesselring’s forces had now been 

driven into northern Italy where the country was very well suited for defense 

or for systematic retirement. There was a series of rivers which could be used 

for rear-guard actions while withdrawing his forces gradually. The enemy 

would have to retreat through the Ljubljana Gap or the passes of the Alps. 

The coast in the Bay of Venice was not suitable for amphibious operations, and 

therefore outflanking operations in the Adriatic did not appear fruitful. So 

far there had been continuousoffensive operations which had driven the enemy 

out of the Apennine line and into the Valley of the Po. Winter weather and 

floods had, however, brought these offensive operations almost to a standstill. 

At present our troops were preparing for further offensive action when 

the weather improved. It had, however, been decided that it would be better 

to transfer some of the forces now in Italy to the Western Front, where at 

present we did not have sufficient superiority in ground forces. Five divisions 

were therefore now to be transferred from Italy to France and certain air 

forces would accompany them. The forces remaining in Italy had been instructed to carry out offensive operations and to seize every opportunity to 

inflict heavy blows on the enemy. Their object was to retain as many of 

Kesselring’sforces as possible by offensive action. However,owing to the topography of the country, it was believed that Kesselring could carry out a partial 

withdrawal without the Allies being able to stop it. The rate of withdrawal was 

estimated at some one and one-half divisions per week. Thus, any withdrawal 

which he did undertake could only be gradual. 

To sum up, it was proposed to take what action was possible to stop the 

German withdrawal in Italy, though it was not thought that this could be 

entirely prevented. For this reason, it had been decided to withdraw certain 

forces from Italy to the vital front in Northwest Europe. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s 

summary of the position but felt that a referenceshould be made to the value 

of our air power in Italy. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked the number of German troops believed 

to be in Italy. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that at present the German forces 

in Italy consisted of 27 German divisions and 5 Italian divisions. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all these forces could not be held down 

in Italy by offensive action. If the Germans decided to retire to the line of the 

Adige, it was estimated that they would be able to withdraw some ten divisions 

from Italy. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on the Western and Italian Fronts 

together the United States and British air forces consisted of some fourteen 

thousand aircraft. This figure did not include the reserve behind the front line. 

Should the land campaign have to halt, the war in the air would continue, so 

far as weather permitted, even more strongly than before. Everything possible 

would be done, as General Marshall had stated, to bring the greatest possible 

air assistance to the vital points of attack in the land offensive. Such air assistance included the operations of a number of airborne divisions, for which 

the necessary transport was available. 

So far as the requirements of the land battle permitted, it was the intention to concentrate the strategic bomber forces on the enemy’s oil supply. 

Evidence was available almost daily that the destruction of his oil production 

capacity was imposing limitations on the enemy’s operations. It was believed 

that the destruction of enemy oil was the best contribution which the air 

forces could make, both to the offensive on land and in the air. Much had been 

done and would continue to be done to disorganize the enemy’s rail communications, but it was our experience that an attempt to cut all railways in the 

middle of Germany to stop troop movements would produce disappointing results in view of the relative ease with which the enemy could repair such 

destruction. 

It was known that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force of 

jet-propelled fighters during the course of the present year. It had therefore 

been decided that, in order to maintain our air superiority into the summer, 

a proportion of our air effort must be devoted to attacks on the German jetpropelled fighter manufacturing plants. Nevertheless, it was an agreed principle that when the land offensive began, everything in the air that could 

contribute to its success should be so used. 

Before the advance of the Soviet armies, Allied air power had been 

brought to bear as far afield as Koenigsberg, Danzig, Posen and Warsaw. The 

great range of our strategic air forces made it most necessary that Allied air 

operations should be coordinated with the advance of the Soviet armies both 

to prevent accidents and to obtain the best value from our bomber effort. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL invited Field Marshal Alexander to comment 

on the capability of air forces in Italy to prevent a German withdrawal. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that it had been his experience in 

Italy that our greatly superior air forces were a most powerful weapon while 

the enemy was withdrawing, if it was possible to force the pace of his withdrawal. If, however, he was in a position to withdraw at his own pace the air 

forces were less effective since the withdrawal could be undertaken mostly 

under cover of darkness. 

In the Valley of the Po there was a series of extremely strong holding 

positions and it would therefore be difficult to force the enemy to withdraw 

faster than he planned. Nevertheless, when the weather improved from May 

onwards, considerable damage could be done to the withdrawing German 

forces and to their lines of communication. However, in February, March and 

April the weather was bad, with low clouds, which hindered the air effort to 

a great extent. Further, the Germans had destroyed nearly all the bridges over 

the River Po and had replaced them with some 30 to 40 pontoon bridges which 

were not kept in position during the day but were hidden along the banks. 

The destruction of these bridges was therefore extremely difficult. 

To sum up, the better the weather the more damage could be done to 

the enemy by air action but however successful the air action, he did not 

believe that it would be possible entirely to prevent a German withdrawal by 

this means. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on 

the previous day the desire had been expressed that every effort should be made 

to stop the movement of German forces from west to east by air action and, in 

particular, to paralyze the vital rail junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. In this 

connection a report he had received that day summarizing Allied air operations 

in the last few days was of interest. On Friday, the second of February, the Royal Air Force had flown 2,400 sorties, concentrating on rail and road targets in 

Euskirchen and Coblenz. The latter, in particular, was of vital importance in 

the transfer of German forces to the East. Similar destruction of rail targets 

had taken place east of Alsace. On the same night a thousand of our bombers 

had attacked Wiesbaden, Karlsruhe and synthetic oil plants elsewhere. On 

the following day, Saturday,the third of February, four-engined United States 

bombers had attacked Marienberg railway yards and 550 RAF bombers had 

attacked targets in the same area. 

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In relation to the destruction of communications and the interference 

with enemy movements the following data had been received relating to the 

effect of air attacks carried out on the 22d and 23d of January: On these 

two days alone 2,500 motor cars and trucks had been destroyed and 1,500 

damaged; a thousand railway cars had been destroyed and 700 damaged; 93 

tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed and a further 93 damaged; 

25 locomotives had been destroyed and 4 damaged; 50 horse-drawn vehicles 

had been destroyed and 88 damaged. In addition, 62 known gun positions 

had been wiped out and 21 marshalling yards damaged. These very large 

results had been obtained on the two days he had referred to, but similar attacks were carried out on almost every fine day by the Allied air forces. He had 

referred on the previous day to the thousand-bomber 'attack on Berlin carried 

out on the third of February. There was also ready a plan to carry out a similar 

attack on Leipzig. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, 

more than 8,000 Soviet planes were being used in the main thrust. In spite of 

weather conditions, between the 12th of January and the first of February 

80,000 sorties had been flown in support of the Russian advance. More than a 

thousand enemy planes had been captured on airfields which had been overrun 

by the Russian troops. These aircraft had been prevented from flying away 

by bad weather. In addition, 560 planes had been shot down in air combat. If 

better weather prevailed air operations could be carried out on objectives 

further in the enemy rear but fog at this time of year rendered such deep 

operations to the west of Berlin almost impossible. He agreed with Sir Charles 

Portal that there were too many railroads in Germany to destroy all of them. 

He hoped that Field Marshal Alexander's operations could be aimed at hampering the movement of German divisions from Italy to the Eastern Front. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that this object was contained in 

his directive. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that he was glad to hear of this. In Italy 

there were fewer railways to assist the enemy withdrawal. 

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER explained that the Germans in Italy 

largely used roads for their withdrawals. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that in addition to the Soviet offensives in 

the North, offensives would also continue in the direction of Vienna and west 

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of Lake Balaton. It was for this reason that Allied action in Italy was of importance to the Soviets. It seemed to him expedient that Allied land offensives 

should be directed toward the Ljubljana Gap and Graz. He now understood 

that this was not possible. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it must be remembered that the Allies 

had no great superiority in land forces. They had come to the conclusion that 

in conjunction with the vital death blows being dealt by the Soviet armies in 

the East, the correct place for the western death blow was in Northwestern 

Europe. For this reason it had been decided to transfer divisions from Italy to 

the Western Front and to limit operations in Italy to holding as many German 

forces in that theater as possible. In the event of a German withdrawal from 

northern Italy, we had forces strong enough to take advantage of such a withdrawal, and possibly at a later date to be able to operate through the Ljubljana 

Gap. Such action, however, must remain dependent on the withdrawal of a 

proportion of the German forces at present in the north of Italy. 

2. MOVEMENT OF GERMAN FORCES FROM NORWAY 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the Germans were transferring forces 

from Norway to Denmark. He asked if there was any way in which such a 

movement could be stopped. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said as far as was known, these movements were being carried out by rail and road to Oslo and not by sea. The troops 

were then being moved across the short sea passage to Denmark. It was not 

possible in view of heavy mining to operate surface forces in the Skagerrak 

and thus prevent the enemy making this short sea passage. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the action of the air forces in this 

connection could be divided into two parts: firstly, by such attacks as could 

be made on shipping in the Kattegat, and with four-engined bombers operated 

on almost every fine night in an endeavor to bomb enemy ships. Several ships 

had recently been set on fire in this area. The second form of air action was by 

mine-layingaircraft. Approximately 1,000 mines were being laid by this method 

each month. Each aircraft carried some six mines. Sir Andrew Cunningham 

had just told him that recently these mines had sunk or damaged four enemy 

transports. German minesweepers did endeavor of course to sweep up our mines 

but it was now planned to increase the number of air attacks made on these 

minesweepers. However, there were so many varying tasks for the air forces 

to carry out that all could not be undertaken equally well. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said an examination had also been made of the 

possibility of stopping the movement of German forces from Norway by land 

action in Norway itself. There were, however, insufficient forces to undertake 

this without weakening our main effort on the Western Front. 

3. USE OF ARTILLERY AND AIR IN FUTURE OPERATIONS 

GENERAL ANTONOV said he felt it would be interesting to exchange 

information with regard to the method of carrying out operations in the 

autumn, winter and spring when, by reason of weather, it was not always 

possible to make use of air power. On these occasions the role of artillery became one of particular importance. As Marshal Stalin had said on the previous 

day, the Russians were establishing special artillery divisions of some 300to 400 

guns each, which were used for breaking through the enemy line. This method 

enabled a mass of artillery of some 230 guns of 76 millimeters and upwards to 

be concentratedon a front of one kilometer. He would be very glad to know what 

degree of artillery density would be used on the Western Front when the February offensive commenced. 

GENERAL BULL said that the northern army group, which would take 

part in the next offensive,possessed some 1,500guns of 105millimeters and upwards, and the United States army group which would also take part in the 

offensive, had some 3,000 guns of similar calibers. The army commanders concerned, by concentrating their artillery power on a narrow front, would be 

able to use some 200 guns to the mile in the area of the break-through. To this 

offensive power should be added the power of the air forces. In the three days 

preceding the attack on the eighth of February, it could be expected that some 

1,600 heavy bombers would be used, capable of delivering 4,500tons of bombs 

on the first day. For the remaining two days before the offensive, a slightly 

less weight of bombs could be dropped, but closer to the point of attack. Not 

only would communications behind the front be bombed, but also positions 

known to be strongly held. 

On the day of the attack itseIf, “carpet bombing” would be used, and 

some 4,000tons could be dropped on an area two miles square. He felt the 

effect of the air attack and the artillery concentration should produce a breakthrough, thus allowing our armor to operate in the enemy’s rear. A similar 

pattern of attack had been used on previous occasions with great success. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV asked what action would be taken if it was 

found that weather prohibited the air from operating on the day of attack. 

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GENERAL BULL explained that the attack was normally timed for a 

day on which it was predicted that the weather would enable “carpet bombing” 

to be carried out. During the actual attack the bombing was carried out some 

2,000 yards ahead of our own front line, but earlier bombing on targets further 

behind the line could be undertaken through overcast. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV explained that all Russian operations in 

winter were planned on the supposition that bad weather would exist, and no 

air operations would be possible. He felt that the Allies should bear this point 

in mind in planning their own operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had endeavored to explain that 

the Allies did not possess the same superiority in ground forces as did the 

Russians. The Allies did not have 300 divisions, nor was it possible to produce 

them. It was therefore essential to make full use of our air superiority. He 

would like to point out the advance across J?rance had, in fact, been accomplished with the same number of divisions as the enemy himself had. This was 

made possible by a combination of ground and air power. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now had a very clear picture of 

Allied offensive intentions. Were there any questions which the British or 

United States Chiefs of Staff would like to ask? 

4. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in view of the very frank discussion of plans 

which was taking place, he would like to bring up the question of liaison between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The distance between the two armies 

was now so short that direct liaison was a matter of great importance. He had 

been directed by the President to bring up this question of liaison before the 

British, Russian and United States Chiefs of Staff. It was the opinion of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff, who had not yet discussed it with their British 

colleagues, that arrangements should be made for the Allied armies in the 

West to deal rapidly with the Soviet commanders on the Eastern Front through 

the Military Missions now in Moscow. He would be glad to take back to the 

President the views of the Soviet and Bfitish Chiefs of Staffs on this matter. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were equally 

anxious to have the necessary liaison in order that plans could be concerted. 

They felt that such liaison required organizing on a sound basis. Military Missions were already established in Moscow, and these should, he felt, act asa link 

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on a high level between the United States, British and Soviet Chiefs of Staffs. 

In addition to this, closer liaison was required between the commanders of Allied 

theaters with the commanders of the nearest Russian armies. For example, 

on the Italian Front, Field Marshal Alexander required direct liaison with the 

Russian commander concerned. 

In the case of the Supreme Commander on the Western Front, he would 

require direct liaison with the commanders of the Russian armies in the East. 

Thus there would be coordination between the high commands dealing with 

future action and in addition, direct coordination between the Allied and Soviet 

armies, who were closely in contact, on such matters as the employment of 

air forces and the coordinationof day-to-day action. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the question of liaison between the 

general staffs was very important and, as had already been mentioned, could 

be undertaken through the Missions in Moscow. In the present state of the 

offensives, this should be perfectly satisfactory until the forces came closer 

into contact with each other. Later, as operations advanced, the question of 

liaison between Army commanders could be reviewed and adjusted. These proposals would be reported to Marshal Stalin. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had not entirely understood the 

necessity for limiting liaison. 

GENERAL ANTONOV explained that his proposal was to limit liaison 

to that through the General Staff in Moscow and the US. and British Missions. 

Such arrangements, however, could be revised and adjusted later to meet 

changing conditions. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that difficulties and serious results 

had already occurred in air operations from Italy over the Balkans. Such 

operations were directed from day to day and even from hour to hour, depending on weather and other conditions. If contact had to be maintained between 

the armies concerned through Moscow, difficulties would be certain to arise. 

If this round-about method of communications through many busy 

people had to be adopted, there was a risk that our powerful air weapon could 

not be properly used. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the accident to which General Marshall 

referred had occurred not because of lack of liaison but due to the pilots concerned losing their way. They had, in fact, made a navigational mistake with 

regard to the correct point for bombing. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that he recognized this. However, the 

bombline at that time excluded roads crowded with retreating Germans who 

could not be bombed by the Allied forces without an approach being made 

through Moscow. A powerful air force was available and good weather existed 

but the Allied air force was unable to act and the Germans profited thereby. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he entirely agreed with General Marshall that, 

through lack of liaison, we are losing the full force of the air power at our 

disposal. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time no tactical coordination was required between Allied and Russian ground forces. We should, he 

believed, aim at planning the strategic requirements of our air forces. The use 

of all Soviet air forces was dictated by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow. It 

was for this reason that the coordination of the air effort should, in his view, 

be carried out through the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, who alone could 

solve the problems. It was possible to agree on the objectives for strategic 

bombing irrespective of a bombline. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in the British view there were two 

distinct problems with regard to liaison. The first was the necessity for the 

form of liaison referred to by General Antonov, i.e., the coordination of the 

Allied long-range bomber effort over eastern Germany and its relation to the 

advance of the Red Army. The Allied long-range strategic bomber force was 

not controlled by the Supreme Commander in the West except when it was 

undertaking work in close cooperation with the ground forces but was controlled by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff. It was right, therefore, 

that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives 

should deal direct with Moscow on this matter. 

The second problem was in respect to the constant air operations out 

from Italy in relation to Russian operations in the Balkans and Hungary. In 

that theater liaison was required, not so much on policy as on an interchange 

of information. The British Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the United 

States view that it was inefficient for liaison between Field Marshal Alexander 

and the Russian commanders to be effected through Moscow. It was, therefore, 

essential that some machinery should be set up to deal with day-to-day liaison 

between General Alexander and the Russian headquarters which controlled 

the southern front. Without such direct liaison it was impossible to take advantage of the many opportunitiespresented to hit the Germans from the air. 

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MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that concerning air action into Germany 

itself, this could be done through the General Staff in Moscow as suggested 

by Sir Charles Portal, using the U.S.and British Military Missions. This liaison 

on policy was one which took time to arrange and was not a matter for great 

speed. With regard to direct liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the 

Russian left wing he felt this was a matter which should be reported to Marshal 

Stalin. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if it could not be agreed that a bombline 

should be established running from Berlin to Dresden, Vienna and Zagreb, all 

these places being allotted to the Allied air forces. Such a line could, of course, 

be changed as the front changed. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY and SIR ALAN BROOKE asked that this matter be 

deferred one day for consideration. 

5. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE LAND OFFENSIVE 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if plans had been made for any naval 

operations in direct assistance to the land attack which was shortly to be 

carried out. He referred not so much to the normal naval operations in the 

defense of communications and day-to-day operations of the fleet to control 

the seas but rather to direct operations in support of a land offensive. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that projected operations 

were too far inland to be directly affected by any operations which could be 

carried out by the fleet except the routine operations of keeping open communications. He asked if Admiral Kuznetsov had any particular operations in 

mind. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said he had no particular operation in mind 

but rather the possibility of some operation in the neighborhood of Denmark 

that would not have any direct tactical connection with the army operations 

but would have a strategic connection. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that possible operations to outflank 

the Rhine had been studied. However, landing on the coast of Holland would 

prove extremely dimcult and the necessary land forces were not available to 

enable an operation against Denmark to be undertaken. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that owing to the difficulty of forcing a crossing 

of the Rhine when that river was in flood, a very detailed examination had been 

carried out of the coastline from the Scheldt to the Danish coast, but operations in this area had not been found practicable since: firstly, large areas of 

Holland could be flooded and, secondly, operations further to the north would 

be too far detached from the main thrust to be of value. 

ADMIRAL KING asked if Admiral Kuznetsov would outline the successes which the Soviet Fleet had been able to obtain in amphibious operations 

or operations to interfere with the transport of troops from the Baltic states to 

Germany. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that Operations of the Soviet Fleet to cut 

German communications in the Baltic had been undertaken by submarines 

and naval aircraft. When the area of Memel was reached, it became possible to 

transfer torpedo boats to augment Russian naval activity in that area. However, all operations were at present hampered by ice conditions and, further, 

the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga were heavily mined by the enemy, 

and mine clearance was hampered by weather conditions and ice. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he appreciated that ice conditions were now 

limiting operations but had asked this question in view of earlier Soviet 

communiques mentioning the damage or destruction of German shipping. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that the earlier destruction of German 

shippinghad been carried out by naval air forces and submarines. 

6. DATE OF THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were engaged in making logistic plans for that phase of the war following the collapse 

of Germany. It had been suggested that such plans should now be based on 

a probable date of the first of July for the earliest possible collapse of Germany. 

Before deciding on such a date he was anxious to have the views of the Soviet 

Staff on this matter. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that until the eastern and western offensives 

developed it was difficult if not impossible to predict the date of the collapse 

of Germany. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he entirely appreciated the uncertainty but for 

planning purposes he would be glad to know if the Soviet Staff regarded the 

first of July as the earliest date as a reasonable assumption. 

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GENERAL ANTONOV said he regarded such assumptions as being difficult to make. He could assure Admiral Leahy that the Soviet General Staff 

would concentrate every effort on the earliest possible defeat of Germany. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that a year ago it had been necessary 

to assume a date for the defeat of Germany on which to base calculations on 

such matters as production and the construction of shipping. It was necessary 

to revise this date from time to time, particularly in connection with the handling of shippingthroughout the world. It had been proposed to take two target 

dates, one the earliest and one the latest likely date for the defeat of Germany. 

Such dates were now under consideration between the United States and 

British Chiefs of Staff who were in agreement that the first of July was the 

earliest likely date but differed by two months with regard to the latest likely 

date. The United States assumption in this connection was the 31st of December. Did General Antonov regard the first of July as improbable as the earliest 

likely date? 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he regarded the summer as the earliest 

date and the winter as the latest. The first of July should be a reasonably 

certain date for the defeat of Germany if all our efforts were applied to this end. 

7. FUTURE BUSINESS 

A brief discussion took place on future business. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that a meeting should be held on the 

following day at 12 noon in the Soviet Headquarters, and that the following 

subjects should be discussed: (1) Coordination of Air Operations; (2) Shuttle 

Bombing; and (3) A Short Discussion on the War in the Far East. 

ADMIRAL KING said he would be prepared to make a statement on 

operations taking place in the Pacific and his conception of the future development of the war in that theater. He would welcome any questions which the 

Soviet Staff might wish to ask on this subject. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said he would be glad to listen to a description of 

the situation in the Far East and operations in that area, but as far as discussion of the matter was concerned the Soviet General Staff would prefer that this 

should take place after the war in the Far East had been considered by the 

Heads of Government. 

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ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE SECOND TRIPARTITE MILITARYMEETING 

HELDIN THE SOVIET HEADQUARTERS, YALTA,

ON TUESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1945,AT 1200.

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

Major General L. S. Kuter 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Major General J. R. Deane, USA 

Major General H. R. Bull, USA 

Major General F. L. Anderson, USA 

Major General J. E. Hull, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastiigs L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

Rear Admiral E. R. Archer 

U.S.S.R. 

Army General Antonov 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Red Army 

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov 

Chief of Soviet Air Staff 

Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov 

Peoples Commissariat for the Navy 

Lieutenant General Grizlov 

Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff 

Vice Admiral Kucherov 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy 

Commander Kostrinski 

Deputy Chief of Foreign Relations 

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SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

INTERPRETERS 

Captain Hill Lunghi 

Lieutenant Joseph Chase, USNR 

Mr.Potrubach 

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CHAIRMANSHIP 

GENERAL ANTONOV requested Admiral Leahy to serve as Chairman 

of the 2d Tripartite Meeting. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked General Antonov but suggested that in the 

interest of continuity, Field Marshal Brooke continue to preside. 

1. BOMBLINE AND LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the first item to be discussed should 

be General Antonov’s proposal for a bombline running from Stettin through 

Berlin, Vienna and Zagreb. He asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to 

express their views on this proposal since they were most intimately concerned 

with it. 

GENERAL KUTER said he would like to read a statement on behalf of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this matter. This 

statement read as follows: 

“1. Our wishes are:­

(a) To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German 

military and economic system. 

(b) To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing from the East. 

(c) To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army. 

“2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, 

it is essential to avoid as far as possible any restriction of strategic bomber 

action. It is not our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude 

our bombers from attacking any targets which are important to the warmaking power of the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and 

American forces. 

“3. To achieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with 

Soviet land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to 

inform the British and United States Missions in Moscow of the positions 

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of the Red Army from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command 

to inform the British and United States Missions if there are any particular 

objectives, for example, railway centers or centers of road communication 

close in front of their armies which they wish us not to attack. We should 

require at least 24, and preferably 48 hours’ notice for action upon such 

requests. 

“4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States 

Missions in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff 

seems to us to be essential. 

“5. To achieve the third wish, that is, assistance to the Russian advance, 

we should be glad to receive through the British and American Missions 

in Moscow any suggestionsfrom the Soviet High Command. This suggestion 

would have to be considered in the light of other commitments and such 

factors 51s the distance and the weather. 

“6. To summarize, we suggest:­

(a) That there should be no rigid division of eastern Germany into 

spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers respectively; 

(b) That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible officer of the Russian High Command and representatives 

of the British and American Missions in Moscow, in order to 

exchange information upon which we can regulate the action 

of the Anglo-U.S. strategic bombers in accordance with the 

development of Soviet operations on land. 

“7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing 

deep into Germany from the East, the coordination of policy should be 

discussed by Soviet, American and British Staff representatives in London 

or in Moscow. Some further machinery for the closer coordination of operations would appear to be necessary at that time.” 

GENERAL KUTER said that he would like to add that in addition to his 

objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets to the east of the proposed line. 

From among some 20 such strategic targets which would be denied to Allied 

air power he would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz, the 

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main production center of high octane gasoline and main source of fuel supply 

for the German Air Force; Ruhrland, second only in importance to Politz, and 

one of the four major synthetic oil plants in Germany. In addition there were 

several other oil targets. Further the proposed line would appear to prohibit 

attacks on some industrial and communication targets in the neighborhood 

of Berlin and Dresden. The line would also prohibit attack on three tank and 

self-propelled gun factories; and, lastly, and of great importance, it would 

prevent attacks on three jet-propelled fighter engine factories where components of the Juno jet engines were made and the engines themselves were 

assembled. He would point out that the oil targets referred to required repeated 

attacks in view of the German’s ability to repair them rapidly. 

There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the 

strategic implication of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical 

considerations. A bombline must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both 

from high and low altitudes. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to add an additional illustration of the point made by General Kuter. He had that morning received a 

message from the Commanding General of the United States heavy bombers 

operating from the United Kingdom, reporting an attack on Berlin carried out 

three or four days previously by a thousand heavy bombers supported by some 

600 fighters. These fighters were practically over the Russian lines and, in fact, 

destroyed a number of German aircraft taking off from an airfield east of 

Berlin. The Commanding General pointed out that, with good liaison parties 

and proper radio communication,not only could valuable information be given 

to the Russians before such an attack but also that the most recent information 

with regard to enemy and Russian movements could be communicated to him. 

With the speed of modern fighters the aircraft taking part in this raid 

were involved in operations only five minutes flying tie from the Russian 

ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing 

a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. 

Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the 

most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting 

the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should 

be found to this problem. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the point of view of the British 

Chiefs of Staff. Owing to the fact that United States bombers operakd by day 

while the Royal Air Force bombers operated mainly by night, this problem 

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affected the United States forces more than it did the British. Nevertheless, the 

problem for both air forces was almost identical. Already complete integration 

of control of the United States and British bomber effort from the West and 

from the South had been achieved. 

Speaking for the British Air Staff, he fully supported the proposals 

which had been put forth by General Kuter which would entirely cover British 

requirements. 

GENERAL ANTONOV explained that in putting forward at the previous 

meeting his proposal with regard to the bombline, he had in mind the wishes 

expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff which had been put 

forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer. These wishes expressed a desire 

that the bombline should be as near as possible to the Soviet front. The line 

that he now suggested was only some 60 to 75 kilometers in front of the Soviet 

lines. There was no possibility of moving the bombline further to the eastward 

as this would hinder the action, not only of the Soviet ground forces but also 

the Soviet air forces. He appreciated that there were a number of important 

targets to the east of the proposed line which should be bombed. In connection 

with the bombing of such individual targets, each one could be considered 

separately. He would ask also that consideration should be given to the fact 

that the Soviets had a large number of aircraft themselves. He had mentioned 

on the previous day the 8,000 aircraft now being employed on the central front. 

If all the targets to the east of the line were made available to the Allied air 

forces, then there would be nothing left for the Soviet forces to attack. The 

line now proposed was only a very general line drawn in the light of considerations put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer and would have to 

be worked out in detail and, in particular, altered to enable Allied flyers easily 

to identify it. With regard to changes in the line necessitated by changes in 

the position of Soviet forces, full information with regard to this would be 

provided daily through the missions in Moscow. Through the same channel, 

the efforts of the Soviet air forces could also be coordinated. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that as he understood it, General Antonov’s 

view was that if the line which he had proposed was to be moved further to the 

east, there would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force to attack. He felt 

there had been some misunderstanding on this point since the United States 

and British air staffs were entirely agreeable that any strategic target should 

be attacked by all three air forces. This was one of the reasons why he was 

opposed to the drawing of any line which would divide Germany into two parts 

from the point of view of strategic bombing. 

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GENERAL KUTER said he would like to comment on two points. He 

was glad to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to his own, as indicated 

by General Antonov’s reference to constant liaison to enable coordination to 

be achieved. Secondly,he would like to refer to the results achieved during the 

advance across the western desert. In this operation, as the result of excellent 

air-ground liaison, it was possible to place the bombline not at some specific 

distance ahead of the front line but at a point which it was expected that our 

own ground forces might be able to reach in eight hours. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked confirmation that General Antonov’s view 

was that the bombline he proposed should be altered so that it could be better 

defined topographically and that at the same time arrangements could be made 

for Allied forces to bomb critical points on the Soviet side of this line. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said the line which he had indicated was a rough 

guide only. He felt that the Heads of the Air Staffs could work out the details 

of this line so as to insure its recognition from the air. This redefinition of 

the line could, he believed, be undertaken at the present conference. He also 

supported the statement made by Sir Charles Portal that there could be no 

line established which would entirely divide the targets of the three strategic 

air forces. It was for this reason that he considered that the action of the Soviet 

strategic air force should be coordinated with the Allied air effort through the 

missions in Moscow. If it was desirable for the Allied air forces to bomb targets 

to the east of the line, such action could be discussed in Moscow and the necessary decision taken. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he regarded the bombline as a line of demarcation between the action of air forces and land forces and not as a line of demarcation between the action of strategic air forces. In Allied operations on 

the Western Front there was no line of demarcation between the action of the 

United States and British strategical air forces but there were bomblines on 

the various fronts closely connected with the action of the land forces and designed to insure close cooperation between land and air forces. He asked if it 

were to be assumed from General Antonov’s statement that the proposed 

bombline now being discussed was to be considered as the bombline which 

would ensure coordination of action between land and air forces but not 

designed to restrict the action of the strategic air forces, which action would 

be regulated through the missions in Moscow on a day-to-day basis. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he would like to put the question in a different way. Was it the intention of the Soviet Staff that the improved liaison 

which it had been suggested should take place through the missions in 

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Moscow, would be in lieu of the line proposed and should be such as to safeguard the Soviet ground forces from the action of strategic bombers? 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the line he had proposed was designed 

to secure Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental bombardment 

by the Allied air forces. Such a line could not be permanent and would be 

changed frequently to conform to changes in the land front. The actions 

of the strategic air forces, both Soviet and Allied, would not be bound by 

this line, however. It was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed 

that the Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the east of 

this line though such targets might exist and in this case action against any 

of them could be decided upon individually. As to the Soviet strategic air force 

it would appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the west of 

the line. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that, since there appeared to be a large 

measure of agreement,time would be saved if the three air staffs met together 

and worked out the details of the proposed bombline. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he would like to suggest an amendment 

to Admiral Leahy’s proposal. He felt that instead of the air staffs trying to 

work out the details of the line they should work out the requirements for 

safeguarding the interests and security of the Soviet forces, having regard 

to the need for the destruction of as many important German installations 

as was possible. There seemed to be little difference between the various views 

expressed and what differences there were could, he felt sure, be settled quite 

easily. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he accepted Sir Charles Portal’s amendment to his suggestion. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy’s view 

that the matter should be referred to the air staffs to work out a detailed line 

in accordance with the principles which had been discussed. 

It was agreed that Marshal Khudyakov, General Kuter and Sir Charles 

Portal should meet together immediately to consider this matter. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was one further related question 

which remained unsettled. This was the question of liaison on a lower level. 

General Antonov had undertaken, at the previous meeting, to seek the views 

of Marshal Stalin on this point. 

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GENERAL ANTONOV said he had reported on this matter to Marshal 

Stalin. Marshal Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close 

contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that 

liaison should take place through the Staff of the Red Army and the Military 

Missions in Moscow. 

2. COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the forthcoming offensives had been fully 

discussed at the previous meeting and coordination had been broadly settled. 

There remained, however, the question of the offensives during March and 

April. General Antonov had mentioned also a summer offensive. Could he 

give any further information as to the probable date of the commencement 

of this summer offensive and whether it would be in great strength? Further 

did he foresee any long periods between the end of the present offensive and 

the commencement of the summer offensive? 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Soviet offensive action had started and 

would continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered by 

weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be difficult to give 

exact data with regard to the interval between the end of the winter and 

beginning of the summer attack. The most difficult season from the point of 

view of weather was the second part of March and the month of April. This 

was the period when roads became impassable. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked, with regard to General Antonov’s comment on the bad weather period between the winter and summer offensives, 

whether it was anticipated that it would be possible to carry out any important 

action until the summer offensive could be started. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, if during this period operations in the 

West were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible action 

on the Eastern Front wherever this could be done. 

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies 

would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most anxious that the 

enemy should not be able to concentrate forces against the Allies on the 

Western Front at that particular time. 

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GENERAL ANTONOV said that he could assure General Marshall that 

the Soviets would do everythingpossible to prevent the transference of German 

forces from east to west during this period. 

3. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO RIVER-CROSSING TECHNIQUE AND EQUIPMENT 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the first meeting between the Heads 

of State, the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging 

information with regard to technique and equipment employed by the Soviet 

forces in river crossings. At the present time in view of the Allied proximity 

to the River Rhine this was a most immediate problem for the Allied forces. 

There were now two officers present from General Eisenhower’s headquarters 

and it appeared highly desirable that they should meet with the appropriate 

Soviet experts on the subject of the technique and equipment employed by 

the Red Army in major river crossings which they had undertaken. Thus the 

Allies on the Western Front could obtain the benefit of the experience of the 

Red Army in this matter. He would therefore very much appreciate if General 

Antonov would indicate whether this could be done and if so would make such 

arrangements as were practicable for the officers from General Eisenhower’s 

headquarters to meet with the appropriate Soviet officers. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the Soviet Army was always ready to 

share its battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there were 

no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to 

look into this matter. He would furnish the required information later. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked General Antonov for this very satisfactory 

reply. 

4. BASES FOR U.S.STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN THE VIENNABUDAPEST AREA 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as the Soviet advance proceeded 

it would be found logistically possible to move US. strategic bomber forces 

now in Italy, with their protecting fighters, to bases in the Vienna-Budapest 

area. It was very desirable for such aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It 

was therefore the hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could 

be arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that area so 

that it could be arranged for some 670 individual heavy bomber sorties to be 

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undertaken each month. This would require the support of about 1,800 fighter 

missions in the same period. To effect this it would be necessary to carry out 

certain construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel could 

be provided from Italy and 200 from elsewhere. The greatest difficulty would 

be the transfer of the necessary supplies and equipment. 22,000 tons would 

be required initially and a further 8,300 tons a month thereafter. The President 

of the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal Stalin 

with a request for his approval. It would involve the use of two airfields in 

the Budapest area and also agreements that the Soviet authorities should 

undertake the movement of the necessary stores to the Budapest area by 

road, rail or barge. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the matter would probably be decided 

between Marshal Stalin and the President. He personally felt that it could 

conveniently be undertaken and suggested that the Heads of the Air Forces 

should consider the problem. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would be very happy for this to be arranged. 

5. PROVISION OF SOVIET AIRFIELDS FOR DAMAGED BRITISH 

NIGHT BOMBERS 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he had one request to make. It would 

be extremely helpful if the Soviet General Staff could allocate air bases with 

night landing equipment at various points distributed along their front at 

which British night bombers, damaged in night combat over Germany, could 

land instead of having to fight their way back over the heavy defenses of 

Germany. If these aircraft wkre so badly damaged that they could not get 

back, and no such airfields were available, the crews had no alternative but 

to bail out and lose their aircraft. If the Soviet authorities could agree to 

this request he suggested that details could be arranged through the missions 

in Moscow. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that he regarded this as a technical 

question. Up to the present the Soviet forces had never denied assistance to 

Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He suggested the details of Sir Charles Portal’s proposal should be worked out after the conference. 

6. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the previous Conference he had 

referred to the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian 
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offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not only adopt a 

passive defense on this line but would try to gather together counterattack 

forces for a break-through. He would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had any intelligence with regard to the collection of such 

forces, their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was particularly interested in the transference of the Sixth S.S. Panzer Army. 

GENERAL BULL said that when he left General Eisenhower’s headquarters a short time ago evidence existed that the Sixth Panzer Army was 

leaving the Western Front and possibly an additional two divisions from 

north of the Vosges. General Eisenhower had taken immediate action to 

put the maximum possible air effort on these German movements. He was 

not up to date with regard to the direction of these moves but he was certain 

that such information as was available at the Supreme Commander’s headquarters could be sent to the Soviet General Staff. He would be glad to take 

this matter up with General Eisenhower immediately on his return. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had received a message on the previous day which gave definite informationof the moves of certain divisions of the 

Sixth Panzer Army from the Western Front. This message had also given 

the new total of enemy divisions on the Western Front as 69. This morning’s 

operational report raised this total to 70 since a newly formed parachute 

division had appeared on the Western Front on the right of Field Marshal 

Montgomery’s forces, in a position somewhere east of Venlo. He would get 

an exact statement on this matter and give it to General Antonov. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that his information was very similar to that 

given by General Marshall. It was known that the Fifth Panzer Army had also 

been pulled out of the line but there were no ixidications yet of its moving to 

the eastward. The British experts believed that this move was unlikely to 

take place. If General Antonov wished, a telegram could be sent asking for 

the latest information. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said he was very grateful for the information 

given him and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth Panzer 

Army to the eastward. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said, with regard to the Italian Front, that as far 

as was known only one division was being withdrawn although there were 

indications of considerable movement. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it might be helpful, if the Soviet Staff was 

not already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the Ardennes. This 

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attack had been made by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack the Sixth Panzer Army had been out of the line for several months and 

had been located northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer 

Army had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army had 

crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before the offensive 

had taken place but had not been located until the attack was launched. 

The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to be withdrawn from the attack 

and the Fifth Panzer Army was finally also withdrawn though it was not 

known if it had left the front. 

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army 

were known. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was difficult to differentiate between 

losses incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on the previous day he had given information with regard to the destruction inflicted on 

one or the other of these armies in the course of two days’ operations. It 

was believed that very heavy casualties had been inflicted on the motor 

vehicles and tanks of almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth 

Panzer Armies. 

GENERAL BULL said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and, of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had 

attacked in the north in the direction Malmedy-Liege. Both the Fifth and 

the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses in armor and two divisions 

of the Fifth Army in particular were known to have suffered heavily. 

7. PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

ADMIRAL KING said that the general principles for the conduct of 

the war against Germany and Japan were: firstly, the defeat of both Germany 

and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and unremitting pressure would be 

maintained against the Japanese forces. Efforts would be made to attain 

positions from which the final attack on Japan could be staged when the 

necessary forces became available from Europe. There had been no fixed 

schedule but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the available 

means permitted. At the present time our operations were hampered chiefly 

by lack of shipping and the shortage of service and auxiliary troops. It was 

worthy of note that all operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious operations and some were carried out over great distances. 

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In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas, and 

Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, 

but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and even to the coast of Japan 

itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 

1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the 

fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was 

that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese navy, air forces, 

and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available,and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the 15th of March. 

Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation 

of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including 

the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the 19th of February the United 

States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly 

as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. 

About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus 

for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to 

intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan. 

Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an 

operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction 

of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water 

highway of the Yangtze. 

In the North Pacific, air operations were being conducted from the 

Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kuriles, chiefly against 

the islands of Paramushiru and Shushima in the extreme north of the chain. 

The weather for air operations in this area was particularly bad, and consequently there had been a number of forced landings by United States aircraft in Kamchatka. He would like to express his deep appreciation for 

the care and assistance which had been rendered to these airmen by the 

Soviet authorities. 

For a period of about a year examination and study had been continuing of the possibility of securing a safe sea passage through the Kuriles by 

seizing an island, preferably in the central part of the chain, whose topography was such as to permit the establishment of airfields. Lack of means 

made it unlikely that such operations would take place during 1945 unless 

they became so vitally important that ways and means would have to be 

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found to do them, even though the over-all means available for the war 

against Japan were limited. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles 

was planned for 1945. 

ADMIRAL KING said that means were not available to undertake it 

as well as the other operations which had been planned; however, as always, 

it was a question of the relative importance of the various operations under 

consideration. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to add that from the point 

of view of the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail, particularly 

with regard to shipping, in order to effect the most rapid possible movement 

of forces from Europe to the Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the 

movement would start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. 

The total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move first, 

accompanied by the service units needed to support the air forces and to 

prepare bases for the other troops. The necessity for these plans was one of the 

reasons why an estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had 

been required. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, as he had mentioned on the previous 

day, it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East 

after this matter had been considered by the Heads of State. 

a. VLR BOMBER OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 

GENERAL KUTER said that the B-29’s, the heavy long-range United 

States bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded by 

General Arnold. The operations of the Twentieth Air Force had been following a plan somewhat similar to that used by the strategic air forces in 

Europe. The Japanese aircraft industry had been selected as the first priority 

target. At the present time this air force had approximately 350 operational 

B-29’s. About a third of that number had been operating from China bases 

since May 1944 and the remainder had begun operating from the Marianas 

in July 1944. It was expected to build up a force of approximately 1,800 

operational B-29’s. The latest operation carried out was on the previous 

Sunday, when 120 B-29’s had attacked Kobe. Broadly speaking, the relatively 

small force of B-29’s which had so far been employed had exceeded the anticipated results for the number of attacks that had been carried out. 

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9. OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND CHINA 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that during 1944 the Japanese had delivered 

a serious attack in north Burma. This attack was stopped and the Japanese were driven back by the British forces in north Burma, assisted by Chinese 

forces under United States direction which had been trained by United States 

officers in India. Land communicationsto China had now been opened through 

north Burma. The road was not good but motor vehicles and guns could now 

be delivered by that road to China. Operations in Burma were continuing 

southward with the object of ultimately clearing the Japanese out of Burma, 

which would then provide a suitable base for further operations against the 

Japanese in those parts. In addition, as Admiral King had mentioned, British 

naval forces had been dispatched to take part in operations in the Pacific. 

Carrier attacks had also been carried out against the oil targets in Palembang 

on the island of Sumatra. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was of interest to add that the 

British advanced forces operating in the Mandalay area and to the west of 

it, were almost entirely dependent on air supply provided by United States 

and British transport aircraft. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States maintained a considerable air force in China, consisting, at the present time, of some 600 

planes with more to come. The sole source of supply for these forces was over 

the 17,000-foot mountains between northeast Burma and Kunming. These 

operations presented an extremely difficult proposition from every point of 

view. As Sir Alan Brooke had said, the Japanese had in the previous spring 

attacked towards the line of communication to China. "his was the line of 

communication not only for the British forces in Burma but also for the 

Chinese forces in Burma, and the United States air transport force flying 

supplies into China. In spite of all the difficulties, 44,000 tons of supplies had 

been flown over the Himalayas last month. A transport plane left airfields 

in Burma every two minutes of the day and night. It was necessary to provide 

not only gasoline for the air forces operating out of China but to provide also 

for the ground forces in China who had little food or equipment. United States 

transport aircraft had moved Chinese forces to India from where, after training, they had again been transferred by air to the seat of operations where they 

had joined up with their equipment. More recently the Chinese forces had 

been flown back over the mountains, thus providing the only really dependable 

well-equipped fighting force in China. They were, however, without armored 

fighting vehicles or medium artillery. Now that the road was open, armored 

fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery could be sent to them. There had been 

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almost a complete lack of motor transport in China and what there had been 

was now worn out. It was under these circumstances that the United States 

Chiefs of Staff had asked assistance from the Soviets in order to get 500 trucks 

to the Chinese. He very much appreciated the efforts the Soviets had made 

and fully understood their difficulties. Fortunately, these vehicles could now 

be sent to China direct by road. 

A United States general (General Wedemeyer) was now acting as 

chief of staff to the Generalissimo in an effort to coordinate the various 

activities of the Chinese forces. This was of particular importance in relation 

to United States action in the Pacific. Operations in China were of increasing 

importance now that naval forces were so close to the coast of China. General 

Wedemeyer was endeavoring to restore a very serious situation and, with 

armored cars and trucks now available, his task should prove easier. As he 

(General Marshall) had previously mentioned, in the face of unparalleled 

difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month. He 

mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest 

feat in all history. In the face of such achievements cooperation by the staffs 

now seated around the table should be relatively easy. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the operations in Burma were regarded 

as decisive operations or secondary operations. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were decisive operations aimed at 

the clearing of Burma of all Japanese forces. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if it was considered that there were enough 

troops for decisive action on the two fronts -the Far East and Europe. Would 

not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the war in Europe and 

thus hasten the end of the war against Japan by making additional forces 

available? 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that mainly local forceswere being used 

in Burma, the majority of them being from the Indian Army. Indian divisions 

had been taken from India and had been engaging Germans since the beginning of the war. However, it had been essential to protect India’s eastern 

frontier and at the same time to open up a land route to China. Far greater 

forces were required in this theater to carry out all the desired operations.

As General Marshall had mentioned, plans were ready to transfer forces as 

fast as possible upon the completion of the war with Germany in order 

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to finish the war against Japan. Up to the present time Germany was regarded as the main enemy and Japan as the secondary enemy, to be taken 

on with full forces immediately Germany was defeated. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the policy of the United States 

Government played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations 

in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance on the 

maintenance of the present regime in China. From the military point of view 

it would be a very serious matter if all China passed into Japanese control. 

Only relatively small American forces had been used except for transport 

aircraft. 

It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the 

Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had 

been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces 

had, however, pushed forward by by-passing Japanese positions. At present 

some 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in these by-passed 

positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in 

Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked for information with regard to the area 

of the United States submarine operations in the Pacific. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the United Statessubmarineforce had always 

operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked generally north of the 

latitude of 20" N. A further submarine force was based on Australia and was 

now supplemented by a considerable number of British submarines. This 

force worked in the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific 

had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now reduced from 

a maximum of some seven million tons to two million tons. These Japanese 

losses had Been inflicted by submarines, by air forces and by naval surface 

vessels. United States submarine losses had remained relatively constant at 

about two per month. The number of United States submarines operating was 

still increasing. It was clear that the closer operations come to Japan the 

tougher would be the opposition not only for submarines but also for air 

and naval forces and for ground troops. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if it was intended that United States 

submarines should operate in the Sea of Japan. 

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ADMIRAL KING said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of 

Japan though they operated in the Yellow Sea. 

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV suggested that the Japanese were likely to 

shift their sea lines of communication to the Sea of Japan. 

ADMIRAL KING explained that such a line of communications already 

existed as did a Japanese sea line of communications to Manchuria and to 

the North China coast. 

10. FUTURE BUSINESS 

After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects 

had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until 

such time as the Heads of State might submit additional problems to the military staffs. 

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL ANTONOV said 

that he felt that for the present no written report to the Heads of State was 

necessary, but rather that each staff should report individually to its own 

Head of State. Should a written report be required, this could easily be prepared later. 

In conclusion, SIR ALAN BROOKE said he would like to thank General 

Antonov for his hospitality in receiving the United States and British Chiefs 

of Staff in Yalta and for his cooperative attitude during the meetings. 

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MINUTES OF 

PLENARY MEETINGS 
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ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF 1ST PLENARY MEETINGBETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND GREAT BRITAIN,

HELDIN THE PRESIDENT’S CABINON BOARD THE “USS QUINCY,” MALTA,

ON FRIDAY, 2 FEBRUARY 1945, AT 1800.

PRESENT 

United States 

The President 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J.King 

Major General L. S. Kuter 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Major General E. I. C. Jacob 

Brigadier General A. J.McFarland 

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THE MEETING had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 776/1). 

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress 

which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions. 

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph. 

a. Paragraph 6 h. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that 

discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to 

be included in this paragraph. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the wording proposed by the British 

Chiefs of Staff raised a new question which involved placing supplies for 

liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease 

and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would 

entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military 

requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to 

accept. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had had less 

than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest 

the requirementsof liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to 

import into Great Britain in 1945. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the wording of the proposed 

basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting. 

THE PRIME MINISTER, referring to paragraph 6 f., thought that 

great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles. 

ADMIRAL KING said that this was all in hand and the first convoy 

was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by 

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the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive 

the supplies. 

b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8) 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at 

the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if 

the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected. 

c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10) 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that 

complete agreement had been reached on this question. 

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the importance of having plenty 

of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, 

so that tired divisions could be replaced. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions 

would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. 

Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what action had been taken on 

SCAF 180. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had 

taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower’s proposed operations, and two further 

telegrams had been received from the latter. SCAF 180 should be read in 

the light of these additional explanations and telegrams. 

THE PRIME MINISTER questioned the meaning of the words “to 

close the Rhine” which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report. 

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General 

Eisenhower’s signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, 

or closing up to, the Rhine. 

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d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11,12, and 13) 

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian 

Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and 

two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there should be no obligation to 

take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their 

withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a 

broad-based government. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed 

directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix “A” 

to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after 

the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he expected that by the time the 

first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing 

troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and 

was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that 

Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn. There were special 

reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was 

also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which 

would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible. 

In reply to an inquiry by the President, SIR HENRY MAITLAND 

WILSON said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed. 

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, SIR CHARLES 

PORTAL explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move 

of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further 

moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that it would be unwise to make any 

significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so 

would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety. 

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Mediterranean, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he 

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attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any 

surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we 

should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that 

more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians. 

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with 

support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” 

should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. 

There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and 

Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims 

of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern 

Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely 

reserved. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either 

the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the phrase as used in the report 

applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia. 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

e. Operations in Southeast Asia Camand (paragraphs 18 and 19) 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the main object of the operations 

to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged 

there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs 

had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to Appendix “C” of the report, which 

contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of 

Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. 

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped there would be time to review this 

matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese 

forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might 

be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go 

where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the 

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Japanese,particularly in the air,as this was the only way which the British 

had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the 

Pacific. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander 

was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review 

the matter. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether paragraph 18 meant that 

there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the 

Kra Peninsula,Malaya, et cetera. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that any such help would be the 

subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the President had not 

been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having 

regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give 

them support. 

THE PRESIDENT said that three generations of education and traming would be required before China could become a serious factor. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the picture in China was 

now considerably changed. In the first place certain well-trained Chinese 

troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. 

Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery 

for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in 

Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move 

back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps 

would soon be in existence. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it now appeared that the American 

and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the 

south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move 

of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the 

operations there. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the facilities for sending equipment 

and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who 

required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities 

certainly could not support British troops as well. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the maintenance of British forces 

in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced 

United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical 

operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening 

of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, 

et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be 

able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased 

in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American 

arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated -one arm of the 

pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the 

Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the 

pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would 

be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main 

operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed 

the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by 

Admiral Mountbatten’s forces much easier. He felt that it was important 

that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available 

to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know 

what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically 

in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. 

It might eve6 be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific 

operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as 

to what forces he could count on for his operations. 

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that if the Americans made any 

request for British troops to go into China he would certainly be prepared 

to consider it. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that all the transportation available was fully 

required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed, and said that he did not think it 

would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been 

secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in 

the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would 

now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces. 

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,” which contained an 

outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs 

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of Staff for the Pacific, THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether it had 

been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the 

German war. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this delay had been necessitated by 

the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service 

troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the 

main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had 

ended in December of 1944,it would have been possible to operate against 

Kyushu in the autumn of 1945.There were also certain seasonal limitations 

on operations in this area. 

Summing up, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to see that 

such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the 

present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast 

of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered 

later. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the 

work which had been accomplished. 

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that arrangements were being made to keep all 

the accommodationsavailable at Malta so that the conference could be resumed 

there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made 

until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the 

return journey would be desirable. 

THE MEETING then adjourned. 

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ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF 2D PLENARY MEETINGBETWEENTHE U.S.A. AND GREATBRITAIN, 

HELDAT LIVADIA PALACE, YALTA,ON FRIDAY, 9 FEBRUARY1945, AT 1200. 

PRESENT 

United States 

The President 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

Major General L. 5.Kuter 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir James Somerville 

SECRETARIAT 

Major General E. I. C. Jacob 

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland 

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 77612) 

THE MEETING had before them the draft of the final report to the 

President and the Prime Minister, containing the results of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff ARGONAUT discussions (C.C.S. 776/2). 

The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime 

Minister without amendment. 

In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were 

touched on briefly: 

a. There was a discussion of possible developments after the defeat of 

Germany and the possible action of Russia at that time. 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the opinion that it would be of 

great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, 

the British Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum 

calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be subjected to 

the overwhelming weight of all the forces of the four powers. Japan might 

ask in these circumstances what mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. 

In this event it would be for the United States to judge the matter; but 

there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worth while if it led 

to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much blood 

and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any 

mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United 

States. Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the matter through 

to the end. 

THE PRESIDENT thought that this was a matter which might well 

be mentioned to Marshal Stalin. He doubted whether the ultimatum would 

have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was 

going on in the world outside, and still seemed to think that they might get 

a satisfactory compromise. They would be unlikely to wake up to the true 

state of affairsuntil all of their islands had felt the full weight of air attack. 

b. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his thanks to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful institution which smoothed out so 

many difficulties, issued clear directions to the commanders in the field 

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and would without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of cooperation between Allies. He hoped very much that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

could be kept in being for three of four years more. There would be many 

problems affectingthe securityof the two nations in this period, the solution 

of which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of Staff could 

continue to operate. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed that there would be many matters affecting 

the two countries, such as the use of bases, which would have to be effectively handled. 

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its existence had certainly simplified 

the solution of the problems which had confronted the two nations during 

the war. 

c. There was a short discussion upon the provision of intelligence to 

the Russian armies, and the President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain steps which had been agreed in discussion between 

General Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke. 

THE MEETING then adjourned. 

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ARGONAUT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE PLENARY MEETINGBETWEEN THE U.S.A., GREATBRITAIN 

AND THE U.S.S.R., HELDIN LIVADIA PALACE, YALTA,

ON SUNDAY, 4 FEBRUARY1945,AT 1700. 

United States 

The President 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

Major General L. S. Kuter 

(Representing General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold) 

Major General J. R. Deane 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Mr. Anthony Eden 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland 

Mr. E. R. Stettinius 

Mr. W. Averill Harriman 

Mr. C. E. Bohlen 

U.S.S.R. 

Marshal Stalin 

Mr. Molotov 

Army General Antonov 

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov 

Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov 

Ambassador to the United States Gromyko 

Ambassador to Great Britain Gusev 

Mr. Pavlov 

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MARSHAL STALIN asked the President to open the meeting. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he was very happy to open such a historic 

meeting in such a lovely spot. In view of the conveniences and comforts that 

had been provided the visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal Stalin 

for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations 

would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely among ourselves the 

matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which 

we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map 

in Europe in fact. Today, however, the conversations by common agreement 

would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the 

British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must 

be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet 

armies against the common enemy. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief 

of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the 

Eastern Front. 

GENERAL ANTONOV made the following statement: 

Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack 

on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a distance of 700 

kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula 

cutting off East Prussia from central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, 

south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against 

Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army 

groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow 

front, 300 kilometers. 

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Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to 

commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected 

to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation 

in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the 

Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the 

High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack 

not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in 

weather. 

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and 

Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, 

since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route 

to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to 

extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation 

was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in 

Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for 

the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a 

swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector 

of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the 

principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the 

Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions 

were located in Courland) ,and thus on the central part of the front there 

remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished. 

On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our 

greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping 

calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than 

double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority. 

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted 

to 220-230 guns (from 75mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front. 

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions-low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility 

of air operationsand limited artillery observation to several hundred meters. 

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and 

a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed 

and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during 

the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, 

to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense. 

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The following results were achieved: 

a. During the 18days of the advance,the Soviet troops moved forward 

up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive. 

Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30kilometers 

per day. 

b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector 

from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian 

industrial area. 

c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East 

Prussia from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group 

(26divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, 

Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 

15 divisions. 

d. Break-throughs in force of long duration of German defensive 

positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions. 

e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the 

following losses: 

Prisoners -about 100,000 men 

Casualties -about 300,000 men 

Total -approximately 400,000 men. 

Probable enemy action: 

a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up 

the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, setting 

up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the 

expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe 

and Italy. 

For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland 

grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula. 

b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna 

more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now 

in action in Italy. 

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The shifting of enemy troops: 

a. On our front there have already appeared: 

From the central regions of Germany - 9 divisions 

From the Western European Front - 6 divisions 

From Italy - 1 division -

Total 16 divisions 

b. In the process of being shifted: 

4 tank divisions 

1 motorized division -

5 divisions 

c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30-35 divisions 

(at the expense of the Western European Front, Norway, Italy, and 

reserves located in Germany). 

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 

divisions. 

Our wishes are: 

a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, 

for which the present situation is very favorable: 

(1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. 

(2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into 

the Ardennes. 

(3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East. 

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February. 

b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying 

out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from 

Norway, and from Italy. 

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. 

c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy. 

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THE PRESIDENT asked whether the Russians proposed to change the 

gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen 

the gauge of the lines. 

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that much of the equipment was unfit 

for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines that 

are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only as a matter of 

necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not sufficient to widen 

all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of the German lines will 

remain intact. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Delegation would have 

a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a technical 

and military nature, he thought it would be more advantageous if they could 

be brought up between the military staffs, 

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that General Marshall explain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western Front. 

THE PRESIDENT pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating 

the operationsof the three Allies now that the British and American armies are 

getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short distance separating 

the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans are now able to transfer their 

reserves quickly from one front to the other. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave a resume5 of the operations planned 

for the Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had 

now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some areas beyond 

the line originally held. During the past week General Eisenhower has been 

regrouping his forces and conducting operations designed to eliminate enemy 

pockets in the southern part of the line north of Switzerland. At the same 

time he has been maintaining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement northeast towards Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered, it was 

decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions further 

north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being directed towards 

the elimination of the German positions in the vicinity of Mulhausen and 

Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied but the advance of the First French 

Army north of Mulhausen has been very slow. 

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North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine 

are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to 

reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other 

employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations. 

Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group and 

Ninth U.S. Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike towards the 

southeast in order to reach the line of the Rhine from Dusseldorf north. A 

complementary operation has been planned in a northeast direction towards 

the same objective, which it is hoped can be launched about a week later than 

the first operation. By means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the 

Germans east of the Rhine north of Dusseldorf and then to cross the river 

north of the Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British 

and American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is 

logistically possible to support. In addition, airborne troops in large numbers 

will land east of the Rhine. 

From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the 

river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing 

prior to 1March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and 

a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate 

initially only five divisions. 

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt 

which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go 

through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now 

conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the 

water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing 

may be swept away by the release of the impounded water. 

The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on 

operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now 

possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans 

have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have 

made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through 

the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of 

course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock 

gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air. 

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United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the 

ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable 

effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne 

and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not 

yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done 

to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes. 

The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German 

oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and 

motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted 

in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. 

The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications 

and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy 

German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. 

The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in 

the Po Valley, they are directed against communicationsleading into Germany. 

There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The 

Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good 

weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and 

rolling stock has been heavy. 

Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine 

war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection 

of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult 

for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, 

heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points 

whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German 

oil supplies. 

In concluding, GENERAL MARSHALL said he would be glad to have 

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought 

desirable. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal 

Brooke to do this and stated that he would like for Admiral Cunningham also 

to say a word about the submarine operations. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Danzig is the place where 

much of the assembling of the submarines is done and expressed satisfaction 

in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which 

are daily drawing closer. 

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the PRIME MINISTER 

said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg. 

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE said that General Marshall had fully 

covered the situation now existing on the Western Front and the operations 

which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff 

were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General 

Marshall had outlined. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that both the British and Americans 

have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the 

British amphibious branch is at present in ARGONAUT and he, the Prime 

Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious 

experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be 

kind enough to provide. 

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, GENERAL MARSHALL 

explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for 

not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the 

Rhine down as far as Dusseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed 

out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially 

on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. 

He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would be 

by-passed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good 

tank country. 

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, GENERAL MARSHALL 

said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he asked the question because in the 

Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know 

how many tanks the Allies expected to employ. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that roughly one in every three divisions 

employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have 89 divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and 

all the remainder were either British or American. 

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Through answers to his questions it was made clear to Marshal Stalin 

that there are nearly 10,000Allied tanks in the European Theater. The British 

divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000, and armored 

divisions contain 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each 

carrying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs. 

MARSHAL STALIN explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more than 

the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British 

and Americans would have over the Germans. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the British and American 

forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but 

not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting 

to the full such superiority in strength as existed. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that the British and Americans had asked the 

Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes 

of the British and Americans were. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of 

the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard 

and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had 

full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians 

was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now. 

MARSHAL STALIN said there had been no demand from the British 

and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted 

by them to bring it about. 

THE PRESIDENT had asked that information of the offensive be given 

to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal 

Tedder, who came to Moscow as General Eisenhower’s representative, had 

requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this 

was understood to be a request from the military leaders. 

MARSHAL STALIN said they had staged their winter offensive because 

they felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the 

attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this 

matter. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said the reason that neither the British nor 

Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because 

of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they 

could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless 

of the discussions which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters 

should be fully discussed now by the three Staffs in order to determine what 

is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on 

the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives 

should be integrated so as to get the best results. 

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought 

it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all 

certain that the war would be over by that time. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that he would like to add something to 

General Marshall's statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the 

submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. 

The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers of new 

types of U-boats. As these will have high underwater speed and embody all 

the latest technical devices, it will be very difficult for the Allied air and 

surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new 

submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as 

a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for 

in that city about 30 percent of the U-boats were being constructed. 

In answer to a question by the President, MARSHAL STALIN stated 

that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was 

hoped that it soon would be. 

Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting.

After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet 

at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation. 

309 

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INDEX 

A 

AACHEN SECTOR 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 110 

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

Employment of Australian troops, 222 

ADRIATIC 

(See also Mediterranean Theater) 

Directive to SACKED, 143, 187 

AGENDA FOR ”ARGONAUT” 

Agenda for ARGONAUT Tripartite Conference, 125, 128 

Agenda for U.S.-U.K. conference at 

Malta, 129, 292, 204 

AIRCRAFT (see also Forces) 

Allied use of aircraft in “carpet bombing,’’ 260 

Effect of Allied bombing on German 

aircraft production, 35 

Employment of B-29’s against Japan, 281 

Employment of war-weary bombers 

against industrial targets in Germany, 293 

General Anderson’s remark regarding need of P-47‘s in Northwest Europe,

209 

German employment of available aircraft, 31 

Number of US. and British air forces 

on the Western and Italian Fronts, 256 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding American-British preponderance over 

Germans in aircraft, 308 

ALEXANDER, FIELD MARSHAL SIR H. 

Statements in reference to: 

Allied action to prevent German withdrawal from Italy, 257 

Employment of the 47th Light Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe, 220 

Number of German and Itallan enemy divisions in Italy, 255 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean, 232 

Transfer of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 209 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean 

of part of the Twelfth Tactlcal Air 

Force, 209 

ALLOCATIONS 

British memorandum regarding allocation of resources between IndiaBurma and China Theaters. 101 

Employment of US.resources in Southeast Asia, 16, 222, 228 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean, 105, 232 235 

Sir Charles Portal and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding allocation of 

forces, a function of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff,202 

AMPHIBIOUS TECHNIQUE 

(See Technique) 

ANDERSON, MAJOR GENERAL F. L. 

Statement regarding need for P-47’s in 

Northwest Europe, 209 

ANTONOV, COLONEL GENERAL 

Statements in reference to: 

Allied operations directed toward 

Ljubljana Gap, 258 

Bases for US.strategic bomber forces 

in the Vienna-Budapest area, 277 

Bombline arrangements and employment of Russian air forces against important German targets, 272 

Coordination in air operations, 263 

Coordination of oflensive operations

in Europe during the spring and 

summer of 1945, 254, 275 

Date for the end of the war with Germany. 265 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, _. 77:. Exchange of information on rivercrossing technique and equipment,

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INDEX 

ANTONOV, COLONEL GENERAL 

(Cont’di 

Liaison arrangements between the 

British-US. and Russian armies, 262 

Measures to prevent movement of 

German forces from Norway, 259 

Operations in Burma and China, 283 

Operations in the Far East, 266 

Outline of the situation existing on 

the Eastern Front, 300 

Russian intentions in Europe, 303 

Technique of employing artillery in 

offensive ODerations. 260 

Widening thk gauge of captured German railroad rolling stock. 304 

ANTWERP 

Possibility of German suicide attacks on 

vital targets. 294 

Resume oi operations planned for the 

Western Front. 305 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

ARDENNES REGION 

General Bull’s remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest Europe,

294 

Resum6 of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 304 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

”ARGONAUT” CONFERENCE 

Agenda for ARGONAUT Tripartite Conference, 126, 128 

Agenda for U.S.-U.K. conference at 

Malta. 129,292,204 

Chairman for the conferences, 292 

Admiral Leahy and Field Marshal 

Brooke’sstatements regarding accomplishments during ARGONAUT Conference, 250 

ARTILLERY TECHNIQUE (see Technique) 

AUSTRALIA 

Employment of Australian troops, 222 

AUSTRIA 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding U.S.-British occupation of Austria, 290 

B 

B-29 AIRCRAFT 

(See Twentieth Air Force) 

BALKANS 

(See also Mediterranean Theater) 

Directive to SACMED, 142, 166 

Discussion with regard to liaison for coordination of air operations, 263 

BASES 

General Marshall and General Antonov’s statements regarding bases 

for US. strategic bomber forces in 

the Vienna-Budapest area, 276 

Sir Charles Portal and Marshal Khudy­ akov’s statements regarding provi­ sion of Soviet airfields for damaged night bombers, 277 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

CCS approve wording for sub-para­ graph h, Basic Undertakings in SUPport of Over-All Strategic Concept,

237 

General Marshall’s statement regarding effect of suggested new category of 

basic undertakings on availability of 

shipping for military operations, 232, 

288 

General Somervell’s remarks regarding 

extent of relief requirements included 

under military shipping, 232 

BASTOGNE 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe. 112 

BELGIUM 

Responsibility for the equipping of liberated manpower. 132, 134, 165 

Note: ltallc numerp18 rder to pager In minuter 01 meeting. 

p~zintype nuneras refer to pager in C.C.S. Papers. 

312 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BLOCKADE 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12,

168 

BOMBING OPERATIONS 

Employment of fighter-bombers to attack communications, entrances to 

tunnels and underground production

plants, 193 

Employment of war-weary bombers 

against industrial targets in Germany, 193 

Establishment of liaison with the Soviet 

High Command with the AngloAmerican strategic bombing in Germany, 181,237, 249 

Flying bomb and rocket attacks on London, 192 

General Kuter’s statement regarding

employment of B-29’s against Japan,

281 

General Marshall’s statement regarding proposed measures to combat German U-boat menace, 306 

General Marshall’s statement reeardine 

the effectiveness of recent Alhd aG 

operations, 257 

General Marshall’s statement with regard to liaison arrangements presently necessary in the Berlin area, 271 

General Marshall and Marshal Khudyakov’s statements regarding effective 

employment of Russian aviation in 

support of ground forces, 258 

German U-boat threat, 222, 231 

Japanese suicide attacks, 194 

Number of U.S. and British air forces on 

the Western and Italian Fronts and 

their proposed employment, 255 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12,

168,219 

Possibility of German suicide attacks 

on vital tareets. -. 194

Prime Minister’s statement regarding diversion of air effort against German 

U-boat pens, 289 

Principle for coordination of air with 

land offensives. 256 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 304 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding Allied action to prevent

German wthdrawal from Italy, 257 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

with regard to liaison for coordination of air operations. 263 

RiDartite Military Meetina discussion 

&th regard to the technique of employing air power in offensive operations, 260 

BOMBLINE 

CCS agree that Sir Charles Portal and 

General Kuter reply separately to 

Marshal Khudyakov indicating impracticability of revised bombline 

agreement proposed by Soviet High

Command, 250 

CCS decision to press the Russians for 

agreement to the proposals set forth 

in FAN 411,200 

Establishment of liaison with the Soviet 

High Command for Anglo-American

strategic bombing in Germany, 181, 

237, 249 

General Antonov’s statement regarding

bombline arrangements and employment of Russian air forces against important German targets, 272 

General Kuter’s statement regarding British-US. principles for establishing bombline between British-US. 

and Russian forces, 269 

General Marshall’s statement with regard to liaison arrangements presently necessary in the Berlin area, 271 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding bombline and liaison arrangements between the British4J.S. 

and Russian armies, 269 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

with regard to liaison for coordination of air operations, 263 

BONIN ISLANDS 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

BONN 

Resume of operations plaMed for the 

Western Front, 304 

SCAEF’sappreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 119 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BORDEAUX, FRANCE 

General Smith’s remarks regarding employment of French divisions, 298 

BORNEO, NORTH 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Paciflc, 220 

BOUGAINVILLE 

Employment of Australian troops, 222 

BREMEN-BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE 

Agreement for the American control of 

the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, 

10, 235 

CCS discussion regarding American 

control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven 

enclave, 235 

Draft agreement for control of the 

Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. 

McCloy, 5 

Map showing Bremen-Bremerhaven 

enclave, facing page 8 

“BROADSWORD” 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command. 19, 163, 170 

BROOKE, FIELD MARSHAL SIR ALAN 

Statements in reference to: 

Accomplishments during ARGONAUT 

Conference, 250 

Action to stop German withdrawals 

from Italy, 255 

Agenda for the conference at Malta, 

292 

Allied operations directed toward 

Ljubljana Gap, 259 

Bombline and liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian armies, 269 

Coordination of offensive operations

in Europe during the spring and 

summer of 1945,253,275 

Coordination of operations with the 

Russians, 200 

Directive to SACSEA, 211> 228 

Employment of British forces in 

China. 292 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 77x 

Equipment for Allied anb liberated 

forces, 226 

Equipping of Greek forces, 244 

Flying bomb and rocket attacks on 

London, 293 

Levels of supply of all petroleum products in all theaters, 240 

Liaison arrangements between the 

British-US. and ‘Russian armies, 

261 

Liaison for coordination of air oper­ ations, 263 

Movement of German forces from 

Norway, 260 

Naval operations in support of the 

land offensives in Northern Europe, 

265 

Operations in Burma and China, 282 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

Operations to close up to the Rhine, 

289 

Over-all review of cargo shipping,

242 

Placing the whole effort in the North 

on the Western mont, 196 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean, 231 

Reciprocal agreement on prisoners of 

war, 242 

Relief of tired units after crossing the Rhine, 198, 289 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 245, 248 

Review of cargo shipping, 227 

SCAEFs plan for operation, 211 

Strategy in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 208, 255 

Transfer of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 208,216,290 

Transfer of the Twelfth Air Force 

from Italy to France, 229 

BUDAPEST 

General Marshall and General Antonov’s statements regarding bases 

for US. strategic bomber forces in the 

Vienna-Budapest area, 276 

314 
Policy with regard to U.S. forces in the 

US. Army overseas strengths after V-E 

India-Burma Theater, 16, 218 

Day, 99 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BULL, MAJOR GENERAL H. R. 

Statements in reference to: 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 

778 

Projected operations in Northwest 

Europe. 194 

Technique of employing air power in 

offensive operations, 260 

Technique of employing artillery in 

offensive operations, 260 

BURMA (See also India-Burma Theater) 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 163, 110,218 

Discussion regarding operations in 

Burma and China. 282 

Discussion regarding operations in 

Southeast Asia Command, 291 

Employment of British forces in China, 

292 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

employment of U.8. forces outside of 

Burma, 212 

BURMA ROAD 

Responsibility for the protection of the 

northern part of the Burma Road 212 

C 

CCS DECISIONS (See Decisions) 

CANADA 

Transfer of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 208, 290 

CHINA THEATER 

Achievement of the Chinese forces, 292 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 160 

British memorandum regarding allocation of resources bktween IndiaBurma and China Theaters. 101 

Discussion regarding operations in 

Burma and China, 282 

Discussion with regard to employment

of British forces in China, 292 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

employment of U.S. resources in 

Southeast Asia, 212 

General Marshali’s statement with regard to importance of China in relation to U.S.action in the Pacific, 283 

General Marshall‘s statement with regWd to the operation of U.S. air 

forces and the transport of supplies

and equipment to China, 282 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

Policy with regard to U.S. forces in the 

India-Burma Theater, 16, 218 

US.Army overseas strengths after V-E 

Day, 99 

CHUSAN-NINGPO AREA 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 220 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12, 

169 

CIVILIANS 

Reciprocal agreement regarding liberated Allied prisoners of war, 115 

COBLENZ 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 119 

COLMAR 

General Bull‘s remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest EuroDe. 194 

Generid Smith’s remarks regarding the 

timing factor for proposed operations, 196 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 305 

COLOGNE-BONN 

General Bull’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest Europe, 195 

Note: It-C n-erals refer to pages in minutes of meetins. 

Plain type numeral. refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

315 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Plenary Meeting discussion regarding

continuation of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff organization after the end of 

the war, 296 

COORDINATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

Allied operations directed toward Ljubljana Gap, 258 

CCS amee that Sir Charles Portal and 

General Kuter reply separately to 

Marshal Khudyakov indicating impracticability of revised bombline 

agreement proposed by Soviet High

Command, 250 

CCS approve certain views to be put

forward to the Russians regarding

liaison between the Soviet High Command and Anglo-American strategic

bombing in eastern Germany, 181, 237 

CCS decision to press the Russians to 

agree to the proposals set forth in 

FAN 411, 200 

Discussion. regarding coordination of 

offensive operations in Europe during

the spring and summer of 1945, 200, 

253, 275 

General Kuter's statement regarding

British-US. principles for establishing bombline between British-U.S. 

and Russian forces, 269 

Marshal Stalin, the President and 

Prime Minister's statements with regard to coordination of effort between 

American-British and Russians during the winter offensives, 308 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian 

armies, 261 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding bombline and liaison ar­ rangements between the British-U.S. 

and Russians, 261, 269 

COSSEA 200, 

170 

COUNTERMEASURES 

Directive for effecting countermeasures 

against the German U-boat threat 

during 1945, 153 

"CRICKET" 

Agenda for US.-U.K. conferences at 

Malta, 129, 192, 204 

CUNNINGHAM, ADM. SIR ANDREW B. 

Statements in reference to: 

German U-boat threat, 202, 222 

Naval operations in support of the 

land offensives in Northern Europe,

264 

Russian assault against Danzig as a measure to combat the U-boat menace. 309 

D 

DANZIG 

Present situation regarding the Ger­ man U-boat threat during 1945, 148 

Prime Minister's statement with regard

to submarine assembling points, 307 

Statements with regard to Russian assault against Danzig as a measure to 

combat the U-boat menace, 309 

DARDANELLES 

Admiral King and the Prime Minister's 

statements regarding shipping to 

Russia via Dardanelles, 288 

DATES (See Target Dates) 

DECISIONS 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

CCS approve wording for sub-paragraph h,Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept,

237 

BOMBLINE 

CCS agree Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter reply separately to Marshal 

Khudyakov indicating impracticability of revised bombline agreement

proposed by Soviet High Command, 

250 

Note: ltailie numer* refer to pages i0 nllnutel of meet-g. 

plain type numerals refer to pager in C.C.S. Papers. 

316 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS fCont'd) 

COORDINATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

CCS approve certain views regarding

liaison with the Soviet High Command of Anglo-American strategic

bombing in eastern Germany to be 

put forward to the Russians, 237 

EQUIPPING LIBERATED FORCES 

CCS agree to proposals for equipping

Greek forces, 226 

CCS note that agreement for equipping

Greek forces will not interfere with 

equipment for Allied and liberated 

forces in Northwest Europe nor result 

in subsequent charges against US. 

resources, 244 

CCS take note of reduced requirements for liberated manpower In ETO, 226 

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 

CCS take note of SCAEF's plan for 

operations during spring and summer of 1945, 223 

CCS take note of CIC report of enemy

situation in Europe, 213 

FIETEENTH AIR FORCE 

CCS note that US.Chiefs of Staff were not contemplating transfer of any

formations of the Flfteenth Air 

Force from the Mediterranean, 201 

INDIA-BURMA AND CHINA THEATERS 

CCS approve policy for the allocation 

of resources between India-Burma 

and China Theaters, 219 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFP 

CCS approve the allocation of 400 LVT's 

to the Mediterranean Theater and 

200 LVT's to the 21st Army Group, 235 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS 

CCS approve directive to SACMED, 230 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

CCS take note of the plans and operations proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff in CCS 411/11, 222 

PETROLEUM 

CCS approve policy for the levels of 

supply of all petroleum produck in 

all theaters, 240 

PRISONERS OF WAR 

CCS approve proposed reciprocal agreement on prisoners of war, 243 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND 

PRIME MINISTER 

CCS approve ARGONAUT Conference 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 248 

SHIPPING 

CCS approve principles for guidance in 

the over-all review of cargo shipping,

227, 242 

CCS approve recommendation for the 

study of proposed civil relief ship­ ping agreement, 227 

CCS approve report on over-all review 

of cargo and troop shipping position

for the remainder of 1945, 242 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

CCS approve directive to SACSEA, 219 

TARGET DATE 

CCS approve planning date for the end 

of the war against Germany, 235 

CCS reaffirm planning date for the end 

of the war against Japan as recom­ mended in OCTAGON, 202 

TWELFTH AIR FORCE 

CCS approve movement to France of 

units of the Twelfth Air Force, 230 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

CCS approve directive for combatting

the German U-boat threat, 231 

CCS take note of Britfsh summary of 

the German U-boat threat and an­ prove directive for measures -6coLbat, 223 

ZONES OF OCCUPATION 

CCS approve agreement for the American control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, 236 

DENMARK 

Discussion of the possibility for naval 

operations in support of the land offensive in Northern Europe, 264 

Note: Itauc numerair refer to pages in minutes of meeting. 

plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

317 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DIRECTIVES 

TO the Supreme Allied Commander,

Mediterranean. 142 

To the Supreme Allied commander,

Southeast Asia. 19 

U-boat threat, 153 

DOMINIONS 

CCS discussion regarding reciprocal 

agreement on prisoners of war, 242 

DUSSELDORF 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of 

operations for the winter and spring of 1945, 121, 123 

Resume of operations planned for the 

western Front, 305 

E 

EASTERN FRONT 

Coordination of offensive operations in 

the spring and summer months of 

1945. 253 

Discussion regarding enemy intelligence and movement of enemy forces 

among various fronts, 277 

Discussion regarding liaison arrangements between the Brltish-US. and 

Russian armies, 261 

Estimate of the enemy situation in 

Europe 88 of 23 January 1945, 29 

oeneral Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

Marshal Stalin’s statement regarding preponderance of Russian divisions 

over the Germans on the Eastern 

Front. 308 

Outline of the situation existing on the 

Eastern Front, 300 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Oermany, 136, 1f34 

ECONOMY 

Estlmate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945. 33 

EISENHOWER, GENERAL D. D. 

Concurrence in rewording and ampli­ flcation of plan for operations in 

ETO, 124 

EQUIPMENT 

(See Supplies and Equipment) 

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 

CCS approve movement to France of 

units of the Twelfth Air Force, 230 

CCS take note of CIC report of enemy situation in Europe, 213 

Employment of the 47th Light Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe, 210 

Forces available in the ETO for spring offensive, 120 

General Anderson’s remark regarding need of P-41% in Northwest Europe,

209 

U.S.Army overseas strengths after V-E 

Day, 99 

EUROPE, NORTHWEST 

CCS discussion regarding levels of sup­ ply of petroleum products in United 

Kingdom and Northwest Europe, 228 

CCS discussion regarding number of 

days’ stocks required in certaln cateaories of oil, 234 

Transfer of the Twelfth Air Force from 

Italy to France, 229 

F 

FAN 477, 

185 

FAN 501, 

142 

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 200, 

201 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

FIFTH ARMY 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 208 

FLEET TRAIN 

British-controlled dry cargo shipping position (March-June), 67 

British dry cargo shipping position after V-E Day, 87 

FORCES, ALLIED 

DEPLOYMENT 

Permanent allocation of forces, a function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

201 

US. Army overseas strengths after V-E 

Day, 99 

EUROPEAN THEATER 

Agreed principle regarding coordination of air with land offensives, 256 

Employment of the 47th Light Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe, 210 

Forces available in the ETO for spring offensive, 120 

General Anderson’s remark regarding need of P-41% in Northwest Europe,

209 

General Marshall’s statement regarding availability of forces for crossing the 

Rhine, 307 

General Marshall’s statement regarding number of tank divisions in General 

Eisenhower’s command, 307 

General Marshall’s statement regarding number of Allied divisions on the 

Western Front, 245 

General Smith’s remarks regarding employment of French divisions, 198 

Marshal Stalin’s statement regarding preponderance of Russian divisions 

over the Germans on the Eastern 

Front, 308 

Number of U.S. and British air forces 

on the Western and Italian Fronts 

and their proposed employment, 256 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding American-British preponderance over 

the Germans in aircraft and armored 

trOODS. 308 

Reserves for relief of tired units in 

Northwest Europe, 198, 289 

Shortage of service troops, 221 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

CCS discussion regarding British equip­ ping of Greek forces, 244 

Principle with regard to transfer of 

tactical air forces from SACNIED to 

SCAEF, 140, 141, 229 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force from 

the Mediterranean to European Theater of Operations, 200 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean of 

the Twelfth Tactical Air Force, 208, 

229 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 290 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Employment of Australian troops, 221 

REDEPLOYMENT 

General Marshall’s remarks regarding planning for the redeployment of 

forces from Europe to the Pacific, 281 

Redeployment of air forces to the Australian area, 81 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

British memorandum regarding allocation of resources between IndiaBurma and China Theaters, 102 

Employment of British forces in China, 

292 

Employment of U.S. resources in Southeast Asia, 211, 218, 292 

to China, 282 

Responsibility for the protection of the 

northern part of the Burma road, 212 

FORCES, ENEMY 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 

277 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, 35 

Measures to prevent movement of German forces from Norway. 259 

Number of German and Itakan enemy divisions in Italy, 255 

Withdrawal of German forces from 

Italy, 255 

Note: xwe numerab refer to pager in minutes of meetfng. 

PW type numerab refel‘ to pages In c.c.8. Papers. 

319 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

47TH LIGHT BOMBER GROUP 

Employment of the 47th Light Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe, 210 

FRANCE 

CCS approve movement to France of 

units of the Twelfth Air Force, 230 

Employment of mench divisions, 198 

Forces available in the ETO for spring offensive, 120 

General Marshall’s statement regarding strategic reasons for maintaining the 

goodwill of Russia and other Allies, 

231 

Responsibility for the equipping of liberated manpower, 132, 134, 165 

FRANKFURT, GERMANY 

General Bull’s remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest EUrope, 194 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of oper­ ations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 117, 123, 304 

G 

GDYNIA 

Present situation regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945, 147 

GERMANY 

Allied action to prevent German withdrawal from Italy, 255, 257 

American control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, 9, 235 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 159 

Draft agreement for control of the 

Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave pro­ posed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy, 

5 

Employment of air forces to prevent German withdrawals from Italy, 257 

Employment of war-weary bombers 

against industrial targets in oermany,

193 

Establishment of liaison with the Soviet 

High Command for Anglo-American strategic bombing in Germany, 182, 

237, 249 

Estimate of the enemy situation in EUrope as of 23 January 1945, 29 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for the defeat of Germany, 160 

General Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

General Bull‘s remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest EUrope, 194 

Map showing Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, facing page 8 

Movement of German forces from Norway, 259 

Number of German and enemy Italian 

divisions in Italy, 255 

Over-all objective and strategic concept for the urosecution of the war. 159 

Pinning ‘date for the end of the war 

with Germany, 136, 164, 202, 211, 235, 

265 

Present situation regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945, 146 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding American-British preponderance over 

the Germans in aircraft and armored 

troops, 308 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of oper­ ations for the winter and spring of 

1945. 123. 161 

The President and General AntonOV’S 

statements regarding widening the 

gauge of captured German railroad 

rolling stock, 304 

Ripartite Military Meeting discussion 

reeardina date of the end of the war 

with Germany, 265 

GREECE 

Directive to SACMED, 142,166 

Equipping of Greek forces, 226, 244 

discussion regarding withdrawal o forces from the Mediterranean 

Theater to ETO, 290 

Responsibility for the equipping of liberated manpower, 132, 134, 165 

”GRENADE” 

General Bull’s remarks regarding Projected operations in Northwest EUrope, 194 

Note: 1tau0 numera1s refer to pages in minuter of meettng. 

plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

320 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

H 

HAINAN 

General ~ ~~ Marshall and Admiral Kine’s

statements regarding operations In 

the Pacific, 219 

HALIFAX, LORD 

Draft agreement for control of the 

Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr.McCloy,

5 

HAMBURG, GERMANY 

Prime Minister’s statement with regard

to submarine assembling points, 307 

HONSHU 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13, 

169 

HOPKINS, HARRY L. 

Agreement for shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945, 47 

HOUFFALIZE, GERMANY 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest ~urope,114 

HUNGARY 

Estimate of the enemy situation in 

Europe as of 23 January 1945, 41 

I 

INDIA-BURMA THEATER 

British memorandum regarding allocation of resources between India-Burma and China Theaters, 102 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 162, 110 

General Marshall’s statemeut regarding employment of U.S. resources in 

Southeast Asia. 212 

Policy with regaid to U.S.forces in the 

India-Burma Theater, 17, 218 

Responsibility for the protection of the 

northern part of the Burma Road, 212 

US. Army overseas strengths - after V-E

Day, 99 

INTELLIGENCE 

Estimate of the enemy situation in 

Europe as of 23 January 1945, 29, 213 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding enemy intelligence and 

movement of enemy forces among

various fronts, 278 

ITALIAN FRONT 

Action to stop German withdrawals 

from Italy, 255 

Coordination of offensive operations in 

the spring and summer months of 

1945. 253 

Number of U.S.and British air forces 

on the Western and Italian Fronts and 

their proposed employment, 256 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding enemy intelligence and 

movement of enemy forces among

various fronts. 277 

ITALY 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

forces from the Mediterranean Theater ..~to ~~ ETO. 216

CCS disc&ion regarding transfer of 

the Twelfth Air Force from Italy to 

France, 229 

Directive ~~~~~ to SACMED. .. 142.166

Estimate of the enemy situation in 

Europe as of 23 January 1945. 29 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for operations in the Mediterranean, 182 

General Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

Number of German and enemy Italian 

divisions in Italy, 255 

The President and Prime Minister’s remarks regarding sovereignty over 

Trieste, 291 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding Allied action to prevent

German withdrawals from Italy, 257 

IWO JlMA 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13,

169 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in minutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

321 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

J 

JAPAN 

Admiral King’s statement with regard

to effectiveness of U.S. U-boat warfare in the Pacific. 284 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 160 

CCS reafUrm planning date for the end 

of the war against Japan as recommended at OCTAGON.202 

General Kuter’s statement regarding employment of B-29’s against Japan, -IPPi

General Marshall and Admiral King’s

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

Japanese suicide attacks, 194 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12,

168 

Over-all objective and strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 159 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan, 162 

Planning for the entry of Russia into 

the war against Japan, 13 

Prime Minister and oeneral Marshall’s 

statements regarding postponement of main operations against Japan until after the close of the German war, 

293, 294 

The President and Prime Minister’s 

statements regarding a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan for unconditional surrender. 296 

JAVA 

Plenary discussion regarding operations in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

K 

KAMCHATKA PENINSULA 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13, 

169 

KASSEL, GERMANY 

Projected operations in Northwest Europe, 194 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of opera­ tions for the winter and spring of 

1945, 117 123 

KHUDYAKOV, MARSHAL 

Statements in reference to: 

Allied action to prevent German withdrawals from Italy, 258 

Effective employment of Russian aviation in support of ground forces,258 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 

279 

Liaison for coordination of air opera­ tions, 264 

Provision of Soviet airfields for damaged British night fighters, 277 

Technique of employing air power in 

offensive operations, 260 

KIEL, GERMANY 

Prime Minister’s statement with regard

to submarine assembling points, 307 

KING, ADMIRAL E. J. 

Statements in reference to: 

Allocation of forces, a function of the 

Combined Chiefs of StaU, 201 

Combatting the German U-boat 

threat, 222 

EUectiveness of US. U-boat warfare 

in the Pacific, 284 

Japanese suicide attacks, 194 

Naval operations in support of the 

land offensives in Northern Europe,

265 

Operations in Burma and China, 284 

ODerations in the PacUlc. 219 

Resume of present and future opera­ tions in the Pacific, 266, 279 

Shipping to Russia via Dardanelles, 

288 

KRA PENINSULA 

Employment of US. resources in Southeast Asia, 292 

Plenary discussion regarding operations in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

Note: Itauc nomerala refer to pages ~n minutes or meeting. 

lain type numeras refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

322 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

KURILES 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13, 

169 

KUTER, MAJOR GENERAL L. S. 

Statments in reference to: 

Bombline and liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian armies, 269 

Employment of B-29’s against Japan, 

281 

Employment of the 47th LiRht Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe. 210 

Impracticability of the Russian revised draft agreement regarding liaison with the Soviet High Command for strategic bombing in eastern Germany, 249 

Measures to combat the German Uboat threat. 222 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 200 

Transfer of the Twelfth Air Force 

from Italv to France. 230 

Withdrawai of forces from the Medlterranean Theater to ETO, 217 

KUZNETSOV, ADMIRAL 

Statements in reference to: 

Naval operations in support of the 

land offensives in Northern Europe, 264 

Operations in Burma and China, 284 

KYUSHU ISLAND, JAPAN 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s statemenk regarding operations in 

9 

L 

LAND, ADMIRAL E. S. 

Statement of the CSAB on the dry cargo shipping position prlor to V-E Day, 64 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT 

Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean, 105, 231, 235 

LAW, RICHARD 

Agreement for shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during flrst six months of 1945, 41 

LEAHY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. 

Statements in reference to: 

Accomplishments during ARGONAUT 

Conference, 250 

Date for the end of the war with Germany, 265 

Exchange of information on rivercrossing technique and equipment, 

276 

Levels of supply of all petroleum products in all theaters, 240 

Liaison arrangements between the 

British-U.S. and Russian armies, 

261 

Operations in Southeast Asia command, 293 

Over-all review of cargo shipping, 241 

Preparation of flnal report to the 

President and Prime Minister, 244 

Reciprocal agreement on prisoners of 

war, 243 

LEATHERS, LORD 

CCS discussion regarding over-all review of cargo shipping, 241 

Statement of the CSAB on the dry cargo shipping position prior to V-E Day, 64 

LIAIS0N 

CCS approve certain views regarding liaison with the Soviet High Command 

of Anglo-American strategic bombing in eastern Germany to be put forward 

to the RussianS, 237 

CCS discussion regarding impractica­ bility of the Russian revised draft 

agreement regarding liaison with the 

Soviet High Command for strategic bombing in eastern Germany, 249 

Note: Italle numerals refer to pages in mlnutes of meeting. 

Plain type numcrarls refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

323 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LIAISON (Cont‘dl 

General Antonov’s statement regarding bombline arrangements and employment of Russian air forces against important German targets, 272 

General Kuter’s statement regarding

British-U.S. principles for establishing bombline between British-U.S. and 

Russian forces, 269 

General Marshall’s statement with regard to liaison arrangements pres­ ently necesary in the Berlin area, 271 

Proposal for the establishment of liaison 

with the Soviet High Command with 

the Anglo-American strategic bombing in Germany, 183 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian 

armies. 261 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding bombline and liaison arrangements between the British-US. 

and Russian armies 269 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

with regard to liaison for coordination of air operations, 260 

LIBERATED AREAS 

Agreement for shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during flrst six months of 1945, 41 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 159 

British-controlled dry cargo shipping position (March-June 1945), 61 

British dry cargo shipping position after V-E Day, 81 

CCS approve recommendation for the 

study of proposed civil relief shipping 

agreement. 227 

CCS approve.wording for sub-paragraph

h, Basic Undertakings in Support of 

Over-All Strategic Concept, 237 

General Marshall’s statement regarding effect of suggested new category of 

basic undertakings on availability of 

shipping for military operations, 232, 

288 

General Somervell’s remarks regarding 

extent of relief requirements included 

under military shipping, 232 

Principles for guidance in allocation of 

combined shipping, 56 

LIBERATED FORCES 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concevt. 156 

ccs agree -to prop&& for equipping Greek forces, 226, 244 

CCS take note of reduced requirements for liberated manpower in ETO, 226 

Field Marshal Brooke’s statement regarding equipment for Allied and 

liberated forces, 226 

Responsibility for the equipping of 

liberated manpower, 132, 134, 165 

LIEGE-NAMUR SECTOR 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 113 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

Admiral King and the Prime Minister’s 

statements regarding shipping to RUSsia via Dardanelles, 288 

Admiral King’s statement with regard 

to effectiveness of US. U-boat warfare in the Paciflc, 284 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 160 

Directive to the Supreme Comander for 

operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 163, 110 

General Antonov’s resum6 of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Paciflc, 219 

The President and General Antonov’s 

statements regarding widening the 

gauge of captured German railroad 

rolling stock, 304 

LJUBLJANA GAP 

Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 

208 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding Allied operations directed 

toward Ljubljana Gap, 259 

LOGISTICS 

General Bull’s remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest Eu­ rme. .~~I 194

~~~ 

General Smith‘s remarks regarding distribution of forces for the coming offensive, 196 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in minuter of meetlng. 

Plain type numerals refer to paees in C.C.S. Papers. 

324 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LOSS RATE 

Present situation regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945, 148 

"LOYALIST" 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Comand, 19, 163, 170 

M 

McCLOY, J. J. 

MACREADY, LT. GEN. G. N. 

Draft agreement for control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave proposed

by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy. 2 

MAINZ-KARLSRUHE 

SCAEF's appreciation and plan of op­ erations for the winter and spring of 

1945. 117, 123 

MAINZ-MANNHEIM 

General Bull's remarks regarding pro­ jected operations in Northwest EUrope, 194 

MALACCA, STRAITS OF 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 163, 170 

Plenary discussion regarding operations

in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

MALAYA PENINSULA 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 163, 110 

EmDloSment of U.S.resources in Southoeneral MarJhall's statement regarding

employment of US. resources in 

Southeast Asia, 212, 213 

Plenary discussion regarding operations

in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

MANPOWER 

CCS take note of reduced requirements

for liberated manpower in ETO.226 

Estimate of the enemy situation in EUrope as of 23 January 1945, 35 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Germany, 136, 184. 202, 235 

MAPS 

Map showing Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, facing page 8 

MARITIME PROVINCES 

oeneral Marshall and Admiral King's 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 221 

MARSHALL, GENERAL G. C. 

Statements in reference to: 

Advantage of more than one line of 

advance on the Western Front, 198 

Agenda for the conference at Malta, 

192 

American control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave, 236 

Availability of forces for crossing the 

Rhine, 307 

Bases for U.S. strategic bomber forces 

in the Vienna-Budapest area, 276 

Bombline and liaison arraneements 

between the British4l.S. aGd Russian armies, 271 

British equipping ~ ~~ of Greek forces, 244

Continuation of the CCS organization after the end of the war, 297 

Coordination of offensive operations in Europe during the spring and 

summer of 1945, 254, 275 

Coordination of operations with the 

Russians, 200 

Effect of suggested new category of 

basic undertakings on availability

of shipping for military operations.

232,288 

Note: Italic numerails refer to pages In minutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Paptrr. 

325 
goodwill 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MARSHALL, GENERAL G. C. (Cont'dl 

Effectiveness of recent Allied air op­ erations. 257 

Employment of British forces in 

China, 293 

Employment of fighter-bombers to attack communications, entrances to 

tunnels and underground produc­ tion ulants, 193 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 

278 

Final report to the President and 

Prime Minister, 248 

Flying bomb and rocket attacks on 

London, 192 

Importance of China in relation to 

U.S. action in the Paclfic, 283 

Levels of supply of petroleum products

in UX. and Northwest Europe. 228 

Liaison arrangements between the 

British-US. and Russians, 262 

Liaison arrangements presently necessary in the Berlin area, 271 

Liaison for coordination of air opera­ tions, 262 

Measures to combat the German Uboat threat. 222 

Number of Allied divisions on the 

Western Front, 245 

Number of German and enemy Italian 

divisions on the Italian Front. 306 

Number of tank divisions in General 

Eisenhower's command. 307 

Ooerations in Burma and China, 282 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command, 292 

Operations in the Pacific, 219 

Operation of US. Air Force and the 

transport of supplies and equipment

to China, 282 

Planning date for the end of the war

with Germany. 202, 211, 266 

Planning for the redeployment of 

forces from Europe to the PBCIAC, 7P1 

Possibility of German suicide attacks 

on vital targets, 194 

Postponement of main operations against Japan until after the close 

of the German war, 294 

Proposed directive to SACSEA, 212,218 

Proposed measures to combat German 

U-boat menace, 306 

Reciprocal agreement on prisoners of 

war, 243 

Removal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO. .. 208.217

Responsibility for the protection of 

the northern part of the Burma 

Road, 212 

Results achieved bv the Chinese 

forces, 292 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 304 

Review of care0 ShiDDinE. .. _. 227

Strategic reasons for maintaining the

"". of Russla and other Allies, 

LJ1 

Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 208 

Technique of employing air power in 

offensive operations, 261 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 201 

Transfer of the Twelfth Air Force 

from Italy to France, 229 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean 

of a part of the Twelfth Tactical 

Air Force, 208 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 207, 216 

Directive to SACMED. 142, 166, 230 

Employment of the 47th Light Bomber 

Group in Northwest Europe, 210 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for operations in the Mediterranean. 162 

Field Marshal Brooke and General Marshall's statements regarding strategy

in the Mediterranean Theater, 208 

Number of German and enemy Italian 

divisions on the Italian Front, 306 

Plenary discussion regarding Strategy in 

the Mediterranean, 290 

Principle with regard to transfer of 

tactical air forces from SACMED to 

SCAEF, 140, 141, 229 

Provision of LVT's for the Mediterranean, 105, 231, 235 

Responsibility for the equipping of liberated manpower, 132, 134, 165 

Note: Italle numerals reler to pages in mlnutes of meeting. 

plain type numerals refer to pager In C.C.S. Papers. 

326 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MEDITERRANEANTHEATER 

OF OPERATIONS fCont’di 

The President and Prime Minister’s re­ marks regarding sovereignty over

Trieste, 291 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 200, 

201 

Ripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding Allied operations directed 

toward Ljubljana Gap, 258, 259 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air 

Force, 207, 229, 230 

“MEDLOC“ 

British-controlled troop shipping posh

tion after V-E Day, 92 

Position of British-controlled troop

shipping position (March-June 1945),

79 

MONSCHAU 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations In Northwest Europe, 112 

MOSELLE 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 121, 124 

N 

NAF 841, 

188 

NETHERLANDS 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

of the possibility for naval operations

in support of the land offensive in 

Northern Europe, 264 

NEW GUINEA 

Employment of Australian troops, 221 

NORWAY 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, 40 

General Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

Measures to prevent movement of Ger­ man forces from Norway, 259 

0 

OKHOTSK, SEA OF 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13,

169 

OKINAWA (see Ryukyu Islands) 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

In the war against the Axis, 160 

In the war against Japan, 162 

P 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Admlral King’s statement with regard 

to effectiveness of US. U-boat war­ fare in the Pacific, 284 

General Kuter’s statement regarding

employment of B-29’s against Japan, 

281 

General Marshall’s remarks regarding

planning for the redeployment of 

forces from Europe to the PaciAc, 281 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12, 

168. 219 

Resume of present and future operations in the Paciflc, 219, 279 

Resume of situation in the Far East and 

ouerations in that area. 266

u.S. Army overseas strength after V-E 

Day, 99 

PETROLEUM 

Agreement on levels of supply of all 

petroleum products in all theaters, 23, 

165, 171, 234, 240 

CCS discussion regarding levels of supply of petroleum products in United 

Kingdom and Northwest Europe, 228 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, 34 

Note: Itilk numerals refer to pages In minutes of meetlng. 

PW typ nome& refer to pares fn C.C.S. rapen. 

327 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Employment of Australian troops, 221 

General Marshall and Admiral King's 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13 

PLANNING 

CCS reamrm planning date for the end 

of the war against Japan as recom­ mended at OCTAGON, 202 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Germany, 136, 164, 202, 211, 235 

Plannina for the entry of Russia into 

the war against Japan, 13 

POLAND 

Estimate of the enemy situation in EUroDe as of 23 January 1945, 29 

Responsibility for the equipping of liberated manpower, 132 

PORTAL, SIR CHARLES 

Statements in reference to: 

Agreed principle regarding coordination of air with land offensives, 256 

Allocation of forces, a function of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 201 

Bombline and liaison arrangements

between the British-US. and Russian armies, 271 

Bombline arrangements and employment of Russian air forces against

important German taregts, 274 

Employment of fighter-bombers to attack communications, entrances to 

tunnels and underground production plants, 193 

Employment of US. resources in 

Southeast Asia, 292 

Employment of war-weary bombers 

against industrial targets in Germany, 193 

Flying bomb and rocket attacks on London, 193 

Impracticability of the Russian re­ vised draft agreement regarding

liaison with the soviet High Command for strategic bombing in 

eastern Germany, 249 

Liaison arrangements presently necessary in the Berlin area, 272 

Liaison for coordination of air operations, 263 

Measures to prevent movement of 

German forces from Norway, 259 

Measures to combat the German Uboat threat, 222 

Number of US. and British air forces 

on the Western and Italian Fronts 

and their proposed employment, 256 

Operations in Burma and China, 282 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command, 292 

Proposed directive to SACSEA, 213,218 

Provision of Soviet airfields for damaged British night fighters, 277 

Reciprocal agreement on prisoners of 

war, 243 

Strategy in the Mediterranean, 290 

The German U-boat threat, 203 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 200 

Transfer of the Twelfth Air Force 

from Italy to France, 229 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 216, 290 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Report to President and Prime Minister 

of the agreed summary of conclusions 

reached by the CCS at the ARGONAUT Conference, 159, 244, 248, 296 

Statements in reference to: 

Continuation of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff organization after the end 

of the war, 297 

Coordination of effort between American-British and Russians during

the winter offensives, 308 

Four-power ultimatum calling upon

Japanese unconditional surrender, 

296 

Operations planned for the Western 

Front, 304 

Results achieved by the Chinese 

forces, 292 

Widening the gauge of captured Ger­ man railroad rolling stock, 304 

Note: Italle numerals refer to pager In minutes Of meeting. 

PU type n-erais to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

328 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PRIME MINISTER OF THE 

UNITED KINGDOM 

Report to President and Prime Minister 

of the agreed summary of conclusions 

reached by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at the ARGONAUT Conference, 

159,244, 248, 296 

Statements in reference to: 

American-British preponderance over the Germans in aircraft and armored troops, 308 

Continuation of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff organization after the end 

of the war, 296 

Coordination of effort between American-British and Russians during

the winter offensives, 309 

Diversion of air effort against Ger­ man U-boat pens, 289 

Employment of British forces in 

China, 292 

Employment of US. resources in 

Southeast Asia 292 

Exchange of information with U.S.S.R. 

regarding amphibious operations, 

307 

Four-power ultimatum calling upon

Japanese unconditional surrender, 

296 

General Eisenhower's proposed operation to close up to the Rhine, 289 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command, 291 

Operations planned for the Western 

FVont, 304 

Postponement of main operations

against Japan until after the close 

of the German war, 293, 294 

Reserves in Northweslrrn Europe to 

replace tired divisions. 289 

Results achieved by the Chinese 

forces, 292 

Shipping required for imports to Great 

Britain, 288 

Shipping to Russia via Dardanelles, 

288 

Sovereignty over Trieste, 291 

Submarine assembling points, 307 

US.-British occupation of Austria, 

290, 291 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 290 

PRIORITY 

CCS discussion regarding over-all re­ view of cargo shipping, 241 

General Kuter's statement regarding

employment of B-29's against Japan, 

281 

General Marshall's remarks with regard 

to planning for the redeployment of 

forces from Euroue to the Pacific. 281 

Principles for yuidince in allocation of 

combined shipping, 56,227 

Shortage of service troops, 221 

PRISONERS OF WAR 

Reciprocal agreement regarding liberated Allied prisoners of war 171, 242, 

243 

PRODUCTION 

Basic undertakings in support of over­ all strategic concept, 164 

Effectiveness of recent Allied air operations on enemy production, 257 

Estimate of the enemy situation in EUrope as of 23 January 1945,33 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Germany, 136, 164,202, 235, 265 

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945,32 

R 

REDEPLOYMENT 

Basic undertakings in support of over­ all strategic concept, 159 

General Marshall's remarks with regard 

to planning for the redeployment of 

forces from Europe to the Pacific, 281 

Over-all review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 

1945, 91,241 

Position of British-controlled troop

shipping position (March-June 1945),

74._ 

Redeployment of air forces to the AUStralian area, 81 

Shortage of service troops, 221 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in mlnuter Of meeting. 

Plain type numerails refer to pages in C.C.S. Papem. 

329 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION 

Agreement for shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during

first six months of 1945,47 

CCS approve recommendation for the 

study of proposed civil relief shipping 

agreement, 227 

General Somervell’s remarks regarding 

extent of relief requirements included 

under military shipping, 232 

Principles for guidance in allocation of 

combined shipping, 56 

REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND 

PRIME MINISTER 

CCS approve ARGONAUT Conference 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 159,248 

Basic undertakings in support of over­ all strategic concept, 156, 159 

Plenary meeting discussion with regard 

to, 288 

The President and Prime Minister’s ac­ ceptance of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the ARGONAUT Conference, 296 

RHINE RIVER 

General Bull’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest Europe, 194 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

availability of forces for crossing the 

Rhine, 307 

General Smith’s remarks with regard 

to crossing of the Rhine, 196 

Plenary discussions regarding General 

Eisenhower’s proposed operation to 

close up to the Rhine, 289 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 305 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 116, 123 

RIDDELL-WEBSTER, GEN. SIR THOMAS 

Statement in reference to levels of supply of petroleum products in United 

Kingdom and Northwest Europe, 228 

ROCKETS AND FLYING BOMBS 

Employment of fighter-bombers to attack communications, entrances to 

tunnels and underground production

plants. 193 

Esiirnate of the enemy situation in EUrope as of 23 January 1945, 39 

Statements regarding flying bomb and 

rocket attacks on London, 192 

ROER RIVER 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 305 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 111 

RUHR 

General Bull’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest Europe, 194 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 305 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

RUSSIA (see u.s.s.R.) 

RUSSIAN FRONT (see Eastern mont) 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13, 

169,219 

S 

SAAR 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 111 

SAAR-LAUTERN 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 111 

ST. NAZAIRE 

General Smith’s remarks regarding em­ ployment of French divisions, 198 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages In mlnutes of meetins. 

Plain type numerals rete. to pages In C.C.S. PPWrS. 

330 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

SCAF 179, 

109 

SCAF 180, 

116 

SCAF 194, 

123 

SCHNORKEL 

Admiral Cunningham and Sir Charles 

Portal’s statements regarding the 

Oerman U-boat threat, 202 

Present Situatlon regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945,146 

SHIPBUILDING, CONVERSIONS 

British-controlled troop shipping position after V-E Day, 92 

U.S. dry cargo shipping position after 

V-E Day, 89 

US. troop shipping position after V-E 

Day, 95 

SHIPPING 

Admiral King and the Prime Minister’s 

statements regarding shipping to RUSsia via Dardanelles, 288 

Agreement for shipment of supplies to 

liberated European countries during first six months of 1945,41 

CCS approve recommendation for the 

study of proposed civil relief shipping

agreement, 227 

CCS approve report on over-all review 

of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945,242 

Directive for effecting countermeasures 

against the German U-boat threat,

153 

Oeneral Marshall’s statements regarding effect of suggested new category of basic undertakings on availability

of shipping for military operations,

232, 288 

General Somervell‘s remarks regarding 

extent of relief requirements included 

under military shipping, 232 

Over-all review of cargo shipping, 55 

Over-all shipping deficiencies, 53,55,61 

Present situation regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945, 146 

Prime Minister and oeneral Marshall’s 

statements regarding postponement

of main operations against Japan until after the close of the German war, 

293. 294 

PrOVi$ional forecast of combined dry 

cargo and troop shipping position after V-E Day on 1July 1945,86,164 

Statement of the CSAB on the drv care0 

shipping position prior to V-E bay, Z4 

SHIPPING, CARGO 

British-controlled dry cargo shipping

uosition (March-June 1945). 61 

British dry cargo shipping position after 

V-E Day, 87 

CCS approve principles for guidance in 

the over-all review of cargo shipping,

227 

CCS discwion regarding over-all review of cargo shipping, 227, 242 

Over-all review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 

1945. 60 

Present ~ situation regarding the German U-boat threat during 1945, I46 

US. dry cargo shipping position (MarchJune 1945), 74 

US. dry cargo shipping position after 

V-E Day, 89 

SHIPPING, PERSONNEL 

British-controlled troop shipping position after V-E Day. 92 

British-controlled troop shipping position (March-June 1945),79 

Over-all review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 

1945. 80 

Present situation regarhg the arman 

U-boat threat during 1945, 146 

U.S. troop shipping position (MarchJune 1945). 85 

US. troop siipping position after V-E 

Day. 95 

SIEGFRIED LINE 

General Smith’s remarks regarding

vulnerability of the Siegfried line, 199 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

SlLESlA 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945,29 

SLOVAKIA 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945,41 

SMITH, LT. GEN. W. B. 

Statements in reference to: 

Crossing of the Rhine, 196 

Distribution of forces for the coming offensive, 196 

Employment of French divisions, 198 

SCAEF’s plan for operation, 211 

Timing factor for proposed operations,

196 

Vulnerability of the Siegfried line, 199 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean 

of a part of the Twelfth Tactical 

Air Force. 209 

Withdrawai of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 217 

SOMERVELL, LT. GEN. B. B. 

Statements in reference to: 

Levels of supply of petroleum products

in United Kingdom and Northwest 

Europe, 228 

Number of days’ forward stocks required in certain categories of oil, 

234 

Over-all review of cargo shipping, 242 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 19, 163, 170,211, 218 

Discussion regarding operations in 

Southeast Asia Command. 291 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

employment of U.S. resources in 

Southeast Asia, 212, 213 

Policy with regard to U.S.forces in the 

India-Burma Theater, 17 

Responsibility for the protection of the 

northern part of the Burma Road, 212 

SOVEREIGNTY 

The President and Prime Minister’s remarks regarding sovereignty over 

Trieste, 291 

STALIN, MARSHAL 

Statements in reference to: 

Attrition of tanks in Russian central 

campaign, 307 

Coordinationof effortsbetween American-British and Russians during

the winter offensives, 308 

Preponderance of Russian divisions 

over the Germans on the Eastern 

Front. 

~ ~..~., 308.. 

Russian assault against Danzig as a 

measure to combat the U-boat menace, 309 

STRASBOURG 

General Smith’s remarks regarding the 

timing factor for proposed operations,

196 

Resum6 of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 305 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 114 

STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 

Transfer of the Fifteenth Air Force 

from the Mediterranean to ETO, 200 

STRATEGY 

Agreed principle regarding coordination of air with land offensives,256 

BASIC POLICIES 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 156, 159 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for the defeat of Germany, 160 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for operations in the Mediterranean, 162 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan, 162 

Over-all objective and strategic concept

for the prosecution of the war, 159 

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff at the ARGONAUT 

conference, 159 

Note: It=lle numerals refer to pages in minutes of meetlng. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages ln C.C.S. Papers. 

332 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

STRATEGY (Cont’d) 

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

OF OPERATIONS 

Coordination of offensive operations in 

the spring and summer months of 

1945,253 

Field Marshal Brooke and General 

Smith’s statements regarding SCAEF’s 

plan for operation, 211 

General Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in EurODe. -. 303

General Bull’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest Europe, 194 

General Marshall’s remarks regarding advantage of more than one line of 

advance on the Western Front, 198 

General Marshall’s statement regard­ ing availability of forces for crossing

the Rhine. 307 

General Smiths’ remarks regarding distribution of forces for the coming

offensive,196 

General Smith’s remarks regarding the 

timing factor for proposed operations, 

196 

Plenary discussion regarding General 

Eisenhower’s proposed operation to 

close up to the Rhine, 289 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 304 

SCAEF’s account of the development of 

operations in Northwest Europe, 109 

SCAEF’s appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 

1945, 116, 123, 223 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

placing the whole effortin the North, 

197 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding coordination of offensive 

operations in Europe during the 

spring and summer of 1945, 275 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

OF OPERATIONS 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 216 

Directive to SACMED, 142, 166, 230 

Employment of air forces to prevent

German withdrawals from Italy, 257 

Field Marshal Brooke and General Marshall’s statements regarding strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 208 

Plenary discussion regarding strategy

in the Mediterranean, 290 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 219 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12, 

168, 219 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Directive to the Supreme Commander 

for operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command. 19.. 163.. 170.211.218 . General Marshall’s statement regarding employment of US. resources in 

Southeast Asia, 212 

Plenary discussion regarding operations

in Southeast Asia, 291 

SUMATRA 

Plenary discussion regarding operations in Southeast Asia, 291 

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT 

Agreement on levels of supply of all 

petroleum products in all theaters, 23, 

165. 171, 240 

ccs .agree to proposals for equipping

Greek forces, 226, 244 

CCS discussion regarding levels of supply of petroleum products in United 

Kingdom and Northwest Euroue. 228 

CCS discussion regarding number of 

days’ stocks required in certain categories of oil, 234 

CCS take note of reduced requirements

for liberated mamower in ETO. 226 

Responsibility for t<e equipping of liberated manpower, 132, 134, 165 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

equipment for Allied and liberated 

forces. 226 

Statement regarding attrition of tanks 

in Russian central campaign, 307 

T 

TACTICAL AIR FORCES 

Principle with regard to transfer of 

tactical air forces from SACMED to 

SCAEF, 140, 141, 230 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in -Utes 01 meeting. 

Plain type numcms refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

333 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

TANKS 

General Marshall’s statement regarding number of tank divisions in General 

Eisenhower’s command, 307 

Statement regarding attrition of tanks 

in Russian central campaign, 307 

TANKERS 

Present situation regarding the German U-boat threat during 1945, 150 

TARGET DATES 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 13, 

169 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Germany, 136, 164 

Planning date for the end of the war 

with Japan, 202 

TECHNIQUE 

Admiral Leahy and General AntonoV’s 

statements regarding exchange of information on river-crossing technique and equipment, 276 

Discussion with regard to the technique of employing air power in offensive 

operations, 260 

Discussion with regard to the technique

of employing artillery in offensive 

operations, 260 

The Prime Minister’s statement regard­ ing exchange of information with 

U.S.S.R. regarding amphibious opera­ tions, 307 

TOKYO PWIN 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s

statements regarding operations In 

the Paciflc, 219 

Operations for the defeat of Japan, 12, 

168 

TRIESTE 

The President and Prime Minister’s remarks regarding sovereignty over 

Trieste, 291 

TROOPLIFT (see Shipping, Personnel) 

TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR FORCE 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO, 216 

CCS discussion regarding transfer of 

the Twelfth Air Force from Italy to 

France, 229 

Withdrawal from the Mediterranean of 

a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air 

Force, 208, 229 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

General Kuter’s statement regarding employment of B-29’s against Japan,

281 

21ST ARMY GROUP 

Provision of LVT’s, 105, 235 

U 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

Admiral Cunningham and Sir Charles 

Portal’s statements regarding the German U-boat threat, 202 

Admiral King’s statement with regard 

to effectiveness of U.S. U-boat warfare in the Paciflc, 284 

CCS discwion regarding measures to 

combat the German U-boat threat, 

222 

Directive for effecting countermeasures 

against the German U-boat threat, 

153, 231 

Estimate of the enemy situation In Euroue as of 23 January 1945. 29 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept for the defeat of Germany, 160 

General Marshall’s statement reaarding proposed measure to combat-German U-boat menace. 306 

Present situation regarding the German 

U-boat threat during 1945, 146. 222 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding diversion of air effortagainst German 

U-boat pens, 289 

Prime Minister’s statement with regard 

to submarine assembling points, 307 

Statements with regard to Rwian assault against Danzig as a measure to 

combat the U-boat menace, 309 

Note: Italic numeip18 reler to pages in mlnotn 01 meeting.

Plain type IllllllCIpLI rder to page in C.C.S. papers. 

334 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

U.S.S.R. 

Admiral King and the Prime Minister’s 

statement regarding shipping to Russia via Dardanelles, 288 

Basic undertakings in support of over­ all strategic concept, 160 

CCS agree Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter reply separately to Marshal 

Khudyakov indicating impracticability of revised bombline agreement

proposed by Sovet High Command, 

250 

CCS decision to press the Russians to 

agree to the proposals set forthin FAN 

477, 200 

Effective employment of Russian aviation in support of ground forces, 258 

Field Marshal Brooke and General Marshall’s statements regarding coordination of operations with the Russians, 200 

General AnMnov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

strategic reasons for maintaining the 

goodwill of Russia and other Allies, 

231 

General Marshall and Admiral King’s 

statements regarding operations in 

the Pacific, 21 9 

Outline of the situation existing on the 

Eastern Front, 300 

Over-all objective and strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 159 

Planning for the entry of Russia into 

the war against Japan, 13 

Proposal for the establishment of liaison 

with the Soviet High Command over Anglo-American strategic bombing in 

Germany, 183,237 

Reciprocal agreement regarding liberated Allied prisoners of war, 177, 242 

Sir Charles Portal’s statement regarding

provision of Soviet airfields for damaged British night fighters, 277 

The President and General Antonov’s 

statements regarding widening the 

gauge of captured German railroad 

rolling stock, 304 

The President and Prime Minister’s 

statements regarding issuing a fourpower ultimatum calling upon Japa­ nese unconditional surrender. 296 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding bombline and liaison ar­ rangements between the British-US. 

and Russian armies, 269 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

regarding liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian 

armies, 261 

Tripartite Military Meeting discussion 

with regard to liaison for coordination 

of air operations, 262 

UNITED KINGDOM 

British-controlled dry cargo shipping 

position (March-June 1945), 67 

British-controlled troop shipping position after V-E Day, 92 

British dry cargo shipping position after 

V-E Day, 87 

CCS discussion regarding levels of supply of petroleum products in United 

Kingdom and Northwest Europe, 228 

CCS discussion regarding number of 

days’ stocks required in certain categories of oil, 234 

Position of British-controlled troop

shipping position (March-June 1945)

79 

The Prime Minister’s statement regarding shipping required for imports to 

Great Britain, 288 

V 

VLR BOMBERS 

(See Twentieth Air Force) 

”VERITABLE” 

General Bull’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest EUrope, 194 

VIENNA, AUSTRIA 

General Marshall and General Antonov’s statements regarding bases for 

US. strategic bomber forces in the 

Vienna-Budapest area, 276 

VOSGES 

SCAEF’s account of the development

of operations in Northwest Europe, 111 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages In mlnutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

335 
196 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

w 

WESTERN FRONT 

Coordination of offensive operations in 

the spring and summer months of 

1945, 253 

Enemy intelligence and movement of 

enemy forces among various fronts, 

277 

E,tlin:ite of the enemy situation in Europr ns of 23 January 1945, 29 

General Antonov’s resume of Russian 

intentions in Europe, 303 

General Bnll’s remarks regarding projected operations in Northwest Europe,

194 

General Marshall’s remarks regarding

advantage of more than one line of 

advance on the Western Front, 198 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

number of Allied divisions on the 

Western Front, 245 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

number of tank divisions in General 

Eisenhower’s command, 307 

General Smith’s remarks regarding the 

timing factor for proposed operations, -”” 

Liaison arrangements between the British-US. and Russian armies, 261 

Number of US. and British air forces on the Western and Italian Fronts 

and their proT)osed emulosment. 256 

Planning date for the end of the’ war with Germany, 136, 164 

Resume of operations planned for the 

Western Front, 304 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

placing the whole effort in the North, 

196 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

relief of tired units after crossing the 

Rhine, 198 

WESTWALL 

Estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, 31 

WILSON, FIELD MARSHAL 

Statements in reference to: 

Strategy in the Mediterranean, 290 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean Theater to ETO. 290 

Y 

YUGOSLAVIA 

Directive to SACMED. 141. 167 

Estimate of the enemy situation in EUrope ah of 23 Jnnuary 1945, 41 

The President and Prime Minister’s re­ marks regarding sovereignty over Trieste, 291 

Z 

ZONES OF OCCUPATION 

Agreement fur the American control of 

the Bremen-Bremerhnven enclave, 2. 

236 

Draft ngrrement for contrnl of the 

Brcmen-Bremerhaven enclave proposed by Lord 11:ilifax and Mr. Mrcloy. 2 

Map showing Bremen-Bremerhaven en­ clave, facing page 8 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in minutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

336