UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DAVID WEBB, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEGAN SMITH, U.S. Marshal’s Service Inspector; RICK CASAS, U.S. Marshal's Service Inspector; JAMES A. THOMPSON, U.S. Marsha l for District of Utah; ELIZABETH LNU, Deputy Clerk; MICHELLE LNU, Deputy Clerk; LOUISE S. YORK, Attorney, Ch ief Deputy Clerk, Defendants - Appellees. No. 16-4003 (D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00049-DLR) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , GORSUCH , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ David Webb appeals the district court’ s denial of his motion to amend his complaint. Exercising ju risdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 29, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- I Webb filed suit against several members of the U.S. Marshals Service and the District of Utah clerk’s of fice because he was require d to be accompanied by an armed security escort during vi sits to the District of Ut ah courthouse. He alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), and state tort law. The district court dismissed the Title VI claims for failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed the FTCA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Webb appealed to this court. We affirmed and remanded to the district c ourt to clarify that th e FTCA claims were dismissed without prejudice and to address Webb’s state tort claims. On remand, the district court amended its judgment to stat e that the dismissal of the FTCA claims was without prejudice, and that the cour t declined to exer cise supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claims. Webb then filed a motion to amend his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. The district court denied his motion because it had already issued a final judgme nt in the case. Th is appeal followed.
II Webb argues the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint because th e complaint demonstrated th at his claims had merit. 1 We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 15 mo tion to amend for abuse of discretion. Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991).

1 We construe Webb’s pro se filings liber ally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10t h Cir. 1991).-3- “This court has repeatedly and unequi vocally held that once judgment is entered, the filing of an am ended complaint is not perm issible until judgment is set aside or vacated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).” The Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1087 (1 0th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Webb filed his motion to amend after the district court entered its amended judgment. And the amended judgment was not set aside or vacated. Furt her, as recognized in our prior order and judgment, We bb must exhaust administra tive remedies before the district court would have ju risdiction over his FTCA clai ms. Although Webb filed an administrative complaint, he has not de monstrated that the complaint has been denied. Thus, he has not shown that he exhausted administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The district court di d not abuse its discre tion in denying Webb’s motion to amend his complaint. 2
III The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

2 Webb also appeals the district cour t’s amended judgment. However, Webb merely restates arguments made in his pr ior appeal. These ar guments are barred by the law of the case. Rohrbaugh v. Ce lotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a case is appealed and re manded, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the ca se and ordinarily will be fo llowed by both the trial court on remand and the appellate court in any subseque nt appeal.”).