FIFTH DIVISION August 17, 2007

No. 1-05- 1849 THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS,

Plai ntif f-A ppel le e, v. ANTONIO HOW

ARD, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appe al fro m the Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty

Ho no r ab le Coll een McSwe eney

-Moor e, Judge Presidin

g. JU STI CEGA

LL A GH ER de l i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Foll owing a ben ch trial, defen

dant An to nio Howard was convicted of a rmed ro bber y and t wo co unt s o f agg ra vat ed d ischar ge o f a firear m. He was sent ence d t o 3 0 year s in priso n for t he armed robb ery count an

d 15 ye ars for the aggravated di scharge counts, wi th the la tt er sentences to run concurrentl

y. On appeal , defen

dant contends that the evi dence prese

nted by the Stat e at t rial failed t o p ro ve him guilty beyo nd a r eas ona ble do ubt . Alt er nat ively, defend ant ar gue s t hat he is e nt it led t o a n ew t r ial be ca us e t he t r ial c o ur t vio lat ed his s ixt h a men dme nt r igh t t o co un se l o f his ch oi ce wh en i t perm i tted h i s a ttorn ey to wi th dr aw ov er h i s ob j ec ti on . F or th

e r ea son s s et f orth belo w, we affir m de fend ant ’s c o nvict io ns fo r a rme d r o bbe ry a nd a gg ra vat ed dis cha rg e o f a fi rear m. We also hold that the t rial court did not abuse its discret ion by permitting defendant’s trial counsel to withdraw.1-05-1849

2 BACK GROUND On the m ornin g of October 10, 2002, Frederick Thom as and Perry

Ki ng arri ved b y c ar at a Chi cago Housing A

uthority (CHA

) housin g project at 4120 So uth Prairie Avenue see kin g day l ab or for the con

tracti ng b usi ne ss of Thom as’ s brother. Th

oma s an d K i ng were the pri

mary v i cti m s of de f en da n t’s ac ti on s a n d th e S tate ’s l ead w i tn es se s i n i ts c as e a gai n st d ef en da n t. At a bou t 7: 30 a .m. , T homas go t ou t of King’s car and a ppr oa ched t he ent ra nce t o t he CH A bu ilding . King r ema ine d b eh ind in t he dr ive r ’s se at . King t es t ified init ially t ha t fr o m his va nta gepoi nt h e c oul d n ot se e the entr

an ceof the bu i l di ng an d that he l ost s i gh t of Th omasf

or “three or [four] seconds, m in utes or so me

thin g” bef ore Thomas returned. Ki ng l ater clarifi

ed that he m eant three or four mi

nutes. Consi stent with h

is previ ous stat em

ent, Ki ng testif ie d under cross -ex am

i na tion that he lost sight of

Thom as f or “two or thre e m

i nute s, se cond s or som

ethi ng. A very s hort t im e.” Under cross-exam

in ation, however, K

in g testifi ed that he bel

ie ved h e saw Thomas enter the bui

ldi ng. Th omastes ti f

i ed tha t ashe ne are d the C HA

bu i l di ng , de f en da nt a ppr oac he d h i m f rom behind and ask ed if he had any money. On cr os s-e xaminatio n, T homas re called d efenda nt co nfr o nt ed him “ma ybe f

o ur st ep s” fr o m t he en t r an ce o f t he bu ilding . Aft er T ho mas t o ld defend ant he had no mo ney, d efenda nt hit him onc e o n t he left chee k and t wice in t he bac k o f the head wi th a sem ia uto ma tic pi stol. Thomas testi fi

ed that he was certai

n def endan t hit hi m wi th that typ e of weap on b eca

use i t had a cl i p rather tha

n a revolv i ng c ha m ber. A f ter de f en da n t str uc k Th om as , Th om as h an de d d ef en da n t a $ 10 b i l l

an d w al ke d b ack to Ki ng’s car becaus e he f

eared for his saf

ety. On cross-exam

in ation, Thomas stated that he saw1-05-1849

3

de f en da n t’s f ac e f or “ ab out 2 0 or

15 m i n ute s. ” A sk

ed i f h e w as “ h av i n g a con v er sa ti on ” wi th defend ant , T homas answ er ed, “I d idn’t have [ a] co nver sat ion wit h him. He ha d a w eap on a nd he was sca re d and he had me st anding t her e. ” T homas late r st at ed he was unsu re how long t he enco unt er last ed. Upo n re t ur ning t o t he ca r, Tho mas t old King he had been r obbe d o f $10 . King testi f i ed th at h e s aw a “ h ol e” i n Thom as ’s h ead a n d “ a l ot” o f b l ood, som

e of wh i ch dri pp ed on to the c ar’s i nteri or. Defe ndan t t hen approached the street and Ki ng, parked across the street, backed hi s car up withi n 15 f eet of defen

dant to co nf

ront him. Thomas testif

ie d Ki ng stopped the car about t wo car l engths away f rom d ef endan t and “h oll ered out the ca

r [ sic ]. He said w

hat is happen in g, ma n[?]” K in g si mi la rly testifi ed that he backed up the

car to “see what he h

it [Thoma s] li

ke that for .” Unde r c ro ss- examinat ion, Tho mas t est ifi ed t hat he, at so me po int, t old King t hat defend ant had a gun. Tho mas and King bot h t est ifi ed t hat defend ant pulled o ut a pist ol and bega n firing at t he car . King r eca lled t hat defend ant pulled o ut a black semiaut omat ic pist ol and fired “[ m]aybe t hre e, fou r, maybe five” sho t s, ho lding t he we apo n sidew ays in his right hand. Altho ugh King init ially s t at ed t ha t he o bse r ve d d efe nd an t in t he ca r ’s mirr o r s, un de rcr o ss - ex amina t io n, King sa id he wa t ched defend ant t hro ugh t he left re ar pas seng er windo w. King said d efenda nt ra n into t he
m i ddle of the street as h

e f i red the wea

pon. Thomas testifi ed that he heard def

endan t fi re “three or four gunsh

ot s” at the car and that he wa s facing fo rw ar d and loo king aw ay fro m defenda nt . T homas claimed he c ou ld see defend ant firin g t he we ap o n t hr o ug h King ’s r ea r vie w mir r o r , ho we ve r , an d t ha t de fen da nt wa s in t he midd le1-05-1849

4

of the street. According to Thomas, K in g “pul le d away in a speed that, you know, that the bulle t wou l dn ’t h i t th e c ar .” Si

m i l arl y , K i n g te sti f i ed th at h e “ pul l ed out to k ee p a h ead of ” def en da n t, es t imat ing t he ca r ’s sp ee d a t 25 miles pe rho ur . T ho mas an d K ing t es t ified t he y hea r d a sing le bul l et ri cochet off

the c ar. Thom as testi f i ed th at th ey f l ag ge d down

a p oli ce ca r a t 35 th and State, although Thom as sa i d h e w as di sor i en ted f rom h i s h ead w oun d a n d c oul d n ot remem b er h ow l on g i t took t o l oca

te help. Tho mas also t est ifi

ed t hat King dr ove so ut h, w hile King tes t ifi ed t hey dr ove nor t h. A l th oug h K i n g te sti f i ed th at th ey l oca ted pol i ce at 3 9th and S t at e, t hat inter sec t ion, like 35t h and State, i s n orth of the C HA bui l di ng. Th e Sta te al so p res en

ted the tes ti mony of Derri ck Ga rdn er, wh o wa s d ri vi ng sou th on Prairi e Avenue to look at po tential propert y i

nve stmen ts in the nei ghborhood. Gardner stated t hat as he approached t he i

ntersect ion of 41st Street and Prai rie A ven ue, he wi tnessed def

endan t fi re a gu n at K i n g’ s v eh i cl e. Ga rd n er testi f i ed th at a s h e n ea re d th e s cen e, K

i n g’ s c ar wa s f ac i n g n orth and was “k i nd of i n the m i ddle of the street,” wh

i ch i s wh at drew Gardn

er’s attenti on. Gardner recal

le d that defenda

nt was standi

ng on the sam

e side of the street as the CHA bui l di ng a nd was “on the

[curb ] – l i ke ri ght of f the [c urb ] i n the stree

t” as h e f i red at K i ng’ s ca r. Gardner testif

ie d Ki ng’s car was speedi

ng northbound wh

en i t passed wi

thin fi ve f eet of hi s own ca r a n d th at def en da n t f i re d tw o or th

re e sh ots at K

i n g’ s v eh i cl e. Con siste n t wi th K i n g’ s a cc oun t, Gardner testif

ie d defen dant hel d hi s f irearm si deways i

n hi s righ t hand. On cr os s-e xaminatio n, G ar dner re called he st op ped his car 10 o r 1 5 feet fro m defenda nt f or “two or thre e se cond s” a nd b acke d up toward

41st Stree

t whi l e kee pi ng h i s ey es on def endan t.1-05-1849

5

Wh en the two m

en made e ye con tact, Gard ner clai med th at def

endan t fi red a s hot i n h i s di rection. Gardner t hen ducked hi s head down and drove west on 41st St r ee t . Ga r dn er dia led 91 1 o n his cell ph one and told polic e that a li ght-skin ned Afri can-A me rican ma le wearin g a bl ack coat and a bl ack hood was fi

rin g a gun at the i

ntersection of 41s

t St reet and Prairi

e Avenue. Gardner then f l ag ge d down

two p oli ce

of f i cersn ea r the i n ter se cti on of 45 th and M ichigan. Chi cago poli ce off

ic er Arthur Davis testif

ie d that at appro xi

ma tely 7:30 a.m., he was dispa t ched t o inves t igat e a r epo rt of sho t s fired by a light- skinned African- American male w ear ing a b lac k c o at an d a bla ck ho o d in fr o nt o f t he CH A bu ilding . Up o n a rr iving at t he sc en e, Da vis saw def endan t standin g on the street acro ss f

rom the CHA

bui ldi ng weari ng a b la ck coat and a ho o d. Da vis t es t ifie d h e a pp r o ac he d d ef en da nt , bu t di d n o t imme di at ely p lac e h im in c us t o dy. Gar dner t hen r et ur ned t o t he sc ene w ith t he t wo officer s he ha d flagg ed d ow n and ident ifi ed d efenda nt as t he gu nman. U nder cr os s-e xaminatio n, G ar dner st at ed t hat when he arri ve d at the sce ne , def endan t was b ei ng q ues tion ed b y onl y one of f i cer a nd was n ot in ha ndc uf f s. Gardner recal

le d that Kin

g and Thom

as returned to t he scen

e after he di

d. Off ic er Davi s recal

le d, however, that Gardner, Thomas a nd K in g arriv ed “al most si mul taneously.” Tho mas t est ifi

ed t hat when t hey ret ur ned, t wo or t hre e po lice officer s we re pr ese nt and that defenda

nt was leani

ng agai nst a car. Ki

ng testif ie d that defenda

nt was i n ha ndcuf fs when they arriv ed. Accordin

g to Thomas , when h

e approached def

endan t, defendan

t stat ed, “I didn’t do anything t o t hese guys he re .” King also re called d efenda nt making a s imi lar r emark upo n see ing the two m

en arri ve . Officer D avis t ra nspo rt ed d efenda nt t o t he se co nd dist rict po lice st at ion whe re he1-05-1849

6

conducted a custodial

search an d recovered a $10 bi

ll from defen dant’s pocket. A fi

rearm was not rec ove

red . De f en da nt’ s ri gh t ha nd tes ted pos i ti ve f or gu ns hot res i due , wh

i ch , ac cord

i ng to the Stat e’s f

orensi c scientis

t, establi shed wi

thin a reasonabl

e degree of sci

entif ic certainty that defen dant dis charged or was i

n the en vi ronmen t o f a di schargi ng weapon or that he touched som ethi ng w i th gun shot residue on

i t. Po lice pho t og ra phs e nt er ed int o e vidence dep icte d ( 1) Tho mas’s fac e and head wher e he was inj ured ; (2) King’s car par ked o ut side the po li ce st ation; and ( 3) t he li

cense plate o f Ki

ng’s car with a n i nden tation that t he polic e forens ic in vestigator testifi

ed was consistent with a b ull et rico chet . King t est ifi

ed t hat his car was five days o ld and t hat t he de nt was not t her e befo re t he shooting. No photo graphs were taken of the in terior of Ki

ng’s car and n o bull ets or shell

casi ngs were recovered from

the scene . The parties sti pula ted that T homa s was a three-tim e convi cted drug offe nder and tha

t defenda nt previously

had b een conv

icted of possession of a controll ed sub stan ce wi th i nten t to deli ver. At the cl ose of evi

dence, the court stat ed that Thomas, Ki ng an d Gardner provi ded credible testim ony tha t cor roborat ed one another’s accounts. The court also noted that Gardner was an indep ende nt eyewit ness. The co ur t furt her not ed t hat t he t est imony of Ga rd ner and Officer D avis est ablished t hat defend ant was not in cust od y when he w as first ident ifi ed by Ga rdn er a nd tha t al l of the wi tne ss es“ i m medi ate l y i de nti f i ed the de f en da nt a s th e shoote r” u pon se eing him. T he c o ur t co nvict ed de fend ant o f ar med ro bbe ry a nd a gg ra vat ed dis cha rg e o f a f i rea rm bu t ac qui tted h i m of atte m pte d m urder. De f

en da nt wassente

nc ed to 30 y ea rs i n pri son for ar med r obbe ry and 15 yea rs fo r e ach c ou nt of a ggr avat ed d ischar ge o f a firear m, wit h t he1-05-1849

7

l atter sen tenc es to run

conc urren tly.
AN

AL YSIS I. Suff ic ie ncy of the Evi

dence Defendant co ntends t hat t he evidence present ed at tr ial fai led to meet t he St ate ’s bu rde n of prov i ng hi s g ui l t be yond a re as ona bl e doubt. He

con ce de s th at the p ros ecution establi shed the elem

ents of armed robbery and aggravated discharge of a weapon. Nevert heless, he co nt ends t hat t he evide nce w as c ont ra dict or y and implausible and do es no t est ablish tha t he was t he r obbe r o r t he gu nman. Whe n r ev iew ing t he su fficie nc y o f t he ev ide nc e o f a c r iminal c o nvic t io n, it is no t t his co ur t ’s r ole t o r et ry t he de fendant ; ra t her , w e de t er mine whet her , view ing t he evide nce in t he light most fa vorable to t he prosecution, an y rational trier of f act could hav

e found the e ssen

tial elem en ts of th e cri me b ey ond a reas onab l e doubt. Jacks on v. Vir ginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2 d 560, 5 73, 99 S . Ct. 2781 , 2788- 89 (19 79); People v. Ward , 215 Ill . 2d 317, 322, 830 N. E. 2d 5 56, 558 -5 9 ( 200 5) . I ndee d, “[i]t is the t rier of fac t ’s r esp ons ibil ity t o d et er mine the witne sses’ credibil

ity and the wei

ght giv en to their testim

ony, to resolve conf

li cts in the evi dence, and to draw reasonable i

nf erences f rom the evi

dence; we will

not substitute our judgme nt for that of the trier of f

act on these ma

tt ers.” People v. Brooks , 187 Ill . 2d 91, 131, 718 N.E .2d 88, 111 (1999 ). Further, a trial

court , havi

ng he ard the evi

dence an d drawn al

l reas onabl

e i nf erences ther efrom, is “‘not o bli

gat ed t o ac cept any possibl e explanation co mpatible with the d efendant’s1-05-1849

8

in nocence an

d el evate i

t t o t he status of reasonab le doubt.’” People v. Sutherland , 223 Ill . 2d 187, 272, 860 N.E.2d 178, 233 (2006), quo ting People v. Evans , 209 Ill . 2d 194, 212, 808 N.E .2d 939, 949 (2004). A conviction wi ll only be reve rsed when

“the ev ide nce is so unreasonable , im probable, or unsatisf

actory as to justif

y a reasonabl

e doubt of the defen

dant’s gui lt.” People v. Sullivan , 366 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 77 0, 782, 8 53 N.E.2 d 754, 7 66 (20 06). Def endan t’s pr i nc i pal conten tion i s tha t the State’ s wi

tnes ses were not cred i bl e. Speci fi cally , defen dant attempts to im

peach Th omas’ s testim

ony on the

basis that hi s prior drug po sses sion c onvict ions t ar nish his cre dibili t y. De fendant furt her alleges t hat seve ra l inconsist ent statements b

y w itnes ses ab out the le

ngth of ti me in whi ch the robbe

ry occurred and the ex

act l oca ti on f rom wh i ch de f en da nt wassh ooti ng “ ca nn ot si m pl y be ex pl ai ne d a wa y by the va ga ri esof me mory .” In part icular, defendant no tes t hat: ( 1) T homas stat ed t hat he t hought he saw defendant’s face fo r “2 0 o r 1 5 minut es” dur ing t he r obbe ry but late r c ou ld no t re member ho w long t he encoun ter l asted ; (2)Ki

ng a nd Th oma s of f ered c onf l i cti ng te sti mony ab out whether the robb ery took p l ac e i

n si de or ou tsi de th e C HA b ui l di n g; (3 ) K i n g a n d Th om as ga v e c on f l i cti n g acc oun

ts about the direction i

n wh ic h they le ft the scen

e; (4) Ki ng’s and Thom

as’s statements that they dr o ve aw ay s lo wly w er e n o t be lieva ble if de fen da nt wa s fir ing a g un at t he m; a nd ( 5) t he ir credibil ity was f urther harm

ed by the im pla usi ble notion that they

would conf

ront an armed as sa i l an t. We find t hese challenge s t o t he cr edibility of t he St at e’s w itnes ses t o be merit less. As t he St at e co rr ect ly point s o ut , a ltho ugh t her e we re minor inco nsist encies in t he t est imony, all of t he1-05-1849

9

wi tness es testi fi

ed cons i stentl

y regardi ng the fa cts m ost pertinent to the State’s cas e, preci sel y : (1) the tim

e and l ocation of the robbery

and sh oot in g; (2) that the gunm

an sh ot repeatedly ; (3) that he hel

d the gun i

n a di stin ct man ner i n hi s righ t hand; a nd (4) that defen

dant ma tched the des cri pti on of the shooter. Ind eed , a s t he I lli

nois S upr eme Co ur t has he ld, va riat ions in wit ness t est imony are “to be ex pected an y tim e se veral pers ons w

i tnes s the sam e ev en t unde r traum ati c ci rcum stan ces .” Brooks , 1 87 I ll. 2d a t 133 , 7 18 N .E .2 d at 112 . I t is not t he r ole o f this co ur t t o r eeva luat e t he cre di bi l i ty of wi tne ss esi n l i gh t of i nc ons i stent te sti

mony an d os ten si bl y retr y the de f en da nt on ap pe al. People v. Milka , 21 1 Il l . 2d 150 , 17 8, 8 10 N .E.2 d 33 , 49 (20 04) . W he the r m i nor in consistencies in

test im ony i rrepar abl y un dermi ned the credibi

li ty of the Stat e’s witnesses was a matt er for t he t rier of fac t t o d ecide . T he sa me can be said o f the impact of T homas ’s t hre e felony convi ctions on the credi

bi li ty of h is testim ony. A convi cted fel on is not auto ma

tical ly preclude d fro m pro viding cr edible t est imony. T he r eco rd re flect s t hat t he t rial co ur t expr essly fou nd t he testi m ony of the State’ s wi

tnes ses , i nc l udi ng Th oma s, to be c

redi bl e. We al so not e that a t no p oint does defendant chall enge the in

dependent eyewi

tness t est imony of Ga rd ner , o n who se t est imony the t rial co ur t heavily relied whe n co nsider ing t he charges of

aggravated di scharge of

a fi rearm. A lthough Th

omas an d Ki ng testif ie d that t hey dr o ve aw ay a t ap pr o ximat ely 2 5 mile s p er ho ur wh en de fen da nt be ga n fir ing , t he t r ial c o ur t co uld have reasonabl

y c oncl uded from

Gardner’s testi

mony that Kin g’s car sped of

f m ore quickl y, as on e m i gh t ex pe ct. “ The tr

i er of f ac t i s f re e to res ol

v e i n con siste n ci es i n testi mon y an d i s f re e to accept or reject as muc

h or as little of

a wi tness’s testim ony as i t pleases .” Sullivan , 366 Ill . App.1-05-1849

10

3d a t 782 , 85 3 N .E.2 d a

t 766 . That K

i ng an d Th omasun de res ti mate d or m

i sstate d the s

pe ed of t heir vehicle d oe s no t call the ir ent ire t est imony into que st ion. Simil ar ly, the fact t hat King and Thomas had diff ic ulty estim ating ti me throughout the trial

and that Thomas

testifi ed that he saw de f en da nt’ s f ac e f or “ 20 or 15 m i nu tes ” d uri ng what s eemed

to be a b ri ef en cou nte r doe s n ot compel a fi ndi ng that their testim

ony was not credib le , giv

en the consi

stency with wh ic h they testi f i ed to the e sse

ntial elem en ts of th e of f en ses . See People

v. Lew is , 165 Ill . 2d 305, 356, 651 N.E.2d 72, 96 ( 1995) (e yewi tn es s te sti mon y al on e m ay b e s uf f i ci en t to pr ov e def en da n t gui l ty bey ond reasonabl

e doubt when, af

ter consideri

ng “ to tali ty of the ci

rcumstances,” court det ermi nes ey ewi tnes ses had am pl e opportun

i ty to obs erv e def

endan t comm i t cri me). La st ly, mu ch o f t he alle ge d imp lau sibilit y t o wh ich de fen da nt po int s in t he r ec o r d is rational ly expl ai ned. Al though defen

dant asserts that no reasonabl e person would conf

ront an arm ed m an and tha t, accordi ngl y , Ki ng’ s versi on of the f acts s houl d be di sreg arded , the re cord doe s n ot re f l ec t th at K

i n g n ec es sa ri l y kn ew de f en da n t wa s a rm ed wi th a g un wh en h e b eg an to back h is car up. Instead, the testimony only establ is hed that Thomas

to ld K in g at some poin

t t hat def endan t had a wea pon. Defe ndan t also asserts that because the record was devoid of

muc h of the ev

ide nce that one would ex

pect to fi nd at the crim

e scene , the Stat e fai

le d to prove hi s guilt bey

ond a
r ea so na ble do ub t . I n p ar t icu lar , he co nt en ds t ha t t he St at e fa iled t o pr o vid e: ( 1) ph o t o gr ap hic ev i de nc e of the i nte rior of the ca r wh ere , ac cord

i ng to Ki ng ’s tes ti mony , b l ood dr i ppe d f rom Thomas ’s wound; (2) phy si cal or phot ographic e

vi dence of shel l c asi ngs an d bul le ts at t he scen

e; and (3) ev

i den ce of bul l et hol es i n K i ng’ s ca r.1-05-1849

11

Defend ant misunder st ands ou r st anda rd of r eview. The que st ion o n app eal is whet her t he evidenc e ac t ually pre sent ed by t he St at e, viewed in the light most favo ra ble to t he pr os ecu t ion, estab l i shes def

endan t’s gu i l t bey ond a reas onab l e doubt. See Jackson , 443 U.S . at 318- 19, 6 1 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89. On cethe State has m et i ts b urden , thi s c ourt n

ee d n ot co nsider whet her mor e evide nce w as p re sent ed. At t rial, t he St at e o ffered (1 ) c re dible t est imony of t hre e eyew itnes ses; ( 2) fou r p os itive in-c ou rt ident ifi cat ions o f defend ant at t he sc ene o f the crim e; (3) a positi

ve gun shot residue test from defen dant’s ri ght han d; (4) photogr aphi

c evi dence of an i nd en tation i n th e l i cens e p l ateof

K i ng ’s ne w c ar w hi ch a p ol i cef oren si c i nv es ti ga tor tes ti f i ed wa s c au se d by

a b ul l et ri coc he t; ( 5) te sti mony i nd i ca ti ng de f en da nt f i t the de scri ption pr ov i de d i

n Ga rd n er ’s 91 1 c al l ; an d ( 6) testi mon y th at a $1 0 b i l l wa s rec ov er ed

f rom de f en da n t, whi ch waspreci

sel y the c urren cy taken f rom T hom as. Defe ndan t neverthel

ess urges us to place

great weigh

t o n the f oll owing poi nts: “an yone ” co uld ca rr y a $10 bill ; his clot hing and c omp lexion ar e co mmonplace ; gu nsho t re sidue co uld have co me fr o m an ywh er e; King ’s lice nse pla t e c o uld ha ve be en de nt ed be fo r eh an d; no we ap o n o rshe ll ca si ng were f oun d on hi m or at th e s cene ; a nd i f he ha d di sp ose d of the ev i de nc e, h e w oul d n ot ha ve r et ur ne d t o t he cr ime s ce ne . Vie win g t he t o t alit y o f t he ev ide nc e in t he ligh t mo st fav o r ab le t o t he St at e, how ever , w e find t hese asse rt ions, along wit h defend ant ’s allega t ions a bou t t he pro bative v

alue of m issi ng evi dence, unpersuasive. As to defendant’s latt er tw o co ntentions, whatever h

is motiv e for returnin

g to the scene , the testimony of the State’s witnes ses establ is hes that de f endan t had am pl e opportun

i ty to di sca

rd hi s we apon

be f ore Of f i cer D avi s arri

ve d. We als o br iefly a dd r es s his co nt en t io n t ha t t he ab se nc e o f bu llet ho les in King ’s ca ris1-05-1849

12

probative of

hi s i nnocen ce. Defen

dant alle ges that if

he were i ndeed f iri ng at Ki ng an d Thomas f rom such cl ose ra n ge , he w oul

d h av e h i t m oreth an th e l i cen se pl ate . We n

ote th at th e S tate charged def endan t wi th ag grav ated di sch arge of a f i rearm , arm ed rob bery and attem

pted m urder, an d t he t r ial c o ur t ac qu it t ed him o f t he lat t er ch ar ge . Pe rha ps if de fen da nt ’s aim w as be t t er o rif his in t en t io ns w er e w o r se , bu llet ho les ind ee d w o uld ha ve be en fo un d in King ’s ca r . Ho we ve r , all parties i nvol ved are f ort unate that li

ves were n

ot put at gr eater risk. Defe ndan t also chal

le nges the ci

rcumstances of h

is arrest at t he scen

e, contendin

g that be ca us e t he po lice pr es en t ed him t o wit ne ss es wh ile he wa s in h an dc uffs , t he ide nt ifica t io n o f him as t he gu nman was a su gge st ive “sho wup .” In p ar t icular , d efenda nt not es t hat King’s t est imony estab l i sh ed h e w as i n h an dcuf f s w h en K i n g a n d Th om as made th ei r iden ti f i ca ti on s. He also p oi n ts ou t t hat all identificat ions w er e made while he wa s flanked by police o ffi cer s. R elying on United States v. Wade , 388 U .S. 218, 2 34, 18 L . Ed. 2d 11 49, 116 1-62, 8 7 S. Ct. 192 6, 1936 (1967 ), and People

v. Carr oll , 12 Ill . App. 3d 869, 874, 299 N.E. 2d 134, 138 (1973), defendan t argues t hat t he pr ese nce o f po lice officer s and handc uffs cas t ser iou s do ubt on t he cr edibility of t he i den tif i cations. In r esp ons e, t he St at e cit es a litany o f aut hor ity t hat a sho wup , e ven co nduc t ed w ith a sus pect i n h andcuf f s, does not autom

ati cal l y weak en the v erac i ty of an i den tif i cation. See, e.g. , People v. Smith , 27 4 Ill. App. 3d 8 4, 6 53 N .E .2d 944 (19 95) ; People v. Johnson , 262 Ill . App. 3d 781 , 63 5 N. E. 2d 8 27 ( 199 4); People v. Hughes , 259 Il l . Ap p. 3d 17 2, 632 N .E.2d 251 (1994 ); People v. Frisby , 160 Ill . App. 3d 19, 512 N.E.2d 1337 ( 1987). The Stat e contends that onepers on sh owu ps , w h i l e s ug ge sti v e, ar e j us ti f

i ed an d p rop er wh er e, as h er e, pol i ce re sp on d to1-05-1849

13

reports of cri m i na l acti vi ty a nd prese nt a s uspe ct f or id en tif i cation sh ortly af ter a cri me. Accordingl

y, the Stat e argues t hat this court must consider the “tot ali ty of the circumstances” surro undin

g the showup and whet her the identif ications are reli

able in li ght o f the wi

tnesses’ opportuni tie s to obse

rve the def endan t. See Stovall v. Denno , 388 U.S. 293, 302, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 1206, 87 S. Ct . 1967, 1972 (1967) (holdin g that “a clai

me d violation of

due process of law in the conduct of a [showup] confrontation depen ds on the tot ality

of the ci rcumstances surroun di ng i t”), overruled on other gr ounds , Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 10 7 S. Ct. 708 (1987 ). We ag re e wit h t he St at e’s a sser t ions. Defend ant ’s r eliance o n Wade and Carr oll is mi spl aced; n ei ther case sets out a brigh

t-li ne rule that the presentation of a sus pect to witne sses whi le fl anked b y pol ic e automatical

ly calls an i dentif ic ation i nto question. See Wade , 388 U.S. at 234 , 18 L. E d. 2 d at 116 1-6 2, 8 7 S. Ct . at 193 6; Carr oll , 12 Ill . App. 3d at 874, 299 N.E .2d at 138. In deed , as the State poi

nts out, Carr

oll held that the presentat ion of a han dcuff ed witness did no t wea ken t he cr edibility of an ide nt ifi cat ion which s t emmed fro m an indepe ndent observati on of the def

endan t commi tt in g the crim

e and wh ic h was n ot in fl uenced b y un due sugg esti on. Carr oll , 12 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 875, 299N.E.2d a

t 139. I n t he inst an t ca se , t he t r ial c o ur t de nie d d efe nd an t ’s mo t io n fo ra d ire ct ed ve r dic t o n t his is sue, noting that a sh

owup iden

tif ic ation i s perm

is si ble “wh en a sh ort period of ti

me el apses between an

off ense *** an

d an i dentif ic ation.” Here, the testim ony of the Stat e’s wi

tnesses establ is hed that the i dentif

ic ations took place sh

ort ly after the sh

oot in g. See Hughes , 25 9 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 174, 632N.E.2d a

t 255 (i den tif i cation wi thi n 20 m i nute s of an off en se w here1-05-1849

14

wi tnes ses al l had am pl e opportun

i ty to obs erv e def

endan t was n ot questionab l e). More over, al though Of f i cer D avi s testi

f i ed th at the wi

tnes ses arri ve d on the sc ene “ al

most si m ul tane ousl y ,” t he t est imony of Ga rd ner and King indica t es t hat Gar dner ar rived first and ide nt ifi ed d efenda nt befo re he wa s in handc uffs. R ega rd less, all witnes ses ha d ample o ppo rt unit y to obs er ve de fendant closel y , and the i

r i den tif i cations c am

e sh ortly af ter the s hooti ng. See People

v. Moriss ette , 150 Ill. App . 3 d 43 1, 438 , 5 01 N .E .2 d 78 1, 786 (1 986 ) ( re liabil ity o f witne ss’s id ent ifi

cat ion is “t he li nch pin in determi ni ng the adm

is si on of identif

ic ation testim

ony”), citin

g Manson v. Br

athw aite , 432 U .S. 98, 11 4, 53 L . Ed. 2d 14 0, 154, 9 7 S. Ct. 224 3, 2253 (1977 ). In concl usi on, defen

dant has m

in ed the trial

court record and presented several in consi stencies i

n ey ewi tness testim

ony. A fter a caref

ul e xam in ation of the record, we concl ude that the se i

nc onsi sten ci es a re not materi al

and do not su

bstantial l y und erm i ne the State ’scas e. Furthermore, the alleged “mi ssin g evi dence” reli

ed upon by def

endant is i nsuf fi cien t t o cast re aso nable do ubt on his g uilt. Afte r view ing t he evide nce in t he light most favo ra ble to t he prosecution, we concl

ude that the evi dence was suf fi ci ent to est abl

is h def endan t’s guil t bey ond a re aso nable do ubt . Ac co rd ingly, we a ffi rm de fendant ’s co nvictio ns for ar med r obbe ry and ag gr av at ed dis ch ar ge o f a fir ea r m.

II. Defenda

nt’s Ri ght to Counsel

of Hi s Choice Defe ndan t next contends that hi s si xth am endm ent righ t t o counsel of

hi s choice was1-05-1849

15

vi ola ted wh en the tri al court perm

i tted his attorne

y to with draw. B eca

use the tri al court permi tt ed the atto rney

to withdraw over h

is obje ction, def

endan t argues that t he trial

court abused it s d isc r et io n a nd , ac co r din gly, t ha t he is e nt it led t o a n ew t r ial. We bri ef l y recoun t the pretria

l ev en ts rel evan t to t his i ssue. In

i tia l l y , the tri al court appoi nted a pub l i c def

ender to repre sen

t def endan t bec aus e h e coul

d not af f ord an attorney . Defe ndan t, apparently

with the f

in anci al assi stance of h

is mother, subse quently

retained a

tt orney Ray m ond H ough to represe

nt h i m , and the

tria l court perm

i tted the publ

i c def en der to wi thdra w. Hough represented def

endan t in a h earin g on a m ot ion to suppress ev

ide nce on A ugust 27, 200 3. F ol l owi

ng the tri al cou rt’ s den i al of the su ppr es si on m oti on, a j ury

tri al wa s s ch ed uled f or Decem ber 8, 2003. On that date, however, the Stat e was not ready to proceed due to the absen ce of a wit ness. The co ur t ask ed H ou gh, who co nsult ed w ith t he pr os ecu t or befo re t he hea ring, if he and the State had agreed to a new jury trial date, and the fol

lowi ng exchan

ge occurred:

“ MR . HO UGH: Your H onor , wh at I th i nk – w ha t I’ m goi ng to ha ve [to] do * ** i s wi

th dr aw f rom th i s c as e. I w oul

d a sk l ea v e to d o th at. T HE CO UR T : Why? MR . HO UGH: The

re’ s b een a

total terr i bl e l ac k of com m un i ca ti on between me an d the peopl e wh o retai ne d m e. Mr. H oward is i

n c ustody . Ob v i ous l y I c an com m un i ca te wi th h i m . B ut c er

tai n oth er pe opl e th at I n ee d to co mmunicate wit h have be en t ot ally unavailable. No pho ne number s. N o p hone calls.1-05-1849

16 TH E C OUR T: Mr. Ho war d, what is your mot ion [ sic ] on your atto rney withdrawi ng? DEFENDANT: I don’t want hi m to withdraw. My moms [ sic ] sa id she[ ’s] been c alling him

, bu t she ha sn’t been g et t ing no answ er . I t old him I have a n um ber that s he

gave m e so he ca n c al l so [h e] ca

n tal k to her. MR. HOUGH: Your Honor, I have n o inf ormation [that] hi s m

ot her had ca lled me. ** * T he r e’ s no wa y I c an co nt ac t t he m. He ’s in c us t o dy. He ca n’t he lp me. So I need t hese peo ples’ [ sic ] co o pe r at io n. ** * W ha t [ de fen da nt ] sa id h er e in op en co ur t is to t ally untr ue. The re have be en no pho ne ca lls from his peo ple and no me ssages an

d no num bers wh ic h I can c al l or [an] address w here I can reach them a t. It ma kes i t virtually im possib le for m e to r epresent the m

an wi thout com m uni cation. DEFEN DA NT: You d

on’ t come see me ei ther. MR . HO UG H: No w, wh at he sa id s o un ds like he ’s dis ap po int ed wit h my representation an

yway . So for all

those reasons, Judge, I would be – DE FE ND AN T : T he mo ne y is p aid . I do n’t o we yo u n o t hing bu t a lit t le bi t more. TH E C OUR T: Yo u kno w, what , Mr . H ou gh – MR. HOUGH: Yes, Judge.1-05-1849

17 THE CO URT: You ne ed to put y our reque st i

n w ri tin g.” Hough f i l ed a w ri tten m otion , whi ch

stated s i m pl y “[t]h at thei r [ sic ] exi st serious com m un i ca ti on pr ob l em s b etw een th e def en da n t at [sic ] his at t or ney.” On Ja nuar y 9, 2 004 , t he co ur t que st ioned defend ant and H ou gh at a hea ring o n t he mot ion:

“TH E C OUR T: Do you [ defend ant ] ha ve any o bject ion t o [ Ho ugh] no longe r representin

g you? DEF END A

NT: I don ’t u

nd ers tan d. W ha t ca n I do? T HE CO UR T : W ell, he sa ys t ha t t he r ea so n he is a sk ing t o wit hd r aw is be ca us e yo u a r e n o t co mmun ica t ing wit h him. DEFEN DA NT: He i s n ot comm uni cati ng w i th m e. I am l ocked u p. Per so nally, I am r ead y to get it o ver wit h. TH E C OUR T: Well, t he issue right now is whet her you ha ve any o bje ct io n t o yo ur at t o rne y wit hd r aw ing an d n o lo ng er r ep r es en t ing yo u. I will appoi n t an oth er attor n ey to re pr es en t y ou. W e w on ’t b e g etti

n g i t ov er wi th beca use we w ill

be st ar t ing at squ ar e o ne ag ain. DEFEN DA NT: Wel l , I don’ t wan

t to do t ha

t.” Hou gh res pon de d by noti ng de f en da nt’ s a ppa ren t di ss ati sf ac ti on w i th h i s r ep res en

tation and r eite ra t ing t hat his co mmunicatio n pr oblems w er e no t wit h defend ant but , r at her , w ith t he person who retain

ed hi m a s def endan t’s atto rney . Specif

ic al ly , Hough stated:1-05-1849

18 “It is not [d efenda nt ]. As he sa id, he is in cust od y, but t he pe op le who ha ve r et ain ed my se r vic es ar e n o t co mmun ica t ing wit h me . ** * T he pe o ple pr incipally – I will be hone st wit h you. It is his mot her . S he has re t ur ned no pho ne ca lls. She has no pho ne number which [ sic ] I can reach h er. Th e l as t ti me w e w ere

i n c ourt, I mad e thes e re

pre senta ti ons to your H onor an d th at h a[ s] n ’t c h an ge d s i n ce th at ti me. ** * Idon ’t k

n ow h ow I am goi n g to conti nue to represe

nt h i m und er the se c i rcum stan ces .” The c our t gr an ted Hou gh ’s moti on to wi th dr aw an d agai n appoi n ted a pub l i c def

en der to represent def

endan t. Followi

ng a seri es of conti

nuan ces due to discovery

del ay s, a ben

ch trial comm enced on October 27, 2004. The si xth am endm ent to t he Un

ited States Constitution provi des “[i ]n al l c rim in al pr o se cu t io ns, t he ac cu se d s ha ll enjo y t he r igh t ** * t o ha ve t he Ass ist an ce o f Co un se l fo rhis defense.” U.S. Co nst., amend. VI; see also Ill . Const . 1970, art. 1, §8 ( “In cri mi nal pro secutions, the accused sh

al l h ave the ri ght to appear and def

end i n person an

d by counsel ”). As the Un

ited St at es S upr eme Co ur t has he ld, “t he es sent ial aim of the Amendment is to gua ra nt ee a n effect ive advo cat e fo r e ach c riminal defenda nt ra t her t han t o e nsur e t hat a de fendant will i nexo ra bly be represented by

the la wyer whom h

e prefers.” Wheat v. United States , 486 U.S . 153 , 159 , 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 108 S . Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); but see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. ___, ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409, 418, 126 S . Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006) (holdi ng that, out si de est ablished limi

t at ions, t he sixt h amendment gua ra nt ee o f fairness r equ ires t hat “the acc use d be de f en de d by the cou ns el he be l i evesto be

be st” ). Acc ordi

ngl y , al thou gh the righ t to coun se l of1-05-1849

19

choic e i s a f

und am en tal ri ght, i t is not ab sol ute an d i s l i m i ted i n s ev eral i m portant res

pects . See People v. Holmes , 14 1 Ill. 2d 204 , 21 7, 5 65 N .E .2d 950 , 95 5 (1 990 ); People v. Spu rlark , 67 I ll. Ap p. 3d 18 6, 196, 3 84 N.E.2 d 767, 7 74 (19 78). A cri m i na l de f en da nt h asno r i gh t to se l ec t an

attorn ey wh o has a con f l i ct of i nte res t or coun sel who is not a m em ber of th e b ar. Wheat , 486 U.S. at 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 149, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. S im

il arly , a defendant has no right to co unsel he cann ot aff ord , nor may h

e insist upon b ei ng r epres en ted b y an attorney who decl i ne s to repres en

t hi m . Wheat , 486 U.S. at 159, 100 L. E d. 2 d a

t 149 , 10 8 S. Ct. a

t 169 7; se e al so People v. Young, 207 Ill . App. 3d 130, 134, 565 N.E .2d

309 , 31 1 (1 990 ) (c ri

m i na l de f en da nt h asno r i gh t to i ns i st u pon cou ns el wh o doe s n ot

“ sta n d r eady , w i l l i n g a n d a b l e” to ap pe ar b ef oreth e c our

t). A de f en da n t wh o ab us es th e s i xth ame nd men t in a n a t t emp t t o de lay t r ial a nd t he effe ct ive ad minist r at io n o f jus t ice may fo r feit his ri ght to coun sel

of choice. People v. Chil dress , 276 Ill . App. 3d 402, 413, 657 N.E. 2d 1180, 1188 (1995) (defenda

nt wil l l ose righ t t o counsel of

choi ce when

he attempts to “thwart justice, de l ay , or e m ba rra ss the ef f ec ti ve ad m i ni stra ti on of j us ti ce ”);se e al so People v. Antoine, 33 5 I ll. App. 3d 562, 580, 781 N.E.2d 444, 460 (2002) (“[t]he exerci se of the ri ght to choi ce of counsel
may be den i ed if i t wi l l und ul y i nterf ere wi th the adm i nistration of

j ustice” ). Mos t i m por tan tl y f or p ur pos es of th i s a pp ea l , thes e l i m i tati on s d o n ot ex i st s ol el y to ensure a d efendant is guarant eed an effective advocat e; instead, t hey also sat isf y a court ’s

“ i nd ep en de nt i nte res t i n e ns uri ng tha t cri m i na l tri als a re c ond uc ted wi thi n th e e thi cal sta nd ard s of the professi

on and that l egal

proceedin

gs appear f

ai r to al l wh

o observe them .” Wheat , 486 U.S. at 1 60, 100

L. E d. 2 d a

t 149 , 10 8 S. Ct. a

t 169 8; se e al so Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at ___, 1651-05-1849

20

L. Ed. 2d at 4 21 -2 2, 1 26 S. Ct. a

t 25 66 . Acc ordi

n gl y , i t i s n ot onl y a cri m i n al de f en da n t’s si xth ame nd men t r igh t at st ak e w he n a co ur t co nsid er s t he ac cu se d’ s ins ist en ce o n t he co un se l o f his cho os ing, bu t also t he t ribuna l’s “instit ut ional int er est in the r endit ion o f just ver dict s” a nd t he adm i nistration of

f ai r tri al s. Wheat , 486 U .S. at 160, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a t 149, 108 S. Ct. at 169 8. Ind eed , t he Su pr eme Co ur t has mand at ed t hat a t rial co ur t has “wid e lat itu de in balanc ing t he righ t t o counsel of

choi ce agai

nst the needs

of f ai rness.” Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 4 21 , 12 6 S . C t. a

t 25 65 -6 6; se e a

l so 1 34 Il l . 2d R. 13 (c )(3 ) (req

ui ri n g tri al cou rt to ev al uate eq ui tabl e concerns wh

en cons i deri ng c ouns el ’smotion

to with draw) . If, however, a t rial

cour t either abuses its discretion or o therwise erro neously deprives a de f en da n t of h i s r i gh t to co unse l

of ch oi ce , the depri

v ati on i s “com pl ete ” a n d i s n ot s ub j ec t to ha rm l ess error an al y si s, reg ardl

ess of w hether the def

endan t ul tim atel y rece i ve d a f ai r tri al . Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 418-19, 126 S. Ct . at 2563. “It is true enough that t he purpose of the ri

ghts set forth in

[the si xth am endm ent] is to ensure a f

ai r trial ; but i

t do es not f oll ow that the

ri ghts can be di sreg arded

so long a s the

tria l i s, on th e wh ole , f ai r.” GonzalezLopez , 54 8 U .S. a

t ___, 16 5 L . Ed. 2d a

t 417 , 12 6 S. Ct. a

t 256 2; se e al so Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at ___ n.3, 165 L. E d. 2d at 419 n.3, 126 S. Ct. at 2563 n.3 (whether counsel of choice was properly deni ed i n order to ensure f

ai r trial is anal ytically dis tinct f rom whether def

endan t receive d f ai r tri al af ter coun sel

of choice was i

m properl y den i ed). Befo re add re ssing t he merit s o f defend ant ’s claim, w e must first det er mine whet her , a s t he State al l eges , he ha s f orfe i ted hi s ri ght to appe al

thi s i ssue. Iss

uesconc ern

i ng a l l eged tria l court erro r are pr oper ly

preserved for appellate review onl y wh en a defen

dant o bj ects at trial and al so1-05-1849

21

i nc l udes the issue i

n a posttri al motion . People v. Enoch , 122 Ill . 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E .2d 1124, 113 0 ( 198 8) . D efenda nt admit s t hat his po st t rial mot ion failed t o r aise t his issue; ho weve r, he insists t hat t he plain er ro r d oc t rine r equ ires t his co ur t t o r eac h t he merit s o f his claim beca use t he den i al of th e c ounse l

of h i s ch oi ce

af f ec ted a f un da men tal ri gh t. Unde r t he plain er ro r d oc t rine, t his co ur t will review a fo rfeit ed issu e whe n eithe r ( 1) t he ev ide nc e p r es en t ed at t r ial w as so clo se ly bala nc ed t ha t t he alle ge d e rr o rmay ha ve impr o pe r ly t ipped t he sc ales o f just ice; o r ( 2) t he er ro r w as “so ser iou s t hat it affec t ed t he fairne ss” o f the defen dant’s trial

or chall enged “ the in tegrity an d reputat ion of

the judi ci al process.” People v. Allen , 222 Ill . 2d 340, 352-53, 856 N. E.2d 349, 355-56 ( 2006). The plai n error doct rin

e, however, does n

ot preserv e al l errors f or revi ew wh ethe r or not they

were rai sed i n the tri al court. Allen , 22 2 Il

l . 2d at 3 53, 856

N.E .2d at 3 56;se e al so People v. Herron , 215 Ill . 2d 167, 177, 830 N.E.2d 467, 474 ( 2005). Even errors aff ectin g constitutional

righ ts may be f orfei ted pro vi ded they do not af f ect the f ai rne ss of a def endan t’s trial or the i nteg ri ty of the j udicial

proces s. Allen , 222 Ill. 2d at 352 -5 3, 856 N. E. 2d a t 355 -5 6. The re viewing co ur t has d iscre t ion t o d et er mine whether i t wi l l en terta i n a n a ppe al of an al l eg ed err or af f ec ti ng su bs tan ti al righ ts th at w asnot properl y pres erv ed. Allen , 222 Ill . 2d at 351, 856 N. E.2d at 355; see als o 134 Ill . 2d R. 615(a) (“Plai n errors or defects aff

ectin g substantial

righ ts may be noti ce d al thou gh the y were n ot broug ht to the a

ttenti on of

the tri al court”). We de t er mine t ha t a p lain e rr o rr ev iew o f de fen da nt ’s sixt h a men dme nt cla im is app ro pr iate , a ltho ugh no t for t he r eas ons given by defend ant . We agr ee w ith bo t h defend ant and the Stat e that the fi

rst pro ng of the pl

ai n error doct rin

e i s not relev

ant to o ur anal

ys is . The trial1-05-1849

22

co ur t ha d n o o cc as io n t o de t er mine w he t he rt he ev ide nc e u lt imat ely p r es en t ed at t r ial w as clo se ly b al an ce d w h en Hou gh f i l ed h i s pre trial

m oti on . F ur

th er more , the dec i si

on to pe rm i t Hou gh to wi thdra w di d not af f ect the ba l ance of the evi den ce pre sen ted at tri al . Bef ore we c onsi

der the se cond

prong of the pl ai n error doctri

ne , however, Allen info r ms us that, contrar

y to def endan t’s a sse rtion , we ar

e not requi

red to rev i ew an y al l eged tria l court error af f ecti ng f und am en tal ri ghts that wa s n

ot properl y pres erv ed f

or appea l . Allen , 222 Ill . 2d at 35 1, 8 56 N. E.2 d a

t 35 5. I n ste ad , b ef

oreexercisi

n g ou r di scre ti on

to rev i ew

th e iss ue , w e ev al

ua te wh eth er th e a l l eg ed er ror p oten ti al l y af f ec ted ei th er th e f ai rnes s of de f en da n t’s trial or c al l s i n to question the i nteg ri ty of the j udicial

proces s. Allen , 222 Ill . 2d at 352-53, 856 N.E.2d at 355-56. Def endan t nowhere c onten

ds that his tri al

wasunf ai r, an d our car ef ul revi ew of the re cord reveals no evi

dence to support such a conten tion. However, defe

ndan t’s chal le nge to the tr ia

l co ur t ’s de cision t o p er mit Ho ugh t o w ithd ra w do es no t lend it self to an eva luat ion o f whet her he ult imately re ceived a fair t rial. As t he Unit ed S t at es S upr eme Co ur t held in Gonzalez-Lopez , if t he t rial co ur t indeed er re d in denying de fendant his co unse l of cho ice, whet her defend ant ul tim atel y rece i ve d a f ai r tri al i s of no con seq

uen ce. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 42 2, 126 S . Ct. at 2566(den i al of c ouns el

of choice n

ot subj ect to harm

l ess error an al y si s). T hu s, t he “fa ir t r ial” st an da r d, wh ich is a clo se r ela t io n t o t he ha r mles s e rr o rst an da r d o f r ev iew , is not an appropriate mea

ns to assess wh

ether defen

dant’s appeal

warrants the exercise of our discr et ion. Neverthel ess, def endan t has presented an

al le ged pretrial

defec t t hat aff ects a substantial righ t, which we do have discretion to hear on appeal . See 134 Il l . 2d R. 6 15(a). Wh

ether the trial1-05-1849

23

court was wrong to deny def endan t his constitutional

righ t t o t he counsel

of choice rai ses le giti ma te concerns about the in

tegrity of the judi ci al process and ensurin

g that t he “ le gal proceedin gs appear f

ai r to al l wh

o observe them .” Compare Allen , 222 Ill . 2d at 352-53, 856 N. E. 2d a t 355 -5 6, wit h Wheat , 486 U .S. at 160, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a t 149, 108 S. Ct. at 169 8. Furtherm ore, whether a trial

court has ab

used i ts discretion by

permi tt in g an attor ney

to withdraw over a defendant’s objection i n a crim in al trial under these unique ci

rcumstances is

one of fi rst i m pre ss i on f or thi s c ourt. A

cc ordi ngl y , we exerc i se our d i screti on a nd proc ee d to the m

eri ts of def endan t’s c ase appl y i ng a n a bus e of di scre tion stan dard of revi ew. See People

v. Burre ll , 228 Il l . Ap p. 3d 13 3, 142- 43, 592N.E.2d 4 53, 460 (1992 ). Defe ndan t’s prin ci pal contention i s that because Hough’ s m ot ion to withdraw was dil ator y, the tria

l c ourt abused i

ts discretion by

grantin g it. Speci fi

cally , he reasons that i f h

e had
r eq ue st ed ne w c o un se l at t he sa me p o int in p r et r ial p r o ce ed ing s, t he t r ial c o ur t almo st ce r t ain ly would have deni

ed it as an i

mproper delay tactic. Defendan t t hus asserts t hat the co urt li kewise shoul d ha ve rej ected H ough’ s m

otion as u ndu l y dil atory . Defe ndan t reasons by

anal ogy that because

this court has rej ected att em

pts by crim in al def endan ts to del ay

thei r tri al s by sub sti tutin g ne w counsel at the l ast m i nute , the tri

al court abused i ts discretion in

permi tt in g an attor ney ’s wi

thdrawal on the e

ve of tri al that resulted i

n an eight-m onth tri al del ay . See, e.g. , People v. Jackson , 216 Ill . App. 3d 1, 7, 574 N.E. 2d 719, 723 (1 99 1) (tri

al cou rt d oes n ot ab us e d i scre ti on i n den y i n g d ef en da n t’s re qu est f or c on ti n ua n ce to obta i n n ew cou ns el when req ue st m ad e s ol el y f or di l atory rea sons) ; s eealso Antoine , 335 Ill . App. 3d at 580- 81, 7 81 N. E.2 d at 460- 61 (t rial court did not abuse discret ion in denyi ng defendant’s1-05-1849

24

re que st for co nt inuance t o be re pr ese nt ed by su bst itu t e co unse l when co nt inuance wo uld have de laye d s en t en cin g a nd de fen da nt co uld no t pr o ve he ha d r et ain ed at t o rne y re ad y, w illing a nd ab le to represe nt h i m ). Defe ndan t also contends that hi s righ t t o be represented by

Hough had attached, i.e. , that he had a sixt h amendment right t o insist upo n his rep re sent at ion aft er he ac cep t ed t he ca se a nd be cam e counsel of re cord. See Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 10 6 S . C t. 4 77 , 48 4 ( 19 85 ) (“On ce th e ri gh t to co unse l

h as atta ch ed an d b een as se rte d, t h e S tate m us t of cou rs e h on or i t”) . Acc ordi

n gl y , de f en da n t ar gu es th at H oug

h cou l d n o l on ger d ec l i

n e to repre sen t hi m . Finally , d efenda nt ar gue s t hat beca use Ho ugh’ s st at ed r eas on fo r w ithd ra wing — t hat he wasuna bl e to com m uni cate wi th de f endan t’s m other — d

i d not f al l wi thi n a ny of the m andatory or permi ssi

ve grounds f

or at to rney

withdrawal

as set out in the Il

li nois Rul es of Profess iona

l Co nduc t , H ou gh’s mo t ion wa s pr et ext ual, co ncluso ry and unsu ppo rt ed by law. Defend ant contends, therefore, that the tr ia l c ourt abused i

ts discretion in

grantin g the motion to withdraw. The State responds that, as shown by the record, Ho ugh ha

d good cause to withdraw, sp ec ifica lly, t ha t t he lac k o f co mmun ica t io n w it h d efe nd an t ’s mo t he rmad e it un r ea so na bly dif fi cul t for Hough to prepare an ef fecti ve def ense. Ci ting R ule 1.16(b)(1)(D) o f the Il

li nois Rul es of Professi

onal Conduct (134 Ill . 2d R. 1.16(b)(1)(D) ), whi ch perm its an atto rney to withdraw from a case wh

en a cl ie nt’s conduct “ren

ders i t unreasonabl

y di ff ic ult f or t he l awy er to carry out the em ploy me nt eff ectivel y,” the State argues, essen tial ly , that t he conduct of def

endan t’s mother wasa prox

y f or the con

duct of def endan t. Beca use Hough could not rea

ch def endan t’s m other,1-05-1849

1 A l thou gh the State doe s n ot arg uethe poi nt, the rec ord s ugg es ts th

at the c oope rati

on of de fe nd an t ’s mo t he rwa s r eq ui r ed fo ran o t he rr ea so n o f c o ns id er ab le in t er es t t o Ho ug h, na mely, pay me nt of his l egal

fees . The record refl ects defen dant was i ni tial ly appoin ted a public

defen der 25 the Stat e argues, she m

ade i t unreasonabl

y di ff ic ult f or Ho ugh to present an ef fecti ve def ense, cr ea t ing leg it imat e g r o un ds fo rwit hd r aw al. Init ially , w e no t e o ur agr eement wit h defend ant t hat his sixth a mendment right t o be repr es en ted b y Hou gh as h i s c ounse l

of ch oi ce h ad atta ch ed wh en th e a ttorn ey f i l ed h i s m oti on to wi thd raw . Hou

gh ha d a cc ep ted

de f en da nt’ s c as e a

nd repres en ted de f en da nt i n a su ppr es si on heari ng. Hou gh wa s def en da n t’s cou n se l of re cord a n d th er ef orewa s n ot f re e to d ec l i n e to represent hi

m wi thout the trial

court ’s perm

is si on. See, e.g. , People v. Segoviano , 189 Ill . 2d 228, 245, 725 N. E.2 d 1275 , 128 3 (20 00) ( upholding tr ial cou rt ’s denial

of defense cou nsel’s pretrial motion to with draw i n cri m i na l cas e). Wh ether the trial

court abused i

ts discretion in

permi tt in g Hough to withdraw is

another question en

tirel y, h owever, and we di sagree compl etely with the rem

ai nder of the argum

ents put f orth by both de f en da nt a nd the State . Con

trar y to the State ’s as serti on, the

con duc t of de f en da nt’ s m othe r i s n ot a p rox y f or de f en da nt’ s c ond uc t an d doe s n ot f al l wi thi n th e a m bi t of Ru le 1 . 16 ( b) ( 1) ( D) . I nd ee d, be yo nd cu r so ry ipse dixit statements, the State fails to provide su ppor t f or i ts a ss erti on th at d ef en da nt’ s m othe r wa s n ec es sa ry to the ef f ec ti ve repres en tati on of defen dant. The fa

cts of this case do not remotely

im pli cate defen

dant’s m ot her, and we f

ai l to see how her cooperation is

in any way relev ant to defendan

t’s case. 11-05-1849

because he was un

abl e to afford an attorney an d that Hough was later retain ed wi th the assi stance of de f en da n t’s moth er . Th

e r ec ord also s h ows th at w h en Hou gh f i rs t re qu ested

l ea v e to withdraw , defendant all

eged t hat Ho ugh was o wed o nly “a li tt le bi t mor e” money. Defendant’s i n ab i l i ty to pa y h i s l eg al f ee s m ay h av e c on sti tute d l eg i ti mate gr oun dsf or al l owi n g H oug h to wi thdra w un der Wheat , which provides a def endan t “ma y n ot in si st on representation by

an atto rney he can not aff ord.” Wheat , 486 U .S. at 159, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a t 149, 108 S. Ct. at 169 7. Sim il arly , Rule 1.16(b )(1)(F) all

ows withdrawal

when a clie nt “sub stantial

ly fai ls to ful fi ll an agree men t or obl i gation to the l

awy er as to expe ns es or f ees .” 134Il l . 2d R. 1 .16(b )(1)(F ). Because n

ei ther party rai ses the i ssue an d because the details of the f

in anci al arrangem

ent between de f en da nt a nd Hou gh are not b ef ore u s, we do not reach

the meri ts of whether n

onp ay men t of f ee s woul d h av e p rov i de d a n i n de pen den t groun d f or th e tr i al cou rt’ s g ra n t of Hou gh ’s moti on to withdraw 26 Fu rther more , a l th oug h Ru l e 1 .16 i s c er tai n l y b i n di n g on Hou gh , i t i s n ot b i n di n g a uth ori ty on the tria l court. See, e.g. , Norton Frickey, P.C. v. James B. Turner, P.C. , 94 P.3d 1266, 1270 ( Co lo . Ap p. 20 04 ) ( no t ing t ha t t he Co lo r ad o Ru les o f Pr o fes sio na l Co nd uc t “p r o vid e g uid an ce in the atto rney

-cli ent relationshi

p and serv

e as a m echan is m of in ternal prof

essi onal dis ci pli ne” b ut are not bi nd i ng on th e c ourts an d l ac k the f orce of l aw). Th ere f ore, wh i l e the R ulesof Pro f es si on al Con du ct c er tai n l y may i n f orm a tr i al cou rt’ s dec i si on to pe rm i t an attor n ey to wi thdra w, the court m ust hav e i nde pen den t bi ndi ng a uthori ty f or its deci sion. We ar e simil

ar ly unper sua ded by defenda nt ’s co nt ent ion t hat t he t rial co ur t sho uld have de ni ed Hou gh ’s moti on as d

i l atory. The ru

l e g ove rni ng whether a

tri al cou rt ab us esi ts d i screti on1-05-1849

27

by denying a de fendant 's re que st for subs t itu t e co unse l pro vides simply tha t a co ur t may deny suc h a r equ est when it believes t he de fendant is abusing his sixth a mendment right t o d elay the eff ic ie nt admi ni stration of j ustice. See Young , 207 Ill . App. 3d at 134, 565 N.E .2d at 311 (whether defendant’s selecti on of counsel of choice un reasonably

in terferes with ord erly

pro cess of judicial admi

nistra tio n li

es wit h sou nd discre tio n of t rial cou rt ); Burrell , 228 Ill . App. 3d at 142, 592 N.E.2d at 459 (factors relev ant to whether request for new counsel is im proper delay t act ic are “whet her t he de fendant has be en co nt inuo usly in cust od y, whe t her he has informed t he trial court of ef

forts to obtain c ounsel , and whethe r he has cooperat ed wi

th appointed counsel ev en though di ssa tis f i ed wi th tha t couns el”). De f en da nt’ s a ss erti

on th at the tri al cou rt ce rtai nl y wou l d have d en

i ed a s i m i l ar req ue st f or new counsel, had def

endan t ma de one b eca

use i t woul d i m perm i ssi bl y del ay the tri al i s pur e spe cul ati on. Cf. People v. Bow

man , 1 38 I ll. 2d 1 31, 146 , 5 61 N .E .2 d 63 3, 641 (1 990 ) ( re ject ing as mer e c o nje ct ur e d efe nd an t ’s ar gu men t t ha t he wa s p r eju dic ed by at t o rne y’s failu r e t o file wri tten m otion to with draw) . The re co rd do es no t sup po rt t he infere nce t hat Ho ugh u sed t he
m otion to with draw as a delay

tacti c. Al though we are tro ubled that defen dant’s trial

was delay

ed eight months , we note t hat t he de lay o r igin at ed be ca us e t he St at e w as no t pr ep ar ed t o go t o t r ial o n t he da y Ho ug h st at ed his de sir e t o wit hd r aw . T he r ec o r d r ev ea ls no ba sis t o co nc lud e t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t kn ew o rco uld have k now n t hat suc h a de lay wou ld re sult fro m set t ing a da t e t o c ons ider Ho ugh’ s mot ion and ulti ma tely permi tt in g hi m to withdraw. Indee d, the maj ority of the seven

-month del

ay that f oll owe d th

e wi th dr aw al h ea ri n g r es ul ted f rom di sc ov er y con ti n ua n ce s. Re ga

rd l es s, we de cl i n e to1-05-1849

28

anno unce a r ule t hat a t rial co ur t has no discr et ion t o a llow an a t t or ney to wit hdr aw w hen t he wi thdra wal may potential l y caus e su bstantial del ay . Del ay i s onl y one f actor that a

tria l court mus t consider wh

en presen ted with a m

ot ion to withdraw. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 13( c) (3 ) ( re quir ing court to consi

der b oth potenti

al del ay and concerns of

equi ty). Inst ead , w e gr ou nd o ur hold ing in the pr inciples set for t h by the S upr eme Co ur t in Wheat and in t he r equ irement s o f Rule 13 (c )( 3) , w hich go ver ns wit hdr awa l mot ions. In Wheat , t he Supreme C ourt considered whether the trial court abused i

ts discretion when

it ref used to allow a cr iminal d efe nd an t t o be r ep r es en t ed by t r ial c o un se l wit h a co nflic t o f int er es t . T he de fen da nt in Wheat wa s c ha r ge d w it h p ar t icip at ing in a dr ug dis t r ibu t io n c o nsp ira cy inv o lving mult iple codef endan ts. Wheat , 48 6 U . S . at 15 4, 10 0 L . E d. 2d at 14 5, 10 8 S . Ct . at 16 94 . T wo da ys b ef oretrial, the def

en da n t m ov ed to h av e th e a ttorn ey repr es en ti n g h i s two cod

ef en da n ts appoi nted as h i s tri al coun sel . Wheat , 486 U .S. at 155, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a t 146, 108 S. Ct. at 169 5. Al l parties a greed to wai ve the ri ght to repre sen

tation by conf l i ct-f ree c ouns el . Wheat , 486 U.S. at 157, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a

t 147, 108 S. Ct. at 169 6. The g ov er

n men t ob j ec ted , c l ai

m i n g th at b ec au se

th e c ode f en da n ts l i ke l y wou l d b e a sk ed to t est ify aga inst e ach o t her , t he co nfli ct was so ser iou s and irre co ncilable tha t it w ou ld pr event t he sub sti tuted attorney

f rom e f f ecti ve l y repre sen tin g an y of the def

endan ts. Wheat , 486 U.S. at 155- 56, 100 L. Ed. 2 d at 146 -47, 10 8 S. Ct. at 16 95. A greei ng w i th the gove rnm en t, the tri al court den i ed th e def

endan t’s m otion f or sub sti tute coun sel . Wheat , 486 U.S. at 157, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 147, 10 8 S. Ct. at 16 96. Af fi rmi ng that deci si on, the Uni

ted St ates Supreme Court held that t rial court s hav

e an1-05-1849

29

af f i rm ati v e ob l i ga ti on to en su recr i m i n al de f en da n ts rec ei v e a f ai r tri al — on e th at a pp ea rsf ai r to al l obj ective observers — an d that t hi s obliga

tion occasional ly

requires a

court to deny

a crim in al def endan t hi s coun sel of choice. Wheat , 486 U.S. at 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 149, 108 S. Ct. at 169 8. Th e C ourt n oted tha t the cri m i na l de f en da nt’ s i ns i stenc e on

cou ns el wi th a con f l i ct of i n terest pu t th e tr i al cou rt i n th e p osi ti on of b ei n g “ ‘w h i p- sa we d’ b y as se rti on s of er ror, ” wi th al le gations of

the depriv

ation of s ix

th ame ndm ent righ ts on the one hand an

d in eff ective assi stance clai m s on th e other. Wheat , 486 U. S. at 161, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 1 50, 108 S . Ct. at 169 8. See also Segoviano , 1 89 I ll. 2d a t 245 , 7 25 N .E .2 d at 128 3 ( cr imi nal defend ant alleged bot h ineffect ive assist ance and tr ial cour t e rr or when co urt refuse d at to rney’s re ques t t o w ithdr aw) ; Bowman , 138 Ill . 2d at 148, 561 N. E.2d at 641 ( rejecting the n ot ion that def

endan t may be pl aced i n “ no-lose” si tuati on wh

ere h e m ay al l ege v i ab l e error n

o ma tter how trial

court ex ercises

i ts di scre tion ). Face d wit h t hese co mpet ing and ir re co ncilable co ncer ns, t he Su pr eme Co ur t held in Wheat th at a trial cou rt m us t h av e b road di scre ti on

to re l y on i ts ex perien ce an d j ud gm en t to ar ri v e a t a deci sion tha t ma i ntai ns the c ourt’s i

nteg ri ty a nd e ns ures that the procee di ngs are f ai r. Wheat , 486 U. S. at 16 2, 10 0 L . E d. 2d at 15 1, 10 8 S . Ct . at 16 99 . Ac co r din gly, t he Su pr eme Co ur t he ld t her e wa s no “right ” o r “wr ong ” ans wer and, altho ugh o t her co ur t s co uld r eac h differing co nclusio ns wit h equ al just ifi cat ion whe n pr ese nt ed w ith similar circ umst ance s, t he de nial of t he defen dant’s counsel

of choice was n

ot an ab use of di scretion wh

en the f ai rness of the proceedin

gs m i ght b e cal l ed i

nto que sti on. Wheat , 486 U .S. at 164, 1 00 L. E d. 2d a t 152, 108 S. Ct. at 170 0. Re ce nt ly, t he Su pr eme Co ur t affir med t his b r o ad dis cr et io n o f t r ial c o ur t s o n t his is su e in Gonzales-Lopez , noting a court has “ wide la titude in bal anci ng the right to counsel

of choice1-05-1849

30

agai nst the needs

of f ai rness.” Gonzalez-Lopez , 54 8 U .S. at _

__ , 16 5 L . Ed . 2d

at 4 21 , 12 6 S . C t. at 2565-66. Applying t he pr inciples set for t h in Wheat and Gonzalez-Lopez to this case, we hol

d that t he t rial co ur t did no t abus e its bro ad d iscre t ion in lim iting d efenda nt ’s r ight t o be re pr ese nt ed by Ho ug h. T he r ec o r d r efle ct s t ha t Ho ug h e xp r es se d a st r o ng de sir e t o be r ele as ed fr o m his obligation to repr esent d efendant. What ever his underly ing reasons for doing so , Ho ugh’s insis t en ce o n w it hd r aw al r ais ed leg it imat e c o nc er ns a bo ut his in clina t io n a nd ab ilit y t o effe ct ive ly represent def

endan t. Simi la rly , defen dant’s statemen

t at t he wi thdrawal h

earin g that he was “rea dy t o g et it o ver wit h” cr eat ed a ddit ional ca use for co ncer n. Fa ced wit h a r eca lcitr ant at t or ney and a see mingly

indiff er ent defend ant , t he t rial co ur t ra t ionally cou ld co nclude t hat t he int eg r it y and fair ne ss o f t he de fen da nt ’s t r ial w er e a t st ak e. Ac co r din gly, t he t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r ly exerci sed i

ts discretion to appoin

t new counsel

who would preserve the i ntegrity of the j udic ia

l process and ensure that the proceedings “appear[ed] fai r to al l wh

o observe[d] them.” Wheat , 486 U.S . at 1 60, 100

L. E d. 2 d a

t 149 , 10 8 S. Ct. a

t 169 8. S eealso United States v. Hughey , 147 F.3d 423, 43 0-31 (5 th

Ci r. 1 99 8) (u

ph ol di n g di scre ti on

of di str i ct c our t to pe rm i t atto rney to wi th dr aw du e to s ch

ed ul i n g c on f l i cts , de sp i

te def en da n t’s ob j ec ti on , b ec au se

of con cern s a b out i nteg ri ty of j udicial proces s an

d ef f i ci en t adm i nistration of

j ustice). Fina lly, w e n o t e t ha t t he pr inc iple s w e h av e a pp lied fr o m Wheat ar e c on siste

n t wi th Supreme C ourt Rul e 13(c)(3), which provides that in c onsi derin

g a m ot ion to withdraw, a trial court wil l we igh whether the granti

ng of the m

ot ion “ would del ay the trial of the case, or w

ould otherw ise be i nequitabl e .” (E mphasis ad ded .) 134 Ill. 2d R. 13( c) (3 ). Thu s, a ltho ugh t he1-05-1849

31

pot entia l f or delay is of consi derabl e concern, the court must bal ance that agai

nst the f undam ental con cern s of eq ui ty , f ai rnes s a n d j us ti ce , w

h i ch th e S up re me C our

t sta ted cou l d b e s uf f i ci en t to den y a def endan t hi s counsel

of choice. Wheat , 486 U.S. at 162, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 150-51, 108 S. Ct. at 1699 . In su m , th e tri al cou rt i n th i s c as e, c onf

ron ted by a p rov erbi al

“ wh i p-s aw ” of err or, di d n ot abuse i ts di scre tion i n pe rm i ttin g Hough to with draw f rom h i s represe ntati on of def endan t. Inst ead , t he co ur t made a n informed judg ment ba sed on it s exp er ience, instinct s and so und judg ment, which is in kee ping wit h bot h t he st anda rd set ou t in Wheat and the spi

rit of our own Supreme Court rul

e. S ee Wheat , 486 U.S. at 163, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 151, 108 S. Ct. at 1699; 134 Il l . 2d R. 1 3(c)(3 ). Thoug h de f en da n t, i n h i s rep l y b rief , i n sists h e h ad th e u n eq ui v oca l si xth amendment right t o “mak e eve n a fo olish cho ice t o c ont inue wit h” Ho ugh’ s re pr ese nt at ion, de fen da nt lac ke d t he ab ilit y t o wa ive t he t r ial c o ur t ’s o blig at io n t o pr o vid e h im wit h a fair t r ial, i nc l udi ng repres en tation b y ef f ec ti ve cou ns el , an d de f en da nt l i ke wi se coul d n ot i ns i st u pon repre sen tation that woul

d com prom i se the i nteg ri ty of the proceed

i ngs . We close wi th a n ote on the scope of the tri al

court’s di scre tion . As the Su prem e Court obs er ved in Wheat , no “right ” o r “wr ong ” ans wer s exist in a case suc h as t his, which t ur ns o n t he sub stan tia l l ati tude of the tri al court to ma

ke an i nf orme d j udgm

en t. Wheat , 486 U.S. at 163, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 151, 108 S. Ct. at 1699. Here, the tr ia l c ourt very

easi ly could have determ

in ed that Ho ugh c ou ld effect ively repr ese nt defend ant des pit e t he at t or ney’s misgivings abo ut do ing so and his ea gern ess to with draw. Cf. Segoviano , 1 89 I ll. 2d a t 245 , 7 25 N .E .2 d at 128 3. Witho ut t he ben efi t o f h in dsight and i

n the context of the m

urky “ pre-trial c ontext when rel ationsh ips between1-05-1849

32

parties are see

n through a glass, darkl

y” ( Wheat , 486 U.S. at 162, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 151, 108 S. Ct. at 1699 ), the tri

al court m ade th e m ost equi tabl e dec i sion poss i

bl e. Ul tim atel y , the tri al court was i n the b est position to determi ne wh ether Hough should have been required to continue repres en ti ng de f en da nt i n l i gh t of the man y com pe ti ng con cern s w e h

ave ou tl i ne d. Th e eva l ua ti on o f t he fac t s a nd cir cu mst an ce s r ele va nt t o t he ex er cis e o f dis cr et io n in t his ma t t er sho uld pr o pe r ly be l eft “to the in

form ed j udgme

nt of the trial

court .” Wheat , 486 U.S. at 164, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 152, 108 S. Ct. at 1700.

CONCLUSION I n su mmar y, t he ev ide nc e p r es en t ed by t he St at e w as su fficie nt t o pr o ve de fen da nt ’s gu ilt beyond a r eas ona ble do ubt . Mo re ove r, t he t rial co ur t did no t abus e its discr et ion in gr ant ing def en se c ouns el ’smotion

to with draw b ef ore tri al . Ac cordi ngl y , the j udgm

en t of the tria l court i s af

f i rmed. Af f i rmed. O' BRIEN , P.J., an

d O' MA RA FR OSSA RD, J ., conc

ur.