In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-2327 

EMILY LEWIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

INDIANA WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. 

No. 1:19-cv-00451-WCL-SLC — William C. Lee, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2022 — DECIDED JUNE 10, 2022 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Dr. Emily Lewis, a 60-year-old African American woman, alleges that Indiana Wesleyan University discriminated against her when it took away her supervisory responsibilities and ultimately eliminated her position. 

She brought various claims against the University under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the University on her 
2 No. 21-2327 

retaliation claims and concluded that she had waived her age 

discrimination claim. But the court’s summary judgment 

opinion did not address Dr. Lewis’s race discrimination 

claim. As explaiȱ ǰȱ ȱĜȱȱǰȱvacate in part, 

and remand for consideration of her race discrimination 

claim. 

I. Background 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise 

noted. Indiana Wesleyan University is a private Christian university based in Marion, Indiana. Dr. Lewis began working 

there in 2017 as Director of Instructional Design. In that role, 

she supervised a team of five instructional designers, who assisted with curriculum development across the University. 

Dr. Lewis initially reported to Lorne Oke, the Executive Director of the Center for Learning and Innovation. Not long after starting her job, Dr. Lewis informed Oke that she believed 

her subordinates (all of whom were white) did not take direction from her on account of her race. 

In July 2018, Dr. Lewis met with Oke and Diane McDaniel, 

the University’s Diversity Officer, to discuss her concerns. 

During the meeting, Oke told Dr. Lewis that she should get 

“Black woman syndrome off of [her] shoulders” and that she 

was “too smart.” On August 6, 2018, Oke informed Dr. Lewis 

that he intended to remove her from her supervisory position 

and sent her home for the day. According to Oke, he merely 

wanted Dr. Lewis to take some time away from her subordinates until a new position could be created. Dr. Lewis, on the 

other hand, believed she was being fired because of her race. 

She immediately contacted McDaniel and Matt Lucas, the 

University’s Chancellor. 
No. 21-2327 3

On August 8, 2018, Lucas, McDaniel, and human resources personnel met with Oke and Dr. Lewis to discuss the 

situation. Dr. Lewis claims she was not told that her position 

was being changed; instead, she was allowed to work from 

home on intermittent assignments for two months. In any 

event, Oke created a new title for Dr. Lewis: Director of Support for Research and Learning. This new role offered the 

same pay and benefits as her prior role but did not involve 

any supervisory or leadership responsibilities. 

Meanwhile, the University planned to merge the Center 

for Learning and Innovation with another department. Erin 

Crisp was selected to lead the combined entity as the Associate Vice President for Innovation. In preparation for this transition, Crisp spoke with Oke about his experience supervising 

Dr. Lewis. In February 2019, Crisp emailed Chancellor Lucas 

explaining that she had decided to eliminate Dr. Lewis’s position. Crisp wrote that she believed research was an essential 

part of her own role, that she did not feel comfortable delegating those responsibilities to Dr. Lewis, and that an employee who is “unable to lead or be led will continue to undermine [our] culture.” In the same email, Crisp noted that a 

research assistant “would be very valuable, but that isn’t what 

this position entails.” There is no evidence in the record that 

Crisp knew of Dr. Lewis’s August 2018 discrimination complaint when she decided to eliminate Dr. Lewis’s position. 

Crisp began supervising Dr. Lewis in April 2019. In June 

2019, Crisp informed Dr. Lewis that her position was being 

eliminated. Crisp gave her the option of accepting a research 

assistant position the following month or being terminated in 

August 2019. Dr. Lewis declined the research assistant position and ceased working at the University. Crisp did not hire 
4 No. 21-2327 

anyone else for the research assistant position, and some of 

Dr. Lewis’s responsibilities were absorbed by members of 

Crisp’s team. 

Dr. Lewis brought various employment discrimination 

claims against the University, only three of which are relevant 

to this appeal. First, Dr. Lewis alleges that her August 2018 

“demotion” from Director of Instructional Design to Director 

of Support for Research and Learning was retaliatory (the “retaliatory demotion claim”). Second, she alleges that her 2019 

termination was in retaliation for her complaint of discrimination in 2018 (the “retaliatory termination claim”). Third, Dr. 

Lewis alleges that her termination was discriminatory on the 

basis of her race and age. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the University on Dr. Lewis’s retaliatory demotion and retaliatory termination claims. The court also concluded that Dr. 

Lewis had waived her age discrimination claim by failing to 

raise it after the University moved for summary judgment. 

But the district court did not address Dr. Lewis’s race discrimination claim as to her 2019 termination. Dr. Lewis timely appealed. 

II. Discussion 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Chatman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 5 F.4th 738, 744 

(7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). We construe all facts and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, but the moving 

party may prevail “by showing an absence of evidence to 
No. 21-2327 5

support” the nonmoving party’s claims. Tyburski v. City of 

Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against 

their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (“ADEA”) further prohibits discrimination against workers aged 40 years or older. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 623(a)(1). To succeed on a Title VII discrimination claim, an 

employee must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected 

class, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and 

(3) causation. Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 

2018). The legal analysis for discrimination claims under Title 

VII and § 1981 is largely identical. McCurry v. Kenco Logistics 

Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2019). Race discrimination claims under Title VII simply require that race be a “motivating factor in the defendant’s challenged employment decision.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 

140 S. Ct. 1009, 1017 (2020). For a § 1981 claim, however, “a 

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for 

cause of [her] injury.” Id. at 1014. Similarly, age discrimination 

claims require a private-sector employee to prove that age 

was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action. Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 598.1

One way of proving employment discrimination is the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). 

1 Cf. Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1173–74, 1175–76 (2020) (distinguishing between the ADEA’s private-sector and public-sector provisions 

and holding that age need not be the but-for cause of a federal employee’s 

personnel action). 
6 No. 21-2327 

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, 

the employee must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was meeting the defendant’s legitimate 

expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, 

and (4) similarly situated employees who were not members 

of her protected class were treated more favorably.” Tyburski, 

964 F.3d at 598. When an employee’s position is eliminated as 

part of a mini-reduction in force (“mini-RIF”), the fourth element of the prima facie case becomes whether the employee’s 

duties were absorbed by workers outside her protected class. 

Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 

2008) (Title VII); Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 526 F.3d 

1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 2008) (ADEA). If an employee meets each 

element of her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

the adverse employment action. The burden then shifts back 

to the employee to show why the employer’s explanation is 

pretextual. Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 598. 

At summary judgment, courts ask whether the evidence 

“would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Abrego, 907 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 

Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)); see also Tyburski, 964 

F.3d at 598 (applying the same test in the ADEA context). We 

have emphasized that “courts must assess the evidence ‘as a 

whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself,’ regardless of whether the 

court also analyzes the evidence pursuant to McDonnell Douglas.” Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 598 (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). 
No. 21-2327 7

A. Discriminatory Termination 

Dr. Lewis argues that her discriminatory termination 

claims—on the basis of race and age—should have survived 

summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas. She further 

contends that her age discrimination was not waived below. 

Two of the four elements of her prima facie case are 

straightforward: she is a member of a protected class (a Black 

woman over the age of 40), and her termination constitutes an 

adverse employment action. We assume for the sake of argument that Dr. Lewis was meeting the University’s legitimate 

expectations, notwithstanding mixed evidence in the record 

as to her performance. The parties primarily disagree as to the 

fourth element: (a) whether similarly situated employees 

were treated more favorably, or (b) under a mini-RIF theory, 

whether her duties were absorbed by employees not in her 

protected class. 

1. Race Discrimination 

Our Circuit Rule 50 provides in relevant part: 

Whenever a district court resolves any claim or counterclaim on the merits, ... the judge shall give his or her 

reasons, either orally on the record or by written statement. The court urges the parties to bring to this 

court’s attention as soon as possible any failure to comply with this rule. 

Nonetheless, the district court failed to explain why it was 

granting summary judgment on Dr. Lewis’s claim that her 

termination was racially discriminatory. As a result, we cannot be sure that the district court adequately considered the 

merits of that claim. 
8 No. 21-2327 

The University argues that remand would be futile, and 

we can affirm for any basis supported by the record. O'Brien 

v. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). But given 

the fact-specific nature of Dr. Lewis’s race discrimination 

claim, we decline to assess it in the first instance. Accordingly, 

we vacate summary judgment as to that claim and remand it 

to the district court. 

2. Age Discrimination 

We agree with the district court that Dr. Lewis waived her 

age discrimination claim by failing to adequately develop it 

in her opposition to summary judgment. See Rozumalski v. 

W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(“We apply waiver even if the issue may have been before the 

district court in more general terms, still holding a party to its 

responsibility to make a specific argument.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 

(7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]rguments that have been raised may still 

be waived on appeal if they are underdeveloped, conclusory, 

or unsupported by law.”). 

In her briefing below, Dr. Lewis made passing reference to 

the legal standard for age discrimination claims by citing the 

McDonnell Douglas framework. Yet she neglected to mention 

(much less grapple with) the ADEA’s requirement that age 

was the but-for cause of her termination. Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 

598. Her evidence of Oke’s “discriminatory animus” sounds 

exclusively in race discrimination, not age discrimination. 

Setting aside whether Oke’s discriminatory animus can or 

should be imputed to Crisp as the final decisionmaker, Dr. 

Lewis failed to point to evidence before the district court suggesting her age drove the decision to eliminate her position. 

Without more, her age discrimination claim is waived. 
No. 21-2327 9

B. Retaliation 

Title VII and the ADEA prohibit employers from retaliating against their employees because an employee complained 

of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 

To survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 

(3) causation. Rozumalski, 937 F.3d at 924 (Title VII); Boston v. 

U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 464 (7th Cir. 2016) (ADEA). 

To show causation, employees may point to circumstantial evidence, such as “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence other employees were treated differently, or evidence the employer’s proffered reason for the 

adverse action was pretextual.” Rozumalski, 937 F.3d at 924 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs may also make 

use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation 

context. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Progress Rail Loco., Inc., 940 F.3d 

360, 370 (7th Cir. 2019). Ultimately, “[t]he key question is 

whether a reasonable juror could conclude that there was a 

causal link between the protected activity or status and the 

adverse action.” Rozumalski, 937 F.3d at 924 (citing Ortiz, 834 

F.3d at 765–66). 

1. Retaliatory Demotion 

The district court concluded that Dr. Lewis’s retaliatory 

demotion claim was time-barred under Title VII and the 

ADEA, but because § 1981 has a longer statute of limitations, 

the court considered the claim on the merits.2 Nevertheless, 

2 Compare Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 

2004) (concluding that four-year statute of limitations applied to a 
10 No. 21-2327 

we agree with the district court that this claim cannot survive 

summary judgment. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Lewis, the facts simply do not support a causal 

connection between her protected activity and an adverse employment action. To recap, on August 6, 2018, Oke informed 

Dr. Lewis that he intended to remove her from her supervisory position. Dr. Lewis then contacted the University’s 

Chancellor and Director of Diversity, explaining that she believed Oke’s decision was racially motivated. After a meeting 

on August 8, Oke created a new director-level position for Dr. 

Lewis. 

Because Dr. Lewis’s protected activity (reporting a claim 

of race discrimination) did not occur until after the August 6 

conversation with Oke, her protected activity could not have 

caused Oke to demote her. The University adds that her new 

role provided the same pay and benefits, so it could not have 

constituted a demotion. See, e.g., Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 

803, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that an employee’s transfer to another position with the same title, pay, and benefits 

was not an adverse action). Dr. Lewis counters that she lost 

her supervisory and leadership responsibilities. We need not 

decide whether her new role amounted to a demotion, however, because Oke had decided to remove her supervisory responsibilities before she engaged in protected activity.

2. Retaliatory Termination 

Likewise, Dr. Lewis’s retaliatory termination claim cannot 

survive summary judgment. The undisputed evidence shows 

retaliation claim under § 1981 because it was premised on conduct that 

took place after the formation of an employment contract), with 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (ADEA). 
No. 21-2327 11

that when Crisp decided to eliminate Dr. Lewis’s position in 

February 2019, Crisp was unaware that Dr. Lewis had complained of discrimination. It follows that Crisp could not have 

acted with retaliatory animus. Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 603 (“For 

a superior to have retaliated against an employee based on 

protected activity, the superior must have had knowledge of 

that protected activity.”). Because Dr. Lewis has failed to 

make out a prima facie case of retaliation, we do not reach her 

argument that the University’s stated reasons for terminating 

her were pretextual. 

On appeal, Dr. Lewis makes a belated attempt to invoke a 

cat’s paw theory of liability. See McDaniel, 940 F.3d at 370 (“In 

employment discrimination cases, the ‘cat’s paw’ is the unwitting manager or supervisor who is persuaded to act based 

on another’s illegal bias.”). Dr. Lewis suggests that Oke’s retaliatory animus should be imputed to Crisp, even though 

there is no evidence that Crisp knew of her protected activity. 

Unfortunately, she failed to develop this theory below, so she 

has waived it. Rozumalski, 937 F.3d at 925.

III. Conclusion 

The district court correctly granted summary judgment in 

favor of the University on Dr. Lewis’s retaliation claims, and 

Dr. Lewis waived her age discrimination claim by failing to 

preserve it below. But because the district court did not explain why it was granting summary judgment on Dr. Lewis’s 

race discrimination claim, we decline to evaluate that claim in 

the first instance. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED in 

part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.