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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: _____________

Filing Date: February 3, 2022

No. A-1-CA-39059

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APRIL L. VEITH,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

Curtis R. Gurley, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM 

for Appellee
OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} Defendant April Veith was charged by criminal complaint in magistrate court 

with petty misdemeanor battery, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-4 (1963). 

The magistrate court dismissed the criminal complaint, and the State appealed to the 

district court. The district court determined Defendant’s arrest was illegal and 

remanded to magistrate court for imposition of the magistrate court’s dismissal 

order. The State appeals the district court’s remand order and argues (1) NMSA 

1978, Section 30-3-6 (1983) provided statutory authority for Defendant’s arrest; (2) 

Defendant’s warrantless arrest was not a violation of the New Mexico Constitution; 

and (3) the district court erred in concluding dismissal was the appropriate remedy. 

We reverse. 

BACKGROUND

{2} The parties stipulated that the following facts from the arresting officer’s 

probable cause statement were true for purposes of resolving Defendant’s motion.

Deputy Deprez was dispatched to a middle school parking lot based on a call in 

which someone reported that “April” (later identified as Defendant) was attacking 

the caller’s mother outside of the school gym. Upon his arrival at the school, Deputy

Deprez observed multiple people attempting to keep Defendant and Jennifer Hebert 

apart. Deputy Deprez noticed Hebert was taking deep breaths, seemed emotional, 
2

and that Defendant had blood on her face. He made sure neither party needed 

medical attention before beginning his on-the-scene investigation. 

{3} Deputy Deprez spoke to Hebert, Defendant, Defendant’s husband, and two 

witnesses while at the scene. Hebert told Deputy Deprez that as she was getting 

ready to leave and as she was putting her children in her car, Defendant walked up 

to her and told her she did not have any “beef” with her, but then got in her face and 

started yelling at her. Hebert stated that Defendant was trying to get her to fight. 

Hebert explained she told Defendant she did not want to fight and yelled for 

Defendant’s husband to come get Defendant. Hebert told Deputy Deprez that 

Defendant pushed her, grabbed her by her shirt, shoved her against a wall, and asked 

if she was scared of her. Hebert went on to say that Defendant began to choke her so 

she defended herself by punching Defendant in the face. She said they both fought 

until Defendant’s husband and another person separated them. 

{4} Deputy Deprez spoke to Defendant who said she had wanted to confront 

Hebert about a guy they both previously dated, but that she did not have any “beef” 

about it. Defendant stated Hebert pushed her and she had to defend herself. Later, 

Defendant changed her story and stated Hebert initially pulled her hair. Deputy 

Deprez could smell alcohol on Defendant’s breath and asked her if she had anything 

to drink that day. Defendant answered that she had been drinking. 
3

{5} Deputy Deprez spoke to Defendant’s husband who explained that when he 

and Defendant arrived at the school, Defendant approached Hebert. He stated he 

knew the two had a previous conflict so he attempted to avoid the situation by 

remaining in his car. He said he did not see who started the altercation, but saw the

two fighting so he separated his wife from the situation. Deputy Deprez also spoke 

to two witnesses who explained Defendant initiated the physical altercation. After 

completing his interviews of the parties and witnesses, Deputy Deprez arrested 

Defendant without a warrant and took her to the detention center. Defendant was 

later charged with battery.

{6} During proceedings in magistrate court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 

or in the alternative to suppress evidence, arguing the arrest violated the 

misdemeanor arrest rule and that the criminal complaint should be dismissed or 

statements and evidence should be suppressed because they were tainted by her

unlawful arrest. The magistrate court entered an order dismissing the complaint with 

prejudice. The State appealed to the district court, and in response, Defendant 

renewed her motion to dismiss or in the alternative to suppress evidence. After a 

hearing on the motion, the district court remanded the matter to the magistrate court 

for imposition of the dismissal order. 

DISCUSSION
4

{7} The State pursues three related but distinct arguments: (1) Section 30-3-6 

provided statutory authority for Defendant’s arrest; (2) the arrest was a reasonable 

warrantless arrest under the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) even if the arrest was 

illegal, dismissal was not the appropriate remedy. 

{8} The question we must address is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested

without a warrant. Our state strongly prefers arrests be made pursuant to a warrant. 

State v. Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 659, 241 P.3d 1099. Under the 

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[t]he right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In United States v. 

Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court applied Fourth Amendment 

jurisprudence to uphold the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest supported by 

probable cause and explicit statutory authority. The Fourth Amendment permits 

warrantless arrests when the arrest is supported by statutory authority and probable 

cause. See State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 17-18, 357 P.3d 958 (holding a 

warrantless arrest with probable cause, see NMSA 1978, § 30-16-23 (1965), which 

permits warrantless arrests with probable cause for shoplifting, did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment based on Watson). Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico 

Constitution requires that all warrantless arrests be “reasonable.” Campos v. State,

1994-NMSC-012, ¶ 5, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117. Under our New Mexico 
5

Constitution, warrantless arrests based on statutory authority are presumed 

constitutional, but require an exigency that precluded the arresting officer from 

procuring a warrant. Id. ¶ 14. 

{9} To address the State’s appeal, we must first determine if Section 30-3-6 

provided statutory authority for the warrantless arrest. We then turn to the State’s 

contention that the arrest was reasonable under the New Mexico Constitution. 

Because the appeal is based on Defendant’s motion to suppress, we are presented 

with a mixed question of law and fact. We review “factual matters with deference to 

the district court’s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and [the 

appellate courts] review[] the district court’s application of the law de novo.” State 

v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183.

I. Section 30-3-6 Provided Statutory Authority for Defendant’s Arrest

{10} The State first appeals the district court’s determination that Section 30-3-6 

did not apply to the facts of this case. The State argues that the plain language of the 

statute provides that so long as an arresting officer has probable cause that a battery, 

or one of the other crimes listed, has occurred, the officer has authority to perform a 

warrantless arrest. Defendant answers that the Legislature did not intend to create 

such a broad exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule, and that the statute applies 

only to arrests that occur in licensed liquor establishments. We agree with the State. 
6

{11} Because Defendant’s appeal centers on our interpretation of Section 30-3-6, 

we interpret the statute de novo. See State v. Gonzales, 2019-NMCA-036, ¶ 7, 444 

P.3d 1064. “In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent.” State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-012, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 14, 206 

P.3d 125. “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give 

effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v. 

McWhorter, 2005-NMCA-133, ¶ 5, 138 N.M. 580, 124 P.3d 215. However, we will 

not give effect to the plain meaning of the statute if “this leads to an absurd or 

unreasonable result.” State v. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 240, 96 

P.3d 801. If it will, we construe the statute “according to its obvious spirit or 

reason[.]” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 3, 117 N.M. 346, 

871 P.2d 1352 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

{12} “[W]e additionally consider the context surrounding a particular statute, such 

as its history, its apparent object, and other related statutes.” State v. Becenti, 2021-

NMCA-060, ¶ 5, 498 P.3d 282 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 

omitted). We are required to “read the entire statute as a whole so that each provision 

may be considered in relation to every other part[.]” State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA089, ¶ 11, 355 P.3d 831 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reading 

the statute as a whole, we are also to consider “its purposes and consequences.” State 

v. Martinez, 2020-NMCA-043, ¶ 34, 472 P.3d 1241.
7

{13} We start by considering the misdemeanor arrest rule, which provides context 

for our discussion of the statute in this case. “The misdemeanor arrest rule provides 

that generally, in New Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor 

arrest only if the offense was committed in the officer’s presence.” Milliron v. Cnty.

of San Juan, 2016-NMCA-096, ¶ 28, 384 P.3d 1089 (alteration, internal quotation 

marks, and citation omitted). “The misdemeanor arrest rule is a holdover from the 

common law distinction between warrantless arrests for felonies and for 

misdemeanors.” State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 11, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 

130. However, New Mexico has several exceptions to this rule. Id. ¶ 12 

(“[P]ermitting officers in specific circumstances to make warrantless arrest if the 

arresting officer has ‘reasonable grounds, based on personal investigation which

may include information from eyewitnesses’[.]” (quoting NMSA 1978, § 66-8-

125(B) (1978)); see also NMSA 1978, § 31-1-7(A) (1995) (permitting warrantless 

arrests for domestic disturbances); State v. Lyon, 1985-NMCA-082, ¶ 18, 103 N.M. 

305, 706 P.2d 516 (allowing for a police-team exception to the “in the presence”

requirement of the misdemeanor arrest rule); § 30-16-23 (permitting warrantless 

arrests for shoplifting). The Legislature has the authority to enact an exception to the 

misdemeanor arrest rule, insofar as it does not violate the New Mexico Constitution, 

see Carrillo v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2017-NMCA-024, ¶ 22, 389 P.3d 1087

(explaining the Legislature may overturn the common law with “clear and 
8

unambiguous language” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), and 

Section 30-3-6 is one such legislatively enacted exception. 

{14} We next turn to examination of the statute. Section 30-3-6, entitled

“Reasonable detention; assault, battery, public affray or criminal damage to 

property[,]”states:

A. As used in this section:

(1) “licensed premises” means all public and private rooms, 

facilities and areas in which alcoholic beverages are sold or served in 

the customary operating procedures of establishments licensed to sell 

or serve alcoholic liquors;

(2) “proprietor” means the owner of the licensed premises or 

his manager or his designated representative; and

(3) “operator” means the owner or the manager of any 

establishment or premises open to the public.

B. Any law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant any 

persons he has probable cause for believing have committed the crime 

of assault or battery as defined in [NMSA 1978,] Sections 30-3-1 

through 30-3-5 [(1963, as amended through 1977)] . . . or public affray 

or criminal damage to property. Any proprietor or operator who causes 

such an arrest shall not be criminally or civilly liable if he has actual 

knowledge, communicated truthfully and in good faith to the law 

enforcement officer, that the persons so arrested have committed the 

crime of assault or battery as defined in Sections 30-3-1 through 30-3-

5 . . . or public affray or criminal damage to property.

The statute has two subsections. The first, a definition section, defines “licensed 

premises,” “proprietor,” and “operator.” Section 30-3-6(A)(1)-(3). “[L]icensed 

premises” pertains to those premises we traditionally refer to as restaurants and bars. 
9

Section 30-3-6(A)(1). The second subsection addresses warrantless arrests for 

enumerated crimes and includes a provision addressing criminal and civil liability 

arising from reporting such crimes. Section 30-3-6(B). Because we find no cases in 

New Mexico that have interpreted Section 30-3-6, its scope is an issue of first 

impression to this Court.

1

{15} Defendant refers to Section 30-3-6 as the “barroom brawl statute that has

traditionally been understood to authorize misdemeanor arrests at bars, restaurants,

and liquor stores.” Defendant argues that the misdemeanor arrest rule is limited to 

three judicially and statutorily created exceptions for crimes against businesses, 

crimes related to domestic violence, and crimes arising from driving vehicles, and 

contends that Section 30-3-6 falls under the exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule 

for crimes against businesses. Defendant highlights two other statutes that allow for 

warrantless arrests, NMSA 1978, § 30-16-16(B) (2006) (permitting warrantless 

arrests for falsely obtaining services or accommodations) and § 30-16-23 (permitting 

warrantless arrests for shoplifting), and suggests that these three statutes read 

 

1Defendant cites a nonprecedential federal case, Montes v. Gallegos, 812 F. 

Supp. 1159, 1165 n.7 (D.N.M. 1992), which references Section 30-3-6. In a footnote, 

Montes refers to the defendant’s argument regarding “the New Mexico ‘barroom 

fight’ statute” and cites to Section 30-3-6, focusing on the statute’s probable cause 

requirement. However, neither the defendant’s nor the federal district court’s

characterization of the statute in Montes, is relevant to our analysis. Clearly, Section 

30-3-6 permits arrests based upon the occurrence of barroom batteries. At issue here,

is whether the statute is limited to that, and only that, context.
10

together protect specific businesses from low-level crimes, i.e. shoplifting from 

stores, fighting or damaging property at bars or restaurants, and getting service 

without paying at restaurants, hotels, and other service-oriented businesses.

Defendant contends, therefore, that a common-sense reading of Section 30-3-6 

indicates that it only applies when the arrest occurs on licensed premises, that is, an 

establishment that sells liquor. 

{16} We disagree with Defendant’s conclusion. Not one of the three statutes cited 

by Defendant limits warrantless arrests to those taking place at specific locations. 

Instead, each statute addresses warrantless arrests for specifically described crimes. 

See §§ 30-16-16(B), -23; § 30-3-6. Although Section 30-3-6 includes civil and 

criminal liability protection for owners—and their managers and designated 

representatives—of establishments licensed to sell or serve alcohol, that protection 

also extends to owners or managers “of any establishment or premises open to the 

public.” Section 30-3-6(A)(3), (B). The liability protection for “licensed premises”

is not a sufficient indication—particularly in light of the fact that the statute includes 

the same protection for owners or managers of any establishment or premises open 

to the public, see id.—that it limits statutory authority for warrantless arrests with 

probable cause for assault, battery, public affray, or criminal damage to property to

be executed at only locations licensed to sell liquor. And the statute’s mere inclusion 

of protection from civil liability for owners and operators of liquor establishments 
11

or other business locations open to the public does not bear upon the statute’s 

otherwise broadly stated exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule.

{17} A plain reading of Section 30-3-6 permits a law enforcement officer to arrest 

people for the enumerated crimes stated therein, including battery, without a warrant 

when the officer has probable cause. See State v. Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 6, 410 

P.3d 239 (“We begin the search for legislative intent by looking first to the words 

chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of the Legislature’s language.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds and 

remanded, 2021-NMSC-030, 499 P.3d 622. The plain language does not limit the 

arrests based on the location of the alleged crime. The only limitation is that the law 

enforcement officer have probable cause that one of the listed crimes occurred. 

{18} Reading the entire statute as a whole, we understand the statute is about two 

central subjects: warrantless arrests and protection from civil and criminal liability 

relating to those warrantless arrests. While the definition of licensed premises—

restaurants and bars—is relevant to the civil and criminal liability portion of the 

statute, it does not limit the provision regarding warrantless arrest requirements. We 

must presume the Legislature chose to omit a requirement that the warrantless arrest

occur on licensed premises. See State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-010, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 

284, 154 P.3d 659 (“We are not permitted to read into a statute language which is 

not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.” (internal quotation marks and 
12

citation omitted)). We also note, as discussed above, the liability protection is not 

limited by the reference to licensed premises, but also extends to operators of 

premises open to the public. Section 30-3-6(B). Defendant’s contention that the 

statute only applies when the arrest occurs on licensed premises ignores the term 

“operator” in the statute. Such an interpretation would render a portion of the statute

superfluous, which we decline to do. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. 

City of Albuquerque, 2013-NMCA-063, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 443 (“Statutes must also be 

construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous[.]” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{19} We next look at the history of Section 30-3-6. It was originally enacted in 

1981 and amended once in 1983. The 1983 amendment changed the title from 

“Reasonable detention on licensed premises; assault, battery or public affray” to 

“Reasonable detention; assault, battery, public affray or criminal damage to 

property[,]” which is still current today. Compare § 30-3-6 (1981) (emphasis added),

with § 30-3-6. This deletion provides further support to our view that the Legislature 

intended that the warrantless arrest need not be based on actions that occurred at 

particular locations and supports our conclusion that Section 30-3-6 requires only 

that the arresting officer have probable cause for one of the crimes listed in the statute 

to execute a warrantless arrest. 
13

{20} The 1983 amendment also added “criminal damage to property” to the list of

offenses and added “operator” to the class of people protected from criminal or civil 

liability arising from such arrests.

2 Compare § 30-3-6, with § 30-3-6 (1981). These 

two additions significantly expanded the scope of the statute by increasing both the 

number and types of situations in which law enforcement is permitted to make 

warrantless arrests and to extend civil and criminal liability protections to more 

people. And by defining “operator” as “owner or the manager of any establishment 

or premises open to the public[,]” compare § 30-3-6(A)(3), with § 30-3-6(A) (1981), 

the statute broadened “licensed premises” beyond licensed liquor establishments to 

include the entirety of premises open to the public. The amendments made to the 

statute support our conclusion that the statute’s scope is not limited to events that 

occur in a barroom or restaurant, but its scope is broad enough to include the events 

that occurred in this case, in a parking lot adjacent to a school. 

{21} We conclude that Section 30-3-6 provides statutory authority for law 

enforcement to arrest someone without a warrant if they have probable cause that 

that person committed a battery pursuant to Section 30-3-4. “An officer has probable 

cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are 

 

2The 1983 amendment to Section 30-3-6 also added the requirement that 

eligible parties must communicate “truthfully and in good faith to the law 

enforcement officer” to qualify for liability protection. Compare § 30-3-6(B), with 

§ 30-3-6(B) (1981). 
14

sufficient to warrant the officer to believe that an offense has been or is being 

committed.” State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 455, 176 

P.3d 1187. Defendant was charged with committing petty misdemeanor battery, 

which is “the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of 

another, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” Section 30-3-4.

{22} Deputy Deprez was called to the scene where people were actively keeping 

Defendant and Hebert apart. Both were visibly injured such that Deputy Deprez 

asked if they needed medical intervention. He interviewed multiple witnesses who 

stated Defendant initiated the physical altercation. Defendant was the only person 

who claimed Hebert hit her first. Defendant also admitted to drinking alcohol and 

gave differing accounts of how Hebert started the fight. These facts together 

sufficiently established probable cause that Defendant committed a battery against 

Hebert. 

{23} Having concluded that Section 30-3-6 provided Deputy Deprez with statutory 

authority to arrest Defendant without a warrant, we next determine whether the 

warrantless arrest was legal under the New Mexico Constitution.

II. Defendant’s Warrantless Arrest Was Valid Under the New Mexico 

Constitution

{24} The State argues that the district court erred in its determination that no 

exigent circumstances existed to excuse Deputy Deprez’s failure to obtain a warrant. 
15

As explained above, all warrantless arrests must comply with the “reasonableness” 

component of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Campos, 1994-

NMSC-012, ¶ 5. “Warrantless arrests made under the authority of [a] statute may be 

presumed reasonable but that presumption may be rebutted under our interpretation 

of what is constitutional.” Id. ¶ 7. “[A] warrantless arrest supported by probable 

cause is reasonable if some exigency existed that precluded the officer from securing 

a warrant.” Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Exigent circumstances exist in “an emergency situation requiring swift 

action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to 

forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Campos, 

1994-NMSC-012, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, 

this is not an exhaustive list, and there “are other situations in which an exigency not 

necessarily amounting to an imminent threat of danger, escape, or lost evidence will 

be sufficient to render reasonable a warrantless public arrest supported by probable 

cause under the totality of the circumstances.” Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 26. 

“An on-the-scene arrest supported by probable cause will usually supply the 

requisite exigency.” Id.

{25} In Paananen, our Supreme Court determined that a warrantless arrest for 

shoplifting met New Mexico’s constitutional standard when the responding officer 

developed probable cause to arrest the defendant at the scene based on the review of 
16

evidence. Id. ¶¶ 24-28. The officers did not have the “information or time to act on 

it prior to arriving on scene, and thus could not have gotten an arrest warrant before 

responding to the call.” Id. ¶ 24. Similarly, in this case, Deputy Deprez was 

dispatched based on a call that Defendant was attacking Hebert. He arrived at the 

scene, interviewed witnesses, and determined based on his investigation that he had 

probable cause to arrest Defendant for battery. Deputy Deprez did not have 

information to act on before he arrived at the scene and investigated, and he did not 

have time to secure a warrant before responding. He developed probable cause to 

arrest based on his review of the evidence at the scene.

{26} Further, just as in Paananen, given it was not reasonable to obtain an arrest 

warrant before responding, Deputy Deprez faced three alternatives: to arrest 

Defendant on the scene; detain Defendant while going to the court to obtain a 

warrant, which would lead to a de facto warrantless arrest based on the time 

necessary to procure the warrant; or release Defendant and secure a warrant. See id.

¶ 25. Our Supreme Court concluded in Paananen that a warrantless arrest was “the 

only reasonable approach” in this situation. Id. It determined that to secure a warrant 

would lead to an expenditure of resources “seemingly disproportionate to the crime

of shoplifting and a risk our Legislature has declared unacceptable” and cited to the 

statute that authorized warrantless arrests for shoplifting. Id. In this case, securing a 

warrant would have led to a similar disproportionate expenditure of resources for a 
17

crime that the Legislature has also declared unacceptable. See § 30-3-6; Paananen, 

2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 25. In our view, Deputy Deprez chose a reasonable approach 

under the circumstances. 

{27} Having concluded Defendant’s warrantless arrest was reasonable, we need not 

address the State’s final argument that dismissal was an inappropriate remedy under 

the circumstances. 

CONCLUSION

{28} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED. 

____________________________

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

________________________________

J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge

________________________________

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge