1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00069-CV

__________________

TRACY SAHUALLA AND PAM SAHUALLA, Appellants

V.

CNH INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, LLC AND TRINITY

VALLEY TRACTORS, INC., Appellees

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 133189

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Tracy and Pam Sahualla (“Sahuallas” or “Appellants”) appeal the 

trial court’s final summary judgment in favor of Appellees CNH Industrial America, 

LLC (“CNH”) and Trinity Valley Tractors, Inc. (“TVT”) (collectively “Defendants” 

or “Appellees”) in a lawsuit related to the Sahuallas’ purchase of a hay baler. We 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Background Facts

On December 1, 2021, the Sahuallas filed a Second Amended Petition1

asserting claims against the Defendants for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act, breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied 

warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a 

particular purpose against the Defendants regarding a hay baler they purchased in 

2016 from TVT that was manufactured by CNH. According to the petition, the hay 

baler malfunctioned after it was delivered to the Sahuallas, and even though the baler 

was subsequently repaired and updates to it were completed by TVT, it still did not 

work properly.

After the Defendants filed their Amended Answers, Plaintiffs’ counsel and his 

firm filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel on July 7, 2022, and provided the 

following justification for the withdrawal:

[] Withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on 

the interests of the clients inasmuch as the case has been mediated, 

considerable discovery has been completed, and trial will not commence 

until 26 September 2022;

[] The clients insist upon pursuing an objective that the Movants 

consider to be imprudent and with which [Plaintiffs’ counsel] has 

fundamental disagreement;

[] The representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on 

the Movants inasmuch as Clients insist that Movants obtain ever more 

depositions and incur greater case expenses. Moreover, further 

1 The Second Amended Petition was the live petition at the time CNH filed its 

Motion for Summary Judgment and at the time the Defendants filed their Joint NoEvidence Motion for Summary Judgment.
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representation has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the clients, 

in part because they have refused to provide Movants with settlement 

authority sufficient to successfully negotiate a satisfactory disposition 

of their claim; and 

[] Other good cause for withdrawal exists because clients ignore the 

lawyer’s advice about litigation tactics and economic risks. Moreover, 

clients continue to hold what, in the professional opinion of the 

Movants, are unrealistic expectations about probable risks and benefits 

of going to trial. 

The motion states that Plaintiffs’ counsel had written to Plaintiffs about the above 

issues on multiple occasions, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the Plaintiffs in writing of 

their intention to withdraw via certified letter mailed on July 6, 2022, the letter

informed the Plaintiffs that they were free to hire other counsel to pursue their

claims, and on the date the motion was filed the Plaintiffs were served a copy of the 

motion, a proposed order, and notice of the hearing. The Motion to Withdraw 

represents that Plaintiffs had received an adequate opportunity to retain substitute 

counsel and to prepare for trial because the trial court had set the case for trial on 

September 26, 2022, the parties had completed substantial discovery in the case, and 

newly substituted counsel for Defendant CNH and newly designated lead counsel 

for Defendant TVT “appear to face the same obstacles” in reviewing the case and 

preparing for trial such that Plaintiffs were not at a material disadvantage given their 

counsel’s withdrawal. As exhibits to the Motion to Withdraw, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

attached the previously executed Power of Attorney Contract between Plaintiffs and 

Plaintiffs’ counsel; the withdrawal letter dated July 6, 2022 addressed to Plaintiffs, 
4

which provides a detailed explanation for the counsel’s withdrawal and counsel’s 

advise to Plaintiffs that they were “free to seek other counsel[;]” a signed “green 

card” indicating Plaintiffs’ receipt of the withdrawal letter; a letter dated July 7, 2022 

regarding the Motion to Withdraw and the hearing on the motion (with the Motion 

to Withdraw, the notice of oral hearing on July 20, 2022, and proposed order

attached); a signed “green card” indicating Plaintiffs’ receipt of the notice of the 

hearing on the Motion to Withdraw; and an expense ledger for the case.

The trial court held a hearing on the Motion to Withdraw July 20, 2022,

2 and 

the trial court signed an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw.

On December 12, 2022, CNH filed a Traditional Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment on the Sahuallas’ claims of breach of contract under the Texas Business 

and Commerce Code, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, 

and for exemplary damages. CNH attached exhibits in support of its motion. On 

December 21, 2022, the Defendants filed a Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary 

2 A docket sheet entry for 7/20/22 signed by the trial court states that 

“plaintiffs did appear and testified[]” at the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw and 

presented evidence to support the motion before the trial court granted the motion. 

A letter in the appellate record that was filed by the Court Reporter for the County 

Court at Law No. 1 states that a record was taken of the hearing the trial court 

conducted on the Motion to Withdraw. The record does not show, however, that any 

of the parties requested the Court Reporter to prepare a transcript of the Reporter’s 

Record of the July 20, 2022 hearing for the appeal. 
5

Judgment alleging that Plaintiffs have no evidence to support each claim against 

each Defendant.3

On January 18, 2023, the Sahuallas filed a pro se Response to CNH’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Sahuallas attached exhibits as evidence. On 

January 25, 2023, CNH filed a Reply to the Sahuallas’ Response to CNH’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment, which included objections to the Sahuallas’ 

summary judgment evidence. Also on January 25, 2023, TVT filed a Notice of 

Joining Objections to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits Submitted with Response to CNH’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, stating that TVT joined in the objections to 

the Sahuallas’ summary judgment evidence filed by CNH “[t]o the extent that the 

Court considers the exhibits submitted by the Sahuallas[] in response to Reply to 

Plaintiffs’ Response to CNH’s Traditional Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment[.]” The Sahuallas did not file a response to the objections. 

On January 27, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on CNH’s Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and on the Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for 

Summary Judgment, the Sahuallas appeared pro se, and no reporter’s record was 

3 Because the disposition of the appeal does not require us to reach the 

underlying merits of the case, we need not discuss the specific arguments in CNH’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion 

for Summary Judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (instructing appellate courts to 

“hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every

issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”).
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taken of the hearing. That same day, the trial court signed an Order on Defendant 

CNH’s Objections to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Evidence, sustaining many of 

the objections to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence. 

On January 30, 2023, the trial court granted the Defendants’ Joint NoEvidence Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Sahuallas’ claims with 

prejudice, and the trial court also granted CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment. On that same day, the Sahuallas filed a pro se Motion for Continuance

seeking “to find legal representation . . . [because] with previous counsel allowed to 

keep interest in the case it has made finding new counsel extremely difficult.” In 

their appellate brief, the Sahuallas state that they “filed their written Motion for 

Continuance at 10:30 in the morning before the Court entered the Summary 

Judgment Order[,]” but they fail to provide a citation to the record to support their 

claim. We note, however, that according to the clerk’s record, the Sahuallas’ Motion 

for Continuance was filed at 1:15 p.m. on January 30, 2023, which the record shows 

would have been after the trial court had already granted the Defendants’ Joint NoEvidence Motion for Summary Judgment, as the record shows the order granting the 

no-evidence motion it was filed at 12:18 p.m. on January 30, 2023. The Sahuallas 

filed a notice of appeal.
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Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the Sahuallas state three issues. In issue one, the Sahuallas argue 

that Defendants’ objections to the Sahuallas’ summary judgment evidence were 

untimely, the Sahuallas should have been permitted to respond to the Defendants’ 

objections, their Motion for Continuance preserved the issue, and the trial court 

should have provided them time to hire new counsel and to “make their summary 

judgment admissible.” In their second issue, the Sahuallas argue that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying their Motion for Continuance because they only had 

two days to respond to Defendants’ objections to the Sahuallas’ summary judgment 

evidence, and the trial court did not give them an opportunity to respond or to cure 

the problems with their evidence before sustaining many of the Defendants’ 

objections. In their third issue, the Sahuallas argue that the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment because “there are genuine issues of material fact as to 

the Sahuallas[’] claims that are not resolved as a matter of law by the video or any 

other summary judgment evidence submitted by the Defendants.” 

Appellees respond and argue in part that the Sahuallas failed to preserve for 

appellate review their complaint regarding the Defendants’ objections to the 

Sahuallas’ summary judgment evidence, failed to preserve appellate review of their 

complaint that the trial court did not continue the hearing on CNH’s Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and on Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, and are not entitled to a “do over” because they failed to comply 

with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Rules of Evidence and have provided 

no legal basis for reversing the trial court’s judgment. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review summary judgments de novo. See Valence Operating Co. v. 

Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). A no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment must be granted if, after adequate time for discovery, the moving party 

asserts there is no evidence of one or more specified elements of a claim or defense 

on which the adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial, and the 

respondent produces no summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of 

material fact on those elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); LMB, Ltd. v. Moreno, 201 

S.W.3d 686, 688 (Tex. 2006).

A party who files a no-evidence summary judgment pursuant to Rule 166a(i) 

has essentially requested a pretrial directed verdict. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 

S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tex. 2006). When the movant files its motion in proper form, the 

burden shifts to the nonmovant to defeat the motion by presenting evidence that 

raises an issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the motion. Id.

at 582; Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
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The Rules of Civil Procedure require that a non-movant respond to a motion 

for summary judgment at least seven days before the summary judgment hearing.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later 

than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or 

other written response.”). Absent a timely response, a trial court must grant a noevidence motion for summary judgment that meets the requirements of Rule 166a(i). 

Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 746; Michael v. Dyke, 41 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (“Failure to respond to a no-evidence motion is fatal.”); 

see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). If a non-movant wishes to assert that, based on the 

evidence in the record, a fact issue exists to defeat a no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment, the nonmovant must timely file a response to the motion raising 

this issue in the trial court. Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 746 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 

166a(i)). 

Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must 

comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Wheeler v. Green, 157 SW.3d 

439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 

184-85 (Tex. 1978). This includes error preservation rules. See Riecke v. Riecke, No. 

09-22-00142-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2267, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 

6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing to Sneed v. Stamat, No. 09-19-00379-CV, 2021 

Tex. App. LEXIS 2155, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem.
10

op.)); Redmond v. Kovar, No. 09-17-00099-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 925, at *6 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ramey v. Fed. 

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 14-14-00147-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6039, at 

*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)); Harrison 

v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. 

denied).

Analysis

We first address Sahuallas’ argument that they preserved error for their 

challenge to the trial court’s rulings sustaining the Defendants’ objections to the 

Sahuallas’ summary judgment evidence. According to the Sahuallas, they preserved

this issue by “fil[ing] a proper Motion for Continuance[.]” The Sahuallas assert in a 

footnote in their appellate brief that their written Motion for Continuance was filed

“at 10:30 in the morning before the Court entered the Summary Judgment Order[,]”

but they fail to provide a citation to the record in support of their contention. The pro 

se Motion for Continuance in the appellate record states as follows:

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

I, The Plaintiff, in the above-entitled cause, am hereby requesting 

a continuance of my case for the following reasons. Plaintiff[]s request 

this motion for continuance to find legal representation to show 

additional good cause to Plaintiffs[’] case. Your Honor with previous 

counsel allowed to keep interest in the case it has made finding new 

counsel extremely difficult.

This motion for continuance is not made for delay and Plaintiff[s]

hereby request it to be granted in the interest of justice. 
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The motion is time-stamped as filed with the county clerk’s office on January 30, 

2023, at 1:15 p.m., three days after the hearing and after the Order Granting 

Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment was signed and filed 

with the county clerk. 

The Sahuallas’ Motion for Continuance makes no mention of their failure to 

timely file responses to Defendants’ objections to the Sahuallas’ summary judgment 

evidence. As stated above, pro se litigants must comply with rules of procedure and 

rules of preservation. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 444; Riecke, 2023 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 2267, at *4. To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show (1) 

the complaint was timely presented to the trial court, and (2) the trial court either (a) 

ruled on the request, objection or motion, or (b) refused to rule on the request, 

objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal to rule. Tex. 

R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Bryant v. Jeter, 341 S.W.3d 447, 450-51 (Tex. App—

Dallas 2011, no pet.) (as a prerequisite to complaining on appeal about the denial of 

a motion for continuance, the record must show that the motion was brought to the 

trial court’s attention and that (1) the trial court denied the motion or (2) the trial 

court refused to rule on the motion and the complaining party objected to the refusal).

Even assuming without deciding that the Sahuallas are correct that a request for a 

continuance is “[t]he proper mechanism” under these facts to preserve their

argument that the trial court erred in not allowing them to respond to the objections 
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or amend any formal defects in their summary judgment evidence, their motion for 

continuance was untimely4 and they failed to obtain a ruling on the motion before 

the trial court signed the summary judgment order. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; 

Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 156 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. 

denied) (“[Plaintiffs] failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the motion for 

continuance and therefore, failed to preserve error.”); Risner v. McDonald’s Corp., 

18 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (trial court did not 

err when it denied party’s motion for continuance because record did not indicate 

that motion was ever brought to its attention or that it ruled on the motion).

Not only was the Sahuallas’ Motion for Continuance untimely, but it also did 

not comply with Rule 251 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because it was not 

4 On appeal, the Sahuallas argue that “statements on the record at the 

[summary judgment] hearing” also preserved error as to the trial court’s denial of an 

opportunity for the Sahuallas to respond to the Defendants’ objections or cure any 

summary judgment evidence defects. According to our appellate record, and as 

conceded by the Sahuallas, there was no reporter’s record taken at the summary 

judgment hearing. We also note that an oral request for a continuance without 

supporting affidavit does not preserve a complaint for appellate review. See 

Redmond v. Kovar, No. 09-17-00099-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 925, at *8 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). In light of their untimely motion 

for continuance, we also reject the Sahuallas’ argument that Defendants’ “late[-]filed 

objections should have been overruled as a procedural consequence of their late 

filing.” See, e.g., Barnes v. Athens, No. 02-12-00173-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 

8716, at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no abuse 

of discretion when trial court considered and sustained movant’s objections to 

nonmovant’s summary judgment evidence, which objections were filed one day 

before hearing; record did not show that nonmovant either requested or filed motion 

for continuance for time to respond to objections).
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accompanied by an affidavit. Rule 251 requires a party seeking a continuance to 

show sufficient cause by affidavit, consent of the parties, or operation of law as 

support for the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. “A motion for continuance must be in 

writing, state the specific facts supporting the motion, and be verified or supported 

by an affidavit.” In re A.E.M., No. 09-18-00288-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, 

at *49 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Serrano v. 

Ryan’s Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. 

denied)); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 251; Redmond, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 925, at 

**7-8 (concluding trial court did not err in denying motion for continuance where 

motion was made orally and was not supported by affidavit or consent of parties and 

therefore did not comply with Rule 251).

5 Furthermore “[w]hen the ground for a 

5 Even if the Motion for Continuance had been timely filed and properly 

supported by an affidavit, the trial court still could have denied the motion on the 

grounds that the Sahuallas had six months to secure new counsel but did not do so. 

See, e.g., Lopez v. Sonic Rests., Inc., No. 04-10-00318-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 

8235, at **9-11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Oct. 13, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 

(trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for continuance 

and proceeding with hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment when

hearing was one month after plaintiffs’ counsel withdrew and nothing in the record 

suggested that plaintiffs presented their motion for continuance to the trial court or 

obtained a ruling on the motion and nothing in the record suggested that the plaintiffs 

attempted to hire new counsel after their attorney withdrew); Moreno v. Silva, 316 

S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (holding that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for continuance when party had oneand-a-half months to secure new counsel but had not taken steps to do so); Williams

v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 115-16 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.)

(no abuse of discretion where appellant was given approximately forty days to secure 

new counsel and prepare for summary judgment); Holt v. D’Hanis State Bank, 993 
14

continuance is the withdrawal of counsel, movants must show that the failure to be 

represented at trial was not due to their own fault or negligence.” Villegas v. Carter, 

711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986); State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984) 

(op. on reh’g). In this case, the Sahuallas offered no argument or evidence that their 

attorney’s withdrawal was not due to their own negligence or fault.

We next address the Sahuallas’ argument on appeal that their pro se Response 

to CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment serves as a “global response” “to 

all motions for summary judgment[.]” It is well settled that courts look to the 

substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely its 

title or caption. See In re J.Z.P., 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016); In re Brookshire 

Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); State Bar of Tex. v. 

Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 71; Surgitek, 

Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (“We should not be 

so constrained by the form or caption of a pleading.”). The substance of a pleading

is gleaned from the body of the pleading and the prayer for relief. See Dow Chem. 

Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 601 S.W.2d 506, 507-08 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1980, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.). The substance of the Sahuallas’ Response to CNH’s Motion for 

S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (trial court did not err in 

setting hearing on motion for summary judgment where appellant had approximately 

thirty-five days to hire a new attorney to represent him in the summary judgment 

proceeding).
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Partial Summary Judgment does not provide argument or discussion of how their 

purported summary judgment evidence or attachments to the response provides

evidence as to the Defendants’ basis for their Joint No-Evidence Motion for 

Summary Judgment. The Sahuallas’ Response fails to even mention the elements 

discussed in the Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. Nor does the 

Sahuallas’ Response to CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment mention any 

other summary judgment motion filed by the Defendants other than CNH’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment (a traditional motion for partial summary judgment) 

and includes no mention of the no-evidence standard. The prayer for relief in the 

Sahuallas’ Response to CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asked that the 

trial court “DENY the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” We conclude the 

Sahuallas’ Response to CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was not a 

“global response” to all summary judgment motions and it was only a response to 

CNH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See id.; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 

Goldberg, No. 09-10-00386-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1327, at **4-5 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Feb. 24, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding motion to stay was 

motion for reconsideration after reviewing body and prayer of the motion).

The record demonstrates that the Sahuallas received timely notice of the 

Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 

166a(c) (motion for summary judgment must be filed and served at least twenty-one 
16

days before the time specified for hearing). The Sahuallas failed to file a written 

response to the Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, as 

required by the rules governing summary judgments. See id. (“Except on leave of 

court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may 

file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.”) Furthermore, the 

Sahuallas did not file a motion for leave to file an untimely response. Because the 

Sahuallas failed to make any response to the Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion 

for Summary Judgment, we conclude the trial court properly rendered summary 

judgment in favor of the Defendants. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (trial court must 

grant no-evidence motion for summary judgment absent a timely response); Imkie 

v. Methodist Hosp., 326 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no 

pet.) (nonmovant must timely file and serve response to defeat no-evidence motion 

for summary judgment); San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 328 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“A no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment must be granted if the party opposing the motion does not 

respond with competent summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of 

material fact.”); Michael, 41 S.W.3d at 751 (“Failure to respond to a no-evidence 

motion is fatal.”). Also, as explained above, the Sahuallas’ Motion for Continuance 

was untimely. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Risner, 18 S.W.3d at 909; see also Southside 

Partners v. Collazo Enters., LLC, No. 11-16-00346-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 
17

10775, at **25-26 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op) (motion 

for continuance untimely when filed after the summary judgment hearing and after 

the trial court ruled). We overrule issues one and two.

In issue three, the Sahuallas argue that if they would have been allowed an 

opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ objections to the Sahuallas’ summary 

judgment evidence, “they would have been able to show that the blanket objections 

to all summary judgment evidence were not sustainable objections[]” and that they

“could [have] overcome the objections.” The only summary judgment evidence 

before the trial court at the summary judgment hearing was the evidence that the 

Sahuallas attached to their response to CNH’s Partial Motion for Summary 

Judgment. We have already determined that the response cannot be considered a 

“global response” and thereby the Sahuallas’ failed to file a response to the 

Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sahuallas’ 

failure to timely respond to the Defendants’ Joint No-Evidence Motion for Summary 

Judgment is fatal, and we overrule issue three.

Having overruled Appellants’ issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on December 21, 2023

Opinion Delivered May 23, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.