District J udg e for the Easter

n District of L ouisiana sitting by desig nation

. * IN T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E F IF T H C IR C U IT

_________________________________ No. 08-10315

_________________________________ UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA Plaintiff-Appellee

v . DAVI D RUSSEL LBRI GHAM Def endant- Appellant

_________________________________ Appea l from the United States District Court for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, Lubbock Division

_________________________________ Be fore SMI TH, SOUTHWI CK, Circuit J udg es, and EN GEL HARDT, District Judge. * KURT D. ENG EL HARDT, District Judge:

Upon re lease from prison in 2007, Def endant- Ap pellant David Russell Br igha m (" Br ig h a m" ) c o mm e n c e d a te r m o f s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e . O n M ar c h 7 , 2 0 0 8 , th e U n it e d States Probation Offic e filed a

petition alleg ing his violation of various supervised relea se conditi ons. On M ar ch 2 4 , 2 0 0 8 , fo l l o wi n g Br i gh am 's s u b s eq u en tarre s tan d

i n i t i al ap p ea ra n ce , t h e ma gi s t ra t e j u d ge found that no proba

ble ca use existed to believe that a violation warra nting r evocation had occur red. Acc ording ly , she orde red that the revoc ation proce eding be dismiss ed. Anticipating revie w of the ruling by the district judge , the m agi s t rate judge alterna tively conclude d that Br igha

m should be rele ased f rom custody

pending further

proce eding s. Upon the Gove rnment' s motion, however, the district judge stay ed both order s, pending his revie w. Four day s later, on March 28, 2008, the district United States Court of A pp eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Ma y 20, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I Clerk2

judge conducte d a fina l revoc ation hear ing a nd, fi n d i n g violations of two special c onditions had

occur red, r evoked B rig ham’s super vised rele ase. On a pp e a l, B ri g ham c ha lle ng e s the dis tr ic t jud g e ' s a uth or ity to r e vie w the ma g istrate judge ' s dismis sal order and to sta y both the dismiss al and r elea se orde rs pendingrevie w. In addition, Br igha m argues that the district cour t improperly

allowed the pr obation office r to require that he submit t o poly g raph e x aminations, and t hen considered the results in violation of Brig ham’s rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination. Finally , Br igha m contends that the two specia l c onditions found to have been violate d wer e improper under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and/or unc onstitut ionally vague and ove rbroa d. We rejec t all of Br igha

m's challeng es and aff

irm the ruling s of the district cour t as rende red by

the district judge

. FACTS AND PROCE ED IN GS

I n 2003, Def

endant- Appellant B rig ham was c onvicted in the United States District Court for the Nor

thern District of T exas of one count of receipt of c hild pornog raphy in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 22 52 A( a )( 2) (A ). On De c e mbe r 1 9, 20 03 , th e dis tr ic t ju dg e se nte nc e d h im t o imprisonment for a ter

m of 51 months and supervised r elea se for 3 y ear s. Br igha

m’s term of supervised r elea se commenc ed on September 20, 2007. O n Marc h 7, 2008, the United States Pr ob a tio n O ff

ic e fi le d a

pe tit ion a lle g ingthat B ri g ham ha d vi ol ate d va ri ou s su pe rv ise d r e le a se conditions. In response , the district judg e order ed that a war rant for his ar

rest be issued. F ollowing his arr e st, B ri g ham ma de an ini tia l a pp e ara nc e , on Ma

rc h 10 , 20 08 , be fo re Un ite d St a te s Ma g istrate J udg e Philip R . L ane in the A bilene, Te x as division of the Norther n District of Texas. Ther eaf ter,The re cord r efle cts that diffe rent United States Ma g istrate Judges c onducted 1 Br i gh am 's i n i t i al ap p ea ra n ce an d p re l i m i n ary

re v o ca t i o n h ea ri n gs . T h i s o cc u rr edb ec au s e B ri gh am 's initial sentence w as imposed in the Lubbock, Te x as division of the United States District Court for the Northe rn District of Te x as, rather than in the Abilene, Texas division, where he was be ing su pe rv ise d at th e tim e of

his Marc h 2 00 8 a

rr e st. 3 he wa s remande d to the custody of the United States Marsha l. The Gove rnment then filed a Motion to Revoke Supervised Rele ase on Ma rch 13, 2008. On Marc h 24, 2008, at a pr eliminary revoc ation and dete ntion hearingin Lubbock, Te xas, Un ite d St a te s Ma g istrate Judg e Na nc y M. Ko eni g fo un d th a t no pr ob a ble c a us e e xiste d to be lie ve that a

vio latio n w arr ant in g re vo c a tio n o f s up e rv ise d r e le a se ha d o c c ur re d. Thus , in

acc ordanc e with Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)( 1)(C), she dismiss ed the r evocation p ro ce ed i n g. An t i ci p at i n g re v i ew o f h er ru l i n g b y t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge, h o we v er , t h e m agi s t ra t e j u d ge

1 additionally

found that, if probable cause did exist , Br igha m did not pose a risk of flig ht or dang er to t he c omm un ity and , th us , s ho uld be rel ease d p e nd ingany fu rt he r r e vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g s, including a

ppeal of the proba ble ca use ruling . That same da

y , the Gover

nment filed a “ Motion for Stay o f Or d er De n ying G overnme nt’s Motion to Detain, and Appe aling Orde r of F inding of No Probable Cau s e. ” The district judg e g rante d the motion and stay ed both the dismissal for lac k of pr ob a ble c a us e ru lin g and

the re le a se ru lin g . T he re a ft e r, the dis tr ic t ju dg e de nie d B ri g ham’ s r e qu e st that the re vocation proc eedingbe dismissed, as well as a subsequent re quest for r econside ration of that denial. On M ar ch 2 8 , 2 0 0 8 , fo u r d ay s af t er t h e p re l i m i n ary

h e a r i n g , t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge conducte d a final revoc ation hear ing and revoked B rig ham’s super vised rele ase ba sed on violations of Specia l Condit ion Nos. 3 and 7. Those c onditions st ate:Although the Gover nment’s Motion to Revoke Supervis e d Re le a s e a ll e g e d

a d d it io nal 2 violations, the Government, at the Marc h 28, 2 0 0 8 fi n al revoc ation hear ing, inf ormed the district j u d g e t h a ti ti n t e n d e d

t o p r o c e e d

o nt h e b a s i s o f

o n l y t h e v i o l a t i o n s s e tf

o rt h i np ar a g r a

p h s III an d IV of t he Mot ion to Revoke Supervise d Release

. See Transc ript of F inal Revocation Hear ing, R. Supp. Vol. 2 at 76. At t h e conc lusion of the revoc ation hear ing, the Court found violations of Special C o n d itions Nos. 3 and 7 to have occ urre d as alleg ed in par ag raphs I I I .B.1 a nd I VB of the motion. Id . at 115. 4

Special Condition No. 3: The defe ndant shall n o t p o s s ess nor have un de r h is c on tr ol, any

po rn og ra phic, sex ua lly

or ie nte d o r s e xua lly stimul ating materia ls, including visual, auditory , t elephonic, or elec tronic media, c omputer prog rams or se rvi ce s . The de fenda nt sh a ll n ot p a tr on ize pla c e s w he re su c h mate ri a l or e nte rt ain ment

is available

. The defenda

nt shall not utiliz e any

sex-related te lephone numbe rs . Sp e c ia l Co n d it io n N o . 7 : T h e d e f e n d an t s h a ll n o t p o s s e s s o r u ti li ze a comput er or interne t connec tion device dur ing the term of supervised r elea se. T h e d is tr ic t c ourt f

o u n d th a t B r ig h a m h a d

v io late d Sp e c ia l C o n d it io nN o . 3 b y “ p o s s e s s [i n g ] a persona l video of himself and a former g irlfriend ha

ving se x ual interc ourse.” He violated Spec ial Con dit ion No

. 7 by “ uti liz[in g ] a c omp ute r a nd [vie wi ng ] the so c ia l ne tw or kin g I nte rn e t We b s ite My Space.c om.” The district j udg e sentenced Brig ham t o 18 months' im prisonment followed by an 2 additional term of 18 months' supervised r elea se.

On appe al, B rig ham cha lleng es: (1) the district court’s a uthority t o revie w the mag istrate judg e’s or der of dismiss al base d on her “ no probable cause ” dete rmination; (2) the district court’s stay of Brig ham’s release from custody pending revie w of the ma g istrate judg e' s “no probable cause ” and “re lease ” determinations; (3) the pr opriety of the district cour

t's a llowing the probation off

icer to impose “mandatory ” poly g raph ex aminations upon Br igha m and then using the results there of in violation of Br igha m’s rig ht a g ainst self-inc rimination; and (4) whe ther the spe cial5

conditions involved w er e i m p roper under 18 U .S.C. §3583 and/or unconstituti onally vague and overbr oad. AN AL YSI S I. The di strict

court did not err by re viewin g the m agistrate judge’s “no probab le cause” dismissal order orby staying th at orderpendi ng its review. When probable c ause to believe that a supervised r elea se condition has bee n violated is a bsent, Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Proc edure 32.1 direc ts “ the judge ” to “ dismiss the proc eeding .” See F ED . R. C R IM . P

. 3 2

. 1 (b )( 1 )( C ). C i t i n g t h i s d i re ct i v e, Br i gh am co n t en d s t h at t h e di s t ri ct j u d ge had no jurisdiction to reviewthe mag istrate judge ’s order of dismissal, or to stay

that ruling pending revie w. In other wor ds, though B rig ham ac knowledg es that t h e Go v ernment could re- file the

revoc ation proce eding following such a dismiss al, he contends that the statute prohibits any sort of revie w by the district court prior

to the rele ase f

rom custody

order ed by

the mag istrate judg e. These c halleng es rest on leg al and c onstitut ional g rounds. Acc ording ly , the Court

c on sid e rs the m de novo

. United States v. Long , 996 F.2d 731, 732 (5 Cir. 1993)

. Neither party has th cited contr olling j u ri s p rudence dire cted to this specific issue. Neve rtheless, unde r the guiding authorities that ar e ava ilable, and for essentially the reasons stated by the Government in its brief,

we fi nd no e rr or by the dis tr ic t c ourt

.

F or purp os e s o f t

his dis pu te, F e de ra l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 32 .1 pr ov ide s, in pe rt ine nt p art : Rule 32.1. Rev o kin g or Modifyin g P robation or Sup ervise d

Re le as e6 (a) Initial Appearance. (1) Per son I n Custody . A per son held in cust o d y for violating probation or supe rvised re l ea s e must be take n without unnecessa ry delay befor e a m agistrate judge

.

* * * (2 ) Up o n a Summ o n s . Wh e n a p e r s o n a p p e ar s in r e s p o n s e to a summons for violating pr obation or supervised rele ase, a m agistrate judge must procee d under this rule. (3) Advic e. The judge m u s ti n fo rm t h e p er s o no f t h e f o l l o wi n g: (A) the alleg ed violation of probation or supervised r elea se; (B ) the pe rs o n 's rig ht to retain counse l or to reque st that counsel be appointed if the pe rson ca nnot obtain counsel; and (C) the pe rson' s rig ht, if held in custody , to a pre lim inary hear ing unde r Rule 32.1(b)( 1). (4 ) A pp e ara nc e in t he Di str ic t With

Juri sd ict ion. I f t

he pe rs on is arr e ste d o r a

pp e ars in t

he dis tr ic t th a t ha s j ur isd ic tio n to c on du c t a revoc ation hear ing – either orig inally or by transfe r of jurisdiction – the cour t must proceed unde r Rule 32.1(b)- (e)

. (5 ) A pp e ara nc e in a Di str ic t L a c kin g Juri sd ic tio n. I f t he pe rs on is arr e ste d o r a

pp e ars in a di stric t th a t do e s n ot h a ve jur isd ic tio n to conduct a revoc ation hear ing, the m agistrate judge mus t: (A ) i f t he a lle g e d v iol a tio n o c c urr e d in the dis tr ic t of

arr e st, conduct a preliminary

hear ing unde r Rule 32.1(b) a nd either: (i) tra nsfer the per son to the district that ha s jurisdiction, if the j udg e finds probable ca use to believe that a violation occur red; or (ii) di smiss the proceeding s and so notify the cour t that has jur isd ic tio n, if

the jud g e fi nd s n o p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that a violation occurr ed; or7 (B ) if th e a ll e g e d v io lati o n d id n o t o c c u r in th e d is tr ict of arr est, transfe r the pe rson to the district that has jurisdiction if:

* * * (6) Re lease or Det ention. Th e m agistrate judge m ay rele ase or detain th e p er son u nder 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) pending f urther pr oc e e ding s. The burden of establishing that the person will not flee or po se a da ng e r to any oth e r p e rs on

or to t he c omm un ity re sts wi th the per son. (b ) R e vo c at ion . (1) P relim inary Hearing. (A ) In G en er al

. I f ap er s o ni s i n cu s t o dy fo r v i o l at i n g a condition o f p robation or supervised re lease , a m agistrate judge mu st pr omp tly

c on du c t a

he ari ngto d e te rm ine wh e the r t he re is probable cause to believe that a violation occur red. The person may wa i v e t h e h ea ri n g. (B ) Requir em en t s . T h e hea ring must be rec orded by a cour t repor t er or by a suitable re cordingdevice . The judg e must g ive the person: * * * (C) R eferr al. If

the judge fin d s p robable cause, the judge m ustc onduc t a r e vo c at ion he ar ing . I f the ju dge doe s no t fi nd probabl e cause, t he judge m ust dis m iss the procee din g. (2) Re vocation Hearing. Unless waived by the per son, the court must hold t he re vocation hea ring within a rea sonable ti m e in the district having jurisdiction. The person is entitled to:

* * * * See F ED . R. C R IM . P. 32.1 (emphasis adde d).

I n challeng ing the district court' s actions, B rig ham asser ts, inte r a lia , t h at t h e r

u l e's usag e of the term “ma g istrate judg e” in Rule 32.1(b) (1 )( A) , wh en conside red a long w ith the dismiss al direc tive in para g raph Rule 32.1( b)(1) (C), indicate s that the probable cause deter mination8

should be made solely b y t h e mag istrate judg e with no pre -re lease rec ourse to the district judg e. Br igha m further emphasizes that Rule 32.1 w as amende d in 2002, and points to a portion of the Ad vis or y Com mitte e No te s r e lativ e to t hat ame ndme nt, wh ic h p ro vid e s:

* * * Rule 32.1 has bee n completely revised and expanded. The Commi ttee believe d that it was important to spell out more completely

in this rule the various proce dural steps that must be met when de aling with a re vocation or modification of probation or su pe rv ise d r e le a se . T o th a t end , s ome langua g e fo rm e rl y loc a te d in Rule 40 has bee n moved to revised Rule 32.1. Throug hout the rule, the term s “magistrate judge ,” and “ court” ( see re vis e d Ru le 1(b)( Def initions )) a

re used to ref

lect that in revoc ation case s, initi al proce eding s in both fe lony and misdemeanor case s will normally be conducte d befor e a ma g istrate judg e, althoug h a district judg e may also conduct them. But a district judg e must make t h e r ev ocation d e c is io nif

th e o f f e n s e o f c o n v ic ti o nw a s a

f e lo n y . S ee 18 U.S.C. § 34 01 (i ) ( re c og nizi ngtha

t di str ic t jud g e may

de sig nate a

ma g ist rate judge to conduct a hear ing and submit proposed finding s of fa ct and rec ommendations).

* * * See F ED . R. C R IM . P. 32.1, A DVI S OR Y C OM MI TT EE N OT ES (April 19, 2002).

Br igha m also contends that the M ag istrate J udg e Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, provides no

a uth or ity fo r t he dis tr ic t ju dg e ’s a c tio ns . I n makin g thi s argume nt, B ri g ham ma int a ins tha t a probable cause deter

mination for a r evocation procee ding is not a “ pretria l ” matter, or one of the specifie d motions i n subpara g raph ( A) inelig ible for de signatio n t o t h e mag istrate judg e for resolution. See § 6 3 6 (b)( 1)(A) . Br igha m further emphasizes that the mag istrate judg e her e ac ted pursuant to a spe cific and separ ate Congr essional g rant of a uthority , i.e. , Ru le 32 .1 , r a the r t ha n s ole ly pursuant to a district cour t desig nation under §636( b).I t has no t bee n sho wn that eith e r part y – Br ig ham or

the Go ve rnme nt –

ob je c te d to 3 the mag istrate judg e' s presiding over the preliminary hear ing. 9 Her e, ther e is no dispute that Rule 32.1 authorizes mag istrate judge s to conduct the pr e lim ina ry re vo c a tio n h e ari ngduri ngwh ic h p ro ba ble c a us e is c on sid e re d. Thus , th e qu e sti on to 3 be d ec i d ed is whether the rule a lso preclude s the district court fr om review ing that determination and, if so, whe ther such a prohibition is leg ally permissible. As stated here in, we find that Rule 32.1 does not, and c annot, divest the district court of this authority

. This Court's de cision in United States v. J o h n s t on , 258 F.3d 361, 363- 64 (5th Cir. 2001), provides he lpful g uidance on these iss ues. Ther e, the Court set for th a two-step inquiry

for deter mining whe ther a

judicial duty

is properly

deleg able to a ma g istrate jud ge. S p ec i fi cally , the Court expl ained:

First, we must ask whether Congr ess, in passing leg islation gove rning mag istrate judg es, intended f or them t o perf

orm the duty

in question. I n applying that firs t step, we should avoid interpr eting any leg islation g overningmag istrate judg es in such a f ashion as to en gender constitutional iss ues if a rea sonable alternative posing no such issues is e vid e nt. B ut i f s uc h a

n a lte rn a tiv e is n ot p os sib le, th en we mus t ne xt co ns ide r “ wh e the r t he de le g a tio n o f t

he du ty to a ma g istra te judge offe nds the principles of A rticle I I Iof the Constituti on.”

* * * [Ar tic le I I I ] se rv e s tw o p ur

po se s: 1 ) “ to s a fe g ua

rd lit ig ants ' ri gh t to have cl ai ms decided be fore judge s who are fre e fr om potential domination by

other branc hes of g overnme nt” and 2) “to protec t the role of the independe nt judiciary within the constituti onal sche me of tripartite g overnme nt.” The f ormer c oncer

ns a def endant' s persona l rig ht to have his ca se hea

rd by an Ar ticle I I Ijudge

. That right may be waive d

. T h e s econd pur

pose per tains to “ce rtain structura l gua rante es wh ic h e ns ur e re sp e c t f

or se pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs pr inc ipl e s. ” Ar

tic le I I I , Section 1 seeks to ensur e such r espec t “by barr ing c ong ressional attempts to transfer jurisdiction [t o non- Article I I I tribunals] for the purpose of

e ma s c u la ti ng constitutional courts, and there by preve nting10 the enc roac hment or agg randizement of one branc h at the expense of the other.” When these Article I I I g uara ntees are at issue, consent or waiver by the par ties to procee d befor e a non- Articl e I I Ioffice r diminis hes but does not eliminate the c onstitut ional conce rns a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h t h e d e l e g a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y t o n o n - A rt i c l e III tribunals beca

use the gua

rante es serve instituti onal intere sts that the pa rt ie s c ann ot b e e xpe c te d to pr ote c t. Johnston , 258 F.3d at 363-64, 366-67 (inter nal citations omitted). A number of

fac tors sug g est that Rule 32. 1 i s p ro p er ly construed to a llow district court re view , i f t i m ely

reque sted, of the mag istrate judg e’s pr obable c ause de termination. Significantly , neither the previously quoted Advisory

Comments to Rule 32.1, the def initions provided by

Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(b) ( defining“cour t,” “f eder al jud g e , ” “

ju d g e , ” a nd “mag istrate judg e”) , nor the Advisory Comments to t he 2002 ame ndment of Rule 1(b) in any way precludea

dis tr ic t c ourt

jud g e , a s o pp os e d to a

ma g ist rate jud g e , from ma

kin g the pr ob a

ble c a us e deter mination. Rather, the 2002 Advisory Comments to Rule 32.1 expressly state t hat district judge s may conduct the initial proc eeding s in criminal proce eding s.

Fur ther, a revie w of the version of Rule 32.1 in eff ect in 2000, i.e. , prior to the 2002 amendments re fer ence d by Br igha m, reve als that, ev en t h en, magistrate judge s, if authorized p u rs u an t to 28 U.S.C. § 636 , s im il ar ly c o n d u c te d p r o b a b le c a u s e d e te r mi n a ti o n s a s p art o f

the p re l i m inary

revoc ation hear ing. See former F ED . R. C R IM . P

. 3 2

. 1 (2 0 0 0 ) (e mp h as i s ad d ed )

. If probable cause did not ex ist, as l ikewise is direc ted by the post-2002 amende d version of Rule 32.1, the proc eedingwas to be dismissed. Id. Thus, usag e of the term “mag istrate judge” in the curr ent version of Rule 32.1( b)(1) (A) simply acknow ledg es and a

pproves the c ommon practice , as of the tim e of the 20 02 a me ndme nts , of havingma g istra te jud g e s, rathe r t

ha n d ist ri c t ju dg e s, e va luate p ro b ab l e c au s e a s p ar to f t h e p re l i m i n ary re v o ca t i o nh ea ri n g.I n Ra dd atz , t h e S u

p r e m e C o u rte mp h a s i z e d t h a t “ C o n g r e s s w a s a l e rtt o A rt i c l e III 4 values c on ce rning the vesting of dec isionmaking powe r in mag istrates” w hen it passed the 1976 amendments to § 636. See R addatz, 447 U.S. at 681, 100 S. Ct . at 2415. 11 Juri sp ru de nc e fr om t

he S upre me Court

and thi s Co ur

t, m or e ov e r, su g g e sts that a leg islative withdrawa l of such re view author ity from Ar ticle I I Idistrict court judg es would be constitutionally

problematic. F or instance , in Tho ma s v . A rn , 474 U.S. 140, 153-54, 106 S. Ct . 466, 47 4 ( 19 85 ), the Sup re me Court add res se d th e de le g a tio n a uth or ity pr ov ide d b y

§ 6 36 and

a Sixth Circuit rule conditioning appellate revie w upon the filing of objec tions to a mag istrate’s r eport a nd

rec ommendation. The Court explained:

“a district c ourt may

ref er dispositive motions to a magistrate for a rec ommendation so long a s “the entire process takes place unde r the d is tr ic t c o u rt' s to ta l c o n tr o l a n d ju r is d ic ti o n , ” Uni ted States v. Ra dd atz , 447 U.S. 667, 681, 100 S. C t. 2406, 2415, 65 L

. Ed.2d 424 (1 98 0) , a nd the [dis tr ic t] ju dg e “ ‘e xer c ise [s] the ult imate a uth or ity to issue an appr opriate or der,’ ” id. , at 682, 100 S. Ct., at 2415 quoti ng Senate Repor

t, at 3. * * * [F ur the r], [t]he wa ive r o f a

pp e llate re vie w d oe s n ot imp lic a te Ar tic le I I I , b e c a us e it i s th e dis tr ic t c ourt , no t the c ourt of a pp e a ls, that mu st exercise supe rvision over the ma g istrate. [] [W ]e do not believe that the rule e levates the mag istrate fr om an a d j u n ct to the functional e qu iva le nt o f a

n A rt ic le I I Ijud g e . T he ru le me re ly e sta bli sh e s a p ro ce d u ra l d ef au l t t h at h as n o ef

fe ct o nt h e m agi s t ra t e's o r t h e c o u rt 's jur isd ic tio n. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e ha s jurisd ictio n o ve r t he c a se a t a ll times. He re tains full authority to decide whether to ref

er a case to the ma g istrate , to re vie w the ma g istra te ' s re po rt , and

to e nte r j ud g me nt. An y p ar t y t h at d es i re s p l en ary

co n s i d er at i o nb y

t h e A rt i cl e II Ij u d ge of any issue need only

ask. More over, w hile the s t atut e does not require the judg e to r eview an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further revie w by

the district judge , sua sponte or at the re quest of a pa

rty , under a

de novo or a

ny other standa

rd. Thomas , 474 U.S. at 153-54, 106 S. Ct. at 474. 412 This Court’s opinions i n United States v. De es, 125 F.3d 261 ( 5th Cir. 1997), c e rt. denied , 522 U.S. 1152, 118 S. C t. 1174 (1998), and Johnston , su pra , l i k e w i s e ar e i n s t r

u c t i v e . In Dee s , w e e xpla ine d th a t “ the Sup re me Cou rt ha s st re sse d th a t th e re vie wa

bilit y of a ma g istrate judge ’s actions is a critica l fac tor in consideringthe proprie ty of an A rticle I I Ijudge ’s deleg ation of authority to a mag istrate judg e.” 125 F.3d at 268. Thus, the C ourt emphasized: “. .

. so long a s the district court has the power to revie w t he magistrate judge ' s actions, there is no threat to the judicial power or the indepe ndence of judicial de cisionmaking that underlies Ar ticle I I I .” Id. (interna l citations and quotation m ar k s omitted). “Only when a mag istrate judg e possesses f inal decisionmaking au thority over a substantial issue in a case does an A rticle I I Iproblem ar ise.” Id. (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted).

The De es de c isi on

a lso re fe re nc e s e arl ie r j ur isp ru de nc e e xpre ssi ngdo ub t th a t A rt ic le I I I allows a non-Article I I Ijudge to preside ove r a f elony criminal trial. Id. at 267. I n doing so, w e

rea soned th a t “ d is tr ic t c o u rt r e v ie w a b il it y p r e v e n t[ s ] m an y

A rti c le I I Ip r o b le ms ” ; h o w e v e r , “a district court ca

nnot adequately

revie w an e ntire fe lony

trial.” Id. Ex panding upon this li mitation, the Johnston decision ex plains that a non-Article I I Ijudge cannot not re nder a sentenc e in a f

elony matter. Johnston , 258 F.3d at 370. Specifica lly , we emphasized there that sentenc ings, unlike othe r matters prope rly

handle d b y

mag istrate judg es, ar e not “ministerial in nature and re quire the le g al judgme nt and ac umen of a lear ned jurist,” who, at times must “do the unpopular and, ther efor e, may need the shield of independe nce a ffor ded by Article I I I .” Id. at 371. The Johnston C o u rt fu rt h er re as o n edt h at , i f i t i s i mp erm i s s i b l e f o r am agi s t ra t e j u d ge to i mpo se a

fe lony se nte nc e , h e or

she s imi larl y

c ann ot n ot r e nd e r a

fi na l r uli ngup on

a mot ion to

vacate, set aside, or

corr ect sentenc e filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This is true even when a13

case proce eds before the mag istrate judg e under § 636(c) with the consent of the parties. Id. at 368- 72. The Court explained that a c ontrary conclusion “turns the conce pt of revie wability on its head” b e c a u s e , w i t h a

§ 2 2 5 5 m o t i o n , a

m a g i s t r a t e j u d g e r e c o n s i d e r s an d r e v i e w s r

u l i n g s o f A rt i c l e III judge s, and, whe n proce eding under § 636(c) is, as a prac tical m atter, subject to reviewonly by the court of a ppeals, not the district cour t. Id. at 371 & n. 6. Finally , though not discusse d by t h e par ties, we note that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(h) provides for

an appe al of a

n otherwise final sentenc e imposed by a mag istrate judg e “to a

judge of the district court, a

nd [st ates that the] section shall apply . . . as thoug h the appe al wer e to the cour t of appeals from a sentence imposed by a dis trict court.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(h). Whil e her e the mag istrate judg e did not impose a final se ntence , this statute further sug g ests the propriety of having p r o b a b l e c a u s e d i s m i s s a l o r d e r s s u

b j e c tt o t h e r e v i e w o f t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtw h e nr e qu e s t e d b y a p art y. Con sid e ri ngthe ins tant a

pp e a l in lig ht of the fo re g oin g pr inc ipl e s, if a “ no pr ob a

ble

cause ” dete rmination remains subjec t to review by district court, the mag istrate judg e’s involvement p o s i t i v e l y i n c r e a s e s t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f

d i s t r i c tc o u rtd o c k e t s . R e m o v a l o f t h a tr e v i e w a

u t h o r i t y, howeve r, could impermissibly interfe re with the district c ourt’s Article I I I obligations a n d p o wer relative to sentenc ing, supervision of persons serving those sentenc es, and revoc ation of super vised

re le a se wh en app rop ria te . F or ins tanc e , th ou g h B ri g ham is c or re c t th a t th e Go ve rnme nt c ou ld immediately re- file its motion to r evoke upon dismiss al by the mag istrate judg e, that same motion,

u n l e s s s e tf

o r p r e l i m i n ar

y h e ar i n g b e f

o r e t h e d i s t r i c tj u d g e , c o u l d r e p e a t e d l y s u f

f e r d i s m i s s a l b y a

no n- Ar tic le I I Ima g istrate jud g e wi thou t any c on sid e ratio n b y

the jud ic ia l of

fi c e r c on sti tut ion a lly char g ed with re sponsibili ty for that c ri m i n al proceeding . Thus, unless district judge revie w of a mag istrate judg e’s dismissal order under Rul e 3 2

. 1 i s available , as both the mag istrate judg e andTo a vo id a ny c on fu sio n, B ri g ham’ s f

ir st i ssu e on app e a l a dd

re sse s th e ma g istrate 5 judge ’s no proba

ble c au s e fi nding a

nd resulting order

of dismissal. The second issue on a ppeal inv olv e s th e ma g istrate jud g e ’s fi nd ingthat, e ve n if it w e re de te rm ine d o n a

pp e a l th a t pr ob a

ble c a us e did exi st, Brig ham did not constitute a dang er to the c ommunity or flig ht risk such that he should be d et ai n edp en d i n g a f

i n al re v o ca t i o nh ea ri n g. 14 dis tr ic t ju dg e he re c on te mpl a te d to be the c a se , that Con g re ssi on a l g ra nt of a uth or ity to m a g istrate jud g e s r e lativ e to p ro ba

ble c a us e de te rm inatio ns pr e se nts c on sti tut ion a l pr ob le ms. Additionally , as part of his f irst issue on appea l, B rig ham also argues that the district judge likewise had no authority to stay the mag istrate judg e' s dismis sal order . We disag ree . Relative t o t h i s a s s e rt i o n , t h e C o u rtn o t e s t h a tt h e f i n a l r e v o c a t i o n h e ar i n g i nt h i s m a t t e r w a s h e l d f o u r d ays afte r the district cour

t stay ed the mag istrate judg e’s or ders. Thus, ther e wa s no prolong ed dete ntion pending the district court’s f inal resolution of the matter. F inally , g iven that Rule 32.1 provides for dis mis sa l w he n n o p ro ba

ble c a us e is f ound , d istri c t c ourt

re vie w v ery oft en c ou ld b e me anin g le ss if the district judg e had no a uthority to stay the dismissal order pe nding r eview. II. The dist r ic t c our t did not e r r in st ay ing th e m ag ist r at e ju dge ’s “r e le as e ” o r de r pe nding the district c ourt’s r eview of that order . Br igha m's se cond cha lleng e conc erns the ma g istrate jud ge's o rder that Br igha

m be

re le a se d f ro m c us tod

y pe nd ingfu

rt he r p ro c e e din g s. Rul e 32 .1 (a )( 6) a llo ws a ma g istra te jud g e to

re le a se or de ta in a pers on su bj ect to a

re vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g purs ua nt t o p ro vis ion s o f t

he B a il Reform Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. Se c tio n 31 45 of that A c t a

uth or ize s revie w of a r elea se orde r by the di strict court. Br igha m, howeve r, m aintains that the district court ha d no authority to stayhis

re le a se pe nd ingtha

t r e vie w. Gi ve n the le g a l ba sis of thi s c ha lle ng e , th e Court

c on sid e rs it de novo

. 5 Long , 996 F.2d at 732.

Se c tio n 3 14 5 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art :15 3145. Review and ap peal of a rele ase or det ention order (a) Review of a

rele ase or der. – I f a pe rson is order ed rele ased by a magistrate judge , or by a person other than a judg e of a court having orig inal jurisdiction over the off ens e and othe r than a

Fe dera l appellate court – (1) the attorney

for the G overnmen t may file, with the cour

t having orig inal jurisdiction over the offe nse, a motion for r evocation of the orde r or a

mendment of the c onditions of relea se; and (2) the pe rson may

file, with the co u rt having orig inal jurisdictio n o v er the offe nse, a motion for a mendment of the conditions of rele ase. T h e m o t i o ns h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d p r o mp t l y. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145.

Br ig h a m c o r

r e c tl y ar g u e s th a t § 3 1 4 5 d o e s n o t e xp r e s s ly a u th o r iz e a stay

. Neve rtheless, a s previously discussed with reg ard t o re v i ew of the dismissal order, g iven that the iss ue be ingre vie we d in

vo lve s a pe rs on ’s re le a se fr om c us tod y pe nd ingfu

rt he r l e g a l pr oc e e din g s, t h e a b s e n c e o f s t ay a u t h o r i t y c o u l d

r e n d e r t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s r e v i e w p o w e r i l l u s o r y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, if the district court disag ree s with the mag istrate judg e’s de terminati o n re g ardingrele ase ve rsus detention, but no stay

is in place, the pe rson in question may have ha rmed th e co m m u n ity

or disappea red by the time the district court’s r uling is re ndere d and dete ntion is ordered. I ndeed, a s cited by

the Gover

nment, sever al district c ourts – albeit in the context of pre- trial detention – have stay ed rele ase order s. See United States v. Zaghmot , No. 00-1348, 2000 WL 1678396, *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (unpublished opinion) ( stay was g rante d by

district court pe nd ing re vie w o f m a g istrate jud g e ' s r e le a se ru lin g ); U n i t e d S t a t es v . Yu , N o . 0 5

- 4 0 0 9 5 , 2 0 0 8 WL 24 35 80 3 ( D. Ka

n. June 12 , 2 00 8) (s tay

of re le a se pe nd ing se c tio n 314 5( a )( 1) a pp e a l g ra nte d b y bo th16

mag istrate judge and district judge ); United States v. Pe tersen , 557 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129-30 (E .D. Ca l. 2 00 8) (s tay

g ra nte d b y ma g istrate jud g e pe nd ingdis tr ic t ju dg e re vie w) ; Un ite d Sta te s v . B ro wn , No

. 2 -0 8 -1 0 6 , 2 0 0 8 W L2 0 9 8 0 7 0 , * 1 (S

. D. Oh i o M ay 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( s t ay

o f r el ea s e p en d i n g § 31 45 (a )( 1) a

pp e a l g ra

nte d b y bo th m a g ist

rate jud g e a

nd dis tr ic t ju dg e ); United States v. Gu zm an -B ae z, No. 07-0797, 2008 WL18093 3 6 , *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr . 18, 2008) (stay g rante d by

ma g istrate jud g e ); Un ite d S tates v . Co lin , 07-512, 2007 WL 4377723, *1 (N.D.N .Y. Dec . 12, 2007) (stay g rante d by

district court af

ter stay reque st was denied by

mag istrate cour

t). T h e rationale of the se de c isi on s li ke wi se a pp lie s to the iss ue pr e se ntl y be fo re thi s Co ur

t. Finally , § 3145(a) require s that revie w of a r elea se orde r be de termined “ promptly .” Henc e, per sons such as Brig ham are protected from prolong ed int erim detention if a re lease order is later upheld by the revie wing district c ourt. Acc ording ly , g iven this a nd the previously

s t ated considerations, we find the stay imposed by

the district court to be w ithout lega l error

.

III. The di strict

court did not imper m issib ly delegate its se ntencing authority, and then im properly consider the r esults of a polygraph exam ination in viol ation of Brigham’ s r igh t a ga inst

se lf- inc r im ina ti on. Br igha m contends that t h e d i s t rict judg e impermissibly deleg ated his sentenc ing authority by allowing Br igha

m's c ounselor to require that he under g o poly g raph e x aminations. He additio n a ll y ma in ta in s th a t th e d is tr ic t ju d g e th e n im p r o p e r ly c o n s id e r e d th e r e s u lt s o f the examinations as part of the r evocation procee ding. Gi ve n the le g a l and c on sti tut ion a l ba se s o f t

he se

a sse rt ion s, the Court

c on sid e rs the m de novo

. United States v. Lock e , 482 F.3d 764, 766-67 (5 Cir. th 20 07 ); see also Long , 996 F.2d at 732.The district c ourt additionally order ed that Br igha m c omplete sex off

ender treatment 6 service s, as order ed by the probation officer , as Specia l Condit ion No. 1 to his term of supervised rele ase. A lthough or igina lly included as a

n addit ional basis for r evocation in parag raph I Iof the Go ve rnme nt’ s Mo tio n to Re vo ke Sup e rv ise d Re le a se , th e Go ve rnme nt d id n ot p ro c e e d o n th e ba sis of this asserte d violation at the final re vocation proc eeding

. See note 2, su pra . See Transc ript of Fina l Revocation H e a r in g , R. Supp. Vol. 2 at 81, 84-85, 98-100, 106 7 and 109. 17

These c halleng es to the di strict court’s actions should be rejecte d for e ssentially the

re a so ns a sse rt e d b y

the Go ve rnme nt i n it s b ri e f. F ir st, the c on dit ion s of su pe rv ise d re le a se fo un d to have be en violated, i.e. , Special Conditi on Nos. 3 and 7, wer e imposed by the district judge , not

by Br igha m’s sex offender

treatment counselor, Emily Orozco, or his probation officer

. 6 Fur thermore , Br igha

m has not demonstrated that the district court ac tually used any results of the polyg raph e x amination as a basis for revoking Br igha m’s rele ase. Sig nificantly , the dis tr ic t ju d g e s p e c if

ic a ll y s tate d , a t th e b e g inn in g o f th e r e v o c a ti o n h e ar in g , th a t h e h a d found poly g raph e x aminations and the results of t hose ex aminations to be inadmissible. Accor dingly , he informed the pa

rties that he would not ente rtain an y ev i d en ce or testimony based on a

poly g raph examination, or the results of a polyg raph ex amination, at t he final revoc ation hear ing. Consis tent with this ruling , the transcr ipt of the revoc ation hear ing reve als that Br igha m se parately

i n fo rm ed bo th h is c ouns e lor

and the pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r o f c on du c t th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d to be in violation of Special Condition Nos. 3 and 7. He also disclosed this information as par t of a g roup counselingsession. 7

I n any event, e ven if B ri gh am we re able to show that polyg raph e vidence was imp ro pe rl y c on sid e re d in c onne c tio n w ithhis re vo c a tio n, thi s Co ur t’ s d e c isi on

inLocke, 482 F.3d

a t 76 7- 68 & n. 1, de monstrate s th e a bs e nc e of any re ve rs ibl e e rr or

by the dis tr ic t c ourt

re lativ e toSee Orozco “A g ree ment Reg ardingThera peutic Ac tiviti es” at p. 1 (R.E. 4 at 143). 8 18 B ri g ham' s F if

th A me ndme nt p ri vil e g e a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n. Th e re , th e de fe nd ant s imi larl y claimed that he had made incriminating statements as pa rt of a mandatory

poly g raph e x amination, which we re the n used to revoke his term of probation. Id. at 767. This Court, how ever , held that L oc ke ’s F if

th Am e ndme nt ri g hts ha d no t be e n inf ri ng e d be c a

us e the qu e sti on s dir e c te d to h im o nly attempted to asc erta in whether he had violated conditi ons of hi s probation, and c ould not serve a s the basis for a

future c riminal prosec ution. Id. Additionally , in Locke , w e als o emp ha size d th a t he ha d o nly “ unre a so na

bly speculate[d] ” that revoc ation would result i f he had invoked his privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination during the poly g raph examination. Id. at n.1. The same may be said he re of

Br igha m’s ref ere nce to cer tain lang uag e in the “Agr eeme nt Reg arding Thera peutic Activiti es” that he si g ned as pa rt of his require d sex offe nder treatment. The langua g e in question provides only that non-complianc e with the twenty -three rules established in that a g ree ment could lead to unsuc cessf ul discharg e fr om treatment which, in turn, “mig ht” ca use B rig ham to “fa ce a dverse leg al conse quence s.” 8 IV . The spe c ialc ondi ti ons of sup e r vis e d r e le as e th at Br igh am vio lat e d wer e not , a s a pplie d, uncons titutionally vagu e and overbroad, or stat utorily im proper. The district c o u

r t r e v o k e d B r ig h a m' s s u p e r v ise d rele ase ba sed on violations of specia l

c on dit ion s p ro hib iti ngpo ssessi on or c on tr ol o f “ po rn og ra

ph ic , s e xua lly

or ie nte d, or

se xua lly sti mu lati n g ma

te r ia ls , ” an d

p o s s e s s io no r

u ti li za ti o no f a c o mp u te r

o r in te r n e t c o n n e c ti o nd e v ic e. Br igha m asserts that the c onditions, as applied, wer e unconstitutionally vague and ove rbroa d, and inconsistent with the require ments of 18 U.S.C. §3583.C i t i n g United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192 (5th Cir. 2003) , the Gover nment 9 maintains that a plain er

ror standa rd of r eview should be utiliz ed bec ause B rig ham failed to object to his conditions of supervised re lease at or after the sentenc ing he aring

. Phipps , howeve r, involved an a p p ea l of a se ntence rathe r than a revoc ation. Fur

ther, thoug h not with as much detail or specific ity , Br igha

m did challeng e these conditions as par t of the re vocation proc eedingconducte d by the district court

. As s t at ed above, how ever , beca use B rig ham did not object to the spec ial conditions a t i s s u e u p o n their imposition at sentencing , they are revie wed only

as they have be en a pp lie d a s p art

of his te rm of su pe rv ise d rel ease . In a

ny e ve nt, the re su lt o n a

pp e a l is a dv e rs e to Br igha m reg ardle ss of whethe r a pla in error standard of

revie w is utili zed. 19 Be cause B r ig h a m d id

n o t o b je c t t o th e im

p o s it io no f

th e s e s p e c ia l c o n d it io n s of

su pe rv ise d r e le a se a t se nte nc ing , th e Court c on sid e rs the m on ly

on an “ a s a pp li e d” ba sis and

on ly

as they perta in to the Court’s revie w of his re vocation proc eeding

. See Lock e , 482 F.3d at 766-67. Whil e revoc ation decisions ar e re viewed f or abuse of discre tion, the leg al and c onstitut ional bases of the c halleng es there to are revie wed de novo

. Id. a t 76 6- 67 ; see also Long , 996 F.2d at 732. 9

Supervised Relea se Specia l Condit ions Nos. 3 and 7 are the provisions at issue he re. As previously

stated, they

provide: Special Condition No. 3: The defe ndant shall not p o s s es s nor have un de r h is c on tr ol, any

po rn og ra ph ic, sex uall y

or ie nte d o r s e xua lly stimul ating m at eria ls, including visual, auditory , telephonic, or elec tronic media, c omputer prog rams or se rvice s. The def en d ant sh a ll n ot p a tr on ize pla c e s w he re su c h mate ri a l or e nte rt a inm ent is available . The de fenda

nt sha ll not utiliz e any

sex-related te lephone numbe rs . Sp e c ia l C o n d it io nN o . 7 : T h e d e f e n d an t sh a ll n o t p o s s e s s o r u ti li ze a comput er or interne t connec tion device dur ing the term of supervised r elea se. I n h is b ri e f, B ri g ham a c kn ow le dg e s tha t the same or sim ila r c on dit ion s o f s up e rv ise d r e le a se , d e sp ite

so me a c kn ow le dg e d va g ue ne ss, have be e n f ound to p ro vid e c on sti tut ion a lly su ff ic ie nt n oti c e of

the ir proscr ip ti o n s b e c a

u s e th e y ar e w r itte n , an d

ar e to b e r e a d , in

a “ c o mm o n - s e n s e w ay . ” B r ig h am urg es, howe ver, that they wer e applied imprope rly here

.20 Reg ardingSpecial Condition No. 3, Brig ham asser ts that the videotape f

orming the fac tual basis of the a lleg ed viol ation of this condition was not leg ally or fa ctually

“pornog raphic .” He a dd iti on a lly

argue s that, a lth ou g h the vid e ota pe in q ue sti on may be “ se xua lly

or ie nte d o r s e xua lly sti mul a tin g ,” the e xac t me anin g of the se te rm s, a s wi th the te rm “ po rn og ra

ph ic ,” is n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y clea r. Finally , he contends that the video did not depict sexual material of the sort that a c ommonse ns e re a din g of

the c on dit ion

wo uld pr oh ibi t. We note that the videotape in question appare ntly depicted B rig ham and a former g irlfriend having sexual int erc ourse dur ing the exis tence of that romantic r elationship. Furthe r, Br igha m admitted to having possession of, viewing , and masturbating to that videotape following his relea se fr o m p ri s o n , which wa s some time after the romantic r elationship with the former g irlfriend ha d ended. B eca use B rig ham no long er w as in an re lationship with t he woman a ppear ing in the videotape, his counselor vi ewe d his masturbation whil e watching the vi deo to be “deviant.”

We find Br igha

m’s vagueness c h al l en ges to Special Condition No. 3 meritless. T h er e h as b ee nn o s u gges t i o nm ad e t h at h e ev er fe l t i t n ec es s ary

t o i n qu i re re gar d i n g t h e m ea n i n gs of the ter ms pornog raphic , sexually orien t ed o r sex ually

stimul ating , as they

are used in Special Con dit ion No . 3 . E ve n so, the de fi nit ion s o f “ c hil d p or no g ra ph y ” and “ se xua lly e xplic it c on du c t”

se t f or th i n 1 8 U .S. C. § 22 56 (2 ) & (8 ) o ff e r s ome pr a c tic a l in sig ht int o th e me anin g of the se te rm s. Fur thermore , and importantly , while the videotape might not be objec tionable in a differ ent context, it depicted sexual int erc ourse with a woman with whom Br igha m no longe r wa s romantica lly

involved, and was viewed by him f or the purpose of masturbating. The se fa cts provide sufficie nt support for the district cour t’s deter mination that the vide otape, even if initially made by B ri g ham f

or pe rs on a l, p ri vate vie wi ng , c on sti tut e d “ po rn og ra ph ic , s e xua lly

ori ent ed or

se xua lly21

stimul ating materia ls,” as contemplated by Special C ondition No. 3. Significa ntly , moreove r, that

su c h a vid e ota pe wo uld so qu a lif y , part ic ula

rl y un de r the sp e c if

ic c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nt h e re , w ou ld be re asonably

appar ent to an ordina

ry person c harg ed with this supervised re lease condition. Br igha m also contends that Sp ec i al Condition Nos. 3 and 7 are violative of the require ments set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, and constitutionally overbr oad. Pursuant to § 3583(d) (1), superv i s ed re l ea se conditions must be rea sonably related to the nature and cir cumstance s of the offe nse, the history and chara cter istics of t he defenda nt, deter renc e of criminal conduc t, protection of the pu bli c , and tr e a tme nt of the de fe nd ant’ s c or re c tio na l ne e ds

. Th e c on dit ion a lso mus t no t r e su lt in any g reater d ep ri vation of liberty than is rea sonably

nece ssary

for the pur

poses of de terring criminal conduc t, protectingthe public from the de fenda nt, and treating the defe ndant’s cor rec tional needs. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). F inally , the condition must be co n sistent with pertinent SentencingCommi ssion policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). We find that both Special Condition Nos. 3 and 7 are r easona bly related to the fa ctors set fort h in §3583(d)(1) & ( 3). And, c onsidering the sentenc ing c ourt’s discre tion in establishing

su c h c on dit ion s, a s we ll a s thi s Court ’s pr ior c a se law, the y lik e wi se are su ff ic ie ntl y narr owly tailored in this instance. As r efle cted in the Pre -Sentenc e Investig ation Report ( “P S R ”) an d the written objec tions thereto, B rig ham’s rele vant offe nse conduc t undisputedly involved posting or display ing a

signific ant number of

imag es that met t he statutory definition of child pornog raphy on an interne t web site. Som e of the se ima g e s inc lud e d d e pic tio ns of min or s e ng a g e d in

g e nit a l- g e nit a l, anal- g enital, and or al-g enital s exual intercour se wit h adults or “la sciviously exposi ng their g enital and pu b i c ar ea s.” In addition, cer tain of the imag es included imag es of pr e-pube scent minors, as22

well as imag es involving por tray al of sadistic or ma sochisti c conduc t. Brig ham also maintained additional other imag es of c hild pornog raphy on his personal c omputer. Un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, a lth ou g h the dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld h a ve c ho se n to imp os e less restric tive conditions than Special Condition Nos. 3 and 7, its contra ry decision is not

unrea sonable, g iven the re prehe nsibili ty of child pornog raphy , the har m to society ’s ch i l d re n that

re su lts the re fr om, and the un dis pu te d li ke lih oo d o f r e c idi vis m. N ot s ur pr isi ng ly , c ouns e lor

Em ily Or ozc o te sti fi e d at Br ig ham’ s re vo c a tio n he ari ng that se xua lly sti mul a tin g ima g e s o f a

ny kin d ( a du lt or child) r einforc e the same ty pe of be havior pre viously exhibi ted by

Br igha m. Fur ther, g iven B rig ham’s use of a computer and the internet to post, rec eive, and store these imag es, a limited period of time – while on supervised r elea se and pa rticipating in sex offe nder treatment – of complete prohibition from such a powerful tool , and ac cess to an e normous amount of per sons of all ag es, is not unrea sonable. Indeed, in a ddition to as s i s t i n g i n Br igha m’s reha bilitat i o n , s u ch a condition provides a n eff ective te st for his prog ress, de dication, re morse, willingness, a

nd ability to make the c hang es in his c onduct nece ssary for his succ essful unsuper vised

re tur n t o s o c i e t y . A n d , t h o u g h B r i g h a m i s c o r r e c t t h a t c o mp u t e r s an d t h e i n t e r n e t h a v e be c ome signific ant and or dinary

components of moder

n life as we know it, they never theless s t i l l ar e not absolutely

essential to a f

unctional life outside of pr ison. I t goe s without say ing that the same is true with respe ct t o a videotape of adult sexual intercour se between two persons not involved in an ong oing c ommitt ed re lationship that is vi ewe d for the pur pose of masturbation. Finally , under this Court’s prior jurisprude nce a nd persua sive jurisprudenc e of othe r

c i r c u i t s , a s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e G o v e r n m e n t ’ s b r i e f

, n e i t h e r s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n is p er se overly broad. I ndeed, in United States v. Phipps , 319 F. 3 d 1 7 7 , 1 9 2 (5 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ), we re j ec t ed a si m i l ar

ch al l en ge23

to a sp e c ia l con dit ion of su pe rv ise d re le a se pr oh ibi tin g po sse ssi on of “ se xua lly or ie nte d o r s e xua lly stimul ating materia ls.” Phipps , 319 F.3d at 193. Specifica lly , we he ld that, when re ad in a c ommonse ns e wa y , Phip ps ’ spe c ia l con dit ion satis fi e d the dic tate s o f d ue pr oc e ss. Id. He re , f

or e sse nti a lly the same re asons pre viously explained relative to B rig ham' s vag ueness c halleng e, Specia l Condit ion No. 3, as a

pplied, likewise is not overly broad. Wit h respe ct to Special Condition No. 7, t h i s C o u rt , in United States v. Paul , 274 F.3d 155, 170 ( 5th Cir. 2001), cert. de nied , 535 U.S. 1002, 112 S. C t. 1571 (2002), held that a n absolut e b an on computer a nd internet use is a cce ptable if it is rea sonably nece ssary

to serve the statutory g oals set fo rt h i n § 3 5 83(d). B eca use we find that it is, as ex plained above , that

c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e lik e wi se fa ils

. CO NC LU SION

For the foreg oing rea sons, we conc lude that the district judg e had jur isdiction to (1) revie w the mag istrate judge ’s order of dismiss al finding no probable cause , (2) stay that dismiss al order pending revie w, and ( 3) stay the mag istrate judg e' s order that Br igha

m be re leased from custody pending any

further proce eding s . S u ch jurisdiction is not violative of F eder al Rule of Cr imi na l Pr oced ure 32 .1 , a nd any pr oh ibi tio n th e re of

wo uld pr e se nt c on sti tut ion a l pr ob le ms. Fur ther, ther e has be en no s h o wi n g that the district court impermissibly deleg ated its sentenc ing authori t y an d / o r i mproperly considere d the re sults of a poly g raph e x amination in violation of Br igha m’s rig ht ag ainst self-incr imi n a tion. Finally , and par

ticularly under the circ umstances pr esent here , we f ind that Special Condition Nos. 3 and 7, which B rig ham violated, ar e re asonably related to the fac tors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3583(d)( 1) & (3), and, as applied, are not c onstitut ionally vague24

and/or ove rbroa d. Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the district court' s revoc ation of B rig ham' s supervised rele ase.