1&/0-"67$&-8
Table of Contents 

Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................... 1

Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 5

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 6

Author Biographies ....................................................................................................................... 7

Chapter One: Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012 ................... 12

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 12

Why is Understanding the PLA’s Structure Important? ........................................................... 13

The Foundation Organizations .................................................................................................. 14

Officer 15-grade Structure ........................................................................................................ 16

Background ........................................................................................................................... 16

Anomalies ............................................................................................................................. 17

Understanding the Rank-Grade Link .................................................................................... 17

Officer Rank Categories ....................................................................................................... 17

Officer 15-grade System ....................................................................................................... 18

Officer Grade-to-Rank Relationship ..................................................................................... 21

PLA Cadre ................................................................................................................................ 22

Officer Career Tracks ........................................................................................................... 23

Civilian Cadre Grades ........................................................................................................... 24

Rank Epaulets ....................................................................................................................... 24

Collar Insignia ....................................................................................................................... 25

Unit Patches .......................................................................................................................... 26

Officer and Civilian Cadre Grade and Rank Comparison .................................................... 26

Noncommissioned Officer Grade and Rank Structure ............................................................. 29

Protocol Order ........................................................................................................................... 31

Military Unit Cover Designators .............................................................................................. 32

Force Reductions ...................................................................................................................... 34

Administrative and Functional Departments ............................................................................ 35

Comprehensive Departments ................................................................................................ 37

Security Committees ................................................................................................................. 38

Security Regulations ............................................................................................................. 39

Political Work System .............................................................................................................. 40

Unit Party Committees .......................................................................................................... 41

Administrative and Functional Department Party Committees ............................................ 41

Grassroots Party Committees ................................................................................................ 41

Party General Branches ......................................................................................................... 41

Party Branches ...................................................................................................................... 41

Party Small Groups ............................................................................................................... 42

Academic Institutions ............................................................................................................... 42

Types of Military Academic Institutions .............................................................................. 42
Differences between University, Xueyuan, and School ....................................................... 42

Comprehensive Universities ................................................................................................. 42

Academic Education and Professional Education Institutions ............................................. 43

Academic Institution Unit and Specialty Codes ................................................................... 44

Protocol Order ....................................................................................................................... 44

Organizational Grade Structure ............................................................................................ 45

Military Unit Cover Designators .......................................................................................... 45

Academic Degrees ................................................................................................................ 45

Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 45

Party Committees .................................................................................................................. 46

Administrative and Functional Departments ........................................................................ 46

Academic Departments and Specialties ................................................................................ 47

Organization Names and Number Designators ..................................................................... 48

Student Organizational Structure .......................................................................................... 49

Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts .......................................................................... 50

The Armed Forces and Military ................................................................................................ 50

CMC, Services, Branches/Arms, and Units .............................................................................. 51

Military Region and Theater of War ......................................................................................... 54

PLA Headquarters, Leadership, and Department Terminology ............................................... 55

Headquarters Terminology ................................................................................................... 55

Leadership Terminology ....................................................................................................... 55

Is it General Staff Headquarters or General Staff Department? ........................................... 58

Is It General Equipment, Armaments, or Armament Department? ...................................... 58

Department Terminology ...................................................................................................... 59

Academic Institutions ............................................................................................................... 59

Grade Terminology ................................................................................................................... 60

Informatization/Informatized .................................................................................................... 61

Appendix 2: PLA and PAP Grade and Rank Structure ......................................................... 62

People’s Armed Police Organizational Structure ................................................................. 71

Appendix 3: PLA Academic Institutions .................................................................................. 73

PLA Academic Institution Name Changes Starting in 2011 .................................................... 76

Chapter Two: The Central Military Commission ................................................................... 79

The CMC in the Broader Political Order .................................................................................. 79

Why Are There Two Central Military Commissions? .......................................................... 80

The CMC and the Party Politburo ........................................................................................ 86

The CMC and the State Council ........................................................................................... 90

The CMC in the Military Sector ............................................................................................... 91

Membership .......................................................................................................................... 91

Chairman ............................................................................................................................... 92

Structure and Administration ................................................................................................ 95
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 99

Chapter Three: China’s Defense Minister and Ministry of National Defense .................... 100

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 101

Wide-ranging Statutory Functions ...................................................................................... 102

Defense Minister and MND Grades ....................................................................................... 104

Defense Minister Responsibilities .......................................................................................... 107

Military Diplomacy Responsibilities .................................................................................. 108

The Next Defense Minister ................................................................................................. 110

MND Responsibilities and Organizational Structure ............................................................. 110

MND Responsibilities ......................................................................................................... 111

MND Structure .................................................................................................................... 111

Ministry of National Defense Information Office and Website ......................................... 115

Military Attachés ................................................................................................................ 115

International Communication Bureau ................................................................................. 116

Peacekeeping Office and Peacekeeping Center .................................................................. 116

Recruitment (Conscription) Office: Same Characters, New Meaning ............................... 117

Defense Mobilization .......................................................................................................... 119

Coordination between the CMC and State Council on National Defense Regulations ...... 120

Possible Reforms .................................................................................................................... 120

Information Gaps .................................................................................................................... 121

Appendix 1: Ministry of National Defense History ............................................................... 123

Appendix 2: China’s 11 Defense Ministers ............................................................................. 124

Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan ....................................................................... 125

Appendix 3: Defense Minister Travel Abroad 2003-2012 ..................................................... 127

Appendix 4: Comparison of Activities by Defense Ministers Chi Haotian, Cao Gangchuan, 

and Liang Guanglie for One Year ........................................................................................... 129

Chi Haotian Activities in 2001 ............................................................................................... 130

Cao Gangchuan Activities in 2006 ......................................................................................... 131

Liang Guanglie Meetings in 2011 ........................................................................................... 132

Chapter Four: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department: Evolving 

Organization and Missions....................................................................................................... 135

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 135

Leadership ............................................................................................................................... 136

Chief of General Staff ......................................................................................................... 137

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff ..................................................................................... 138

Staff Organization ................................................................................................................... 139

GSD General Office ............................................................................................................ 140

GSD Operations Department .............................................................................................. 142
GSD Intelligence Department ............................................................................................. 145

GSD Technical Department ................................................................................................ 148

GSD Informatization Department ....................................................................................... 151

GSD Strategic Planning Department .................................................................................. 153

GSD Army Aviation Department ....................................................................................... 154

GSD Military Training Department .................................................................................... 154

GSD Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department ................................................. 157

GSD Mobilization Department ........................................................................................... 158

GSD Military Affairs Department ...................................................................................... 159

GSD Management Support Department ............................................................................. 160

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 161

Chapter Five: The General Political Department .................................................................. 162

Introduction and Overview ..................................................................................................... 162

History..................................................................................................................................... 163

Leadership ............................................................................................................................... 164

Current Leadership.............................................................................................................. 165

Deputy Directors ................................................................................................................. 165

GPD Grades and Ranks ...................................................................................................... 166

General Office ..................................................................................................................... 167

Cadre Department ............................................................................................................... 167

Organization Department .................................................................................................... 168

Propaganda Department ...................................................................................................... 168

Liaison Department ............................................................................................................. 169

Security Department ........................................................................................................... 169

Discipline Inspection Department....................................................................................... 170

Direct Work Department ..................................................................................................... 170

Military Court ..................................................................................................................... 171

Military Procuratorate ......................................................................................................... 171

Academic Institutions ............................................................................................................. 172

Important New Regulations ................................................................................................ 173

National-Level Committees/Small Groups ......................................................................... 173

Chapter Six: General Logistics Department Organizational Reforms: 2000 – 2012 ......... 174

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 174

GLD’s Role and Missions ....................................................................................................... 176

Logistics Reforms and Corresponding GLD Organizational Shifts ....................................... 176

GLD Leadership ...................................................................................................................... 182

GLD Organization .................................................................................................................. 186

Headquarters Department .................................................................................................. 187

Political Department ........................................................................................................... 192

Finance Department ........................................................................................................... 193

Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department ................................................................. 195
Health Department .............................................................................................................. 200

Military Transportation Department ................................................................................... 207

Capital Construction and Barracks Department ................................................................. 211

Audit Office ....................................................................................................................... 213

Logistics Bases ........................................................................................................................ 216

Appendix 1: GLD Organization Charts ................................................................................. 218

Chapter Seven: General Armament Department .................................................................. 221

Leadership ............................................................................................................................... 224

Zhang Youxia ..................................................................................................................... 225

Chang Wanquan .................................................................................................................. 225

Chen Bingde........................................................................................................................ 225

Li Jinai ................................................................................................................................ 226

Cao Gangchuan .................................................................................................................. 226

GAD’s Second-level Organizational Structure ....................................................................... 226

Headquarters Department ................................................................................................... 228

Science and Technology Committee .................................................................................. 228

Political Department ........................................................................................................... 231

Logistics Department .......................................................................................................... 231

Comprehensive Planning Department ................................................................................ 231

Services and Branches Equipment Department .................................................................. 232

Ground Force Armament Scientific Research and Procurement Department .................... 232

General-Use Equipment Support Department .................................................................... 234

Electronic and Information Infrastructure Department ....................................................... 234

Aerospace S&T Equipment Bureau .................................................................................... 235

The Aerospace S&T Equipment Bureau ............................................................................ 235

Technology Infrastructure Bureau ...................................................................................... 235

The Technology Infrastructure Bureau ............................................................................... 235

International Cooperation Department ............................................................................... 236

Science and Technology Department ................................................................................. 236

Directly Subordinate Organizations ........................................................................................ 237

Manned Spaceflight Organizations ..................................................................................... 237

Launch Facilities ................................................................................................................. 239

Space Control Centers ......................................................................................................... 240

Telemetry Tracking and Control Stations ........................................................................... 242

China Maritime Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Department ........................................ 245

Test Organizations .............................................................................................................. 247

Academic Institutions ......................................................................................................... 250

Research Organizations ...................................................................................................... 252

Chapter Eight: The PLA Army/Ground Forces .................................................................... 259

China’s Strategic Intentions in “Army Building” ................................................................... 260

Army Force Structure Changes ............................................................................................... 262
Current Army Force Structure ................................................................................................ 265

Military Regions – Regional Headquarters ......................................................................... 267

Local Headquarters ............................................................................................................. 271

Operational and Tactical Units ........................................................................................... 273

Group Armies...................................................................................................................... 273

Divisions ............................................................................................................................. 276

Brigades .............................................................................................................................. 277

Regiments and Groups ........................................................................................................ 279

Battalions ............................................................................................................................ 280

Main Force Units ................................................................................................................ 280

Border and Coastal Defense Units ...................................................................................... 286

Logistics Subdepartments ................................................................................................... 289

Reserve Units ...................................................................................................................... 291

Professional Military Education Organizations .................................................................. 293

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 296

National and Local Command Structures Still Focus on Mainland Defense ..................... 297

Operational and Tactical Force Structure Reflects Strategically Defensive Orientation ... 298

Smaller Forces Require Higher Readiness and Training Levels and a Positive Image ...... 300

Appendix 1: Maps of Ground Force Units, Subdepartments, and Reserves ...................... 302

Chapter Nine: The People’s Liberation Army Navy as an Evolving Organization ........... 305

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 305

PLAN Roles, Missions, and Headquarters-level Leadership .................................................. 306

PLAN Headquarters Organizational Reforms .................................................................... 311

PLAN Equipment Department Reforms ............................................................................. 311

PLAN Naval Aviation Headquarters Reforms ................................................................... 312

Leadership ........................................................................................................................... 313

PLAN Fleet and Below Organizations ................................................................................... 316

Fleet Headquarters Reforms ............................................................................................... 316

Fleet Aviation...................................................................................................................... 317

Restructuring of the PLAN’s Bases in 2004 ....................................................................... 318

Restructuring of the PLAN’s Bases in 2012 ....................................................................... 320

PLAN Garrisons...................................................................................................................... 324

Combatant and Support Zhidui and Below Organizations ..................................................... 326

PLAN Research and Academic Organizations ....................................................................... 332

PLAN, Evolving Naval Strategy, “Jointness,” and Civil-Military Integration ....................... 336

PLA Naval Strategy ............................................................................................................ 336

Joint Operations .................................................................................................................. 338

Chapter Ten: PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012 ..................................... 340

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 340

PLA Air Force Missions, Responsibilities, and Strategy ....................................................... 342
The PLAAF’s New Strategy ............................................................................................... 344

Leadership ............................................................................................................................... 344

PLAAF in Military Region Deputy Leader and Above Organizations .............................. 345

PLAAF Leadership Changes at the 18th Party Congress ................................................... 346

PLAAF Headquarters Changes ............................................................................................... 347

Administrative and Functional Departments ...................................................................... 347

PLAAF Headquarters Grade Structure ............................................................................... 348

Headquarters Department ................................................................................................... 349

Political Department ........................................................................................................... 353

Logistics Department .......................................................................................................... 355

Equipment Department ....................................................................................................... 357

Branches and Specialty Units ................................................................................................. 360

The PLAAF’s Force Restructuring ......................................................................................... 362

PLAAF C2 Reforms in 2003-2004 and 2012 ..................................................................... 363

PLAAF Creates New Bases in 2012 ................................................................................... 364

Aviation Branch ...................................................................................................................... 364

Aviation Branch Reforms ................................................................................................... 365

Shifting Commanders from the Tower to the Command Post ............................................ 366

Surface-to-Air Missile Branch ................................................................................................ 367

Surface-to-Air Missile Branch Reforms ............................................................................. 368

Antiaircraft Artillery Branch................................................................................................... 368

Antiaircraft Artillery Branch Reforms ................................................................................ 369

Radar Branch .......................................................................................................................... 369

Radar Troops ....................................................................................................................... 369

Airborne Branch...................................................................................................................... 370

Airborne Branch Reforms ................................................................................................... 371

Specialty Units ........................................................................................................................ 371

Communications Troops ..................................................................................................... 372

Electronic Countermeasures Troops ................................................................................... 372

Chemical Defense Troops ................................................................................................... 373

Technical Reconnaissance Troops ...................................................................................... 373

Equipment Research Academy ............................................................................................... 374

Academic Institution Reforms ................................................................................................ 376

Administrative and Functional Departments ...................................................................... 376

PLAAF Command College ................................................................................................. 379

Air Force Military Professional University ........................................................................ 384

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 387
Chapter Eleven: The People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) as an 

Organization .............................................................................................................................. 388

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 388

Key Findings ....................................................................................................................... 391

Organization of the Study ................................................................................................... 393

Research Sources .................................................................................................................... 393

Policy, Strategy, and Force Structure ..................................................................................... 394

Organization of Second Artillery Force .................................................................................. 398

Leadership of PLASAF ....................................................................................................... 399

Organizational Structure of PLASAF ................................................................................. 400

PLASAF Wartime Organization ......................................................................................... 431

Possible Future Developments ................................................................................................ 432

The Future of Second Artillery’s Nuclear and Conventional Missile Forces ..................... 432

Chapter Twelve: China’s People’s Armed Police Force Leadership, Command, and 

Organization in the Wake of the 2009 PAP Law ................................................................... 436

Historical Background ............................................................................................................ 436

The PAP Leadership System .................................................................................................. 438

Activation of PAP Units: Central versus Local Control ..................................................... 438

Basic Organization of the PAP Leadership Today ................................................................. 439

PAP General Headquarters (wujing zongbu) ...................................................................... 441

Command Department ........................................................................................................ 442

Political Department ........................................................................................................... 442

Logistics Department .......................................................................................................... 444

Command and Leadership in the PAP Law Debate ................................................................ 444

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 452

Chapter Thirteen: The PLA’s Wartime Structure ................................................................ 453

Evolving Concepts of Modern Warfare .................................................................................. 453

“Integrated Operations, Key Point Strikes” ........................................................................ 455

Joint Campaigns and Their Command Structure ................................................................ 456

Military Regions and War Zones ............................................................................................ 458

Evolving PLA Views of Future Wars ..................................................................................... 461

Modifying the Campaign Basic Guiding Concept .............................................................. 463

Command of Fully Integrated Joint Operations.................................................................. 467

Appendix 1: Key Leadership Terms ....................................................................................... 477
1 

Acronyms 

1LT First lieutenant 

2LT Second lieutenant 

AAA Antiaircraft artillery 

ACOGS Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff 

ADF Air Defense Force 

ADM Admiral 

AKA Also known as 

AMMS Academy of Military Medical Science 

AMS Academy of Military Science 

AOR Area of Responsibility 

ASBM Anti-ship Ballistic Missile 

ASW Antisubmarine Warfare 

ATC Air traffic control 

AVIC Aviation Industry Corporation of China 

BITTT Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telemetry Technology 

BNCC Beijing North Computing Center 

BXA Bureau of Export Administration 

C2 Command and Control 

C3I Command, control, communications, and intelligence 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

CAD Computer Aided Design 

CAEP China Academy of Engineering Physics 

CCP Chinese Communist Party 

CCTV China Central Television 

CDR Commander 

CIDEX China International Defense Electronics Exhibition 

CMC Central Military Commission 

CMSEO China Manned Space Engineering Office 

CND Computer Network Attack 

CNE Computer Network Exploitation 

CNKI China National Knowledge Infrastructure 

CNO Computer Network Operations 

COGS Chief of the General Staff 

COL Colonel 

CONUS Continental United States 

COS Chief of Staff 

COSTIND Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

CP Command Post 

CPT Captain 

DCDR Deputy Commander 

DCOGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff 

DCOS Deputy Chief of Staff 

DDIR Deputy Director 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
2 

DIR Director 

DLI Defense Language Institute 

DoD Department of Defense 

DPC Deputy Political Commissar 

EAR Export Administration Regulation 

ECCM Electronic Counter-counter Measures 

ECM Electronic countermeasures 

ELINT Electronic intelligence 

EO Electrical-optical 

ESF East Sea Fleet 

GAD General Armament Department 

GCI Ground controlled intercept 

GED General Equipment Department 

GEN General 

GLD General Logistics Department 

GPD General Political Department 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GSD General Staff Department 

HAF Headquarters Air Force (USAF) 

HF High Frequency 

HQ Headquarters 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning 

IAPCM Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 

IRBM Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile 

JCCH Joint Campaign Command Headquarters 

JLD Joint Logistics Department 

JLSD Joint Logistics Sub-department 

JSLC Jiuquan Space Launch Center 

JTC Joint Theater Command 

KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) 

LACM Land Attack Cruise Missile 

LSG Leading Small Group 

LTC Lieutenant colonel 

LTG Lieutenant general 

MAC Military Affairs Commission 

MAJ Major 

MAJCOM Major Command 

MASINT Measures and signals intelligence 

MD Military District 

MD Military District 

MG Major general 

MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 

MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle 
3 

MND Ministry of National Defense 

MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 

MOST Ministry of Science and Technology 

MR Military Region 

MRAF Military Region Air Force 

MRB Military Representative Bureau 

MRBM Medium-range Ballistic Missile 

MRD Military Representative Division 

MRO Military Representative Office 

MSD Military Subdistrict 

MUCD Military Unit Cover Designator 

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBC Nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

NCO Noncommissioned officer 

NCO Noncommissioned Officer 

NDC National Defense Council 

NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 

NDU National Defense University 

NFU No First Use 

NINT Northwest Nuclear Technology Institute 

NPC National People’s Congress 

NRC Naval Equipment Demonstration Center 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSF North Sea Fleet 

NUDT National University of Defense Technology 

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 

OR Operations Research 

PAFD People’s Armed Forces Department 

PAP People’s Armed Police 

PC Political commissar 

PKO Peacekeeping Operations 

PLA People’s Liberation Army 

PLAA People’s Liberation Army Army (Ground Forces) 

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

PLAEEI PLA Electronics Engineering Institute 

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 

PLASAF People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force 

PLAUST PLA University of Science and Technology 

PME Professional Military Education 

POL Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (e.g., fuels) 

PRC People’s Republic of China 

R&D Research and Development 
4 

RADM Rear Admiral 

RDA Research, Development, and Acquisition 

RI Research Institute 

S&T Science and Technology 

SAM Surface-to-air missiles 

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 

SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

SATCOM Satellite Communications 

SC Standing Committee 

SCOL Senior colonel 

SIGINT Signals intelligence 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

SILG State Informatization Leading Group 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SPD Strategic Planning Department 

SRBM Short-range Ballistic Missile 

SSF South Sea Fleet 

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

TEL Transporter erector launcher 

TO&E Table of Organization & Equipment 

TRB Technical Reconnaissance Bureau 

TT&C Telemetry, Tracking, and Control 

U.S. United States 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UHF Ultra High Frequency 

ULF Ultra Low Frequency 

USAF United States Air Force 

USG United States Government 

VADM Vice Admiral 

VIP Very Important Person 

VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal 

XSCC Xi’an Space Control Center 

XSLC Xi’an Space Launch Center 
5 

Foreword 

The time period since the first PLA as Organization conference was held in 2000 and the 

subsequent publication of the conference volume in 2002 has seen an explosion in the number of 

resources, especially Internet resources, with which to analyze China’s People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP). With the PLA and PAP undergoing a rapid 

modernization and changing their organizational structure to meet the demands of a new 

generation of weapons and equipment, as well as fighting and winning wars under 

informationized conditions, the ten year anniversary of the publication of the first PLA as 

Organization volume seemed an ideal time to take another look at the very important, but little 

covered topic of the PLA’s and PAP’s organizational structure. 

From June 13-14, 2012, DGI organized a conference with some of the best minds on PLA and 

PAP organization issues providing their knowledge as paper writers, discussants, and conference 

attendees. This volume presents the outcome of that conference and includes the organizational 

and personnel changes that occurred in conjunction with the 18th Party Congress in November 

2012. The group of authors who accepted the onerous task of delving into the minutia of the 

PLA’s and PAP’s organizational structure – cataloging the numerous units and their functions, 

knowing the difference between a zhidui and a dadui, and, most importantly, understanding the 

PLA’s grades and ranks structure – spent countless hours researching their respective 

organizations. Their hard work has culminated in the most complete and authoritative guide to 

the PLA as organization since the first volume was published in 2002. 

As with the first volume, this second volume is meant to be a reference guide. While some select 

few (and we know who you are) may be tempted to read this cover-to-cover, the vast majority of 

readers will gain value from this book by reading individual chapters or looking up individual 

organizations. With that intent, we hope that the book occupies a prominent place on people’s 

bookshelves as they continue their study of the PLA. 

Kevin Pollpeter 

Kenneth W. Allen 
6 

Acknowledgements 

No conference volume can be successfully published without the valuable assistance of others. 

This conference volume is no exception. Particular thanks goes to Hannah Pitts, who helped find 

the conference venue, organized conference logistics, and was at the forefront of editing and 

establishing consistency among the chapters. Additional thanks goes to Daniel Alderman, who 

also helped with conference logistics and taking copious notes as the conference’s rapporteur. 

We would also like to thank Gary Williams for his support in providing graphics support. Dr. 

James Mulvenon played an invaluable role as the guiding force and progenitor of the conference. 

Finally, we would like to thank (in Dr. Mulvenon’s words) “our wise and generous sponsor” for 

supporting this endeavor. 
7 

Author Biographies 

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst with the Defense Group, Inc. (DGI), where he 

focuses on China’s military organizational structure, personnel, education, training, and foreign 

relations. During 21 years in the U.S. Air Force (1971-1992), he served as a Chinese and Russian 

linguist and intelligence analyst with tours in Taiwan (U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché Office), 

Berlin, Japan (5th Air Force), PACAF Headquarters, China, and Washington DC (Defense 

Intelligence Agency’s Joint Military Attaché School). From 1987-1989, he served as the 

Assistant Air Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, where he received the Director of Central 

Intelligence’s Exceptional Intelligence Collector of the Year Award in 1988. He was inducted 

into the DIA’s Attaché Hall of Fame in 1997. Since 1992, he has worked in various non-profit 

and for-profit research organizations. He has a B.A. degree from the University of California at 

Davis and the University of Maryland and an M.A. degree from Boston University. 

Katherine Atha is a Research Associate at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis at 

Defense Group, Inc. She is a recent graduate with a B.A. in Biology from Oberlin College, 

where she studied Chinese and studied in Beijing, China. Her research interests include Chinese 

biological research and development. 

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), served 23 years as a Military 

Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. Mr. Blasko was an army 

attaché in Beijing from 1992-1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995-1996. He also served in 

infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Headquarters Department of the Army (Office of Special Operations), and the National 

Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. Mr. Blasko is a graduate of the United 

States Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written numerous articles 

and chapters on the Chinese military and defense industries and is the author of the book, The 

Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition 

(Routledge, 2012). 

Amy Chang is a Master in Public Policy (MPP) candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. Ms. 

Chang was formerly a Research Associate at Defense Group Inc.’s (DGI) Center for Intelligence 

Research and Analysis (CIRA). Prior to joining DGI, she was the Research Fellow in Military & 

Security Affairs at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Ms. 

Chang has published on topics such as Chinese defense policy and security strategy, Chinese 

military hardware and technology, and Asia-Pacific regional security. 

Michael S. Chase is an associate professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at 

the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He also directs the Naval War College’s 

Mahan Research Group, which focuses on strategic deterrence issues. Prior to joining the faculty 

at the Naval War College, Dr. Chase was a research analyst at the RAND Corporation and 

Defense Group Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. He holds a PhD in 

international affairs and MA in China studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of 

Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
8 

Dean Cheng is currently the Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Military Affairs at the 

Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, he was a senior analyst with the 

China Studies Division (previously, Project Asia) at CNA from 2001-2009. He specialized on 

Chinese military issues, with a focus on Chinese military doctrine and Chinese space 

capabilities. Prior to joining CNA, he was a senior analyst with Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC) from 1996-2001. From 1993-1995, he was an analyst with the 

U.S. Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment in the International Security and Space 

Division, where he studied the Chinese defense industrial complex. He has written a number of 

papers and book chapters examining various aspects of Chinese security affairs, including 

Chinese military doctrine, the military and technological implications of the Chinese space 

program, and the dual-use nature of Chinese industrial and scientific infrastructure. 

Christopher M. Clarke retired from the State Department in 2009 where, for some 25 years, he 

was a China analyst and Chief of the China Division of the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 

and Research. During that period, he wrote over 2,500 analyses for policymakers in the State 

Department, White House, and other government agencies. Chinese leadership and politicomilitary issues were among his top priorities. Before joining the State Department, Dr. Clarke 

was associate director of research at the US-China Business Council. He was a frequent 

contributor to the China Business Review and has been editor, author, or contributor to several 

journals and books, including the Joint Economic Committee of Congress’ China series. Since 

his retirement, Dr. Clarke has been an independent consultant in which capacity he has written a 

number of articles and given talks at the Foreign Service Institute, the State Department, CNA, 

the Naval War College, and other venues. Dr. Clarke holds a B.A. in International Relations 

from Fairleigh Dickinson University (1971) and an M.A. (1979) and Ph.D. (1980) in political 

science, with a focus on contemporary China, from The Ohio State University. He served four 

years (1971-1975) in the U.S. Air Force. 

John F. Corbett, Jr., an Analytic Director with CENTRA Technology, Inc. since 2001, 

specializes in China, Taiwan, and Asian military and security issues. He retired as a Colonel 

after a career in the U.S. Army as a Military Intelligence/China Foreign Area Officer 

(FAO). His last Army position was as Senior Country Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. During his military 

career, he served in a variety of operational, intelligence, and policy positions in the 82d 

Airborne Division, U.S. Army Pacific, and Defense Intelligence Agency. He also served as an 

Army Attaché in Beijing from 1986-1988 and in Hong Kong from 1992-1998. He is a graduate 

of the United States Military Academy, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the U.S. Army War 

College, and has Masters degrees in International Relations and in Asian Studies from the 

University of Hawaii. He has published articles in The China Quarterly and The China Strategic 

Review and has contributed chapters on the Chinese military to a series of books published by the 

U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. 

Ian M. Easton is a China analyst at the CNA Corporation’s Center for Naval Analyses, a 

federally funded research and development center. Before joining CNA, he was a research fellow 

at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducted research on Chinese military space and missile 

programs. He also previously worked as a research analyst for the Defense News Asia bureau 

chief, a consultant for a Taiwan-based software company, and a translator for the Foundation on 
9 

Asia-Pacific Peace Studies. Mr. Easton lived and studied in both Taiwan and China. He holds an 

M.A. in China studies from National Chengchi University in Taipei, and a B.A. in international 

studies from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He received his formal Mandarin 

language training at National Taiwan Normal University’s Mandarin Training Center in Taipei, 

and Fudan University in Shanghai. 

Lonnie Henley is the Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst for China at Defense Intelligence 

Agency and a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Level executive service. He has been a 

China specialist since his undergraduate studies in the mid-1970s, including 22 years as a U.S. 

Army military intelligence and foreign area officer and twelve years so far out of uniform. His 

post-Army positions include Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia; Senior Defense 

Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning; senior analyst at CENTRA Technology, Inc.; Deputy 

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia (ODNI Senior National Intelligence Service); and his 

current position since 2008. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering and Chinese from the 

U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and master’s degrees in Chinese language from Oxford 

University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar; in modern Chinese history from Columbia 

University; and in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College. 

Roy Kamphausen is a Senior Associate for Political and Security Affairs at The National 

Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and an adjunct associate professor in Columbia University’s 

School of International and Public Affairs. Mr. Kamphausen previously served as Senior Vice 

President for Political and Security Affairs and Director of NBR’s Washington, D.C., office. 

Prior to joining NBR, Mr. Kamphausen served as a U.S. Army officer—a career that culminated 

in an assignment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Country Director for ChinaTaiwan-Mongolia Affairs and included prior postings as an analyst and China policy chief for 

three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, as well as two tours at the Defense Attaché Office of the U.S. 

Embassy in China. Mr. Kamphausen has authored numerous works on China’s People’s 

Liberation Army and co-edited the six most recent volumes on the PLA produced from the PLA 

Conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He holds a BA in Political Science from Wheaton College 

and an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University and has studied Chinese at both 

the Defense Language Institute and Beijing’s Capital Normal University. 

Nan Li is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department of the U.S. Naval War 

College and a member of its China Maritime Studies Institute. He has published extensively on 

Chinese security and military policy. His writings have appeared in China Quarterly, Security 

Studies, China Journal, Asian Security, Armed Forces & Society, Issues and Studies, U.S. Naval 

War College Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and many others. He has contributed to 

edited volumes from RAND Corporation, NDU Press, Clarendon Press, M.E. Sharpe, U.S. Army 

War College, National Bureau of Asian Research, and Naval Institute Press. He has also 

published a monograph with the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is the editor of Chinese CivilMilitary Relations (Routledge, 2006). His most recent publications include Chinese CivilMilitary Relations in the Post-Deng Era: Implications for Crisis Management and Naval 

Modernization (China Maritime Studies Series No. 4, U.S. Naval War College Press, 2010) and 

China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership 

(U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2010, coeditor). Nan Li received a Ph.D. in political science from 

Johns Hopkins University. 
10 

Alice Lyman Miller is a member of that most admired of professional communities, a MingQing historian. She teaches at Stanford University and at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 

Monterey, California. She is also a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and general editor 

of Hoover’s China Leadership Monitor. She is the author of Science and Dissent in Post-Mao 

China: The Politics of Knowledge (University of Washington Press, 1996), and, with Richard 

Wich, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War 

II (Stanford University Press, 2011), as well as a lot of other tediously pedantic and mindnumbingly boring stuff. 

Kevin Pollpeter is the Deputy Director of the East Asia Program at Defense Group Inc (DGI) 

where he manages a group of more than 20 China analysts. Before DGI, he was a researcher at 

Rand. He is widely published on China national security issues, with a focus on China’s space 

program. His most recent publications include, “The PLAAF and the Integration of Air and 

Space Power,” in Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders, The Chinese Air 

Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (NDU, 2012) and “Controlling the 

Information Domain: Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis 

Tanner, Strategic Asia 2012-2013: China’s Military Challenge (NBR: 2012). His other 

publications include ”Upward and Onward: Technological Innovation and Organizational 

Change in China’s Space Industry” in the Journal of Strategic Studies (June 2011) , “China’s 

Space Doctrine” in Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power 

(Naval Institute Press, 2011), ”Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and 

Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew 

Scobell, The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s 

Military, Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth Fiveyear Plan and the U.S. Response (Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), as well as numerous articles 

in China Brief. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies. 

Leigh Ann Ragland is a Research Associate at Defense Group Inc. She received her B.A. in 

International Affairs and Chinese Language and Literature from George Washington 

University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and a certificate in advanced Chinese studies 

from Peking University. Leigh Ann has 10 years of Chinese linguistic experience and an 

extensive background in S&T research. Her current research interests include Chinese S&T 

policy, defense electronics and information technology, and civil-military integration. 

Erin Richter analyzes China’s military logistics system and associated military-civilian 

interdependencies at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Before joining DoD in 2004, she 

served as a logistics officer in the United States Marine Corps, completing assignments in Japan, 

the Balkans, the Middle East, and within the continental United States. She is a graduate of the 

Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School and Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

She holds a M.A. in International Affairs from American University and a B.A. in Anthropology 

from the University of Maryland, College Park. 

Mark Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. A 20-year U.S. Air Force 

veteran, Mark served as assistant air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic 
11 

of China (PRC). Between 1997 and 2004, he was a policy director for the PRC, Taiwan and 

Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After retirement from military service, Mark 

was executive vice president of Laifu Trading Company, then Taiwan country manager for 

Raytheon International. He was concurrently a member of the Board of Governors of the 

American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. He joined Project 2049 in Arlington, Virginia at 

its inception in January 2008. Mark holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University, and graduate 

degrees in International Relations and Asian Studies from Boston University and the Naval 

Postgraduate School. A graduate of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, he 

has working proficiency in Chinese Mandarin. 

Murray Scot Tanner (Scot) is a Senior Research Scientist in the China Strategic Issues Group. 

Dr. Tanner has written and published widely on Chinese and East Asian politics and security 

issues, including internal security, social unrest, policing, and political reform in China, as well 

as China’s emerging national security interests and policy-making institutions, Chinese military 

doctrine, and China’s security relations with India, Russia, North Korea, and Taiwan. He is the 

author of many books, monographs, and articles, including Distracted Antagonists, Wary 

Partners: China and India Assess their Security Relations; Chinese Economic Coercion Against 

Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use; and The Politics of Lawmaking in China. He is also co-author 

of A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute

and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department Of 

Defense. His articles and book chapters appeared in multiple books and journals, including The 

Washington Quarterly, Comparative Politics, and The China Quarterly. Before joining CNA in 

2008, Dr. Tanner served as Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University, as 

Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, and as the Co-Chairman’s Senior Staff 

Member for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Dr. Tanner received his B.A. 

and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. 

Daniel Yoon is a Research Associate at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis at 

Defense Group, Inc. He is a graduate of Tufts University and formerly a visiting student at the 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
12 

Chapter One: Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012 

Kenneth W. Allen 

The active components of the PLA can be categorized into the general 

headquarters/departments, the services and arms, and the military area 

commands. The PLA’s general headquarters/departments system is composed of 

the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, the General 

Logistics Department, and the General Armaments Department, which are placed 

under the leadership of the CMC. The CMC, through these four general 

headquarters/departments, directs and commands all the military area commands 

and the services and arms. The routine work of the Ministry of National Defense 

is handled, respectively, by these four general headquarters/departments. 

 

The PLA is composed of three services - the Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN) and Air 

Force (PLAAF) - and an independent arm, the Second Artillery Force (PLASAF). 

The Army has such arms as the infantry, artillery, armor, engineering, 

communications, anti-chemical warfare and Army aviation, as well as other 

specialized units. The Navy has such arms as the surface, submarine, naval 

aviation, coastal defense and Marine Corps, as well as other specialized units. 

The Air Force has such arms as the aviation, surface-to-air missile and 

antiaircraft artillery, radar, and airborne, as well as other specialized units. The 

Second Artillery Force is composed of the strategic missile, conventional missile, 

and other specialized units. 

The military area commands (theaters of war) of the PLA are military 

organizations set up according to the state’s administrative divisions, 

geographical locations, strategic and operational orientations, and operational 

tasks. Under each military area command are a number of Army combined corps, 

units of various arms, logistical support units, and provincial or garrison 

commands. At present, the PLA has seven military area commands, namely, 

Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. 

PRC Ministry of National Defense Website1

Introduction 

The information noted in the Ministry of National Defense’s website above provides the essence 

of how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA/䀓᭮ߋ (is organized. The information not only 

identifies the organizations, but it also provides their protocol order within the hierarchy. Of 

particular note, however, is that the PLA uses different English translations than the U.S. 

government (USG) for some of these organizations, such as military area command instead of 

military region. Even the USG, however, is not consistent in its translations. To help alleviate 

this issue, Appendix A provides a list of key Chinese terminology used in this book along with 

 

11 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/index.htm. 
13 

the various ways they are translated and their meaning. In addition, a list of acronyms is located 

at the beginning of the book. 

The purpose of this chapter is to update the Introductory Chapter of The People’s Liberation 

Army as Organization, which was written in 2000 and published in 2002. That chapter provided 

a good foundation for examining the historical background of the PLA’s organizational structure. 

This chapter does not review the history prior to 2000, but does point out some errors from the 

2000 Introductory Chapter based on new information. The primary sources of information for 

this chapter are shown below: 

x China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition)2 (2006)

x China’s National Defense3 (1998 – 2010)

x PRC Ministry of National Defense Website4 (since 2009)

x Contemporary Military Organizational Reform Research5 (2007)

x The Internet

The chapter is organized into the following 11 sections and three appendices: 

x Section 1: The Foundation Organizations 

x Section 2: Officer 15-Grade Structure 

x Section 3: PLA Cadre 

x Section 4: Noncommissioned Officer Grade and Rank Structure 

x Section 5: Protocol Order 

x Section 6: Military Unit Cover Designators 

x Section 7: Force Reductions 

x Section 8: Administrative and Functional Departments 

x Section 9: Security Committees 

x Section 10: Political Work System 

x Section 11: Academic Institutions 

x Appendix A: Key Terminology and Concepts 

x Appendix B: PLA and PAP Grade and Rank Structure 

x Appendix C: PLA Academic Institutions, Ministry of Education Codes, and assigned 

grades 

Why is Understanding the PLA’s Structure Important? 

Why is it important to understand all of the material in this chapter? The simple answer is that it 

provides the basis for understanding all of the information in the remaining chapters about the 

PLA’s organizational structure. Equally important, it provides the information necessary to 

 

2 China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition) (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖᅮҼ⡸), Beijing: Encyclopedia of China 

Publishing House, 2006-2007. 

3 China’s National Defense (ѝഭⲴഭ䱢) has been published biennially from 1998 through 2010 by the PRC State 

Council’s Information Office. This publication is usually referred to as the defense white paper (ⲭⳞҖ). 4

 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/index.htm. This website was officially opened in August 2009. 5

 Hu Guangzheng, ed. Contemporary Military Organizational Reform Research (ᖃԓߋһփࡦਈ䶙⹄ウ), Beijing: 

Military Science Publishing House, October 2007. 
14 

determine what an officer’s rank, grade, organization, and possible career track (technical or 

non-technical) is by merely looking at his uniform. Furthermore, understanding the grade system 

provides the foundation for understanding the PLA’s command and control (vertical) and 

coordination (horizontal) structure. One of the biggest challenges is how best to translate PLA 

terminology so that non-Chinese linguists can best understand it in terms of the U.S. military 

system. In some cases, however, just because a Chinese term translates into an English term does 

not mean that they have the same meaning. For example, a PLAAF squadron consists of two to 

four aircraft, while a U.S. Air Force squadron consists of 15 to 24 aircraft, and a PLA ground 

force brigade is not the same size nor is it organized the same way as a U.S. Army brigade. 

The Foundation Organizations 

The first step in examining the PLA is to understand the top echelons that build the foundation 

for the PLA’s organizational structure. According to Contemporary Military Organizational 

Reform Research, the Central Military Commission (CMC/ѝཞߋင) is responsible for leading 

(亶ሬ) and providing unified command (㔏аᤷᥕ) for China’s Armed Forces, as well as 

determining military strategy and the operational guidelines (֌ᡈᯩ䪸).6 The Four General 

Departments—General Staff Department (GSD/ᙫ৲Ḁ䜘), General Political Department (GPD/

ᙫ᭯⋫䜘), General Logistics Department (GLD/ᙫਾऔ䜘), and General Armament Department 

(GAD/ᙫ㻵༷䜘)—serve as the administrative and functional departments (χޣ/䜘䰘) for the 

CMC and as the Army/Ground Force Headquarters (䱶ߋ亶ሬχޣ(. The PLA has seven 

Military Region HQ (MR/ߋ४), what the PLA calls Military Area Commands, each of which is 

responsible for directly leading all subordinate units in its area of responsibility (AOR).7 With 

only a couple of exceptions, the MRs are based on peacetime, provincial boundaries. Each 

province and autonomous region is identified as a military district (MD/ⴱߋ४), which are 

further divided into military subdistricts (MSDs/࠶ߋ४).8 

The PLA has systematically reduced the number of its MRs from 13 to 11 to 7, and has been in 

the process of morphing ( ࡍ↕ᡀර ) them to theaters ( ᡈ ४ ) since the early 2000s. 9

Unfortunately, no explanation has been given to what morphing means; however, the implication 

is that, even though they still have the same provincial boundaries, more training and exercises 

 

6

 According to the 2002 China’s National Defense, China’s Armed Forces (↖㻵࣋䟿) consists of three components: 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA/ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ(, which is composed of active duty Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Second Artillery personnel; the People’s Armed Police (PAP/Ӫ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏); and the Reserves (亴༷ᖩ䜘

䱏) and Militia (≁ޥ(. 7 Contemporary Military Organizational Reform Research, p. 95-97. 8

 One of the few exceptions to the rule of MR’s being composed of provinces is the Lanzhou MR, which also 

incorporates a small portion of Tibet, which, in turn, is part of the Chengdu MR. Although military districts are 

identified generically as a shengjunqu (ⴱߋ४), such as the Henan Military District (⋣ইⴱߋ४), not every MD 

has the character sheng (ⴱ) in the name. Specifically, autonomous regions, such as the Xinjiang Autonomous 

Region, is identified as the Xinjiang junqu (ᯠ⮶ߋ४), which is sometimes mistranslated as the Xinjiang Military 

Region. 

9

 Liu Wei, ed., Introduction to War Zone Joint Campaign Command (ᡈ४㚄ਸᡈᖩᤷᥕᾲ䇪), Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, September 2003, p. 6-7. This book provides time frames or specific years for the 

transition from field armies to 6 MRs (1947-195), to 12 MRs (1955-1956), to 3 MRs (1956-1967), to 11 MRs (1967-

1985), and to 7 MRs (1985), but did not give any specific date for when they began or would complete changing 

into theater commands. 
15 

are occurring across MR borders and between headquarters in each MR/theater. Furthermore, 

during exercises, each MR is referred to as a theater. The stated goal is to have a command and 

control structure that is combined during peacetime and wartime (ᒣᡈ㔃ਸ).10

Since around 2000, certain PLA books, as well as China’s National Defense and the Ministry of 

National Defense website, have identified each of the existing seven MRs as theaters in English, 

such as the Beijing Theater (ेӜߋ४).11 Although some media reports have indicated that the 

PLA will merge some of the MRs and permanently call them theaters (ᡈ४) or strategic areas 

(ᡈ⮕४), this has not yet happened.12

While Army personnel dominate the CMC, general departments, and military regions, the PLA 

also has the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF. Below PLAN Headquarters are the three fleets 

(North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet), and below PLAAF Headquarters are 

seven Military Region Air Forces (MRAF), which equate to the boundaries and protocol order of 

the seven MRs. 

The headquarters for each of the seven MRs, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF, as well as their 

subordinate organizations down to the regiment level, have relevant administrative and 

functional departments that mirror the four General Departments. Figure 1 shows a comparison 

of the leadership and departments for the CMC and subordinate General Departments with the 

services, branches, and unit levels. 

Figure 1: PLA Leadership and Department Comparison 

 

10 Liao Xilong, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform,” PLA Daily Online, 16 

December 2008. 

11 China Theater Geography and Logistics Support, Beijing: PLA Press, March 2001, sponsored by the General 

Logistics Departments’ Headquarters Department. 

12 Kang Juan, “Military Reshuffle Not Likely,” Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao) in English, 31 July 2009. Li Ping, 

“Talk about Reforming the Military Organizational Structure” (䈸䈸ߋ䱏㕆ࡦփࡦ᭩䶙), Chinese Academy of 

Social Science, 7 March 2012. See www.cssn.cn/news/463675.htm. 
16 

Officer 15-grade Structure 

As a starting point, it is important to understand that officer (cadre) grades, not ranks, are the key 

to understanding the PLA’s organizational structure.13 The primary reason for this is that the 

grade structure, which is assigned not only to individuals and billets but also to every 

organization and vessel, defines the PLA’s command and control (vertical) and coordination 

(horizontal) structure. For example, an MR can command a PLAN fleet and PLAAF MRAF, but 

the fleet and MRAF, which are the same grade can coordinate with each other, but neither one 

can command the other. This section provides some background on the rank and grade system 

and discusses anomalies within the system, as well as various aspects of the link between grades 

and ranks. 

Background 

Unlike the U.S. military’s officer corps, which has ten ranks and ten grades that are synonymous 

with each other (e.g., an Air Force and Army captain are O-3s and a Navy commander and Army 

lieutenant colonel are O-5s), since 1988, the PLA has had 10 officer ranks and 15 grades that do 

not have a 1 to 1 relationship. In addition, unlike the U.S. military, the PLA assigns grades not 

only to officers and billets, but also to every PLA organization, including naval vessels 

commanded by officers but not noncommissioned officer (NCOs). This system, which all PLA 

services and branches use, is based on ground force terminology. 

The PLA’s grade system parallels the civilian government cadre system of grades. It is thus used 

by military and civilians alike, so that PLA officers and their government counterparts are aware 

of each other’s place in the bureaucracy and allows organizations at the same level to coordinate 

with each other. It also allows officers to transfer to comparable-grade civilian positions (䖜ъ) 

if they leave the military before their mandatory retirement age. 

There are four key differences between the U.S. military and the PLA in terms of their use of 

rank and grade: 

x First and most importantly, in the PLA, rank is not as important as grade. Rank insignia 

are used primarily as a visual cue to rapidly determine where one’s approximate status is 

within a group and for interacting with foreign militaries. 

x Second, in the PLA, billets are assigned based on one’s grade, not rank. 

x Third, promotion in grade, not rank, is what determines how one moves up the career 

ladder. For example, moving from senior colonel to major general while remaining in the 

same grade is not as important as moving from one grade to the next, even if you retain 

the same rank.14 

x Finally, every PLA organization, not just officers and billets, is assigned a grade. 

Therefore, it is the grade system that defines the vertical command and control (C2) and 

horizontal coordination relationship among organizations. 

 

13 This information was taken from People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010, Dayton, OH: National Air and Space 

Intelligence Agency (NASIC), August 1, 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). Hereafter identified as PLAAF 

2010. 14 In the PLA, base pay is divided into time in service, which includes time as a cadet, time-in-grade, and time-inrank. 
17 

Anomalies 

The PLA has only a few anomalies shown below where the grade for senior officers and their 

organizations are not in synch: 

x Although the GLD and GAD are CMC Member-grade organizations and their directors 

are CMC Member-grade officers, their political commissars hold the grade of MR leader 

x Although the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF are MR leader-grade organizations and their 

commanders became CMC Member-grade officers starting in 2004, their political 

commissars, who serve as the Party Committee secretary, are MR leader-grade officers 

x In 2008, Li Andong (ᵾᆹь), who was at the time one of the GAD’s deputy directors, 

became a concurrent chairman of the GAD’s Science and Technology (S&T) Committee 

(ᙫ㻵༷䜘、ᢰငઈՊ). In July 2010, Li received his third star. Although GAD’s deputy 

directors are assigned the grade of MR deputy leader, only MR leader- and CMC 

member-grade officers can have the rank of general. As a result, it appears that the grade 

of the S&T Commission was elevated and Li was given the grade of MR leader as the 

commission chair, even though he is still only a GAD deputy director. 

Understanding the Rank-Grade Link 

The importance of understanding the link between rank and grade promotions is manifested 

when analyzing who the PLA’s senior leaders will be. According to Retired Army Colonel John 

Corbett, the July 2010 group of promotions to three-stars demonstrates the path to full 

general/admiral, which combines rank and grade promotions consisting of three observable 

steps:15

x Step One: Lieutenant generals (LTGs) in a Military Region (MR) deputy leader-grade 

move laterally to a second position in the same grade 

x Step Two: After three or so years, they receive a grade promotion to an MR leader-grade 

position 

x Step Three: After three years or so as a LTG in an MR leader-grade position, they receive 

a rank promotion to full general [Note: Since the rank-to-grade adjustment in 1994, all 

MR leader-grade officers in the PLA have received their third star.] 

Officer Rank Categories 

Figure 2 shows the 10 PLA officer ranks and their distribution within the flag-rank, field-grade, 

and company-grade categories. Although the rank for PLA Navy (PLAN) officers is usually 

translated using U.S. military terminology, such as admiral or commander, the actual PLA 

terminology is Navy general (⎧ߋкሶ) and Navy lieutenant colonel (⎧ߋѝṑ), respectively. 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) merely adds Air Force in front of the rank, such as Air Force 

colonel (オߋкṑ). 

 

15 Kenneth Allen, “Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks,” China 

Brief, July 22, 2010 Vol 10 Issue 15 (Part 1) and August 5, 2010 Vol 10 Issue 16 (Part 2)). 
18 

Figure 2: PLA Officer Ranks and Categories 

Officer 15-grade System 

Since 1988, all PLA and PAP officers and organizations have been assigned one of 15 grades. 

Table 1 shows the current grade and rank system as it applies to the PLA. This book uses the 

word “leader” rather than “commander” because, in the PLA, the commander and political 

officer are co-equals and have the same grade.16 Note that each grade from Military Region (MR) 

leader down to platoon has a primary and secondary rank (а㙼є㺄).17 The ranks in the left 

column are the most common. The reason why each grade has two possible ranks is because rank 

and grade promotions rarely occur at the same time. Specifically, company and field grade 

officers receive their next higher rank about every three years and receive a promotion in grade 

every four years. In addition, only the uniformed, not civilian, Central Military Commission 

(CMC) vice chairmen are assigned grades. 

 

16 Some USG organizations use “principal” rather than “leader”. The acronyms equivalent to the U.S. Army come 

from www.defense.gov/about/insignias/officer.aspx, which also has the acronyms for equivalent U.S. Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine ranks. 

17 From 1988 to 1994, each grade had three assigned ranks (а㙼й㺄). 
19 

Table 1: Officer Grades and Assigned Ranks 

Grade Primary 

Rank

Secondary 

Rank

CMC Chairman (ߋငѫᑝ) 

Vice Chairmen (ߋင࢟ѫᑝ)* 

None 

General 

CMC Member (ߋငငઈ) General 

MR Leader (↓བྷߋ४㙼) GEN/ADM LTG/VADM 

MR Deputy Leader (࢟བྷߋ४㙼) LTG/VADM MG/RADM 

Corps Leader (↓ߋ㙼) MG/RADM LTG/VADM 

Corps Deputy Leader (ߋ࢟㙼) MG/RADM SCOL/SCPT 

Division Leader (↓ᐸ㙼) SCOL/SCPT MG/RADM 

Division Deputy Leader (࢟ᐸ㙼) COL/CPT SCOL/SCPT 

Regiment Leader (↓ഒ㙼) COL/CPT LTC/CDR 

Regiment Deputy Leader (࢟ഒ㙼) LTC/CDR MAJ/LCDR 

Battalion Leader (↓㩕㙼) MAJ/LCDR LTC/LCDR 

Battalion Deputy Leader (࢟㩕㙼) CPT/LT MAJ/LCDR 

Company Leader (↓䘎㙼) CPT/LT 1LT/LTJG 

Company Deputy Leader (࢟䘎㙼) 1LT/LTJG CPT/LT 

Platoon (ᧂ㙼) 2 LT/ENS 1LT/ENS 

 *Note: the chairman and civilian vice chairman are not assigned ranks. 

As noted in Table 1, each grade has an assigned name, such as “division leader.” The PLA does 

not assign numbers to each grade. Therefore, while it is not correct to call someone a grade-3 

(e.g., a Military Region leader) officer or organization, the USG often assigns numbers to each 

grade for simplicity sake. In addition, PLA officers are rarely referred to by their rank verbally or 

in the media. They are usually addressed or identified by their position, such as Deputy 

Commander Zhang or Operations Division Director Wang. However, when PLA delegations 

travel abroad or meet foreign military visitors to China, the Chinese media refer to their rank and 

sometimes to their position, but, because most foreigners do not understand the PLA’s grade 

structure, the media rarely identifies them by their grade. 

Since 2007, PLA officers have worn ribbons that indicate what their grade is based on the 

number of rows (1 to 7), number of stars (1 is for a deputy leader and 2 is for a leader) in the 

center ribbon at the top, and the color of the ribbon with the star(s). Of note, although the CMC 

vice chairmen and CMC members have separate grades, they both have a single star. No one in 

the CMC has two stars. Figure 3 shows the ribbons for a corps leader-grade officer (5 rows an 2 
20 

stars), and Table 2 shows the grade, ribbon color, number of stars (1 or 2) for each grade, and the 

number of rows of ribbons per grade. 

Figure 3: PLA Officer Ribbons (Corps Leader Grade) 

Table 2: PLA Officer Ribbons 

Appendix B provides five tables showing the grade for the following types of organizations 

along with the ranks for the officers holding those billets: 

x Four General Departments 

x MR, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF Headquarters 

x Corps leader-grade headquarters 

x Division leader-grade headquarters 
21 

x Division deputy leader-grade headquarters, which is the grade assigned to brigades.18

Officer Grade-to-Rank Relationship 

While each grade has two ranks, each rank can have from one to four grades associated with it. 

As illustrated in Table 3, a major general can be assigned to a billet in one of four grades: 

military region deputy leader, corps leader, corps deputy leader, or division leader. As a result, 

one should not focus on the rank when discussing one’s importance within the chain of 

command. In particular, PLA units have multiple deputy commanders and they have the same 

grade as the Chief of Staff (e.g. director of the Headquarters Department). As a result, a Chief of 

Staff can move directly to becoming the commander. For example, the current director of the 

General Armament Department (GAD), General Chang Wanquan, previously served as the 

Lanzhou MR Chief of Staff and the Beijing MR Chief of Staff before becoming the Shenyang 

MR commander. He did not serve as an MR deputy commander. 

 

 

18 It is important to note that, in the PLA, no brigades are subordinate to a division and no brigades have subordinate 

regiments. One way to think about this is that a brigade is either a downsized division or an upsized regiment. 

Historically, brigades have been formed by expanding the size of a regiment or combining two regiments or by 

downsizing a division. 
22 

Table 3: PLA Ranks and Grade Relationship 

Ranks/Grades GEN LTG MG SCOL COL LTC MAJ CAPT 1LT 2LT

CMC Vice 

Chairman

 

CMC Member

MR Leader 

MR Deputy

Corps Leader

Corps Deputy 

Division Leader 

Division Deputy/

Brigade Leader

 

Regiment Leader/

Brigade Deputy

 

Regiment Deputy 

Battalion Leader 

Battalion Deputy 

Company Leader 

Company Deputy 

Platoon 

Grades per Rank 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 1

PLA Cadre 

For outsiders, the PLA’s cadre system is complicated. 19 Historically, the PLA (and its 

predecessor the Red Army until 1948) has had two types of personnel. The first consists of cadre 

(ᒢ䜘), which is synonymous with officer (ߋᇈ), and the second consists of soldiers (༛ޥ/ᡈ

༛), which is synonymous with enlisted personnel who, over the decades, have either been 

 

19 Dennis Blasko helped write this section. 
23 

volunteers (ᘇᝯޥ (or conscripts (ѹޥ࣑(.20 In addition, prior to 1949, cadre were divided into 

the two career tracks of military officers and political officers. The current five career tracks are 

discussed later. 

In 1988, the PLA implemented a civilian cadre (᮷㙼ᒢ䜘) system to complement the 15-grade 

active duty officer (cadre) system. Like active duty military personnel, civilian cadre wear 

military uniforms; however, they wear but different rank insignia on their shoulders than officers 

and have their own grade system. 

This section explains the grade and rank relationship between the active duty cadre and civilian 

cadre systems.21 See Appendix A for information on the different terms for grades. 

Officer Career Tracks22

The PLA has five officer career tracks for what it calls active duty officers (⧠ᖩߋᇈ) as shown 

below. The PLA often combines the first four career tracks together to differentiate them from 

special technical officers (уъᢰδߋᇈ), but there is no official name for all the officers in 

the first four career tracks.23

x Military (operational) officers ( ߋһߋᇈ ) serve as a unit commander or deputy 

commander down to the platoon level, as well as in staff officer billets in the General 

Staff Department and a lower echelon Headquarters Department down to the regiment 

level24

x Political officers (᭯⋫ߋᇈ) serve as the director or deputy director, as well as in staff 

officer billets in the General Political Department and a lower echelon Political 

Department/Division, as well as political officer billets in the battalion and company 

levels 

x Logistics officers (ਾऔߋᇈ) serve as the director or deputy director, as well as in staff 

officer billets in the General Logistics Department and in staff officer billets in a lower 

echelon Joint Logistics Department and/or Logistics Department/Division, as well 

logistics billets down to the platoon level. The staff officer billets include finance, 

 

20 In the PLA, the General Staff Department’s Military Affairs Department (࣑ߋ䜘) serves as the enlist force 

personnel center, and the General Political Department’s Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘) serves as the officer personnel 

center. Of note, the PLA’s term for sailor (≤ޥ (refers to enlisted PLAN personnel only and, unlike the U.S. Navy, 

does not refer to officers. Furthermore, the PLA/PLAAF does not have a term for airman. PLAAF, as well as PLAN, 

enlisted personnel are referred to as soldiers. 

21 “System of Cadre Grades,” in China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), December 2006, Military Cadre 

Work (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌) Vol 39, p. 48-50. People’s Liberation Army Air Force Officer’s Handbook (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ

オߋߋᇈ᡻޼(, Beijing: Blue Sky Press, November 2006. 22 Information on these career tracks and terminology were accessed at http://qiming0130.blog.163. 

com/blog/static/7975228120119279109428/ on 5 March 2012. See also “System of Cadre Grades,” in China 

Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), December 2006, Military Cadre Work, Vol 39, p. 48-50. 23 Some PLA dictionaries and encyclopedias combine military, political, logistics, and equipment officers as nonspecial technical officers (䶎уъᢰδߋᇈ). 24 When someone is referred to as a “military officer”, this means that he is in the military (operational) career track, 

not that he is a generic military officer. 
24 

supplies, materials, fuels, transportation, health, and barracks.25

x Equipment officers (㻵༷ߋᇈ) serve as the director or deputy director, as well as in staff 

officer billets in the General Armament Department and a lower echelon Equipment 

Department/Division, as well equipment billets down to the platoon level. The staff 

officer billets include equipment development, support, and management.26

x Special Technical officers (уъᢰδߋᇈ) can serve in technical billets in any of the 

four departments, but tend to be concentrated in equipment- and R&D-related 

organizations. Their specialties are divided into 16 sets (パーセントࡇ (with 52 categories. The 16 

specialty sets include education, scientific research, engineering technology, health 

technology, economics and accounting, the arts, sports education, news, publishing, and 

broadcast, interpreting, and agricultural technology. Most sets have multiple categories 

within them.27 Depending on their particular job, some officers move back and forth 

between being a special technical officer and an equipment and/or logistics officer. 

Civilian Cadre Grades 

Civilian cadre are found in a wide variety of jobs in research, engineering, medical, education, 

publishing, archives, cultural, and sports units.28 The PLA’s civilian cadre can be categorized as 

special technical civilian cadre (уъᢰδ᮷㙼ᒢ䜘) and non-special technical civilian cadre (䶎

уъᢰδ᮷㙼ᒢ䜘). They are assigned one of 10 grades (㓗), including special grade (⢩㓗) 

followed by grade 1 (1 㓗) at the top and grade 9 (9 㓗) at the bottom. For pay purposes, these 

grades are equivalent to the 10 officer ranks, with special grade equating to a full general, grade 

1 to a lieutenant general, and so on down to grade 9, which equates to a second lieutenant. The 

special technical posts (уъᢰδ㙼࣑ (for special technical civilian cadre (уъᢰδ᮷㙼ᒢ䜘) 

are organized into three levels (㓗): senior (儈㓗), intermediate (ѝ㓗), and basic (ࡍ㓗). These 

three levels for special technical grades (ᄬ㓗) are further divided into 14 grades, which range 

from grade 1 (1 㓗) at the highest to grade 14 (14 㓗) at the bottom. These grades are equivalent 

to officer grades, with special technical grade 1 being equivalent to CMC member, special 

technical grade 2 equivalent to MR leader, and so on down to special technical grade 14 

equivalent to platoon grade. 

Rank Epaulets 

Civilian cadre wear shoulder epaulets with one of two rank insignia shown in Figure 4. 

Compared to the insignia shown in Figure 5 that have 5-pointed stars, the rank insignia for 

civilian cadre have a six-pointed flower bud with a wreath or scroll at the shoulder edge shown 

 

25 PLA Military Terminology (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋ䈝), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September 1997, 

p. 340. This version does not have any English translations for the terms. In December 2011, the PLA published an 

updated version with English translations for each term. Both publications are “For Internal Distribution Only” (޵

䜘ਁ㹼) and are simply identified as the Junyu (ߋ䈝). 26 Ibid. 

27 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London and New 

York: Routledge, 2006, p. 63-64. 

28 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London and New 

York: Routledge, 2006, p. 63-64. 
25 

in Figure 6. The epaulet on the left with the wreath is for senior grade (儈㓗) civilian cadre, and 

the epaulet on the right with the scroll is for intermediate and junior civilian cadre.29 

Figure 4: Civilian Cadre Rank Insignia 

Collar Insignia 

In addition to their shoulder rank insignia, officers, civilian cadre, and enlisted personnel wear 

insignia on their collars. In 2007, the PLA issued new uniforms with new collar insignia, which 

are divided into the following types:30

x Pine branch (ɲ᷍ਦ亶㣡) 

x Olive branch (4ᾴਦ亶㣡) 

x 5-pointed star (ӄᱏ/ӄ䀂ᱏ) 

x 6-pointed atom (৏ᆀᅨਧ) 

Officers in non-special technical billets and all enlisted personnel wear a combination of a pine 

branch or olive branch and a 5-pointed star. Special technical officers and special technical 

civilian cadre wear a combination of a pine branch or olive branch and a 5-pointed star or a 6-

pointed atom. The different combinations are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 

Figure 5: Insignia for Military, Political, Logistics, and Equipment Officers 

Figure 6: Special Technical Officer or Civilian Cadre 

For the most part, officers in the military, political, logistics, and equipment career tracks wear 

the star collar insignia, while technical officers and civilian cadre wear the atom. As a general 

 

29 Ibid, p. 77-78. 

30 Xu Ping, and Yang Tingxin, eds., History of Military Uniforms (ߋȢਢ䈍), Beijing, Liberation Army Press, 

September 2009, p. 238. 
26 

rule, however, some, but not all, technical officers and civilian cadre who serve in a leadership 

billet, such as an office director or deputy director, wear a star. 

Unit Patches 

All uniformed military personnel, including officers, civilian cadre, and enlisted personnel wear 

a unit patch (㟲ㄐ) on their left arm that identifies their organization. For example, Figure 7 

shows different unit patches for the PLAAF. 

Figure 7: PLA Unit Patches 

 

Officer and Civilian Cadre Grade and Rank Comparison 

Tables 4 and 5 are taken from the PLA Air Force Office Handbook. Table 3 compares the grade 

(㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) for different groups of officers and civilian cadre, as well as comparing ranks for 

officers and civilian cadre.31 Table 4 compares the rank (ߋ㺄ᄬ㓗) for officers compared to the 

rank (㓗࡛ (for civilian cadre. 

 

31 People’s Liberation Army Air Force Officer’s Handbook, p. 162. 
27 

Table 4: Officer and Civilian Cadre Grade Comparison 

Military, Political, Logistics, and 

Equipment Officers 

Special Technical 

Officers and Special 

Technical Civilian Cadre 

Non-Special Technical Civilian Cadre 

CMC Chairman (ߋငѫᑝ) 

Vice Chairmen (ߋင࢟ѫᑝ) 

Grade 1 (1 㓗) 

CMC Member (ߋငငઈ) Grade 2 (2 㓗) 

MR Leader (↓བྷߋ४㙼) Grade 3 (3 㓗) MR Deputy Leader Equivalent (᤹࢟བྷߋ४

㙼ᖵ䙷) 

MR Deputy Leader (࢟བྷߋ४㙼) 

 (४㙼ߋབྷ࢟

Grade 4 (4 㓗) Corps Leader Equivalent (᤹↓ߋ㙼ᖵ䙷) 

Corps Leader (↓ߋ㙼) Grade 5 (5 㓗) Corps Deputy Leader Equivalent (᤹ߋ࢟㙼

ᖵ䙷) 

Corps Deputy Leader (ߋ࢟㙼) Grade 6 (6 㓗) Department Leader (↓ተ㓗) 

Division Leader (↓ᐸ㙼) Grade 7 (7 㓗) Department Deputy Leader (࢟ተ㓗) 

Division Deputy Leader (࢟ᐸ㙼) Grade 8 (8 㓗) Office Leader (↓༴㓗) 

Regiment Leader (↓ഒ㙼) Grade 9 (9 㓗) Office Deputy Leader (࢟༴㓗) 

Regiment Deputy Leader (࢟ഒ㙼) Grade 10 (10 㓗) Section Leader (↓、㓗) 

Battalion Leader (↓㩕㙼) Grade 11 (11 㓗) Section Deputy Leader (࢟、㓗) 

Battalion Deputy Leader (࢟㩕㙼) Grade 12 (12 㓗) Grade 1 Staff Member (а㓗、ઈ) 

Company Leader (↓䘎㙼) Grade 13 (13 㓗) Grade 2 Staff Member (Ҽ㓗、ઈ) 

Company Deputy Leader (࢟䘎㙼) Grade 14 (14 㓗) Worker/Clerk (࣎һઈ) 

Table 5: Officer and Civilian Cadre Rank Comparison 

Officer Rank (ߋ㺄ᄬ㓗) Civilian Cadre Rank (㓗࡛ (

General (кሶ) Special Grade (⢩ᢰ) 

Lieutenant General (ѝሶ) Grade 1 (1 㓗) 

Major General (ቁሶ) Grade 2 (2 㓗) 

Senior Colonel (བྷṑ) Grade 3 (3 㓗) 

Colonel (кṑ) Grade 4 (4 㓗) 

Lieutenant Colonel (ѝṑ) Grade 5 (5 㓗) 

Major (ቁṑ) Grade 6 (6 㓗) 

Captain (кሹ) Grade 7 (7 㓗) 

Second Lieutenant (ѝሹ) Grade 8 (8 㓗) 

First Lieutenant (ቁሹ) Grade 9 (9 㓗) 
28 

The following bullets summarize the key differences and similarities between officers and 

civilian cadre: 

x PLA cadre are either officers or wenzhi ganbu. NCOs are not considered “cadre.” 

Insignia of rank (or levels for civilian cadre) worn on the shoulder epaulets or collars of 

various uniforms distinguish officers, civilian cadre, NCOs, and conscripts/recruits from 

each other. 

x PLA officers are classified as military (operational/ߋһ), political (᭯⋫), logistics (ਾऔ

), equipment (㻵༷), and specialized technical (уъᢰδ) personnel. They are assigned 

one of ten ranks from second lieutenant to general. The first four classifications 

correspond to the four systems controlled by the GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD. Military 

(operational), political, logistics, and equipment personnel (including officers, NCOs and 

conscripts/recruits) wear lapel and collar insignia consisting of a pine branch with a fivepointed star or a five-pointed star in a circular wreathe on the summer uniform. There is 

no specific term used to describe military (operational), political, logistics, and equipment 

officers as a group. Special technical officers wear lapel and collar insignia consisting of 

a pine branch with a six-pointed atom (consisting of three electrons in elliptical orbits) or 

a six-pointed atom in a circular wreathe. See Figure 6. 

x Civilian cadre are classified as either non-specialized technical personnel or specialized 

technical personnel. They wear similar lapel and collar insignia as do PLA officers 

according to their classification (i.e., the five-pointed star or six-pointed atom). 

x Military (operational), political, logistics, and equipment officers are assigned one of 14 

grades/posts (㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) from platoon to CMC member. They serve as principal officers 

(commanders and political commissars/instructors, heads of staff departments), deputies, 

or staff officers within the system to which they are assigned. 

x Specialized technical officers are assigned one of nine ranks ( ߋ 㺄 ) from second 

lieutenant to lieutenant general. China’s National Defense 2004 gives highest rank as 

lieutenant general for technical officers. They are NOT assigned grades, but are further 

classified according to technical levels (уъᢰδᄬ㓗). The 13 technical levels (from 

the lowest 14 to 2, the highest) correspond/are equivalent to grades/posts from platoon to 

MR leader grade. They are also classified into 16 specialized technical sets with a total of 

52 categories of specialties. 

x Civilian cadre are NOT assigned military ranks (ߋ㺄), but are assigned one of up to 14 

levels ( 㓗 ) according to whether they are non-specialized technical or specialized 

technical personnel. Specialized technical civilian cadre may be assigned levels from the 

lowest (14) to the highest (1). Non-specialized technical civilian cadre are assigned levels 

equating from 14 to 3, but use names similar to the civilian cadre grade structure (up to 

bureau level, equivalent to division level) and then corps deputy, corps leader, and MR 

deputy leader for the most senior non-specialized technical civilian cadre. These levels 

correspond/are equivalent to the grade (㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) system for military (operational), 

political, logistics, and equipment officers. Civilian cadre are also assigned one of 10 

levels (㓗࡛) (in this case the words “grade” or “rank” are not appropriate, but could be 

called “level” or “step”) for pay purposes, but these distinctions are not visible by their 

epaulets or ribbons. 
29 

x In theory, a civilian cadre could be the equivalent of a general/CMC member, but a 

specialized technical officer could rise to no higher than lieutenant general/MR leader 

grade. 

Noncommissioned Officer Grade and Rank Structure 

Two of the most significant events in the PLA’s reform of its enlisted force were the December 

1998 revision to the Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China and the July 1999 

revision of the Regulations on Military Service of Active-Duty Soldiers. In December 2009, the 

PLA implemented new reforms to the noncommissioned officer (NCO) system.32

Prior to 1999, PLAN and PLAAF conscripts served for four years and Army conscripts served 

for three years. Moreover, after finishing their conscription period, all service members retained 

the option of remaining on active duty as “volunteers” (ᘇᝯޥ (for a total service time of 16 

years. The revised 1998 law and 1999 regulations: 

x Reduced the mandatory service period for conscripts in all PLA services and branches to 

two years 

x Established a standard 30-year career path for NCOs in an effort to make service in the 

NCO corps attractive as a potential long-term career. 

In an effort to professionalize the NCO corps, the 1998 revised Military Service Law created a 

standard 30-year career path divided into six service periods. At the end of each service period, 

NCOs may extend their stay in the PLA by being promoted to the next higher rank; otherwise, 

they are demobilized and sent back to their hometown. NCOs in certain specialties, such as 

drivers and cooks, cannot serve beyond 12 years and are then demobilized. 

In December 2009, the CMC implemented a new “Plan for Reforming the NCO System” along 

with three revised regulations for NCO active duty service periods, management, and education 

and training. The new plan and revised regulations were intended to: 

x Keep the overall size of the enlisted force the same 

x Increase the size of the NCO corps while reducing the size of the conscript force 

x Increase the number of intermediate- and senior-grade NCOs while reducing the number 

of the junior-grade NCOs 

x Increase the number of NCOs recruited directly from civilian college students and 

graduates (i.e., they do not serve two years as a conscript/volunteer before being 

commissioned directly as an NCO) 

x Increase the education and training requirements for promotion to the next grade level 

x Increase the salary and benefits for intermediate and senior NCOs 

x Allow NCOs to serve beyond 30 years if necessary. 

According to The Chinese Army Today, the new plan and revised regulations changed the name 

for each of the ranks, as well as added a third rank in the senior grade NCO level. In terms of 

service periods, the new plan and revised regulations allows for NCOs to serve for more than a 

 

32 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 4 (Enlisted Force). 
30 

total of 14 years in the senior grade NCO grade. Table 6 shows the revised NCO system and 

Figure 8 shows the NCO rank insignia, as well as Private First Class and Private Second Class 

for the first two year conscripts/recruits.33

Table 8: PLA NCO Grades and Ranks as of 2009 

Grade Level Rank Time in Service 

Junior Grade NCO Corporal (л༛) 3 Years 

Sergeant (ѝ༛) 3 Years 

Intermediate Grade NCO Sergeant First Class (к༛) 4 Years 

Master Sergeant Class Four (ഋ㓗ߋ༛䮯) 4 Years 

Senior Grade NCO Master Sergeant Class Three (й㓗ߋ༛䮯) 4 Years 

Master Sergeant Class Two (Ҽ㓗ߋ༛䮯) 4 Years 

Master Sergeant Class (а㓗ߋ༛䮯) 2 or More Years 

Figure 9: Enlisted Rank Insignia as of 2009 

 

33 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, p. 61, 76. 
31 

Protocol Order 

The PLA is a very protocol oriented institution. When the PLA lists its services, military regions, 

branches/arms, administrative and functional organizations, or its key personnel, the lists are 

always in protocol order (㓴㓷ᒿࡇ(. 34 The first criteria is generally the date a particular 

organization was established, but there are exceptions that should be paid attention to. For 

example, the order of the three services (ߋ (⿽is always Army (August 1927), Navy (April 

1949), and Air Force (November 1949). Since the Second Artillery Force (July 1966) is an 

independent branch/arm (ޥ(⿽, it is never listed as one of the “three services” (йߋ(. When the 

PLA wants to include the Second Artillery Force, it uses the term “all services and 

branches/arms” (䈨ޥߋ(⿽. 

The four General Departments are always listed in protocol order of GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD. 

The subordinate departments, bureaus, and offices within each of the general departments are 

also listed in protocol order. The first criteria is when they were established, but some elements 

are placed higher in the order than older elements based upon their priority within the 

organization. The GSD’s Army Aviation Bureau (䱶ߋ㡚オተ/䱶㡚ተ) is a good example. It 

was created in 1986 and incorporated into the new Service Arms Department (ޥ⿽䜘) in 1993, 

which was then combined with the GSD Military Training Department in the mid-2000s. In 1995, 

the Army Aviation Bureau was separated from the Service Arms Department and became its 

own department (䱶㡚䜘), where it remains today even though the Service Arms component of 

the Military Training and Service Arms Department was abolished in 2011. As a result, it is 

important to watch where these organizations fit in the protocol order. 

The seven military regions are always listed in the following protocol order based upon the dates 

they were established (most prior to 1949) and where they fit in the level of importance at the 

time they were formed: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and 

Chengdu.35 Whereas certain MRs were more prestigious in the past, this is no longer the case. 

Therefore, the protocol order is more of an administrative tool today rather than a reflection of 

priority within the hierarchy. As such, the protocol order allows the PLA to be consistent in the 

way it deals administratively with the armed forces and its personnel as a whole. As an analyst, it 

is important to note if an organization or person changes their position in the protocol order, 

which most likely means that a significant change has occurred after a long internal debate. For 

example, over the years, the PLAN’s submarine force and surface force have alternated between 

first and second in protocol order. The PLA’s annual World Military Yearbook for 1987-1990 

listed the submarine force as first, but the 1991-2002 yearbooks listed the surface forces as first. 

Since 2002, however, the biennial China’s National Defense, which is commonly referred to as 

the defense white paper, have listed submarines as first. Although the PLA has not clarified why 

the changes took place, one possible explanation is that there was a change in focus on the two 

branches, which may have resulted in changes to funding. Another explanation may be that the 

commander from 1988-1996, Zhang Lianzhong, was a submarine commander and the first 

 

34 China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 3, p. 856. 35 See World Military Yearbook (ц⭼ߋһᒤ䢤), Beijing: PLA Press for the years 1987-2011; China’s National 

Defense, which has been published biennially since 1998; and 70 Years of the PLA (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋਢⲴ 70 ᒤ), 

Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, July 1997, p. 623. 
32 

commander to have served at sea, and that the commander from 2003-2006 was Zhang Dingfa, 

was also a submarine officer, and together they pushed through the change. 

From 1975 to 2000, the PLAAF listed its seven Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs) in a 

different order based on a combination of their priority and the dates they were created, even 

though each MRAF had a predecessor organization since around 1950: 36 Shenyang (1955), 

Beijing (1955), Lanzhou (1955), Nanjing (1955) 37 , Guangzhou (1955), Jinan (1967), and 

Chengdu (1985). However, when the PLA implemented a new Military Unit Cover Designator 

(MUCD) system discussed below, the protocol order was adjusted in 2000 to match the MR 

order. The order for the three PLAN fleets—North Sea Fleet (1960), East Sea Fleet (1955), and 

South Sea Fleet (1955)—is based on geography rather than when they were created.38

The criteria for listing personnel in protocol order within a particular organization is based on 

their importance, not necessarily on their seniority in grade, rank, or position.39 Therefore, when 

a new person, such as a deputy commander, moves to the top of the protocol order, it usually 

implies he is being groomed for promotion in grade and that the deputy commanders listed 

below him will not be promoted and may retire within a reasonable time. 

Military Unit Cover Designators 

Since the 1950s, the PLA has simultaneously used a True Unit Designator (TUD/䜘䱏⮚ਧ) 

system, where units are identified by their actual number, and a Military Cover Unit Designator 

(MUCD/䜘䱏ԓਧ) system to protect the identity of its units.40 These cover designators are used 

on stationery letterhead, banners, in newspaper and magazine articles, and on signs at the 

entrance to military facilities. The PLA has changed its MUCDs at least four times since the 

early 1950s. Two separate sets of four-digit designators were used from the early 1950’s to 1975, 

when a five-digit system was instituted. A new five-digit system was instituted in 2000.41 For 

example, the 41st Group Army was originally identified as the 53010 unit when it was formed in 

1985 and was re-designated as the 75100 unit when a new system was implemented in 2000.42 

 

36 This is based on the author’s analysis of information obtained on the PLAAF over a 20-year period as well as 

individual entries in Yao Wei, ed., China Air Force Encyclopedia (ѝഭオߋⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Aviation Industry 

Press, November 2005, p. 1235-1240. Even the encyclopedia has the entries listed in protocol order. This is also the 

order shown in Wang Hai, General Wang Hai: My Combat Career (⦻⎧кሶ:ᡁⲴᡈᯇ⭏⏟), Beijing: Zhongyang 

Wenxian Press, February 2000, p. 300 

37 Even though the Nanjing MRAF was created in 1955, it did not have any forces in Fujian Province until the start 

of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 

38 Shi Yunsheng, ed. China Navy Encyclopedia (ѝഭ⎧ߋⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Haichao Publishing House, 

December 1998, p. 49, 232, and 1370. 39 For example, during the late 1980s, the PLAAF had four deputy commanders. Lieutenant General Yu Zhenwu 

was the youngest and was the last one promoted to this position, but he was listed first in protocol order. 

40 Zhu Rongchang, editor, Air Force Dictionary (オߋབྷ䗎ި), Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, September 

1996, p. 145. Wu Xuyun and Xu Yuezheng, “Designator Code of Units” (䜘䱏ԓਧ), and Zhang Qingyun, 

“Designation of Units” (䜘䱏⮚ਧ) in Song Shilun and Xiao Ke, eds, China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 2, p. 

22. 

41 The five-digit system was instituted following an expanded meeting of the CMC, which also instituted a 600,000-

man reduction in force. Deng Xiaoping had just been rehabilitated and was re-instituted as a Party vice-chairman, 

Politburo member, CMC vice-chairman, and chief of the general staff. 70 Years of the PLA, p. 568. 42 http://wenwen.soso.com/z/q167058140.htm, and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4fcd03e90102dr5d.html. 
33 

The PLA assigns MUCDs to “units” (䜘䱏), which are defined as corps-, division-, brigade-, and 

regiment-level operational and support organizations. 43 These units are subordinate to the 

General Staff Department, General Logistics Department, and, since 1998, the General 

Armament Department, as well as units within the seven MRs, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF. 

Because the General Political Department does not have any units (䜘䱏), it is not assigned any 

MUCDs. The PLAAF’s seven flight colleges appear to be the only academic institutions 

assigned MUCDs. The reason for this is that they are organized like an operational unit rather 

than an academic institution. The following list shows the MUCD blocks for the period of 1975 

to 2000: 

x 32/83xxx = Nanjing MR 

 (32xxx = Fuzhou MR 1975-1985) 

 (83xxx = Nanjing MR 1975-1985) 

x 34/53/54xxx = Guangzhou MR 

 (33/34xxx = Wuhan MR 1975-1985) 

x 35/56xxx = Chengdu MR 

 (351xx-355xx = Kunming MR 1975-1985) 

x 36/84xxx = Lanzhou MR 

x 37/38xxx = Navy 

x 39/86/87xxx = Air Force 

x 51/52xxx = Beijing MR 

x 546/55xxx = Jinan MR 

x 57/58/88xxx = General Staff Department 

x 59xxx = General Logistics Department 

x 80xxx = Second Artillery Force 

x 81/82xxx = Shenyang MR 

x 89xxx = General Armament Department 

When the 1975 MUCD system was implemented, the PLA was organized into 11 MRs and had 

about four million personnel. In 1985, the number of MRs was reduced to seven and by 2000, the 

PLA had downsized by more than 1.2 million personnel. As a result, the old MUCD system no 

longer fit its structure. Therefore, the following new MUCD system was implemented in October 

2000. Note that the protocol order for the blocks is the General Departments, Army (i.e., seven 

MRs), Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force. 

x 61xxx = General Staff Department 

x 62xxx = General Logistics Department 

x 63xxx = General Armament Department 

x 65xxx = Shenyang MR 

x 66xxx = Beijing MR 

x 68/69xxx = Lanzhou MR 

x 71/72xxx = Jinan MR 

 

43 Wang Yingdong, “Troops,” ( 䜘䱏 ), in China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 2, p. 22. PLA Military 

Terminology, 1997, p. 156, and 2011, p. 332. 
34 

x 73xxx = Nanjing MR 

x 75/76xxx = Guangzhou MR 

x 77/78xxx = Chengdu MR 

x 91/92xxx = Navy 

x 93/94/95xxx = Air Force 

x 96xxx = Second Artillery Force 

One anomaly is that some administrative and functional bureaus (ተ) under the GSD’s Third 

Department (Technical Reconnaissance) and Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) are also 

assigned an MUCD. For example, the Third Department’s First Bureau has the MUCD 61786 

assigned to it.44 The reason for this is unclear because bureaus are bumen (䜘䰘) not budui (䜘

䱏), and should therefore not be assigned an MUCD. 

Each subunit (࠶䱏) is also assigned a one-, two-, or three-digit number that follows the MUCD, 

such as the 78130 unit 30 subunit (78170 䜘䱏 30 ࠶䱏).

45

Force Reductions 

When the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA had 5.5 million troops. Since then, it has 

implemented ten force reductions (マㆰ), which occurred in 1952, 1953, 1957, 1966, 1975, 1980, 

1982, 1985, 1997, and 2003.46 The only expansion occurred at the onset of the Korean War, 

when the force increased to 6.27 million. During the initial years, the PLA, which was formed on 

the basis of the infantry, added the Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Second Artillery 

Force, as well as the Army’s artillery, armored, engineering, chemical defense, communications, 

and railway branches.47 Between October 1949 and mid-1957, the CMC created a total of eight 

directly subordinate general departments. Between mid-1957 and late-1958, the CMC reformed 

the eight general departments, leaving only three–GSD, GPD, and GLD.48 

Most of the downsizings focused on reducing the size of the infantry and bloated higher-echelon 

headquarters. It also merged the Air Defense Force with the PLAAF, turned over entire 

organizations, such as the railway corps, to civilian control, and transferred units to the Ministry 

of Public Security and the People’s Armed Police. 

On 1 September 2003, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin announced the tenth downsizing, which 

called for 200,000 troops to be cut. The primary goal was to move forward the development in 

the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and advance military reforms with Chinese 

 

44 Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence 

and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure, Washington DC: Project 2049 Institute, November 11, 2011, p. 7. 45 http://t.qq.com/feng656746221, 

46 Jiang Yanyu, 60 Years of New China National Defense and Military Building (ᯠѝഭഭ䱢઼ߋ䱏ᔪ䇮 60 ᒤ), 

Beijing: Dangjian Duwu Press, September 2009, Chapter 2, p. 17-64. 

47 As noted in the opening quotation for this chapter, China’s National Defense translates fanghua (䱢ॆ) as antichemical warfare; however, the Ministry of National Defense website translates it as chemical defense. See 

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/army.htm. In actuality, the term refers to nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) warfare. 

48 James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2002, p. 37. 
35 

characteristics. The goals of the tenth force reduction were as follows: to reduce the size of unit 

headquarters in order to increase their efficiency and quality; and to improve the balance 

between leadership and management compared with the support structure.49 

Of the 200,000 personnel, 85 percent were officers, including 200 one-star billets.50 In terms of 

organizational changes, the PLAN reduced its eight corps leader-grade bases to corps deputy 

leader-grade support bases, and the PLAAF reduced its ten corps leader-grade air corps (オߋߋ (

and bases (สൠ) to corps deputy leader- or division leader-grade command posts. The Army 

also adjusted its forces. These reforms are discussed in the relevant service chapters. 

In addition to reducing the number of officers, more than 70 junior officer specialty billets in 

aviation, communications, missile, vessel, and radar units were turned over to NCOs.51 One of 

the largest specialties assigned to NCOs was that of mess officers.52 The problem, however, is 

that the billets are still assigned junior officer grades and NCOs cannot be given an officer’s 

grade. As a result, the NCOs filling those billets are still identified as “acting” (ԓ⨶) leaders. 

Administrative and Functional Departments 

The PLA’s administrative (㹼᭯) and functional (ъ࣑ (departments (䜘䰘), which are 

sometimes called “organs” (χޣ(, below the CMC are fairly consistent throughout the services 

and branches from the highest level down to the lowest level. Some departments have also been 

identified as operating departments (һъ䜘䰘). This structure consists of first level (а㓗䜘), 

second level (Ҽ㓗䜘), and in some cases third-level (й㓗䜘) “departments”. 

Although no Chinese military dictionaries have a single entry or provide a good definition for 

administrative department, functional department, and operating department, based on the terms’ 

usage in PLA writings and interviews with PLA officials, the best estimate of their meanings are 

shown below. Note that some of their components overlap. 

x Administrative departments generally refer to the Logistics Department and Equipment 

Department and to most of their subordinate organizations. The departments also include 

some, but not all, of the subordinate organizations in Headquarters and Political 

Departments. These administrative departments conduct work that impacts upon daily 

life, including support, supplies, and housing. 

x Functional departments generally refer to anything that impacts on operations. Specific 

functional departments include operations, intelligence, training, finance, and health. 

x Operating departments are organizations that carry out specific missions that can include 

intelligence, communications, or political work. Within the financial management 

system, operating departments are responsible for funding related to their specific 

functional area. They manage (acquire, distribute, and use) the itemized expenditures of 

funds within their functional purview. 

 

49 Jiang Yanyu, 60 Years of New China National Defense and Military Building, p. 62 50 Interviews with PLA officials in 2004. 

51 Cheng Ronggui, “The NCOs are not only the Technical Backbone,” PLA Daily, February 15, 2008. 52 Jiang Heping and Su Ruozhou, “Training and Recruitment for Officer Billets to be Converted to NCO Duties 

Next Year,” PLA Daily, December 23, 2004. 
36 

Historically, the regiment level has been the lowest level with these departments. Although no 

references to any administrative and functional departments were found below the regiment level, 

it appears that certain battalion leader-grade organizations may be trying to establish at least a 

Headquarters Department-type organization headed by a chief of staff (৲䈻䮯). For example, 

certain PLAAF SAM battalions now have a chief of staff.53

At the higher echelons, the first-level generally consists of departments (䜘), the second-level 

includes departments, a general office (ޜ࣎঵/ޜ࣎ᇔ), and bureaus (ተ),54 and the third-level 

consists of bureaus, divisions (༴), or offices (、).55 In the lower echelons, the first level 

consists of departments and divisions, while the second-level consists of divisions, offices, and 

branches (㛑). Regardless of whether it is a department, bureau, division, office, or branch, they 

are generically called departments (䜘䰘). 

Table 7 provides an overview of how the structure looks from top to bottom. For example, the 

General Political Department (ᙫ᭯⋫䜘) has a second-level Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘), 

which has a subordinate Propaganda Bureau (ᇓՐተ). This structure is the same for the services 

and the military region headquarters. At the corps level, there is a Political Department with a 

second-level Organization Division (㓴㓷༴), with a subordinate Propaganda Office (ᇓՐ、). 

At the regiment level, there is a Political Division (᭯⋫༴) with a second-level Organization 

Branch (㓴㓷㛑). Since the regiment administrative staff is so small, there are no third level 

elements, so the officers in the second-level Organization Branch are responsible for all the 

duties handled by their counterparts at higher headquarters. 

 

 

53 www.chinadaily.com.cn/HQjs/2006-05/10/content_586239.htm. 

54 First level department directors in the general departments, such as the GSD Operations Department, are major 

generals and have the grade of corps leader. First level bureau directors have the grade of division leader. 

55 According to interviews with PLA officials, in the late 1990s, all of the third-level divisions (chu) subordinate to 

second-level departments in the four general departments were upgraded to bureaus (ju). 
37 

Table 7: Administrative and Functional Department Levels 

Organization First Level Second Level Third Level 

General Departments (ᙫ䜘) 4 Departments (䜘) Department (䜘), office 

(ޜ࣎(঵, bureau (ተ) 

Bureau (ተ) 

Service HQ (ߋ (⿽4 Departments (䜘) Department (䜘), office 

(ޜ࣎ᇔ), bureau (ተ) 

Division (༴) 

Military Region HQ (ߋ४) 4 Departments (䜘) Department (䜘), office 

 (ᇔޜ࣎)

Division (༴) 

MRAF HQ (ߋ४オߋ(/ 

Fleet HQ (㡠䱏) 

4 Departments (䜘) Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), 

Division (༴) 

Office (、) 

Corps (ߋ (4 Departments (䜘) Division (༴) Office (、) 

Division (ᐸ) 4 Departments (䜘) Office (、) 

Brigade (᯵) 4 Departments (䜘) Office (、) 

Regiment (ഒ) HQ department (䜘); 

Political, Logistics, & 

Equipment Divisions (༴) 

Branch (㛑) 

Battalion (㩕) None 

Company (䘎) None 

In some cases, certain departments are separated at the higher levels and split at the bottom. For 

example, operations and training are separated at military region- and corps-level headquarters, 

but they are combined at some division and brigade headquarters and at all regiment 

headquarters. On the other hand, the PLA has combined its quartermaster/supply, materials, and 

POL departments at the highest levels but continue to split them at the regiment level. 

Comprehensive Departments 

As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, during the 2000s, the PLA has created various 

types and levels of what it calls “comprehensive departments” (㔬ਸ䜘䰘), which appear to be 

responsible for consolidating everything from the other second- and third-level departments, 

producing policy recommendations for the department leaders and unit deputy leaders and 

leaders, and then implementing those decisions once the Party committee has approved them. 

These departments include a Comprehensive Department (㔬ਸ䜘) and/or Comprehensive 

Planning Department (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ䜘) and their lower-level counterparts at the bureau (ተ) and 

division ( ༴ ) levels. It is not clear if each Comprehensive Department is actually a 

Comprehensive Planning Department but the name is just shortened for simplicity sake. It 

appears that these departments have replaced the Headquarters Department in various 

organizations, and they have either complemented or replaced the General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ) in 

other organizations. 
38 

Security Committees 

Every PLA organization at the regiment and above level has a Security Committee (؍ᇶငઈ

Պ), which is responsible to that level’s Party Committee and the next higher level’s Security 

Committee.56 Military security work (ߋ䱏؍ᇶᐕ֌) includes establishing policies, laws, and 

regulations, as well as the organizational structure, management, transmission, investigations, 

and education concerning the security of classified materials.57

The exact structure of the Security Committee system is not clear; however, based on the 

available information, the highest level military committee is the CMC Military Security 

Committee (ѝཞߋင؍ᇶငઈՊ), which is also referred to as the PLA Security Committee 

(䀓᭮؍ߋᇶငઈՊ).58 This committee is apparently subordinate to the CMC’s General Office 

(ߋငޜ࣎(঵, which also identified as the All-Army Security Committee General Office (ߋޘ

؍ᇶ࣎(. One of the DCOGS serves as the director (ѫԫ), which implies the committee is a 

military region leader-grade organization.59 The committee also has several full-time members 

(у㙼ငઈ) and at least one deputy director (࢟ѫԫ) who has the rank of major general, which 

implies the General Office is a corps leader-grade organization.60 In addition, the committee 

publishes the monthly periodical Security Work (؍ᇶᐕ֌) through Gold Wall Press (䠁෾ࠪ⡸

矢).61

Each committee at every level has a General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), which manages the committee’s 

daily affairs. At the higher levels, each General Office appears to have a subordinate Security 

Bureau (؍ᇶተ) and a Security (Classified) Records Bureau (؍ᇶẓṸተ). Examples of the 

various committees, general offices, and bureaus are shown below: 

x Central Military Commission General Office 

 CMC/PLA Security Committee 

 Security Committee General Office62

 Security Bureau63

 Technology Security Research Center (ᢰδᆹޘ⹄ウѝᗳ)

64

 

56 “Security Committee,” in PLA Military Terminology, December 2011, p. 198. Although this dictionary translates 

baomi (؍ᇶ) as security, other dictionaries translate it as secret or secrecy. See A New English-Chinese ChineseEnglish Dictionary of Military Terms, Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, October 1999, p. 254. While baomi

security covers classified material and its transmission from one point to another, baowei (؍ছ) security covers 

personal and facilities security; however, the two types of organizations work closely together to security classified 

information. 

57 “Military Security Work,” in PLA Military Terminology, December 2011, p. 198. 58 www.mxrb.cn/jrmx/2008-06/11/content_367066.htm and www.cqvip.com/Main/Detail.aspx?id=30229392. 

59 DCOGS General Zhang Li (ᕐ哾) was the director in 2008. See www.cqvip.com/Main/Detail.aspx?id=30229392. 60 http://club.xilu.com/xinguancha/msgview-950389-124719.html and http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-

03/29/content_5911235.htm. 

61 www.jccb.com.cn/magazine/. 

62 www.cqvip.com/Main/Detail.aspx?id=30229392. 

63 www.jingpin163.com/Item/Show.asp?m=1&d=2399. 

64 www.cnf888.com/zsxm/project.asp?1699.html. 
39 

 Technology Security Research Institute Product Promotion Center (ᢰδᆹޘ⹄

ウᡰӗ૱᧘ᒯѝᗳ)

65

 Security Records Bureau (؍ᇶẓṸተ)

66

x General Staff Department General Office 

 GSD Security Committee General Office (ᙫ৲؍ᇶငઈՊޜ࣎ᇔ)

67

 Security Bureau (؍ᇶተ)

68

 Security Records Bureau (؍ᇶẓṸተ) 

x General Political Department 

 GPD Security Committee (ᙫ᭯؍ᇶငઈՊ)

69

 No Security Committee General Office or Bureau were found 

x General Logistics Department 

 GLD Security Committee General Office (ᙫਾ؍ᇶငઈՊޜ࣎ᇔ)

70

 Security Bureau (؍ᇶተ)

71

x General Armament Department 

 GAD Security Committee (ᙫ㻵؍ᇶငઈՊ)

72

 No Security Committee General Office was found 

 Security Bureau (؍ᇶተ), which works closely with the GAD Technology Security 

Inspection General Office (ᙫ㻵ᢰδᆹޘỰḕޜ࣎ᇔ)

73

x All 7 MR Headquarters plus PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF Headquarters have a Security 

Committee and Security Committee General Office, which appear to be directly 

subordinate to the Headquarters rather than to a specific administrative or functional 

department.74

Security Regulations 

The PLA organizes its classified material the following three categories (ᇶ㓗):75

x Top secret (㔍ᇶ) 

x Secret (χᇶ) 

x Confidential (〈ᇶ). 

 

65 http://big5.made-in-china.com/showroom/guohong73. 

66 www.guoxue.com/zt/xuezhuchangcheng/03/0001.htm. 

67 www.baomiwang.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=11&id=267. The Security Bureau was 

only a Security Division (؍ᇶ༴) during the late 1970s, and was apparently upgraded sometime after that. See 

http://william87621.blog.sohu.com/86347620.html. 68 www.bidcenter.com.cn/newscontent-6192292-4.html. 

69 http://oldweb.cqvip.com/qk/80914X/200605/21778373.html. Although the GPD has a General Office, no 

information was found to indicate that the Security Committee is subordinate to it. 

70 www.cqvip.com/QK/80914X/201108/39290886.html. Although the GLD has a General Office, no information 

was found to indicate that the Security Committee is subordinate to it. 71 http://bj.tuitui99.com/RentInfo8032971.html. 

72 www.zxhsd.com/kgsm/ts/2007/11/02/1201657.shtml. Although the GAD has a General Office, no information 

was found to indicate that the Security Committee is subordinate to it. 73 www.noveri.com.cn/shownews.asp?news_id=86&bid=5. 

74 www.baomi.org/bmyw_info.php?optionid=30&auto_id=1412. 

75 www1.dg.gov.cn/business/htmlfiles/dgbmj/s10899/201203/479322.htm. Separate entries for “Top Secret,” 

“Secret,” and “Confidential” in PLA Military Terminology, December 2011, p. 198. 
40 

In 1963, the CMC issued the fist “PLA Security Regulations” (䀓᭮؍ߋᇶᶑֻ), which have 

been updated four times, including the latest version in 2011.76 Following the release of the 1998 

version, a lengthy PLA Daily article stated, “In recent years, there have been some shocking 

cases of military secrets being leaked. Some people have talked thoughtlessly about the 

designation of military units, active equipment, the location of their stations, and other military 

secrets, and have even released information involving military secrets on television and radio as 

well as in the open press.”77 According to the 2011 regulations, classified material is divided into 

13 types, which can be generalized as everything that has to do with the organizational structure, 

strategy, operations, tactics, weapons and equipment, personnel, research and development, 

budgets and acquisition, training, intelligence, deployments, missions, political work, 

mobilization, and communications.78 

Political Work System 

The PLA’s political work (ᮤ⋫ᐕ֌) is the means through which the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) guarantees absolute control over the military. The PLA political work system consists of 

the following six main elements that are integrated into every organization in the PLA:79

x Party Congress (ފԓ㺘བྷՊ) system 

x Party Committee (ފင) system 

x Political officer (᭯⋫ᒢ䜘) system 

x Political administrative and functional department (᭯⋫䜘䰘) system 

x Discipline inspection (㓚ᖻỰሏᐕ֌) system 

x Judicial (᭯⌅ᐕ֌) system. 

The PLA has two categories of Party committees: 

x Unit Party committees (䜘䱏ފင) 

x Administrative and functional department Party committees (χފޣင). 

Furthermore, every administrative and functional department has one of five types of party 

organizations: 

x Party committee (ފင) 

x Grassroots Party committee (สቲފင) 

x Party general branch (ފᙫ᭟) 

x Party branch (ފ᭟䜘) 

 

76 “Jiang Zemin Signs Promulgation of `PLA Secrecy Regulations’,” PLA Daily, 27 March 1996. PLA Secrecy 

Regulations, found at http://baike.baidu.com/view/1091425.htm. PLA Security Regulations (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮؍ߋᇶ

ᶑֻ), 13 March 2012, found at www1.dg.gov.cn/business/htmlfiles/dgbmj/s10899/201203/479322.htm. 77 “Article Warns of Intelligence Theft,” PLA Daily, 14 May 1998. 78 PLA Security Regulations ( ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮؍ߋᇶᶑֻ ), 13 March 2012, found at 

www1.dg.gov.cn/business/htmlfiles/dgbmj/s10899/201203/479322.htm. 79 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 6 (Political Work System). 
41 

x Party small group (ފሿ㓴). 

Unit Party Committees 

A unit Party committee is established in each headquarters for all PLA organizations at the 

regiment level and above. Each of these Party committees has a standing committee consisting of 

the commander, political commissar, deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, and 

directors of the four first-level administrative departments (Headquarters, Political, Logistics, 

and Equipment). In most cases, the political commissar serves as the Party secretary and the 

commander as the deputy secretary. In some situations, such as when the commander has 

previously served as a political commissar, the commander is the secretary and the political 

officer is the deputy secretary. For example, former PLAAF commander Qiao Qingchen, who 

had previously served as the PLAAF political commissar, was the Party secretary. 

Administrative and Functional Department Party Committees 

In addition to the headquarters’ Party committee, each of the four first-level departments 

(Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment) has its own department Party committee. All 

second- and third-level departments also have some type of Party organization. Depending on the 

size of the department, the Party organization can be a Party committee, Party general branch, or 

Party branch. 

x The chief of staff serves as the secretary of the Headquarters Department’s Party 

committee, and one of the deputy chiefs of staff serves as the deputy secretary. 

x The Political Department director serves as the secretary of the Political Department’s 

Party committee, and one of the deputy directors serves as the deputy secretary. 

x Because the Logistics Department and Equipment Department each have a director and a 

political commissar, the political commissar is usually the Party secretary and the director 

serves as the deputy secretary. 

x In second- and third-level departments, the department director is the Party secretary and 

one of the deputy directors is the deputy secretary. 

Grassroots Party Committees 

A grassroots Party committee is assigned to the headquarters element for all battalion-level 

organizations. Although these committees are formally identified as grassroots Party committees, 

the PLA often omits the term “grassroots” and identifies them just as Party committees. 

Grassroots Party committees are not assigned to administrative departments. 

Party General Branches 

Party general branches are established only within administrative and functional departments that 

are too small to have a Party committee but too large for a Party branch. They are not established 

as a unit’s Party organization. 

Party Branches 

Party branches are assigned to all company-level organization headquarters and, depending on 

their size, to most second- and third-level administrative and functional departments. For 

example, the second-level Propaganda Division subordinate to an MRAF Political Department 

has a Party branch. 
42 

Party Small Groups 

All PLA Party members must belong to some type of Party organization. Party small groups are 

established at the platoon level, where only a few officers are present, and at the squad level, 

which is composed solely of enlisted personnel. 

In addition, when the PLA establishes ad hoc working groups, the members, regardless of their 

grade or rank, are organized into a Party small group or a Party branch. The type of Party 

committee established, such as a Party small group or Party branch, depends on the number of 

Party members involved. 

Academic Institutions 

Types of Military Academic Institutions 

There does not appear to be a single PLA source, including chinamil.com (PLA Daily online), 

with an official list of the PLA’s academic institutions in the education and training system (ᮉ

㛢䇝㓳パーセント㔏). Part of the reason for this is that several institutions have merged into universities, 

but they are not counted in the official list, while others have changed their name or been 

abolished. See Appendix A for an explanation of the key terms used for PLA academic 

institutions (䲒ṑ): university (བྷᆖ), xueyuan (ᆖ䲒), and school (ᆖṑ). 

Differences between University, Xueyuan, and School 

In terms of organizational structure, the biggest differences between a PLA university, xueyuan

and schools are shown below. Each of the components will be discussed in detail later. 

x Universities, such as National University of Defense Technology 

 Command staff (commander, political commissar, and deputies) 

 Administrative and functional departments 

 Subordinate xueyuan

 Command staff 

 Administrative and functional departments 

 Academic departments 

 Key labs 

x Xueyuan such as the Second Artillery Force Engineering Academy and Air Force Early 

Warning College 

 Command staff 

 Administrative and functional departments 

 Academic departments 

 Key labs 

x Schools (xuexiao) such as the Air Force Dalian Communications NCO School 

 Command staff 

 Administrative and functional departments 

 Academic departments 

Comprehensive Universities 

In 1999, the Central Military Commission (CMC/ѝཞߋင) designated five PLA universities as 

comprehensive universities (㔬ਸབྷᆖ) with programs in science, engineering, military science, 
43 

social science, management, economics, philosophy, literature, education, law, and history. No 

good definition was found for a comprehensive university, but the PLA Navy discusses its 

program as one that provides senior technical, bachelor’s, master’s, and doctorate degrees in a 

wide variety of technology and engineering areas. The five universities, each of which has 

several subordinate xueyuan, are:80

x Air Force Engineering University (AFEU/オߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ) 

x National University of Defense Technology (NUDT/ഭ䱢、ᆖᢰδབྷᆖ) 

x Naval Engineering University (NAE/⎧ߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ) 

x PLA Information Engineering University (PLAIEU/䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ) 

x PLA Science and Engineering University (PLAUST/䀓᭮ߋ⨶ᐕᆖ䲒) 

Academic Education and Professional Education Institutions 

During the 14th All-Army Academic Institution Conference (ᅮॱഋ1⁄9ߋޘ䲒ṑՊ䇞) in June 

1999, the decision was made to separate academic and professional education and to switch from 

academic education as the primary (Ѫѫ) to having professional education as the primary. As 

such, the education focus (ᮉ㛢䟽ᗳ) was shifted from engineering and technology (ᐕ〻ᢰδ) 

to education for command and staff officers (ᤷᥕо৲䈻ߋᇈษޫ). During the 15th All-Army 

Academic Institution Conference (ᅮॱӄ1⁄9ߋޘ䲒ṑՊ䇞) in November 2003, the decision 

was made to change the organizational structure of the PLA’s academic institutions by creating 

two types ( 学) with professional education institutions as the main form (ѫփ). 81 The 

implication is that academic institutions were the second form. 

According to the Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary, academic 

education institutions are responsible for providing bachelor’s degrees to new officers (⭏䮯ߋᇈ

ᴥ、ᆖশᮉ㛢). At the same time, they are responsible for providing graduate student education 

(⹄ウ⭏ᮉ㛢). Professional education institutions are responsible for providing professional 

military education (PME/ษ䇝) for billets for all categories of officers and NCOs (਴㓗਴学ߋ

ᇈ઼༛ᇈ዇սԫ㙼ษ䇝).82 

Prior to July 2011, the PLA categorized its existing 67 academic institutions by subordination 

into eight responsible units ( ѫ㇑অս ), each of which is, in turn, organized into two 

categories—academic education institutions and professional education institutions—as shown 

in Table 8 below. See Appendix C for the full list. 

 

80 Information accessed at http://club.xilu.com/emas/msgview-821955-4656460.html on 3 January 2011. “University 

(㔬ਸབྷᆖ),” in Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary (⧠ԓߋṑᮉ㛢䗎ި), Beijing: 

National Defense University Press, July 2009, p. 115. 

81 Tu Hengzhang, ed., Discussion of Military Professional Education (ߋһԫ㙼ᮉ㛢䇪), Beijing: Academy of 

Military Science Press, March 2007, Chapter 5, p. 92. 

82 Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary, p. 116-117. Of note, this dictionary translates 

renzhi jiaoyu (ԫ㙼ᮉ㛢) as vocational educational institutions, but it also translates zhiye jiaoyu (㙼ъᮉ㛢) as 

vocational education. 
44 

Table 8: The PLA’s 67 Academic Institutions 

Responsible Unit Academic Education Institutions Professional Education Institutions 

CMC (2) 1 1 

General Staff Department (18) 6 12 

General Political Department (3) 0 3 

General Logistics Department (9) 6 3 

General Armament Department (5) 2 3 

Navy (8) 3 5 

Air Force (15) 3 12 

Second Artillery Force (3) 1 2 

Military Regions (4) 0 4 

Total (67) 22 45 

Academic Institution Unit and Specialty Codes 

During the early 2000s, the Ministry of Education (MOE/ᮉ㛢䜘) created the National Code List 

for Institutions that Award Degrees (ޘഭ਴ᆖսᦸҸঅսԓ⸱) as a foundation to assign a 

five-digit code (অսԓ⸱) to most, but not all, degree awarding academic and research 

institutions, including PLA institutions, which are, in turn, identified by their official name (অս

਽〠). The list was updated in January 2009 to add institutions that were omitted from the earlier 

list and to make the necessary changes to the names of existing institutions. Appendix C provides 

a list of the PLA academic and research institutions and available codes. It is not clear why the 

PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS/ߋһ、ᆖ䲒), which is an MR leader-grade 

organization and provides graduate degree programs, is not assigned an academic code.83

In addition, MOE assigns a four-digit code (ᆖ、уъԓ⸱) and an official name (ᆖ、уъ਽

〠) to every graduate major/specialty, and a six-digit code and official name to every graduate 

sub specialty, which is based on the four-digit code to which each sub specialty is related.84 The 

four-digit codes are identified as level 1 (а㓗) and the six digit codes are identified as level 2 

(Ҽ㓗) codes.85 

Protocol Order 

The PLA’s academic institutions have a protocol order, which appear to match the MOE list of 

institutions shown in Appendix C. In addition to the protocol order for the academic institutions, 

the people and organizations within each institution are almost always listed in protocol order. 

This is extremely helpful, as discussed below, in finding the link between the name and number 

assigned to institutions and academic departments. 

 

83 See http://wenku.baidu.com/view/655f7f170b4e767f5acfce11.html for information about AMS’s 2011 

recruitment for 36 master’s degree students and www.cnki.net/kcms/detail/Detail.aspx?dbname= 

CJFD2010&filename=JSYC201003022 for information about AMS’s 2011 recruitment for 39 doctoral students. 

84 Information accessed at www.5istudy.com/Article/master/jianzhang/Article_22608.html on 16 February 2011. 85 Information accessed at www.caeitedu.com/zhaosheng.htm and www.5istudy.com/Article/master/jianzhang/ 

Article_22608.html on 18 February 2011. 
45 

Organizational Grade Structure 

Every academic institution has a grade (㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) assigned to it, which is the same grade as the 

commandant and political commissar. In 2003, the CMC determined that all military academic 

institutions would have one of five grades: military region (MR) leader (↓བྷߋ४㙼), MR 

region deputy leader (࢟བྷߋ४㙼), corps leader (↓ߋ㙼), corps deputy leader (ߋ࢟㙼), or 

division leader (↓ᐸ㙼).86 National Defense University (NDU/ഭ䱢བྷᆖ) and the Academy of 

Military Science are the only MR leader institutions, and National University of Defense 

Technology is the only MR deputy leader institution.87 

In addition, each subordinate xueyuan, administrative and functional department, academic 

department, laboratory, and student team has a grade assigned. Finally, every officer billet has a 

grade assigned. 

Military Unit Cover Designators 

Whereas MOE has assigned codes to all military academic institutions except the NCO schools, 

the exact opposite is true for MUCDS. In this case, it appears that no military academic 

institutions except for the PLAAF’s seven flight colleges, which are organized like operational 

units, are assigned an MUCD. 

Academic Degrees 

Military academic institutions offer the five following types of academic degrees (ᆖս): 

x Secondary technical degree (ѝу), which is a 2-year high school equivalency degree that 

is available only to enlisted personnel; however, some officers received this degree 

through the mid-1990s 

x Senior technical degree (བྷу), which is a 2- or 3-year degree equivalent to a U.S. 

associates or vocational degree that is available to all enlisted personnel, as well as 

officers (primarily in the maintenance, support, and technical specialties) 

x Bachelor’s degree (ᴥ、), which is a 4-year degree that is available primarily to officers 

in the military/command track, as well as some officers in the maintenance, support, and 

technical tracks. The PLA began offering its first bachelor’s degrees in 1982. Some 

enlisted personnel with bachelor’s degrees are beginning to voluntarily join the PLA. 

x Master’s degree (⺅༛), which is available to officers. The PLA began offering its first 

master’s degrees in 1988. Not every institution offers this degree. 

x Doctorate degree (ঊ༛), which is available to officers. The PLA began offering its first 

doctorates in 1990. Not every institution offers this degree. 

Leadership 

Universities, xueyuan, and schools have the following leaders. Note that the commandant and 

political commissar often have different ranks, which differ by one rank, such as colonel and 

 

86 “Establishment of rank of military college (ߋṑ㕆ࡦᄬ㓗),” in Contemporary Military Academic Institution 

Education Dictionary, p. 111. 87 There are various websites that provide the grade for these institutions, such as 

http://hi.baidu.com/1119873681/blog/item/ 1becdeb349273ffa30add162.html. 
46 

senior colonel or senior colonel and major general. Although they may have different ranks, they 

always have the same grade, which is the same grade as the institution. 

x Commandant/President: University and school commandants are identified as a 

xiaozhang (ṑ䮯), and xueyuan commandants, including xueyuan subordinate to a 

university, are identified as yuanzhang (䲒䮯). 

x Political commissar (PC): The PC for all academic institutions, including xueyuan

subordinate to a university, is identified as the zhengzhi weiyuan (᭯⋫ငઈ) or simply 

the zhengwei (᭯င) 

x Deputy commandants/presidents: Depending on the type of institution, they are identified 

as fuxiaozhang (࢟ṑ䮯) or fuyuanzhang (࢟䲒䮯). Depending on the institution’s level, 

there are usually 2-3 deputy commandants, each with different responsibilities. 

x Deputy political commissars: The deputy PCs are identified as fuzhengwei (࢟᭯င). 

Depending on the institution’s level, there are usually 1-2 deputy PCs. 

Party Committees 

Each academic institution has a Party committee (ފင) with a standing committee (ᑨင). The 

political commissar is usually the secretary (Җ䇠), and the commandant is the deputy secretary 

(࢟Җ䇠). The standing committee usually consists of the political commissar, commandant, 

director of the Political Department, and director of the Training Department, as well as the 

deputy commandants and deputy political commissars. 

Each subordinate xueyuan within a university also has its own Party committee and standing 

committee, whose members mirror those on the university’s Party committee. Each of the 

members of the xueyuan’s Party committee is also a member of the university’s Party committee. 

Each academic department, in turn, has its own Party committee and standing committee, and its 

members are members of the xueyuan’s Party committee. Because academic departments do not 

have a political commissar, the director usually serves as the secretary and one of the deputy 

directors serves as the deputy secretary. 

Administrative and Functional Departments 

Military academic institutions have at least the following three functional ( ъ ࣑ ( and 

administrative (㹼᭯) departments (χޣ/䜘䰘), which are always listed in protocol order: 

x Training Department (䇝㓳䜘): The Training Department serves the same purpose as a 

Headquarters Department in other organizations. It is also responsible for all policy 

issues as well as managing all training matters. Every university has a Training 

Department, and most, but not all, of its subordinate xueyuan have their own Training 

Department. 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘): The Political Department is organized the same as all 

other PLA Political Departments and serves the same functions. Every university has a 

Political Department, and most, but not all, of its subordinate xueyuan have their own 

Political Department. 

x Xueyuan/School Affairs (䲒࣑䜘 or ṑ࣑䜘): It is not clear what the Xueyuan/School 

Affairs Department is responsible for, but it is most likely in charge of managing the 
47 

facilities and logistics issues. Every university has this department, and some, but not all, 

of its subordinate xueyuan have their own department as well. 

Depending on the institution’s mission and curriculum, it also has a Scientific Research 

Department (、⹄䜘), which is responsible for overseeing all of the institution’s technical 

training curricula and systems research work. The Scientific Research Department also has 

subordinate classrooms and laboratories, where personnel from the department provide training 

to the cadets. For example, the National University of Defense Technology’s Scientific Research 

Department has a Weapons and Equipment Development Research Center (↖ಘ㻵༷ਁኅ⹄ウ

ѝᗳ). 

The Graduate School ( ⹄ウ⭏䲒 ) is also considered an administrative and functional 

organization but not a department. It provides overall guidance for the graduate programs in each 

subordinate college. It does not have any students assigned to it. It is a corps deputy-leader grade 

organization. 

Each university most likely has all of the above departments. Depending on their size, specialty, 

and location, each of the university’s subordinate xueyuan has some, but not all, of the 

departments. Xueyuan not subordinate to a university have at least a Training Department, 

Political Department, and Xueyuan Affairs Department. 

The PLAAF’s seven flight colleges are an exception to the structure above, because they are 

organized in the same way as an operational air division with a command staff plus four 

administrative and functional departments—Headquarters Department ( ਨԔ䜘 ), Political 

Department (᭯⋫䜘), Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘), and Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘). 

Rather than academic departments, each college has a subordinate basic trainer regiment for the 

third-year students and one or more advanced trainer regiments for the fourth-year students. 

Academic Departments and Specialties 

Each institution has several academic departments (パーセント) and associated specialties (уъ), which 

prepare graduates to assume their operational duties. For example, the PLAAF’s Air Defense 

Missile College has six academic departments—Command Engineering, Computer Engineering, 

Electro-Mechanical Engineering, Radar Engineering, Guided Missile Engineering, and Systems 

Engineering—and 12 academic specialties. The subordinate departments and specialties are 

usually listed in protocol order in books, media articles, and on the web. 

The Basic Department (ส⹰䜘) is considered an academic department not an administrative and 

functional department. It is responsible for providing instruction in certain required basic 

education courses that all undergraduates must take regardless of their specialty. In some cases, 

however, the Basic Department no longer exists. For example, NUDT’s department was replaced 

by a computer center (䇑㇇χѝᗳ), which is also responsible for the university’s library. It is a 

corps deputy-leader grade organization. 
48 

Organization Names and Number Designators 

Depending on the institution, at least some, but not necessarily all, of the subordinate 

organizations, including xueyuan and academic departments, are assigned a name and a number 

designator, such as NUDT’s College of Aerospace and Materials Engineering is also identified 

as the 1st College (а䲒). In most cases, only the name or the number designator is used. 

Therefore, you must search for either the name or the number designator; however, certain 

websites provide a list of both.88 PLA websites and information in news articles, blogs, and 

books almost always list the organizations and subordinate entities in protocol order. Therefore, 

it is easier to link the names and number designators. Table 9 provides a good example of NUDT, 

which shows the ten colleges, their assigned college number, grade, and number of subordinate 

academic departments as they are listed in NUDT’s official website, other websites, and PLA 

books. 

Table 9: National University of Defense Technology Organizational Structure 

Chinese Name English Name College 

Number 

˄䲒˅

Grade 

(ᄬ㓗) 

Academic 

Departments 

(パーセント) 

㡚ཙоᶀᯉᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 College of Aerospace and 

Materials Engineering 

1 Division leader 

(↓ᐸ) 

3 

䟼ᆖ䲒 College of Science 2 Division leader 2 

χ⭥ᐕ〻о㠚ࣘॆᆖ䲒 College of Mechatronic 

Engineering and 

Automation 

3 Division leader 3 

⭥ᆀ、ᆖоᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 College of Electronic 

Science and Engineering 

4 Corps deputy 

 (ߋ࢟) leader

3 

ؑ᚟パーセント㔏о㇑⨶ᆖ䲒 College of Information 

Systems and Management 

5 Division leader 3 

䇑㇇χᆖ䲒 College of Computer 6 Corps deputy 

leader 

2 

ݹ、⭥ᆖоᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 College of Opto-Electronic 

Science and Engineering 

7 Division leader 2 

Ӫ᮷о矢Պ、ᆖᆖ䲒 College of Humanities and 

Social Sciences 

8 Division leader 3 

ᤷᥕߋᇈส⹰ᮉ㛢ᆖ䲒 College of Basic Education 

for Commanding Officers 

9 Division leader 4 

㔗㔝ᮉ㛢ᆖ䲒 College of Continuing 

Education 

None Corps deputy 

leader 

0 

Most, but not all, academic departments also have a name and a number designator. Table 10 

provides an example for the Air Force Engineering University’s Air Force Engineering College, 

which has nine academic departments and 15 specialties: 

 

88 See www.tianya.cn/new/publicforum/Content.asp? strItem=university&idArticle= 60744. 
49 

Table 10: Air Force Engineering College Organizational Structure 

Chinese Name English Name English 

Number 

Chinese 

Number 

伎χҾਁࣘχᐕ〻パーセント Aircraft and Engine Engineering Department 1st

 Department аパーセント

㡚オޥಘᐕ〻パーセント Aviation Weapons Engineering Department 2nd

Department 

Ҽパーセント

㡚オ㠚ࣘ᧗ࡦᐕ〻パーセント Aviation Automatic Control Engineering Department 3rd

 Department йパーセント

㡚オ⭥ᆀᐕ〻パーセント Aviation Electronics Engineering Department 4th Department ഋパーセント

χ൪ᔪᅌᐕ〻パーセント Airfield Construction Engineering Department 5th Department ӄパーセント

㡚オ㻵༷㇑⨶ᐕ〻パーセント Aviation Equipment Management Engineering 

Department 

6th Department ޝパーセント

ཆ䈝パーセント Foreign Languages Department None None 

ᯠ㻵༷䇝㓳パーセント New Equipment Training Department None None 

ཆ䇝パーセント Foreign Training Department None None 

Student Organizational Structure 

Depending on the academic institution, undergraduate students/cadets (ᆖઈ) and graduate 

students (⹄ウ⭏) are organized into the following organizations, which are usually subordinate 

to the academic department to which they are affiliated. 

x Student joint training brigade (ᆖઈਸ䇝᯵) is subordinate to the university or xueyuan, 

is the largest student unit, and has subordinate numbered teams (䱏), such as the 1st Team 

(а䱏). 

x Student group (ᆖઈབྷ䱏) is a numbered battalion-level organization, such as the 5th

Group (ӄབྷ䱏), and has subordinate numbered teams. 

x Student company (ᆖઈ䘎) is a numbered company, such as the 2nd Company (Ҽ䘎), has 

subordinate numbered teams. 

x Student team (ᆖઈ४䱏) is a numbered organization, such as 1st Team (а४䱏), that is 

unique to academic institutions and is somewhere between a company and platoon. 

x Student team (ᆖઈ䱏) is a numbered platoon-level organization, such as the 3rd Team 

(й䱏), each of which has subordinate squads. Every military academic institution has 

student teams. 

x Student squad (ᆖઈ⨝) is the smallest organization, each of which has a number such as 

the 1st Squad (а⨝). 

x Graduate student team (⹄ウ⭏䱏) is a platoon-level organization, which are occasionally 

identified as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, teams (⹄ウ⭏а䱏, Ҽ䱏) 

x Doctorate student team (ঊ༛⭏䱏) is a platoon-level organization 

x Master’s student team (⺅༛⭏䱏) is a platoon-level organization 
50 

Appendix 1: Key Terminology and Concepts 

As a general rule, the PLA does not have a problem with the names for its organizations. The 

problem comes when either the PLA or USG tries to translate the names into English. Yet 

another issue for the USG is how to write the Pinyin for Chinese terms. For example, how does 

one write the Pinyin for the four characters for General Staff Department ( ᙫ৲Ḁ䜘): 

zongcanmoubu, zongcanmou bu, zong canmou bu, or zong can mou bu. 

One of the most difficult aspects of any study on the PLA is deciding on the best method to 

translate key PLA terms and concepts so that they make sense in a U.S. military context. 

Unfortunately, most Chinese military dictionaries provide only a direct English translation for 

key terms, and the same term is often translated differently in different books and even within 

the same book. In addition, most PLA books do not provide detailed explanations or definitions 

for those terms. Sometimes, PLA terms cannot be easily translated into English, or the common 

English translation means something different for the U.S. military than it does for the PLA. For 

example, a PLA Air Force or Naval Aviation zhongdui (ѝ䱏), which is normally translated as a 

squadron, has only two to four aircraft, while a U.S. Air Force squadron has 15-24 aircraft. 

Therefore, some PLA terms are best translated into English, while other terms are best left in 

Chinese. For example, it is sometimes best to use certain Chinese terms, such as zongdui (ᙫ䱏), 

zhidui (᭟䱏), dadui (བྷ䱏), and zhongdui (ѝ䱏), rather than assigning them an English 

translation. 

The following sub-sections list key PLA terminology and explain their meaning based on 

analysis of how the PLA uses the terms in its newspapers, journals, and books. In some cases, 

the information comes from interviews with PLA officers. The terms are organized into the 

following four categories: 

x The Armed Forces and Military 

x CMC, Services, Branches/Arms, and Units 

x Military Region and Theater of War 

x PLA Leadership and Administrative and Functional Organizational Structure 

x Academic Institutions 

x Grades and Ranks 

x Informatization/Informatized 

The Armed Forces and Military 

Wuzhuang liliang (↖㻵࣋䟿): According to the 2002 China’s National Defense, China’s Armed 

Forces consists of three components: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA/ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ(, 

which is composed of active duty Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force personnel; 

the People’s Armed Police (PAP/Ӫ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏); and the Reserves (亴༷ᖩ䜘䱏) and 

 .(ޥ≁) Militia

Jundui (ߋ䱏): According to the PLA’s dictionary, jundui is a regular armed organization 

established by a state or political group for the preparation and implementation of war. The 2011 
51 

PLA Military Terminology translates jundui as PLA and army.1 China Military Encyclopedia

translates jundui as army and uses the same definition as the PLA dictionary. Jundui is often 

used in combinations, such as army building (ߋ䱏ᔪ䇮), which refers to all of the armed forces. 

Depending on the context, it is best to translate jundui as military, which connotes all of the 

armed forces, not just the PLA or ground forces. 

CMC, Services, Branches/Arms, and Units 

Zhongyang junwei (ѝཞߋင): Zhongyang junwei refers to the Military Commission (ߋһငઈ

Պ) of the Central Committee (ѝཞငઈՊ) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP/ѝഭޡӗ

ފ(, but even the Chinese use the acronym CMC. This organization has been in existence since 

the early days of the Red Army and was identified in English as the Military Affairs Commission 

(MAC) until the late 1980s, when it was renamed the Central Military Commission and given the 

acronym CMC. 

Dierpao bing (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ/Ҽ⛞): Dierpao bing refers to the Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), 

which is sometimes referred to simply as Second Artillery. Although it is an independent branch 

(⤜・ޥ (⿽and the PLA originally referred to it as Second Artillery Corps, the China Military 

Encyclopedia (2007) translated it as Second Artillery and the biennial China’s National Defense

has referred to it since 1998 as the Second Artillery Force and added the acronym PLASAF in 

2010. Meanwhile, the USG continues to refer to it as Second Artillery Corps in DoD’s Annual 

Report to Congress. For purposes of this book, Second Artillery Force and the acronym PLASAF 

are used. Quite often, authors mistakenly include Second Artillery Force as a service. To solve 

this problem, it is sometimes best to add a footnote the first time Second Artillery Force is 

identified and state that, for simplicity purposes, the three services and PLASAF will be referred 

to as “the services.” 

Junzhong (ߋ (⿽and (bingzhong; ޥ(⿽: The PLA has three services (ߋ(⿽, including the Army 

or Ground Forces (PLAA/䱶ߋ(, Navy (PLAN/⎧ߋ(, and Air Force (PLAAF/オߋ(, which are 

always listed in protocol order based their date of origin. Each service is composed of several 

branches/arms (bingzhong; ޥ(⿽. When Second Artillery, which is an independent branch, is 

noted along with the three services, it is always listed fourth in protocol order. The PLA uses zhu 

jun bing zhong (䈨ޥߋ(⿽, which is translated as the services and branches, to refer to all three 

services and Second Artillery Force. 

Jun (ߋ(: The PLA has jun leader-grade (↓ߋ㙼) and jun deputy leader-grade (ߋ࢟㙼) 

organizations and officers. While some dictionaries translate jun as army, most translate it as a 

corps. One of the problems is that, in the U.S. military, an army and corps are two different 

levels of organizations and a corps can be subordinate to an army. The PLA has several jun

leader-grade organizations, some of which incorporate the term jun and some of which do not. 

For PLA organizations that include the term jun, some translations use corps or army. 

Specifically, there are jituanjun (䳶ഒߋ(, which the USG calls group armies and biennial 

China’s National Defense and military encyclopedia call combined corps. 

 

1 PLA Military Terminology, 1997, p. 12 and 2011, p. 19. China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 2, p. 324. 
52 

Zhihui bu (ᤷᥕ䜘): This term is often translated as command or headquarters, depending on the 

situation. The PLA has engineering zhihui bu subordinate to various logistics headquarters, and 

the PAP has gold, hydropower, communications, and forestry zhihui bu, all of which are corps 

leader-grade organizations. The PLA also has also been creating joint zhihui bu (㚄ਸᤷᥕ䜘), 

which are usually translated as joint command headquarters, during certain exercises and the 

2008 Sichuan earthquake relief efforts.2

Zongdui (ᙫ䱏): There is no good translation for the term zongdui, which is often translated as 

general unit, general corps, general group, and contingent. Zongdui in the PLA and PAP are 

subordinate to zhihui bu. In the PLA, most zongdui are engineering organizations and are 

division leader-grade organizations. The PAP’s zongdui are subordinate to the gold, hydropower, 

communications, and forestry zhihui bu and are division leader-grade organizations. 

Zhidui (᭟䱏): There is no good translation for zhidui, which is often translated as flotilla, naval 

ship brigade, and detachment, so it is best not to translate it. Within the PLA, zhidui have the 

grade of division leader. In the PAP; however, it is a regiment leader-grade organization.3 

Dadui (བྷ䱏): Depending on the context, a dadui can be either a division deputy leader-, 

regiment leader- or a battalion leader-grade organization. The ground forces have various special 

operations force (SOF) dadui that are division deputy leader-grade organizations, some of which 

are being re-designated as brigades. Each service has several regiment leader-grade training 

dadui. The PLAN has regiment leader-grade vessel dadui, which are usually translated as 

squadrons.4 The PLAAF and Naval Aviation have battalion leader grade flight dadui (伎㹼བྷ䱏) 

and maintenance dadui (χ࣑བྷ䱏), which are usually translated as groups. 

Zhongdui (ѝ䱏): Depending on the context, a zhongdui can be translated as a squadron or just 

zhongdui. The PLAAF and Naval Aviation have company leader-grade flight and maintenance 

zhongdui, which are usually translated as squadrons. The problem with this, however, is that a 

PLAAF and Naval Aviation squadron has only 2-4 aircraft, while a USAF squadron has 15-24 

aircraft, so it may be misleading to a USAF audience. The PLAN has battalion leader-grade 

 

2 Information on a zhihui bu being created for the 2012 Queshan (⺞ ኡ) Joint Exercise was accessed at 

www.cssn.cn/news/495854.htm on 29 June 2012. Li Junbo, Yang Bin, and Yu Donghai, “An Explorative Analysis 

of the Organization and Command of Troops in Carrying out Disaster Rescue and Relief Operations,” Zhanshi Bao, 

4 July 2008. 

3

 To illustrate the lack of continuity among PLA Navy sources, the Navy Dictionary (p. 179) translates jianting 

zhidui (㡠㡷᭟䱏) as a naval ship brigade. The PLA Navy Encyclopedia (p. 1099) translates the same term as a ship 

detachment. China’s 2002 defense white paper translates zhidui as flotilla. Some Western publications, such as 

Jane’s Fighting Ships, translate zhidui as naval divisions. There is no good English equivalent for a PAP zhidui; 

however, China’s biennial defense white papers have translated PAP zhidui as detachments. Zhang Xusan, ed. Navy 

Dictionary (⎧ߋབྷ䇽ި), Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, October 1993. 4

 The PLA Navy Dictionary and the PLA Navy Encyclopedia translate jianting dadui (㡠㡷བྷ䱏) as a ship group. 

China’s National Defense 2002 translates the term as a squadron. Zhang Xusan, Navy Dictionary p. 180. Shi 

Yunsheng, ed. China Navy Encyclopedia (ѝഭ⎧ߋⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Haichao Publishing House, December 

1998, p. 1099. China’s Navy 2007 uses the term dadui and does not translate it into squadron. 
53 

vessel zhongdui, which do not have a good U.S. military equivalent term. Therefore, references 

to naval vessel zhongdui do not include an English translation.5

Bingtuan (ޥഒ): The 1997 China Military Encyclopedia translates bingtuan as “formation” and 

states that it is the generic term for corps, division, and brigade combat units, which are 

organized into campaign bingtuan and tactical bingtuan.

6

 Although the encyclopedia translates 

bingtuan as formation, it is best to just use bingtuan and add a footnote explaining what it is. 

From 1979 to 1988, the PLA had 18 grades, including a bingtuan leader (↓ޥഒ㙼) and 

bingtuan deputy leader (ޥ࢟ഒ㙼) grade between the military region and corps levels. In 1988, 

the bingtuan level was abolished. The bingtuan leader grade organizations were upgraded to MR 

deputy leader, and the bingtuan deputy leader grade organization were downgraded to corps 

leader. At that time, the seven MRAF and three fleet headquarters were upgraded from bingtuan

leader to MR deputy leader, and, as a result, the commanders became concurrent MR deputy 

commanders. Of note, although the 1997 edition of PLA Military Terminology has an entry for 

bingtuan, which states that it is the generic term for divisions and brigades, the 2011 edition does 

not have an entry.7 

Juntuan (ߋഒ): The 1997 China Military Encyclopedia translates juntuan as “large formation” 

and states that it is the generic term for “front army” (ᯩ䶒ߋ (and “group army” (䳶ഒߋ (

combat units. While front armies are strategic and campaign juntuan, group armies are campaign 

juntuan.

8

 Although the encyclopedia translates juntuan as large formation, it is best to just use 

juntuan and add a footnote explaining what it is. Based on analysis of how juntuan is used, it 

normally applies to the PLA’s MRAFs, fleets, group armies, and Second Artillery bases. Of note, 

although the 1997 edition of PLA Military Terminology has an entry for juntuan, which states 

that it is the generic term for group armies (corps) and above combat organizations, the 2011 

edition of PLA Military Terminology does not have an entry for juntuan.

9

Danwei (অս): To make the distinction between a budui (䜘䱏) and danwei, both of which can 

be translated as unit, a good workaround is to translate danwei as a work unit. The PLA uses the 

term danwei as a generic term that refers to all types of PLA organizations, including combat and 

non-combat units and organizations. In some cases, the PLA uses danwei to refer only to noncombat organizations, such as administrative organizations, academic institutions, and research 

institutes, etc. The exact meaning is usually clear from the context. 

Budui ( 䜘 䱏 ): The term budui is translated as unit. A budui refers to four specific 

organizations—corps (ߋ(, division (ᐸ), brigade (᯵), or regiment (ഒ). Budui are operational 

and support organizations that are normally involved in the campaign-level (ᡈᖩ) of war. 

 

5 China’s Navy 2007 uses the term zhongdui for vessels and does not translate it. 6 China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 2, p. 13. 7 PLA Military Terminology, September 1997, p. 156. The 1997 edition does not have an English translation for the 

term. 

8

 See China Military Encyclopedia, 1997, Vol 2, p. 401 for juntuan and p. 90 for front army. 9 PLA Military Terminology, September 1997, p. 155-156. 
54 

Jiceng (สቲ): Jiceng is usually translated as grassroots or grassroots units, which refers 

specifically to battalions, companies, and platoons, although some definitions include squads 

(ban; ⨝), which are led by NCOs. 

Fendui ( ࠶ 䱏 ): Different Chinese and English dictionaries translate fendui as subunit, 

detachment, element, battery (SAM or AAA), or flight (maintenance). For continuity sake, it is 

best to just refer to it as a fendui. Although the term fendui refers specifically to battalions, 

companies, and platoons, which together comprise the grassroots level, a fendui can also refer to 

an ad hoc grouping of personnel, usually at the platoon, company, or battalion level, organized 

for a particular function. For example, a logistics support fendui can consist of personnel from 

several different specialties. 

Budui (fendui)/䜘䱏 (࠶䱏): PLA articles often use the terms budui and fendui together as 

bu(fen)dui (䜘(࠶(䱏). This combination of terms refers to all operational organizations between 

the corps level and platoon level, and sometimes includes the squad level. When these terms are 

noted together, it is best to use units and subunits. 

Jidi (สൠ): Jidi is always translated as base. Within the PLA, there can be corps leader-, corps 

deputy leader-, and division leader-grade bases. The different types of bases include satellite 

launch and tracking bases, weapons test bases, Second Artillery bases, PLAN support bases, and 

training bases. The person in command of a base can be a commander (ਨԔઈ) or a director (ѫ

ԫ). The difference between the two terms and their responsibilities is not clear. 

Military Region and Theater of War 

Junqu (ߋ४) and zhanqu (ᡈ४): The best translation for junqu is military region (MR), but the 

PLA translates it as military area command. The best translation for zhanqu is theater, while the 

PLA translates it as theater of war and occasionally just uses theater.10 Some non-government 

Western publications translate zhanqu as warzone. 

The PLA has systematically organized its forces geographically into five field armies (1947), 5 

MRs (1948), 6 MRs (1949), 13 MRs (1955), 11 MRs (1969), and 7 MRs in 1985. Since the early 

2000s, it has been in the process of morphing (ࡍ↕ᡀර) the 7 MRs into zhanqu (ᡈ४). As 

noted earlier, unfortunately, no explanation has been given to what morphing means; however, 

the implication is that, even though they still have the same provincial boundaries, more training 

and exercises are occurring across MR borders and between headquarters in each MR/theater. 

Furthermore, during exercises, each MR is referred to as a theater. The stated goal is to have a 

command and control structure that is combined during peacetime and wartime (ᒣᡈ㔃ਸ).11

 

10 Ibid, p. 77-78. The dictionary translates zhanqu as theater of war and defines it as a strategic area (ᡈ⮕४) 

without mentioning MRs. China’s 2006 defense white paper translated zhanqu as theaters of war, the 2008 version 

translated it as theaters, and the 2010 version translated it as military area command, which implied that the MRs 

and theaters were synonymous. The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on the PLA has only 

used the term theater or theater of war a few times since 2006, which is usually a direct quote from China’s defense 

white paper. It has not used the term warzone. 

11 Liao Xilong, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform,” PLA Daily Online, 16 

December 2008. 
55 

Today, China is divided into seven junqu (ߋ४), which the PLA translates as military area 

command and the USG translates as military region. Each MR covers two or more provinces/ 

autonomous regions and includes the four centrally-administered cities (municipalities) of 

Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. MRs are MR leader-grade organizations and are 

named after the city in which their headquarters is located. In 2012, the seven MRs (in protocol 

order) are structured as follows: 

x Shenyang MR, consists of the Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang MDs and includes the 

northeastern part of Inner Mongolia (mostly east of the 120 degree line of longitude12) 

x Beijing MR, consists of the Beijing and Tianjin Garrisons and the Hebei, Shanxi, and 

Inner Mongolia (west to about the 107 degree line of longitude and east to about the 120 

degree line of longitude) MDs 

x Lanzhou MR, consists of the Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Nanjiang 

(southern Xinjiang) MDs and the western part of Inner Mongolia (east to about the 107 

degree line of longitude) 

x Jinan MR, consists of the Shandong and Henan MDs 

x Nanjing MR, consists of the Shanghai Garrison and the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, 

and Jiangxi MDs 

x Guangzhou MR, consists of the Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and Hubei MDs 

x Chengdu MR, consists of the Chongqing Garrison and the Sichuan, Xizang (Tibet), 

Guizhou, and Yunnan MDs. 

PLA Headquarters, Leadership, and Department Terminology 

This subsection provides information about PLA headquarters, leadership, and department 

terminology. 

Headquarters Terminology 

For the most part, the PLA does not have a specific term for headquarters. For example, the 

terms junqu (ߋ४) refer to a Military Region as well as the Military Region Headquarters. The 

meaning is usually obvious from the context. Junqu siling bu ( ߋ४ਨԔ䜘 ) is often 

mistranslated as Military Region Headquarters, when, in fact, it is the Military Region 

Headquarters Department. 

The one exception is that the PLA has begun to use the term zhihui bu (㚄ਸᤷᥕ䜘) to refer to 

existing organizations that are designated as a “command headquarters” during wartime.13

Leadership Terminology 

The PLA has multiple terms for its leaders and leadership organizations. The key terms are 

discussed below. 

 

12 The boundaries of the Shenyang, Beijing, and Lanzhou MRs are depicted differently from previous maps of the 

Military Regions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” p. 73. 

13 Zhang Yuliang, Editor, Science of Campaigns (ᡈᖩᆖ), Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2006. 
56 

Lingdao (亶ሬ), zhuguan (ѫᇈ), and shouzhang (俆䮯): Various Chinese dictionaries translate 

these three terms as follows: lingdao is translated as leader(s), leadership, or leading; shouzhang

is translated as leading cadre or leading officer; and zhuguan is translated as principal officer. 

For all practical purposes these three terms are synonymous, which can generically be called the 

command staff. Based on interviews with PLA officers, the PLA’s command staff includes the 

commander, political commissar (PC), deputy commanders, deputy PCs, and directors of the 

Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment/Armament Departments. Furthermore, based 

on the interviews, the only real difference among lingdao, shouzhang, and zhuguan, is that 

zhuguan do not include the deputy commanders and deputy political commissars. 

Zhihuiyuan (ᤷᥕઈ): Zhihuiyuan appears to be the generic term for commander compared to 

specific terms such as silingyuan (ਨԔઈ) or zhang (䮯), as in division commander (ᐸ䮯). 

Based on how zhihuiyuan is used, it sometimes refers to a single person and other times it refers 

to the leaders (亶ሬ) and principal officers (ѫᇈ) as a group, to include the commander, 

political commissar, deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, and directors of the four 

first-level departments (Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment). The Air Force 

Dictionary translates zhihuiyuan as commander and defines it as the leading cadre (亶ሬᒢ䜘) at 

each level who are responsible for combat/operations command (֌ᡈᤷᥕ). The commander’s 

primary combat/operations responsibilities are organize intelligence and reconnaissance (ᛵᣕז

ሏ), issue decisions (ᇊлߣᗳ), clarify missions/tasks (᰾⺞ԫ࣑(, formulate combat plans (ࡦ

ᇊ֌ᡈ䇑ࡂ(, organize coordinated actions and support (㓴㓷ॿ਼ࣘ֌઼⿽਴؍䳌) [within the 

PLAAF and with other services and branches], inspect combat preparations situation (Ựḕ֌ᡈ

߶༷ᛵߥ(, and implement battlefield coordination and control (ᇎᯭᡈ൪ॿ䈳о᧗ࡦ(

14

According to PLA Military Terminology, which does not translate each term into English, 

zhihuiyuan is 1) The principal military [track] officer(s) (ߋһѫᇈ) at every level in the military; 

2) The leading cadre (亶ሬᒢ䜘) at each level who is/are responsible for combat/operations 

command (֌ᡈᤷᥕ) or military functional work (ߋһ㹼᭯ᐕ֌); 3) The general term (⌋〠) 

for military cadre. 15 It is also defined as the officer(s) who is/are responsible for all command of 

combat/operations at a particular level (ሩᴥ㓗֌ᡈ䍏䍓ޘ䜘ᤷᥕ䍏䍓Ⲵߋᇈ).16 

Zhihui junguan ( ᤷᥕߋᇈ) and zhihui ganbu ( ᤷᥕᒢ䜘): According to various PLA 

publications, such as the Military Cadre Work volume of the China Military Encyclopedia, 

zhihui junguan is translated as commanding officer and is defined as officers who have the grade 

of platoon leader and above and are in one of the four PLA officer career tracks—military, 

political, logistics, and equipment—and are identified as military commanding officers (ߋһᤷ

ᥕߋᇈ), political commanding officers (᭯⋫Ცភߋᇈ), logistics commanding officers (ਾऔᤷ

ᥕߋᇈ), and equipment commanding officers (㻵༷ᤷᥕߋᇈ). These tracks are discussed later 

 

14 Zhu Rongchang, ed. Air Force Dictionary, p. 71. 15 PLA Military Terminology, 1997, p. 132 and 2011, p. 171. 16 Sun Ruling, Basic Introduction to Combat/Operations Command (֌ᡈᤷᥕส⹰ᾲ䇪), Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, May 2011, p. 101. 
57 

in Part 1. Commanding officers are categorized by their career track, grade, missions/tasks, and 

by their service and branch.17

Canmouzhang (৲䈻䮯): Canmouzhang is translated as chief of staff. According to Discussion of 

Headquarters Department Building, the chief of staff is the director of the Headquarters 

Department (ਨԔ䜘䜘䮯). 18 In 1996, the CMC approved PLA Headquarters Department 

Regulations (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋਨԔ䜘ᶑֻ), which specified the chief of staff’s responsibilities. 

First, the regulations state that the responsibilities identified in the previous regulations that “the 

chief of staff at each level is the unit’s chief of staff” was changed to read “the chief of staff is 

one of the members of the units’ command staff (৲䈻䮯ᱟ䜘䱏Ⲵ俆䮯ѻа).” Furthermore, the 

regulations clarified that, as one of the members of the units’ command staff, “the chief of staff 

assists the principal officers (e.g., other members of the command staff) lead military building 

(ॿࣙѫᇈ亶ሬߋһᔪ䇮); he is the primary person responsible for organizing and coordinating 

commanding military actions (ᤷᥕߋһ㹼ࣘⲴѫ㾱㓴㓷㘵઼ॿ䈳㘵); and he directly 

organizes and leads the building and work of the Headquarters Department (ⴤ᧕㓴㓷亶ሬਨԔ

䜘Ⲵᔪ䇮઼ᐕ֌).” The regulations further specify the following four issues: 

x As one of the members of the units’ command staff, the chief of staff is considered one of 

the unit’s leaders along with the principal officers and deputy grade command staff. 

x The chief of staff assists the principal officers with their work, is directly responsible to 

the principal officers (military and political officers as one), and has “overall 

responsibility” for assisting the principal officers with military work.19

x Concerning military work, the chief of staff is the “primary organizer” among the 

multitude of people who assist the principal officers. The chief of staff has the 

responsibility for organizing overall unit military building and commanding unit military 

actions based on the principal officers’ decisions, resolutions, and intentions. 

x The chief of staff is the “primary organizer” responsible for implementing the principal 

officers’ decisions, determination, and intentions. He is also responsible for coordinating 

all of the relevant military building work and military actions with the unit’s 

Headquarters Department, Political Department (Division), Logistics Department 

(Division), and Equipment Technical Department (Division). 

According to Science of Campaigns, “besides being one of the commanding personnel, the chief 

of staff and participating along with the command staff in all command activities, the chief of 

staff is primarily responsible for coordinating and executing everything within the Headquarters 

Department concerning the campaign decision, plan, and control, as well as guiding the relevant 

 

17 “Commanding Officer” (ᤷᥕߋᇈ) in Xu Yaoyuan, ed., Military Cadre Work (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌), 84, in China 

Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), November 2006. Su Shubo, Yang Qi, Yu Zhiyong, and Lin Cheng, eds., 

Military Cadre Work Handbook (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌᡻޼(, Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2011, p. 

35-36. 

18 Discussion of Headquarters Department Building, p. 152-153. 19 Note, “military work” (ߋһᐕ֌) refers to everything that comes out of the Headquarters Department, as 

compared to political work, logistics work, and equipment work. It also equates to anything that officers in the 

“military career track” are involved in. 
58 

work by the Logistics Department and Equipment Department”.20

Is it General Staff Headquarters or General Staff Department? 

China Military Encyclopedia (1997 and 2007) and the China’s National Defense in 1998 

translated zongcanmou bu (ᙫ৲Ḁ䜘) as General Staff Department. Since 2000, China’s 

National Defense and the Ministry of National Defense website (created in 2009) have used 

General Staff Headquarters, along with department for the three other general departments.21

Meanwhile, DoD’s Annual Report to Congress has consistently used General Staff Department 

(GSD). 

Is It General Equipment, Armaments, or Armament Department? 

In 1998, the PLA created the zongzhuangbei bu (ᙫ㻵༷䜘) by merging the military personnel in 

the existing Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

(COSTIND/、ᐕင) with the General Staff Department’s Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘) and 

the General Logistics Department’s Ordnance/Armament Department (ߋỠ䜘), along with the 

relevant weapons and equipment research and development (R&D) organizations into a new 

general department.22 The Chinese name given to the department was zongzhuangbei bu, which, 

literally translated is General Equipment Department. However, based on interviews with PLA 

officials, there was a debate within the PLA as to the actual mission of the new department, 

which was responsible for overseeing the birth-to-death of all PLA weapons and equipment. 

Many believed that it went beyond equipment and should encompass ordnance/armament. The 

compromise was to call it zongzhuangbei bu in Chinese but General Armaments Department 

(GAD) in English. Although the 1998 edition of China’s National Defense translated it as 

General Armament Department, all successive biennial editions of China’s National Defense and 

the Ministry of National Defense’s website have translated it as General Armaments Department. 

On the other hand, the 2007 edition of China Military Encyclopedia translates it as General 

Equipment Department.23 Meanwhile, DoD’s 2002 Annual Report to Congress first identified it 

as the General Equipment Department (GED). Since 2006, it has inconsistently used General 

Armament Department (GAD) and General Armaments Department. 

For purposes of this book, General Armament Department (GAD) is used. Even though the book 

uses General Armament Department, it uses Equipment Department rather than Armament 

Department for the equivalent departments in the services and branches. 

 

20 Science of Campaigns, p. 130. 21 See http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/index.htm. Neither China’s National Defense nor the Ministry of 

National Defense website has used an acronym, such as GSH or GSD, for the General Staff 

Department/Headquarters. 

22 The PLA’s term junxie (ߋỠ) can be translated as ordnance or armament. 23 Military Structure (ࡦߋ(, Vol 1, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), December 2007, p. 81-82. 

China’s Military Encyclopedia’s (Second Version) PLA Military History (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋਢ), December 2007, 

Vol 1, p. 69-71. 
59 

Department Terminology 

Jiguan (χޣ (and si da bu (ഋབྷ䜘): These are best translated as administrative and functional 

departments.24 For all practical purposes, these terms are synonymous and refer to the PLA’s 

Four General Departments (GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD), as well as the four departments in 

lower echelon headquarters—Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), 

Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘), and Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘).25 The PLA also considers 

the four General Departments (ഋᙫ䜘)— General Staff Department or GSD (zong canmou bu; 

ᙫ৲䈻䜘), General Political Department or GPD (zong zhengzhi bu; ᙫ᭯⋫䜘), General 

Logistics Department or GLD (zong houqin bu; ᙫਾऔ䜘), and General Armament Department 

or GAD (zong zhuangbei bu; ᙫ㻵༷䜘)—as departments (jiguan) for the CMC. 

Siling bu (ਨԔ䜘) and Canmouzhang (৲䈻䮯): The PLA translates si ling bu as Headquarters 

Department and canmouzhang as chief of staff. Note that the PLA does not have a term that 

translates as headquarters, such as a military region (MR) headquarters or PLAAF Headquarters. 

For example, the term kongjun (オߋ (refers to the PLAAF in general or to PLAAF Headquarters, 

and the exact meaning is usually clear from the context. Kongjun siling bu (オߋਨԔ䜘) or 

kongsi (オਨ) is often mistranslated as PLAAF Headquarters, but it refers to the PLAAF’s 

Headquarters Department not PLAAF Headquarters. In the PLA, the chief of staff is the director 

of the Headquarters Department. He is not equivalent to the chief of staff in a U.S. military 

organization. 

Xingzheng bumen (㹼᭯䜘䰘): The best translation is administrative department(s). No Chinese 

military dictionaries provide a good definition of this term, but they do have groups of terms 

under this category. Based on the term’s usage in PLA writings and interviews with PLA 

officials, the term generally refers to the Logistics Department and Equipment Department and to 

most of their subordinate organizations. It also refers to some, but not all, of the subordinate 

organizations in Headquarters and Political Departments. These departments conduct work that 

impacts upon daily life, including support, supplies, and housing. 

Yewu bumen (ъ࣑䜘䰘): The best translation is functional department(s). No available Chinese 

military dictionaries provide a good definition of this term. Based on the term’s usage in PLA 

writings and interviews with PLA officials, the term generally refers to anything that impacts on 

operations. Specific functional departments include operations, intelligence, training, finance, 

and health. 

Academic Institutions 

There are five key terms affiliated with the PLA’s academic institutions. Each of them is 

discussed below. 

 

24 Academic institutions have two types of “departments.” Jiguan ( χ ޣ ( and bumen ( 䜘 䰘 ) include the 

administrative and functional departments (Training Department, Political Department, Basic Department, and 

Scientific Research Department), and academic departments (xi; パーセント). In most, if not all, of our studies we identify 

these as “academic departments” to make the distinction. 

25 Some dictionaries and Chinese English translations of PLA materials translate jiguan as organ. 
60 

Yuanxiao (䲒ṑ): This is the generic term for all of the military’s education organizations. It is 

often translated as universities and colleges, universities and schools, colleges and schools, or 

academies and schools, etc. The best translation is academic institutions. It is often seen as 

jundui yuanxiao (ߋ䱏䲒ṑ), which is best translated as military academic institutions, because it 

also includes the PAP as well as the PLA. 

Daxue ( བྷ ᆖ ): This is best translated as university. Although this is a daxue, the 

commandant/president is identified as a xiaozhang (ṑ䮯). 

Xueyuan (ᆖ䲒): This is the most confusing of all the institution names. Although it is simply a 

xueyuan in Chinese, it is often translated in English as college, academy, institute, or school. 

Therefore, the problem is not the Chinese term but the English translation. One will find a 

combination of all of them in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database and 

on the web. For example, gongcheng xueyuan (ᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) might be noted as the College of 

Engineering, Engineering Academy, Institute of Engineering, and School of Engineering. The 

best place to find the “official” English name is the institutions’ website; however, not every 

institution has its own website, and many of those that have one do not have an English 

translation. Even though several PLA dictionaries and encyclopedias have entries for some or all 

of the institutions, there is oftentimes a lack of consistency in the translation. As a result, analysts 

will have to make a decision on which one to use based on all of the sources available. 

Xuexiao (ᆖṑ): The best translation is school. In the mid-1980s, the PLA upgraded all of its 

existing officer xuexiao to xueyuan. Today, the only remaining xuexiao are the six 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) schools (༛ᇈᆖṑ). Each NCO school specializes in only a 

few areas, such as the Air Force Dalian Communications School and the Wuhan Ordnance NCO 

School, and offers only secondary and senior technical degrees, not bachelor’s degrees; however, 

29 officer institutions offer secondary and/or senior technical degree programs for NCOs. 

Xi ( パーセント ): The best translation is academic department so as not to confuse it with an 

administrative and functional department (䜘). 

Grade Terminology26

The PLA has several terms individually and combinations thereof that are translated as grades: 

x Deng (ᄬ) is translated as grade 

x Ji (㓗) is translated as level or grade 

x Dengji (ᄬ㓗) is translated as grade 

x Jibie (㓗࡛ (is translated as level or grade 

x Zhiwu dengji (㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) together is translated as grade, but PLA books usually translate 

zhiwu (㙼࣑ (as post as compared to gangwei (዇ս) which refers to a billet. 

x Junxian dengji (ߋ㺄ᄬ㓗) refers to the relationship between ranks and grades 

 

26 This information was accessed at “System of Cadre Grades,” in China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), 

December 2006, Military Cadre Work (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌) Volume 39, p. 48-50. 
61 

Informatization/Informatized 

Xinxihua (ؑ᚟ॆ): Depending on the context, the best translation for xinxihua is informatization 

or informatized, but it is also known as informationization. Informatization, broadly, refers to the 

utilization of information technology (IT) by government, military, academia, and industry to 

promote innovation, enhance productivity, and improve the quality of economic growth and 

social development. China’s central government released a 2006-2020 National Informatization 

Development Strategy outlining its objectives for informatizing its society and infrastructure. 

China’s concept of informationization is based on Deng Xiaoping theory, Jiang Zemin’s “Three 

Represents” ideology, and Hu Jintao’s scientific development concept. 
62 

Appendix 2: PLA and PAP Grade and Rank Structure 

Appendix B provides eight tables showing key billets for organizations with the following grades 

along with the primary and secondary ranks for the officers holding the billets: 

x CMC Member (Four General Departments) 

x Military region leader 

x Military region deputy leader 

x Corps leader 

x Corps deputy leader 

x Division leader grade 

x Division deputy leader grade 

x Regiment leader grade 

x PAP grade structure 

In the following tables, “leader” refers to the commander, political commissar (PC), deputy 

commanders, and deputy PCs. Note that, even though NDU, AMS, academic institutions, and 

research institutions have different administrative and functional department structures than the 

other combat/operational and support organizations, there is a logical grade structure from top to 

bottom. 

Table 11 provides the grade structure for the Four General Departments (GSD, GPD, GLD, and 

GAD). Whereas second-level departments (䜘䰘) include departments (䜘) and bureaus (ተ), 

third-level departments include departments, bureaus, and divisions (༴). 
63 

Table 11: CMC Member Organizations (Four General Departments) 

Grade GSD (Ranks) GPD (Ranks) GLD (Ranks) GAD (Ranks)

CMC Member Chief of the 

General Staff 

(GEN) 

Director (GEN) Director (GEN) Director (GEN) 

MR Leader Deputy Chiefs 

(GEN/LTG) 

Deputy Directors 

(GEN/LTG) 

Political Commissar 

(GEN) 

Political Commissar 

(GEN) 

MR Deputy Leader Deputy Directors & 

PCs (LTG/MG) 

Deputy Directors & 

PCs (LTG/MG) 

Corps Leader 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

2nd Level Departments 

& Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

2nd Level Departments 

& Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy 

Leader 

2nd

 Level 

Department 

Deputies 

(MG/SCOL)1

2nd

 Level 

Department 

Deputies 

(MG/SCOL) 

2nd Level Department 

Deputies (MG/SCOL) 

2nd Level Department 

Deputies (MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader 3rd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

3rd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

3rd Level Departments 

& Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

3rd Level Departments 

& Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

3rd

 Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Table 12 shows the structure for military region leader-grade organizations, which include what 

the PLA calls “12+1.” The “12” refers to the seven MR Headquarters, PLAN Headquarters, 

PLAAF Headquarters, PLASAF Headquarters, NDU, and AMS, and the “1” refers to PAP 

Headquarters. It also includes the GAD’s Science and Technology Commission (ᙫ㻵、ᢰငઈ

Պ). The first-level departments (䜘䰘) for each organization other than AMS, NDU, and the 

S&T Commission are departments (䜘) that have subordinate second-level departments (䜘), 

which, in turn, have subordinate third-level divisions (༴). 

 

1 The Meteorological & Hydrological Bureau, which is a third-level department under the GSD Operations 

Department, is also a corps deputy leader-grade organization. 
64 

Table 12: Military Region Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks) 

CMC Member PLAN, PLAAF, & 

PLASAF 

Commander (GEN) 

 

MR Leader MR Commander; 

MR, PLAN, 

PLAAF, and 

PLASAF PC 

(GEN/LTG) 

 

MR Deputy 

Leader

Deputy 

Commanders & 

Deputy PCs 

(LTG/MG) 

Chief of Staff 

(LTG/MG) 

Director 

(LTG/MG) 

 

Corps Leader Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(MG/LTG) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy 

Leader

 Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Deputy Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Regiment Leader 3rd

 Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments and 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment Deputy 

Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Table 13 shows the structure for military region deputy leader-grade organizations, which 

include those in the following list. With the exception of the Hong Kong Garrison and Xinjiang 

and Tibet Military Districts, the commander of each of the other organizations is concurrently a 

military region deputy commander, and some, but not all, of their political commissars are 

concurrent military region deputy political commissars. Each first-level department (䜘䰘) is a 

department (䜘) that has subordinate second-level divisions (༴) and third-level offices (、). 
65 

x 7 MRAF Headquarters 

x 3 PLAN Fleet Headquarters 

x Beijing Garrison and Hong Kong Garrison 

x National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) 

x Xinjiang Military District and Tibet Military District 

Table 13: Military Region Deputy Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks) 

MR Deputy 

Leader

MRAF, Fleet, & 

Beijing Garrison 

Commander/PC 

(LTG/MG) 

 

Corps Leader Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(MG/LTG) 

Chief of Staff 

(MG/LTG) 

Director 

(MG/LTG) 

 

Corps Deputy 

Leader

 Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(MG/SCOL) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Director/PC 

(MG/SCOL) 

Director/PC 

(MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader Deputy 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Deputy Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Regiment Leader 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment Deputy 

Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments and 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Battalion Leader 3rd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 
66 

Table 14 shows the structure for corps leader-grade organizations shown below. Each first-level 

department (䜘䰘) is a department (䜘) that has subordinate second-level divisions (༴) and 

third-level offices (、). 

x 18 group armies (the PLA calls these army combined corps) 

x Second Artillery bases 

x 15th Airborne Corps 

x 3 garrisons (Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing) 

x 25 of the 27 military districts 

x GAD satellite launch centers 

x Some PLA academic institutions 

x Some PLA academies/colleges and universities 

 Academic institutions have a Training Department (䇝㓳䜘) that serves as the 

Headquarters Department, a Political Department ( ᭯⋫䜘 ), a School/College/ 

Academy Affairs Department (ṑ࣑䜘/䲒࣑䜘) that manages the facilities, and a 

Graduate School (⹄ウ⭏䲒) 

 Some academic institutions also have a Scientific Research Department (、⹄䜘) 

x Almost all General Department second-level departments and bureaus [Note: The GSD’s 

third-level Meteorological and Hydrological Bureau (ᙫ৲֌ᡈ䜘≄䊑≤᮷ተ) and 

Survey, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau (ᙫ৲⍻㔈ሬ㡚ተ), which are under the 

Operations Department, are an exception and are corps deputy leader-grade 

organizations.] 

x GAD space mission-related and weapons testing bases 

x Beijing and Xinjiang PAP zongdui headquarters 

 
67 

Table 14: Corps Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks)

Corps Leader Commander/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

 

Corps Deputy 

Leader

Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(MG/SCOL) 

Chief of Staff 

(MG/SCOL) 

Director 

(MG/SCOL) 

 

Division Leader Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(SCOL/MG) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Director/PC 

(SCOL/MG) 

Director/PC 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(COL/SCOL) 

Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(COL/SCOL) 

Regiment 

Leader

 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Battalion 

Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Table 15 shows the structure for corps deputy-leader grade organizations shown below. Each 

first-level department (䜘䰘) is a department (䜘) that has subordinate second-level divisions (༴) 

and third-level offices (、): 

x PLAN support bases 

x Fleet aviation headquarters 

x Some PLAAF Command Posts 

x Some weapons testing bases 

x Some PLA academies/colleges and universities 

 Academic institutions have a Training Department (䇝㓳䜘) that serves as the 

Headquarters Department, a Political Department ( ᭯⋫䜘 ), a School/College/ 

Academy Affairs Department (ṑ࣑䜘/䲒࣑䜘) that manages the facilities, and a 
68 

Graduate School (⹄ウ⭏䲒) 

 Some academic institutions also have a Scientific Research Department (、⹄䜘) 

x PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF Equipment Research Academies (㻵༷⹄ウ䲒) 

 Each academy has an S&T Department (、ᢰ䜘) that serves as the Headquarters 

Department, a Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), and Academy Affairs Department (䲒

࣑䜘) that manages the facilities

Table 15: Corps Deputy Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks)

Corps Deputy 

Leader

Commander/PC 

(MG/SCOL) 

 

Division Leader Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(SCOL/MG) 

Chief of Staff 

(SCOL/MG) 

Director 

(SCOL/MG) 

 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(COL/SCOL) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Director/PC 

(COL/SCOL) 

Director/PC 

(COL/SCOL) 

Regiment 

Leader

 Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(COL/LTC) 

Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Battalion 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Company 

Leader 

 3rd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

Table 16 shows the structure for division leader-grade organizations as shown below. Each firstlevel department (䜘) has subordinate second-level offices (、): 

x Army divisions 

x Military Subdistricts (MSD/ߋ४ⴱԭߋ४) 
69 

x PLAN garrisons and vessel zhidui 

x PLAAF divisions and some command posts 

x Second Artillery engineering zongdui 

x Most PLA academic xueyuan and research institutes, but their administrative and 

functional organizations are organized different than operational and support 

organizations 

x Most PLA training bases 

x All PAP zongdui headquarters except for Beijing and Xinjiang 

Table 16: Division Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks)

Division Leader Commander/PC 

(SCOL/MG) 

 

Division Deputy 

Leader

Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(COL/SCOL) 

Chief of Staff 

(COL/SCOL) 

Director 

(COL/SCOL) 

 

Regiment 

Leader

 Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(COL/LTC) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(COL/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Battalion 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Table 17 shows the structure for division deputy leader-grade organizations, which include Army, 

Marine Corps, PLAAF, and PLASAF brigades. Each first-level department (䜘) has subordinate 

second-level offices (、). [Note: The PLA does not have a brigade leader or deputy leader grade. 

Brigade leaders hold the grade of division deputy leader, and brigade deputy leaders hold the 

grade of regiment leader.] 

 
70 

Table 17: Division Deputy Leader (Brigade Leader) Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks)

Division Deputy 

Leader

Commander/PC 

(COL/SCOL) 

 

Regiment 

Leader

Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(COL/LTC) 

Chief of Staff 

(COL/LTC) 

Director 

(COL/LTC) 

 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader 

 Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(COL/LTC) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(COL/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(COL/LTC) 

Battalion 

Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

& Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

2nd Level 

Departments & 

Directors 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Company 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(CPT/1LT) 

Table 18 shows the structure for regiment leader-grade organizations, as shown below. Note that 

regiment headquarters have a Headquarters Department, but the Political, Logistics, and 

Equipment organizations are divisions (༴) not departments. Each first-level department and 

division has subordinate second-level branches (㛑). 

x Army regiments 

x PLAN vessel dadui, destroyers, and some conventional powered submarines (Kilo, Song, 

Yuan) 

x PLAAF regiments and airfield stations 

x Training dadui

x Composite depots (㔬ਸԃᓃ) 

 
71 

Table 18: Regiment Leader Organizations 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Division 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Division 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Division 

(Ranks)

Regiment 

Leader

Commander/PC 

(COL/LTC) 

 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader 

Deputy Commanders 

& Deputy PCs 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Chief of Staff 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Director 

(LTC/MAJ) 

 

Battalion Leader Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Director/PC 

(MAJ/LTC) 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Deputy 

Directors/PCs 

(CPT/MAJ) 

Company 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Departments 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/1LT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/1LT) 

Company 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd

 Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(1LT/CPT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(1LT/CPT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(1LT/CPT) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(1LT/CPT) 

People’s Armed Police Organizational Structure 

The bullets below provide general information about the grade structure for the PAP, which is 

based on the PLA’s 15-grade structure.2 The organizational and grade structure, including firstand second-level departments, is the same as that for the MR, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF 

Headquarters shown in Table 12. For more detail, see the PAP Chapter in this book. 

x PAP Headquarters (ᙫ䜘) is an MR leader-grade organization 

 The Headquarters Department and Political Department are MR deputy leader-grade 

organizations 

 The Logistics Department and Equipment Department are corps leader-grade 

organizations 

x Corps leader-grade organizations 

 Beijing and Xinjiang zongdui (ᙫ䱏) 

 Gold (哴䠁), Hydropower (≤⭥), Communications (Ӕ䙊), and Forestry (἞᷇) 

zhihui bu (ᤷᥕ䜘) 

x Corps deputy leader-grade organizations 

 All other province, municipality, and autonomous region zongdui (਴ⴱ,ⴤ䗆ᐲ,㠚⋫

४↖䆖ᙫ䱏) 

x Division leader-grade organizations 

 

2

 Information accessed at http://blog.renren.com/share/232083560/7512174767 and China Military Encyclopedia

(Second Edition), Military Organization (ࡦߋ (Vol 1, p. 53-54, and Vol 2, p. 355-357. 
72 

 14 mobile divisions (χࣘᐸ), which are four-digit 86xx and 87xx organizations 

 Gold, Hydropower, Communications, and Forestry zongdui

 The Gold and Hydropower zongdui are numbered 1st to 3rd (e.g., 哴䠁ᅮаᙫ䱏) 

 The Communications zongdui are numbered 1st to 2nd

x Regiment leader-grade organizations 

 Subordinate zhidui (᭟䱏) to each type of division leader grade-organization noted 

above 
73 

Appendix 3: PLA Academic Institutions 

This appendix includes information in Table 1 about the PLA’s academic institutions prior to 

2011, which is followed by a list of the known changes that occurred starting in 2011. 

There does not appear to be a single PLA source, including chinamil.com (PLA Daily online), 

with an official list of all PLA academic institutions. Part of the reason for this is that several 

xueyuan and/or academic departments have merged into universities or been subordinated to 

universities. Some lists include them, while others do not. Other xueyuan have changed their 

name or been abolished. In addition, the PLAAF’s seven flight colleges and six PLA NCO 

schools are sometimes, but not always, list in part or in full. 

Table 19 provides a list of PLA academic institutions identified prior to 2011 from two sources: 

x Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary, which was published 

by National Defense University Press in July 2009.3 The list identifies only four of the 

six NCO schools and identifies PLAAF flight colleges in general but does not identify 

them individually. 

x The 2007 edition of China Military Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ) has a threevolume series that covers the PLA’s history. Volume 3 of this series has an entry for all 

of the PLA’s academic institutions that includes the English name, a short history, and 

the organizational structure.4 The entries include profiles of almost every PLA academic 

institution, including ones that have been abolished or merged with other institutions. 

Prior to 2004, the Ministry of Education (ᮉ㛢䜘) created a National Code List for Institutions 

that Award Degrees (ޘഭ਴ᆖսᦸҸঅսԓ⸱). The list, which includes academic and 

research institutions, consists of a five-digit unit code (অսԓ⸱) and the official name (অս਽

〠) for each institution.5 A new list was published in 2010 that includes what appears to be all of 

the PLA’s academic institutions except the six NCO schools.6 The 2010 list includes several 

PLA institutions that were not on the pre-2004 list, and some of the numbers have changed. The 

most likely reason for this was that the first list did not have all of the PLA academic institutions, 

they were not in protocol order, some of the institutions have changed their name, and there were 

not enough empty spots left to accommodate changes. Table 19 provides the code for each of 

 

3

Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary (⧠ԓߋṑᮉ㛢䗎ި), Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, July 2009, Section 14, p. 398-423. Additional information was accessed at 

http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jsyx/yxjs.htm, http://school.freekaoyan.com/, and http://xpb.xidian.edu.cn/show.aspx? 

id=456&cid=39 on 19 February 2011. 

4 China’s Military Encyclopedia’s (Second Version) PLA Military History (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋਢ) Vol 3, Beijing: 

Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, December 2007. 5

 Information accessed at www.ynni.edu.cn/grs/Ufl/article/ޘഭ਴ᆖսᦸҸঅսԓ⸱ on 16 February 2011. 6 Information accessed at http://njc.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=48 and http://njc.chinacourt.org/upload/ 

1273742222466054636.doc on 23 February 2011. The date of the information was 13 May 2010. 
74 

academic institution. The institutions appear to be organized using a basic protocol order of joint, 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery.7

It should be noted that, while Table 19 includes the English translation that is available in 

column two from the Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education Dictionary for 

each institution, they do not necessarily match those in column three from the China Military 

Encyclopedia or on china.mil. For example, the dictionary and encyclopedia both use Naval 

Command College, but the dictionary uses Naval Submarine College while the encyclopedia 

uses Navy Submarine Academy. The biggest difference is whether xueyuan is translated as 

college or academy, while in some cases it is translated as university. Therefore, given the 

different translations available, the names in Table 19 are merely representative of the official 

name and should not necessarily be taken as the official name. The table also includes the grade 

identified for each institution.8

Table 19: Pre-2011 PLA Academic Institutions, MOE Codes, and Grade 

Chinese Name English Name (Dictionary) English Name (Encyclopedia) MOE 

Code 

Grade 

ഭ䱢བྷᆖ National Defense University 90001 MR Ldr 

ഭ䱢、ᆖᢰδབྷᆖ National Defense University 

of Science and Technology 

National University of Defense 

Technology 

90002 MR Dep 

Ldr 

⸣ᇦᒴ䱶ߋᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Shijiazhuang Army Command College 90003 Corps 

Ldr 

ইӜ䱶ߋᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Nanjing Army Command College 90004 Corps 

Ldr 

ؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ PLA Information and Engineering University 90005 Corps 

Ldr 

䀓᭮ߋ⨶ᐕབྷᆖ PLA Technology University PLA University of Science and 

Technology 

90006 Corps 

Ldr 

ഭ䱵ޣパーセントᆖ䲒 PLA International Studies 

University 

PLA Institute of International 

Relations 

90007 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䀓᭮ߋཆഭ䈝ᆖ䲒 PLA University of Foreign Languages 90008 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䙊ؑᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Communication and 

Command College 

 90009 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䟽ᒶ䙊ؑᆖ䲒 Chongqing Communication College 90010 Div Ldr 

㾯ᆹ䙊ؑᆖ䲒 Xi’an Communication College 90011 Div Ldr 

⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Artillery Commanding 

College 

Artillery Command College 90012 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⛞ޥᆖ䲒 Artillery College Artillery Academy 90013 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⊸䱣⛞ޥᆖ䲒 Shenyang Artillery College Shenyang Artillery Academy 90014 Div Ldr 

䱢オޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Air Defence Forces Command College 90015 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

㲼ฐඖݻᆖ䲒 Bengbu Tank College Bengbu Tank Academy 90016 Div Ldr 

ᐕ〻ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Engineer Corps Commanding 

College 

Engineer Corps Command 

College 

90017 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

 

7

 See http://wenku.baidu.com/view/655f7f170b4e767f5acfce11.html for information about AMS’s 2011 recruitment 

for 36 master’s degree students and www.cnki.net/kcms/detail/Detail.aspx?dbname= 

CJFD2010&filename=JSYC201003022 for information about AMS’s 2011 recruitment for 39 doctoral students. 

8

 Information accessed at http://wenda.sogou.com/question/9755072.html on 23 June 2012. 
75 

䱢ॆᤷᥕᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Chemical Defense Command and Engineering College 90018 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䀓᭮ߋ⭥ᆀᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Electronic Engineering College 90019 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䱶ߋ㡚オޥᆖ䲒 Army Aviation Corps 

College 

Army Aviation College 90020 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ইӜ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒 Nanjing Political Institute Nanjing Political College 90021 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

㾯ᆹ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒 Xi’an Political Institute Xi’an Political College 90022 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

䀓᭮ߋ㢪δᆖ䲒 PLA Art Institute PLA Art College 90023 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ਾऔᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Logistic Command College Logistics Command Academy 90024 Corps 

Ldr 

ਾऔᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Logistic Engineering College Logistical Engineering 

University 

90025 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ߋһ㓿⍾ᆖ䲒 Military Economics College Military Economic College 90026 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ߋһӔ䙊ᆖ䲒 Military Transportation 

College 

Military Communications 

College 

90027 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⊭䖖㇑⨶ᆖ䲒 Vehicle Management College 90028 Div Ldr 

䭷⊏㡩㡷ᆖ䲒 Zhenjiang Vessels College Zhenjiang Ship College 90029 Div Ldr 

ᅮҼߋ५བྷᆖ Second Military Medical University 90030 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ᅮйߋ५བྷᆖ Third Military Medical University 90031 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ᅮഋߋ५བྷᆖ Fourth Military Medical University 90032 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

㻵༷ᤷᥕᢰδᆖ䲒 Academy of Equipment 

Command Technology 

Institute of Command and 

Technology of Equipment 

90033 Corps 

Ldr 

㻵⭢ޥᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Armored Corps Engineering 

College 

Armored Force Engineering 

College 

90034 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ߋỠᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Ordnance Engineering College 90035 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

↖≹ߋỠ༛ᇈᆖṑ Wuhan Ordnance Sergeant 

School 

Wuhan Ordnance 

Noncommissioned Officer 

School 

 Div Ldr 

⎧ߋᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Naval Command College 90037 Corps 

Ldr 

⎧ߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ Naval Engineering University 90038 Corps 

Ldr 

⎧ߋ㡚オᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Naval Aeronautical and 

Astronautical College 

Naval Aviation Engineering 

Academy 

90039 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⎧ߋབྷ䘎㡠㡷ᆖ䲒 Naval Dalian Ship College Dalian Naval Ship Academy 90040 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⎧ޥߋ⿽ᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Naval Arms Command 

College 

Naval Arms Command 

Academy 

90041 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⎧ߋ▌㡷ᆖ䲒 Naval Submarine College Naval Submarine Academy 90042 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

⎧ߋ伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Naval Flight College Naval Flight Academy 90043 Div Ldr 

⎧ߋ㲼ฐ༛ᇈᆖṑ Naval Bengbu NCO School Bengbu Naval Petty Officers 

Academy 

 Div Ldr 

オߋᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Air Force Command College 90044 Corps 

Ldr 
76 

オߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ Air Force Engineer 

University 

Air Force Engineering 

University 

90045 Corps 

Ldr 

オߋ㡚オབྷᆖ Air Force Aviation University 90046 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

オߋ䴧䗮ᆖ䲒 Air Force Radar College9 90047 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

Ṳ᷇オߋᆖ䲒 Guilin Air Force College 90048 Div Ldr 

ᗀᐎオߋᆖ䲒 Xuzhou Air Force College Xuzhou Air Force Academy10 90049 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮа㡚オᆖ䲒 Air Force First Aviation 

[Technology] College11

Air Force First Aviation 

[Technology] College 

90050 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮа伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force First Flight College 90051 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮҼ伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Second Flight 

College 

 90052 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮй伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Third Flight 

College 

 90053 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮഋ伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Fourth Flight 

College 

 90054 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮӄ伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Fifth Flight 

College 

 90055 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮޝ伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Sixth Flight 

College 

 90056 Div Ldr 

オߋᅮॱй伎㹼ᆖ䲒 Air Force Thirteenth Flight 

College 

 90057 Div Ldr 

オߋབྷ䘎䙊ؑ༛ᇈᆖ

ṑ

Air Force Dalian 

Communications School 

Dalian Air Force 

Communication 

Noncommissioned Officer 

School 

 Div Ldr 

ᅮҼ⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒 Second Artillery Command College 90058 Corps 

Ldr 

ᅮҼ⛞ޥᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 Second Artillery Engineering College 90059 Corps 

Dep Ldr 

ᅮҼ⛞ޥ䶂ᐎ༛ᇈᆖ

ṑ

Second Artillery Qingzhou 

NCO School 

Qingzhou Second Artillery 

Noncommissioned Officer 

School 

 Div Ldr 

㾯ᆹ䱶ߋᆖ䲒 Xi’an Army College Xi’an Military Academy 90061 Div Ldr 

ই᰼䱶ߋᆖ䲒 Nanchang Army College Nanchang Military Academy 90062 Div Ldr 

ᰶ᰾䱶ߋᆖ䲒 Kunming Army College Kunming Army Academy 90063 Div Ldr 

PLA Academic Institution Name Changes Starting in 2011 

In 2011, the PLA began implementing academic institution reforms, including abolishing, 

merging, and/or changing the names of several institutions as noted below. Although not stated 

in the source material, some of the grades may have changed.12

x The Artillery Command Academy (⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒) in Xuanhua, Hebei Province, was 

disbanded and became a new GSD Artillery Training Base (ᙫ৲⛞ޥ䇝㓳สൠ) and 

 

9

 Became the Air Force Early Warning College (オߋ亴䆖ᆖ䲒) in 2011. 10 Became the Air Force Logistics College (オߋऔ࣑ᆖ䲒) in 2011. 11 This college provides aircraft maintenance education and training. 

12 Dennis Blasko provided most of the information concerning these changes. 
77 

elements of the former command academy were incorporated into the Nanjing Artillery 

Academy discussed below13

x The Nanjing Artillery Academy (ইӜ⛞ޥᆖ䲒) in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, merged 

“a PLA artillery command academy in Hebei province with another artillery school in 

Nanjing”14

x The Communication Command Academy in Wuhan, Hubei Province, (↖≹Ⲵ䙊ؑᤷᥕ

ᆖ䲒) was renamed the National Defense Information Academy (ഭ䱢ؑ᚟ᆖ䲒)

15

x The Air Defense Command Academy (䱢オޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒) in Zhengzhou was renamed the 

Air Defense Academy (䱢オޥᆖ䲒)

16

x The Chemical Defense Command and Engineering Academy (䱢ॆᤷᥕᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) in 

Beijing’s Changping District has been renamed the Chemical Defense Academy (䱢ॆᆖ

䲒)

17

x The Engineer Command Academy (ᐕ〻ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒) in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, has 

been renamed the Engineer Academy (ᐕ〻ޥᆖ䲒)

18

x The Logistics Command Academy (ਾऔᤷᥕᆖ䲒) in Beijing has become the Logistics 

Institute (ਾऔᆖ䲒)

19

x The Armament Command and Technology Academy (㻵༷ᤷᥕᢰδᆖ䲒) in Huairou, 

outside of Beijing has become the Armament Academy (㻵༷ᆖ䲒)

20

x The Hefei Artillery Academy (ਸ㛕Ⲵ⛞ޥᆖ䲒) in Hefei, Anhui Province, changed its 

name to the Army Officer Academy (䱶ߋߋᇈᆖ䲒)

21

x The Xi’an Army Academy (㾯ᆹ䱶ߋᆖ䲒) in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, has become the 

Border Defense Academy (䀓᭮ߋ䗩䱢ᆖ䲒)

22

x The Bengbu Tank Institute (㲼ฐඖݻᆖ䲒) in Bengbu, Anhui Province, has been 

renamed the Armored Force Academy (㻵⭢ޥᆖ䲒)

23

x Bethune Military Medical NCO School (ⲭ≲ᚙ५࣑༛ᇈᆖṑ) in Shijiazhuang, Hebei 

Province, was formed out of the Bethune Army Medical College (ⲭ≲ᚙߋ५ᆖ䲒)

24

x The Bengbu Vehicle Noncommissioned Officer Academy (㲼ฐ⊭䖖༛ᇈᆖṑ) in 

Bengbu, Anhui Province, was formed out of the Vehicle Management Academy (⊭䖖㇑

⨶ᆖ䲒)

25

 

13 www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-11/06/content_70510.htm. 

14 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseEducation/2011-11/08/content_4313425.htm. 

15 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

16 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

17 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

18 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

19 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

20 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

21 www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-08/28/content_65703.htm. 

22 www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-09/13/content_66914.htm. 

23 www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2012-02/28/content_79205.htm. 

24 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/yy/2012-05/22/content_4870867.htm. 

25 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jx/2012-02/28/content_4802581.htm. 
78 

x The Naval Flight Academy (⎧ߋ伎㹼ᆖ䲒) in Huludao, Liaoning Province, and two 

Naval training bases (⎧ߋⲴєњ䇝㓳สൠ) merged to become the Naval Aviation 

Academy (⎧ߋ㡚オޥᆖ䲒)

26

x The Naval Arms Command Academy (⎧ޥߋ⿽ᤷᥕᆖ䲒) in Guangzhou, Guangdong 

Province, was changed to become the PLAN Marine Corps Academy (⎧ߋ䱶ᡈᆖ䲒)

27

x The Guilin Air Force Academy (Ṳ᷇オߋᆖ䲒), in Guilin, Guizhou Province, was 

transformed into the PLAAF Airborne College (オ䱽ޥᆖ䲒)

28 (Note: Prior to 1999, this 

college was the PLAAF’s Antiaircraft Artillery College. In 1999, it began including cadet 

education training for airborne officers. It is not clear where the PLAAF is now educating 

and training its AAA officers.)

x The PLAAF Radar College (↖≹Ⲵオߋ䴧䗮ᆖ䲒) in Wuhan, Hubei Province, was 

renamed the Air Force Early Warning College (オߋ亴䆖ᆖ䲒)

29

x The Xuzhou Air Force College (ᗀᐎオߋᆖ䲒) in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, was 

renamed the Air Force Logistics College (オߋऔ࣑ᆖ䲒).30 Although the English name 

(Logistics College) is now the same as it was from 1993 to 2004, the Chinese term for 

logistics was changed from houqin (ਾऔ) to qinwu (औ࣑(, which is usually translated as 

“service.” According to Military Dictionary, qinwu refers to units and subunits that carry 

out specialized support missions. 31 The dictionary does not have an entry for houqin. 

x The Second Artillery Engineering Academy (Ҽ⛞ᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, 

was changed to the Second Artillery Engineering University (Ҽ⛞ᐕ〻བྷᆖ).32

 

26 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

27 www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2012-05/08/content_4701.htm. 

28 www.chinayz.net.cn/2012/glkj/. 29 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm. 

30 Air Force News, 25 May 2012. 31 PLA Military Terminology, 1997, p. 19 and 2011, p. 67. 32 http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_02/29/12864372_0.shtml. 
79 

Chapter Two: The Central Military Commission 

Alice Miller 

The Central Military Commission (CMC/ѝཞߋһငઈՊ/ѝཞߋင) is the apex of the military 

hierarchy in China’s political order. Under the 1982 constitution of the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP), a party CMC is appointed by the party Central Committee at the same plenum that 

appoints the party Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Secretariat, and the Central 

Discipline Inspection Commission leadership.1 Under the 1982 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

constitution, a state CMC is appointed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and is 

institutionally co-equal with the PRC’s executive branch, the State Council. In China’s military 

hierarchy, the CMC is the top grade body that outranks every other military institution. 

Most studies of the CMC focus on its mission, organization and internal processes, and 

relationship with other institutions in China’s military sector.2

 As critically important as this 

focus is, it nevertheless suffers from what Mao Zedong in 1929 called a “purely military 

viewpoint” that neglects the broader political context that a military serves.3

 The CMC’s role, 

organization, and processes are better understood from two perspectives: first, from the 

perspective of the broader hierarchies of civilian political institutions within which it fits; and 

second, from the perspective of the military sector itself. This paper offers assessments from both 

perspectives since 2000. 

The CMC in the Broader Political Order 

The authority and place of the CMC in China’s political order today reflect the maturation of 

fundamental changes in the overall institutional structure and processes of politics made in the 

early 1980s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. To a large degree, these changes marked a 

restoration of reforms in the PRC’s political institutions introduced in the mid-1950s that were 

intended to enable the CCP to shift from a politics of revolution to a politics of governance and 

that soon thereafter fell afoul of the increasingly polarized leadership politics that eventually led 

to the Cultural Revolution. The changes Deng introduced in the early 1980s also took into 

account the experiences of the last two decades of Mao Zedong’s disastrous leadership, seeking 

to inhibit a recurrence of the politicized military and of the militarized politics of that era. As a 

consequence, the CMC has been reshaped in accord with priorities that have driven the reform of 

all of China’s civilian institutions. 

 

1

 In common usage, the Zhongyang junwei (ѝཞߋင) refers to the Military Commission (ߋһငઈՊ) of the 

Central Committee (ѝཞငઈՊ) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP/ѝഭޡӗފ(, but even the Chinese use 

the acronym CMC. This organization has been in existence since the early days of the Red Army and was identified 

in English as the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) until the late 1980s, when it was renamed the Central Military 

Commission and given the acronym CMC. 

2

 Comprehensive studies of the CMC along this line include: Nan Li, “The Central Military Commission and 

Military Policy in China” and David Shambaugh, “The Pinnacle of the Pyramid: The Central Military Commission,” 

in James Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2002, pp.45-94 and 95-121 respectively; and Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China 

Central Military Commission in the 21st Century,” paper prepared for the CAPS-RAND-NDU-Carnegie conference 

on the PLA, Taipei: November 2011, pp.1-30. 

3

 Mao Zedong, “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” December 1929, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 

Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, Vol. I, p.105ff. 
80 

Why Are There Two Central Military Commissions? 

Since its creation under the revised state constitution of 1982, the PRC CMC has often struck 

Western observers as an exceptionally anomalous convolution in the frequently convoluted 

world of Chinese politics. In the day-to-day work of managing China’s military, moreover, the 

institution of two CMCs, though identical in membership—thus “one organ, two signboards” (а

њχʃ,єњ⡼ᆀ)—seems to make no practical difference. And since the CCP is the engine of 

all regime politics and policy, the party CMC is the abiding reality, and it is easy to see the state 

CMC as effectively a superfluous myth. The establishment of coextensive party and state CMCs 

in 1982, however, reflects a compromise resolution to a longstanding dilemma of civilian 

authority over China’s military. The inherent ambiguities in that resolution subsequently fed into 

the politics of the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 and continue to spark controversy down to today. 

Initially, when the CCP-led coalition PRC government was established in 1949, the PRC 

Organic Law established a new People’s Revolutionary Military Council as “the supreme 

military command of the state.”4

 In turn, the CCP abolished its CMC.5 In September 1954, when 

the PRC’s first socialist constitution was adopted and full-scale socialist institutions were 

established at the First NPC, authority over the PLA was again placed under the state. Article 20 

of the new constitution stated that “the armed forces of the PRC belong to the people,” and 

Article 42 stipulated that “the President of the PRC shall command the armed force.” Article 42 

also stated that the PRC president “chairs the National Defense Council (NDC),” a new body 

whose functions were not laid out in the constitution. Finally, on 28 September 1954, the same 

day the NPC was closing, the Politburo adopted a “Decision” to “re-establish” (䟽ᯠ䇮・) the 

party’s Military Commission (ߋһငઈՊ) to “take charge of leadership over all military work” 

under the direction of the Politburo and Secretariat. It further appointed Mao Zedong as 

chairman and 11 members, and it put Peng Dehuai in charge of the Commission’s day-to-day 

work. Shortly thereafter, Huang Kecheng was appointed Military Commission secretary.6

As one authoritative source on institutional history notes, the NDC, staffed with a large number 

of non-party people and former ROC military leaders, “was not a leading organ of the armed 

forces.”7

 The seat of regime military policy-making was clearly the party’s Military Commission, 

although until 1959 that body was very rarely mentioned in PRC media. The revised party 

constitution adopted at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956 did not mention it, nor did 

the communiqué of the Eighth Central Committee’s First Plenum—which announced 

appointments to the new Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and Secretariat—

 

4

 1949 Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 4. Article 23 states further that “the PLA...shall 

come under the unified control and command of the People’s Revolutionary Military Council.” 5

 Some analysts argue that the party’s Military Commission existed informally as the core group of CCP members of 

the People’s Revolutionary Military Council. 

6

Central Committee Organization Department, Central Committee Party History Research Office, and Central 

Archive, eds.(ѝޡѝཞ㓴㓷䜘, ѝޡѝཞފਢ⹄ウᇔ,ѝཞẓṸ侶), Materials on the Organizational History of 

the Chinese Communist Party (ѝഭޡӗފ㓴㓷ਢ䍴ᯉ), Beijing: ѝފޡਢࠪ⡸矢, 2000, Vol.5, p. 55; Liu 

Guoxin (ࡈഭᯠ) et al., eds. Veritable Record of the People’s Republic of China(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᇎᖅ), Changchun: 

Jilin People’s Press, 1994, Vol.1 Part 2 (1953-1956), p. 1087. 7

 Ibid.. 
81 

announce appointments to the Military Commission. 8 Nevertheless, the primacy of the 

Commission for military policy was evident from its expanding membership. From 1954 to 

1956, its membership consisted of Mao, all ten of the military leaders given the rank of marshal 

in 1955, and Deng Xiaoping, who had just been appointed party secretary-general (〈Җ䮯).9 In 

November 1956, the Military Commission membership expanded from 12 to 22, adding the 

directors of the newly restructured General Departments, as well as the commanders of the PLA 

Navy, Air Force, and Armor. 

The civil-military significance of these institutional arrangements was to establish the principle 

that command of China’s armed forces belonged to the state, even while major military decisions 

were to be made in the party. Mao Zedong served both as chairman of the party’s Military 

Commission and, as PRC president, as commander of the armed forces. Peng Dehuai, the 

Military Commission’s leading executive, served concurrently as vice premier and defense 

minister in the State Council. Mao also presided over the NDC, and Peng served, after Zhu De, 

as its second-ranking vice chairman. 

This division of party and state authority over the military was disrupted in 1959, and it was 

abandoned altogether in the Cultural Revolution decade. At the Second NPC in April 1959, Mao 

ceded the post of PRC president to Liu Shaoqi, and with it constitutional authority to command 

China’s armed forces, even though Liu was not a member of the Central Military Commission. 

Liu was re-appointed president at the Third NPC in January 1965. Later in 1959, in August at 

Lushan, Mao purged Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng from the Military Commission, replacing 

Peng with Lin Biao as defense minister and as the man in charge of the CMC’s day-to-day work. 

When the leadership began in 1970 to debate convocation of a Fourth NPC and revisions of the 

PRC constitution, Mao, by all available accounts of a particularly murky episode in PRC 

political history, adamantly opposed restoration of the post of PRC president, purging Chen 

Boda and chastening Lin Biao for advocating it at the 1970 Ninth Central Committee’s Second 

Plenum at Lushan. The successive party constitutions adopted at the Ninth Party Congress in 

1969 and at 11th Party Congress in 1977 and the new PRC constitutions of 1975 and 1978 all 

implicitly or explicitly placed command of the PLA under the CCP. The 1977 CCP constitution, 

for example, stated that “State organs, the PLA and the militia, and revolutionary mass 

organizations...must accept the absolute leadership of the CCP” (Art. 14). The 1978 PRC 

constitution stipulated that “the chairman of the CCP Central Committee commands the armed 

forces” and that “the Chinese PLA is the workers’ and peasants’ own armed force led by the 

CCP; it is the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat.” (Art. 19) 

The watershed victory of Deng Xiaoping and his coalition of veteran leaders in overturning 

Mao’s and Hua Guofeng’s ideological platform of advancing “class struggle” in favor of 

focusing the CCP on the “general task” of China’s economic modernization brought not only the 

first waves of economic reforms that set the PRC on its current path to power and prosperity but 

 

8

 “The Eighth Central Committee Elects New Central Organs,” People’s Daily (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ), 29 September 1956, p.1. 9

 This was a different position than party general secretary (ᙫҖ䇠), which had been the party’s top post from the 

party’s founding in July 1921 until its abolition in 1937. The post of general secretary was restored at the Eighth 

CCP Congress in 1956 and given to Deng as part of a major reform of the party’s leadership structure, on which see 

below. 
82 

also on fundamental political reforms. Deng Xiaoping sketched the grand design for reform in 

both party and state institutions in a major speech to an enlarged Politburo meeting on 18-23 

August 1980.10 With respect to the CCP’s central institutions and processes, the Eleventh Central 

Committee’s Fifth Plenum in February 1980 restored the party Secretariat and the position of 

general secretary and mandated revision of the CCP’s constitution, preparing the way for the 

abolition of the post of party chairman and the restoration of the 1954-1956 structure of 

Politburo-Secretariat policy-making at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982 (on this more 

below). With regard to state institutions, efforts also began in 1980, with the decision of the Fifth 

NPC’s Third Session to revise the PRC constitution on the basis of the 1954 constitution. These 

steps immediately raised anew the question of whether to restore the post of head of state and 

with it the question of who should command the PLA. 

In September 1980, the Politburo appointed a drafting committee to begin work on a revised 

PRC constitution.11 After extensive consultations, the committee produced an initial discussion 

draft at the end of 1981 that reflected the broadly held judgment that the post of PRC president 

be restored as head of state to represent the People’s Republic abroad and to command the PLA, 

as the 1954 constitution had provided. The draft therefore stipulated that the president would 

command the armed forces and serve concurrently as chairman of a restored NDC; that the 

president would formally appoint the NDC’s vice chairman and its members, as well as the 

directors of the PLA’s General Departments; and that the State Council would attend to the 

maintenance of the PLA. The only major departure from the 1954 constitution’s provisions was 

the restriction that the president “will not interfere in government work nor assume any 

administrative responsibilities.” 

The initial draft was circulated for comment and provoked several basic questions. According to 

Chen and Liu, some commentators objected that it would be impossible for the president to lead 

the armed forces if he had no role in government. Others wondered whether party and army 

would be able to act in a concerted way in the event of a war if the president could not engage 

the government and the party chairman did not’ lead the armed forces. Others noted that the 

position of president was very high and assumed responsibilities for leading all three of the 

PLA’s services (e.g., Army, Navy, and Air Force) and worried that he might not be adequately 

supervised and prevented from using the armed forces to advance his personal ambitions. Others 

argued that the NDC under the 1954 system was empty, and so why restore it? 

On the basis of these and other considerations, the drafting committee concluded that the 1954 

system no longer suited contemporary realities, especially in light of the lessons of the Cultural 

 

10 The landmark document elaborating the purposes of this political reform agenda is Deng Xiaoping’s speech to an 

enlarged Politburo meeting on 18 August 1980, entitled “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership” 

and included in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1982), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984, pp. 302-

325. All analysts seeking to understand post-Mao politics should read, study, mark, learn, and inwardly digest this 

speech as part of their daily catechism. On the broader context of Deng’s speech, see Wu Guoyou, A History of the 

People’s Republic of China (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭਢ), Zheng Qian, general editor, Beijing: People’s Press, 2010, Vol.4: 

1977-1991, pp. 212-215. 

11 The following account derives from Chen Sixi & Liu Songshan, “The Process of Establishing the PRC CMC,” (ᇚ

⌅⺞・ഭᇦѝཞߋһငઈՊⲴ㓿䗷), Legal Studies (⌅ᆖ), 2001 no.2, pp. 3-6. The authors served on the NPC’s 

Legislative Affairs Committee. 
83 

Revolution. By this time, the drafting committee had already received letters suggesting that the 

party CMC be transferred to the state. Others suggested that if the NDC were to be re-established, 

it should be unified with the party CMC, so that under the party there would be a CMC and 

under the state an NDC. At a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference forum on 12 

March 1982, the former Nationalist Party (KMT) leader Cheng Siyuan proposed moving the 

CMC from the party to the state and making the president chairman of the CMC. 

Thereafter, in the spring of 1982, the Politburo dropped the idea that the head of state command 

the PLA and that a revamped NDC be restored. Instead, it decided that a PRC CMC should be 

established to lead the armed forces; that the CMC’s chairman would report to the NPC; that the 

NPC would have the power to appoint and remove the chairman; and that the State Council 

would provide for the armed forces’ needs. In early April 1981, these decisions were 

incorporated into the draft constitution and approved for broad discussion. On 22 April, at a 

session of the NPC Standing Committee, Chairman Peng Zhen laid out the rationales for the 

particulars of the revised draft, and on the 27th the NPC Standing Committee approved it for 

nationwide debate. The Xinhua News Agency publicized both the text of the draft constitution 

and of Peng’s speech on 28 April.12

The draft constitution produced questions from several quarters. Why the change from the 

president commanding the armed forces to the state CMC commanding them? If the state CMC 

commands the armed forces, what would the party CMC do? What would be the relationship 

between the party and state CMCs? According to Chen and Liu, “doubts and mistaken views” 

about the draft constitution were particularly notable among the PLA. The Politburo responded 

with a “Central Committee Notice on the Establishment of a CMC in the Revised Constitution 

Draft.”13 Drafted under the personal direction of Peng Zhen, the notice explained that under the 

new structure, the party CMC would continue to lead the PLA because the party and state CMCs 

would be “one body, two signboards”. In addition, the party CMC would direct political work in 

the PLA through the political commissar system. The new constitutional stipulations, therefore, 

would not revoke party leadership over the army, nor did they “mean that the place of the army 

was being demoted.”14

Over the next several months, Peng Zhen’s drafting committee incorporated other provisions. 

Because of the sensitive nature of military affairs, the constitution would not specify the limits 

on tenure of the state CMC chairman, even though it did stipulate that the NPC chairman and 

State Council premier could serve no more than two five-year terms. In addition, the CMC 

chairman would not make formal reports to the NPC because of concerns about preserving the 

necessary secrecy of military affairs. On 14 October 1982, Peng Zhen conveyed these and other 

decisions in a letter to party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Politburo Standing Committee 

member and CMC chairman Deng Xiaoping and, after Politburo discussion, they were 

incorporated into the final draft presented to the Fifth NPC’s Fifth Session on 26 November 1982, 

 

12 The text of Peng’s speech is in CCP Central Committee Documents Research Office, ed., Selected Important 

Documents since the Third Plenum (йѝޘՊԕᶕ䟽㾱᮷⥞䘹㕆), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 2011, Vol. 

II, p. 541ff. For translations of both, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: China, 29 April 1982, 

pp. K1ff and 30 April 1982, pp. K1ff. 

13 This notice has never been publicized. 

14 Chen and Liu, pp. 5-6. 
84 

which promulgated the new constitution. In presenting the final draft of the constitution to the 

NPC, Peng Zhen summed up the logic of the new structure: 

The People’s Liberation Army, created and led by the Chinese Communist Party, 

has been the national army since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. 

On the basis of summing up experience since the founding of the People’s 

Republic and in accordance with the actual conditions and needs of our country, 

the draft properly defines the position of the armed forces in the state system. The 

leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over the armed forces will not change 

with the establishment of the state Central Military Commission. The party’s 

leading role over the life of the state, which is explicitly affirmed in the preamble, 

naturally includes its leadership over the armed forces.15

These decisions created the coextensive party and state Central Military Commissions and their 

relationship to the civilian political order that prevails today. Under the 1982 PRC Constitution, 

“the Central Military Commission of the PRC commands the armed forces of the country” and 

“the chairman of the CMC is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its standing 

committee” (Articles 93 and 94). The 1997 National Defense Law codified the powers of the 

PRC CMC in Articles 13 and 27, as follows: 

x To command the armed forces of the country in a unified way 

x To decide on the military strategies and the principles of operation for the armed forces 

x To direct and administer the building of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, work out 

programs and plans, and organize personnel to carry them out 

x To submit bills to the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee 

x To formulate military laws and regulations and issue decisions and orders in accordance 

with the constitution and laws 

x To decide on the structure and size of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and set the 

tasks, functions, and powers for general departments, military regions, arms, services, 

and other units equivalent to a military region 

x To appoint, remove, train, evaluate, reward, or punish members of the armed forces in 

accordance with laws and military laws and regulations 

x To approve the armed forces’ weapons and equipment systems and their programs and 

plans for the development of weapons and equipment and to administer scientific 

research and production for national defense in coordination with the State Council 

x To administer spending and assets for national defense in coordination with the State 

Council 

x To exercise other functions and powers as prescribed in laws 

x To direct in a unified way work concerning frontier, coastal and air defense 

 

15 Peng Zhen, “Report on the Revised Draft of the PRC Constitution” (ޣҾѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᇚ⌅؞᭩㥹ṸⲴᣕ੺), 

26 November 1982, in CCP Central Committee Documents Research Office, ed., Selected Important Documents 

since the Twelfth Congress (ॱҼབྷԕᶕ䟽㾱᮷⥞䘹㕆), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 2011, Vol. I, p. 130. 

For a translation, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: China, 7 December 1982, p. K33ff. 
85 

According to the PRC constitution, the PRC president plays no role in military affairs except to 

proclaim a state of war and a state of martial law, but the decisions to do so rest with the NPC 

and its Standing Committee. 

Under the 1982 CCP Constitution, the role of the CCP CMC is to direct the party apparatus in 

the PLA and its political affairs: 

Party organizations in the Chinese PLA carry on their work in accordance with 

the instructions of the Central Committee. The political work organ of the Central 

Military Commission of the Central Committee is the General Political 

Department of the PLA; the General Political Department directs party and 

political work in the army. The organizational system and organs of the party in 

the armed forces are prescribed by the Military Commission of the Central 

Committee.” (Art.23) 

This division of labor between two CMCs satisfies the goal of legalizing command of China’s 

armed forces under the state, a principle that the regime leadership sought to establish in the 

1950s, that was discarded in the polarized leadership politics of the 1960s and 1970s, and that 

was restored as a cardinal priority by Deng Xiaoping and his collaborators. 

Any potential conflict arising out of this division of labor is circumvented by the practice that 

most of the time the membership of the two CMCs is identical. 

Although this system has remained unchanged for 30 years, ambiguities inherent in it have 

provoked persistent controversy and suggestions about how to address them. These appear in 

particular in articles on the legal foundations of PLA supervision in China’s law journals. In 

recent years, for example, one article in 2009 called for constitutional clarifications on 

supervision of the CMC by the NPC, and another suggested a constitutional amendment whereby 

the CMC would regularly report to the NPC. 16 Another article in 2011 addressed several 

ambiguities in civil-military relationships under the state constitution, such as Premier Wen 

Jiabao’s directing PLA troops in the context of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake relief, the 

relationship between the CMC and the NPC and State Council, the term of office of the CMC 

chairman, and other issues.17 The persistence of these debates may be one of the factors that has 

provoked the longevity of the CCP’s campaign, which began in the summer of 1989 in the wake 

of the Tiananmen crisis but which continues down to today, that stresses the need for the PLA to 

remain “absolutely loyal” to party’s leadership and that stridently rebuts calls for the 

“nationalization” (ഭᇦॆ) of the PLA and the excision of the party (䶎ފॆ (from the armed 

forces. 

 

16 Lin Zishen, “䈅䇪ᆼழD儈・⌅χޣሩҾѝཞߋငⲴⴁⶓχࡦ) “A Tentative Discussion of Perfecting the 

Supreme Legislative Organs’ Supervisory Mechanisms Regarding the CMC,” Rule of Law and Society (⌅ࡦо矢

Պ), 2009 no. 6, pp .255-256; and Qin Qianhong and Huan Ji’e , “A Study of the Evolution of Tenure Institutions of 

China’s National Military Leaders,” Ningbo University Journal(ᆱ⌒བྷᆖᆖᣕ), Vol. 22 no. 4 (July 2009), pp. 105-

110. Lin Zichen is MA student in military legislation at the People’s Armed Police Academy; Qin and Huan are at 

Wuhan University Law School. 

17 Ma Ling, “ᡁഭ⧠㹼ᇚ⌅ѝⲴߋһᵳ㿴㤳” (The Norms of Military Power in Our Constitution), Rule of Law 

Forum ⌅ࡦ䇪ы, Vol. 26 no. 2 (March 2011), pp. 1-15.
86 

The CMC and the Party Politburo 

Under the 1982 party constitution, the CMC is directly subordinate to the party Politburo and its 

Standing Committee. Although the CMC, like the Politburo, is appointed directly by the Central 

Committee and so is an organ of the Central Committee, the party constitution stipulates that the 

Politburo and its Standing Committee “exercise the functions and powers” of the Central 

Committee when it is not in session. The constitution makes no prescription, however, for how 

the Politburo guides the CMC. 

How the CMC’s relationship with the Politburo has developed over the past 30 years has been 

strongly shaped by the processes of institutionalization that have in tandem shaped the CCP’s 

leadership policy-making bodies over that period. Paralleling his efforts to reshape the CMC, 

Deng Xiaoping began in 1980 to recast the leadership decision-making system in the Politburo 

and Secretariat based on reforms that were introduced at the 1956 Eighth CCP Congress and that, 

like CMC reforms of the period, fell apart in the polarized leadership competition that led into 

the Cultural Revolution. 

Deng’s purposes in reforming the party leadership system were twofold. First, he sought to 

institutionalize a collective leadership process that could make balanced and effective policy 

decisions in guiding a country undergoing rapid modernization and possessing growing wealth 

and power. Second, he sought to inhibit any individual leader from exerting dictatorial power 

over the rest of the leadership and leading China into national disaster as Mao had done in the 

Cultural Revolution decade. Institutionalizing an effective and stable relationship between the 

party leadership and the military was essential to both purposes. As a major instrument of 

Chinese foreign relations and national security and as a major interest group in state budgetary 

allocations, the PLA required effective representation in top-level policy-making. At the same 

time, for the second purpose it was critical to erect adequate barriers against the use of the 

military as a base of political power in leadership politics as Mao had done. 

Deng’s initial reform of the party leadership was to restore the 1956 leadership system.18 Under 

that arrangement, two party bodies dominated the process of making policy decisions and 

supervising their implementation: a restored Politburo Standing Committee, which was staffed to 

make decisions on all major policy matters, and the Secretariat, which supervised coordination 

and implementation of Standing Committee decisions. Under this system, the Politburo largely 

ratified decisions made by its Standing Committee and rarely met. As established in 1956, Mao, 

as both party and CMC chairman, presided over a six-man Standing Committee that included the 

leaders of the major institutional hierarchies, and Deng Xiaoping as general secretary—also a 

post restored since its abolition in 1937--presided over the Secretariat and concurrently sat on the 

Standing Committee as its lowest ranking member. The Secretariat constituted the “first line” of 

the leadership and managed the day-to-day affairs of the party, and the Politburo Standing 

Committee constituted the “second line.” As Mao remarked in 1958, “I am the commander, and 

Deng is the lieutenant.” As recreated at the Twelfth CCP Congress in 1982, General Secretary 

 

18 I have sketched these leadership reforms in greater detail in “Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of 

Chinese Leadership Politics,” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp. 61-79. 
87 

Hu Yaobang presided over a five-man Politburo Standing Committee that included Deng himself 

as CMC chairman and concurrently presided over the Secretariat. 

This modified 1956 party leadership system was altered further after Hu Yaobang was removed 

as general secretary in January 1987 for, among other things, using the Secretariat to infringe on 

the powers of the Politburo Standing Committee. Under a structure set down at the 13th CCP 

Congress and the Thirteenth Central Committee’s First Plenum in the fall of 1987, the Politburo 

Standing Committee remained the core of leadership decision-making, but new steps to balance 

overall membership in the Politburo were introduced. These included the introduction of regional 

leaders as an institutional constituency to balance against the cluster of members serving in the 

party apparatus and those serving in state organs, as well as a sharp reduction of the number of 

members representing the PLA. In addition, the Politburo itself adopted new procedures to 

constrain the prerogatives of the general secretary. Finally, the Secretariat was severely reduced 

from 11 members to four and its role in coordinating policy decisions through the use of leading 

small groups was gradually moved to the Politburo Standing Committee. This new 1987 

leadership system evolved with some tinkering during Jiang Zemin’s tenure as general secretary 

from 1989 to 2002 and has appeared to stabilize under the leadership of Hu Jintao since 2002. 

That this leadership system has continued under the succession of General Secretary Xi Jinping 

at the Eighteenth CCP Congress in November 2012 indicates that this structure has hardened into 

a permanent system. 

As the leadership system has matured under Jiang Zemin since the 1997 Fifteenth Party 

Congress and under Hu Jintao since 2002, the CMC and Politburo have been linked in two ways. 

First, the party general secretary serves concurrently as the chairman and for most of the time as 

the sole civilian member of the CMC. Second, the CMC—and so the PLA—is represented on the 

Politburo Standing Committee by the CMC chairman and on the broader Politburo by the CMC 

vice chairmen serving as regular members.19

On the Politburo Standing Committee, Hu’s representation of the CMC fits into that body’s 

broader structure of institutional representation and division of policy labor.20 According to a 

system that began during Jiang Zemin’s tenure and that has matured under Hu Jintao, each 

Standing Committee member represents a major institutional and policy sector and supervises 

the institutions associated with it. In Hu Jintao’s two terms as party leader, these responsibilities 

break down as shown in Tables 1 and 2: 

 

 

19 The sole exception was CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing’s service on the Politburo Standing Committee from 

1992-1996. 

20 This system of responsibilities of members of the Politburo Standing Committee and the PLA’s place in it is 

described more fully in Alice Miller, “The PLA in the Party Leadership Decision-Making System,” paper presented 

to the CAPS-RAND-NDU-Carnegie Conference on the PLA, Taipei, November 2012. 
88 

Table 1: The 16th CC Politburo Standing Committee’s Division of Policy Work (2002-2007) 

Member Other Posts Policy Sector Leading Small Group 

Hu Jintao CCP general secretary, PRC president, 

CMC chairman

Foreign relations, military 

affairs

Foreign Affairs LSG; 

Taiwan Affairs, LSG 

Wu Bangguo Chairman, National People’s Congress Legislative affairs 

Wen Jiabao Premier, State Council Government administration Director, Finance & 

Economy LSG 

Jia Qinglin Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference 

United front affairs 

Zeng 

Qinghong 

Executive secretary, CC Secretariat; 

president, Central Party School; PRC 

vice president 

Party apparatus; Hong 

Kong & Macao affairs 

Party-building LSG; Hong 

Kong & Macao Affairs LSG 

Huang Ju Executive vice premier, State 

Council 

Finance and economy Deputy director, Finance & 

Economy LSG 

Wu 

Guanzheng 

Chairman, Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission 

Party discipline 

Li 

Changchun 

 Ideology and propaganda 

affairs 

Ideology & Propaganda 

LSG 

Luo Gan Internal security Politics & Law Committee 

Table 2: The 17th CC Politburo Standing Committee’s Division of Policy Work (2007-2012) 

Member Other Posts Policy Sector Leading Small Group 

Hu Jintao CCP general secretary, PRC president, 

CMC chairman

Foreign relations, military 

affairs

Foreign Affairs LSG; 

Taiwan Affairs, LSG 

Wu Bangguo Chairman, National People’s 

Congress 

Legislative affairs 

Wen Jiabao Premier, State Council Government administration Director, Finance & 

Economy LSG 

Jia Qinglin Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference 

United front affairs 

Li 

Changchun 

 Ideology & propaganda 

affairs 

Xi Jinping Executive secretary, CC Secretariat; 

president, Central Party School; PRC 

vice president 

Party apparatus; Hong & 

Macao affairs 

Party-building LSG; Hong 

Kong & Macao Affairs LSG 

Li Keqiang Executive vice premier, State 

Council 

Finance & economy Deputy director, Finance & 

Economy LSG 

He 

Guoqiang 

Chairman, Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission 

Party discipline 

Zhou 

Yongkang 

 Internal security Politics & Law Committee 
89 

From this perspective, Hu’s representation of the CMC on the 17th Central Committee Politburo 

Standing Committee parallels He Guoqiang’s representation of the Central Discipline Inspection 

Commission, Wu Bangguo’s representation of the NPC and Wen Jiabao’s of the State Council, 

and Jia Qinglin’s representation of the Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference. The 

representation of these major institutional hierarchies by these leaders, together with the 

representation of the Central Committee’s leading small groups for foreign affairs, Taiwan and 

Hong Kong affairs, finance and economy, ideology and propaganda, party-building, and internal 

security brings together the principals of all major institutional and policy sectors, enabling the 

Standing Committee to address any major issue before the leadership in a balanced way. This 

system of institutional and policy representation and supervision makes the Standing Committee 

the core decision-making body in China’s political order. 

The CMC has also been represented on the Politburo by the seating of two of its vice chairman 

as regular members on that body. Since 1987, the number of PLA leaders serving concurrently 

on the Politburo has been sharply reduced and limited to no more than two. This limitation 

appears to fit in with a broader effort to balance institutional representation—as shown in Table 

3—as a way to inhibit the ability of any institutional bloc to dominate the Politburo. And the 

rather sharp limitation on PLA representation in this scheme appears to reflect a concern to 

constrain the potential for the general secretary to use a PLA bloc in the Politburo to assert his 

power over the rest of the leadership, as Mao Zedong had done. 

Table 3: Representation of Institutional Constituencies on the 17th Central Committee 

Politburo (2007) 

Party Apparatus State Organs Regional Military/Security 

Li Changchun Li Keqiang Wang Lequan Zhou Yongkang 

Xi Jinping Wang Zhaoguo Liu Qi X 

He Guoqiang Wang Qishan Wang Yang Xu Caihou 

Wang Gang Hui Liangyu Zhang Gaoli Guo Boxiong 

Liu Yunshan Liu Yandong Yu Zhengsheng 

Li Yuanchao Zhang Dejiang Bo Xilai 

The leadership under Xi Jinping appointed at the Eighteenth Central Committee’s First Plenum 

on 15 November 2012 preserved these arrangements with only minor tinkering. As shown in 

Table 4, the Politburo Standing Committee was reduced from nine to seven members, returning 

it to the size it was under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s and dropping two of the policy portfolios—

internal security and propaganda—that had been represented on the Standing Committee under 

Hu. In passing his post as party chief on to Xi, Hu did not stay on another two years as CMC 

chairman, departing from the precedent set by Jiang Zemin in transferring his post as general 

secretary to Hu in 2002. The PLA continues to be represented on the Standing Committee by 

General Secretary Xi, who serves concurrently as CMC chairman. Finally, as before, only the 

two CMC vice chairmen hold seats concurrently on the Politburo. 
90 

Table 4: The 18th CC Politburo Standing Committee’s Division of Policy Work (2012-

present) 

Member Other Posts* Policy Sector Leading Small Group 

Xi Jinping CCP general secretary, PRC president 

(?), CMC chairman

Foreign relations, military 

affairs

Foreign Affairs LSG; 

Taiwan Affairs, LSG 

Li Keqiang Premier, State Council (?)))) Government administration Director, Finance & 

Economy LSG 

Zhang 

Dejiang 

Chairman, National People’s 

Congress (?) 

 

Yu 

Zhengsheng 

Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference (?) 

United front affairs 

Liu Yunshan Executive secretary, CC Secretariat; 

president, Central Party School (?); 

PRC vice president (?) 

Party apparatus; Hong & Macao 

affairs (?) 

Party-building LSG; 

Hong Kong & Macao 

Affairs LSG 

Zhang Gaoli Executive vice premier, State Council 

(?) 

Finance & economy Deputy director, 

Finance & Economy 

LSG 

Wang 

Qishan 

Chairman, Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission 

Party discipline 

*Positions marked with (?) are expected, pending the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013 or 

appointments subsequent to the 18th CCP Congress. 

The CMC and the State Council 

Under Article 12 of the 1997 National Defense Law, the State Council is charged with several 

functions that the Chinese call “defense construction.” These are: 

x To draw up programs and plans for the development of national defense construction 

x To formulate principles, policies, and administrative laws for national defense 

construction 

x To direct and administer scientific research and production for national defense 

x To administer expenditures and assets for national defense 

x To direct and administer the work concerning national-economic mobilization, the 

mobilization of people’s armed forces, people’s air defense, national-defense 

communications, and other related matters 

x To direct and administer work in support of the army and give preferential treatment to 

families of servicemen and martyrs and work concerning the placement of soldiers 

discharged from active duty 

x To direct work concerning education in national defense 

x To direct work concerning the building of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force and 

the people’s militia, conscription, and reserve service and to administer work concerning 

frontier, coastal, and air defense in coordination with the Central Military Commission 

x To exercise other functions and powers related to the building of national defense as 

prescribed by law 
91 

A few of these functions explicitly require coordination with the CMC, and most of the rest do 

implicitly in areas in which the functions of the two bodies overlap. To facilitate such 

coordination, Article 14 of the National Defense Law authorizes the CMC and State Council to 

“convene coordination meetings according to circumstances to solve problems concerning 

national defense.” Such meetings are not normally publicized in PRC media, and so their 

frequency and procedures and the specifics of the issues they address are not known. 

Among institutions that the CMC and State Council administer jointly is the State National 

Defense Mobilization Commission. This body proceeds under Article 47 of the National Defense 

Law, which charges the CMC and State Council to “jointly direct work” of national mobilization. 

In the Commission’s current configuration, Premier Wen Jiabao presides as chairman over a 

membership that includes CMC member and Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie. 

Another body that the CMC and State Council jointly direct is the State Special Committee (ഭ

ᇦу䰘ငઈՊ). Originally created in 1962 as the Central Special Committee (ѝཞഭᇦу䰘င

ઈՊ) to coordinate China’s nuclear and missile programs with the CMC, this body was chaired 

by Premier Zhou Enlai and reported to the Politburo. References to it are exceedingly rare in 

Chinese publications, but it appears to have been moved under joint CMC-State Council 

supervision in the 1980s and renamed accordingly. Very limited information suggests that its 

role is to coordinate the Shenzhou space project and other sensitive programs.21

The CMC in the Military Sector 

Membership 

Organizationally, the CMC chairman and vice chairmen constitute the top grade followed by the 

CMC members in the second grade in the 15-grade hierarchy that informs China’s military 

sector. 22 As such, all military organizations are ultimately subordinate to its authority. All 

members of the CMC apart from the chairman, who is a civilian and, if appointed, the civilian 

successor-designate vice chairman, enjoy the rank of general. 

Over the past decade, the membership of the CMC has been shaped by trends that broadly 

parallel those in the evolution of China’s civilian leadership bodies. These trends trace their roots 

back into the periods of Deng Xiaoping’s and Jiang Zemin’s leadership and matured under Hu 

Jintao’s leadership to produce a more routinized and predictable organizational life. These 

include trends toward functional representation over personalistic priorities in Mao’s heyday, 

retirement norms and institutionalized retirement norms and membership turnover, and 

succession processes to the post of chairman. 

The most notable representational change in CMC membership came at the 16th Central 

Committee’s Fourth Plenum in September 2004, when it was expanded to include the 

commanders of the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery. Commanders of the PLA’s 

specialized ground force service arms had become part of the CMC’s membership in 1956, in 

 

21 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China—The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy, Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 2009, pp. 29-30 and 254. 

22 For a detailed analysis of this grade structure and its implications, see the “Introduction” in this volume by 

Kenneth Allen. 
92 

keeping with the prevailing expectations of collaboration with Soviet Red Army forces under the 

Sino-Soviet Treaty, and they remained members through the politicized expansion of the CMC at 

the 9th through 11th Party Congresses. As Table 4 shows, CMC membership was severely 

reduced as Deng Xiaoping recast the CMC in the 1980s, and these commanders were excluded. 

Since 1992, the regular members of the CMC have included only the directors of the General 

Departments and, in the early 1990s, the defense minister (Chi Haotian) after 1997, Wang Ruilin, 

who had been Deng Xiaoping’s left-hand man in the military for decades. 

The inclusion of these commanders most likely reflected the increasing focus of the PLA on joint 

warfare, especially since the shift away from the “people’s war” defense doctrines of the 1960s 

and 1970s in favor of a preparations to fight “local limited wars,” announced in 1985, and its 

subsequent refinements “local limited war under high-technology conditions” (1992) and “local 

limited wars under conditions of informationization” (2004). PRC media commentary following 

the 2004 Sixteenth Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum explained the addition of these 

commanders in these terms. For example, the communist controlled Hong Kong-based China 

News Service ( ѝഭ䙊䇟矢 ) report cited “Beijing military experts” as stating that the 

appointments “suit the trend toward joint warfare,” especially with respect to the task of 

deterring Taiwan independence.23

Table 5: Membership of the CCP CMC, 1954-2007 

Party 

Congress 1954 1956 1959 1969 1976 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 

Chairman Mao Mao Mao Mao Hua 

Hua 

1981: 

Deng 

Deng 

Deng 

1989: 

Jiang 

Jiang Jiang 

Jiang 

2004: 

Hu 

Vice 

Chairman - - 3 6 4 5 3 2 

2 

1995: 

4 

2 

1999: 

3 

3 

Members 12 12 21 49 29 63 - - 4 4 

4 

2004: 

7 

Standing 

Committee - - 13 12 10 22 - - - - - 

Standing 

Committee 

Vice 

Chairman 

- - - - - - 1 1 - - - 

SecretaryGeneral 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - - - 

Deputy 

Secretary 

General 

1 1 4 - - - - - - - - 

 

23 Lin Chuan, “Central Military Commission Line-Up is Younger, Its Structure More Rational,” China News Service, 

20 September 2004, translation slightly modified from that in OSC document number CPP20040920000223.Please 

do not directly cite OSC material. Can you find the original? 
93 

PRC media reporting suggested a related reason for the inclusion of the three service 

commanders was its expected impact on CMC decision-making. As Deng rebuilt the CMC in 

the 1980s, ground force officers overwhelmingly dominated CMC staffing, a trend that 

continued into the early 2000s. The inclusion of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery 

commanders broke this dominance and, in an era when defense doctrines emphasized joint 

warfare, facilitated more balanced decision-making in a CMC that had up to that point had 

privileged ground force-based thinking. The same China News Service report cited above noted 

that heretofore these commanders could only attend enlarged CMC meetings, and it cited 

National Defense University professor and Major General Pan Zhenqiang as predicting that their 

inclusion would “play a major role in scientific decision-making” in the CMC.24

Retirement norms for CMC members appear to have consolidated during Hu Jintao’s leadership 

of the CMC. Under the 1994 revision of the 1988 “Active Service Regulations,” the specific 

retirement age of 65 was set down for PLA officers up through military region leader grade. 

According to one account, regular members of the CMC were expected to retire at 70, though 

with the possibility under some circumstances at 72, and there was no age limit for CMC vice 

chairmen.25 The age 70 CMC retirement norm seemed to coincide with the emergence of the 

same norm for retirement of Politburo members evident at the 15th Central Committee First 

Plenum’s Politburo appointments in 1997. At the 16th Party Congress in 2002 and again at the 

17th in 2007, a lower retirement norm of 68 appeared to dictate retirement of Politburo members. 

PRC media in 2007 stated that this had become an established internal norm for the Politburo, 

supplementing longstanding party regulations establishing explicit norms for retirement of cadres 

in party organs below the Politburo. As Tables 5 and 6 suggest, an age 68 retirement norm 

appears to have come into force over the same period: 

Table 6: Retirement of Military Leaders from the 1997-2002 CMC Membership

Member Birth Age in 2002 Retired in 2002? 

Zhang Wannian 1928 74 yes 

Chi Haotian 1927 75 yes 

Fu Quanyou 1930 72 yes 

Yu Yongbo 1931 71 yes 

Wang Ke 1931 71 yes 

Wang Ruilin 1930 72 yes 

Cao Gangchuan 1935 67 no 

Guo Boxiong 1942 60 no 

Xu Caihou 1943 59 no 

 

24 Ibid. 

25 For a translation of the 1994 revision of the “Active Service Regulations Governing Active Duty Officers of the 

PLA,” see FBIS Daily Report-China, 17 May 1994, p. 35-40. See also the discussion in James Mulvenon, 

Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997, pp. 

38-43. 
94 

Table 7: Retirement of Military Leaders from the 2002-2007 CMC Membership

Member Birth Age in 2007 Retired in 2007? 

Guo Boxiong 1942 65 no 

Cao Gangchuan 1935 72 yes 

Xu Caihou 1943 64 no 

Liang Guanglie 1940 67 no 

Li Jinai 1942 65 no 

Liao Xilong 1940 67 no 

Chen Bingde 1941 66 no 

Qiao Qingchen 1939 68 yes 

Zhang Dingfa 1943 64 Deceased 2006 

Jing Zhiyuan 1944 63 no 

Based on an age 68 retirement norm, we may project who among the current CMC roster will 

retire at the 18th CCP Congress in 2012, as follows: 

Table 8: Retirement of Military Leaders from the 2007-2012 CMC Membership

Member Birth Age in 2012 Retired in 2012? 

Guo Boxiong 1942 70 yes 

Xu Caihou 1943 69 yes 

Liang Guanglie 1940 72 yes 

Chen Bingde 1941 71 yes 

Li Jinai 1942 70 yes 

Liao Xilong 1940 72 yes 

Chang Wanquan 1949 63 no 

Jing Zhiyuan 1944 68 yes 

Wu Shengli 1945 67 no 

Xu Qiliang 1950 62 no 

However much retirement norms for CMC members may have become more clear, criteria for 

promotion onto the CMC remain obscure. They are complicated by considerations of promotion 

according to grade and rank and are, as always, subject to the personalistic and political 

preferences of the CMC chairman and the party Politburo. If the retirement projections in Table 

7 are correct, however, it seems possible that leaders whose careers have been in other than 

ground forces in the PLA may ascend to the post of CMC vice chairman for the first time since 

the retirement of Liu Huaqing in 1997.26

 

26 For a detailed examination on CMC promotion considerations generally, and of this question in particular, see 

Kenneth W. Allen, “Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks—Part 1,” 

China Brief, Vol. X Issue 15 (22 July 2010), pp. 6-8 and “Part 2,” ibid., Issue 16 (5 August 2010), pp. 5-9. 
95 

Succession to the post of CMC chairman may also have clarified. Jiang Zemin’s delayed 

retirement in favor of Hu Jintao in September 2004, two years after he gave his post of party 

general secretary to Hu and a year after he ceded his post as PRC president to Hu, was widely 

interpreted as his attempt to hang onto power, contrary to expectations by many that he would 

retire from the CMC in 2002. An alternative explanation, however, is that Jiang’s staggered 

retirement was planned from the start, based on precedents set by Deng Xiaoping in his own 

retirement from the party and CMC leadership. 

Deng retired from the Politburo Standing Committee, his last party post, at the Thirteenth CCP 

Congress in 1987. Two years later, in November 1989, he retired from his post as chairman of 

the party CMC and from his post as state CMC chairman the following March. Nearly a decade 

later, Hu Jintao was promoted into positions to succeed Jiang according to the same staggered 

intervals. In 1997 at the Fifteenth Party Congress, he was reappointed to the Politburo Standing 

Committee to run the party apparatus. In March 1998, he was appointed PRC vice president, 

allowing him to travel on state business and receive foreign heads of state under official protocol. 

Finally, at the Fifteenth Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in 1999, he was appointed vice 

chairman of the CMC. These staggered promotions put him in position to succeed Jiang, which 

he did in the same staggered intervals—as party general secretary in 2002, as PRC president in 

2003, and as CMC chairman in 2004. PRC media at the time hailed this transition as 

institutionalizing a precedent set by Deng Xiaoping and that presaged stability in future 

transitions.27

Looking ahead, and judging by the pattern of Xi’s appointments since 2007, the Hu leadership 

appeared to be arranging for the same staggered succession to the top party, state, and military 

posts of Xi Jinping in 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively. But In the end, these precedents were 

not in fact followed, as Hu Jintao transferred both his post as party general secretary and as CMC 

chairman simultaneously to Xi Jinping. This transfer of both posts to Xi may have been decided 

at last minute and reflect significant haggling among the leadership, both party and military. In 

the longer term, the move consolidates the process of transition in the leadership and likely 

contributes to the institutionalization of leadership succession. 

Structure and Administration 

The internal structure, staffing, and processes of the CMC remain tightly held state secrets. PRC 

media rarely mention meetings of the CMC on a current basis, and mentions of CMC staff 

members are only occasionally seen. Portions of Jiang Zemin’s speeches to enlarged CMC 

meetings devoted to major shifts in military affairs appear considerably after the fact in his 

Selected Works, published in 2006, and in the Important Documents series for his tenure as party 

leader.28 Comparable publication of Hu Jintao’s speeches on such occasions will likely have to 

 

27 See, for example, Yang Zhongxu, “From Deng to Jiang, A Transition from Old to Young Among High-Level 

Leaders: From Precedent to Institution” (Ӿ䛃ሿᒣࡠ≁⌭⊐, 儈ቲ亶ሬᯠ㘱Ӕᴯ:⭡ݸֻࡦࡠᓖ), News Weekly

(ᯠ䰫ઘ࠺(, 27 September 2004, pp. 21-23. 28 These are the CCP Central Committee Documents Office series Selected Important Documents since the 13th

Party Congress (ॱйབྷԕᶕ䟽㾱᮷⥞䘹㕆), Beijing: People’s Press, 1993, 3 volumes; Selected Important 

Documents since the 14th Party Congress (ॱഋབྷԕᶕ䟽㾱᮷⥞䘹㕆), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, 3 
96 

wait some time after his retirement. It is no surprise therefore that relatively little new light has 

been shed on these aspects over the past decade.29 And so these questions will be dealt with 

summarily. 

As the military’s top-grade organizational authority, the CMC exercises command through the 

four General Departments and through the headquarters of the Navy, Air Force and Second 

Artillery, the commanders of which all now sit on the CMC itself. In addition, the CMC has a 

direct line of command to China’s seven military regions—though normally through the General 

Staff Department—and to the People’s Armed Police headquarters. 

The CMC also directly administers two major military education institutions: the National 

Defense University (NDU), which is the prime officer training academy for the PLA; and the 

National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). NDU was established in 1985 by merging 

the former GSD’s Military Affairs Academy, the GPD’s former Political Academy, and the 

GLD’s former Logistics Academy to train senior officers at division level and above. The CMC 

also administers the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), which is the PLA’s foremost think 

tank. Founded in 1958 and modeled after the Soviet General Staff Academy, the AMS conducts 

research on all aspects of military affairs and doctrine, including foreign militaries, campaign 

tactics, military organization, strategy and theory of war, and military history. The AMS 

publishes the PRC’s most prominent openly available journal on military affairs, Chinese 

Military Science (ѝഭߋһ、ᆖ) and the important textbooks The Science of Military Strategy 

(ᡈ⮕ᆖ) and The Science of Campaigns (ᡈᖩᆖ).30

The CMC administration includes several offices and bureaus, including a CMC Discipline 

Inspection Commission, currently headed by Admiral Tong Shiping. The core of the CMC’s 

administrative staff is its General Office, which, as the general offices of the party Central 

Committee and of the State Council do, arranges the paper flow and communications, document 

drafting and archiving, logistics, office and meeting space, and other staff work for the CMC 

leadership. The sensitivity of these functions means that the director of the CMC General Office 

must enjoy a close working relationship with the CMC chairman but also the confidence of the 

rest of the CMC membership. 

The CMC General Office has a Political Office and a Research Office, in addition to a Foreign 

Affairs Office, which it shares with the Ministry of Defense. The General Office also has at least 

five subordinate bureaus. These are: 

x The Legal Affairs Bureau, currently directed by Major General Song Dan, which drafts 

military regulations and legislation and, with the GPD, presides over the PLA’s judicial 

system 

 

volumes; and Selected Important Documents since the 15th Party Congress (ॱӄབྷԕᶕ䟽㾱᮷⥞䘹㕆), Beijing: 

People’s Press, 2002, 3 volumes. 

29 Standard descriptions include the chapters by Nan Li and David Shambaugh cited above in footnote 1 and in 

Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, pp. 110-124. A recent 

assessment by a veteran CMC watcher is Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military 

Commission in the 21st Century,” cited above and on which much of what follows is based. 30 For further details, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 175-182. 
97 

x The Auditing and Finance Department, which collaborates with the Ministry of Finance 

in drafting the defense budget and monitors its implementation 

x The Communications and War Readiness Office, which is the CMC’s command and 

control body and which, together with the GSD, transmits orders to the military region 

commands 

x The PLA Secrecy Commission, which supervises maintenance of a classified military 

documents and manages the PLA’s Central Archive 

x The PLA’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission31

The CMC General Office is assigned the grade of military region deputy leader, and as such, the 

director is normally a lieutenant general with long experience working with the PLA brass or 

with high-level party leaders, or both. During Jiang Zemin’s tenure as chairman there were three 

directors—Li Jijun, Cheng Jianning, and Tan Yuexin; under Hu there have been two—Jia 

Tingan and Wang Guanzhong. Jia served as personal secretary to Jiang Zemin beginning in 1982 

and during Jiang’s subsequent years in Shanghai. When Jiang became party chief in June 1989, 

Jia moved to Beijing with him as chief of his personal staff. Finally, in 2003, Jiang appointed 

him director of the CMC General Office, a post he retained until 2007. His successor Wang 

Guanzhong for a time worked as personal secretary to Yang Shangkun, formerly executive vice 

chairman of the CMC, and began working his way up the CMC General Office hierarchy in 1996, 

when he was appointed a bureau chief. In 2002 he became a General Office deputy director. 

The CMC’s decision-making processes remain as obscure as ever, and lists of various kinds of 

CMC meetings—such as CMC standing conferences ( ߋငᑨ࣑Պ䇞 ), “head-knocking” 

meetings (ߋင⻠ཤՊ䇞), and CMC plenary meetings (ߋငޘփՊ䇞)—based on sources 

recounting practices in the 1980s may be superseded, given the transformation of the CMC in 

other respects in the time since. 

The constant in the CMC processes has been the annual enlarged CMC meeting, which seems to 

have become a regular benchmark in the CMC’s operation since the early 1990s. The meeting 

convenes in December each year to review overall PLA work over the outgoing year and set out 

priorities for the coming year, in much the same fashion that the Politburo convenes annual work 

conferences for economic and finance, propaganda, and internal security in the same period and 

the Central Discipline Inspection Commission convenes an annual plenum every January. These 

annual sessions may be supplemented by other enlarged CMC meetings as occasion requires 

through the year. Veteran CMC watcher Tai Ming Cheung has compiled what is known about 

CMC enlarged sessions—as presented and slightly amended as Table 9: 

 

 

31 For further details, see David Shambaugh, “The Pinnacle of the Pyramid: The Central Military Commission,” pp. 

104-106. 
98 

Table 9: Enlarged Sessions of the CMC, 2000-2009

Date Type of 

Meeting 

Participants Key Issues Discussed 

December 

2000 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, all CMC 

members, commanders and political 

commissars of PLA general departments, 

service arms, military regions, & key 

academies. 

Emphasis on development of 

Informatization in the PLA. 

Portion of Jiang’s speech in Selected 

Works, vol. III, p.157ff. 

December 

2002 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, all CMC 

members, commanders and political 

commissars of PLA general departments, 

service arms, military regions, & key 

academies 

“Military transformation with Chinese 

characteristics.” 

Portion of Jiang’s speech in Selected 

Works, vol. III, p.576ff. 

July 2003 Enlarged 

Meeting 

Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, all CMC 

members, commanders and political 

commissars of PLA general departments, 

service arms, military regions, & key 

academies. 

Focus on structural and organizational 

reform, including decision to cut PLA by 

200,000 personnel announced in Sept. 

2003 

September 

2004 

Enlarged 

Meeting 

Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, all CMC 

members, commanders and political 

commissars of PLA general departments, 

service arms, military regions, & key 

academies. 

Succession of Hu Jintao to Jiang Zemin 

as CMC chairman. 

December 

2004 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Hu Jintao presides as CMC chairman for 

first time and unveils “Historic Missions 

of the Armed Forces in the New Period 

of the New Century.” 

December 

2005 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Hu Jintao unveils military version of his 

“scientific development concept.” 

December 

2006 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Unknown 

December 

2007 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Focus on Taiwan Strait and potential for 

instability arising from the upcoming 

Taiwan presidential election. 

December 

2008 

Enlarged 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Worries raised about global and Chinese 

economic situation that could threaten 

domestic social stability. 

December 

2009 

Enlarge 

Annual 

Meeting 

Hu Jintao, all CMC members, 

commanders and political commissars of 

PLA general departments, service arms, 

military regions, & key academies. 

Hu Jintao speech on accelerating the 

“transformation of combat power.” 

Source: Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military Commission in the 21st Century,” 

pp.15-16; slightly modified. 
99 

Conclusion 

Developments in the CMC since 2000 broadly parallel similar patterns and trends in the 

evolution of Chinese political leadership institutions. In the case of the party Politburo and 

related leading institutions, trends toward enhanced institutionalization, balanced collective 

decision-making in a leadership oligarchy based on representation, orderly retirement and 

succession of leaders, and curbs against competition by individual leaders that may destabilize 

the leadership collective all appear intended to enable the CCP to govern a country that has 

grown in wealth and power and that has a great stake in political order and stability. In the case 

of the CMC, parallel trends seem intended to enable that body to guide a PLA whose capabilities 

are growing in range and power and that requires increasingly sophisticated and effective 

management. In both cases, Deng Xiaoping was the intelligent designer who initiated these 

trends, and his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have each pressed them further. In the 

immediate wake of the Eighteenth CCP Congress, appointments made with sweeping turnover in 

the leadership of both the CCP’s top institutions and in the military’s appear to attest to the 

strength and continuity of these trends. As for how they play out over the longer term under the 

Xi Jinping leadership, once again, as Sunzi sagely observed, only time will tell. 
100 

Chapter Three: China’s Defense Minister and Ministry of National Defense 

Kenneth W. Allen, Christopher M. Clarke, John F. Corbett, Jr., and Lonnie D. Henley1

This chapter provides an overview of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) Defense 

Minister (ഭ䱢䜘䮯) and Ministry of National Defense (MND/ഭ䱢䜘). Despite decades of 

research, dozens of books, and hundreds of articles on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA/Ӫ≁

䀓᭮ߋ(, our examination of the literature has turned up no adequate study of the Defense 

Minister’s responsibilities or of MND’s history, structure, functions, and actual operation, 

especially in the post-Mao era. For example, no official Chinese government or military 

publications or websites provide details about MND’s organizational structure and 

responsibilities or clarity about the Defense Minister’s responsibilities.2

It is our hope that this chapter will encourage future research to close the obvious information 

gaps on this important organization and the Defense Minister, who serves as a bridge between 

the military and government (e.g., the State). Based on the information available, this chapter 

attempts to address MND’s staffing pattern and to address if its offices are essentially “ghosts” 

for counterpart elements of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military 

Commission (CMC/ѝཞߋင), General Staff Department (GSD/ᙫ৲Ḁ䜘), and General 

Political Department (GPD/ᙫ᭯⋫䜘)—what the PLA calls “one organization with two plaques” 

(ањχʃєඇ⡼ᆀ). As such, the chapter addresses these issues in the following six sections 

and four appendices: 

x Section 1: Introduction 

x Section 2: Defense Minister and MND Grades 

x Section 3: Defense Minister Responsibilities 

x Section 4: MND Responsibilities and Organizational Structure 

x Section 5: Possible Reforms 

x Section 6: Information Gaps 

x Appendix 1: Ministry of National Defense History 

x Appendix 2: China’s 11 Defense Ministers 

x Appendix 3: Defense Minister Travel Abroad 2003-2012 

x Appendix 4: Comparison of Activities by Defense Ministers Chi Haotian, Cao 

Gangchuan, and Liang Guanglie for One Year 

 

1

 The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 

or position of the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Several people, including Frank Miller, Dan 

Tobin, Steve Angel, Shirley Kan, and Kevin Pollpeter, provided valuable input into this chapter. 

2

 The official websites include www.gov.cn/, www.mod.gov.cn/, and www.chinamil.com.cn/. Although the official 

website uses the acronym MOD, China’s biennial Defense White Paper uses the acronym MND for the Ministry of 

National Defense. The official publications include the China Military Encyclopedia (1997 and 2007 versions) and 

World Military Yearbook (first published in 1985). Although each publication has a lengthy entry for each of the 

four General Departments that includes their organizational structure, the entries for MND do not provide any 

substance. 
101 

Introduction 

The first step in understanding the roles of China’s Defense Minister and the Ministry of 

National Defense is to recognize that they do not equate in any respect to the United States’ 

Secretary of Defense and Department of Defense in terms of making defense policy or 

commanding the military. In China, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military 

Commission (CMC/ѝཞߋင), which has had a mirror image State CMC since 1982, and the 

four General Departments (ഋᙫ䜘)—GSD, GPD, General Logistics Department (GLD/ᙫਾऔ

䜘), and General Armament Department (GAD/ᙫ㻵༷䜘)—are responsible for making defense 

policy and commanding the military.3

The Defense Minister is the public face of MND, but his individual authority derives from being 

a CMC member and a State Councilor who represents military interests in the government 

through the State Council. The ministry, itself, is essentially an entity that exists in name only. 

The few organizations associated with MND are actually based within and are subordinate to the 

CMC and four General Departments. Depending on the purpose of the actual work, it is then 

attributed to either MND or the parent organization. As a result, one must make a clear 

distinction between the Defense Minister and the Ministry of National Defense in terms of their 

subordination and responsibilities. 

MND is one of the most opaque and least understood agencies in a military and political system 

rife with lack of transparency. While it is possible to sketch out its organization, history, and 

publicly defined roles, very little is known about how it actually functions within the Chinese 

political and military systems or how it serves its mission as a liaison organization between the 

PLA and those organizations outside the PLA. Indeed, given the tripartite structure of power in 

China, divided among the parallel “stovepipes” of the CCP, the People’s Republic of China 

(state/government), and the PLA (military functions), one might ask why a government ministry 

of national defense is even needed.4

One key to understanding the PRC’s Defense Minister and MND is to realize that they serve the 

“dui wai” (ሩཆ) function for the PLA of dealing with the “outside,” i.e., handling relations with 

elements of the government and foreign realms outside the PLA itself. This allows the Party’s 

PLA largely to remain insulated from outside forces, to preserve its position as a self-referential 

and semi-independent “xitong” (sub-system) within the PRC’s power structure, and to provide a 

firewall for dealing directly, yet securely and on a need-to-know basis, with government 

agencies, foreign governments, and military-to-military relations. The Defense Minister and 

MND serve as the only link between the PLA and government within the stovepiped military 

 

3

 Of note, the Central Military Commission (ѝཞߋင) is actually the Military Commission (ߋһငઈՊ) of the 

Central Committee (ѝཞငઈՊ) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP/ѝഭޡӗފ(, but even the Chinese use 

the acronym CMC and call it the Central Military Commission in English. Prior to the 1980s, it was known in 

English as the Military Affairs Commission and had the acronym MAC. As of 1982, the Party CMC also functions 

as the State CMC. See Alice Miller’s CMC chapter for further details. 

4

 Although some liaison inevitably takes place between these three “stovepipes,” the three power systems of China 

overlap in command authority only at the very top—in the politburo standing committee of the party, where the 

chairman of the Central Military Commission, the president of the PRC, and the head of the party are embodied in a 

single individual. 
102 

community down to the lowest levels and the People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs/Ӫ≁

↖㻵䜘) discussed later in the chapter. 

This chapter provides information about the history, responsibilities, and grade of the individuals 

who have held the post of Defense Minister, as well as the history, responsibilities, bureaucratic 

“grade,” and organizational structure of MND. It poses a number of questions about—and points 

to significant information gaps in our understanding of—the actual functions of the Defense 

Minister and MND, as well as their statutory or customary duties, and of how they carry out their 

wide-ranging duties. 

Wide-ranging Statutory Functions 

According to the 2010 World Military Yearbook, the 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic 

of China states that the State Council leads and manages national defense building. To 

accomplish its military mission, the State Council created the Ministry of National Defense to be 

responsible for all of the government’s military affairs. Although the Ministry of National 

Defense is subordinate to the State Council, it is under the dual leadership of the State Council 

and the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. In practice, the CMC’s 

General Office provides the day-to-day guidance while the four General Departments actually 

manage the work attributed to MND.5 The 1985 World Military Yearbook clarifies this even 

more by stating that, even though the State Council established MND as a subordinate ministry, 

its work is managed directly under the CMC’s leadership.6 In late 2012, the PLA National 

Defense University’s College of Defense Studies created its own website that has a short section 

on the leadership and management structure for national defense. According to the website, “The 

State exercises unified leadership over national defense activities.”7 It only identifies the CMC 

and four General Departments and does not even mention MND or the Defense Minister. 

This 2010 official description of MND highlights the unique and complicated situation of MND 

and the Defense Minister, which at the same time have an apparent “split personality” as entities 

within the PLA and State Council. Three points discussed below are crucial in understanding 

MND’s role and functions today. 

An Unfamiliar Breed 

The Chinese MND is totally unlike the U.S. Department of Defense or the Ministry of National 

Defense in most other countries. In China, the Party’s CMC, not MND, is the organization 

responsible for commanding and managing the military. China’s MND has no command 

authority and does not set military policy. It is a government agency and a “ministry,” which is 

subordinate to the State Council. As such, it is under the dual leadership of the State Council and 

the CCP’s CMC. Furthermore, MND is staffed by military officers who are dual-hatted with 

duties that include handling the MND mission as well as their parent General Department 

responsibilities. 

 

5 World Military Yearbook 2010, (Beijing: PLA Press, January 2011), p. 142. 6 World Military Yearbook 1985, (Beijing: PLA Press, December 1986), p. 9. 7

 “Leadership and Management Structure of National Defense” found at www.cdsndu.org/en/zgjs/jfjgk/jfjgk.htm. 

the quote cited is from the English version of the website. 
103 

This concept of “dual leadership” is alien to the political thinking of most analysts in the West 

and runs counter to the central tenet of “unity of command.” Yet, “dual leadership” is a 

fundamental element of the organization of power within China. Under this concept, many if not 

most agencies are under the “dual control” of both vertical (tiao) and horizontal (kuai) authority 

or subject to two bosses, sometimes for different functions. The People’s Armed Police, for 

example, is subordinated to the State Council (via the Ministry of Public Security) for 

administrative and policing functions, but also answers to the CMC for para-military and military 

functions.8

 

Changes over Time 

MND has not been a static organization. During parts of the Mao Zedong period, it was very 

much involved in operational and command functions, sometimes presenting something of an 

alternative power center to the PLA’s General Departments and high command under Mao. One 

of the main reasons for this was that, during pre-1949 period, many of the Party leaders served as 

senior military leaders at the same time. During the late 1950s, for example MND was a 

powerful organization that oversaw key research and development areas for the defense industry 

and functioned as a powerful “mountaintop” for Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. During the 

1960s, Marshal Lin Biao also used MND as a power base.9 As a result of Defense Minister Lin 

Biao’s death in 1971 following an attempted coup against Mao, MND lost virtually all of its 

power; however, it now has a broad portfolio that bridges the relationship between military and 

State entities across a wide spectrum of key national defense and civil-military issues. However, 

this portfolio is exercised by organizations subordinate to the General Departments while 

providing support to MND missions. 

Another issue on which MND has changed over time, even during the reform era, is the 

concurrent rank/grade of the Defense Minister. The current minister is concurrently a State 

Councilor (ഭ࣑ငઈ) and a CMC Member (ߋငငઈ), but previous ministers have also served 

concurrently as a CMC Vice Chairman (ߋင࢟ѫᑝ) and a member of the CCP’s Political 

Bureau (Politburo). State Councilors are the “protocol equivalent” of a vice premier, but rank a 

half-step lower in authority. Most have a narrower span of control than vice premiers (in the 

defense minister’s case, military affairs), and there is no evidence that they chair State Council 

 

8

 For information on the tiao-kuai system see “Getting the most from vertical management” in China Daily 21 

December 2007, available at www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/236456.htm. For other studies on the “tiao-kuai” or 

“tiaotiao-kuaikuai” issue, see Paul E. Schroeder, “Ten Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of 

Hubei and Wuhan” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision 

Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley, CA: University Of California Press, 1992; Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s “Soft” 

Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations” in The China Quarterly, 2005 pages 791-810 accessible at 

http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/am847/pdf/Soft%20Centralization%20Final.pdf; and Yang Zhong, Local Government 

and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003, especially Chapter 3, pages 47-93. 9

 See, for example, The Case of Peng De-huai, 1959-1968. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968; Jurgen 

Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985; Roderick 

MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume 2, The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1983; and Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, 

Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959. Armonk, NY: 

M.E. Sharpe, 1998. On Lin see Michael Y.M. Kau, The Lin Piao Affair. White Plains, NY: International Arts and 

Sciences Press, 1975 and Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao. Honolulu: University of 

Hawaii Press, 1996.
104 

meetings in the absence of the premier. (The executive vice premier does exactly that.) 

Nonetheless, this makes the Defense Minister a member of the core “executive committee” of 

the State Council, which reportedly meets fairly regularly to discuss major policy issues. By 

contrast, plenary sessions of the State Council—involving all heads of ministerial-level agencies 

of the government—are far less frequent and seemingly meet pro forma to approve decisions 

already made and ratify government documents already decided upon. As a member of the core 

of the State Council, he is in a position to regularly and—if necessary, forcefully—represent the 

PLA’s point of view, and, in effect, the CMC’s perspective within the government’s top circles. 

Different From The Rest Of The PLA 

Not only is MND under the “dual leadership” of the State Council and the CMC, it is the only 

PLA headquarters-level organization that has neither deputies—there are no “deputy” or “vice” 

defense ministers—nor a political commissar, chief of staff, or any other high-ranking officials. 

Below the CMC Member Defense Minister (full general), the table of organization drops off 

precipitously to the military region deputy leader- to division leader-grade (major general and 

senior colonel) heads of second- and third-level departments subordinate to and within the four 

General Departments. In addition, unlike most PLA organizations, MND does not have a 

Political Department, which further reinforces the fact that MND does not have its own 

organizational structure for day-to-day activities like every other PLA organization.10 These 

organizations are discussed later in the chapter. 

Defense Minister and MND Grades 

The relationship between MND and other parts of the government is shaped not only by the 

portfolios each is responsible for, but also by the relative bureaucratic rank of the organizations 

and individuals involved. There are separate grade systems for the PLA and civilian officials, 

with different nomenclature and structures. The military system is fairly well understood among 

Western PLA specialists,11 and the civil system among specialists in Chinese politics,12 but there 

seems to have been little effort to compare the two. This section will attempt to bridge that divide. 

To preview the conclusion, there is a structural mismatch that puts the Minister and Ministry of 

National Defense senior to their civilian counterparts, complicating efforts to coordinate China’s 

external behavior. 

In the PLA system, there are ten officer ranks (ߋ㺄) from General down to Second Lieutenant, 

mapped against 15 “duty position grades” ( 㙼࣑ᄬ㓗 ) from Military Commission Vice 

Chairman down to Platoon Leader.13 So an officer of Military Region (MR) Leader grade, for 

example, may be either a General or Lieutenant General, while a Lieutenant General may of MR 

 

10 Political departments play a key role in promotions and assignments. The fact that MND has none is another 

indicator that it is something of a shell or shadow organization and that such important MND functions as personnel 

management and all functions associated with a typical Political Department, including discipline, take place within 

the PLA, not MND or the State Council. 

11 See for instance Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 

Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 52-53. 

12 John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” OECD Journal on Budgeting Vol. 7 No. 1 (2007), available at 

www.oecd.org/governance/budgetingandpublicexpenditures/44526166.pdf, accessed November 2012. 13 People’s Liberation Army Regulation on Military Officer Ranks (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋᇈߋ㺄ᶑֻ), passed 1988, 

amended 1994, promulgated as PRC Presidential Order Number 26 [1994], http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jfdg/2011-

07/13/content_4470092.htm, accessed October 2012. 
105 

Leader, MR Deputy Leader, or Corps/Army Leader (↓ߋ (grade. This contrasts to the U.S. 

system, where each military rank has only one corresponding grade and the two are synonymous 

for most purposes (e.g., an Army captain is an O-3). Organizations have grades as well, using the 

same 15-grade system, and each officer’s duty position grade is dictated by his organization and 

role in it. Unlike the civil service system described below, PLA grades are not numbered. 

The civil service, conversely, has only ten “duty position levels” (㙼࣑ቲ1⁄9) from National 

Level Leader down to Township or Office Deputy Leader,14 mapped against 27 numbered grades 

(㓗࡛(.15 16 Again there is overlap; for example, a National Level Deputy Leader may be grade 

2-4, while a Province or Ministry Leader may be grade 4-8, so a grade 4 official might hold 

either duty position level. The civil service grade system applies to all organs of the Communist 

Party, People’s Congress, executive branch (State), People’s Consultative Congress, judiciary, 

procuratorate, democratic parties, and state-owned industries at every level, according to the 

2006 Central Committee document promulgating the grade regulations.17 (This appears to settle 

the long-standing debate over whether there is a Party rank structure separate from civil service 

rank; there is not.) Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any authoritative public document 

that spells out the duty position level or numbered grade for specific jobs – for example, whether 

a State Council member, surely a National Level Deputy Leader, is grade 2, 3, or (presumably 

not) 4, or even whether all State Councilors are the same grade. There are non-authoritative but 

reasonable sounding lists on Chinese websites that relate jobs to duty position levels, but none 

pairing jobs to grades.18

In two such hierarchical systems – the military and the civil/Party structure – relationships across 

organizational boundaries inevitably are influenced by the relative ranks of the individuals and 

organizations. There seems to be no authoritative public document matching military to civil 

grades, but Table 1 provides a speculative assessment of how they may correspond. 

With that background, we return to the Ministry of National Defense and its Minister, and their 

relationship to other parts of the State hierarchy, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(MFA). During the 17th Central Committee and 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), the two 

Vice Chairmen of the CMC were also members of the Politburo, making them National Level 

Deputy Leaders on the Party/government side and civil grade 2. Defense Minister Liang 

 

14 PRC Civil Servants Law (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ࣑ޜઈ⌅), April 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-

04/27/content_2886656.htm, accessed February 2011. 

15 Provisions on Management of Civil Servant Positions and Grades (࣑ޜઈ㙼࣑о㓗࡛⨶㇑㿴ᇊ), issued as an 

appendix to Central Committee Document No. 9 [2006], www.hg12333.gov.cn/news/Show.asp?id=424, accessed 

February 2011. 

16 The distinction among ᄬ㓗, ቲ1⁄9, and 㓗࡛ seems to be as arbitrary as that among “grade,” “level,” and “rank” 

in English. We get a small break with ߋ㺄, which unambiguously means “military rank.” 17 Central Committee Document No. 9 [2006], Implementation of the PRC Law on Civil Servants, ѝޡѝཞ㓴㓷䜘,

Ӫһ䜘, ljѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ࣑ޜઈ⌅NJᇎᯭᯩṸ,ѝਁ[2006]9 ਧ, www.hg12333.gov.cn/news/Show.asp?id=424, 

accessed February 2011.

18 “Detailed explanation of the correspondence between civil service and military ranks in China!” (ѝഭ㹼᭯㓗࡛

ᙫ≷ˈ࣑ޜઈߋӪ㙼࣑㓗࡛䈖䀓!) http://gyx.fjsc.gov.cn/cms/html/gyx/2010-03-11/986634433.html, accessed Oct 

2012. Article on Baidu.com, “Demarcation of our country’s Party and Government personnel grades” (ᡁഭފ᭯㓗

࡛о᭯ᓌᇈઈ㓗࠶ࡂ࡛(, 17 July 2007 http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/30542168, accessed February 2011. 
106 

Guanglie was a State Councilor, making him also a National Level Deputy Leader, probably 

grade 3, equal to the State Councilor in charge of foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo. Minister of 

Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, meanwhile, almost certainly was not higher than grade 4, since he 

was not a State Councilor, and may not even have been a National Level Deputy Leader, but 

rather a Province or Ministry Leader, in which case he could have been lower than grade 4. The 

imbalance in bureaucratic grade between the Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs 

has been even worse at times, as when Defense Minister Chi Haotian was also Vice Chairman of 

the CMC and a member of the Politburo, equal to a Vice Premier. 

In effect, the PLA is co-equal in bureaucratic stature to the entire civilian government as a whole, 

not to MFA or other ministries. The CMC and State Council are equal in grade, each headed by a 

National Level Leader (CMC Chairman, Premier) with grade 2 National Level Deputy Leaders 

directly subordinate.19 This creates a structural problem in the coordination of military actions 

with other foreign policy behavior, since no one below the Politburo Standing Committee has 

seniority over all the relevant actors. 

At the first Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2012, Wang Huning was named 

to the Politburo, and it seems likely he will become the senior manager of Chinese foreign affairs. 

This makes him equal in bureaucratic rank to the most senior uniformed PLA officers, CMC 

Vice Chairmen Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang. This should somewhat ameliorate the structural 

problem in coordination of military and diplomatic efforts, but it will not remove the many other 

barriers to inter-agency coordination in China’s stove-piped system. 

 

 

19 For an insightful discussion of the role of rank in the Chinese political system, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Managing 

the China Challenge: How to Achieve Corporate Success in the People’s Republic, Brookings Institution Press, 

2011, p. 50-52. 
107 

Table 1: Assessed Comparison of Selected Military and Civilian Positions20

PLA Position 

PLA duty 

position grade 

(㙼࣑ᄬ㓗) 

Civil duty position 

level 

(㙼࣑ቲ1⁄9) 

Civil grade 

(㓗࡛ (Civil position 

CMC Chairman (none) 

National Level 

Leader 

(ഭᇦ㓗↓㙼) 

1 

President 

Party General Secretary 

Premier 

Chairman, NPC SC 

Chairman, CPPCC SC 

PBSC member 

CMC Vice Chairman CMC Vice 

Chairman 

National Level 

Deputy Leader 

(ഭᇦ㓗࢟㙼) 

2 

PB Member 

Vice President 

Vice Premiers 

(Others?) 

CMC Member 

COGS, Dir. GPD, GLD, 

GAD 

Cdr, PLAN, PLAAF, 

PLASAF 

CMC Member 3 

State Council member 

 (Others?) 

MR Commander or PC 

DCOGS 

MR Leader21

(↓བྷߋ४㙼) 4 (Various) 

MR Deputy 

Commander 

ACOGS 

DDir GLD, GAD 

DCdr PLAN, PLAAF, 

PLASAF 

MR Deputy 

Leader 

 (४㙼ߋབྷ࢟)

Province or Ministry 

Level Leader 

(ⴱ䜘㓗↓㙼) 

4-8 

Ministers (incl. MFA?) 

Governors and 

Provincial Party 

Secretaries 

Defense Minister Responsibilities 

As an individual, the Defense Minister is the military interface between the military and the State. 

Specifically, he is the member of the CMC whose portfolio and responsibilities are to represent 

military equities as well as to liaise with the State Council in areas of overlapping concern. He is 

 

20 Notice that the elevation of the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF commanders to CMC membership created a 

structural flaw in their services. The service deputy commanders, who are MR Deputy Leader grade, cannot be 

promoted directly to service commander and therefore CMC Member without violating the strong norm against twograde “helicopter” promotions, so their only route to service command is through being a Deputy Chief of General 

Staff (DCOGS). Ground force officers, meanwhile, can get to the CMC either from DCOGS or from MR command. 21 This grows more speculative as we move down the grade structure. Who is co-equal to a provincial governor, his 

corresponding Provincial Military District (MD) commander or the next-higher MR commander? Are all governors 

even of the same grade, as we can be confident that all MD commanders are? How do MR Leader-grade deputies in 

the four General Departments relate to their civil counterparts? These would be good topics for discussion with 

Chinese interlocutors. 
108 

also a vice chairman of the National Defense Mobilization Committee (ഭᇦഭ䱢ࣘઈငઈՊ), 

which was established in 1994 under the “dual control” of the CMC and State Council.22 While 

his position as a State Councilor provides him with the appropriate status in the State system to 

participate in cabinet executive meetings, his status is probably informally greater than other 

State Councilors because he represents the CMC, which is an organization of the same weight as 

the State Council as a whole.23 This was most likely even more evident when Chi Haotian and 

Cao Gangchuan, who held higher CMC and Party rank, were defense ministers. 

Although no information was found that clearly identifies the defense minister’s specific 

responsibilities, a review of the venues that Liang Guanglie has attended and the topics he has 

spoken about provide a fairly good overview of the types of overlapping civil-military issues 

MND is tasked to coordinate, as well as MND’s and the Defense Minister’s responsibility for 

representing the PLA publicly at home and abroad. 

Military Diplomacy Responsibilities 

One of the most visible components of the defense minister’s portfolio is military diplomacy at 

home and abroad, which he apparently shares with the Chief of the General Staff (COGS) and 

the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCOGS) whose portfolio includes foreign affairs. The 

Defense Minister appears to have clear responsibilities for hosting foreign defense ministers and 

meeting with other senior foreign military leaders in Beijing. In some cases, he shares 

responsibilities with the COGS and DCOGS, such as meetings with the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) at home and abroad and the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. At the same 

time, however, it appears that COGS or DCOGS, rather than the Defense Minister, has 

represented China during strategic partnerships, dialogues, and consultations. 

Meetings with Foreign Defense Ministers 

The Defense Minister frequently hosts foreign military delegations at home and represents the 

PLA abroad (See Appendix C for foreign visits by recent defense ministers and Appendix D for 

a comparison of meetings held by Defense Ministers Chi Haotian, Cao Gangchuan, and Liang 

Guanglie during a typical year.) In addition to his foreign relations portfolio, he speaks at home 

about the defense budget, defense mobilization, civil defense, enlisted force 

recruitment/conscription, militia affairs, national defense education for civilians, disaster relief, 

local government responsibilities for security near military installations, and preferential civil 

government treatment for wounded veterans. He also presents defense legislation before the 

NPC. Furthermore, he represents the military in establishing defense requirements associated 

with major infrastructure programs, such as high speed highways, railroads, airfields, and 

communication networks. 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

The Defense Minister, COGS, and DCOGS for foreign relations appear to share responsibility 

for SCO activities. Specifically, the Defense Minister has participated in every SCO Defense 

Ministers’ Meeting at home and abroad since 2001 and has attended some of the joint exercises. 

 

22 http://baike.baidu.com/view/268241.htm. The committee’s Chairman is Premier Wen Jiabao. The two Vice 

Chairmen are Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and State Councilor and State Council Secretary General Ma Li. 

The committee’s Secretary General is Deputy Chief of the General Staff Admiral Sun Jianguo, whose portfolio 

includes defense mobilization. 

23 The top leadership of the State Council and the “State” CMC is “elected” by the full National People’s Congress. 
109 

For example, the Defense Minister (Cao and Liang) also attended the Peace Mission-2004 

exercise in China, the “Peace Mission-2007” joint anti-terrorism exercise in Russia, and the 

“Peace Mission-2010” joint anti-terrorism exercise in Kazakhstan.24

Meanwhile, the COGS or DCOGS have participated in the planning and execution of combined 

exercises. For example, in May-June 2012, the COGS, General Chen Bingde, visited Tajikistan, 

where he attended an SCO Defense Meeting to discuss the Peace Mission-2012 Exercise. He 

also visited Uzbekistan Turkmenistan on the same trip. 

Strategic Partnerships, Dialogues, and Consultations 

Since the 1990s, China has built a three-tiered structure for strategic relations—strategic 

partnerships (ᡈ⮕Չդ), strategic dialogues (ᡈ⮕ሩ䈍), and strategic consultations (ᆹޘ⻻

୶)—with at least 22 countries to discuss key issues such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, 

bilateral military and security cooperation, disaster relief, peacekeeping, maritime safety, border 

joint patrols, and non-proliferation.25

As President, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao attended several of the first meetings to establish the 

relationship; however, the Premier, Foreign Minister, one of the Vice Foreign Ministers, the 

COGS, or one of the DCOGS attended the follow-on meetings.26 The Defense Minister has 

apparently never attended any of these venues. 

The Shangri La Dialogue 

The only other venue found where both the Defense Minister and the DCOGS for foreign affairs 

have participated at different times has been at the United Kingdom’s Institute for International 

Strategic Studies (IISS) track-one Asia Security Summit in Singapore, which is better known as 

the Shangri-La Dialogue. The dialogue, which began in 2002, is held during June each year. 

Today, the participants include defense ministers and senior military officers from 28 AsiaPacific states. Since 2007, the PLA has attended the Shangri La Dialogue and has been led by the 

following officers:27

 

24 Sun Shangwu, “Peace Mission 2005 ends in blaze of glory, China Daily, 26 August 2005, found at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/26/content_472436.htm. “China, Russia satisfied with joint anti-terror 

military exercise,” Xinhua, 25 July 2009, found at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2009-

07/25/content_4016909.htm. “Chinese defense minister to observe SCO anti-terror drill in Kazakhstan,” Xinhua, 24 

September 2010, found at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2010-09/24/content_4196175.htm. 

25 PRC 2010 Defense White Paper. A review of each relationship shows that strategic consultations is the generic 

term for a group of discussions, including the Chief of the General Staff dialogue (ᙫ৲䈻ሩ䈍), Defense and 

security consultation (䱢࣑ᆹޘ୶⻻/ 䱢࣑оᆹޘ(୶⻻, Defense and strategic consultation (䱢࣑ᡈ⮕⻻୶), 

Defense consultation (䱢࣑(୶⻻, Defense strategic consultation (䱢࣑ᡈ⮕⻻୶), Meetings (Պ䇞), Military 

cooperation dialogue (ߋһਸ֌ሩ䈍), Security consultation (ᆹޘ(୶⻻, Security dialogue and cooperation (ᆹޘ

ሩ䈍оਸ֌), Strategic and security consultation (ᡈ⮕оᆹޘ(୶⻻, Strategic consultation (ᡈ⮕⻻୶), and 

Strategic defense consultation (ᡈ⮕䱢࣑(୶⻻. 26 The DCOGS who attended the meetings has usually been the deputy with the foreign affairs portfolio. 

27 PRC 2008 and 2010 Defense White Papers. Information on the Shangri-La Dialogue can be found at 

www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/about/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shangri-La_Dialogue. 
110 

x 2007: DCOGS Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, who was the DOGS in charge of 

intelligence and foreign affairs28

x 2008, 2009, and 2010: DCOGS Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, who was the DOGS in 

charge of intelligence and foreign affairs29

x 2011: Defense Minister Liang Guanglie30

x 2012: Lieutenant General Ren Haiquan, Vice President of the PLA’s Academy of 

Military Science31

It is not clear why the Defense Minister has not been the primary participant at each of the 

sessions. In addition, the PRC did not state why neither the DCOGS nor Defense Minister 

participated in 2012, even though Defense Minister Liang Guanglie attended the ASEAN 

Defense Ministers Meeting in Cambodia in July. 

The Next Defense Minister 

Changes in the CMC normally occur during the Party Congress held every five years. 

Historically, however, the new Defense Minister is not officially named and does not assume his 

position until the National People’s Congress that takes place in the spring following the Party 

Congress. For example, although Liang was replaced as the COGS at the 17th Party Congress, he 

stayed on the CMC without an assigned position. Once the NPC officially selected him as the 

Defense Minister in March 2008, he assumed his CMC Member position and was listed first in 

protocol order. As such, although the 18th Party Congress was held in November 2012, the next 

Defense Minister, General Chang Wanquan, will not officially be named and assume his position 

until the 12th NPC in early 2013. See Appendix B for Chang’s profile. 

MND Responsibilities and Organizational Structure 

Although the Defense Minister speaks publicly about a wide range of topics, MND is not 

necessarily responsible for the content of all those topics. The reason for this is that all of MND’s 

subordinate organizations are dual-hatted, with most of the resources and personnel to handle the 

issues housed under the CMC or General Departments. One area that remains unclear is the role 

the Defense Minister has in tasking and overseeing functions carried out under MND auspices or 

whether the parent organizations have that responsibility and, at the end, turn the results over for 

approval and release by the Defense Minister. This section discusses MND’s responsibilities and 

organizational structure. 

 

28 Zhang only served as one of the DCOGS from December 2006 until June 2007. Immediately after the Shangri-La 

Dialogue, he was appointed as the Guangzhou Military Region commander. Information found at 

http://baike.baidu.com/view/763190.htm. His speech can be found at www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-ladialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2007/plenary-session-speeches-2007/second-plenary-session--lt-gen-zhang-qinshen/. 29 Information, including Ma Xiaotian’s speeches, can be found at www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-ladialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2008/plenary-session-speeches-2008/second-plenary-session-the-future-of-east-asiansecurity/second-plenary-session-lt-general-ma-xiaotian/, www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangrila-dialogue-2009/plenary-session-speeches-2009/second-plenary-session/lieutenant-general-ma-xiaotian/, and 

www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/secondplenary-session/ma-xiaotian/. 

30 Liang Guanglie’s speech can be found at www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue2011/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/general-liang-guanglie-english/. 

31 “Defense ministry spokesman: China hopes Shangri-La Dialogue to boost mutual understanding and trust,” PLA 

Daily, 1 June 2012, found at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2012-06/01/content_4373014.htm. 
111 

MND Responsibilities 

Today, MND is the public face for the PLA both domestically and internationally. It is best 

known internationally for managing the PLA’s foreign relations program, which is based on 

close coordination between the Defense Minister, wearing his CMC and State Councilor hats, 

and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff who is responsible for foreign relations and 

intelligence. MND is also the lead organization under the State Council and CMC that represents 

China in coordinating with the United Nations on peacekeeping operations (PKO), although the 

troops (regardless of their specialty) and resources actually deployed fall under the GSD or the 

People’s Armed Police (PAP).32 Finally, it is responsible, along with GSD’s Military Affairs 

Department and Mobilization Department, for the annual enlisted force recruiting/conscription 

process. 

MND Structure 

Based on the information available, MND consists of the following organizations, each of which 

is dual hatted and is essentially a shadow or front for corresponding elements of the PLA. As a 

result, each component has a PLA grade. Table 2 shows the MND component’s organization 

name, the base organization (CMC, GSD, or GPD), actual name with the base organization, and 

the organization’s PLA grade. 

Table 2: MND Organizations 

MND Organization Name Base Organization Actual Name in the Base 

Organization PLA Grade 

MND General Office (ޜ࣎

঵) 

CMC CMC General Office Military region deputy 

leader 

MND Foreign Affairs Office 

(ཆһޜ࣎ᇔ) 

GSD GSD Foreign Affairs Office Corps leader 

MND International 

Communication Bureau (ഭ

䱵Ր᫝ተ) 

GPD GPD Propaganda Bureau 

Foreign Propaganda Bureau 

Division Leader 

MND Peacekeeping Office 

(㔤઼һޜ࣑࣎ᇔ) 

GSD Second (Intelligence) 

Department 

GSD Peacekeeping Bureau Corps deputy leader 

MND Recruitment Office (ᖱ

 (ᇔޜ࣎ޥ

GSD GSD Mobilization 

Department 

Corps leader 

Of particular note, MND does not have a Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), which further 

emphasizes that it does not have any personnel assigned and that the General Political 

Department (GPD) is responsible for managing MND’s political work and reinforces the view 

that MND is a front for the CMC and General Departments. 

 

32 PAP is also under “dual control,” with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) responsible for administrative 

functions and the CMC for military functions. PAP is discussed in a separate chapter. 
112 

General Office 

As with most PLA and PRC organizations, the General Office (ޜ࣎ (঵is responsible for 

managing the daily affairs of the headquarters and is the hub for all information that moves 

between the leaders and lower organizations. 

It appears that the CMC’s General Office serves concurrently as MND’s General Office. Based 

on a detailed history of the CMC’s General Office, a single General Office has served the CMC 

and MND since the 1950s, and, in some cases, served the GSD at the same time. The General 

Office’s history is shown below:33

x November 1949: The Central People’s Government People’s Revolutionary Military 

Commission’s General Office was created 

x October 1954: The name was changed to the CMC General Office and was also called 

the MND General Office 

x November 1965: The General Office was also called the GSD General Office and served 

all three organizations 

x Cultural Revolution: Was subordinated only to GSD 

x April 1979: The GSD General Department General Office and CMC General Office were 

split, with the CMC General Office also being called the MND General Office. 

The CMC General Office, which is also the MND General Office, is a military region deputy 

leader-grade (࢟བྷߋ४ࡦ (organization.34 Although not stated in available authoritative PRC 

descriptions, this suggests that each of MND’s offices and bureaus are dually subordinate to the 

General Office and the appropriate General Department. 

Foreign Affairs Office Responsibilities 

In reality, MND’s Foreign Affairs Office (MND FAO/ཆһޜ࣎ᇔ/ཆ࣎ (is the GSD’s Foreign 

Affairs Office (GSD FAO/ཆһޜ࣎ᇔ) and also serves as the CMC Foreign Affairs Office.35

Together, they serve as the foreign affairs organization for the CMC, GSD, and MND.36 MND 

FAO/GSD FAO resides in its own building, located at No. 25 Huangsi Dajie Dewai in Beijing’s 

 

33 Information on the history of the General Office was found at www.360doc.com/ 

content/11/0708/02/5257523_132252865.shtml. 

34 This information is based on an Internet posting that appears reliable and was accessed at 

http://bbs.ncku1897.org/forum.php?mod=viewthreat&tid=2769249&page=1. A biography for the current director, 

Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, also states that his grade is that of a military region deputy leader. He was 

promoted from major general to lieutenant general in 2009. His bio was accessed at 

www.3zhao.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=15672. 

35 The history of Foreign Affairs Office can be found at www.360doc.com/content/10/ 

0918/19/896167_54674643.shtml. The fact that MND FAO serves the CMC, MND, and GSD is confirmed by 

business cards handed out by the various members at different events attended by the authors over several years. 

Furthermore, over the years, several MND FAO members have acknowledged that it is a GSD bureau. In addition, 

the annual World Military Yearbook lists the Foreign Affairs organization as being subordinate to GSD. 36 One blog in particular identified MND FAO and the GSD FAB as the same organization: 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_694e9bca0100oih7.html. Several Internet entries continue to identify the existence of 

GSD’s FAB, but they do not identify the director. These websites include http://post.8684.cn/o42305_5.htm, 

www.douban.com/note/127982258/, and http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_ 2727230_2.html/post_2701563_1.htm. 
113 

Xicheng District, not the Bayi Building that was opened in July 1999.37 According to past and 

current U.S. military attachés, the PLA holds meetings with foreign attachés at the GSD FAB 

location, which has its own reception room, while senior PLA leader meetings with all foreign 

delegations take place in the Bayi Building. 

MND FAO is a corps leader-grade second-level department, which means that it is equal in 

grade and can deal directly with and have the same clout as the other second-level GSD 

departments, including GSD’s Intelligence (Second) Department (2PLA). MND FAO’s current 

director is a major general. 

Based on analysis of its responsibilities, MND FAO manages military diplomacy, while 2PLA 

manages intelligence. This most likely involves a dual chain of command based on function. 

Specifically, PLA military attachés most likely report to MND FAO on questions related to 

military-to-military relations, but they probably report to 2PLA on intelligence matters. At the 

GSD deputy chief level, both portfolios are united under one DCOGS. As such, the DCOGS in 

charge of foreign relations most likely coordinates with both the Defense Minister and the COGS. 

In one of its most visible roles, MND FAO is primarily responsible for managing all of the 

PLA’s interaction with foreign military attachés stationed in Beijing. In addition, MND FAO 

controls the PRC’s military mission to the United Nations (傫㚄ਸഭߋһ৲䈻ഒ) and the 

Chinese delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. 

Foreign Affairs Office—A Brief History 

According to various Chinese blogs, the Foreign Affairs Office had its origins in 1951, when the 

CMC created a Foreign Liaison Division (ཆ㚄༴).38 After MND was formed in 1954, it used 

this office as a base to establish a subordinate Foreign Affairs Office in 1955 that received dual 

guidance from the General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) Intelligence (Second) Department and 

MND’s General Office (ޜ࣎(঵. In 1959, it came solely under MND’s General Office. In 

January 1964, it was expanded to become the Foreign Affairs Bureau (ཆһተ) under the 

General Office. The bureau created a subordinate General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ) and three numbered 

divisions: 

x 1st Division (а༴): Military Attachés (↖ᇈ) 

x 2nd Division (Ҽ༴): Military Assistance (ߋᨤ) 

x 3rd Division (й༴): Research (䈳⹄). 

In 1965, the bureau was re-subordinated under GSD, where it underwent unidentified 

organizational adjustments. From that time forward, GSD’s Foreign Affairs Bureau often used 

the name “MND Foreign Affairs Bureau” as a front for its activities. 

 

37 “Bayi Building” found at http://baike.baidu.com/view/1017607.htm. Construction began in March 1997. 38 The information is this section on the Foreign Affairs Office’s subordinate organizations comes primarily from a 

blog on MND organizational structure found at http://wenwen.soso.com/z/q188261375.htm. Additional footnotes 

will identify other sources for the material. 
114 

In December 1998, GSD changed the name of the Foreign Affairs Bureau to the Foreign Affairs 

Office (ᙫ৲ཆһޜ࣎ᇔ) and MND changed the name of its Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB/ཆһ

ተ) to the Foreign Affairs Office (ཆһޜ࣎ᇔ/ཆ࣎ (to coincide with the GSD name change.39

Besides the name change, the new office was also upgraded to a corps leader-grade organization, 

which now allows it to deal as an equal with GSD’s Second Department and GSD FAO’s 

counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.40 

Foreign Affairs Office—Current Structure. Today, MND FAO has a director and about five to 

six deputy directors.41 It also has at least the following subordinate seven bureaus, each of which 

is a division leader-grade organization: 42

x General Planning Bureau (㔬ਸተ) 

x Military Assistance and Arms Control Bureau (ߋᨤߋ᧗ተ)

43

x Asian Affairs Bureau (ӊ⍢ተ), which includes South Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as 

plus Asia-Pacific multilateral security cooperation (ӊཚཊ䗩ᆹޘਸ֌᭯ᅙ) policy44

x European and Asian Affairs Bureau (3⁄5ӊተ), which includes Western and Eastern 

Europe, Russia, and East Asia45

x American and Oceania Affairs Bureau (㖾⍢བྷ⌻⍢ተ) 

 

39 Ou Can, “Ministry of National Defense Holds Spring Festival Reception,” Liberation Army Daily, 17 January 

1998. Information was also found at www.360doc.com/content/10/0918/19/896167_54674643.shtml. The changes 

went into effect on 1 January 1999. 

40 http://military.people.com.cn/mediafile/201201/13/F201201131125241882725157.jpg. 

41 Although a corps leader-grade officer can hold the primary rank of major general and secondary rank of lieutenant 

general, the directors of the FAO so far have all been major general. In addition, the deputy directors can have the 

primary rank of major general or secondary rank of senior colonel. So far, however, most of the directors have been 

major generals or are promoted to major general within a year of being appointed. 

42 The primary rank for a division leader-grade organization is a senior colonel and the secondary rank is a major 

general. To date, most, if not all, of the directors have been senior colonels. Information on the seven bureaus was 

found at http://wenwen.soso.com/z/q188261375.htm with a date of 23 April 2010. 

43 In 1995, the PRC’s White Paper on China’s Arms Control and Disarmament stated that the State Administrative 

Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT),under the leadership of the State Council and the Central 

Military Commission, was responsible for the centralized control of transfers of military equipment and related 

technologies. Its main function is drafting laws and policies governing such transfers. The committee consisted of 

various government and military organizations, while the State Bureau of Military Products Trade (SBMPT) was 

responsible for handling day-to-day affairs. In 1998, SACMPT was abolished, COSTIND was renamed the new 

COSTIND (or State COSTIND) comprised only of civilians, and the General Armament Department (GAD) was 

created. However, in 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) was created and the new 

COSTIND was renamed and downgraded to the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for 

National Defense (SASTIND). Although the 2010 Defense White Paper had a short paragraph on arms control and 

disarmament, no details about the organizational structure were provided. As a result, it is not clear what the current 

responsibilities for MIIT, SASTIND, MND, GSD, and GAD are for arms control and disarmament. The information 

on the changes above can be found at: “Research on the People’s Republic of China’s Arms Control and 

Disarmament History,” China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), 1 August 2012, 

www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-8/01/ content_5207330.htm; Evan S. Medeiros, Bates Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports: 

Policy, Players, and Process,,” August 2000 By, page 35, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/chinarms.pdf;and 

“China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Dynamic Conference,” 21-21 June 2006, found at http://csis.org/ 

files/media/csis/events/060620_china_nuclear_participants.pdf. 

44 Information on Southeast Asia was found at http://talk.weibo.com/ft/201206276144?page=1. Information on 

South Asia was found at http://mil.eastday.com/m/20120626/u1a6653608.html. 

45 Information was found at http://news.163.com/12/0427/03/802KVE5F00014AED.html, http://mil.huanqiu.com/ 

Exclusive/2010-11/1230964.html, and http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/70731/15984873.html. 
115 

x West Asian and African Affairs Bureau (㾯ӊ䶎⍢ተ) 

x Information Office (ᯠ䰫ተ). 

Ministry of National Defense Information Office and Website 

In May 2008, MND FAO created a subordinate Information Office (ᯠ䰫һ࣑ተ/ᯠ䰫ተ) and 

officially set up a spokesman system (ᯠ䰫ਁ䀰Ӫࡦᓖ) within the office.46 The director of the 

Information Office also serves as the primary spokesman for the PLA through MND, but the 

deputy directors also fulfill that function as well.47 According to the China’s National Defense 

2010, the Information Office releases important military information through regular or irregular 

press conferences and written statements. 

In addition, on 20 August 2009, MND inaugurated an official website to serve as a new platform 

for releasing military and defense related information.48 There are both Chinese and English 

versions of the website. Each website displays a different format and the content varies 

somewhat between the two sites.49 

Although no information was found, the Information Office and website are most likely closely 

affiliated with the General Political Department’s (GPD’s) Propaganda Department, and are 

probably run out of that department in coordination with the GSD’s Foreign Affairs Bureau. It is 

not clear how this office coordinates with the State Council Information Office and with the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Military Attachés 

The PLA identifies its military attachés as being subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Office and 

the patches on the uniform have the characters for MND on them, but it is common knowledge 

that they are actually subordinate to the GSD’s Intelligence (Second) Department. Since 1988, 

the number of Chinese military attaché offices abroad has grown from 58 to 109, and the number 

of foreign countries with attaché offices in Beijing has more than doubled from 44 to 103.50

 

46 PRC 2010 Defense White Paper. Of note, although the Chinese for the Information Office is ᯠ䰫ተ, which 

translates as Information Bureau, the PLA has officially translated it as an office. This was part of a governmentwide effort to show greater transparency. 

47 Photos of the director and one deputy director along with their titles as spokesman was accessed at 

www.mod.gov.cn/reports/201108/wfbwsx/2011-07/21/content_4287428.htm. The deputy director in the photo is a 

colonel (primary rank) with the grade of division deputy leader. 

48 PRC Ministry of National Defense Prepares to Open Website for Military Transparency,” Ta Kung Pao, 8 May 

2008. “China’s defense ministry launches official website,” China Daily in English, 20 August 2009. 

www.chinadaily.com/cn/china/2009-08/20/Content_8592527.htm. The Chinese version of the new MND website is 

www.mod.gov/cn. The English version is http://eng.mod.gov.cn/. 

49 There are two Chinese versions—one using traditional characters, which are used in Taiwan, and one using 

simplified characters, which are used in China. 50 Information about the number of attaché offices in 1988 comes from the files of Ken Allen, who was assigned to 

the U.S. Defense Attaché office in Beijing at the time. For information on the number of attaché offices in since 

1998, see the biennial Defense White Paper; however, the 2010 version did not have any figures. Based on 

correspondence in early 2012 with the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing, 103 foreign countries had military 

attaché offices in Beijing. One Chinese blog posted in March 2011 provided a list of 86 countries where the PLA has 

military attachés and included the name of the senior officer, of which 11 were major generals, which implies they 

are most likely corps deputy leader-grade billets. The 11 countries with major general defense attaches are North 

Korea, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Egypt, Russia, Ireland, Britain, Germany, France, and the United States. All 
116 

International Communication Bureau 

MND created an International Communication Bureau (ഭ䱵Ր᫝ተ) as early as 2008. Although 

it is called the MND International Communication Bureau, it is actually the General Political 

Department’s International Communication Bureau (ᙫ᭯ഭ䱵Ր᫝ተ), which is the same as the 

GPD Propaganda Department’s Foreign Propaganda Bureau (ᙫ᭯ᇓՐ䜘ཆᇓ䜘). They have 

the same director and the same two deputy directors.51 The bureau is a division leader-grade 

organization and the director is a senior colonel. 

It is not clear what its function is, but it does produce glossy brochures about the PLA. The titles 

for three of them, which were available at the PLA’s anniversary celebration in Washington in 

July 2012, are as follows: 

x Defensive in Nature: China’s National Defense Policy 

x Gungchong Tseri: PLA Officer Who Dedicating his Life to Maintaining Ethnic Unity 

x China’s International Rescue Operations. 

Of note, only four PLA Daily articles cite the bureau, but the Internet has several articles based 

on participation in local events. 

Peacekeeping Office and Peacekeeping Center 

China’s National Defense 2010 states that China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations 

(PKO/㚄ਸഭ㔤઼㹼ࣘ (began in 1990 when it sent five military observers to the UN Truce 

Supervision Organization (UNTSO). 52 In 2001, MND created a subordinate Peacekeeping 

Affairs Office (㔤઼һޜ࣑࣎ᇔ) to manage all PKO operations. The office, which was 

identified as the GSD Peacekeeping Office (ᙫ৲㔤઼ޜ࣎ᇔ) in 2003, has apparently been 

upgraded to a bureau.53 The Bureau is staffed with approximately 50 personnel, who generally 

have advanced degrees and extensive overseas experience, including peacekeeping deployments. 

The bureau’s senior officers, who speak fluent English, frequently observe peacekeeping 

exercises at the various regional training centers, such as the one in Mongolia.54 This is another 

example of MND’s use as the “window” for the PLA to conduct its foreign relations. 

 but one of the remaining officers were senior colonels, which implies they are most likely division leader-grade 

billets. The foreign ministry similarly “ranks” the countries with which it has diplomatic relations, with about half a 

dozen rating vice minister-level ambassadors. Various Chinese blogs have incomplete lists of China’s military 

attaché offices, including http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_694e9bca0100oih7.html dated 8 March 2011. 

51 Two separate articles about the same visit in October 2008 by the bureau’s director to Xinhua identified the 

bureau as the MND International Communication Bureau and the GPD International Communication Bureau. The 

articles were found at http://news.163.com/08/1022/14/4OS94NE2000120GU.html and http://news.sdinfo.net/ 

gnxw/520990.shtml. Two separate Internet articles linked the deputy directors, Li Zhen (ᵾⵏ) and Meng Yan (ᆏ

ᖖ), to the Propaganda Department’s Foreign Propaganda Bureau: http://roll.sohu.com/20111223/n330074496.shtml. 52 PRC 2010 Defense White Paper. 53 “Chinese Peacekeepers in the African Wilderness Can Surf the Internet,” 14 February 2003 at 

www.cctv.com/news/other/20030214/100287.shtml. “The Second Group of Chinese Peacekeepers in the Sudan 

Begin Training in Beijing,” 31 July 2012 at www.mod.gov.cn/djxw/2012-07/31/content_4388129.htm. 

54 Information on the bureau’s personnel is based on an interview with a U.S. Army attaché, LTC Chris Pultz, who 

served in Mongolia from 2011 to late 2012 and had the opportunity to interact with the PLA peacekeeping officers. 
117 

In addition, in 2009, MND established a Peacekeeping Center (㔤઼ѝᗳ) in the Huairou District 

in northeast Beijing for training international PKO personnel.55 The 16,000-square-meter facility, 

which cost 200 million yuan (US$29 million), also serves as a venue for international exchanges 

in peacekeeping, including international conferences and training peacekeepers for other 

countries. With 20 classrooms, including simulation rooms for shooting and driving, the center 

offers professional courses on peacekeeping missions as well as English. It also offers training 

facilities for peacekeeping skills, including simulated UN peacekeeping camps and de-mining 

training grounds, as well as swimming and driving venues. 

The director of the PKO Office is one of the deputy directors of the GSD’s Intelligence (Second) 

Department, which indicates the office is subordinate to 2PLA and is a corps deputy leader-grade 

organization.56 The office has subordinate organizations (ߋ४㔤઼һޜ࣑࣎ᇔ) in at least the 

following three military regions (MRs): 

x The Beijing MR, which trains medical personnel for PKO operations57

x The Lanzhou MR, which trains engineers and medical personnel for PKO operations58

x The Jinan MR, which trains engineers, transportation personnel, and medical personnel 

for PKO operations.59 The director of the Jinan MR office is also the director of the Jinan 

MR Handover Group (⍾ইߋ४Ӕ᧕㓴).60

It is not clear what the grade for the MR offices are, but the directors are senior colonels and are 

most likely division leader-grade officers, which implies this is the grade for the offices as 

well.61

Recruitment (Conscription) Office: Same Characters, New Meaning 

MND’s Recruitment Office (ᖱޜ࣎ޥᇔ), which is also identified as the Conscription Office, is 

responsible only for enlisted members (༛ޥ/ᡈ༛), not officers.62 Since the Red Army was 

formed in 1927 and became the PLA in the late 1940s, the military service system (ޥᖩࡦᓖ) 

for the enlisted force has gone through several stages as shown below:63

 

55 “China opens 1st peacekeeping training center,” Xinhua, 25 June 2009. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-

06/25/content_8324367.htm. “Ministry of National Defense Peacekeeping Center Inaugurated in Beijing’s Huairou 

District,” http://forum.home.news.cn/thread/68174850/1.html. 

56 www1.clzg.cn/xinwen/2007-07/30/content_829610_2.htm, http://go.ourgo.com/Bbs/showtopic-15158.aspx, and 

www.mod.gov.cn/djxw/2012-07/05/content_4382945.htm. 

57 http://news.qq.com/a/20090222/007495.htm. 

58 http://news.163.com/11/0729/15/7A51SU2600014JB5.html. 

59 http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2007-09-20/060712601700s.shtml. 

60 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wh/2011-12/12/content_4739389.htm. 

61 The director for the Lanzhou MR Peacekeeping Office is Senior Colonel Zhou Shiliang (ઘᰦ㢟), who is a staff 

officer in the Lanzhou MR Headquarters Department. http://news.163.com/09/0626/09/5CNNDPQF000120GR.html 

and www.baidu.com/s?wd=%22%E5%86%9B%E5%8C%BA%E7%BB%B4%E5%92%8C%E4%BA%8B%E5%8 

A%A1%E5%8A%9E%E5%85%AC%E5%AE%A4%22&pn=70&ie=utf-8. 

62 In the PLA, soldier refers only to enlisted personnel and covers all of the services. In the PLA Navy, sailor refers 

only to enlisted personnel. The PLA does not have a term for airman. 

63 Cong Wensheng, “China’s Military Service System,” and Li Shanshan, “Amendment to the Military Service Law, 

China Armed Forces, No. 12, Vol. 4, 2011, p. 22-27 and 28-31, respectively. For an excellent overview of the 

problems with the current system in recruiting talented personnel and then retaining them, see Chen Silin and Xin 
118 

x 1927-1955: Volunteer system (᭟ᨤޥᖩࡦᓖ) 

x 1955-1979: Compulsory system (ѹޥ࣑ᖩࡦᓖ) requiring service of two years as a 

conscript (ѹޥ࣑ (based on the Military Service Law (ޥᖩ⌅) 

x 1979-1998: Increased the required service period to three years with the option of 

continuing as a volunteer for further service for a maximum of 16 years, which was 

included in an amended Military Service Law in 1984 

x 1998-2011: Based on an amended Military Service Law, the system based primarily on 

compulsory service was replaced with a system combining conscripts and volunteers, 

whereby all new soldiers serve for only two years, but they could remain on active duty 

as a noncommissioned officer (NCOs/༛ᇈ). Furthermore, NCOs with certain specialties 

could remain on active duty for a total of 30 years and receive a pension. 

x 2011-Present: Based on yet another amended Military Service Law, the system continues 

to include conscripts and volunteers, but it also includes new incentives for college 

students and graduates to join the PLA as enlisted personnel. 

One of the problems is that the PLA continues to use the term zhengbing (ᖱޥ (to refer to 

conscription and recruitment. In addition, even though the percentage of personnel who are 

voluntarily joining the PLA is increasing, the PLA still has a conscription system to fill the holes 

and to maintain links with the people. Furthermore, all new two-year soldiers (ᯠޥ (are still 

called conscripts (ѹޥ࣑ (regardless of whether they enlisted voluntarily or were conscripted.64

Overall, MND is responsible for coordinating with the civilian side in China’s annual enlisted 

force military recruitment on behalf of the State Council and CMC.65 MND’s Recruitment Office, 

which is actually the GSD Mobilization Department (ࣘઈ䜘), is the specific organization 

responsible for overseeing all aspects of the annual enlisted force recruitment cycle.66 The grade 

for the Recruitment Office/Mobilization Department is corps leader. The Recruitment Office also 

works closely with GSD’s Military Affairs Department (࣑ߋ䜘), which is responsible for the 

PLA’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The Recruitment Office has subordinate 

recruitment offices in every provincial government. 

According to Article 7 of China’s Recruitment Work Regulations (ᖱޥᐕ֌ᶑֻ), MND’s 

Recruitment Office is responsible for all enlisted force recruitment work under the dual 

leadership of the State Council and CMC. Each military region is responsible for enlisted force 

recruitment work within its area of operations under the guidance of MND’s Recruitment Office. 

 Xin, “Current ‘Difficulty in Recruiting Military Personnel’ and ‘Difficulty in Recruiting High-Caliber Military 

Personnel’,” National Defense (ഭ䱢), August 2011, p. 60-62. 64 For example, the 2004 Defense White Paper used the terms zhengbing (ᖱޥ (as conscription and yiwubing (ѹ࣑

ޥ (as conscripts to describe the situation at that time for the PLA’s new two-year enlisted personnel. Although the 

2006 and 2008 White Papers did not use either term, the 2010 White Paper translated zhengbing as recruitment and 

did not use the term yiwubing at all. This represents the PLA’s overall attempt to move away from a draft/conscript 

system to a volunteer system for its enlisted personnel. 

65 PRC 2004 Defense White Paper. 66 The director of the MND Recruitment Office and GSD Mobilization Office, who is a major general, is the same 

person. “PLA Organizations and Leaders,” found at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_694e9bca0100oih7.html and 

http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_2727230_2.html/post_2701563_1.html. 
119 

The People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) within each military district down to the 

township level are responsible for carrying out recruitment duties.67

The annual enlisted force recruitment process begins each August when the military holds a 

conference to make arrangements for the upcoming winter recruitment cycle. Operational units 

for all services and branches determine how many new conscripts and noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) are needed for the coming year. The units then submit these figures to each military 

district and military region headquarters where they are compiled and sent to the GSD.68

At the same time, local PAFDs are required to contact all draft-age males who reach the age of 

18 before 31 December of the current calendar year. Once registration is complete, the PAFD 

begins the process in October of reducing the number of potential conscripts. At the end of 

October, the State Council and the CMC issue the order for the upcoming recruitment period. 

During November, potential conscripts are screened and then return home to wait for the 

decision on whether they will be inducted. Around 10 December, all personnel selected for 

active duty arrive at the designated location (train station or airport) and are escorted to their 

basic training unit.69 

Defense Mobilization 

Although the State Council and CMC are jointly responsible for defense mobilization under the 

National Defense Mobilization Law, a review of available information indicates that the primary 

military organization responsible for mobilization is GSD’s Mobilization Department, which 

comes under the guidance of one of the DCOGSs and the CMC’s General Office. There are no 

indications that MND has any separate subordinate organizations responsible for mobilization 

activities. 70 Furthermore, other than Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, who often attends 

mobilization conferences as both a State Council and CMC representative, there are no 

indications anyone else from MND is on the State National Defense Mobilization Committee (ഭ

ᇦഭ䱢ࣘઈငઈՊ).71 A review of the Mobilization Committee’s website (www.gfdy.gov.cn) 

also does not identify any additional MND role or actors, but it does indicate that the four 

General Departments contribute to the process. 

 

67 Information on the Recruitment Office and its responsibilities was accessed at 

http://baike.baidu.com/view/2838156.htm. 

68 Information on the recruiting process comes from multiple sources, including http://mil.fjsen.com/2009-

10/13/content_2063604.htm. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/30/content_1557079.htm, and http://baike. 

baidu.com/view/27042.htm. 

69 The PLA does not have a central training base for enlisted personnel. They are either sent to their operational unit, 

where they receive about 6-8 weeks of basic training, or to a technical training base where they first receive basic 

training followed by specialty training. 

70 A review of National Defense (ഭ䱢) magazine for the years 2007 to mid 2012 did not find a single article written 

by anyone from MND, nor did it have any reference to MND other than Defense Minister Liang Guanglie speaking 

at various mobilization-related meetings. National Defense is published by the State National Defense Mobilization 

Committee and is managed by the Academy of Military Science. 

71 “All-China National Defense Mobilization Building Award Ceremony for 2011,” National Defense, February 

2012, p. 4-7. “Liang Guanglie Attends Jinan Military Region National Defense Mobilization Committee’s 7th Full 

Plenum on Recruitment Work and Presents a Speech,” National Defense, October 2011, p. 5. 
120 

Coordination between the CMC and State Council on National Defense Regulations 

MND is most likely responsible for coordinating with its counterpart organizations in the CMC, 

four General Departments, and State Council the drafting and dissemination of joint CMC-State 

Council regulations relating to civil-military issues, such as those shown below: 

x Chongqing National Defense Education Regulations (䟽ᒶᐲഭ䱢ᮉ㛢ᶑֻ) 

x Common-use Aviation Flight Management Regulations (䙊⭘㡚オ伎㹼㇑ࡦᶑֻ) 

x Conscription Work Regulations (ᖱޥᐕ֌ᶑֻ) 

x Military Personnel Bereavement Pension Regulations (ߋӪᣊᚔՈᖵᶑֻ) 

x Military Personnel Salary Regulations (ߋӪᐕ䍴ᖵ䙷ᶑֻ) 

x Military Support Socialization “12th Five-Year Plan” Regulations (ߋ䱏؍䳌矢Պॆ”

ॱҼӄ”㿴ࡂ (

x Military Uniform Management Regulations (ߋȢ㇑⨶ᶑֻ) 

x Military-Industry Key Equipment and Installation Management Regulations (ߋᐕޣ

䭞䇮༷䇮ᯭ㇑⨶ᶑֻ) 

x Militia Political Work Regulations (≁ޥ᭯⊲/ᐕ֌㿴ᇊ) 

x PLA Active-duty Enlisted Service Regulations (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ⧠ᖩ༛ޥȢᖩᶑֻ) 

x Retired Enlisted Personnel Resettlement Regulations (䘰ᖩ༛ޥᆹ㖞ᶑֻ) 

x Weapons and Equipment Quality Management Regulations (↖ಘ㻵༷䍘䟿㇑⨶ᶑ

ֻ). 

As can be seen, several of the above regulations deal with the conscription and demobilization of 

enlisted personnel. This particular set of issues is most likely the responsibility of MND’s 

Conscription Bureau, which coordinates closely with GSD’s Military Affairs Department. 

Possible Reforms 

In late 2011, the PLA’s Military Economic Research journal published an article criticizing the 

way the military manages its resources, including its leadership and organizational structure.72

Specifically, it identified four key problems which, together, state that the current system of 

linking resource allocation with operations is inefficient because it is managed by the four 

General Departments that are top heavy, too vertical, overstaffed, and are not interconnected. To 

solve this problem, he recommended that MND should establish a number of core departments, 

including: 

x General Office, which would be separate from the CMC General Office 

x Development and Planning Bureau 

x National Defense Mobilization and Recruitment Bureau 

x National Defense Fund Appropriation and Finance Bureau 

x National Defense Legal Affairs Bureau 

x National Defense Education and Training Bureau, 

 

72 Liu Guojing, “Accelerate Transformation of Combat Power Generation Model, Advance Reform o National 

Defense and Military Organization and Leadership System,” Military Economic Research, Issue 11, 2011, p. 13-15. 

Liu is a professor in the PLA’s Xi’an Political Academy. Military Economic Research is published by the PLA’s 

Military Economics College in Wuhan, Hubei Province. 
121 

x Expert Advisory Committee 

x Discipline Inspection, Supervision, and Auditing Bureau. 

Although his recommendations are sound and are impressive simply because they were 

published in an authoritative PLA journal, they will also be difficult to implement for the very 

reasons he discussed. For example, although MND plays an active role in the conscription 

process, it apparently is not involved in defense mobilization, which is clearly under the GSD 

Mobilization Department’s jurisdiction and is probably reluctant to share that responsibility. That 

said, however, the PLA has made some significant changes in the past year, including creating a 

Strategic Planning Department in the General Staff Department. It has also reformed the former 

GSD Military Training and Service Arms Department by eliminating the service arms 

component. These changes are discussed in the GSD chapter. The biggest obstacle to expanding 

the authority of MND over actual military functions lies in the combination of its historical 

entwinement with political struggles and the campaign, especially since the Tiananmen Incident 

of 1989, to underscore that the PLA must remain under the firm and unwavering control of the 

CCP and that no thought of rendering it into a “state” military can be entertained. Thus, for the 

foreseeable future, MND seems likely to remain a shadowy organization that mainly functions as 

a window to the world outside the PLA. 

Information Gaps 

The discerning reader will have noted that this chapter was able to provide much more 

information on the organization, history, and publicly defined roles of MND, but has shed very 

little light on how it actually carries out its functions under the “dual control” system of political 

power within the Chinese political system or how it conducts its responsibilities as a liaison 

organization between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and those outside the PLA, especially 

domestically. Most of the China-watching community’s key information gaps on MND fall 

under this category of function and process. Some of the most pressing needs for information 

include: 

x What exactly is the role of MND in working joint civil-military issues? 

 What is MND’s role in negotiating with other agencies on such issues? Does it have 

separate authority to negotiate and make deals with civilian agencies that impinge on 

the PLA’s equities? Does it simply present the PLA’s (i.e., the CMC’s or GSD’s) 

requirements to the civilian side at meetings like State Council executive sessions, 

with no latitude for discussion? 

 Does it “take messages” back to the CMC and/or GSD or GLD to explain conflicting 

government requirements, desires, or stumbling blocks? Does it play a “middle man” 

role, explaining the positions of each side to the other? 

 How much is MND a conduit for PLA demands or faits accomplis (for example, on 

the PLA budget), and how much is there real negotiation? 

 Does MND serve as the negotiator or bring in experts with command or budgetary 

authority from the general departments? 

 What role does the minister himself play in these issues, as opposed to his staff? 

x What role does MND play in civil-military discussions of cross-cutting regulations like 

those listed in the section above? 
122 

 Is there an iterative process on issues like use of airspace (aviation management), 

equipment and installation management, pensions, placement of retirees, and 

conscription? Does MND play a role in such discussions or negotiations or turn over 

the actual work to experts with command, budgetary, or decision-making authority 

from the general departments? 

 Does MND play a role in the drafting or coordination of White Papers with military 

content, such as the biennial military white papers and papers on such issues as arms 

control and disarmament? 

x How does MND carry out its responsibilities to “be responsible for all of the 

government’s military affairs” as described in the 2010 statement of MND’s functions 

provided above? 

 In practice, how does MND’s “dual subordination” to the State Council and the CMC 

work? MND’s personnel are all career military officers whose futures, promotions, 

and careers will be determined by the military command under the CMC, GSD, and 

GPD. What sense of responsibility do they have toward the civilian government and 

what, if any, real authority or control do civilian officials have over their actions or 

careers? 

 Does MND have any command authority or other mechanism for control over lowerlevel actors in issues such as conscription, mobilization, placement of retirees or 

finding jobs for demobilized soldiers? 

x As a member of the State Council’s executive committee, does the Defense Minister ever 

speak up on issues that are not strictly in his military “lane?” If so, what issues engage his 

attention, and what effect can he have on such issues? Do defense ministers define their 

roles as narrowly as possible? As broadly as they can get away with? Has this differed 

between defense ministers? 

x MND conducts “state-to-state” military relations. Does it have any role in military 

relations with non-state actors such as political parties not in power, arms traders, or 

revolutionary movements? 

x How are MND’s Military Assistance and Arms Control Bureau, regional bureaus, 

information office, peacekeeping office, and recruitment office staffed? Do they even 

have a staff, or are these offices really “transoms” over which those outside the PLA can 

pass messages to the real actors on these issues within the PLA? 

 Is there an MND career path, or are jobs within MND merely assignments in between 

“real” PLA work? Are such assignments seen as career-enhancing? Dead ends? 

Detriments to upward movement? 

x What is the staffing pattern of MND? Are its offices essentially “empty” or “ghosts” for 

counterpart elements of the GSD?73

x Does the CCP have a Party grade and rank structure that equate to the PLA and State 

grade structures? 

 

73 The Chinese refer to this as “one organization with two plaques” (ањχʃєඇ⡼ᆀ). 
123 

Appendix 1: Ministry of National Defense History 

From 15-28 September 1954, the PRC’s First National People’s Congress (NPC/ᅮаቺޘഭӪ

≁ԓ㺘བྷՊᅮа1⁄9Պ䇞) held its first plenum in Beijing.74 On 20 September 1954, the First 

NPC adopted the PRC Constitution (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᇚ⌅).75 The Third Section (ᅮй㢲) 

discusses the leadership and responsibilities of the State Council (ഭ࣑䲒), but it does not 

identify the subordinate organizations. It does, however, state that the State Council will “lead 

armed forces building” (亶ሬ↖㻵࣋䟿Ⲵᔪ䇮).76 On 21 September 1954, the NPC approved the 

PRC State Council Organization Law (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭഭ࣑䲒㓴㓷⌅), whose Second Article 

includes the creation of the Ministry of National Defense (ഭ䱢䜘).77 On 27 September 1954, the 

State Council was officially founded to replace the Central People’s Government Administration 

Council of the People’s Republic of China (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭѝཞӪ≁᭯ᓌ࣑᭯䲒), which was 

created on 1 October 1949.78Once it was created, MND was placed under the dual leadership of 

the State Council and the CMC.79 

From 1956 through 1958, the CMC established four research academies under MND, including 

the 5th (all missiles except air-to-air), 6th (aircraft and air-to-air missiles), 7th (ships), and 10th

(electronics). In 1965, all four research academies were re-subordinated from MND to their 

associated ministries of machine building (MMB), which are sometime identified as ministry of 

machine industry (MMI): 3rd MMB (aviation) took over the 6th Research Academy; the 4th MMB 

(electronics) acquired the 10th Academy; the 6th MMB (shipbuilding) received the 7th Academy; 

and the 5th Research Academy was reorganized and became the 7th MMB (missiles).80

Marshal Lin Biao reorganized and strengthened MND in late 1959, but lost control to the CMC 

for managing research, development, and schools.81 After Lin’s death in September 1971, the 

minister’s position remained vacant until Marshal Ye Jianying was appointed in January 1975. 

Under Ye, MND again reasserted control over schools and the military-industrial complex until 

Deng Xiaoping regained his authority in 1978, at which time MND once again yielded most of 

its authority to the CMC. The center of gravity of military authority thus seems to have oscillated 

between MND and the CMC from 1954 to 1978. 

Although MND’s most visible role has been the PLA’s foreign relations program at home and 

abroad, it has also been responsible for coordinating civil-military issues as discussed earlier in 

the chapter. 

 

74 http://forum.home.news.cn/thread/95574022/1.html 

75 http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1954/1954bilingual.htm 

76 Ibid. 77 http://law.lawtime.cn/d656693661787_2_p1.html 

78 www.hudong.com/wiki/%E5%9B%BD%E5%8A%A1%E9%99%A2 

79 2010 World Military Yearbook (ц⭼ߋһᒤ䢤), (Beijing: PLA Press), p. 142. 80 Deng Liqun, Ma Hong, Wu Heng, ed., China Today: Defence Science and Technology, (In English), Vol I & II, 

Beijing, National Defence Industry Press, 1993. 

81 Deng Liqun, Ma Hong, Wu Heng, ed., China Today: Defence Science and Technology, (In English), Vol I & II, 

Beijing, National Defence Industry Press, 1993. 
124 

Appendix 2: China’s 11 Defense Ministers 

From 1954 until early 2013, MND has had 11 Defense Ministers. As a general rule, because of 

their concurrent positions they have held in the CMC and Party, the Defense Minister has been 

one of the most powerful individuals in the PLA.82 The following bullets provide information on 

each Defense Minister: 

1. Sep 1954-Aug 1959: Marshal Peng Dehuai (ᖝᗧᘰ), who served concurrently as a CMC 

executive vice chairman who managed the CMC’s daily affairs83

2. Aug 1959-Sep 1971: Marshal Lin Biao (᷇ᖚ), who served concurrently as CMC vice 

chairman, a member of the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and as a vice 

chairman of the CCP Central Committee84

3. Sep 1971-Jan 1975: Position vacant following Lin Biao’s attempted coup against Mao 

Zedong and his subsequent death in an airplane crash. The absence of a Defense Minister 

for over three years not only reflects the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution, but 

also reveals that the position was not seen as central to the functioning of the PLA. 

4. Jan 1975-Mar 1978: Ye Jianying (ਦࢁ㤡), who served concurrently as executive vice 

chairman of the CMC with responsibilities for its day to day affairs and as a CCP vice 

chairman85

5. Mar 1978-Mar 1981: General Xu Xiangqian (ᗀੁࡽ(, who served concurrently as a 

CMC Standing Committee Member, Vice Premier in the State Council, and a Politburo 

Member86

6. Mar 1981-Nov 1982: Geng Biao (㙯伊), who served concurrently as a CMC Standing 

Committee Member, Vice Premier of the State Council, and State Councilor87

7. Nov 1982-Apr 1988: Zhang Aiping (ᕐ⡡㨽), who served concurrently as Deputy 

Secretary General of the CMC and State Councilor88

 

82 Of note, in comparison to the lengthy entries on the CMC and general departments, the two versions of the 

Academy of Military Science’s China Military Encyclopedia (1997 and 2007) each has only one short item on 

defense ministries in general and merely lists the PLA’s Defense Minister. Guan Junjie and Sui Dongsheng, 

“Ministry of National Defense,” in China Military Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ), (Beijing: Academy of 

Military Science Press, July 1997), Vol 2, p. 144. “Department of National Defence,” in China Military 

Encyclopedia (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, July 2007), Military Organization (ࡦߋ (Volume 

1, p. 35-37. 

83 Dictionary of China’s Communist Party Central Committee Members for 1921-2003, (ѝഭޡӗފশቺѝཞငઈ

བྷ䗎ި), (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2004), p. 561-562. 84 Ibid, p. 406-409. 85 Ibid, p. 960-961. Although the PLA abolished ranks in 1965, Ye had been one of the ten marshals chosen in 1955. 86 Ibid, p. 900-901. Although the PLA abolished ranks in 1965, Xu had been one of the generals chosen in 1955. 87 Ibid, p. 164-165. Geng spent much of his career in overseas diplomatic billets. After the PRC was formed in 1949, 

Geng served as the ambassador to Sweden, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Albania. He returned to China in 1971, and 

served in Party propaganda billets. In 1978, he was appointed as vice-premier of the State Council, in charge of 

foreign relations, military industry, civil airlines and tourism. In January 1979, he became the secretary-general and 

member of Standing Committee of CPC’s Central Military Commission. In 1981, he became the Minister of 

National Defense, and became state councilor the following year. In 1983, he became vice chairman of the Standing 

Committee of the National People’s Congress, and chairmen of foreign relation committee in NPC. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geng_Biao. 

88 Ibid, p. 1002-1003. In 1955, Zhang was given the rank of general and resumed it when the PLA re-instituted ranks 

in 1988. 
125 

8. Apr 1988-Mar 1993: General Qin Jiwei (〖สՏ), who served concurrently as a CMC 

Member and State Councilor89 

9. Mar 1993-Mar 2003: General Chi Haotian (䘏⎙⭠), who served concurrently as a CMC 

Vice Chairman, State Councilor, and Politburo Member90

10. Mar 2003-Mar 2008: General Cao Gangchuan (ᴩࡊᐍ), who served concurrently as a 

CMC Vice Chairman, State Councilor, and Politburo Member91

11. Mar 2008-Mar 2013: Liang Guanglie (ằݹ(⛸, who served concurrently as a CMC 

Member and State Councilor.92

Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan 

General Chang Wanquan (ᑨзޘ (was selected as the 11th Defense Minister during the 18th

Party Congress in November 2012, but he did not officially assume the position until the 12th

NPC in 2013. During the interim, however, he remained as a CMC member. As the Defense 

Minister, Chang is concurrently a State Councilor and a Party and State CMC member. Chang’s 

biographical information is shown below:93

Date of Birth: January 1949 

Place of Birth: Nanyang, Henan Province 

Ethnicity: Han Chinese 

Education: 

x Sep 1985 – Jul 1987: Graduated, Correspondence Program, Weinan Specialized Teachers 

School, Shaanxi province 

x Mar 1994 – Jan 1995: Student, Basic Course, National Defense University 

Military Background: 

x Mar 1968: Joined the PLA and CCP (age 19) as an Army enlisted member and became a 

squad leader 

x Jul 1970: Staff Officer, Headquarters Department, Operations and Training Office, 140th

Division, 47th Army94, Linton, Shaanxi Province, Lanzhou Military Region95

x Mar 1974: Staff Officer, Headquarters Department, Operations and Training Division, 

47th Army 

x Feb 1978: Staff Officer, Headquarters Department, Operations Department, Second 

Office, Lanzhou Military Region 

 

89 Ibid, p. 594. 90 Ibid, p. 94-95. 91 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao_Gangchuan. 

92 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liang_Guanglie. Liang will retire and be replaced during the National People’s 

Congress in early 2013. 

93 Information on Chang’s military career was found at http://baike.baidu.com/view/325385.htm. 

94 Most Westerners translate jun (ߋ (as army as in the 47th Army; however, the 1997 and 2007 versions of China 

Military Encyclopedia translates jun as corps. For example, see “47th Corps of the CPLA (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᅮ 47

ߋ(,“China’s Military Encyclopedia’s (Second Version) PLA Military History, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China 

Publishing House, December 2007, Vol 2, p. 481-482. 95 According to the China Military Encyclopedia, the 47th Corps was located in Hunan Province in 1950. According 

to baidu.com, in 1970, the 47th Corps moved from Hunan to northern Shaanxi Province. See 

http://baike.baidu.com/view/184851.htm. 
126 

x Sep 1978: Secretary, Headquarters Department, General Office, Secretariat Office, 

Lanzhou Military Region 

x Mar 1980: Deputy Director, Headquarters Department, Operations Division, 47th Army 

x Mar 1981: Director, Headquarters Department, Operations Division, 47th Army 

x May 1983: Staff Officer, Headquarters Department, 140th Division, 47th Army 

x Sep 1985: Deputy Commander, 140th Division, 47th Army 

x Sep 1990: Director, Headquarters Department, Operations Department, Lanzhou Military 

Region 

x Feb 1992: Commander, 61st Division, 20th Group Army, Kaifeng, Henan Province, Jinan 

Military Region96

x Nov 1994: Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department, 47th Group Army, Lintong Shaanxi 

Province 

x Jun 1998: Director, Campaign Teaching and Research Office, National Defense 

University 

x Oct 2000: Commander, 47th Group Army 

x Jan 2002: Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department, Lanzhou Military Region 

 Member, 16th CCP Party Congress Central Committee 

x Dec 2003: Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department, Beijing Military Region 

x Dec 2004: Commander, Commander, Shenyang Military Region 

x Sep 2007: Director, General Armament Department and (Oct 2007) CMC Member 

 Oct 2007: Member, 17th CCP Party Congress Central Committee 

x Oct 2012: CMC Member (replaced as Director, GAD) 

x Mar 2013: Defense Minister 

Senior Officer Rank Promotions: 

x 1988: Senior colonel 

x Nov 2007: General (3 stars) 

x Early 2003: Lieutenant general (2 stars) 

x Jul 1997: Major general (1 star) 

 

96 Information on the 20th Group Army and 60th Division were found at http://baike.soso.com/v56555622.htm and 

“20th Corps of the CPLA (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᅮ 20 ߋ(,“China’s Military Encyclopedia’s (Second Version) PLA 

Military History, Vol 2, p. 443-444. 
127 

Appendix 3: Defense Minister Travel Abroad 2003-2012 

This appendix provides a list of the countries China’s Defense Ministers visited from 2003 

through August 2012. Altogether, the two Ministers of Defense (Generals Cao Gangchuan and 

Liang Guanglie) took 29 trips to 50 different countries, averaging two to four trips per year and 

one to five countries per trip. They visited 13 countries twice and four countries three times.97

Some of those visits were to participate in the various Defense Ministers’ Conferences.98

x May 2003: Russia (SCO Defense Ministers’ Conference)99

x Oct 2003: United States 

x Dec 2003: Russia 

x Mar 2004: Pakistan, India, and Thailand 

x Oct 2004: France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Belgium 

x Apr 2005: Egypt, Tanzania, Netherlands, and Denmark 

x Sep 2005: Russia 

x Sep 2005: Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 

x Apr 2006: North Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea 

x Sep 2006: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Belarus 

x May 2007: Cuba, Argentina, Chile, Greece, and Switzerland 

x Jun 2007: Kirghizstan (SCO Defense Ministers’ Conference) 

x Aug-Sep 2007: Japan and the Philippines 

x Dec 2007: Kenya, Kuwait, and Thailand 

x Jan 2008: Brunei, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia 

x May 2008: Tajikistan (SCO Defense Ministers’ Conference) 

x Sep 2008: Italy, Germany, Belarus, and Hungary 

x Nov 2008: United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar 

x Sep 2009: Slovakia, Serbia, and Bulgaria 

x Nov 2009: Japan 

x May 2010: Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan 

x Aug 2010: Mexico, Columbia, and Brazil 

x Oct 2010: Vietnam (ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting) 

x Mar 2011: Kazakhstan (SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting), Uzbekistan 

x May-Jun 2011: Singapore (Shangri-La Dialogue), Indonesia, and the Philippines 

x Nov 2011: Visit to Ghana, Uganda, and the Seychelles 

 

97 The 13 countries visited twice include Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 

Switzerland, Tajikistan (includes one SCO Defense Ministers’ Conference), Thailand, the United States, and 

Vietnam (includes one ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting). The four countries visited three times include 

Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore (includes one Shangri-La Dialogue), and Russia (includes one x SCO Defense 

Ministers’ Conference). 

98 The information for 2008 through 2011 came from individual volumes of Qu Xing, ed., International Situation 

and China’s Foreign Affairs, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe). Each volume has a separate section on PLA 

foreign diplomacy. Zhang Zhe, “Liang Guanglie Visits the Three Countries in America and Europe,” PLA Pictorial, 

Issue 2, June 2012, p. 4-5. Zhang Zhe, “Liang Guanglie Visits Cambodia for ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 

Conference,” and Zhang Zhe, “Chen Bingde Visits Three Central Asian Countries,” PLA Pictorial, Issue 1, July 

2012, p. 32-36. Wu Xiaoyi, Guo Hngtao, and Li Xiaowei, “Xu Caihou Visits Mongolia,” PLA Pictorial, Issue 2, 

June 2012, p. 4-7. 

99 No SCO Defense Ministers’ Conferences were held in 2004 and 2005.
128 

x May 2012: United States, Poland, and Latvia 

x July 2012: Cambodia (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting) 

x Sept 2012: India, Sri Lanka, and Laos.100

 

100 “India and China to Hold Joint Military Exercises,” accessed at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india19473365#story_continues_1. Liang’s visit was the first to India by a defense minister in eight years. China and 

India began holding combined exercises in 2007, but they were put on hold after 2008 following a series of 

diplomatic disagreements over visa issues. “Liang Guanglie Visits Three Asian Countries,” PLA Pictorial, 2012-10, 

Top Half of the Month, p. 16-17.
129 

Appendix 4: Comparison of Activities by Defense Ministers Chi Haotian, Cao 

Gangchuan, and Liang Guanglie for One Year 

This appendix provides information for activities by Defense Ministers Chi Haotian (2001), Cao 

Gangchuan (2006), and Liang Guanglie (2011) during the calendar year prior the Party Congress 

when their replacement was selected. Even though their replacements were selected during the 

Party Congress, they did not step down until the following year’s National People’s Congress 

(NPC) when the remaining State Council leaders assumed their new positions. 

The data in Table 3, which was taken from a review of PLA Daily articles during the appropriate 

year, includes the number of articles about the Defense Minister, the number of foreign visits (䇯

䰞) made and the number of countries visited, the number of hosted visits and talks (Պ䈸) for 

defense minister counterparts, and the number of meetings (Պ㿱) held for other foreign military 

and key government officials.101 

Table 3: Defense Minister Comparisons 

Defense 

Minister 

Year PLA Daily 

Articles 

Foreign 

Visits 

Countries 

Visited 

Hosted Talks 

with Defense 

Ministers 

Meetings with 

Foreign 

Delegations 

Chi Haotian 2001 254 2 10 19 67 

Cao 

Gangchuan 

2006 201 2 9 16 38 

Liang 

Guanglie 

2011 128 3 7 15 24 

Although the exact reason for the difference in the number of articles and meetings with foreign 

delegations for the three Defense Ministers is not clear, the most logical explanation is that Chi 

and Cao served not only as the Defense Minister but concurrently as a CMC Vice Chairman and 

Politburo Member. As a result, they most likely had greater responsibilities for meeting foreign 

delegation that Liang has had while serving only as the Defense Minister and CMC Member. 

Even so, all of them still only travelled abroad an average of two to three times per year. 

The following three sections provide information for Chi, Cao, and Liang. While the non-hosted 

meetings listed for Chi and Cao merely identify them as a delegation for a certain country, the 

information for Liang identifies the leader of the delegation. In addition, the data for Liang 

includes his other activities (ᓗ䈸Պ) during 2011, which most likely equates to the same types 

of meetings that Chi and Cao participated in. The extra meetings can be organized into the 

following categories: 

x Attended conferences or meetings as one of many leaders where Hu Jintao and/or Wen 

Jiabao spoke 

x Participated in conferences or meetings and presented a speech 

x Attended Party functions, including Party Congresses at various levels 

x Participated in National Defense Mobilization Conferences and gave a speech 

 

101 The source is East View Press’ PLA Daily database. 
130 

x Attended National People’s Congress functions 

Chi Haotian Activities in 2001 

PLA Daily articles: 254 

Travel Abroad: 2 trips to 10 countries 

Feb 2001: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Nepal 

Aug-Sep 2001: Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria 

Hosted Visits and Talks with Defense Minister Counterparts: 19 

x Jan 2001: Philippines 

x Mar 2001: Australia 

x Apr 2001: Czech Republic 

x Apr 2001: Gabon 

x Apr 2001: Brazil 

x Apr 2001: Suriname 

x May 2001: Hungary 

x May 2001: Mali 

x Jun 2001: Morocco 

x Jun 2001: Mongolia 

x Jun 2001: Guinea 

x Jun 2001: Thailand 

x Jul 2001: Papua New Guinea 

x Oct 2001: Croatia 

x Oct 2001: Armenia 

x Nov 2001: New Zealand 

x Nov 2001: Yugoslavia 

x Dec 2001: South Korea 

x Dec 2001: Holland 

Meetings Held For Other Foreign Military and Key Government Officials: 67 

x Mar 2001: United State delegation 

x Mar 2001: South Korea delegation 

x Mar 2001: Nepal delegation 

x Mar 2001: South Korea delegation 

x Apr 2001: Thailand delegation 

x Apr 2001: Qatar delegation 

x Apr 2001: Austria delegation 

x Apr 2001: Russia delegation 

x Apr 2001: Lebanon delegation 

x Apr 2001: France delegation 

x Apr 2001: Thailand delegation 

x May 2001: India delegation 

x May 2001: Japan delegation 

x May 2001: Russia delegation 

x May 2001: Canada delegation 

x May 2001: Malaysia delegation 

x May 2001: Thailand delegation 

x May 2001: Tonga delegation 

x May 2001: Venezuela delegation 

x May 2001: Hungary delegation 

x May 2001: Venezuela delegation 

x Jun 2001: Zimbabwe delegation 

x Jun 2001: Cuba delegation 

x Jun 2001: Turkey delegation 

x Jun 2001: Colombia Defense Minister 

x Jun 2001: Pakistan delegation 

x Jun 2001: Malta delegation 

x Jun 2001: Britain delegation 

x Jun 2001: Cuba delegation 

x Jun 2001: Morocco delegation 

x Jul 2001: Pakistan delegation 

x Jul 2001: Nigeria delegation 

x Jul 2001: Georgia delegation 

x Jul 2001: Bangladesh delegation 

x Jul 2001: Colombia delegation 

x Aug 2001: United State delegation 

x Aug 2001: Ecuador delegation 

x Aug 2001: Zambia delegation 

x Aug 2001: South Africa Delegation 

x Aug 2001: Uruguay delegation 

x Aug 2001: Romania delegation 

x Sep 2001: Myanmar delegation 

x Sep 2001: New Zealand delegation 

x Sep 2001: Italy delegation 

x Oct 2001: Chile delegation 

x Oct 2001: Guyana delegation 

x Oct 2001: Vietnam delegation 

x Oct 2001: South Africa delegation 

x Oct 2001: Russia delegation 

x Oct 2001: Britain delegation 
131 

x Oct 2001: Singapore delegation 

x Oct 2001: Uruguay delegation 

x Oct 2001: Australia delegation 

x Nov 2001: Tunisia delegation 

x Nov 2001: Nepal delegation 

x Nov 2001: Bolivia delegation 

x Nov 2001: Maldives delegation 

x Nov 2001: Turkey delegation 

x Nov 2001: Guinea-Bissau delegation 

x Nov 2001: North Korea delegation 

x Nov 2001: Cambodia delegation 

x Dec 2001: Romania delegation 

x Dec 2001: South Africa Defense 

Minister 

x Dec 2001: Belorussia delegation 

x Dec 2001: Pakistan delegation 

x Dec 2001: Laos delegation 

x Dec 2001: Russia delegation 

Cao Gangchuan Activities in 2006 

PLA Daily Articles: 201 

Travel Abroad: 2 trips to 9 countries 

x Sep 2006: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Belorussia 

x Apr 2006: North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam 

Hosted Visits and Talks with Defense Minister Counterparts: 16 

x Jan 2006: Portugal 

x Feb 2006: East Timor 

x Feb 2006: Switzerland 

x Mar 2006: Rwanda 

x Mar 2006: Ecuador 

x Apr 2006: Sudan 

x May 2006: India 

x May 2006: Burundi 

x May 2006: Eretria 

x Aug 2006: Kenya 

x Aug 2006: Bolivia 

x Sep 2006: Gabon 

x Sep 2006: Libya 

x Oct 2006: Estonia 

x Nov 2006: New Zealand 

x Nov 2006: Afghanistan 

Meetings Held For Other Foreign Military and Key Government Officials: 38 

x Jan 2006: U.S. delegation 

x Jan 2006: Thailand delegation 

x Jan 2006: U.S. delegation 

x Feb 2006: Thailand delegation 

x Feb 2006: Pakistan delegation 

x Mar 2006: Kirghizstan delegation 

x Mar 2006: Senegal delegation 

x Mar 2006: Brazil Vice President and 

concurrent Defense Minister 

x Apr 2006: Singapore delegation 

x Apr 2006: Malaysia delegation 

x Apr 2006: Russia Vice Premier and 

concurrent Defense Minister 

x Apr 2006: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 

and Kirghizstan Defense Ministers 

(during SCO Defense Ministers’ 

Meeting) 

x May 2006: U.S. delegation 

x May 2006: Philippines delegation 

x May 2006: Thailand delegation 

x May 2006: Hungary delegation 

x May 2006: Spain delegation 

x May 2006: Pakistan delegation 

x May 2006: Bangladesh delegation 

x May 2006: Malaysia delegation 

x May 2006: United Nations Nuclear 

Safety Commission delegation 

x Jun 2006: Qatar delegation 

x Jun 2006: Afghanistan delegation 

x Jul 2006: Switzerland delegation 

x Jul 2006: Singapore delegation 

x Aug 2006: South Korea delegation 

x Sep 2006: South Africa delegation 

x Sep 2006: North Korea delegation 

x Oct 2006: Germany delegation 

x Oct 2006: Vietnam delegation 

x Oct 2006: New Zealand delegation 

x Oct 2006: Philippines delegation 
132 

x Oct 2006: Kenya delegation 

x Oct 2006: Australia delegation 

x Nov 2006: Sweden delegation 

x Nov 2006: Slovakia delegation 

x Nov 2006: Benin delegation 

x Dec 2006: Latvia delegation 

Liang Guanglie Meetings in 2011 

PLA Daily Articles: 128 

Travel Abroad: 3 trips to 8 countries 

x Mar 2011: Attended SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Kazakhstan followed by a trip 

to Uzbekistan 

x May-Jun 2011: Singapore for Shangri-La Dialogue, and visits to Indonesia and the 

Philippines 

x Nov. 2011: Visit to Ghana, Uganda, and the Seychelles 

Hosted Visits and Talks with Defense Minister Counterparts: 15 

x Jan 2011: United States 

x Apr 2011: Cameroon 

x May 2011: Peru 

x May 2011: Indonesia 

x Jun 2011: Chile 

x Jun 2011: Israel 

x Jun 2011: Cambodia 

x Jun 2011: Slovenia 

x Jul 2011: Switzerland 

x July 2011: South Korea 

x Oct 2011: Vietnam 

x Oct 2011: Montenegro 

x Oct 2011: Burundi 

x Oct 2011: Gabon 

x Oct 2011: Laos 

Meetings Held For Other Foreign Military and Key Government Officials: 24 

x Jan 2011: Sierra Leone Defense 

Minister 

x Jan 2011: Britain Army Chief of Staff 

x Jan 2011: Tajikistan Defense Minister 

x Feb 2011: Indonesia Vice Defense 

Minister 

x Feb 2011: Pakistan Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

x Feb 2011: Kazakhstan Defense 

Minister 

x Mar 2011: Italy Army Chief of Staff 

x Apr 2011: Zambia Army Commander 

x May 2011: Serbia Army Commander 

x Jun 2011: Separate meetings with 

Russian First Deputy Premier, New 

Zealand Defense Minister, South 

Korean Defense Minister, Japanese 

Defense Minister, and U.S. Deputy 

Secretary of State 

x Jun 2011: Separate meetings with 

Australian, Mongolian, and British 

Defense Ministers 

x Jun 2011: Peru Navy Commander 

x Jun 2011: Japan delegation 

x Jun 2011: Tanzania People’s Defense 

Force Commander 

x Jun 2011: Portugal Army Chief of 

Staff 

x Jun 2011: Greece National Defense 

Chief of Staff 

x Jul 2011: Romania Navy Chief of Staff 

x Jul 2011: U.S. Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen 

x Jul 2011: British Navy Chief of Staff 

x Aug 2011: Vietnam Vice Defense 

Minister 

x Aug 2011: North Korea People’s 

Army Logistics Delegation 

x Sep 2011: Bangladesh Army Chief of 

Staff 

x Oct 2011: Namibia Defense Minister 

x Oct 2011: European Union High 

Representative for Foreign and 

Security Policy 
133 

Other Meetings: 42 

x Jan. 2011: National Defense Education Symposium in Tianjin. Liang co-chaired the 

meeting 

x Jan. 2011: MND-hosted Spring Festival Reception 

x Jan. 2011: Spring Civil-Military Literary Event with all other senior CCP and State 

leaders 

x Jan 2011: Visits troops during Spring Festival 

x Feb 2011: Spring Festival Reception hosted by Hu Jintao 

x Feb 2011: State Council Meeting where Wen Jiabao discussed the 12th Five-Year Plan 

x Feb 2011: Lantern Festival hosted by Hu Jintao 

x Feb 2011: Social Management Innovation Symposium where Hu Jintao spoke 

x Feb 2011: Speaker at the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Personnel Award 

Ceremony 

x Mar 2011: New China Military Diplomatic History Museum Dedication Ceremony. 

Liang attended. 

x Mar 2011: First session of the Fourth Session of the Eleventh National Committee of the 

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Liang attended. 

x Mar 2011: Meetings with Military Members of the National People’s Congress 

x Mar 2011: Closing meeting of the Fourth Session of the Eleventh CPPCC National 

Committee. Attended the meeting. 

x Mar 2011: Fourth Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress. Attended. 

x Mar 2011: 11th Five-Year Plan Science and Technology Exhibition. Attended where Hu 

Jintao spoke. 

x Mar 2011: Attend cremation of former Party member 

x Mar 2011: PLA NPC Delegation held its Second Session 

x Apr 2011: Tree planting ceremony 

x Apr 2011: Spoke at militia work symposium in Chengdu 

x Apr 2011: People’s Armed Forces Department Meeting in Shandong 

x May 2011: Attend cremation of former Party member 

x Jul 2011: Meeting with outstanding PLA Party members 

x Jul 2011: Attended the 21st Session of the 11th NPC Standing Committee as an observer 

and gave a speech 

x Jul 2011: Attended Central Water Conservancy Work Conference in Beijing 

x Jul 2011: Attended People’s Armed Police Forces’ Second Party Congress 

x Jul 2011: Attended 16th All-Army Academic Institution Conference 

x Jul 2011: Attended 3-star Promotion Ceremony 

x Jul 2011: Visited several cities in Northeast China to provide speeches on militia work 

x Aug 2011: Attended PLA Anniversary Reception hosted by MND and gave the main 

toast 

x Aug 2011: Attended ceremony formally establishing MND website 

x Aug 2011: Attended and spoke at Beijing MR’s 6th National Defense Mobilization 

Conference 

x Aug 2011: Attended the 22nd Session of the 11th NPC Standing Committee as an observer 

x Sep 2011: Attended Jinan MR 7th Mobilization Conference and gave a speech 
134 

x Sep 2011: Attended All-Army Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 

Symposium and gave a speech 

x Sep 2011: Attended and gave a speech at a ceremony to honor PLA athletes who 

participated in the Fifth World Military Games 

x Sep 2011: Attended Lanzhou MR Mobilization Conference to discuss militia and reserve 

issues 

x Sep 2011: Attended and gave a speech at the Guangzhou MR Defense Mobilization 

Committee’s 8th Plenary Session 

x Oct 2011: Attended 62nd Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC 

x Oct 2011: Attended China-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Meeting 

between Hu Jintao and Vietnamese counterpart 

x Nov 2011: Attended launch of Shenzhou 8 at launch site 

x Nov 2011: Attended and spoke at Guangzhou MR and Chengdu MR National 

Mobilization Committee Conferences 

x Nov 2011: Attended Seventh Party Congress of the Academy of Military Science, where 

Hu Jintao spoke 
135 

Chapter Four: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff 

Department: Evolving Organization and Missions 

Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton 

Introduction 

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is transforming into a modern military force 

capable of an increasingly diverse set of missions further from its shores. The General Staff 

Department (GSD/ᙫ৲Ḁ䜘/ᙫ৲), which was created in March 1931, is the heart of the PLA 

and driver of its future. GSD develops policies, plans, and programs, establishes requirements, 

and allocates resources to support the PLA mission to defend the interests of the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP). The GSD is responsible for day to day joint operations, intelligence, 

strategic planning and operational requirements, training, and mobilization. In addition to its role 

in military diplomacy and security of senior party and state leadership, GSD concurrently 

functions as Army headquarters.1 

GSD encompasses a large, complex bureaucracy consisting of a General Office and at least 12 

second-level departments (䜘). Like the three other General Departments, GSD’s second-level 

departments and their directors are corps leader grade (↓ߋ㙼). Unlike the three other General 

Departments, however, some of the third-level bureaus (ተ) and their directors are corps deputy 

leader grade (ߋ࢟㙼). 

Over the last decade, GSD’s organizational structure has remained relatively stable with some 

exceptions. The most significant changes include establishment of a new department for strategic 

planning, and greater emphasis on informatization and joint training. GSD also has increased its 

role in computer network operations (CNO) and space operations. The relationship between 

Service Arms and Training Departments has been uncertain over the years. Although 

unconfirmed, GSD may be in the midst of managing a PLA reorganization, including standing 

up an independent Army general headquarters and military region (MR) realignment.2 

 

1

 For example, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Ma Xiaotian was a central player in the U.S. 

military-to-military relationship, and has the portfolio for Sino-Indian military-to-military relations. He also was a 

member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group. Ma Xiaotian traveled to India in December 2008 and 

December 2011 to represent the PLA at the second and fourth annual Sino-Indian defense dialogues. He also hosted 

Indian Defense Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar in Beijing during the third annual Sino-Indian defense dialogues in 

January 2010. See “India China Bilateral Defence Cooperation in 2010-11,” Embassy of India in Beijing, at 

www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=5&SubMenuId=0. 

2

 The last major reorganization of military regions took place in 1985. The establishment of the Fuzhou Military 

Region was ordered on 22 April 1956, with formal ceremony conducted on 1 July 1956. Consisted of Fujian and 

Jiangxi Military Districts, with officers of the Fuzhou Military District assuming command. Ye Fei was commander 

and PC. In June 1985, the MR was absorbed into the Nanjing Military Region. See the Introduction chapter of the 

2002 version of the PLA as Organization for a history of the MRs. 
136 

Building upon previous published research, this chapter examines GSD roles and organization.3

It first examines GSD’s role within the CCP, Central Military Commission (CMC), and PLA, 

then surveys current leadership. The chapter then outlines GSD’s organizational structure, and 

examines its function in overseeing PLA transformation. The following table provides 

information about the grades and ranks for organizations and personnel discussed within this 

chapter (see the Introduction Chapter for further information). 

Table 1: GSD Grade and Rank Structure 

Grade GSD (Ranks)

CMC Member (ߋငငઈ) Chief of the General Staff (GEN) 

MR Leader (↓བྷߋ४㙼) Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (GEN/LTG) 

MR Deputy Leader (࢟བྷߋ४㙼) Assistants to the Chief of the General Staff (LTG/MG) 

Corps Leader (↓ߋ㙼) 2nd

-Level Departments and Directors (MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy Leader (ߋ࢟㙼) 2nd

-Level Department Deputies (MG/SCOL) 

Some 3rd-Level Bureaus and Directors 

Division Leader (↓ᐸ㙼) 3rd

-Level Departments/Bureaus and Directors (SCOL/MG) 

Some 3rd-Level Bureau Deputies 

Division Deputy Leader (࢟ᐸ㙼) 3rd

-Level Department/Bureau Deputies 

Leadership 

GSD’s leadership includes the Chief of the General Staff (COGS/ᙫ৲䈻䮯), Deputy Chiefs of 

the General Staff (DCOGS), General Office Director, and Assistants to the COGS. At the 

pinnacle of the GSD hierarchy is the Chief of the General Staff, a position that separates the 

department from sister entities while the General Political Department (GPD) is led by a director, 

the General Logistics Department (GLD) and General Armament Department (GAD) each have 

a director and political commissar. Among the first-level departments, GSD is well represented 

within the CCP Central Committee.4

 

3

 David Finklestein, “The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, 

and Missions,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: 

Reference Volume v1.0, (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2004), p. 122-222; John Wilson Lewis and Xue 

Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Also 

see Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London and 

New York: Routledge, 2006. 

4

 Prior to the recent Party Congress, full members included Chen Bingde, Zhang Qinsheng, and Ma Xiaotian; 

alternates were Sun Jianguo, Wei Fenghe, Cai Yingting, and Chen Zuoning. The latter is a senior researcher from 

the Third Department 56th Research Institute. Zhang Qinsheng and Hou Shusen do not appear to have been elected 

as members to the 18th Central Committee. Fang Fenghui, Sun Jianguo, Qi Jianguo, and Wang Guanzhong were 

elected as full members to the 18th Central Committee. Former DCOGS Xu Qiliang and former ACOGS Fan C 
137 

Chief of General Staff 

The COGS is a CMC member and directs the General Staff Department. Practice has been for a 

former MR commander to serve in the position.5

 As of the 18th Party Congress in November 

2012, the PLA has had 14 Chiefs of the General Staff since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

was founded in 1949, as shown below: 

x Xu Xiangqian (ᗀੁࡽ(: 1949-1954 

x Su Yu (LTD㼅): 1954-1958 

x Huang Kecheng (哴ݻ䈊): 1958-1959 

x Luo Ruiqing (㖇⪎য): 1959-1966 (concurrently CMC member, standing committee 

member, CMC Party secretary, vice minister of defense, GSD Part Secretary) 

x Yang Chengwu ( ᶘᡀ↖ ): 1966-1968 (concurrently member of CMC Standing 

Committee and CMC deputy Party Secretary) 

x Huang Yongsheng (哴≨㜌): 1968-1971 (concurrently director of the CMC General 

Department and CMC member and Politburo member) 

x Deng Xiaoping (䛃ሿᒣ): 1975-1980 (concurrently CMC vice chairman) 

x Yang Dezhi (ᶘᗇᘇ): 1980-1987 (concurrently CMC Party deputy secretary) 

x Chi Haotian (䘏⎙⭠): 1987-1992 

x Zhang Wannian (ᕐзᒤ): 1992-1995 

x Fu Quanyou (ޘڵM): 1995-2002 

x Liang Guanglie (ằݹ(⛸: 2002-2007 

x Chen Bingde (䱸⛣ᗧ): 2007-2012 

The current COGS is General Fang Fenghui (ᡯጠ䖹; b. April 1951), who replaced Chen Bingde 

in October 2012.6 Fang rose through the ranks of the Lanzhou MR’s 21st Group Army before 

serving as Chief of the Staff of the Guangzhou MR in 2003. Assigned to the Beijing MR in 2007 

at the age of 56, Fang was the youngest among the seven major military region commanders. 

Worth noting is that no COGS was assigned to the position subsequent to serving as Deputy 

Chief of the General Staff. For example, Fang Fenghui’s predecessor, Chen Bingde, was 

appointed as COGS after directing GAD and had previously commanded the Nanjing MR. 

Liang’s predecessor, Fu Qianyou, had directed GLD before his assignment as COGS, and 

commanded the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs beforehand. Fu’s predecessor, Zhang Wannian, had 

commanded the Jinan MR before his GSD assignment. As a side note, the COGS has served as a 

member of the State Informatization Leading Group (SILG) Network and Information Security 

Working Group (㖁㔌оؑ᚟ᆹޘ㓴), which advises senior leaders on computer network 

operations policies.7

 

5

 For an insightful discussion of promotion patterns, see Ken Allen, “Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to 

CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 1” China Brief, July 22, 2010, and “Assessing the PLA’s 

Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 2,” China Brief, August 5, 2010. 6

 The COGS also serves as the GSD Party Committee Secretary (ᙫ৲䈻䜘ފငҖ䇠). 7

 See Jimmy Goodrich, “Chinese Civilian Cybersecurity: Stakeholders, Strategies, and Policy,” in Jon Lindsay (ed), 

China and Cybersecurity: Political, Economic, and Strategic Dimensions, University of California, San Diego 

Workshop Report, April 2012. The working group has included Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, Ling 

Jihua, Meng Jianzhu, and Chen Bingde. 
138 

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (DCOGS) assist the COGS in managing GSD and supporting 

the CMC. The number of deputies has changed over the years. There are currently five DOCGSs 

– four Army and one Navy – as shown in protocol order in Table 2. DCOGSs have a grade 

equivalent to MR leader. With one exception, all are full members of the Central Committee. 

Current DCOGSs are as follows, in protocol order: 

Each most likely adopts a portfolio and oversight of specific GSD departments and functions. 

General Zhang Qinsheng has the operations portfolio.8 Zhang formerly directed the Operations 

Department and commanded the Guangzhou MR. Likely having the training portfolio, Admiral 

Sun Jianguo serves as Director of the PLA Security Committee and Secretary-General of the 

State National Defense Mobilization Committee (ഭᇦഭ䱢ࣘઈငઈՊ).9

 Assigned in October 

2012, former CMC General Office Director Wang Guanzhong or Qi Jianguo likely has 

intelligence and foreign policy responsibilities. Newly assigned DCOGS Qi Jianguo had 

previously commanded the 12th Group Army, directed the GSD Operations Department, and 

served as Assistant to the COGS (ᙫ৲䈻䮯ࣙ(⨶.10 A DCOGS also is a member of the Central 

Committee Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs and Leading Group for National Security. In 

addition, the position of Assistant to the COGS holds a grade equivalent to an MR deputy leader 

and often is a stepping stone to assignment as DCOGS or MR Commander.11 

 

8

 Born in 1948, Zhang Qinsheng joined the PLA in 1968. He also served as Director, Beijing Military Region 

Training Department; Deputy Director, GSD Training Department; Director, GSD Operations Department, and 

ACOGS. Zhang serves as Deputy Secretary of the GSD Party Committee (ᙫ৲䈻䜘ފင࢟Җ䇠).Zhang was 

rumored to have been dismissed in March 2012 for pressing on nationalization of the PLA (ߋ䱏ഭᇦॆ). Among 

various sources, see www.gcpnews.com/articles/2012-03-06/C1063_78592.html. 

9

 Chung Wen, “A Major Deployment of High-ranking Officers in the CPC Military (ѝߋޡᯩሶ亶བྷᐳተ),” 

Kuang Chiao Ching, February 16, 2005, p. 20-23. See also Chen Baocheng, “High Level of General Staff Gets New 

‘Four-in-One’ Model in Personnel Reshuffle,” Nanfang Dushi Bao, December 31, 2009, p. AA28; and Qian Xiaohu 

and Li Tang, “Blue Strike-2010’ China-Thailand Joint Exercise Successfully Ends (㬍㢢ケ-2010 ѝ⌠㚄䇝ശ┑㔃

ᶏ),” PLA Daily, November 12, 2010, p. 2; and Tao Shelan, “Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Meets a 

Vietnamese National Assembly Delegation To Expound China’s Stand on the South Sea Issue (䀓᭮࢟ߋᙫ䮯Պ㿱

䎺ইഭՊԓ㺘ഒ 䱀䘠ই⎧䰞仈・൪),” Zhongguo Xinwen She, April 27, 2010. Assigned to his current position in 

2009, Sun Jianguo is a career submarine officer and former Navy Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the Naval 

Submarine Institute where he studied navigation. He commanded a key oceangoing training voyage of the nuclear 

submarine Changzheng 3 (Submarine 403) in the winter of 1985 and “set a world record for a nuclear submarine 

being continuously underway at sea.” As DCOGS, Sun Jianguo visited Thailand in November of 2010 to observe 

the first training exercise ever conducted by PLAN marines in a foreign country. These events suggest that he is 

likely to play a key role in planning for contingencies involving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Admiral 

Sun Jianguo is a native of Wuqiao, Hebei, and elected as a full member of the 18th Central Committee in November 

2012. 

10 From Jiangxi’s Xingguo, Qi Jianguo spent much of his career in the armored academy and Army Command 

Academy in Shijiazhuang and Nanjing. After commanding the 12th Group Army, Qi Jianguo was assigned as 

Director, GSD Operations Department in 2005. He was assigned as Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 2009. In 

November 2012, Qi Jianguo was elected as a full member of the 18th Central Committee. Former Deputy Chiefs of 

the General Staff Ma Xiaotian (傜ᲃཙ) and Cai Yingting (㭑㤡ᥪ) were assigned as Air Force Commander and 

Nanjing Military Region Commander respectively. 

11 The current ACOGS is Major General Chen Yong (䱸ࣷ ;b. 1952). Newly appointed Politburo CMC member Fan 

Changlong (㤳䮯嗉) served as ACOGS before his assignment as Jinan Military Region Commander. Fan served 

much of his career with the 16th Group Army in Changchun, Jilin Province. 
139 

Figure 1: Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff 

Zhang Qinsheng

ㄐ⊱⭏

Sun Jianguo 

ᆉᔪഭ

Hou Shusen12

἞ṁן

Wang Guanzhong 

ѝߐ⦻

Qi Jianguo 

ᡊᔪഭ

 

b. 1948 b. 1952 b. 1950 b. 1952 b. 1952 

Staff Organization 

GSD consists of a General Office, Political Department, and a number of functional second- and 

third-level departments and bureaus. GSD second-level department directors have grades 

equivalent to a corps leader and third-level department leaders, including bureau directors, have 

grades equivalent to corps deputy leader or division leader.13 

The CCP guarantees absolute control over the military through its political work system. The 

GSD Political Department manages GSD Party Committee functions, and ensures discipline and 

personnel security among other functions.14 A number of second level departments, such as the 

Intelligence, Technical, Informatization, and Army Aviation Departments, have Political 

Commissars in addition to a Political Department, implying the broad scope of that department. 

Figure 2: GSD Organizational Structure

 

12 Born in 1950, Hou Shusen has a logistics background and was formerly Shenyang Military Region commander. A 

Jilin University graduate, General Hou has spent most of his career in the Shenyang Military Region. In 2009 he 

became DCOGS. 

13 Department (䜘䰘) is a generic term for department, bureau, division, office, or branch. 14 As of mid-2012, Major General Geng Liaoyuan (㙯⟾৏) directed the GSD Political Department. Born in 1954, 

Major General Geng had previously directed the GSD Communications Department Political Department and 

Political Commissar of the PLA Information Engineering University (䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ). Major General Cheng 

Jian (〻ඊ) serves as Deputy Director. 
140 

On behalf of the Ministry of National Defense, GSD also manages the Foreign Affairs Office (ཆ

һޜ࣎ᇔ), a corps leader-grade second-level department under the purview of a Deputy Chief 

of the General Staff that is responsible for military diplomacy, arms control, and military 

assistance. 15 Worth noting is the Army’s dominance and the significant presence of the political 

system through the organization. Each second-level department is discussed below in their 

protocol order. 

GSD General Office 

The GSD General Office (ᙫ৲ޜ࣎ (঵is a powerful organization that functions as the 

executive staff for the COGS, DCOGS, and ACOGS.16 As a corps leader organization, the 

General Office controls access to the leadership, manages GSD communications and documents, 

processes administrative actions, ensures secure communications, and coordinates internal GSD 

meetings, and as well as with other PLA departments, MRs, and civilian authorities. The General 

Office’s Political Department (ᙫ৲ޜ࣎঵᭯⊲/䜘) manages internal political activities, and the 

General Office’s Secretariat Bureau (ᙫ৲ޜ࣎〉঵Җተ) oversees executive support to senior 

GSD leaders. 

Figure 3: GSD General Office 

At least three General Office entities have security-related functions. The PLA Security 

Committee (䀓᭮؍ߋᇶငઈՊ) and standing Security Committee Office are responsible for 

 

15 For example, the Foreign Affairs Office would be responsible for planning COGS visits overseas. The last Chief 

of General Staff visit to the United States took place 15-22 May 2011. Chen Bingde visited at the invitation of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other members of his entourage included General Zhang Haiyang (Second 

Artillery Political Commissar), General Qi Jianguo, General Zheng Qin (Deputy Commander, Guangzhou MR), 

General Su Zhiqian (Commander of the East China Sea Fleet), General Zhang Jianping (Jinan MR Air Force 

Commander), General Yang Hui (Nanjing MR Chief of Staff), and General Guan Youfei. In addition to meetings in 

Wash DC, Chen toured Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia, Fort Stewart in Georgia, Nellis Air Force Base and the US 

Army’s National Training Center. 

16 Born in 1957, Major General Ji Wenming (ਹ᮷᰾) was appointed as Director, GSD General Office in 2011. He 

spent his early career in the 46th Group Army. He formerly served as Deputy Commander of the 1st Group Army, 

Director the General Office Military Work Research Office, and Commandant of the Nanjing Military Academy. He 

replaced Lin Jianxiao (᷇ᔪ䎵), who previously served as Deputy Director of the GSD Political Department. Deputy 

Directors are said to include: Qiu Jingping (䛡Ӝᒣ); Song Xinbin (ᆻᯠᮼ); Zhang Guohua (ᕐഭॾ); Chang Jinxin 

(㣼䠁1⁄3); and Liu Huaiyan (ࡈᘰᖖ). 
141 

developing classification system and safeguarding national secrets. 17 The office oversees a 

Technology Security Research Institute (ᢰδᆹޘ⹄ウᡰ), which is linked with the GSD 

Technical (Third) Department-managed PLA Information Security Test and Evaluation Center 

(䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᆹޘ⍻䇴䇔䇱ѝᗳ).18 The General Office also manages the PLA Archives Bureau 

(ẓṸተ), which maintains historical records. 

Part of a broader system managed by the Central Committee Cryptologic Small Leading Group 

(ފငᇶ⸱ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴), the GSD Confidential Bureau (ᙫ৲χ㾱ተ) is responsible for 

encryption of senior GSD leader communications and networks.19 The Chief Engineer, GSD 

Confidential Bureau is dual hatted as Deputy Director of the Central Committee Cryptologic 

Working Small Group Office (ފငᇶ⸱ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴ޜ࣎ᇔ). The GSD Confidential Bureau 

oversees the GSD 51st Research, a division leader entity located in Changxindian that is 

sometimes referred to as the Northern Institute of Information Technology (ेᯩؑ᚟ᢰδ⹄ウ

ᡰ).20 The Confidential Bureau may also oversee the GSD Confidential Technology Support 

Dadui (ᙫ৲χ㾱ᢰδ؍䳌བྷ䱏).21 In addition, the General Office includes a Military Work 

Research Office (ߋһᐕ֌⹄ウᇔ), a division deputy leader-grade organization that functions 

as an in-house think tank.22

The General Office supports the Central Committee General Office Central Guards Bureau, a 

corps leader grade organization, although its exact relationship remains unclear.23 The bureau has 

operational control over the Central Guards Regiment (61889 Unit), consisting of as many as 

eight groups responsible for security of the CCP and PLA leadership, as well as security of key 

 

17 GSD General Office Deputy Director Qiu Jingping (䛡Ӝᒣ) was appointed director of the Security Committee 

Office in 2012. Deputy Directors Chang Jinyan (㣼䠁1⁄3) and Zhang Guohua serve as PLA Secrecy Committee 

members. Zhang was formerly the GSD Office Classified Archives Bureau (ᙫ৲ޜ࣎঵؍ᇶẓṸተተ䮯). Liu 

Huaiyan (ࡈᘰᖖ) is also a member of the PLA Secrecy Committee. See “All-Army Classified Electronic Document 

and Watermark Management System Training Held in Beijing (ߋޘ⎹ᇶ⭥ᆀ᮷Ԧḷㆮ઼≤ঠ㇑⨶パーセント㔏ᓄ⭘䳶䇝

൘ӜѮ࣎(, “China Secrecy On-Line, May 7, 2012, a t www.baomi.org/bmyw_info.php?optionid=30&auto_id 

=1326; and http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/2011-05/13/content_4435095.htm. 

18 The Technology Security Research Institute may be assigned a cover designator of the 61600 Unit. 19 In the political structure of China, a leading small group (亶ሬሿ㓴) is coordinating body formed to build 

consensus on issues that cut across the government, party, and military systems when the existing bureaucratic 

structure is unable to do so. Leading groups can be subordinate to the Party or State Council, and members of the 

leading groups developing policy recommendations for the Politburo and State Council. The leading groups are 

viewed as powerful in they represent consensus of relevant government, party, and military representatives. The 

leading groups rely on standing offices to manage daily operations and for research and policy recommendations. 

The party leading groups in particular can ensure party authority over state entities. He Liangsheng (օ㢟⭏) is 

Chief Engineer, GSD Confidential Bureau and Deputy Director, Central Committee General Office Crypto 

Management Office. He is one of a number of GSD Technical Department (Third Department) cryptologic 

engineers supporting national level leaders in information security. The GSD Confidential Bureau is probably also 

known as the PLA Cryptologic Management Bureau (䀓᭮ߋᇶ⸱㇑⨶ተ). 20 http://military.people.com.cn/GB/6360932.html. ᙫ৲䈻䜘ޜ࣎঵χ㾱ተᅮ 51 ⹄ウᡰᙫᐕ〻ᐸᆄᘇঠ; ᙫ৲䈻

䜘ޜ࣎঵χ㾱ተᅮ 51 ⹄ウᡰ(ेӜᐲѠਠ४䮯䗋ᓇ䭷χᇦඏᶁӄ䟼йਧ䲒). Its PO Box is ेӜᐲ 7227 ؑ㇡ 2

࠶㇡ेᯩؑ᚟ᢰδ⹄ウᡰ

21 The GSD Confidential Technology Support Group may also be known as the 61840 Unit. 

22 Wang Xuhe (⊚ᗀ઼) may be the Research Office Director. 23 As of early 2012, Guards Bureau Director is MG Cao Qing (ᴩ␵). 
142 

facilities, such as Zhongnanhai, National People’s Congress, Yuquanshan, and Beidaihe. Other 

groups are responsible for special operations, training, and engineering.24 

The General Office also supports the administrative management of academic institutions, such 

as the PLA University of Science and Technology (PLAUST/ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ⨶ᐕབྷᆖ). Based 

in Nanjing, the university integrates a number of educational and research enterprises under GSD 

management. In addition to meteorology, the university also hosts the 63rd Research Institute, a 

corps deputy leader-grade equivalent R&D entity that focuses on electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM), including counter-communications jamming and frequency spectrum 

management technology development.25

GSD Operations Department 

First in protocol order, the GSD Operations Department (ᙫ৲֌ᡈ䜘), which is also known as 

the First Department (ᙫ৲а䜘), is responsible for current military operations, including 

management of the PLA Joint Operations Command Center, airspace surveillance and air traffic 

control (ATC), border defense, and survey and mapping, hydrological, and meteorological 

support to current operations.26 As a rough counterpart to the U.S. Joint Staff J-3, the GSD 

Operations Department is managed by a director and five deputy directors (three Army, one Air 

Force, and one Navy). 27 The Operations Department’s Political Department ( ᭯⋫䜘 ) is 

responsible for internal political work. The Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸተ) is responsible for 

overall integrated force planning. 

The Operations Department also manages a number of contingency planning and real time 

emergency management functions. In addition to functioning as the National Joint Operational 

Command Center, the Joint Operations Command Bureau (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕተ) theoretically 

would coordinate with Joint Theater Command in a crisis situation. The GSD Command Center 

is under Baiwangshan (Ⲯɛኡ) in the Western Hills, and is said to oversee an operational 

targeting center (֌ᡈⴞḷѝᗳ; or ⴞḷ᧗ࡦѝᗳ).28 The Operations Department’s Emergency 

 

24 Wang Qingren ( ⦻ᒶԫ ) serves as deputy director. See http://gxrb.gxnews.com.cn/html/2012-

04/04/content_666666.htm. The Central Guards Regiment may consist of as many as 8,000 soldiers. The First Dadui 

is supposedly responsible for Zhongnanhai; Second Dadui for Great Hall of the People; Third for Xinliusuo (ᯠޝ

ᡰ); Fourth Group for Yuquan Mountain; Fifth Dadui for Beidaihe; and Sixth Group for Special Operations (66284 

Unit); Seventh Dadui for training; and Eighth Dadui for engineering. 

25 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-12/09/content_1577227.htm 

26 The Operations Department may have been previously referred to as the CMC First Bureau (ѝཞߋငаተ). In 

May 2009, former 20th Group Army Commander Major General Bai Jianjun (ⲭᔪߋ (replaced Qi Jianguo as 

Director, GSD Operations Department. 

27 Deputy Directors include Major General Jia Jiancheng (䍮ᔪᡀ); Major General Meng Guoping (ᆏഭᒣ); Major 

General Wang Kebin (⦻ݻ ;(ᮼSenior Colonel Qu Rui (ᴢ⶯); and Rear Admiral Kan Likui (䱊・ཾ). The latter 

formerly directed the GSD Operations Department Navy Bureau. He appears to have replaced Senior Colonel Jiang 

Guoning (ဌഭᆱ), who formerly served as a senior Navy submarine officer and possibly in a staff position within 

the CMC General Office. Born in 1958, Major General Meng Guoping formerly directed the GSD Operations 

Department Air Force Bureau. See, for example, http://gansu.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2011/12/29/012332097 

.shtml; and http://news.lanzhou.cn/system/2011/12/30/010067438.shtml. 

28 See Lewis and Hua, p. 124. The Command Center may be the 61683 Unit. Before his assignment as GSD 

Operations Department Deputy Director in 2009, Major General Wang Kebin managed the Joint Operations 

Command Bureau. 
143 

Response Office (ᓄᙕ࣎(, or Emergency Response Bureau (ᓄᙕተ), is a deputy corps leader 

organization that coordinates with civilian natural disaster warning, response, and recovery 

organizations.29 The Operations Department oversaw a Strategic Planning Bureau (ᡈ⮕㿴ࡂተ) 

until it morphed into a separate GSD second-level department in 2010. 

Figure 4: GSD Operations Department 

The Operations Department’s Border Bureau (䗩䱢ተ) establishes policies and planning for 

ensuring the security of the country’s borders of over 22,000 kilometer and coastline of over 

18,000 kilometers. The bureau director is dual-hatted as Deputy Director of the State Border 

Defense Office (ഭᇦ䗩⎧䱢࣎(.30 The Operations Department’s Civil Defense Bureau (Ӫ䱢ተ) 

is responsible for civil air defense and other emergency management functions. One of the 

Operations Department’s deputy directors and Civil Defense Bureau’s director are dual-hatted as 

a deputy director of the State Civil Defense Office ( ഭᇦӪ䱢࣎( . 31 The Operations 

 

29 The Emergency Response Office is directed by Major General Li Haiyang (ᵾ⎧⌻), who formerly directed the 

Lanzhou Military Region Operations Department. See, for example, www.cea.gov.cn/manage/html/ 

8a8587881632fa5c0116674a018300cf/_content/12_04/02/1333344379017.html; and http://yxj.miit.gov.cn/ 

n11293472/n11295057/n11298523/11956670.html. Also see “Summary: State Inspection Team Inspects Flood 

Control, Drought Relief in Hubei,” Hubei Ribao, May 28, 2011. 30 As of early 2012, bureau director was Ma Qinglei ( 傜ᒶ䴧 ). Among various references, see 

www.xlgl.gov.cn/zwxw/zyxw/201109/t20110913_693783.html. 

31 Liu Qingsen (ḣᒶ἞) currently serves as Civil Defense Bureau Director. See, for example, (ഭᇦӪ䱢࢟࣎ѫԫ

ḣᒶ἞㿶ሏᗀᐎӪ䱢ᐕ֌), People’s Air Defense Network, March 5, 2012, at www.rmfk.gov.cn/ 

new_news_sanji.aspx?id=18080&cid=32; and www.jzrfb.gov.cn/News_View.asp?NewsID=611. 
144 

Department’s Campaign Training Bureau ( ᡈᖩ䇝㓳ተ ) is responsible for establishing 

operational training requirements.32

The Operations Department’s Readiness and Force Development Bureau (ᡈ༷ᔪ䇮ተ) is 

responsible for a range of planning and security functions, including coordination of dual-use 

airfields.33 The Operations Department dispatches joint inspection teams to monitor security of 

key military facilities. For example, Deputy Director Meng Guoping (ᆏഭᒣ) led one such 

inspection team across seven provinces to conduct inspections of “underground command 

projects, military airports, ports, and missile and radar positions.” This joint inspection team 

included participation from a number of CCP government entities including the Public Security 

Bureau and the Ministry of State Security. 34 The Operations Department’s Enterprise 

Management Bureau (Աъ㇑⨶ተ) appears to be responsible for land management and other 

related issues.35

The Operations Department also includes separate Navy and Air Force bureaus that are 

responsible for service coordination. Among other responsibilities, the Air Force Bureau (オߋ

ተ) coordinates joint airlift support.36 At least one reference notes a GSD Operations Department 

Special Operations Bureau (⢩⿽֌ᡈተ), which played a role in providing security for the 

Beijing Olympics.37 The existence of a bureau responsible for coordination with the Second 

Artillery remains unconfirmed.38 The Operations Department Air Traffic Control Office Bureau 

(オ㇑ተ), which is managed by a PLAAF officer, is responsible for development of air traffic 

management policies and coordination, and also functions as the State Air Traffic Control 

Commission Office (ഭᇦオѝӔ䙊㇑ࡦငઈՊޜ࣎ᇔ).39 

The Operations Department has at least two anomalies for third-level organizations. Whereas 

most third-level organizations within the four General Departments are division leader-grade, the 

Operations Department’s Survey, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau (ᙫ৲⍻㔈ሬ㡚ተ) and the 

 

32 See ( 䇝㓳᭩䶙✝⛩㚊❖˖㚄ਸ䇝㓳ᗵ享ᑨᘱॆ ), PLA Daily, June 4, 2009, at 

http://news.mod.gov.cn/forces/2009-06/04/content_3000467_4.htm. Another training-related organization is the 

GSD Operations Department Campaign Training and Education Bureau (ᙫ৲֌ᡈ䜘ᡈᖩษ䇝ተ). 33 As of early 2012, the Readiness Bureau director is Ma Yifei (傜㘬伎). See, for example, (傜㘬伎⦷ഭᇦߋһ䇮

ᯭ؍ᣔ㚄ਸᢗ⌅Ựḕ㓴ᶕ⍋Ựḕ), Luoyang Network, June 21, 2011, at http://news.ly.ha.cn/0379001/ 

20110621/362_345416.shtml. 

34 Li Yun, “Overall Nationwide Military Facilities Are Well Protected; Three Issues Cause for Concern,” Xinhua, 

July 10, 2011. 

35 As of early 2012, bureau director was Senior Colonel Ma Xiaochun (傜ᲃ᱕). 36 www.soa.gov.cn/soa/news/importantnews/webinfo/2011/05/1305507673721940.htm. Air Force Bureau Director 

is Senior Colonel Qian Zehong (䫡⌭ᆿ). The Air Force Bureau is associated with a military cover designator of the 

61139 Unit. 

37 See, for example, “Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games Transport Service Volunteers Hold Work Summary 

Meeting (ेӜྕ䘀Պ↻ྕՊӔ䙊Ȣ࣑ᘇᝯ㘵ᐕ֌ᙫ㔃Պਜᔰ),” China Youth League Network, September 25, 

2008, at www.gqt.org.cn/place/news/beijing/200809/t20080925_93705.htm. 38 Some sources, such as Lewis and Xue (p. 120) , cite the existence of a Strategic Forces Bureau. They also cite a 

Regional Bureau that is responsible for deliberate planning on page 121. 

39 As of March 2012, the Air Traffic Control Bureau is directed by Sun Hongwei ( ᆉᆿՏ ). See 

www.cauc.edu.cn/cauc_news/News/Show.asp?id=7403. 
145 

Meteorological and Hydrological Bureau ( ≄䊑≤᮷ተ ) are corps deputy leader-grade 

organizations as discussed below.

The GSD Operations Department also develops requirements for and manages joint military use 

of navigation, geodetic, meteorological, and oceanographic space systems. A deputy corps 

leader-grade organization, the Survey, Mapping, and Navigation Bureau plays a critical role in 

providing navigation, geographic information systems, and mapping support. It operates the 

Beidou satellite navigation ground segment, with the Satellite Navigation Control Center (ѝഭ

ছᱏ㡚ᇊսᓄ⭘㇑⨶ѝᗳ) based in Xi’an, and oversees a number of survey and mapping units 

around the country.40 The bureau leverages a national satellite laser ranging (SLR) network for 

precise determination of satellites, a capability critical for ensuring precision of the Beidou 

navigation satellite system. The bureau also is believed to operate a very long baseline 

interferometer (VLBI) network of radio telescopes that support China’s space tracking system. 

The Operations Department’s Meteorological and Hydrological Bureau supports the PLA with 

military weather and oceanographic information. The bureau oversees the GSD Meteorological 

and Hydrological Space Weather Command (ᙫ৲≄䊑≤᮷オ䰤ཙ≄ᙫㄉ), which supports 

space missions and has a Maritime Environment Center. 41 

GSD Intelligence Department 

The GSD Intelligence Department (ᛵᣕ䜘), which is also known as the Second Department (ᙫ

৲Ҽ䜘) and 2PLA, is roughly analogous to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and is 

responsible for military and political intelligence collection and analysis. Increasingly reliant 

upon space and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, the Intelligence 

Department also shares common characteristics of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

The Intelligence Department appears to conduct both overt and clandestine intelligence 

collection, intelligence analysis, and mans a watch center that likely is collocated with the GSD 

Command Center.42 The GSD Intelligence Department appears to play a role in the development 

 

40 As of early 2012, the bureau director is Xue Guijiang (㯋䍥⊏), who appears to have replaced Yuan Shuyou (㺱ṁ

৻). The bureau is probably located in the Haidian District, 69 North Central Third Ring Road ( ⎧⏰४ेй⧟ѝ䐟

69 ਧ). The 61081 Unit, referred to as a zongzhan, is believed to be the cover designator for the Satellite Navigation 

Application Management Center (ѝഭছᱏ㡚ᇊսᓄ⭘㇑⨶ѝᗳ). GSD Survey and Mapping groups include the 

61365 Unit (First Survey and Mapping Group); the 61512 Unit (the Fourth Survey and Mapping Group, and the 

61363 Unit (Survey and Mapping Information Technology Group, or zongzhan); and the 61540 Unit (GSD Survey 

and Mapping Research Institute in Xi’an); and the 61512 Unit (GSD Survey and Mapping Information Center in 

Beijing). 

41 The Meteorological and Hydrological Bureau is directed by Li Fulin (ᵾ鬯᷇). The command has a military cover 

designator of the 61741 Unit, and is located in Beijing’s northern Shangzhuang suburb. The command’s Chief 

Engineer, Wang Yegui (⦻ъṲ), directed the weather expert working group for Shenzhou 9 manned space mission. 

Among various sources, see “Video: PLA GSD Provides Meteorological, Hydrological Support for Shenzhen-8 

Return,” CCTV-7, November 17, 2011. Also see “Weather Conditions Suitable for Shenzhou Landing” (ѫ⵰䱶൪

≄䊑ᶑԦᅨਸ血ҍ伎㡩⵰䱶Ⲵ㾱≲ ), Xinhua, June 28, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-

06/28/c_123344772.htm; and “GSD Meteorological and Hydrological Bureau Director Major General Lin Fulin,” 

information accessed at www.dashuhua.com/boke/60146860.html. 

42 The Intelligence Department has been affiliated with a military cover designation of the 61599 Unit. As of 

October 2012, Major General Chen Youyi (䱸৻䈺) served as Second Department Director, and Yao Liyun (ည・Ӂ) 

as Political Commissar. A Russia and Central Asia specialist, Chen replaced former Director Yang Hui (ᶘᲆ), who 
146 

of space-based reconnaissance operational requirements and operation of ground receiving 

stations. 

Figure 5: GSD Intelligence Department 

Speculative assessments indicate that the Intelligence Department consists of more than 10 thirdlevel departments. In addition to the Intelligence Department’s Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), 

administrative bureaus are responsible for comprehensive support for the department leadership 

(㔬ਸተ), reference (䍴ᯉተ), and archival work (ẓṸተ). The Intelligence Department’s 

Computer Center (䇑㇇χᡰ) provides information systems support.43 Functional third-level 

departments include the Intelligence Bureau (ᛵᣕተ), or GSD Intelligence Department First 

Bureau, which appears responsible for defense-related HUMINT collection, with special focus 

on Taiwan. 

The Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau ( ᡈδזሏተ ) is responsible for joint airborne 

reconnaissance operations and dissemination. At least one research entity ostensibly subordinate 

to the Second Bureau – the 55th Research Institute – supports the Intelligence Department 

leadership in developing operational and technical requirements for intelligence collection 

systems, particularly unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sensors. The Second Bureau may oversee 

at least one operational UAV regiment or brigade, based in Beijing’s northern suburb of Shahe. 

 transferred to serve as Nanjing Military Region Chief of Staff. Former Tianjin Bureau Director Major General Feng 

Bingsheng ( Ѡ⛣⭏ ) serves as a Deputy Director. See www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/zggc/2012-01-

11/content_4931032.html; and Choi Chi-yuk, “Central Asia Expert to Head PLA Intelligence,” South China 

Morning Post, January 12, 2012, at http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Central-Asia-expert-tohead-PLA-intelligence. 

43 The Computer Center is directed by Major General Duan Miyi (⇥⍓⇵). See “Active Duty Generals” (⧠ᖩሶߋ(, 

Chaling News, December 5, 2011, at www.clnews.cn/Info.aspx?ModelId=1&Id=796. 
147 

The Attaché Bureau (↖ᇈተ), also referred to as the Third Bureau, manages defense attaché 

offices within PRC embassies around the world. Three Intelligence Collection and Analysis 

Bureaus (ᛵᣕ᭦䳶࠶᷀ተ) provide analytical support related to the former Soviet Union and 

Central Asia, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region. (See the Ministry of National Defense 

chapter for more information on military attachés.) 

The Technology Bureau (ᢰδ䜘), also known as the Space Reconnaissance Bureau and the 

Seventh Bureau, appears responsible for space-based intelligence collection and analysis. Based 

in the northern Beijing suburb of Qinghe, The bureau’s Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing 

Information (ेӜ䚕ᝏؑ᚟⹄ウᡰ) appears to be primarily focused on electro-optical (EO) and 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) remote sensing operations. The bureau may operate regional 

remote sensing ground stations. Major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and 

Shenyang, have liaison bureaus. 

In addition to managing the PLA Institute of International Relations (䀓᭮ߋഭ䱵ޣパーセントᆖ䲒) and 

China International Institute for Strategic Studies (CIISS) (ѝഭഭ䱵ᡈ⮕⹄ウᆖՊ), the 

Intelligence Department oversees a Peacekeeping Bureau (ᙫ৲㔤઼ተ). As noted in the 

Ministry of National Defense (MND) Chapter, MND created a subordinate Peacekeeping Affairs 

Office (㔤઼һޜ࣑࣎ᇔ) in 2001 to manage peacekeeping operations (PKO). The office, which 

was identified as the GSD Peacekeeping Office (ᙫ৲㔤઼ޜ࣎ᇔ) in 2003, has apparently been 

upgraded to a bureau.44 In addition, in 2009, MND established a Peacekeeping Center (㔤઼ѝᗳ) 

in Beijing for training international PKO personnel.45 The director of the PKO Office and the 

Peacekeeping Center is one of the deputy directors of the GSD’s Intelligence Department, which 

indicates the office is subordinate to the Second Department and is a corps deputy leader-grade 

organization.46 The office has subordinate organizations (ߋ४㔤઼һޜ࣑࣎ᇔ) in at least the 

following three MRs: 

x The Beijing MR, which trains medical personnel for PKO operations.47

x The Lanzhou MR, which trains engineers and medical personnel for PKO operations.48

x The Jinan MR, which trains engineers, transportation personnel, and medical personnel 

for PKO operations.49 The director of the Jinan MR office is also the director of the Jinan 

MR Handover Group (⍾ইߋ४Ӕ᧕㓴).50

 

44 “Chinese Peacekeepers in the African Wilderness Can Surf the Internet,” 14 February 2003 at 

www.cctv.com/news/other/20030214/100287.shtml. “The Second Group of Chinese Peacekeepers in the Sudan 

Begin Training in Beijing,” 31 July 2012 at www.mod.gov.cn/djxw/2012-07/31/content_4388129.htm. 

45 “China opens 1st peacekeeping training center,” Xinhua, 25 June 2009. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-

06/25/content_8324367.htm. “Ministry of National Defense Peacekeeping Center Inaugurated in Beijing’s Huairou 

District,” http://forum.home.news.cn/thread/68174850/1.html. 

46 www1.clzg.cn/xinwen/2007-07/30/content_829610_2.htm, http://go.ourgo.com/Bbs/showtopic-15158.aspx, and 

www.mod.gov.cn/djxw/2012-07/05/content_4382945.htm. 

47 http://news.qq.com/a/20090222/007495.htm. 

48 http://news.163.com/11/0729/15/7A51SU2600014JB5.html. 

49 http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2007-09-20/060712601700s.shtml. 

50 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wh/2011-12/12/content_4739389.htm. 
148 

It is not clear what the grade for the MR offices are, but the directors are senior colonels and are 

most likely division leader-grade officers, which implies this is the grade for the offices as 

well.51

GSD Technical Department 

Roughly analogous to its American counterpart, the National Security Agency (NSA), the GSD 

Technical Department (ᢰδ䜘), which is also known as the Third Department (ᙫ৲й䜘˅and 

3PLA, oversees a vast infrastructure for monitoring communications traffic from collection sites 

inside China, possibly from embassies and other facilities abroad, and perhaps from space-based 

assets in the future.52 Faced with its own challenges to communication systems and computer 

networks, the Technical Department also has responsibility for assuring the security of PLA 

computer systems to prevent foreign adversaries from gaining access to sensitive information. 

With modest origins in the 1930s, the Technical Department was previously known as the CMC 

Second Bureau and consisted of three entities responsible for collection, translation, and 

deciphering/encryption.53 These functions are encompassed within the euphemism of “technical 

reconnaissance” (ᢰδזሏ), which is the foundation of “informatized” warfare.54 The GSD 

Technical Department appears to be diversifying its traditional signals intelligence (SIGINT) 

mission. Cyber surveillance, or computer network exploitation (CNE) in the U.S. lexicon, 

represents the cutting edge of SIGINT and indications exist that the Third Department may serve 

as the national executive agent for CNE.55 The GSD Technical Department is a reasonable 

choice to serve as the national PRC authority for cyber surveillance based on its core 

competency in SIGINT, high performance computing and encryption technical capabilities, and 

status as China’s largest employer of well-trained linguists. 56 Computer network operations 

 

51 The director for the Lanzhou MR Peacekeeping Office is Senior Colonel Zhou Shiliang (ઘᰦ㢟), who is a staff 

officer in the Lanzhou MR Headquarters Department. http://news.163.com/09/0626/09/5CNNDPQF000120GR.html 

and www.baidu.com/s?wd=%22%E5%86%9B%E5%8C%BA%E7%BB%B4%E5%92%8C%E4%BA%8B%E5%8 

A%A1%E5%8A%9E%E5%85%AC%E5%AE%A4%22&pn=70&ie=utf-8. 

52 See sample chapter of Roger Faligot, Secret history of Chinese Spies: Chapter 12: The People’s Liberation Army 

of Cyberwarriors (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions), www.lerenseignement.com/nouveaumonde/pdf/ 

4200_Les-services-secrets-chinois---version-anglai.pdf. 53 The Third Department is also known as the Technical Reconnaissance Department (ᢰδזሏ䜘). See “Lantern 

Through the Night” (“ 䎠ཌ䐟Ⲵ⚟ᇗ ”: ߋငҼተ ), Xinhua, July 4, 2011, at 

www.js.xinhuanet.com/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2011-07/04/content_23160214.htm. 

54 For one report on challenges to Chinese networks, see “Rising Releases 2010 Report on Threats to Corporate 

Security (⪎ᱏਁᐳ 2010 Աъᆹޘᣕ੺ ҍᡀഭ޵ԱъB㻛ץޕ(, “China Rising, March 11, 2011, at 

www.rising.com.cn/about/news/rising/2011-03-11/9056.html. 

55 See, for example, “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network,” Information Warfare Monitor, 

March 29, 2009, at www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf. SIGINT consists of communications intelligence (COMINT) 

and electronic intelligence (ELINT). The latter involves collection, analysis, and storing of radar emissions. See Ian 

Easton and Mark Stokes, China’s Electronic Intelligence Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and 

Naval Operations (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 23 February 2011). 56 See James Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” 

in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2009, p. 274; and Bryan Krekel, “Capability of the 

People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation,” Northrop Grumman 

Corporation Information Systems Sector Report for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, at 

www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2

009.pdf. 
149 

(CNO) in China often are referred to as “network attack and defense,” based on the premise that 

“without understanding how to attack, one will not know how to defend.”57 In the U.S. lexicon, 

CNO includes computer network attack (CNA), CNE, and computer network defense (CND).58

Nestled in the quaint Xianghongxi community in the western hills of Beijing’s Haidian District, 

the GSD Technical Department headquarters complex is clustered together with the GSD 

Operations Department, including its 24 hour watch center in Xishan Mountain, the Academy of 

Military Sciences (AMS), and National Defense University (NDU). Technical Department 

bureau, office, and section facilities and sites located throughout China report directly to Beijing, 

and are not under administrative jurisdiction of MR commanders or political commissars. 

Figure 6: GSD Technical Department

 

57 For the concept of “without understanding how to attack, one will not know how to defend” (н៲䘋᭫ቡнՊ䱢

ᆸ), see Qiu Junbo (䛡׺ (⌒and Hu Zewen (㜑⌭᮷), “The Incredible Abilities of Hacker MM: Chengdu Area 

Universities’ Cyber Defense and Attack Competition” (‘唁ᇒ MM’ᇎ࣋н؇ ᡀ䜭儈ṑѮ࣎㖁㔌᭫䱢བྷ䎋), 

Sichuan Morning News, April 25, 2005, http://news.qq.com/a/20050425/001504.htm. A 2007 news article published 

on Chengdu’s University of Electronic Science and Technology of China website at 

http://news.cduestc.cn/news/xykj/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=5030. Also see You Ming and Zhou Xiyuan, 

“Analysis of Attack and Defense Mechanisms in Information Network War (ؑ᚟㖁㔌ሩᣇχࡦⲴ᭫䱢࠶᷀(, “

Network Security Technology and Application, December 6, 2004, at 

http://tech.ccidnet.com/art/1101/20041206/185771_1.html. 

58 See “Information Operations,” Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13, 2006, at 

www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf. 
150 

Details on Technical Department leadership are scarce. Like other second level GSD 

departments, the Director and Political Commissar are equivalent to a Group Army 

Commander.59 The Technical Department has a subordinate third-level Headquarters Department, 

Political Department, and Logistics Department, as well as an Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸተ), 

S&T Intelligence Bureau (、ᢰᛵᣕተ), and S&T Equipment Bureau (、ᢰ㻵༷ተ). The S&T 

Equipment Bureau oversees three research institutes responsible for computing, sensor 

technology, and cryptography:60

The GSD Technical Department has direct authority over 12 operational bureaus. Eight of the 12 

bureau headquarters are clustered in Beijing. Two others are based in Shanghai, one in Qingdao, 

and one in Wuhan. 61 The operational bureaus are separate and distinct from technical 

reconnaissance bureaus (TRBs) under the PLA’s seven MRs, PLAN, PLAAF, and Second 

Artillery. TRB directors likely report to MR, PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Chiefs of 

Staff. TRB directors likely report to MR and Service Chiefs of Staff. However, the Technical 

Department likely provides TRBs with policy guidance and tasking for collection and analysis. 

Bureau-level leaders have grades equivalent to that of a division leader oversee between six and 

14 subordinate sites or administrative divisions (༴). 

The Technical Department’s Beijing North Computing Center (BNCC) appears responsible for 

design and development of computer network defense, attack, and exploitation systems. One of 

China’s earliest organizations engaged in high performance computing, BNCC leaders are 

equivalent in grade to an army division commander or Third Department bureau director.62

 

59 Major General Liu Xiaobei (ࡈᲃे (is said to be Technical Department Director and Meng Xuezheng (ᆏᆖ᭯) 

serves as Political Commissar. Liu Xiaobei appears to have replaced Lieutenant General Wu Guohua, who directed 

the Third Department between 2005 and December 2010. Wu Guohua was assigned as Second Artillery Deputy 

Commander. Born in March 1954, Wu was trained in Russian and spent most of his career at the Foreign Language 

Institute. Liu formerly served as Third Department Deputy Director and Political Commissar. Senior Colonel Zheng 

Junjie (䜁׺f) serves as a second Deputy Director. Zheng formerly directed the Third Department’s S&T 

Equipment Bureau. 

60 Senior Colonel Geng Ruihua (㙯⪎ॾ) serves as S&T Equipment Bureau Deputy Director as of August 2011. See 

“PLA University of Science and Technology, General Staff Third Department, Visits the Radio Reconnaissance Site 

Xiaobu to Observe Education (䀓᭮ߋ⨶ᐕབྷᆖǃᙫ ৲й䜘ࡠሿᐳᅮа䜘ᰐ㓯⭥ז ሏਠᰗ൰৲㿲ᆖҐ),” 

Ningdu China government, www.ningdu.gov.cn/xwzx/xzdt/201105/t20110503_58574.htm; Liu Xiangdong (ࡈੁь) 

had previously been in the position. See Zhuang Haobin, “National Information Security Engineering Technology 

Research Center establishes roots in Shenzhen” (ഭᇦؑ᚟ᆹޘᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ”㩭ൠ”␡ൣ),Shenzhen News 

(␡ൣᯠ䰫㖁), October 2, 2008, www.sznews.com/zhuanti/content/2008-10/12/content_3301180.htm; also see Fan 

Run-hu (›⏖㱾), “Vice President Xuan Yimin Leads Delegation to Beijing General Staff Third Department for 

Research and Exchange” (ᇓ⳺≁࢟ṑ䮯ᑖ䱏䎤ेӜᙫ৲й䜘䈳⹄Ӕ⍱),Science and Technology Agency (、ᢰ

༴), January 18, 2010, at http://zs.njust.edu.cn/newzs/news/xxyw/ 

20100118140939.htm. The bureau also oversees a Meteorology Center (䇑䟿⍻䈅ѝᗳ) (61236 Unit), which is in 

the Third Department headquarters area. For reference to the S&T Intelligence Bureau, see “GSD Third Department 

S&T Intelligence Bureau Visits Our School for Exchange Work” (ᙫ৲й䜘、ᢰᛵᣕተᶕᡁ侶Ӕ⍱ᐕ֌), 

cnliam.com, May 24, 2011, www.cnliam.com/node/168930. 

61 For further background, see Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Occasional Paper, Project 2049 Institute, 11 

November 2011.

62 BNCC, which is also referred to as the GSD 418th Research Institute, has a military cover designation of the 

61539 Unit (previously was the 57370 Unit). 
151 

On behalf of the State Council’s Ministry of Science and Technology, National Crypto 

Management Center, State Security Bureau, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of State 

Security, the GSD Technical Department also has administrative oversight of at least three 

information security engineering bases located in Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin.63 

Training and education for Technical Department personnel is generally conducted at one of two 

institutions. Most linguists assigned to Technical Department bureaus and TRBs receive 

language training at the PLA University of Foreign Languages in Luoyang, the rough counterpart 

of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California.64 Upon graduation, they are 

assigned to a bureau for mission specific technical training. Technical training for electrical 

engineers, communications specialists, computer scientists, network security personnel is 

conducted at the PLA Information Engineering University (PLAIEU/䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ) in 

Zhengzhou, Henan Province.65

GSD Informatization Department 

The GSD Informatization Department (ᙫ৲ؑ᚟ॆ䜘), referred to as the Communications 

Department (ᙫ৲䙊ؑ䜘) prior to June 2011, is responsible for developing, constructing, 

operating, and maintaining the PLA’s nation-wide command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence (C4ISR) system. 66 The department also works with civilian 

ministries and companies at the national and provincial levels to enhance PRC’s 

telecommunications infrastructure. The Informatization Department supports development of 

PLA operational and technical requirements for telecommunications. 

In addition to Political and Comprehensive Planning Bureaus, the Informatization Department 

includes the S&T Equipment Bureau (、ᢰ㻵༷ተ), which plays a central role in operational and 

technical requirements development. The S&T Bureau is supported by the GSD 61st Research 

 

63 See “Construction Completed on National Information Security Engineering Technology Center Website (ഭᇦؑ

᚟ᆹޘᐕ〻ᢰδѝᗳ㖁ㄉᆼᐕ),” Beijing Lan Bo Synergy Technology Co. Ltd. (ेӜ㬍ঊ㶽Ც、ᢰM䲀 ޜਨ), 

September 22, 2008, at www.librich.com/news_view.asp?viewid=51; furthermore, Beijing Guowei Xin’an Network 

Technology Company (ेӜഭছؑᆹ㖁㔌ᢰδM䲀ޜਨ) works closely with Third Department First Bureau in 

supporting the project. See “Yin Chuan-xi (ቩՐௌ),” at www.ushi.cn/p/2991; and “Cooperation Partners,” China 

Cuslink Co., Ltd. (ेӜѝ⎧䙊、ᢰM䲀ޜਨ), at www.cuslink.cn/Partners.aspx. 64 In addition to the Third Department’s Luoyang language center (䀓᭮ߋཆഭ䈝ᆖ䲒), the GSD Second 

Department may also have a foreign language training center in Nanjing. 

65 The Information Engineering University was formed in 1999 through merging of several academies responsible 

for information engineering, surveying, and other specialties. The University’s website can be accessed at 

www.plaieu.cn/. See “2010 China People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering University Requirement for 

Admissions (2010 ᒤѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖᤋ⭏ ㄐ〻),” China People’s Liberation Army Information 

Engineering University (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ), August 2, 2010, at http://gaoxiao.xuanxiao.com/ 

1876/8114.html. 

66 As of September 2012, Informatization Department Director was Cheng Dong ( 䱸 ь ). Communications 

Departments of services and military regions were also renamed Informatization Departments. Among various 

sources, see Guo Yuandong, “PLA Sets up Four New Departments in One Month – Expert: The Military Reform in 

China Has Been Launched. It Has Entered a New Time Period of Transformation. The Reform Will Still Go Deeper 

(䀓᭮ߋ 1 L޵ᡀ・ 4 њᯠ䜘䰘уᇦ˖ѝഭߋһ᭩䶙੟ࣘ 䘋ޕ䖜රᯠᰦk ᭩䶙䘈Պ␡ޕ(, “Fazhi Wanbao, 

December 22, 2011. 
152 

Institute, also known as the Beijing Institute of Communications (ेӜ䙊ؑ⹄ウᡰ).67 Other 

bureaus include the Military Affairs Bureau (࣑ߋተ), Military Representative Bureau (ߋһԓ

㺘ተ) and Factory Management Bureau (ᐕল㇑⨶ተ), which are responsible for defense 

industry contracting and coordination; Command Automation Bureau (ᤷᥕ㠚ࣘॆተ); Mobile 

Networks Bureau ( 〫ࣘ㖁㔌ተ ); and Training Bureau ( 䇝㓳ተ ). The Informatization 

Department maintains a training facility in the greater Beijing area.68

Figure 7: GSD Informatization Department 

The department oversees at least two division leader-level communications commands (䙊ؑᙫ

ㄉ ), the first in Beijing (61623 Unit) and the second in Xi’an (61068 Unit). Each 

communications command oversees a number of communications regiments.69 Reportedly, the 

GSD Informatization Department leverages long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such 

as those used for strategic reconnaissance.70

 

67 The 61st Research Institute is located in Lugouqiao area of Beijing’s Fengtai District, specifically 䜁ᑨᒴᶁ䜁ᑨ

ᒴ 67 ਧ. 68 The training base is probably the 61579 Unit. As of June 2012, Tian Wei (⭠Տ) directed the S&T Equipment 

Bureau. 

69 The First GSD Communications Command was formerly designated the 58001 Unit. Units under the First 

Communications Command may include: 61035 Unit (First Regiment, Beijing, Changping District, Yangfang 

Village); 61416 and 61932 Units (Third and Fifth Regiments, Beijing Wanshou Road); 61468 Unit (Sixth Regiment, 

Xinzhou City, Dingxiang County); 61516 Unit (11th Regiment, Lengquan Village in the Beijing suburb of 

Xibeiwang); 61593 Unit (possibly the 10th Regiment, although indications exist it has been closed). The 61345 Unit 

(Second Regiment, Ankang) and 61413 Unit (Ninth Regiment, Xiangyang) are said to be under the Second 

Communications Command. The 61892 Unit is a satellite ground station in Shantou. The Informatization 

Department is also said to oversee an information support base (ᙫ৲䈻䜘ؑ᚟؍䳌สൠ; possibly the 61088 Unit). 70 At least one source asserts that the GSD Informatization Department also leverages UAVs. See, for example, 

Andrei Chang, “Application of Strategic Reconnaissance UAVs in Chinese Armed Forces,” Kanwa Asian Defense 

Review, No. 86, December 1, 2011, p. 6-7. 
153 

GSD Strategic Planning Department 

On 22 November 2011, GSD officially established a new Strategic Planning Department (SPD/

ᡈ⮕㿴ࡂ䜘). This new second-level department was founded on the basis of the GSD Operation 

Department’s Strategic Planning Bureau, upgrading it into a corps leader-grade organization.71 

The Strategic Planning Department may support the CMC through the COGS in a number of 

areas. First, the department may offer long term analysis of the international security 

environment, including net assessment of evolving national security challenges, balances, and 

required future capabilities required to meet challenges. It may cooperate or conflict with 

military intelligence (e.g., Second and Third Departments) and defense doctrinal and academic 

communities (e.g., AMS and NDU). 

The Strategic Planning Department may also be responsible for organizational transformation 

through analysis of alternative organization and command relationships, such as possible 

formation of Army Service HQ and restructuring Military Regions. There could be a possible 

linkage with reorganization of the GSD Training and Service Arms Department. The new GSD 

Training Department establishes foundation for future incorporation of Armored and Artillery 

and Air Defense Bureaus into Headquarters Department of Army General HQ. It is possible that 

it could incorporate some responsibilities of the GSD Military Affairs Department. The 

department also may assess costs and benefits of a military region realignment, such as possible 

incorporation of Chengdu MR into Lanzhou and Guangzhou MRs; incorporation of Jinan MR 

into Beijing or Nanjing MR 

A third mission of the Strategic Planning Department could be strategic resource allocation. This 

could include advising the CMC on broad budget priorities and allocation decisions to support 

force transformation goals. The department could have a possible role in developing defense 

planning and policy guidance, including illustrative scenarios as basis for planning, 

programming, and budgeting. The GSD Strategic Planning Department may also be responsible 

for departmental and “domain” coordination. In implementing defense planning guidance from 

CMC, it may establish and manage formal coordination mechanisms between GSD Departments, 

the four General Departments (e.g., GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD); Army, Air Force, Navy, and 

Second Artillery.72

Based on analysis of available information, the Strategic Planning Department has 3-4 deputy 

directors. According to a brief discussion in Washington DC in August 2011, one of the deputy 

directors stated that the department has five subordinate bureaus and two directly subordinate 

research centers. A review of available information indicates that the subordinate bureaus 

 

71 For example, see Chung Chien, “Meaning of Setup of a New Strategic Planning Department by General Staff 

Department (ᙫ৲ᯠ䇮ᡈ⮕㿴ࡂ䜘᜿⏥),” Feng Huang Chou Kan, December 15, 2011. Yao Yijiang, Lu Zhengtao, 

and Zhang Xuege, “Think Tank Construction: A New Center of Gravity in China’s Military Reform,” Nanfang 

Zhoumo, January 4, 2012. 72 The Strategic Planning Department may be linked with the CMC Strategic Committee (ᡈ⮕ငઈՊ), or Strategy 

Small Working Group (ᡈ⮕ሿ㓴). The Strategic Planning Department could oversee a GSD International Situation 

Study Group (ᙫ৲ഭ䱵ᖒ࣯⹄ウሿ㓴), although little is known about the organization. Major General Chen 

Shoumin ( 䱸ᆸ≁ ) was identified as Deputy Director in March 2012. For at least one reference, see 

www.360doc.com/content/11/0409/09/1298788_108324159.shtml. and www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/ 

zlwj/article_2011113049577.html. And http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/zhuanlan/xuelitai/detail_2011_11/24/ 

10873044_0.shtml. 
154 

include Development Planning, Strategic Resources, Strategic Research, and Statistical 

Assessment.73

GSD Army Aviation Department 

Headquartered in Beijing’s eastern Tongzhou District, the GSD Army Aviation Department (ᙫ

৲䱶㡚䜘) is responsible for developing operational and technical requirements for attack, 

transport, and other utility helicopters, and maintains direct control over much of the PLA’s army 

aviation assets.74 Established as a bureau under the Service Arms Department (ޥ⿽䜘) in 1986, 

the Army Aviation Department became an equal department in 1995. Among its bureaus include 

the GSD Army Aviation Department Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸተ); Equipment Bureau (㻵༷

ተ); Operational Training Bureau (֌ᡈ䇝㓳ተ); and Military Representative Bureau (ߋԓተ). 

The GSD Army Aviation Department also oversees a flight academy and Flight Test Group 

(61297 Unit) that is located at Jingdezhen. 

Figure 8: GSD Army Aviation Department 

GSD Military Training Department 

In December 2011, the GSD Military Training and Service Arms Department (ᙫ৲ߋ䇝оޥ⿽

䜘) was reorganized into the GSD Military Training Department (ᙫ৲ߋ䇝䜘).75 Detailed status 

of the bureaus that have represented the “Service Arms” portion of the previous department 

remains unknown. The Training and Service Arms Department had been separate before their 

 

73 Zhou Feng, “The formation of the strategic planning department move our military to adapt to the new revolution 

in military affairs (㓴ᔪᡈ⮕㿴ࡂ䜘ᱟᡁߋ䘲ᓄᯠߋһਈ䶙ѻѮ),” China Daily, 1 December 2011. Accessed at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/micro-reading/dzh/2011-12-01/content_4538211.html. 

74 Born in 1957, Major General Yuan Jichang (㺱㔗᰼) was appointed as GSD Army Aviation Department Director 

in September 2011. Yuan is a former PLA Air Force pilot with grade equivalent to a corps leader. He replaced 

Major General Zhang Ming, who transferred to become GSD Strategic Planning Department Director. Major 

General Chen Xiangdong (䱸ੁь) has served as Political Commissar and Army Aviation Department Party 

Secretary since 2010. He was formerly with 14th Group Army in Chengdu Military Region. Deputy Director with 

force modernization portfolio appears to be Major General You Jun (ቔߋ(. He formerly directed Army Aviation 

Department Equipment Bureau, and has frequent interaction with AVIC and other defense industrial entities. Other 

Deputy Director is Senior Colonel Sun Delong (ᆉᗧ嗉), who may have operations and training portfolios. 75 The Training Department Director is Major General Chen Zhaohai (䱸➗⎧) and Political Commissar is He 

Jiangbo (䍪⊏⌒). 
155 

merger in 2003. GSD has sought to further implement its modernization by revamping its 

internal bureaucratic structure for training and professional military education (PME). 

Figure 9: GSD Training Department 

The new Military Training Department is responsible for the “strategic management of military 

training within the entire armed forces, overall management of training in services and branches, 

comprehensive management of the construction of branches under ground forces.” This 

organizational shake-up is intended to serve as a concrete measure to help the PLA adapt to the 

“requirements of new missions, new situations and new tasks” by centralizing and improving the 

management of military training and PME. Among other things, it seeks specific improvements 

in strategic thinking, strategic management theory, joint operations training, joint unit operations 

training, and service and branches training.76 

The Department’s Training Bureau presumably is responsible for policy development, joint 

standards, and oversight, while the Training Support Bureau (䇝㓳؍䳌ተ) most likely manages 

support functions for training facilities. The Combined Arms Tactics Training Bureau (ਸ਼ᡈδ

䇝㓳ተ) likely focuses on ground force-specific training. Other entities include the Education 

Administration Bureau ( ᮉ㛢㹼᭯ተ ), which presumably is responsible for curriculum 

development. The Sports Education Bureau (փ㛢䇝㓳ተ) ensures physical fitness standards. 

The Academies and Schools Bureau (䲒ṑተ) most likely is responsible for professional military 

education organizational policy and oversight. Audio-visual Education Bureau (⭥ॆᮉᆖተ) 

may be responsible for distance learning programs. 

 

76 Zhuang Lijun and Liu Feng’an, “Military Training is Planned and Guided at a Higher Level – Military Training 

Department Under General Staff Department Invites Related Leaders and Experts to Study Strategic Management of 

Military Training in a centralized Manner,” PLA Daily, March 27, 2012, p. 1. 
156 

Bureaus responsible for ground force-related policy and force planning include the Armored 

Bureau (㻵⭢ޥተ), Artillery and Air Defense Bureau (⛞ޥ䱢オޥተ), Engineering Corps 

Bureau (ᐕ〻ޥተ), and the Chemical Defense Bureau (䱢ॆተ). The Engineering Corps has 

been comprised of as many as six engineering dadui. These bureaus may be either downgraded 

in status or perhaps in the midst of resubordination to a new Army general headquarters. This 

remains speculative. 

Like any large new bureaucratic organization, the Military Training Department is likely to be 

seeking to solidify its place in the GSD hierarchy by promoting new programs to demonstrate 

commitment to its core mission. In February 2012, it was reported that the GSD inaugurated the 

PLA’s first joint staff advanced training class at the National University of Defense Technology 

(NUDT/ഭ䱢、ᢰབྷᆖ). This inaugural one-year class is comprised of 80 battalion and regiment 

commanders from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery units in the Guangzhou MR. 

The goal of this program presumably is to elevate the PLA’s ability to conduct system-of-system 

operations based on information systems by cultivating joint operations staff personnel with 

expertise in “informatization,” cross-service campaign and tactical theories, and the ability to 

coordinate and command joint operations. During the first stage of the program, trainees will 

receive academic training at NUDT, NDU, and various service command academies. During the 

second stage of the program, trainees will receive practical training at various service branch 

departments where they will train on division or brigade-level operations to enhance their joint 

operation planning capability. Two classes will be held each year, with different MRs rotating 

commanders through the program.77

Another key tool that will be used by the Military Training Department to implement new 

doctrine and training theory is the promulgation of annual training instructions. For example, the 

annual military training instructions issued by the GSD of the year 2012 stress the importance of 

establishing of appraisal standards “based on the systems, categories and grading for the job and 

position of each individual.” One “model” unit, a Guangzhou MR division focused on 

information warfare, is reported to have implemented these instructions by setting up an 

appraisal system with more than 1,000 quality indicators in nearly 100 training categories. 

Reports such as these reflect an attempt by GSD to institutionalize the concept of integrated joint 

operations at the operational level while underscoring the need for units to refine their training 

on information-based equipment.78

The Military Training Department has also established a sub-organization for joint training.79

This is in-line with the overall driving force behind the reorganization of GSD’s Military 

 

77 Wang Wowen and Pang Kun, “National Defense Science and Technology University Inaugurates the PLA First 

Joint Staff Advanced Training Class (ߋޘ俆k㚄ਸ৲䈻䎵ࡽษ䇝⨝ഭ䱢、བྷᔰᆖ),” China National Radio 

Online, February 14, 2012. 78 Liao Baoqi and Shi Binxin, “A Guangzhou Military Region Division Pushes for Change in the Generation of 

Combat Capabilities by Means of Quality appraisals (ᒯᐎߋ४Ḁᐸԕ䍘䟿ḷ߶᧘ࣘᡈᯇ࣋⭏ᡀ⁑ᔿ䖜ਈ),” PLA 

Daily, January 20, 2012, p. 1. 79 The name of this new sub-organization was not included in the report. See Liu Feng’an, “Promoting the 

Transformation of Military Training by Building On Our Strengths – An Interview with Chen Zhaohai, Director of 

the General Staff Military Training Department (҈࣯㘼к᧘䘋ߋһ䇝㓳䖜ਈ——䇯ᙫ৲ߋ䇝䜘䜘䮯䱸➗⎧),” 

PLA Daily, January 13, 2012, p. 2. 
157 

Training and Service Arms Department into the new Military Training Department. Whereas the 

former organization focused heavily on land forces, the new Military Training Department is 

intended to focus on the entire PLA, unifying the Army with the Navy, Air Force, and Second 

Artillery.80

GSD is responsible for disseminating and implementing PLA doctrine and related training 

materials for PME. As part of a major push to reform PME in the Chinese military, GSD in the 

second half of 2010 officially published and issued to all PLA units two series of “newgeneration” teaching materials on strategic and campaign theory, totaling 37 volumes and more 

than five million characters.81 These materials, which were developed over the course of nearly 

one year, are intended to provide guidance on winning local wars under informatized conditions. 

They focus on combining of all forces for joint system-of-system operations and emphasize: 

x Integrating information and firepower in planning operations; 

x Applying innovative joint command procedures and methods; 

x Exploiting superior new operational forces for better tactics and countermeasures; 

x Employing networked information systems; 

x Engaging in operations in the multi-dimensional land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic 

domains.82

These two series of books on strategic and campaign theory were developed by GSD “with the 

National Defense University as the lead and with the participation of all relevant MRs, military 

services, and military academies.”83 As part of its effort to apply the new theories and drive the 

reform of the PLA’s PME, GSD issued a circular on studying and applying the new-generation 

teaching materials, convened a seminar of key faculty members at intermediate and advancedlevel command academies, inspected the application of the new materials in teaching and 

research, and “promoted the transformation and development of teaching as the military 

academies.”84

GSD Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department 

GSD’s Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department (⭥ᆀሩᣇ䴧䗮䜘) is responsible for 

radar-related joint operational requirements development and electronic countermeasures 

 

80 Please note that this source is affiliated with Qingnian Bao. See Guo Yuandong, “PLA Sets up Four New 

Departments in One Month – Expert: The Military Reform in China Has Been Launched. It Has Entered a New 

Time Period of Transformation. The Reform Will Still Go Deeper (䀓᭮ߋ 1 L޵ᡀ・ 4 њᯠ䜘䰘уᇦ˖ѝഭߋ

һ᭩䶙੟ࣘ 䘋ޕ䖜රᯠᰦk ᭩䶙䘈Պ␡ޕ(, “Fazhi Wanbao, December 22, 2011. 81 While not stated explicitly, these “teaching materials” are likely to include new editions of Zhanyi Xue and 

Zhanlue Xue. See Li Weiya and Hu Junhua, “Seize the Commanding Height of Informatized Warfare – Roundup 

About the Development and Implementation of New Strategic and Campaign Theory Teaching Materials Organized 

by the General Staff Department (ᣒঐؑ᚟ॆᡈҹࡦ儈⛩——ᙫ৲㓴㓷ᯠаԓᡈ⮕ᡈᖩ⨶䇪ᮉᶀᔪ䇮оᓄ⭘㔬

䘠),” PLA Daily, April 5, 2012, p. 1. 82 Ibid. 

83 Reportedly, this included more than 300 subject matter specialists working on key issues and more than 200 

leaders and experts reviewing and editing drafts. Members were drawn from all large units, advanced and 

intermediate-level command academies, and the four general departments. Li and Hu, “Seize the Commanding 

Height of Informatized Warfare,” PLA Daily, April 5, 2012, p. 1. 84 Ibid. 
158 

(ECM).85 Also known as the GSD Fourth Department (ᙫ৲ഋ䜘) and 4PLA, priorities appear to 

include satellite jamming and counter-stealth radar systems. With regard to the former, GSD 

appears capable of disrupting adversary use of communications, navigation, synthetic aperture 

radar and other satellites. 

Figure 10: GSD ECM and Radar Department 

In addition to an advisory group and the GSD 54th Research Institute, the Fourth Department 

consists of at least four bureaus. The Radar Bureau (䴧䗮ተ) may specialize in counter-stealth 

force modernization, among other responsibilities. The ECM Bureau ( ⭥ᆀሩᣇተ ) is 

responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for ECM systems. The Technical 

Equipment Bureau ( 、ᢰ㻵༷ተ ) appears to be responsible for acquisition. 86 The PLA 

Electronic Engineering Academy (PLAEEI/䀓᭮ߋ⭥ᆀᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) in Hefei, Anhui Province, is 

the department’s institution for cadet education and technical training as well as officer PME. 

Operational units include at least one ECM brigade (61906 Unit) that appears to be have been 

headquartered in the Miyun area north of Beijing. Other unit, possibly an ECM brigade (61251 

Unit), is headquartered in the Qinhuangdao area of Hebei Province. The Fourth Department may 

operate electronic reconnaissance satellite ground receiving stations to support joint targeting, 

and one or possibly two satellite jamming regiments, including the 61764 Unit on Hainan Island. 

GSD Mobilization Department 

The Mobilization Department (ᙫ৲ࣘઈ䜘), also known as the MND Recruitment Office (ᖱޥ

ޜ࣎ᇔ), oversees the reserve force, militia, and annual enlisted ground force recruitment (see 

the Ministry of National Defense chapter). Fulfilling requirements under the National Defense 

Mobilization Law, the Mobilization Department Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ) develops 

general requirements, while the Equipment Bureau (㻵༷ተ) is responsible for acquisition issues 

associated with mobilization planning. 

 

85 The Fourth Department Director is former GSD 54th Research Institute Director Hao Yeli (䜍ਦ࣋(. 86 The Technical Equipment Bureau may also be known as the GSD ECM and Radar Department Third Bureau. Its 

PO Box is (ेӜᐲ 8315 ؑ㇡йተ). 
159 

Figure 11: GSD Mobilization Department 

Reserve, Militia, and Military Representative Bureaus within the GSD Mobilization Department 

coordinate with military regions/military districts and the services in managing overall PLA 

reserve/militia policies and procedures. The Mobilization Department Call-Up Bureau (ᖱ䳶ࣘ

ઈተ) likely oversees mobilization practices. The Director of the GSD Mobilization Department 

is dual-hatted as Director, National Defense Mobilization Committee Office (ഭᇦഭ䱢ࣘઈင

ઈՊ㔬ਸޜ࣎ᇔ).87

GSD Military Affairs Department 

The Military Affairs Department (ᙫ৲࣑ߋ䜘) is responsible for organizational planning and 

regulations, including the PLA’s table of organization and equipment (TO&E).88 As such, the 

department may be responsible for organizational reform. The GSD Military Affairs Department 

also deals with welfare and benefits policies for servicemen. This includes adjustments related to 

dependents, dependent children education, housing, medical support, and special allowances 

based on posts in frontier area or remote regions or islands. Whereas the GPD’s Cadre Bureau is 

responsible for officer personnel issues, the GSD Military Affairs Department serves as the 

enlisted force’s personnel center. 

 

87 Mobilization Department Director is Mou Mingbin (⢏᰾┘). 88 Chen Dongdeng (䱸ьⲫ) currently serves as Military Affairs Department Director. 
160 

Figure 12: GSD Military Affairs Department 

A number of subordinate offices are responsible for organizational planning and personnel force 

structure. The Organizational Planning Bureau (㓴㓷䇑ࡂተ) focuses on broad organizational 

coordination and command relationships. The Organizational Structure Bureau (㕆ࡦተ) is 

responsible for personnel force planning, including billet management and professional military 

education institutional management. The Troop Bureau (ޥઈተ) is responsible for new two-year 

soldier and the NCO Bureau (༛ᇈተ) oversees NCO personnel management, among other 

things. The Service Bureau (䱏࣑ተ) manages garrison force structure planning issues, among 

other responsibilities. The GPD and GLD entities also appear to be involved in the formulation 

and institutionalization of these policies.89 

GSD Management Support Department 

The GSD Management Support Department (ᙫ৲㇑⨶؍䳌䜘) appears to function as the 

GSD’s logistics enterprise. Bureaus and offices include the GSD Management Support 

Department’s Comprehensive Management Bureau (㔬ਸ㇑⨶ተ), which focuses on broad 

operational logistical requirements. The Health Bureau (ছ⭏ተ), which manages GSD health 

planning issues. The Infrastructure and Barracks Bureau (สᔪ㩕ᡯተ) is focused on facilities 

management, with the Material Supply Bureau (䍒׋࣑ᓄተ) develops requirements for daily 

use operational supplies. The Retired Cadre Bureau (㘱ᒢተ) oversees veteran issues. The 

Military Service Training Bureau (࣑ߋ䇝㓳ተ) conducts planning related to various training 

facilities. 

 

89 Sha Chenglu, Jia Shijiang and Dong Qiang, “Open Door of Happiness for Military ‘Altair and Vega’ – Leaders of 

Relevant Functional Departments of PLA General Departments Talk About Adjustment on Policy on Dependents 

Who Accompany Servicemen (Ѫߋ“᯵⢋䛾㓷ྣ”ᢃᔰᒨ鬯ѻ䰘——ᙫ䜘Mޣъ࣑䜘䰘亶ሬ䈸ߋӪᇦ኎䲿ߋ᭯

ᅙ䈳ᮤ),” PLA Daily, 25 March2011. 
161 

Figure 13: GSD Management Support Department 

Conclusion 

In short, the PLA is transforming into a modern military force capable of an increasingly diverse 

set of missions further from its shores. The GSD is the heart of the PLA and driver of its future. 

The GSD is responsible for day-to-day joint operations and intelligence, and serves as the focal 

point for strategic planning and operational requirements development. The GSD encompasses a 

large, complex bureaucracy consisting of a general executive office and at least 12 second-level 

departments, each of which has several third-level departments, bureaus, and directly subordinate 

units. The GSD develops policies, plans, and programs, establishes requirements, and allocates 

resources to support the PLA mission to defend CCP interests. In addition to its role in military 

diplomacy and security of senior party and state leadership, the GSD also has overseen ground 

force operational requirements and planning functions.90 Although unconfirmed, the GSD also 

may be in the midst of managing a PLA reorganization, including standing up an independent 

Army general headquarters and military region realignment.91 The GSD oversees a broad and 

diffuse organizational infrastructure for developing requirements and operating portions of the 

ground segment supporting space operations. 

 

90 For example, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Ma Xiaotian has been a central player in the U.S. military 

to military relationship, and has the portfolio for Sino-Indian military-to-military relations. He also is a member of 

the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group. Ma Xiaotian traveled to India in December 2008 and December 2011 to 

represent the PLA at the second and fourth annual Sino-Indian defense dialogues. He also hosted Indian Defense 

Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar in Beijing during the third annual Sino-Indian defense dialogues in January 2010. See 

“India China Bilateral Defence Cooperation in 2010-11,” Embassy of India in Beijing, at 

www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=5&SubMenuId=0. 

91 The last major reorganization of military regions took place in 1985. The establishment of the Fuzhou Military 

Region was ordered on 22 April 1956, with formal ceremony conducted on 1 July 1956. Consisted of Fujian and 

Jiangxi Military Districts, with officers of the Fuzhou Military District assuming command. Ye Fei was commander 

and PC. In June 1985, the MR was absorbed in the NMR. 
162 

Chapter Five: The General Political Department 

Roy Kamphausen 

Introduction and Overview 

The General Political Department (GPD/ᙫ᭯⋫䜘) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a 

Central Military Commission (CMC) member–level organization (ߋငငઈ). It is led by a 

Director (ѫԫ) who is a member of the CMC (grade: CMC member -ߋငငઈ, rank of General) 

and by four deputy directors (grade of military region leader - ↓བྷߋ४㙼, ranging in rank 

from lieutenant general/vice admiral to general/admiral.) Directors of the GPD have been 

members of the CMC since at least 1977 when Wei Guoqing (世ഭ␵) became GPD Director 

after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the overthrow of the Gang of Four.1 

The GPD is responsible for the management and organization of Communist Party work within 

the PLA; full-spectrum personnel management; development and dissemination of Party 

propaganda; culture; liaison, security; legal and judicial issues; and investigations. The GPD 

leads the all-PLA military discipline and inspection system. 

The GPD also provides the functional lead for the political commissar system found at all levels 

throughout the PLA, party committees at battalion and above and party branches at company and 

below. 

The GPD in 2012 has 10 subordinate entities, including a general office, seven second-level 

departments, the military court, and the military procuratorate, as well as more than a dozen 

independent direct work entities, which may be situated within the Direct Work Department for 

bureaucratic reasons. The GPD has three military academies that are subordinate to it, including 

the Nanjing Political Academy, Xi’an Political Academy, and the PLA Arts Academy (Beijing). 

In the last several years, several new regulations or guidelines have been issued to govern the 

activities of the GPD and subordinate elements, in attempts both to regularize the political work 

and functions within the PLA as well as to retain relevance for the GPD in a rapidly-evolving 

period of modernization and activity for the PLA. The GPD also leads or participates in at least 

two national-level committees or small groups, including the Military Discipline and Inspection 

Committee and the Military Demobilized Cadres Work Reassignment Committee. 

This chapter proceeds with a brief history of the GPD. Next, the chapter discusses the leadership 

of the GPD. Following the leadership section, the chapter examines in detail the structure of the 

GPD’s second- and third-level departments and bureaus. The chapter then discusses the military 

academies that are subordinate to the GPD and then the national-level committees of which the 

 

1

 The period of the Cultural Revolution was one of great turmoil for the GPD, whose operations were suspended for 

a period of time, leaders were detained. At one point the CMC political works office took over the functions of the 

GPD. At the end of the Cultural Revolution one of the Gang of Four, Zhang Chunqiao (ᕐ᱕ẕ), actually was 

recognized as Director of the GPD from January 1975. 
163 

GPD is a participant. The chapter concludes with a discussion of several issues worthy of further 

study. 

History 

In February 1931, the forerunner of the PLA’s General Political Department, namely the General 

Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Work Committee (ѝཞ䶙ભߋһင

ઈՊᙫ᭯⋫䜘), was established. Signifying the importance of the department’s political work, 

Mao Zedong himself was the first leader of the GPD. Despite its long history, the GPD is 

attempting to stay current; the GPD even has its own Facebook page.2

There have been notable structural changes to the GPD over the ensuing eight decades, in many 

ways paralleling developments that have occurred in the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party 

more broadly. The most significant restructuring occurred at the Third Plenum of the 11th

Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1978 that set up the structure as follows: 

1978 Reorganization by CMC Order: 

x Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘) 

x Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘) 

x Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘) 

x Culture Department (᮷ॆ䜘) 

x Security Department (؍ছ䜘) 

x Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘) 

x Mass Works Department (㗔ᐕ䜘) 

x Military Procuratorate (ߋһỰሏ䲒) 

x Military Courts (ߋһ⌅䲒) 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ (঵

x Direct Administratively Managed Department (ⴤ᭯䜘) 

x Management Bureau (㇑⨶ተ). 

Further revisions led to a structure for the GPD in the late 1980’s that included: General Office 

(ޜ࣎(঵, Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘), Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘), Propaganda 

Department (ᇓՐ䜘), Security Department (؍ছ䜘), Culture Department (᮷ॆ䜘), Mass 

Works Department (㗔Շᐕ֌䜘), Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘), Old (retired) Cadres Bureau 

(㘱ᒢ䜘ተ), Military Court (ߋһ⌅䲒), Military Procuratorate (ߋһỰሏ䲒), and the Directed 

Work (ⴤᐕ䜘) department. 

Today, the GPD has 10 subordinate second-level departments or work units (অս), including the 

General Office (ޜ࣎ ;(঵Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘); Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘); 

Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘); Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘); Security Department (؍ছ䜘); 

Discipline Inspection Department (㓚ᖻỰḕ䜘); Directly Subordinate Work Departments (ⴤ኎

 

2

 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Peoples-Liberation-Army-General-PoliticalDepartment/215439231821847?rf=249676901714379. 
164 

ᐕ֌䜘); Military Court (ߋһ⌅䲒); and Military Procuratorate (ߋһỰሏ䲒).3

 The Military 

Court and Military Procuratorate also have reporting responsibilities to other functional entities, 

in the case of the military courts to the Supreme People’s Court (D儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒) and Supreme 

People’s Procuratorate (D儈Ӫ≁Ựሏ䲒). 

 

Of note, GPD is the only General Department that does not assign military unit cover designators 

(MUCDs/䜘䱏ԓਧ) to its subordinate organizations. The reason for this is that GPD has 

subordinate departments (䜘䰘) and work units (অս) but does not have subordinate units (䜘䱏) 

for which MUCDs are assigned.4

Other directly subordinate entities to the GPD include publishing/media functions, including the 

PLA News (䀓᭮ߋᣕ矢), PLA Publishing (䀓᭮ߋࠪ⡸矢), PLA Pictorial Press (䀓᭮ߋ⭫ᣕ

矢), and PLA Arts Press (䀓᭮ߋ᮷㢪矢). Cultural/entertainment functions include: “August 1st”

Movie Studio (ޛа⭥ᖡࡦ⡷ল), PLA Military Song and Dance Troupe (䀓᭮ߋl㡎ഒ)

5

, PLA 

Opera Troupe (lࢗഒ), PLA Theater Troupe (䈍ࢗഒ), PLA “August 1st” 䀓᭮ޛߋаփᐕབྷ

䱏, and the Military Band (ߋҀഒ). A final direct reporting function is the Military Museum (ߋ

һঊ⢙侶). 

Additionally, GPD personnel are in place at Xinhua’s PLA news bureau (ᯠॾ矢䀓᭮࠶ߋ(矢, 

Central People’s Broadcasting Station military division (ѝཞӪ≁ᒯ᫝⭥ਠߋһ䜘), and the 

CCTV military division (ѝཞ⭥㿶ਠߋһ䜘).6

Leadership 

Since the establishment of the PRC, there have been 13 Directors of the General Political 

Department, or its predecessor organizations. Marshal Luo Ruohan (㖇㦓ẃ) served on three 

occasions as GPD Director or equivalent (from April 1950 until October 1954, after a 

reorganization from October 1954 to December 1956 and then again after Tan Zheng (䉝᭯) was 

relieved in January 1961 until September 1954. Wei Guoqing (世ഭ␵) served two consecutive 

terms, from August 1977 until January 1980, and then from January 1980 until September 1982. 

The position was effectively vacant during several years of the Cultural Revolution, when the 

leaders of the GPD and then later the structure itself was under attack. At one point in 1968, the 

CMC political work office undertook the functions of the GPD. 

 

 

3

 The addition of the Discipline Inspection Department and the subordination of the old cadres bureau into the 

second-level cadre department and the mass works department into the Direct Subordinate Department are what 

distinguish the current GPD structure from its 1980’s version. 

4

 See the Introduction Chapter for further information. 

5

 Peng Liyuan (ᖝѭ჋), reported to be a major general of the PLA Song and Dance troupe, is the wife of new CCP 

General Secretary Xi Jinping. 

6

 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/114919.htm on November 19, 2012. 
165 

Table 1: Directors of the General Political Department 

Name (Chinese) Date Selected Previous GPD Positions 

Liu Shaoqi (ࡈቁྲཱྀ) October 1949 

Luo Ruohan (㖇㦓ẃ) April 1950 

Luo Ruohan(㖇㦓ẃ) October 1954 

Tan Zheng (䉝᭯) December 1956 Deputy Director (1954-1956) 

Luo Ruohan (㖇㦓ẃ) January 1961 

Xiao Hua (㩗ॾ) September 1964 Deputy Director (1954-1964) 

Vacant 

Li Desheng (ᵾᗧ⭏) December 1969 

Zhang Chunqiao (ᕐ᱕ẕ) January 1975 

Wei Guoqing (世ഭ␵) August 1977 

Wei Guoqing (世ഭ␵) January 1980 

Yu Quili (։⿻䟼) September 1982 

Yang Baibing (ᶘⲭߠ (November 1987 

Yu Yongbo (Ҿ≨⌒) October 1992 Deputy Director (1989-1992) 

Xu Caihou (ᗀ᡽৊) November 2002 Deputy Director (1999-2002) 

Li Jinai ᵾ㔗㙀) September 2004 Deputy Director (1990-1992 

Zhang Yang (ᕐ䱣) November 2012 

Current Leadership 

Just prior to the convening of the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Guangzhou MR 

political commissar General Zhang Yang (ᕐ䱣) (Army) was appointed as the GPD Director and 

CMC Member (ߋငငઈ). Zhang Yang has not served previously in the General Political 

Department. 

Deputy Directors 

GPD Deputy Directors are at the Military Region deputy leader level (࢟བྷߋ४㙼). As of 

November 2012, deputy directors of GPD are: 

x General Jia Tingan (䍮ᔧᆹ) (Army) 

x General Du Jincai (ᶌ䠁᡽) (Army) (also Secretary of the Central Discipline 

Inspection Committee 

x LTG Wu Changde (੤᰼ᗧ) (Army) 

x LTG Yin Fanglong (⇧ᯩ嗉 ) (Army) 

Assistant Director is LTG Nian Fuchun (ᒤ鬯㓟) (Army).7

 

7

 Information accessed at http://china.caixin.com/2012-10-25/100451858.html and http://china.caixin.com/2012-10-

30/100454034.html on November 19, 2012. 
166 

A brief review of the histories of the deputy and assistant directors shows a variety of 

backgrounds, including service at lower levels within the GPD itself, as well as political work 

duties in other departments and the military regions.8 In short, there is no critical path to 

becoming a deputy director of the GPD. And while there does not appear to be a fixed rule that a 

GPD Director has previously been a Deputy Director of the GPD, the last three GPD Directors 

before Zhang Yang all previously served in the Deputy Director role. 

Prior to his retirement early in 2012, GPD Deputy Air Force General Liu Zhenqi(ࡈᥟ䎧) joined 

Admiral Tong Shiping (ㄕцᒣ) as the top two deputies to GPD Director (and Army General) Li 

Jinai, creating the appearance of “jointness” within the GPD leadership, in the process almost 

mimicking the “joint” approach employed to select generals from the other services to be Deputy 

Chiefs in the General Staff Department. However, in the Fall of 2012 Admiral Tong Shiping has 

followed General Liu into retirement, with the result that now all of the top GPD leaders hail 

from the Army. It is unclear if this is a temporary correction or reflects more fundamental 

misgivings about a nascent “joint GPD”. (Of note, no GPD leader has ever been identified as 

coming from the Second Artillery branch.) 

GPD Grades and Ranks 

The following table provides information about the grades and ranks for organizations and 

personnel within GPD. See the Introduction Chapter for further information. 

Table 2: GPD Grade and Rank Structure 

Grade GPD (Ranks)

CMC Member Director (GEN) 

MR Leader Deputy Directors (GEN/LTG) 

MR Deputy Leader Assistant Directors (LTG/MG) 

Corps Leader 2nd-Level Departments and Directors (MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy Leader 2nd-Level Department Deputies (MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader 3rd-Level Departments/Bureaus and Directors (SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy Leader 3rd-Level Department/Bureau Deputies 

 

 

8

 Before becoming a GPD Deputy Director, General Jia Tingan was Jiang Zemin’s close confidant, director of his 

General Office while in Shanghai, then director of the CMC General Office when Jiang became CMC Chair. 

Similarly, Wang Ruilin (⦻⪎᷇) was Secretary to Deng Xiaoping before himself becoming a GPD Deputy Director. 

While insufficient data exists to confirm the existence of a trend or established practice there may well be a tradition 

to retain the previous top leader’s confidant as a deputy GPD Director. 
167 

Second-level Departments of the GPD 

Figure 1: Structure of the GPD, 2012 

General Office (ޜ࣎ (঵

The General Office contains the headquarters of the GPD, including the secretaries (〈Җ) and 

led by a Secretary-General (functions like a Chief of Staff.) The General Office manages the 

workflow processes and seeks to implement the decisions and priorities of the Department. The 

General Office has at least two subordinate bureaus: the Secretary/Executive Assistant Bureau 

(〈Җተ), the Legal Bureau (ਨ⌅ተ) and the Mass Works Bureau or Office (㗔ᐕተ or ࣎(.9

The Executive Assistant Bureau manages the activities of the assistants to the Director, Deputy 

Directors, and Assistant Director of the GPD. The Legal Bureau provides legal support to 

commanders and military operations; almost all of the lawyers within the PLA are in this bureau. 

It is understood that they do not act as prosecutors, but may serve as defense attorneys.10 The 

Mass Works Office contributes to overall national movement efforts, such as the Capital 

Spiritual Construction efforts.11

Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘) 

The Cadre Department is arguably the most important second-level department in the GPD. The 

Cadre Department’s staff manages all aspects of officer/cadre management within the PLA, 

including officer accession and initial training requirements; assignments; professional/career 

training; personnel evaluations and management of pay and benefits. The Cadre Department’s 

subordinate bureaus include at least: The Training/Development Bureau (ษ䇝ተ) – responsible 

for officer/cadre training initiatives and quotas; Reserve Cadres Bureau (亴༷ᒢ䜘ተ) – 

responsible for managing reserve affairs; Pay and Benefits Bureau (ᐕ䍴鬯࡙ተ) – responsible 

for all remuneration issues; Civilian Specialist Cadre Bureau (、ᢰ᮷㙼ᒢ䜘ተ) – responsible 

 

9 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html and 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 

10 Author interviews with GPD Legal Bureau staff in April 1999. 

11 Information accessed at http://xxgk.bjwmb.gov.cn/zzjg/sdwmw/ on November 19, 2012. 

(ޜ࣎) (঵ᒢ䜘䜘) (㓴㓷䜘) (ᇓՐ䜘) (㚄㔌䜘) (؍ছ䜘) 

(㓚ᖻỰḕ䜘) (ⴤᐕ䜘) (ߋһ⌅䲒) (ߋһỰሏ䲒) 
168 

for managing the civilian work force within the PLA, especially that section that wears uniforms; 

old (retired) Cadre bureau (㘱ᒢ䜘ተ) – responsible for managing veteran’s affairs, with 

particular emphasis placed on the dwindling cohort of revolutionary veterans; and the Military 

Academy Bureau (䲒ṑተ) – responsible for personnel affairs of the military academy system 12. 

The Cadre Department places such a central role within the PLA in large part because of the 

breadth of issues it manages. Responsible for functions as diverse as the accession process 

planning and direction of the National Defense Student (ഭ䱢⭏) program in the Training 

Bureau13; the officer evaluation system14, the personal identification system15, and managing the 

care and consideration given to old cadres (veterans)16 points to the far-reaching effects of the 

Cadre Bureau on the people in the PLA. 

Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘) 

The Organization Department manages the structure of the PLA’s political work system, Party 

affairs, and is the PLA’s representative to the broader Chinese Communist Party structure and 

initiatives17. Its subordinate bureaus include at least the Organization Bureau (㓴㓷ተ), Youth 

Bureau (䶂ᒤተ), and Party Affairs Bureau.18 The Organization Bureau is assessed to manage 

the Party structure responsibilities of the Department. The Youth Bureau in particular has close 

ties with the Communist Youth League (CYL) and acts to manage and implement CYL activities 

within the ranks of the PLA.19

Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘) 

This department manages the Party’s messages, both internal and external, through its 

propaganda and news publishing functions, as well as being responsible for the morale-building 

activities of the department, including music, sports and drama.20 The department’s subordinate 

bureaus including the News Publication Bureau (ᯠ䰫ࠪ⡸ተ), Culture and Arts Bureau (᮷ॆ㢪

δተ), Culture and Sports Bureau (᮷ॆփ㛢ተ), Military Unit Propaganda Bureau (䜘䱏ᇓՐተ)

and the Soldier’s Education Bureau (䜘䱏ᮉ㛢ተ).21

 

12Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html; 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b9955500102e74w.html; and www.lszsb.com/html/xw/1116.html; 

http://ankang.mca.gov.cn/article/gzdt/201204/20120400294328.shtml on November 19, 2012. 

13 Information accessed on www.lszsb.com/html/xw/1116.html on November 19, 2012. 

14 Information accessed at http://mil.cnr.cn/gfzc/7/201101/t20110122_507611745.html on November 19, 2012. 

15 Information accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-08/04/content_35027.htm on November 

2012. 

16 Information accessed at www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/0979/1419167.html on November 19, 2012. 

17 Information accessed at www.swszgw.gov.cn/article.asp?pclass=%B7%A8%C2%C9%B7%A8%B9%E6& 

sclass=%B7%A8%C2%C9%B7%A8%B9%E6&id=395 on November 19, 2012. 

18 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ 

6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 

19 Information accessed at www.ccyl.org.cn/documents/zqbf/200705/t20070515_26868.htm on November 19, 2012. 20 Information accessed at: http://politics.dwnews.com/news/2010-08-24/56377705.html on November 19, 2012. 21 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/ 

blog_6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 
169 

The News Publication Bureau manages standardization of content and form across the PLA 

while interfacing with other national and provincial level publication entities on a broad array of 

publishing initiatives.22 The Culture and Arts Bureau cultivates the development and display of 

culture and art within the PLA. In addition to putting on performances by PLA artists, the Bureau 

also puts on national level exhibitions to promote the work of ordinary PLA soldier-artists.23 

The Culture and Sports Bureau promotes athletics within the PLA and for international 

competitions.24 The Military Unit Propaganda Bureau manages the delivery of Party messages to 

PLA units, including especially the dissemination of reports on PLA modernization and 

reforms.25 The Soldiers’ Education Bureau helps manage the delivery of non-military related 

educational content to units and soldiers including on topics related to agriculture, language and 

moral development.26

Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘) 

The Liaison Department manages the Chinese Communist Party’s Interaction with other socialist 

countries’ militaries. Its subordinate bureaus include at least the External Liaison Bureau (ሩཆ

㚄㔌ተ).27 Of note, for instance, it is the General Political Department that plays a leading role 

in interactions with North Korea and the Korean People’s Army (KPA). GPD Directors have on 

several occasions visited North Korea during periods of great external pressure on the North, 

including visits by General Xu Caihou in 200328 and General Li Jinai in November 2011.29 The 

near-absence of reporting on operational interactions between the PLA and KPA suggests that 

the political work liaison is the most substantive part of the exchange. The Liaison Department 

also includes an intelligence collecting/dissemination function and is a participant on the GSD 

2nd Department-led intelligence network.30

Security Department (؍ছ䜘) 

The Security Department is responsible for military discipline inspection and security within the 

PLA, as well as general security work including counter-intelligence investigations. 31 This 

highly secretive second-level department also plays a role in VIP escort and security.32 The 

 

22 Information accessed at www.kpqk.org.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=186 and 

http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=185045 on November 19, 2012. 

23 Information accessed at www.cflac.org.cn/ys/ms/mszx/201207/t20120727_142714.html on November 19, 2012. 

24 Information accessed at: http://news.sports.cn/other/2012-04-25/5281.html on November 19, 2012. 25 Information accessed at www.most.gov.cn/jgdj/jcxxsjhdxl/jcxxsjhdjcdt/200811/t20081124_65492.htm on 

November 19, 2012. 

26 Information accessed at http://archive.wenming.cn/moral/2008-09/21/content_14451774.htm on November 19, 

2012. 

27 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html on November 19, 2012. 

28 Information accessed at http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FJ05Dg01.html November 19, 2012. 29 Information accessed at http://newshopper.sulekha.com/kim-jong-il-li-jinai_photo_2061310.htm on November 19, 

2012. The GPD’s interactions with North Korea do not seem to involve crisis communications and management 

functions. In November 2010, the author was part of a visit with then-GPD Director General Li Jinai that occurred 

several hours after the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island earlier in the day of the visit (November 23, 

2010). General Li was unaware of the attack until briefed by his visitors. 30 Information accessed at www.omnitalk.com/miliarch/messages/870.html on November 19, 2012. 

31 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4d5df974010178ix.html on November 19, 2012. 

32 Author interacted with members of the Security Bureau during US VIP visits to China or PLA VIP visits to the 

United States while serving as a military attaché in Beijing from 1998-2001. 
170 

department includes at least the Security Bureau (؍ছተ), Reconnaissance Bureau (זሏተ) and 

Punishment Bureau (זࡁተ)among subordinate organizations. 

33

Discipline Inspection Department (㓚ᖻỰḕ䜘) 

The Discipline Inspection Department functions like an internal watchdog against illegal 

activities within the PLA. It has at least one subordinate entity, the Discipline Inspection Bureau 

(㓚ᖻỰḕተ).

34 The Department also provides investigative and evidence collection assistance 

for prosecutors of military trials.35

Direct Work Department (ⴤ኎ᐕ֌䜘) 

This second-level department serves a series of functions, including as a catch-all for bureaus 

that either operated independently in an earlier era, or which require a higher profile but do not 

fit into another second-level department. Its subordinate bureaus36 include the Comprehensive 

Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ ተ) 37 One citation lists the Legal Bureau (ਨ⌅ተ), indicated in the 

General Office above, as within the Direct Work Department,38 in both instances, the bureau 

exists as a third-level bureau under direct supervision of the GPD leadership. 

Other Direct work units include the Management Support Bureau (㇑⨶؍䳌ተ), Liberation 

Army Press (䀓᭮ߋᣕ-↓ߋ㓗), Liberation Army Art Academy (䀓᭮ߋ㢪δᆖ䲒ߋ࢟㓗), 

Movie Production Facility (⭥ᖡࡦ⡷ল-ߋ࢟㓗), CCTV Military Affairs Department (ѝഭѝ

ཞ⭥㿶ਠߋһ䜘-ߋ࢟㓗), Central Peoples Broadcast Station Military Center (ѝཞӪ≁ᒯ᫝⭥

ਠߋһѝᗳ-↓ᐸ㓗), The Sound of the Strait Broadcast Station (⎧጑ѻ༠ᒯ᫝⭥ਠ-↓ᐸ㓗), 

People’s Revolutionary Military Museum (ѝഭӪ≁䶙ભߋһঊ⢙侶-↓ᐸ㓗), PLA Publishing 

(䀓᭮ߋࠪ⡸矢), PLA Pictorial Magazine (䀓᭮ߋ⭫ᣕᵲᘇ), PLA Arts Publishing (䀓᭮ߋ᮷

㢪ࠪ⡸矢), GPD Song and Dance Troupe (ᙫ᭯l㡎ഒ), PLA Opera House Troupe (䀓᭮ߋl

ࢗ䲒Ҁഒ), PLA Entertainment Unit (䀓᭮ߋ⧘Ҁഒ), PLA Band (䀓᭮ߋҀ䱏), PLA “August 

1st” Teams (䀓᭮ߋ“ޛа”䘀ࣘ䱏), Xinhua PLA Branch (ᯠॾ矢䀓᭮࠶ߋ(矢.39

The publishing functions performed by the various PLA-related publishing entities are selfexplanatory. The purposes of the various entertainment troupes are to entertain leaders and 

soldiers and to showcase talented PLA entertainers to a broader national and international 

audiences.40 Finally, the active PLA GPD personnel who staff the various national broadcast and 

 

33 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ 

6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 

34 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 

35 Author’s interview, April 1999. Author’s interactions with lawyers and judges assigned to the GPD, while 

escorting a GPD legal delegation to the PACOM Operations and Law Conference in April 1999. 36 Information accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2528271_1.html on November 19, 2012. 

37 The Comprehensive Planning Bureau performs net assessment and strategic planning functions for the GPD, 

according to author interviews, April 1999. 38 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. 

39 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b9955500102e74w.html on November 19, 2012. This 

source lists all direct work units as belonging in the Direct Work Department. 

40 Author has several acquaintances who are active duty members of various PLA troupes, some of whom hold 

military rank, who are also national television entertainers. 
171 

news services highlight the extent to which the GPD is centrally involved in “managing the 

PLA’s message” for domestic and international audiences. 

Military Court (ߋһ⌅䲒) 

The Court manages the system of subordinate courts and as well serves as the court of final 

resort for trials under the jurisdiction of the PLA. Of note, within the PLA legal system, judges 

are often not lawyers, reflecting a different tradition of managing court cases.41

Military Procuratorate (ߋһỰሏ䲒) 

Perhaps the single most difficult entity to understand within the PLA, the Military Procuratorate 

serves investigation work, either independently or in support of trials. The function blends 

functions associated in the West with attorneys general, police investigators, and internal affairs 

units.42

 

 

41 Author’s interviews, April 1999. 

42 Author’s interviews, April 1999. 
172 

Table 3: GPD Sub-Department and Bureau Leadership43

Sub-Department and Bureau Leadership 

General Office (ޜ࣎(঵, Secretary-general (〈Җ䮯) Zhang Gongxian (ᕐ䍑⥞) ቁሶ

Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘) Yu Daqing (Ҿབྷ␵) ቁሶ

Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘) Qin Shengxiang (〖 ⭏谷)ቁሶ

Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘) Zhou Tao (ઘ⏋) ቁሶ

Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘) Geng Yunming (䛒䘀᰾) ቁሶ

Security Department (؍ছ䜘) Yu Shanjun (Ҿழߋ (ቁሶ

Discipline Inspection Department (㓚ᖻỰḕ䜘) Wang Bingshan (⦻⿹ኡ) ቁሶ

Direct Support Work Department (ⴤ኎ᐕ֌䜘) Dai Yunpeng (ᡤӁ呿) ቁሶ

PLA Military Court, (䀓᭮ߋߋһ⌅䲒), Chief Justice 

(䲒䮯) 

Liu Liqin (ࡈ ( ቁሶ

PLA Military Procuratorate (䀓᭮ߋߋһỰሏ䲒) Chief 

Investigator (Ựሏ䮯) 

Li Xiaofeng (ᵾᲃጠ) ቁሶ

PLA Newspaper Press (䀓᭮ߋᣕ矢) Director (矢䮯) Sun Xiaoqing (ᆉᲃ䶂) 

PLA Newspaper Press (䀓᭮ߋᣕ矢) Editor-in-Chief 

(ᙫ㕆䗁) 

Huang Guozhu (哴ഭḡ)ቁሶ

“August 1st” Movie Studio (ޛа⭥ᖡࡦ⡷ল); 

Manager 

Ming Zhenjiang (᰾ᥟ⊏)ቁሶ

PLA Revolutionary Military Museum (ѝഭӪ≁䶙ભߋ

һঊ⢙侶) Museum Chief (侶䮯) 

Chen Shifu (䱸༛ᇼ)ቁሶ

PLA TV Propaganda Center (䀓᭮ߋ⭥㿶ᇓՐѝᗳ) 

Director (ѫԫ) 

Li Xiubao (ᵾ⿰ᇍ)བྷṑ

Academic Institutions 

The GPD has three directly subordinate academic institutions: The PLA Nanjing Political 

Academy (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋইӜ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒); the PLA Xi’an Political Academy (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮

ߋ㾯ᆹ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒); and the PLA Arts Academy (䀓᭮ߋ㢪δᆖ䲒). The Nanjing and Xi’an 

academies are categorized as intermediate professional education academies (ѝ㓗ԫ㙼 ᮉ㛢䲒

ṑ). All three academies are listed as corps leader grade institutions (㕆ࡦᄬ㓗Ѫ↓ߋ㓗 ). The 

Nanjing and Xi’an academies both train political commissars at the initial entry and intermediate 

levels. They do not appear to differentiate themselves from each other according to their 

curricula, but it is informally understood that the Nanjing academy specializes in liaison work 

and Xi’an emphasizes legal/judicial preparations.44

In the category of curious observations, the website for the Xi’an Political Academy has an 

unexplained anomaly. The website shows the front gate of the Xi’an academy, which has a sign 

 

43 Information accessed at www.360doc.com/content/12/0318/11/95411_195325291.shtml on November 19, 2012. 

44 Author’s interviews, April 1999. 
173 

that reads in Chinese ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ㾯ᆹ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒 (PLA Xi’an Political Academy). But the 

English subtitle reads “National University of Defense Technology”. 

Important New Regulations 

China’s National Defense 2010 describes several new laws and regulations promulgated in the 

2009-2010 time period, including “Opinions on Strengthening Political Work in Military 

Operations Other than War (MOOTW),” promulgated in March 2009, and the “Regulations on 

Work Procedures for the Selection and Appointment of Military Cadres (Trial),” issued in 

January 2009, and “Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” 

promulgated in August 2010.45 The new regulations argue for the political work system of the 

PLA to contribute to improved warfighting capabilities while reinforcing the absolute leadership 

of the CCP over the PLA. The regulations discuss the political work importance of the three 

warfare’s - “media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.” Finally, the regulations 

encourage political work to support military operations other than war.46

National-Level Committees/Small Groups 

There are two national-level committees or small groups which the GPD either leads or plays a 

leading role. The first is the CMC Discipline Inspection Committee (ѝޡѝཞߋһငઈՊ㓚ᖻ

ỰḕငઈՊ), which was instituted in its current form in the PLA GPD in November 1980.47 The 

CMC Discipline Inspection Committee serves to “safeguard the Party constitution and other 

rules and regulations.” The National level committee supports a structure that is replicated 

throughout the PLA at regiment level and above. GPD Deputy Director Du Jincai is secretarygeneral of the committee.48

The second committee is the Military Demobilized Cadres Work reassignment committee (ߋ䱏

䖜ъᒢ䜘ᆹ㖞Ჲ㹼࣎(⌅. 49 This is a national-level committee that works on policy and 

implementation regarding the reintegration of PLA cadres into civilian work placement. For 

instance, in April 2012, the All-Army Demobilized Cadres Work Reassignment Videoteleconference (ޘഭߋ䱏䖜ъᒢ䜘ᆹ㖞ᐕ֌⭥㿶⭥䈍Պ䇞) was held. State Councilor and 

State Council Secretary General Ma Kai (傜ࠟ) and CMC Member and then-GPD Director Li 

Jinai (ᵾ㔗㙀) chaired the meeting. Among other points, Li emphasized the importance of 

treating well those cadres who had been demobilized because of the value it could serve in 

improving the morale of currently serving troops. It was noted that, in 2011, more than 43,000 

cadres were demobilized.50 The Political Department participation in the transfer of military 

cadre to government positions (䖜ъᒢ䜘ᆹ㖞) process is replicated at all levels nationwide. 

 

45 Information accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851_14.htm on 

November 19, 2012. 

46 Xinhua News Agency, 13 September 2010. 47 Information accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/0821/14/7499155_142157179.shtml on November 19, 2012. 

48 Information accessed at http://blog.people.com.cn/article/28/1353200320258.html on November 19, 2012. 

General Du Jincai is also a member of the new Central Discipline Inspection Commission. 49 Information accessed at www.lysrsj.gov.cn/xinxigongkai/zhengcefagui/guojiafagui/2012-03-29/149.html on 

November 19, 2012. 

50 Information accessed at 2011.www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/04-26/3849505.shtml November 19, 2012. 
174 

Chapter Six: General Logistics Department Organizational Reforms: 2000 – 

2012 

Erin Richter, Leigh Ann Ragland, and Katherine Atha1

Assessments and measurements of the PLA’s success or failure should avoid 

simplistic and direct comparisons to other modern military logistics systems, 

especially evolving Western logistics systems. Analysts should avoid assessments 

based on perennially limited information that habitually disdain PLA logistics as 

a historically weak link. On the contrary, PLA logistics have proven highly 

adaptable and flexible to the situation. Often PLA logistics was not “pretty.” It 

lacked efficiency, expended excessive personnel and other resources, or it failed 

to support decisive engagements. Significant shortfalls do exist. Nonetheless, PLA 

logistics has been proficient in providing sufficient operational support to massive 

numbers of personnel and equipment of mixed generations and origins that would 

make Western logisticians blanch. 

Susan Puska, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics Department 

(GLD): Towards Joint Logistics Support 2000.”

Introduction 

This chapter follows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics Department (GLD) 

(ᙫਾऔ䜘) from the 2002 The People’s Liberation Army as Organization conference. The 2002 

chapter on the GLD, along with several other publications, provided a good foundation for 

examining the historical background of the GLD’s organizational structure. However, while 

researching the GLD’s organization, we discovered that the majority of authoritative sources on 

the GLD are dated 2003 or earlier. Many documents draw heavily on the People’s Liberation 

Army Military Logistics151 Encyclopedia published in 2002, which predates major GLD 

reorganizations that began in 2003. At this time, no openly available publication, in English or 

Chinese, comprehensively captures the organizational changes within the GLD. 

To complicate matters, there appears to be a great deal of confusion within the PLA and among 

PLA watchers surrounding the organization of the GLD. While blog entries are notoriously 

inaccurate, what was surprising was the inaccurate reporting of the GLD organization structure 

in official government and military publications. For example, in June 2005, a PLA periodical 

Junshi Shilin (ߋһਢ᷇), published by the General Political Department’s (GPD’s) Propaganda 

Department and organized by the Chinese Revolutionary Army Military Museum, carried an 

article on the GLD and General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) recent reorganization. In the article, 

 

1

 The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 

or position of the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
175 

the author erroneously listed the GLD’s subordinate departments as they were organized prior to 

2002, but published a five page list of corrections in a later edition.2

In order to delineate the GLD’s organizational structure, we assembled data from a wide variety 

of sources. In most cases, we were able to confirm these organizations were still active in the last 

three years. The primary sources used are shown below: 

x Science of Strategic Logistics (2001)3

x Encyclopedia of China Publishing House (2007)4

x World Military Yearbook (2009, 2010)5

x Chinese Military Encyclopedia (1997, 2002, 2007)6 

x Chinese Military Logistics Encyclopedia (2002)7

x Recruitment, promotion, and award announcements 

x GLD organization websites 

x Official press reports 

o PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ) 

o Xinhua (ᯠॾ)

o China Military Online (ѝഭߋ㖁)

8

x Press releases 

x Chinese journals 

o Military Economics Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ) 

o China Logistics & Purchasing (ѝഭ⢙⍱о䟷䍝) 

o Petroleum Products Application Research (⸣⋩୶ᢰ) 

This chapter focuses on the organizational structure of the GLD, not the development of the PLA 

joint logistics system. An excellent treatise on the subject is Susan Puska’s article “Taming the 

Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 2000” published in the June 2010 U.S. Army 

War College Strategic Studies Institute publication The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military. 

 

2

 Liao Feng, “Corrections for the Historical Evolution of our Military’s General Staff Department and General 

Logistics Department (ޣҾᡁߋᙫ৲ǃᙫਾশਢ⋯䶙㤕ᒢᛵߥⲴ㺕↓),” Junshi Shilin (ߋһਢ᷇), June 2005, 

vol. 7, p. 1-5. 

3

 Wan Xiaoyuan, Cao Tingze eds., Science of Strategic Logistics (ᡈ⮕ਾऔᆖ), Beijing: PLA Press, April 2001, p. 

152. 

4

 Zhao Yiping, ed., Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, Second Edition (ѝഭབྷⲮ、ޘҖࠪ⡸矢ᅮҼ⡸), 

Beijing: China Publishing House December 2007. 5 World Military Yearbook (ц⭼ߋһᒤ䢤), Beijing: PLA Press, 2009. World Military Yearbook, Beijing: PLA 

Press, 2010. 

6 Chinese Military Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997. Chinese 

Military Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2002. Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2007. 7 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Gold Shield Press, 2002. 8

 Sponsored by People’s Liberation Army Daily and has official authorization from the PLA to release news. 
176 

GLD’s Role and Missions 

The GLD is responsible for the management of logistics and logistics support work for the entire 

PLA under the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC). It is responsible for 

military finance, supply, subsistence, transportation, fuel, infrastructure construction, facilities 

management, health services, and auditing. The Department’s basic missions are to plan and lead 

the implementation of logistics work for the entire military; to draft rules, ordinances, and 

regulations for logistics work; recommend organization of logistics forces; organize logistics war 

preparations and mobilization; train logistics personnel; equip units with logistics equipment; 

draft the PLA’s budget and supervise approved budget execution.9

With the guidance of the GLD but under the leadership of the heads of their own services’ and 

service arms’ Party Committees (ފင), the logistics departments of the Navy, Air Force, and 

Second Artillery are the leading organs for the specialized logistics work of their own services 

and service arms.10

GLD organizations are assigned Military Unit Cover Designators (MUCDs) 62000 – 62999. 

Logistics Reforms and Corresponding GLD Organizational Shifts 

Over the past decade, the PLA has carried out a revolution in military affairs that has 

fundamentally altered the means and mechanism by which China is able to wield its military as 

an instrument of national power. A significant component of this transformation can be seen in 

the reforms carried out within the GLD and its subordinate combat support, financial, material, 

fuel, medical, transportation, capital construction and barracks, and audit organizations. These 

reforms have produced major changes in the organizational structure of the GLD as well as its 

doctrine, training, and the operational mechanisms by which it carries out peacetime and wartime 

logistics support. 

Contemporary reforms to the PLA’s logistics system germinated from the PLA’s resounding 

logistics failures in the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979, PLA observations of United States military 

operations in the Balkans and Persian Gulf in the early 1990s, and self-criticism of its inferior 

military capabilities during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. During an enlarged meeting of 

the CMC in December 1998, Chinese President and CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin introduced the 

“PLA Joint Combat Program” outlining China’s strategy for national defense and PLA 

modernization. Key characteristics of the program included the requirement to: 

x Unify PLA services and arms to achieve a joint operational capability and strategic unity 

of effort 

x Holistically modernize PLA doctrine, force structure, equipment, and infrastructure 

x Speed PLA withdrawal from commercial business 

 

9

 “General Logistics Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘),” Dictionary of National Defense Economics (ഭ䱢㓿⍾ᆖ޼࠶(, 

Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, November 1999, p. 55. 

10 Yuan Wenxian and Wun Ruling, ed., Introduction to High Ranking Organ Work (儈㓗亶⦷χޣᐕ֌ᾲ䇪),

Beijing: Defense University Press, 2005, p. 317. 
177 

x Surge funding for the PLA11

Nested in the program was a 10-year PLA logistics support system reform plan introduced by the 

director of the GLD, General Wang Ke, which emphasized: 

x Developing a joint logistics system at the Military Region (MR) level 

x Streamlining logistics organizations 

x Improving logistics training and modernizing equipment 

x Standardizing and increasing transparency of military supplies and maintenance funds 

x Transitioning to a financial vice materiel remuneration system for officers 

x Socialization of support functions – replacing military support personnel with civilian 

professionals and contracting out logistics services to civilian companies 

x Scientifically managing logistics services12

The “PLA Joint Combat Program,” also named the “No. 13 PLA Combat Order” was signed 24 

January 1999. 13 Within a year of its implementation, major organizational reforms were 

underway within the GLD. Bloated from over a decade of entrepreneurial adventures, by early 

1999 the GLD began shedding its corporate investments, handing over factories and other 

commercial businesses to the civilian sector.14 Many of the bureaus subordinate to the GLD’s 

Production Management Department (⭏ӗ㇑⨶䜘), which was responsible for managing much 

of the GLD’s commercial enterprise and factory system, were downsized and realigned under 

various other GLD departments. In October 2000, the GLD’s Production Management 

Department was officially eliminated with its remnant functions transferred to the GLD 

Materials and Fuel Department’s (ᙫਾऔ䜘⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) Factory Management Bureau (ᐕল㇑

⨶ተ).15

In September 2001, two major agricultural production enterprises, the Chenhu Base (⊹(19)สൠ) 

in Hubei Province and the Nenjiang Base (ᄙ⊏สൠ) in Heilongjiang Province were transferred 

to local government authorities.16

By 2002, socialization of support functions was in full swing in terms of reducing the overall 

size of the logistics system and associated management structures. According to China’s 

National Defense 2002, by 2002 thousands of mess halls and service centers (small post 

exchanges) had been turned over to civilian companies, barracks turned over to real estate 

managers, and support enterprises and farms turned over to central or local civilian government 

 

11 Pei Fang, “Major Operation to be Performed on Military Logistics System,” Kuang Chiao Ching (ᒯ䀂䮌), no. 

318, 16 Mar 1999, p. 50-52. 

12 Ibid. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Cao Haili, “The Chinese Army Has Sailed Out of the Business Sea,” Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian (ेӜ䶂ᒤ᯵㹼

矢), 15 February 1999, p. 4-7. James Mulvenon, “Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese MilitaryBusiness Complex, 1978-1998” M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2001. 

15 Xinxing Cathay International Group, “Historical Evolution ( শਢ⋯䶙 ),” accessed at 

www.xxcig.com/jtgk/lsyg/index.htm on 13 May 2012. 

16 Tianmen Peoples Government, www.tianmen.gov.cn/root10/xzbcq/0128/.../t20090421_25297.html, accessed 13 

May 2012. 
178 

control. About 200,000 personnel were no longer on the PLA’s payroll and 29,000 enlisted 

personnel were reassigned to other duties. Other functions partially contracted out to private or 

government-owned enterprises include vehicle maintenance, transportation services and fuel 

support, medical support, shore service for naval ships, and food and supplies for units on longdistance road marches.17

At the end of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) 16th Congress (ѝഭޡӗފᅮॱޝ1/9ޘ

ഭԓ㺘བྷՊ) in November 2002, Jiang Zemin reportedly introduced to senior military officers a 

new strategy for furthering military transformation. Publically announced in March 2003, this 

strategy envisioned achieving the capability of winning local limited wars under high tech 

conditions by 2010, optimizing the organization and quality of PLA personnel and systems by 

2020, and achieving a fully informationized force equal to or surpassing the U.S. military by 

2050.18 The GLD leadership subsequently developed a strategy for speeding up logistics reforms. 

In addition to improvements to the joint logistics system, a major element of this revised logistics 

development strategy focused on force structure adjustments to streamline logistics forces, 

eliminating redundant structures left over from the MR-level joint logistics reforms and 

redundancies within the GLD’s directly subordinate organizations.19 In September 2003, Jiang 

Zemin announced the plan to further reduce the PLA by 200,000 troops by 200520. These cuts 

did not take place across the board but selectively reduced some units and increased others in 

order to improve the capability of combat units. While not the sole target, logistics organizational 

reform was a major goal of this reduction.21

Apart from special purpose depots and general hospitals under the General Departments and 

services, all other rear depots, hospitals, and recuperation centers were integrated and 

reorganized under the joint logistics support system. A total of eight division-level logistics 

organizations (Joint Logistics Sub-Departments), 94 rear depots, and 47 hospitals and 

recuperation centers were closed. According to GLD director, General Liao Xilong, these 

personnel cuts totaled at least 74,000.22 In addition to these closures, the GLD executed a major 

restructuring of directly subordinate organizations between 2003 and 2004, which includes the 

following: 

x GLD organizations that were eliminated: 

 

17 “China’s National Defense in 2002,” PLA Daily in English, 10 October 2002 and 30 December 2001. 18 Wen Tao, “China to Speed up Military Transformation with Chinese Characteristics, Push for Informatization of 

the Armed Forces,” Ching Pao (䨑๡), 1 June 2003, p. 40-42. 19 Liao Xilong, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform,” PLA Daily in English, 16 

December 2008, p. 7. 

20 For a summary of this force reduction, see introduction chapter. 

21 Ibid; Wen, “China to Speed up Military Transformation with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 40-42. Cheng Ying and 

Xu Jinzhang, “Inside Story of PLA Logistics Reforms (䀓᭮ߋਾऔਈ䶙޵(ᛵ, “Oriental Outlook (ⷝɛьᯩઘ࠺(, 

19 January 2006, No. 3, p. 33-34, 36-38. 

22 “China’s National Defense in 2006,” accessed at www.china.org.cn/english/China/194332.htm on 16 January 

2006. Liao Xilong, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform,” PLA Daily in English, 

16 December 2008, p. 7. 
179 

o The Finance Department’s (䍒࣑䜘) Military Products Corporate Enterprise 

Bureau (ߋӗԱъ䍒࣑ተ)

23

o The Audit Office’s (ᇑ䇑㖢) Engineering Enterprise Audit Bureau (ᐕ〻Աъᇑ

䇑ተ)

24

x GLD responsibilities transferred to civilian control: 

o The Quartermaster Department’s (ᙫਾऔ䜘ߋ䴰䜘) Military Supplies University 

(བྷᆖߋ⭘⢙䍴)

25

o The Health Department’s (ছ⭏䜘) First Military Medical University (ᅮаߋ५

བྷᆖ)

26

o The Health Department’s Third Military Medical University (ᅮйߋ५བྷᆖ) 

Chengdu Medical College (ᡀ䜭५ᆖ䲒)

27

o The Health Department’s Fourth Military Medical University Jilin Medical 

College (ਹ᷇५㦟ᆖ䲒)

28

x GLD organizations that were merged or re-subordinated: 

o The Quartermaster Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘ߋ䴰䜘) was merged with the Materials 

and Fuel Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) to form the Quartermaster, 

Materials, and Fuel Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘).29 

o The Health Department’s PLA 304 Hospital (䀓᭮ߋ 304 ५䲒) was merged with 

the PLA 301 Hospital (䀓᭮ߋ 301 ५䲒), and then renamed the 304 Department, 

which is also known as the First Affiliated Hospital of the PLA General Hospital (

䀓᭮ߋᙫ५䲒ᅮа䱴኎५䲒).30

o The PLA 309 Hospital (䀓᭮ߋ 309 ५䲒) was merged with the 301 Hospital, 

becoming the Second Affiliated Hospital of the PLA General Hospital (䀓᭮ߋᙫ

५䲒ᅮҼ䱴኎५䲒); however, in 2009 it was re-subordinated to become the 

General Hospital of the PLA General Staff Department (䀓᭮ߋᙫ৲䈻䜘ᙫ५䲒

).31

 

23 “Strengthen the Financial Management of the Armed Forces, The Establishment of a New Financial Mechanism 

of the ‘Three-in-One’ Network,” State Owned Assets Management (ഭM䍴ӗ㇑⨶), August 2002, p. 4-5. 24 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_520e45d50100c7s1.html on 15 May 2012. 

25 Cheng and Xu, “Inside Story of PLA Logistics Reforms,” p. 33-34, 36-38. 

26 The First Military Medical University is now named the Southern Medical University (ইᯩ५、བྷᆖ). Cheng 

and Xu, “Inside Story of PLA Logistics Reforms,” p. 33-34, 36-38. “Deputy Political Commissar Liu Yuan of the 

General Logistics Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Wen Wei Po (᮷य़๡), 10 January 2006. 27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Xu Ping, “Is the General Logistics Department Quartermaster and Munitions Department a Department? (ᙫਾߋ

䴰䜘઼ߋ䴰⭏ӗ䜘ᱟањ䜘ੇ ?)” China Military Online, October 2003, accessed at 

http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wy/2011-09/20/content_4680435.htm on 12 May 2012. 

30 “General Logistics Department 302 Hospital Enter Barracks to Provide Health Services (ᙫਾऔ䜘 302 ५䲒䎠䘋

ߋ㩕䘱ڕᓧ ),” 13 November 2008, accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-

11/13/content_1544919.htm on April 25 2012. “PLA General Hospital (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᙫ५䲒),” accessed at 

www.301hospital.com.cn/ on 13 May 2012. 

31 “PLA 309 Hospital (䀓᭮ߋᅮ 309 ५䲒),” accessed at www.309yy.com on 13 May 2012. 
180 

o In 2003, the General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ) and Strategic Planning Office (䇑ࡂᡈ⮕) 

of the Finance Department ( 䍒࣑䜘 ), 32 Health Department, 33 and Military 

Transportation Department ( ߋһӔ䙊䘀䗃䜘 ) 34 were merged to create a 

Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ) for each Department. The same 

merger likely occurred in the GLD Audit Office in October 2003 (ᙫਾऔ䜘ᇑ䇑

㖢).35 

x GLD organizations that were newly established: 

o The Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department’s Science and Technology 

(S&T) Training Equipment Bureau (、䇝㻵༷ተ) also known as the S&T 

Training Bureau (、㓳ተ)

 36

o The Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department’s Military Production 

Engineering Finance Bureau (ߋӗᐕ〻䍒࣑ተ)

37 

o The Health Department’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences’ Health Service 

and Medical Information Institute (ছ⭏औ࣑о५ᆖᛵᣕ⹄ウᡰ)

38

o The Health Department’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences’ National BioProtection Engineering Center (ഭᇦ⭏⢙䱢ᣔ㻵༷ᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ)

39

o The Health Department’s Compliance Services Bureau (ን㓖һ࣑ተ)

40

o The Audit Office’s Capital Construction Audit Bureau (สᴥᔪ䇮ᇑ䇑ተ)

41

 

32 “Ministry of Finance General Office on the Issuance of Accounting Qualification Examination Outline 

(Amendment Notice) (䍒᭯䜘ޜ࣎঵ޣҾঠਁՊ䇑Ӿъ䍴Ṭ㘳䈅བྷ㓢(؞䇒)Ⲵ䙊⸕),” 26 October 2009, 

information last accessed at www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/ 

2009niancaizhengbuwengao/wengao200911qi/201002/t20100202_267442.html on 16 May 2012; “Thirty Years of 

Reform and Opening Up: Interviews with Authors of Selected Essays Submitted for the Essay-Writing Contest on 

the Theme of China’s 30 Years of Reform and Opening Up,” CCTV-7 Military video, Notes from CCTV-7 Military 

News (CCTV-7 ߋһ ߌъ), 4 December 2008. China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, p. 83; and 2007 

Interview with Chinese Official. 

33 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, p. 83. “(Wei Gao and the GLD Health Department Sign CivilMilitary Integration Strategic Cooperation Agreement for the Construction of a Medical Material Guarantee System 

(ေ儈оᙫਾছ⭏䜘ㆮ㖢ߋ≁㶽ਸ㦟ᶀ؍䳌փパーセントᔪ䇮ᡈ⮕ਸ֌ॿ䇞),” Weigao Holding Company, last accessed 

at www.weigaoholding.com/h/xwzx/topic-1423.htm on 14 May 2012. 

34 2007 Interview with Chinese Official. 

35 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 36-37. 36 “Headquarters Command of Logistics Departments,” China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, Beijing: 

Gold Shield Press, 2002, p. 35. “China Textile and PLA GLD Strategic Cooperation Department Held Meeting in 

Beijing (ѝ㓪ॿо䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ䜘ᡈ⮕ਸ֌Ӕ⍱ᓗ䈸Պ൘ӜѮ㹼),” 14 September 2011, accessed at 

www.texindex.com.cn/Articles/2011-9-14/242972.html on 14 May 2012. 

37 Ma Huijun, “Integrated Management System Study of Military Assets (ߋ䱏䍴ӗаփॆ㇑⨶փࡦ᭩䶙⹄ウ),” 

Military Economic Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), 2010 No. 6. p. 37-40. 38 “Health Service and Medical Information Institute ( ছ⭏औ࣑о५ᆖᛵᣕ⹄ウᡰ ),” accessed at 

www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/724.html on 13 May 2012. 

39 Information last accessed at www.npec.org.cn/, www.npec.org.cn/sfzwasp.asp?ppid=4&keyno=20, and 

www.bmi.ac.cn/channels/16.html on 14 May 2012. 

40 Information accessed at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-11/0038539954s.shtml and 

www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/jbzsc/2007-07/12/content_877051.htm on 15 May 2012. 

41 “PLA Audit Office (䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑㖢),” accessed at www.4yjd.cn/historyshow.asp?id=3276 on 5 August 2012. 
181 

In addition to organizational restructuring, in 2003 Jiang Zemin announced that more than 10 

categories of technical, managerial, and support positions would be replaced by civilian cadre 

(᮷㙼ᒢ䜘).42 While the PLA’s civilian cadre system was officially established in 1988, it was 

not until June 2005 that the PLA was able to fully institute a professional corps separate from the 

military personnel system allowing the PLA to hire and fire talented personnel from the civilian 

sector without the overhead cost of their training, maintenance, and disposition. Many GLD 

professional positions were transitioned from military to civilian cadre billets as a result.43

According to then GLD director Liao Xilong, from 2000 to 2005, the PLA made great progress 

in the implementation of many goals of the logistics support system reform plan. In addition to 

successes in implementing joint logistics programs, improving quality of life for PLA personnel, 

and overhauling financial management and procurement systems, the GLD had addressed 

redundancies within the logistics structure and the force had been sufficiently reduced.44 From 

2005 to 2012 additional organizational changes were limited to establishing leading groups and 

research centers to improve civil-military integration of support work, boost resource 

conservation, and improve technologies for medical and emergency services. Organizations 

which were established during this period include the following: 

x Military Logistics Support Socialization Work Leading Group of the PLA (ߋ䱏ਾऔ؍

䳌矢Պॆᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴), established in 2006 45

x Military Resource-Saving Work Leading Group (ߋ䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴), 

established in 200746

x The Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department jointly established a National 

Military Food Mobilization Center (ഭᇦߋ⭘伏૱ࣘઈѝᗳ) with the Economic 

Mobilization Office (ഭ≁㓿⍾ࣘઈޜ࣎ᇔ) of the National Development and Reform 

Commission (NDRC) (ഭᇦਁኅ઼᭩䶙ငઈՊ) in 2007.47

 

42 More information can be found on the civilian cadre system in the introduction chapter. 43 Hao Yingquan and Li Xuanlian, “PLA Begins to Implement System of Non-Active Service Staff in 2006,” Xinhua 

Domestic Service, 15 February 2006. CCTV-7, “Documentary for Military (ߋһ㓚һ),” 22 June 2009. 44 “China’s National Defense in 2002,” PLA Daily in English, 22 February 2002. 45 “Military Support Socialization Will Launch—New Series of Initiatives (ߋ䱏؍䳌矢Պॆሶ᧘ࠪаパーセントࡇᯠѮ

᧚),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 3 March 2010. “Liao Xilong: Scientific Planning Promotes Logistic Protection and 

Other Protection Socialization (ᔆ䭑嗉˖、ᆖㆩࡂ᧘䘋ਾऔ؍䳌઼ަԆ؍䳌矢Պॆ),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 1 

March 2006. “Military Protection of Socialization Reform with Remarkable Results (ߋ䱏؍䳌矢Պॆ᭩䶙ᡀ᭸ᱮ

㪇),” 3 November 2010, accessed at http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-11/12/content_3442576.htm on 13 May 2012. 46 Luo Quan and Fan Juwei, “Liao Xilong Stresses Technological Innovation in Military Resource-saving Work,” 

PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ),, 17 February 2012. “Liao Xilong Lectures on Efforts to Save Military Resources Work 

Leading Group Conference, Efforts to Save Military Resources Presented Before Society as a Whole (ᔆ䭑嗉൘ߋ

䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴Պ䇞䇢䈍㾱≲, ࣋ࣚ֯ߋ䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌䎠൘ޘ矢Պࡇࡽ(, “PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 

17 February 2012. 

47 Shao Chunyu and Fan Fuwei, “National Military Food Mobilization Center Established,” PLA Daily Online in 

English, 21 May 2007. 
182 

x The Health Department’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences established the State 

Key Laboratory of Pathogens and Biosecurity (⯵৏ᗞ⭏⢙⭏⢙ᆹޘഭᇦ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) 

in 2005.48

x The Logistics Engineering Academy (ਾऔᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) established the National Disaster 

Relief and Emergency Response Equipment Engineering and Technological Research 

Center (ഭᇦᮁ⚮ᓄᙕ㻵༷ᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ) in 2009.49

Since 2000, the GLD has undergone significant organizational change in both structure and 

composition. Not only is the GLD more streamlined, with less bureaucratic overlap, but the 

composition of its workforce has become a balance of civilian contractors, cadre, and military 

professionals. In the future, the PLA is likely to continue restructuring within the GLD with the 

goal of decreasing manpower by leveraging the increased capacity of information systems.50

Reforms to PLA-wide research, development, procurement, and audit processes may result in 

some additional reorganization within related departments and possibly between the GLD and 

General Armament Department (GAD). In addition, the GLD will probably close the Capital 

Construction and Barracks Department Retired Cadres Housing Construction Bureau (㘱ᒢ䜘տ

ᡯᔪ䇮㇑⨶ተ) once retired cadre management programs have been fully transferred to 

government control in 2015.51 The future GLD will likely look significantly more integrated with 

the civilian sector at the strategic and operational levels, relying on civilian companies for 

procurement, transportation, fuel, provisions, and general logistics equipment development.52

GLD Leadership 

The GLD is led by a director and political commissar, who are co-equals, and the GLD 

headquarters is at a separate location from the GSD, GPD, and GAD. The GLD’s director (䜘䮯) 

is a CMC member-grade officer (ߋငငઈ) with the rank of general (GEN/кሶ).53 The director 

of the GLD is generally appointed to this position after having served as an MR commander and 

has an operational background, generally in the infantry or artillery. Many former directors have 

combat experience and have served as political commissars during their careers due to the 

historical interrelationship between the logistics and political disciplines within the PLA.54 To 

date, no director of the GLD has a professional logistics background. 

In November 2012 General Zhao Keshi (䎥ݻ (⸢was announced as the 12th director of the GLD 

at the 18th Party Congress. Zhao is 64 years old, making him one of the oldest of the new CMC 

 

48Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/16/982.html, and 

www.bjkw.gov.cn/n1143/n1240/n1465/n242664/n242712/7794764.html on 28 April 2012. 

49 Liu Changjiang and Yuan Genglin, “China Sets up Research Center To Improve Equipment for Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Response,” PLA Daily in English, 27 April 2010. 50 “Spring Breeze of Reform Plays Main Theme of Logistics Construction -- Adjust Functions, Straighten Out 

Relations, Optimize Structure, Improve Efficacy,” PLA Daily in English, 14 January 2009. Gao Zhiwen, Zhao 

Jianwei, and Ding Jidong, “Abstract of Focal Points,” PLA Daily Online in English, 14 January 2009, p. 2. 51 “Important Measure To Promote the Arrangement and Management Work of Retired Cadres in the Military,” PLA 

Daily in English, 3 November 2011. 52 Bian Junwei, Lu Yadong, and Lin Zhicheng, “Financial Support For PLA Logistics Construction (ᡁߋਾऔᔪ䇮

䍒؍࣋䳌᧒䇘),” Military Economics Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), July 2011, p. 64-65. 53 For more information regarding grades and ranks see Appendix B of the Introductory Chapter. 

54 Susan M Puska, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics Department (GLD): Toward Joint 

Logistics Support,” The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, p. 270. 
183 

members. Zhao was commander of the Nanjing MR from June 2007 to 2012 and previously 

held the position of commander of the 31st Group Army when Xi Jinping was deputy secretary 

of the Fujian Provincial CPC Committee. 55 In addition to his ties to Xi, Zhao may have been 

selected based on his experience with enacting logistics reform. Nanjing MR appears to have 

been at the forefront of PLA operational logistics developments between 2001 and 2006. Many 

of the changes enacted were subsequently promulgated PLA wide after 2004. For example, the 

formation and operationalization of task-organized joint logistics units. 

Zhao’s predecessor was General Liao Xilong (ᔆ䭑嗉). Appointed in 2003, he served until 2012, 

making him the longest standing and, at the age of 72, oldest GLD director in PLA history. A 

possible explanation for this extended tenure was the lack of combat experience within the senior 

leadership of the PLA.56 Liao Xilong distinguished himself as a regiment commander in the 

Sino-Vietnam War of 1979. 57 Before assuming the current position, Liao served as the 

commander of the Chengdu MR from 1995 – 2002.58

Liao’s predecessor was General Wang Ke (⦻ݻ (whom, prior to his appointment as director of 

the GLD from 1995 – 2003, was the commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou MRs.59 

The GLD’s political commissar (PC/᭯င) is an MR leader-grade (བྷ४↓㙼) officer with the 

rank of general. The current GLD PC is General Liu Yuan (ࡈK). Liu Yuan’s assumption of the 

GLD PC position in 2011 is striking, as he was a 60-year old PC at the Academy of Military 

Science (AMS/ߋһ、ᆖ䲒) at the time. Since 1979, the AMS PC position typically ended with 

retirement. Prior to his position at AMS, he served as a GLD deputy political commissar (DPC/

࢟᭯င) from 2003 until 2005.60 Since 1973, only one other GLD PC held GLD experience prior 

to entering the PC post: Hong Xuezhi (⍚ᆖᲪ).

61

 

55 “Zhao Keshi Becomes Director of the GLD, ‘Taking the Team’ with Political Commissar Liu Yuan” (䎥ݻԫ⸢

ᙫਾऔ䜘䜘䮯 о᭯ငࡈK”ᩝ⨝ᆀ”), CQCB (䟽ᒶᲘᣕ), 26 October 2012. 

http://cqcbepaper.cqnews.net/cqcb/html/2012-10/26/content_1582519.htm. “CMC Holds Ceremony for Promoting 

Generals” (ѝཞ䓽င㠹㹼ᱹॷкሷ䓽䣌ܰᔿ), 20 July 2010. Accessed at 

http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/42967/12194218.html on 16 November 2012 and Ma Haoliang, “Fang Fenghui, 

Zhang Yang Become ‘Partners’ Again (ᡯጠ䕍ᕥ䲭䟽ᯠ”ᩝ⃄”),” Ta Kung Pao (བྷޜᣕ), 26 October 2012. 56 “Liang Guanglie and Liao Xilong Separately Take Office as Defense Secretary and Chief of Staff, Taiwan Attack 

Preparations (ằݹ⛸ǃᔆ䭑嗉࡛࠶ቡԫഭ䱢䜘䮯ǃᙫ৲䈻䮯,Ѫ᭫ਠڊ߶༷(, “22 March 2008, accessed at 

http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_2658147_1.html on 13 May 2012. 

57 “Shocking: Liang Guanglie Expresses Rage Against Foreign Affairs Department at Internal Conference (䴷᛺˖

ằݹ൘⛸޵䜘Պ䇞кᙂᯕཆӔ䜘䖟ᕡʽ),” 5 January 2012, Chinese Military Fans (ѝഭߋһ䘧㖁), accessed at 

www.milfuns.com/2012/0105/42017_6.html on 13 May 2012. “Vietnam War-Produced Chinese Star General (䎺ᡈ

ѝӗ⭏Ⲵѝഭ㪇਽к),”accessed at http://blog.searchina.net.cn/log.asp?logid=158892 on 13 May 2012. 58 “Vietnam War-Produced Chinese Star General (䎺ᡈѝӗ⭏Ⲵѝഭ㪇਽к),”accessed at 

http://blog.searchina.net.cn/log.asp?logid=158892 on 13 May 2012. “Comrade Liao Xilong’s Resume (ᔆ䭑嗉਼ᘇ

ㆰশ),”People’s Daily Online (Ӫ≁㖁), accessed at 

www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9670/20021129/877930.html on 13 May 2012. “General Liao Xilong 

Introduction (ᔆ䭑嗉кሶㆰӻ),” accessed at http://sjfm.xilu.com/lxl/ on 13 May 2012. 59 “Wang Ke’s Resume (⦻ݻㆰশ),” 20 May 2005, China News (ѝഭᯠ䰫㖁), accessed at 

www.chinanews.com/2002-05-20/26/186836.html on 13 May 2012. 

60 James Mulvenon and Leigh Ann Ragland, “Liu Yuan: Archetype of a ‘Xi Jinping Man’ in the PLA?” China 

Leadership Monitor, 2012, No. 36, p. 2-3. Liu Anyuan held a GLD PC position from 1987 until 1990, entering the 
184 

In addition to the director and PC, the GLD leadership also includes between three and five MR 

deputy leader-grade (࢟བྷߋ४㙼) deputy directors (DDIR/࢟䜘䮯) with the rank of lieutenant 

general (LTG/ѝሶ) or major general (MG/ቁሶ); and at least one MR deputy leader-grade DPC 

with the rank of lieutenant general or major general. Unlike the director of the GLD, the DDIRs 

are generally promoted from one of the various second-level departments subordinate to the 

GLD. Each DDIR is assigned specialized logistics functional “portfolios” which represent the 

various logistics systems. Two of the current DDIRs, Ding Jiye (б㔗ъ) and Qin Yinhe (〖䬦

⋣), were both appointed in 2007 and hold the rank of lieutenant general. Prior to their 

appointments as GLD DDIRs, Ding Jiye was the DDIR of the GLD Finance Department,62 and 

Qin Yinhe was the director of the PLA General Hospital (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᙫ५䲒). Qin Yinye 

served concurrently as the GLD DDIR and the director of the PLA General Hospital between 

2007 and 2009, and before this was director of the Daping Hospital under the Third Military 

Medical University.63 GLD DDIR Gu Junshan (䉧׺ኡ) and former director of the Capital 

Construction and Barracks Department was relieved for corruption in 2012.64

According to one Chinese official, while the GLD and GAD are both CMC member-grade 

organizations, they are considered one-half grade lower than their GSD and GPD counterparts. 

However, the directors of the GLD and GAD are considered co-equals to the directors of the 

GSD and GPD. This discrepancy is likely intended to clearly subordinate support functions of 

armament and logistics support to the operational functions of combat. This subordination is 

 

post the rank of major general (ቁሶ) with one star and was promoted to lieutenant general while at the post, 

overlapping with Hong Xuezhi who served as both GLD Director and as PC from 1980 until 1990, and who held the 

rank of general at the time. Hong Xuezhi had prior GLD experience before entering the GLD post, first serving as 

GLD DPC in 1954, followed by GLD DIR in 1957. Information accessed in Chinese Communist Party Central 

Committee members from all previous sessions 1921–2003 (ѝഭޡӗފশቺѝཞငઈབྷ䗎ި˄1921ʊ2003˅), 

Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2004, p. 393, 401, 724, 786, 660–662, 815, 951, and 960–961. 

61 Hong stands out as the only PLA officer to receive the rank of general twice, first in 1955 and then again in 1988, 

and was called by some a “six-star general” (ޝᱏкሶ). He entered the GLD PC post with the rank of general. 

Information accessed in Chinese Communist Party Central Committee members from all previous sessions 1921–

2003 (ѝഭޡӗފশቺѝཞငઈབྷ䗎ި˄1921ʊ2003˅), Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2004, 

p. 393, 401, 724, 786, 660–662, 815, 951, and 960–961, and accessed at 

http://mil.hebei.com.cn/system/2011/04/19/011085889.shtml on 10 May 2012. 

62 “GLD Promoted Two Deputy Directors Ding Jiye in Charge of the National Defense Cost (ᙫਾᱻॷє࢟䜘䮯 б

㔗ъ࠶㇑ഭ䱢ߋ䍩),” 13 January 2008, accessed at www.stnn.cc/china/200801/t20080113_711782.html on 13 May 

2012. “Ding Jiye’s Resume, Ding Jiye Introductory Materials (б㔗ъㆰশˈб㔗ъㆰӻ䍴ᯉ),” Celebrity 

Network (਽Ӫ㖁), 13 February 2012, accessed at www.mingren365.com/gushi/jianjie/2012/0213/ 

2903.html on 13 May 2012. 

63 “Li Shuzhang the PLA General Hospital Director ( ᵾҖㄐԫ䀓᭮ߋᙫ५䲒䲒䮯 ),” accessed on 

http://blog.people.com.cn/open/articleFine.do?articleId=1318763791008 on 13 May 2012. 64 “Gu Junshan No Longer Serves as General Logistics Department Director (䉧׺ኡн޽ᣵԫ䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ䜘࢟

䜘 䮯 ),” accessed at http://news.163.com/12/0211/07/7PVDHVCL00014JB5.html on 13 May 2012. “General 

Logistics Department to Expand ‘Lecture Politics Overall Situation, and Discipline’ Educational Activities (ᙫਾχ

ޣኅᔰ”䇢᭯⋫亮བྷተᆸ㓚ᖻ”ᆖҐᮉ㛢⍫ࣘ(, “China Military Network (ѝഭߋ㖁), 11 February 2012, accessed 

at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/head/2012-02/11/content_4786610.htm on 13 May 2012. “GLD Deputy Director Ding 

Jiye: Military Insurance Review and Outlook (ᙫਾ࢟䜘䮯б㔗ъ˖ᡁഭߋӪ؍䲙ᐕ֌എ亮оኅɛ),” PLA Daily 

(䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 7 May 2012, accessed on http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-05/07/c_123087224.htm on 13 May 

2012. 
185 

clearly reflected in the grade difference between general department DDIRs. Deputy chiefs of the 

general staff within the GSD and the DDIRs of the GPD are MR leader-grade officers while the 

DDIRs of the GLD and GAD are MR deputy leader-grade officers, one full grade lower.65

This GLD leadership forms the GLD Party Standing Committee (ᙫਾऔ䜘ᑨ࣑ငઈՊ), which 

effectively carries out decision-making by consensus. The Standing Committee consists of the 

director, PC, DDIRs, DPCs, and select directors of second-level departments. In recent years, the 

director of the GLD serves as the Party Committee’s secretary and the PC as the deputy 

secretary.66

Liao Xilong also heads a number of PLA Leading Groups: 

x Military Logistics Support Socialization Work Leading Group (ߋ䱏ਾऔ؍䳌矢Պॆᐕ֌

亶ሬሿ㓴): Established in 2006, the Leading Group is dedicated to further developing 

military-civilian integrated support through the outsourcing of military logistics tasks to the 

civilian sector such as food service, barracks management, communications service, and 

transportation support. This PLA Leading Group supports the efforts of the joint State 

Council and CMC leading group with the same name tasked with implementing military 

support socialization in the overall planning for national economic and social development 

and the special programs and annual work plans of the State Council. In addition to heading 

the PLA’s leading group, Liao Xilong also serves as the first deputy leader of joint State 

Council and CMC leading group.67

x Military Resource-Saving Work Leading Group (ߋ䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴): Established 

in 2007, the Leading Group is dedicated to promote resource conservation through scientific 

and technological innovation and utilization efficiency.68

x Environmental Protection and Afforestation Committee (ߋޘ⧟؍㔯ॆငઈՊ) is the 

leading body for environmental protection and ecological work for the PLA. The committee 

develops the PLA’s environmental protection and afforestation plans and supervises their 

implementation throughout the PLA. The GLD’s Capital Construction and Barracks 

 

65 Interview with Chinese official, 2007. 

66 “Four PLA General Departments Earnestly Study, Comprehend Spirit of General Secretary Hu Jintao’s Important 

Speech at Central Party School; Liang Guanglie, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, and Chan Bingde Take Part in Discussions 

and Give Speeches,” PLA Daily in English, 29 June 2007. “Party Committees of PLA General Staff, Political, 

Logistics, and Armament Departments Earnestly Study General Secretary Hu’s Important Speech, with Chen 

Bingde, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, and Chang Wanquan Separately Participating in Studies and Speaking,” PLA Daily in 

English, 3 July, 2011. 

67 “Military Protection Socialization Will Launch—New Series of Initiatives (ߋ䱏؍䳌矢Պॆሶ᧘ࠪаパーセントࡇᯠѮ

᧚),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 3 March 2010. “Liao Xilong: Scientific Planning Promotes Logistic Protection and 

Other Protection Socialization (ᔆ䭑嗉˖、ᆖㆩࡂ᧘䘋ਾऔ؍䳌઼ަԆ؍䳌矢Պॆ),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 1 

March 2006. “Military Protection of Socialization Reform With Remarkable Results (ߋ䱏؍䳌矢Պॆ᭩䶙ᡀ᭸ᱮ

㪇),” 3 November 2010, accessed at http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-11/12/content_3442576.htm on 13 May 2012. 68 Luo Quan and Fan Juwei, “Liao Xilong Stresses Technological Innovation in Military Resource-saving Work,” 

PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 17 February 2012. “Liao Xilong Lectures on Efforts to Save Military Resources Work 

Leading Group Conference, Efforts to Save Military Resources Presented Before Society as a Whole (ᔆ䭑嗉൘ߋ

䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴Պ䇞䇢䈍㾱≲, ࣋ࣚ֯ߋ䱏䍴K㢲㓖ᐕ֌䎠൘ޘ矢Պࡇࡽ(, “PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 

17 February 2012. 
186 

Department is the administrative body of the PLA Environmental Protection and 

Afforestation Committee.69

x Patriotic Health Campaign Committee (ߋޘ⡡ഭছ⭏䘀ࣘငઈՊ): Dedicated to promoting 

the physical and mental health of officers and soldiers in order to ensure combat 

effectiveness, improve the sanitation of military garrisons and camps, and comprehensively 

prevent disease throughout the PLA.70

x GLD Discipline Inspection Commission (ᙫਾऔ䜘㓚င): Responsible for Party discipline 

inspection work within the GLD which is focused on punishing and preventing corruption 

among senior leaders as well as reporting to and implementing the directives of the CMC 

Discipline Inspection Commission.71

x Military Leading Group for Economic Responsibility Audits of Leading Cadres (ߋһ亶ሬᒢ

䜘㓿⍾䍓ԫᇑ䇑亶ሬሿ㓴): Established to strengthen supervision of middle and seniorlevel PLA officers. The Leading Group promulgated the “Implementation Method for 

Economic Responsibility Audits of Armed Forces Leading Cadres” to define the specific 

operation procedures for economic responsibility audits of leading cadres.72

GLD Organization 

The GLD is a CMC member-grade organization. It has a number of second-level administrative 

and functional departments which supervise specialized services, conduct functional planning, 

and coordinate with other national governmental and commercial organizations to ensure 

adequate resources and services are available to the PLA. Each second-level department is 

composed of third-level bureaus (ⴤ኎ተ) as well as an assortment of work units (অս), such as 

research institutes, publishing houses, centers, and other offices. Each second-level department is 

a corps leader-grade (↓ߋ㙼) organization,73 while their subordinate third-level bureaus are 

 

69 “A New Starting Point in the Continual Creating of Military Environmental Protection and Ecological 

Construction New Situation (൘ᯠ䎧⛩кнᯝᔰߋࡋ䱏⧟ໍາ؍ᣔ⭏ᘱᔪ䇮ᯠተ䶒),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 15 

February 2012. “Earnestly Raise the Level of Armed Forces Environmental Protection and Ecological Construction 

(࠷ᇎᨀ儈ߋ䱏⧟؍о⭏ᘱᔪ䇮≤ᒣ),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 20 March 2009. “Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army Afforestation Regulations (Amended Draft),” PLA Daily in English, 11 August 2005. 70 Fan Shunliang and Fan Juwei, “Liao Xilong Stresses on Healthy Development of Patriotic Health Work,” PLA 

Daily Online (䀓᭮ߋᣕ㖁㔌⡸), 18 January 2010. Wu Baoli and Ju Weifan, “Continual Increase in Military 

Patriotic Health Work Quality Level (нᯝᨀ儈ߋ䱏⡡ഭছ⭏ᐕ֌䍘䟿≤ᒣ),” China Military Network (ѝഭߋ

㖁 ), 6 April 2012, accessed at http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/newscenter/zongbu/content/2012-

04/06/content_4827995.htm on 13 May 2012. 

71 Yan Wengang and Meng Jin, “Practice and Thoughts on Construction of System of Corruption Prevention in 

Field of Armed Forces Supply Procurement,” Military Economics Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), Vol. 11, p. 49-51. Sai 

Zongbao and Teng Xiaodong “Firmly Advance the Establishment of a System for Punishing and Preventing 

Corruption within the Armed Forces – A Supervisor from the Discipline Inspection Department Under the General 

Political Department Answered Inquiries from the Reporters regarding the Implementation of a Working Plan for 

Establishing and Perfecting a System to Punish and Prevent Corruption within the Armed forces between 2008 and 

2012,” PLA Daily in English, 28 October 2008, p. 8. 72 Liu Yunxi and Fan Juwei, “Appraisal Standards for Economic Responsibility Audits of Armed Forces Leading 

Cadres (ߋ䱏亶ሬᒢ䜘㓿⍾䍓ԫᇑ䇑䇴ԧḷ߶),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 27 April 2010. “The Establishment of 

the Military Leading Group for Economic Responsibility Audits of Leading Cadres (ߋޘ亶ሬᒢ䜘㓿⍾䍓ԫᇑ䇑

ᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴ᡀ・),” Xinhua (ᯠॾ), 20 July 2006, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-

07/20/content_4861650.htm on 13 May 2012. 

73 The corps leader-grade is sometimes referred to as jun leader-grade. 
187 

division leader-grade (↓ᐸ㙼) organizations. 

Some second-level departments are listed with a subordinate General Office responsible for daily 

administrative tasks for the leadership of the GLD and a Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ

䇑ࡂተ) responsible for synchronizing planning and support activities across the bureau; while in 

other cases only the Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ) is listed. It appears that in 

2003, the General Office and Plans and Strategy (䇑ࡂᡈ⮕) Offices of some second-level 

departments were merged under a single Comprehensive Planning Bureau for each department. 

In 2010-2012 Chinese journal publications, many authors identify their professional organization 

as the General Office, therefore it is not possible to ascertain in all cases whether it is an 

independent third-level organization. In cases where there remains a question, we have listed the 

General Office as independent of the Comprehensive Planning Department. 

Within the PLA, military academic institutions are jointly managed by several departments. The 

GSD provides training and policies, the GPD selects the faculty, and in cases of logistics 

institutions the GLD provides the curriculum. Some of these institutions provide specialized 

logistics training such medical, transport, and construction while others provide a more 

comprehensive logistics education. We have therefore listed the institutions under the secondlevel department which is most intimately involved in the training and curriculum for each 

academy. 

Second-level departments of the GLD are listed in protocol order. However, due to limited 

information available on many of the third-level departments and bureaus, their protocol orders 

could not be confirmed. The GLD’s second-level departments are as follows: 

Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

The Headquarters Department is led by the GLD Chief of Staff (ਾऔ৲䈻䮯) and is responsible 

for carrying out work based on the intentions of the logistics commanders. Its basic missions are 

to organize and coordinate logistics construction and logistics support; to organize and lead the 

deployment, maneuvers, and military administrative work of logistics organizations and 

subordinate units; to organize logistics training, scientific research, defense, and communications 

networks; and to carry out logistics command.74

The following organizations are subordinate to the Headquarters Department: 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ): Oversees daily administrative tasks for the leadership of the GLD. 

These tasks include managing the flow of paperwork going to the GLD director and deputy 

directors, managing budgets and schedules for the GLD leadership, and performing other 

secretarial services. The General Office is staffed with a director and deputy director, as well 

as secretaries (〈Җ) who provide support to the GLD leadership.75 

 

74 “Headquarters Command of Logistics Departments,” China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol.1, p. 275-276. 

Song Shilun and Xiao Ke Eds., “Logistics Command,” Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 87-88. 75 Li Guiqing and Qian Shugen, eds., “General Office of the National Defense Mobilization Committee of China,”

Chinese War Mobilization Encyclopedia, p. 296. 
188 

x Operational Logistics Planning Bureau ( ᡈऔ䇑ࡂተ ): Formulates logistics support 

requirements and develops logistics support plans based on operations plans. The bureau also 

examines and verifies campaign logistics plans drawn up by campaign logistics staffs to 

ensure that the requirements plan coincides with the requirements of the campaign 

operational mission and is within the scope of strategic logistics support.76

x Management and Equipment Bureau (࣑ߋ㻵༷ተ): While we were able to determine that 

the bureau is still active, there is no information available describing its responsibilities or 

activities.77

x S&T Equipment Bureau (、ᢰ㻵༷ተ): Responsible for overseeing the development of new 

technologies for logistics support as well as procuring logistics technologies from the 

commercial sector for military use.78

x Military Training Bureau (ߋ䇝ተ): Responsible for developing, organizing, and supervising 

logistics training for the entire PLA based on the plans established by the CMC and GSD.79

x Labor and Personnel Bureau (ࣣࣘӪһተ): While there is evidence that the bureau is still 

active, no specific information is available on it since its move to the Headquarters 

Department in 2000. Based on its historical role, it is likely responsible for labor force 

management within the GLD.80

 

76 “China Dismisses Worries of Food Supplies for Armed Forces in Rescue Operations,” Xinhua (ᯠॾ), 18 May 

2008. Li Decai, “Modeling of Decision-Making in Strategic Logistics (ᡈ⮕ਾऔᤷᥕߣᅙ⁑රॆ⹄ウ)” China 

Military Science Doctoral Dissertation Library ˄ѝഭߋһᆖঊ༛᮷ᓃ˅, Beijing: National Defense University 

Publishing House, 2002. Information accessed at www.plaaf.net/html/90/n-1490.html on 28 April 2012. Qi Jidong, 

Deng Shuangquan, Li Jinhua, Wang Guiqiang, and Luo Shaofeng, “On Military Materials BMIS Management Mode 

(ߋ⭘⢙䍴 BMIS ㇑⨶⁑ᔿ⹄ウ),” Journal of Military Transportation University (ߋһӔ䙊ᆖ䲒ᆖᣕ), 2011, No. 

5, p. 1. 

77 “A contemporary military pursuit of life - Remembering the PLA General Logistics Command Military 

Affairs equipment,” Deputy Secretary Wen Shanzhong (аսᖃԓߋӪⲴӪ⭏䘭≲——䇠䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ䜘ਨԔ䜘

࣑ߋ㻵༷ተ࢟ተ䮯⑙ழᘐ ),” 7 September 2010, accessed at 

http://xy.sdut.edu.cn/3ASnews/ReadNews.asp?NewSID=1369 on 14 May 2012. 

78 Zhou Ming, Lin Songshan, Zheng Huhui, Wang Yu, Xu Dong, and Mao Yujie, “Clinical Research on the Impact 

of Periodontal Disease Prevention for Global Flight Crews (⢉ઘ⯵亴䱢ሩ⧟⨳㡚㹼㡠ઈ⢉喸⚾ᖡ૽ⲴѤᒺ⹄ウ),” 

People’s Military Surgeon (Ӫ≁ߋ५), 2007, No. 6, p. 1. “Expected Promotion of Deputy Corps Commanders of 

Division-Level Cadres (MɛᱻॷѪߋ࢟㙼Ⲵ↓ᐸ㓗ᒢ䜘(2012.1)1),” Righteousness Network (↓≄㖁), 20 

February 2012, accessed at http://wangluohongren.wangluoliuxing.com/hongren-495cacfa010126ij.htm on 13 May 

2012. “Deputy Chief of Staff Li Kexin Major-General Visited the Exhibition,” 9 July 2011, 

www.bpsa.org.cn/IFPST2011/contents/477/2767.html, website of the 2011 the Chinese Military and Civilian 

Science and Technology Innovation and Development Forum accessed on 14 May 2014. “General Logistics 

Department Research Study,” 29 December 2011, www.fcqc.com/news_view.asp?id=9, website of Zhenjiang Speed 

Automotive Group Co. LTD. accessed on 14 May 2014. 

79 Wan Xiaoyuan, Cao Tingze eds., Science of Strategic Logistics (ᡈ⮕ਾऔᆖ), Beijing: PLA Press, April 2001, p. 

284. 

80 “Navy Anqing Hospital (⎧ߋᆹᒶ५䲒),” accessed at www.116yy.com/2006.asp on 13 May 2012. “Yichun City 

Continental Real Estate Development Co. Ltd. Qualification Information (ᇌ᱕ᐲӄ⍢ᡯൠӗᔰਁM䲀ޜਨᢗъ䍴

Ṭؑ᚟),” January 2012, accessed at www.yichun.gov.cn/Pub/ZWGK/GCJSLYXXGK/CYRYXYXX/ 

ZYZGXX/2012-01/201201041140532193.html on 13 May 2012. “Ministry of Labor of the People’s Republic of 

China Ministry of Personnel, National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Liberation Army General Logistics 

Department notice on the military labor and personnel work to strengthen business contacts with local authorities 

(ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭࣣࣘ䜘ǃѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭӪһ䜘ǃഭᇦ㔏䇑ተǃѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ䜘ޣҾߋ䱏Աъࣣ

ࣘӪһᐕ֌਼ൠᯩMޣ䜘䰘࣐ᕪъ࣑㚄パーセントⲴ䙊⸕) 

 8 September 1994, accessed at www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/0979/1419210.html on 13 May 2012. 
189 

x Communications and Automation Bureau (䙊ؑ㠚ࣘॆተ): Responsible for oversight and 

management of GLD communications systems and associated infrastructure. The name is 

shortened to Automation Bureau (㠚ࣘॆተ) when abbreviated.81

x Confidential Bureau (χ㾱ተ): While there is no specific information on the function of the 

GLD Confidential Bureau, based on like organizations throughout the PLA, the bureau is 

responsible for ensuring secure communications within the GLD and between the GLD and 

other government and military organizations. Functions likely include document 

classification; message encryption, decryption, and reporting; cipher management; 

information security; and cipher equipment maintenance.82

x Foreign Affairs Bureau (ཆһተ): Manages and coordinates logistics-related foreign contact 

activities for the GLD.83

Other organizations subordinate to the GLD Headquarters Department include the GLD archives 

(ᙫਾẓṸ侶),84 Jindun Publishing House (AKA Golden Shield Publishing House/䠁⴮ࠪ⡸矢), 

and Logistics magazine (ਾऔᵲᘇ).85

The Headquarters Department of the GLD is also responsible for the management of the 

serviceperson support cards of the PLA in cooperation with the Industrial and Commercial Bank 

of China (ѝഭᐕ୶䬦㹼), the China Construction Bank (ѝഭᔪ䇮䬦㹼), and the Agricultural 

Bank of China (ѝഭߌъ䬦㹼㛑ԭM䲀ޜਨ).86 These identity cards store critical data for each 

soldier used for personal identification as well as their medical records, housing records, uniform 

and equipment details, and meal allowances. The card is also a bank card through which 

personnel are paid and reimbursed for expenses. Introduced in 2001, the support cards and 

underlying information systems officially become compulsory PLA-wide in 2011 when 

information processing terminals were installed at all units above the independent battalion 

 

81 “Lift People’s Spirits ( ᢺӪ≁Ⲵ࡙⳺儈儈ᢈѮ ),” 2000, accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/item/sars/content/487.htm on 13 May 2012. Information accessed at www.emil.com.cn/n/20080113/110541.shtml on 14 May 2012. 

82 “Party’s Loyal ‘Messenger’ -- Profile of Zhang Kunguo, Chief of Message Encryption, Decryption and Reporting 

Office of Shenyang Military Region Headquarters Department’s Confidential Bureau,” Qianjin Bao (ࡽ䘋ᣕ), 4 

August 2008. 

83 Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Logistics Department Headquarters, Science of Strategic Logistics, p. 

282. “Simultaneous interpretation - I am the Secretary to provide simultaneous translation services for international 

conferences ( ਼༠Ր䈁 -- ᡁਨѪഭ䱵Պ䇞ᨀ׋਼Ր㘫䈁Ȣ࣑( , “2 November 2006, accessed at 

www.whsense.com/news_view.asp?newsid=117&topic on 14 May 2012. 

84 “Liu Yuan to Inspect the General Logistics Department’s Archives,” 16 July 2011, 

www.archives.org.cn/news.aspx?id=1747 accessed on 14 May 2012. 

85 Jindun Publishing House, “Publishing House Introduction ( ࠪ⡸矢ㆰӻ ),” accessed at 

www.jdcbs.cn/brief/briefCn.php on 13 May 2012. Jindun Publishing House, “Textbook Guide (䍝Җᤷই),” 

accessed at www.jdcbs.cn/help/default.php on 13 May 2012. 86 Yang Jianyong and Tang Xiangdong, “Serviceman Support Card Assumes Functions in Banking and Financial 

Service,” PLA Daily Online in English, 30 November 2009. 
190 

level.87 There are at least two types of support cards – one for officers and non-commissioned 

officers (Type I card), and one for new two-year enlisted personnel (Type II card).88

While not responsible for their administration, the GLD Headquarters Department also provides 

curriculum for the following PLA academic institutions: 

x Logistics Command Academy (ਾऔᤷᥕᆖ䲒): Located in Beijing’s Haidian District, 

the academy trains and educates mid-level leadership and management officers, including 

the directors of administrative divisions within units, as well as logistics department staff 

members and instructors. The academy offers degrees in logistics command, logistics 

services, military supplies, medical support, military transportation, fuel management, 

infrastructure management, materiel distribution, finance and audit, and logistics political 

work.89 The academy is capable of running logistics exercises and courses in real-time 

integrating multiple venues throughout China through its Simulation-Based Training 

Center (⁑ᤏษ䇝ѝᗳ).90 The Logistics Command Academy also hosts the Logistics 

Science Research Institute (ਾऔ、ᆖ⹄ウᡰ). The Logistics Command Academy is a 

corps deputy leader-grade organization. 

x Logistics Engineering Academy (ਾऔᐕ〻ᆖ䲒): Founded in 1961, the academy is 

located in the Daping District of Chongqing. The academy provides from secondary 

technical specialties (e.g., 2-year GED for NCOs and 3-year associates degrees for NCOs 

and officers) to doctoral programs for technology and management officers in barracks 

and fuel infrastructure, logistics management, and warehousing specialties. Degrees are 

offered in construction management and civil engineering; information and automation; 

petrochemical, mechanical, and electrical engineering; warehousing and logistics 

management; logistics theory; and technology and equipment research. About 70 percent 

of PLA fuel and barracks system cadres are graduates of the academy. The academy is a 

national key university in the PLA “2110 Project” and home of the PLA’s Military 

Underground Construction Laboratory (ߋһൠлᔪᅌᐕ〻ᇎ傼ᇔ).91 It publishes the 

quarterly Journal of the Logistics Engineering Academy (ਾऔᐕ〻ᆖᣕ).92 The Logistics 

Engineering Academy is a division leader-grade organization. The following research 

centers and institutes are under the academy: 

o National Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Equipment Engineering and 

Technological Research Center (ഭᇦᮁ⚮ᓄᙕ㻵༷ᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ): 

 

87 Zhou Xiaopeng and Tang Xiangdong, “Mobilization Video-and-Teleconference on Deepening Application of 

Serviceperson Support Card Held,” PLA Daily Online in English, 13 October 2011. 88 Zhang Junmin, “Serviceperson Support Card for Compulsory Servicepersons Officially Issued,” PLA Daily 

Online in English, 4 July 2011. Li Xiaoping and Cheng Wenxiang, “Accelerating Move Toward Informatization of 

Logistics Support Measures -- Reporter’s Q-and-A On Military Region Joint Logistics Department Leaders’ 

‘Military Personnel Support Pilot Expansion’ Work (࣐ᘛ᧘䘋ਾऔ؍䳌᡻⇥ੁؑ᚟ॆ䗸䘋—ߋ४㚄औ䜘亶ሬቡ”

ߋӪ䳌঑ᢙ䈅” ᐕ֌ ᅗ䇠㘵䰞),” Zhanyou Bao (ᡈ৻ᣕ), 20 November 2008. 89 Feng Liang and Ma Yongwei, “Logistics Command Academy of the CPLA (ѝഭ䀓᭮ߋਾऔᤷᥕᆖ䲒),” China 

Military Logistics Encyclopedia, p. 259-262. 90 Beijing CCTV-7 in Mandarin , 9 November 2009. 91 Information accessed at www.hqgc.net, website of the Logistics Engineering Academy accessed on 12 May 2012. 92 Feng Xiaosong, “Training Course on Standards of PLA Field Oil Pipeline Systems Held,” PLA Daily Online in 

English, 28 November 2007. 
191 

China’s first state-level scientific and technological research platform for the 

equipment used in disaster-relief and emergency response.93 

o Modern Logistics Engineering Institute (⧠ԓ⢙⍱⹄ウᡰ): Established in 

January 1987, the institute began offering master’s degrees in 1992 and Ph.D. 

degrees in 2003. Research areas include information technology, logistics 

engineering management, and cost control and optimization. It is responsible for 

the All-Army Supply Mechanization and Automation Society’s Automation 

Special Committee (ߋޘԃᓃχỠॆ㠚ࣘॆᆖՊ㠚ࣘॆуငՊ).94

o Building Design Research Institute ( ᔪᅌ䇮䇑⹄ウ䲒 ): See the Capital 

Construction and Barracks Department for additional details. 

o Construction Engineering Research Institute (ᔪᅌᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ): See the Capital 

Construction and Barracks Department for additional details. 

x Military Economics Academy (ߋһ㓿⍾ᆖ䲒): The academy is a specialized school for 

training military economics management personnel from each of the PLA’s services. 

The academy was founded in Heilongjiang Province but has since moved to its current 

location in Wuhan, Hubei Province. The academy offers academic programs in national 

defense economics, finance, logistics management, military supplies, and grassroots 

logistics leadership. 95 Military Economics Academy is a corps deputy leader-grade 

organization. The Military Economics Academy has four subordinate institutes, however, 

only information on the following is available: 

o Nourishment Institute/Nutritious Food Institute (㩕ޫ伏૱⹄ウᡰ): Conducts 

research, development, and testing of various food processing and preparation 

methods for military use.96

o Quartermaster Equipment Research Institute ( ߋ䴰㻵༷⹄ウᡰ ): See the 

Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department section for additional information. 

o Fuel Research Institute (ᙫਾ⋩ᯉ⹄ウᡰ): See the Quartermaster, Materials, and 

Fuel Department section for additional information. 

It is possible that the academy is also referred to as the Military Institute of Economics, though 

this cannot be confirmed. According to the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the Military 

Institute of Economics manages the Center for Research of Anti-Corruption System for Military 

Economic Activity, which is dedicated to strengthening the building of a system for fighting 

corruption and promoting clean administration in key sectors.97

 

93 Liu Changjiang and Yuan Genglin, “China Sets up Research Center To Improve Equipment for Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Response,” PLA Daily Online in English, 27 April 2010. 94 Information accessed at http://023-56.com/rencai/wlpx/2012-05-08/1426.html on 9 May 2012. 

95 Yang Xiaoming and Su Jie, “GLD Promulgate New POL Consumption Standard for Military Planes,” PLA Daily 

Online in English, 3 February 2009. 96 Information accessed at www.oursteps.com.au/bbs/archiver/?tid-384309-page-3.html on 14 May 2012. “Mint is 

One of the World’s Three Major Spices, Known as “Asia’s Spice,” (㮴㦧ᱟц⭼йབྷ俉ᯉѻаˈਧ〠ӊ⍢ѻ俉) 

12 August 2011, www.shucai001.com/News/Detail-17784.html, accessed on 14 May 2012. 97 Liu Daxin and Li Bing, “PLA General Logistics Department [GLD] Sets up Center for Research of AntiCorruption System for Military Economic Activity (ᙫਾᡀ・ߋһ㓿⍾⍫ࣘ亴䱢㞀䍕ࡦᓖ⹄ウѝᗳ),” PLA Daily 

Online (䀓᭮ߋᣕ㖁㔌⡸), 7 May 2011. 
192 

Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

The Political Department is responsible for carrying out political work within the GLD. 

Responsibilities include leading party building, managing cadres, propagandizing, defending and 

working with the masses, and conducting liaison work.98

The following organizations are subordinate to the Political Department: 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ): Oversees daily administrative tasks for the leadership of the 

GLD political department and coordinates activities of the various departments as 

required. x Organization Department ( 㓴㓷䜘 ): Oversees and guides the activities of party 

organizations and party members to include the formation and selection of 

representatives for Party committees, branches, and congresses; overseeing the 

development of party members in the GLD.99 

x Propaganda Department ( ᇓՐ䜘 ): Responsible for overseeing and implementing 

ideological education for GLD personnel, overseeing efforts to raise the professional and 

general education level of military personnel, and dissemination of political content to 

military personnel and the general public.100

x Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘): Manages officer personnel issues, to include officer salaries, 

training, promotions and assignments, and welfare issues. The Cadre Department is 

responsible for overseeing four types of personnel, which includes active-duty officers, 

civilian cadre, retired military officers, and reserve personnel.101

x Security Department (؍ছ䜘): Oversees the execution of security work to include the 

prevention of crime and theft of military secrets, carrying out criminal investigations, and 

handling some physical security.102

 

98 “The Outline for Ideological and Political Education Within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ≁䀓

᭮ߋᙍᜣ᭯⋫ᮉ㛢བྷ㓢),” PLA Daily Online in English, 19 November 2009, p. 2. Qian Haihao, ed., Lectures on 

the Study of the Organizational Structures of the Armed Forces, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2000. 99 “Expected Promotion of Deputy Corps Commanders of Division-Level Cadres (MɛᱻॷѪߋ࢟㙼Ⲵ↓ᐸ㓗ᒢ

䜘 (2012.1)1),” 20 February 2012, accessed at http://wangluohongren.wangluoliuxing.com/hongren495cacfa010126ij.htm on 13 May 2012. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the National Meeting of Organization Department 

Heads (൘ޘഭ㓴㓷䜘䮯Պ䇞кⲴ䇢䈍),” Dangjian Yanjiu (ފᔪ⹄ウ), January 2011, p. 4-11. Li Zengguang, 

“Political Departments,” in Song Shilun and Xiao Ke, eds, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 374-75. Li 

Yunzhi, “General Political Department,” in Song Shilun and Xiao Ke, eds, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 

398-400. 

100 Zhou Ben, “Implement The Party’s Theory Of Innovation To Build Even Educating People The Fundamental 

Requirement Vigorously Strengthen The Primary Theoretical Work Of Arming The New Situation” (䍟ᖫ⭘ފⲴࡋ

ᯠ⨶䇪ᔪ䘎㛢Ӫṩᴥ㾱≲བྷ࣐࣋ᕪᯠᖒ࣯лสቲ⨶䇪↖㻵ᐕ֌),” PLA Daily Online (䀓᭮ߋᣕ㖁㔌⡸), 29 

December 2010, p. 2. Li Zengguang, “Political Departments,” in Song Shilun and Xiao Ke, eds, Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 374-75. 101 Sai Zongbai, “Systems-Based Guarantee for Building a Contingent of High-Quality Staff Officers – Leader of 

Cadre Department of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army Answers Reporters 

Questions Concerning the Staff Officer Evaluation and Assessment System,” PLA Daily Online (䀓᭮ߋᣕ㖁㔌⡸), 

1 April 2010. Li Yunzhi, “General Political Department,” p. 398-400, Li Zengguang, “Political Departments,” in 

Song Shilun and Xiao Ke, eds, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4 p. 374-75. 
193 

x Cadre Training Bureau ( ᒢ䜘ษ䇝ተ ): Responsible for the political training and 

development of military cadres.103

x Discipline and Inspection Department (䇠Ự䜘 AKA 䇠ᖅỰḕ䜘): Responsible for Party 

discipline inspection work within the GLD which is focused on punishing and preventing 

corruption.104

Finance Department (䍒࣑䜘) 

The Finance Department is the head of the PLA’s finance system that administers funding and 

conducts financial oversight over the entire PLA. The department has a key role in PLA 

budgeting. Budgeting units at each level within the PLA carry out studies to decide on their 

budget items, make calculations of their requests for funds, and then report to the next higher 

authorities. The GLD, working with the relevant departments of other general 

headquarters/departments, analyzes, calculates, and verifies the annual budget requests submitted 

by all the MRs, the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force, and draws up the defense 

budget. After being reviewed and approved by the CMC, the defense budget is submitted to the 

Ministry of Finance.105

The following organizations are subordinate to the Finance Department: 

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ): Coordinates among the various Finance 

Department bureaus in order to draft wartime and emergency financial support plans, 

identify fiscal requirements and shortfalls, produce reports for State Council subordinate 

organizations, and draft finance distribution plans. Often referred to as the 

Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸተ).106 This bureau appears to have absorbed the former 

General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), responsible for daily administrative tasks for the leadership of 

the GLD Finance Department.107

 

103 “Ministry of Education and Other Seven Ministries on the Selection and Training of Military Cadres in 

Universities and Colleges to Carry Out Pilot Work,” 9 April 2011, 

http://haijun.xaut.edu.cn/PoliceRefer/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=12, accessed on 14 May 2012. 104 Sai Zongbao and Teng Xiaodong, “Firmly Advance the Establishment of a System for Punishing and Preventing 

Corruption within the Armed Forces – A Supervisor from the Discipline Inspection Department Under the General 

Political Department Answered Inquiries from the Reporters regarding the Implementation of a Working Plan for 

Establishing and Perfecting a System to Punish and Prevent Corruption within the Armed forces between 2008 and 

2012,” (᡾ᇎ᧘䘋ߋ䱏᜙⋫઼亴䱢㞀䍕փパーセントᔪ䇮——ᙫ᭯㓚Ự䜘䍏䍓Ӫቡ䍟ᖫ㩭ᇎljᔪ・ߋޘڕ䱏᜙⋫઼亴

䱢㞀䍕փパーセント 2008-2012 

ᒤᐕ֌㿴ࡂNJᅗ䇠㘵䰞) PLA Daily, (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 28 October 2008, p. 8. Yan Wengang and Meng Jin, “Practice 

and Thoughts on Construction of System of Corruption Prevention in Field of Armed Forces Supply Procurement,” 

Military Economics Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), Vol. 11, p. 49-51. 105 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” 

29 December 2006. See section IX: Defense Expenditure. 

106 “Ministry of Finance General Office on the Issuance of Accounting Qualification Examination Outline 

(Amendment Notice) (䍒᭯䜘ޜ࣎঵ޣҾঠਁՊ䇑Ӿъ䍴Ṭ㘳䈅བྷ㓢(؞䇒)Ⲵ䙊⸕),”, 26 October 2009, 

information last accessed at 

www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2009niancaizhengbuwengao/wengao200911qi/201002/t20100202

_267442.html on 16 May 2012. 

107 Ibid. 
194 

x Military Finance Bureau (һъ䍒࣑ተ): Little information is available on this bureau 

save that it is responsible for the scientific management of military finance.108

x Wages and Benefits Bureau (ᐕ㯚鬯࡙ተ): Oversees budgeting and payroll management 

for PLA personnel and retired cadres pay and benefits.109

x Military Production Engineering Finance Bureau (ߋӗᐕ〻䍒࣑ተ) AKA Military 

Production Finance Bureau: This bureau is responsible for supervising the transfer, 

replacement, sale or disposal of military assets as well as the budgets for the procurement 

and maintenance of military equipment and facilities.110 The bureau is also responsible 

for coordinating equipment and facility requisitions from the civilian sector. 111 This 

department absorbed the former Military Property and Enterprise Finance Bureau (ߋӗ

Աъ䍒࣑ተ).112

x Servicemen Insurance Bureau (ߋӪ؍䲙ተ): Administers insurance policies for current 

and retired servicemen. Leads the Servicemen Insurance Division (ߋӪ؍䲙༴), which 

falls beneath the Finance Departments of the PLA services and branches. Established a 

Military Policy-based Finance Organization Sub-Department (ߋ䱏᭯ᅙᙗ㶽䍴χʃ࠶

䜘), which is responsible for managing fund raising for military insurance, to ensure the 

appreciation of the insurance fund, for administering insurance policy payments, and 

developing military property insurance and military business insurance services.113

The GLD Finance Department also manages a Financial Account Settlement Center (䍒࣑㔃㇇

ѝᗳ) that likely manages funds collection and disbursements 114 and a Financial Support 

 

108 Information accessed at www.4yjd.cn/historyshow.asp?id=3213 on 14 May 2012. Tian Xiaojun, “Achieve 

Military Scientific Funds Management,” Military Economic Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), September 2011, p. 43-45. 109 Information accessed at http://bbs.junzhuan.com/thread-1376568-1-1.html, 

http://blog.ifeng.com/article/10617761.html, http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1106967-1-1.html, and 

http://shanghai.junzhuan.com/thread-1615282-1-1.html on 14 May 2012. 

110 Ma Huijun, “Integrated Management System Study of Military Assets (ߋ䱏䍴ӗаփॆ㇑⨶փࡦ᭩䶙⹄ウ),” 

Military Economic Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), 2010, No. 6, p. 1. Zhang Hui, Sun Lingxiu, Zhu Junfeng, and Liu 

Yang, “Matrix Asset Disposal Regulatory Model Design (⸙䱥ᔿ䍴ӗ༴㖞ⴁ㇑⁑ᔿ䇮䇑),” Military Economics 

Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), 2010, No. 6, p. 1. 111 “PLA General Logistics Department to Push Forward Asset Management Reform,” CCTV-7, 30 December 2008. 

Information accessed at http://wangluohongren.wangluoliuxing.com/hongren-495cacfa010126ij.htm and 

www.sample.net.cn/cdoc/officer/20119161648554023.htm on 13 May 2012. “CMC and GLD Disaster Damage 

Relief Research Group Arrives to Investigate (ߋငᙫਾ⚮ᦏ؞༼䈳⹄㓴ᶕᣊ䈳⹄),” Fuzhou Daily (ᣊᐎᰕᣕ), 

17 July 2010, accessed at www.zgfznews.com/fznews/lingdaoxinxi/xiefaming/2010/7/17/527675.shtml on 15 May 

2012. 

112 Ma Huijun, “Integrated Management System Study of Military Assets (ߋ䱏䍴ӗаփॆ㇑⨶փࡦ᭩䶙⹄ウ), 

Military Economic Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), 2010, Vol. 6, p. 1,7. 113 Sun Jinwen, Hu Yanchuan, and Qu Peng, “Military Insurance Foundation Shares Management Discussion (ߋӪ

؍䲙ส䠁ᣅ䍴䘀㩕᧒䇘 ),” 11 September 2011, Thesis Network ( ∅ъ䇪᮷㖁 ), last accessed at 

www.wybylw.com/securityfinance/fund/201109/27402.html on 22 June 2012. 

114 Information accessed at www.4yjd.cn/historyshow.asp?id=3213 and 

www.chinavalue.net/Management/Blog/2011-11-25/857980.aspx on 14 May 2012. 
195 

Command Center (䍒؍࣑䳌ᤷᥕѝᗳ) to provide cross-service financial support. This 

command center depends on the Account Settlement Center to allocate funds to units.115

Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department116 (ᙫਾऔ䜘ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

Formed in October 2003 from the GLD Quartermaster Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘ߋ䴰䜘) and the 

GLD Materials and Fuel Department (ᙫਾऔ䜘⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘),117 the Quartermaster, Materials, 

and Fuel Department is responsible for providing food, clothing, materiel, and fuel support to the 

PLA. The department manages the production, procurement, storage, and distribution of military 

uniforms, personal combat equipment and daily use items, fuel, raw and processed foodstuffs, 

tents, camouflage materials, and field utilities like generators and water purification systems.118

In order to improve quality of supplies and reduce military expenditures, the GLD has, over the 

last decade, increasingly relied on commercial suppliers for the production of military materials. 

Between 1998 and 2002, many factories associated with the GLD were privatized and handed 

over to local state-owned enterprises. By 2005, People’s Liberation Army Daily notes that all 

quartermaster factories had been handed over to civil organizations, and 45 percent of military 

supplies, clothing, and accoutrements are ordered from civilian vendors through open tender.119

The department ensures the quality of military-use goods produced at civilian factories through 

Quartermaster Military Representative Bureaus (ߋ䴰ߋһԓ㺘ተ) in Shenyang, Beijing, 

Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, and Xi’an.120

The following organizations are subordinate to the Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel 

Department: 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ): Oversees daily administrative tasks for the leadership of the 

Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department and coordinates activities of the various 

departments as required.121

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ): Coordinates among the various bureaus 

in order to draft wartime/emergency materiel support plans, identify resource 

requirements and shortfalls, and identify economic mobilization requirements. Often 

called the Comprehensive Bureau for short (㔬ਸተ), in August 1999 this bureau 

 

115 Lian Heng, Mo Wenhua, and Fu Xu, “Research on Financial Support Alternatives in Sea Crossing Island 

Landing Operations (⑑⎧ⲫዋ֌ᡈ䍒؍࣑䳌ሩᅙ⹄ウ),” Military Economic Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), March 

2003, p. 67-68. 

116 “Fuel” is often also referred to as “POL,” which stands for “petroleum, oil, and lubricants.” 117 Xu Ping, “Are the GLD Quartermaster Department and Quartermaster Production Department One Department? 

( ᙫਾߋ䴰䜘઼ߋ䴰⭏ӗ䜘ᱟањ䜘ੇ ),” China Military Online ( ѝഭߋ㖁 ), accessed at 

http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wy/2011-09/20/content_4680435.htm on 12 May 2012. 

118 Chinese Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Vol. 4, p. 1-53. 119 Nie Zhonglin, “Remarkable Progress Made in PLA Logistics Socialization,” PLA Daily in English, 11 April 2005. 120 “‘Military Documentary’ and ‘New Military Uniforms’ (Below) Script (ߋһ㓚ᇎѻᯠߋ㻵˄л˅㝊ᴥ),” 31 

June 2007, CCTV, accessed at News.cctv.com/military/20070731/112038.shtml and 

news.cctv.com/military/20070731/110816.shtml on 22 June 2012. 121 Information accessed at State Administration of Grain ( ഭᇦソ伏ተ ) website, 

www.chinagrain.gov.cn/n16/n6994/n7046/n7321/4664560.html on 8 May 2012. 
196 

absorbed the responsibilities of the former S&T Training Bureau (、ᢰ䇝㓳ተ) and the 

former Planning and Finance Bureau (䇑ࡂ䍒࣑ተ) of the Quartermaster Department. 122

x Science & Technology Training Equipment Bureau (、䇝㻵༷ተ) AKA S&T Training 

Bureau (、㓳ተ AKA 、䇝ተ): Although the responsibilities of the S&T Training 

Bureau of the former Quartermaster Department were absorbed in August 1998, this 

bureau was re-established in October 2003 and is likely responsible for activities relating 

to equipment development and training.123

x Provisions Bureau (㔉ޫተ)

124: Manages the storage and distribution of military logistics 

equipment to include tents, generators, and clothing.125

x Clothing and Accoutrements Bureau (㻛㻵ተ): Responsible for the administration of 

research, development, and production of military uniforms and individual equipment. 

Provides direction to the Quartermaster Equipment Research Institute (ߋ䴰㻵༷⹄ウᡰ

).126

x Bureau of Agricultural and Sideline Production (࢟ߌъ⭏ӗተ): Responsible for 

overseeing the management of PLA farms which are predominantly maintained by units 

stationed in remote areas where adequate food supplies are not available on local 

markets.127 The bureau manages multiple Agricultural Supplies Terminals (ߌᢰ⢙䍴ᙫ

ㄉ) AKA Field Operation Military Provisions Supply Stations jointly with the State 

Administration of Grain, which are prepositioned storage sites where food may be 

delivered from military and civilian sources to support PLA units in the field. This 

reduced the required field messing equipment the PLA must deploy with and enables the 

PLA to inspect and ensure the safety and quality of food from civilian sources prior to 

distribution to troops. 128 The bureau also manages Agricultural and Sideline Science and 

Technology Service Centers ( ࢟ߌъ、ᢰȢ࣑ㄉ ) which develop and test new 

agricultural technologies, processes, and products. 129 In 2007, the Quartermaster, 

 

122 Information accessed at State Administration of Grain ( ഭᇦソ伏ተ ) website 

www.chinagrain.gov.cn/n16/n6994/n7046/n7321/4664560.html on 5 May 2012. 

123 “Headquarters Command of Logistics Departments,” China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 35. 

“China Textile and PLA GLD Strategic Cooperation Department Held Meeting in Beijing (ѝ㓪ॿо䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ

䜘ᡈ⮕ਸ֌Ӕ⍱ᓗ䈸Պ൘ӜѮ㹼),” 14 September 2011, accessed at www.texindex.com.cn/Articles/2011-9-

14/242972.html on 14 May 2012. 

124 Qiu Dongqing, Wu Jun, “Establishment and Prospects Of Military Food Nutrient Enrichment Standards (ߋ⭘伏

૱㩕ޫᕪॆḷ߶Ⲵࡦ䇒৺ަࡽᲟኅɛ),” Food Research and Development (伏૱⹄ウоᔰਁ), 2009, Vol. 5., p. 1. 

Gai Fang and Zhang Yi, “GLD Sends Engineering Maintenance Facilities To Support Yushu Quake Relief,” PLA 

Daily Online in English, 13 August 2010. 125 Li Xiaomin and Tang Xiangdong, “GLD Goes All Out To Support Disaster Relief Work in Zhouqu,” 13 August 

2010, PLA Daily Online in English. 126 Information last accessed at http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/328986968.html 13 May 2012. 127 Sui Yi and Fan Juwei, “PLA To Strengthen ‘Vegetable Basket’ Project,” PLA Daily Online in English accessed 

at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-07/09/content_1354122.htm on 13 May 2012. 

128 Zuo Yun and Fan Juwei, “FOMPST Becomes New Provisions Support Mode for Field Encamping Training 

Troops,” PLA Daily Online in English. Information last accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2011-08/22/content_4654566.htm on 14 May 2012. Li Taifu, “Pleased and Hopeful – 

Agricultural Mechanization Division Leader Zong Jinyao and his Delegation Researching in Wuzheng (1⁄3ហоᐼɛ

——ߌχॆਨਨ䮯ᇇ䭖㘰а㹼൘ӄᖱ䈳⹄),” Contemporary Agriculture Journal of Shanxi Province (ኡ㾯ߌχ), 

2011, p. 29. 

129 Information accessed at www.bjhrtc.cn/html/View_1021.html on 14 May 2012. 
197 

Materials, and Fuel Department jointly established a National Military Food Mobilization 

Center (ഭᇦߋ⭘伏૱ࣘઈѝᗳ) with the Economic Mobilization Office (ഭ≁㓿⍾ࣘ

ઈޜ࣎ᇔ) of the NDRC. The Center was formed to develop improved mechanisms by 

which the PLA could receive subsistence support from civilian sources.130

x Factory Management Bureau (ᐕল㇑⨶ተ): Established in February 1999 under the 

former Quartermaster Department. In October 2000, the GLD’s Production Management 

Department was downsized and its functions were transferred to the Factory Management 

Bureau.131

x Supply and Support Bureau (׋ᓄ؍䳌ተ): Manages rear depots and warehouses directly 

subordinate to the GLD.132

x Imported Materials Management Bureau (⢙䍴䘋ਓ㇑⨶ተ): Responsible for the 

procurement of materials from foreign suppliers. The bureau appears to manage the 

Military Imported Materials Tianjin Special Bonded Warehouse (ߋ䱏䘋ਓ⢙䍴ཙ⍕⢩

⿽؍〾ԃᓃ) and the Military Imported Materials Special Bonded Warehouse (ߋ䱏䘋ਓ

⢙䍴к⎧⢩⿽؍〾ԃᓃ).133

x Fuel Depot Management Bureau (⋩ᓃ㇑⨶ተ): Responsible for drafting regulations and 

standards for military fuel depot management, overseeing the management of strategic 

fuel depots, and identifying purchasing requirements.134

x Fuel Supply Bureau (⋩ᯉ׋ᓄተ): Responsibilities include administrating and revising 

standards for military fuel transportation equipment.135

x Materials Procurement Management Bureau ( ⢙䍴䟷䍝㇑⨶ተ ): Responsible for 

administration of military procurement, including publishing information bulletins for 

procurement specifications, inviting and selecting tender suppliers, selecting procurement 

evaluation experts, and administering quality inspection work.136

x Quartermaster Military Representative Bureau (ߋ䴰ߋһԓ㺘ተ): Oversees the quality 

of military-use goods produced at civilian factories to ensure compliance with contracts 

 

130 Shao Chunyu and Fan Fuwei, “National Military Food Mobilization Center Established,” PLA Daily Online in 

English, 21 May 2007. 

131 Xinxing Cathay International Group (ᯠޤ䱵ॾ䳶ഒM䲀ޜਨ), “Historical Evolution (শਢ⋯䶙),” accessed at 

www.xxcig.com/jtgk/lsyg/index.htm on 14 May 2012. 

132 Information last accessed at http://bbs.ahys.gov.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=435815 on 14 May 2012. Li 

Xiaomin and Tang Xiangdong, “GLD Goes All Out To Support Disaster Relief Work in Zhouqu,” PLA Daily 

Online in English, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/2010cmfm/2010-

08/13/content_4281348.htm on 14 May 2012. 

133 Xie Yongfei and Liu Jia, “Chinese PLA Concludes 1st Independent International Bidding for Logistic Material 

Procurement,” PLA Daily Online in English, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2011-04/08/content_4418129.htm on 14 May 2012. 

134 “GLD Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department Leaders Attend Cippe Petroleum Exhibition (ᙫਾߋ䴰⢙

䍴⋩ᯉ䜘ᄬ亶ሬ㦵Ѥ cippe ⸣⋩ኅ ),” Cippe.net ( ޘ⋨⸢⨳ॆᐕ㖁 ), information last accessed at 

www.cippe.net/news/68687.htm on 14 May 2012. 

135 Beijing CCTV-7 in Mandarin, 30 December 2008. Information accessed at 

www.cqvip.com/QK/95846A/200601/20999024.html and 

www.caigou2003.com/news/interviews/guests/20111027/guests_203089.html on 13 May 2012. 

136 Information accessed at www.caigou2003.com/news/interviews/guests/20111027/guests_203089.html on 6 May 

2012. 
198 

and standards.137 Each bureau manages one or multiple Quality Control Stations for 

Quartermaster Products (ߋ䴰ӗ૱䍘䟿Ự傼ᙫㄉ).138

x Fuel Military Representative Bureau (⋩ᯉߋһԓ㺘ተ): Responsible for overseeing the 

quality of fuel, oil, and other petroleum products for military use by commercial 

refineries to ensure compliance with contracts and standards.139

x Domestic Materials Procurement Bureau ( ഭ޵⢙䍴䟷䍝ተ ): Responsible for 

administration of domestic military materials procurement, including publishing 

procurement regulations and information bulletins identifying procurement 

specifications. It is unclear how the responsibilities of this office differ from the Materials 

Procurement Management Bureau, however a September 2004 source identifies this 

bureau as active after the 2003 reorganization.140

The Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department also manages six Military Materials 

Procurement Bureaus (ߋ⭘⢙䍴䟷䍝ተ), which are tasked with purchasing required materials 

and equipment from commercial suppliers. They manage bidding and contracting, calculate 

materials-related expenses, test and oversee materials quality, and organize the storage, 

forwarding, and delivery of materials.141 The Department also manages a competitive bidding 

site (www.chinabidding.com) which allows international companies to compete for PLA 

contracts for items like medical, engineering, and administrative equipment.142 The relationship 

between the Materials Procurement Management Bureau, the Domestic Materials Procurement 

Bureau, and these six Military Materials Procurement Bureaus is unclear, however it is clear that 

the two former bureaus have a regulatory role and the latter has an operational role. The six 

Military Material Purchasing Bureaus are as follows: 

x Northeast Military Materials Procurement Bureau (ьेߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) located in 

Shenyang, Liaoning Province (MUCD 62401).143

 

137 Shi Meiwu, Wang Ni, Yu Wei, Hu Zhongzhao, and Zhang Yan, “The Analysis Methods for Cover-shelter Effect 

of Fabrics (䶒ᯉⲴ㿶㿹䚞㭭᭸᷌䇴ԧᯩ⌅),” China Fiber Inspection (ѝഭ㓔Ự), 2012, No. 2. p. 62-65. 138 Zhang Qiang, Che Zhongchen, Ou Mingjiao, “Guard the Vital Interests of the Officers- General Logistics 

Department Quartermaster Military Representative Bureau’s Quality Supervision Office Inspection Director Liu 

Baoshan his Team Implement Rigid Transshipping Quality Controls Documentary (ᆸᣔᇈޥⲴ࠷䓛࡙⳺-ᙫਾߋ

䴰ߋԓተ䍘Ự༴༴䮯ࡈᇍ䫒઼ԆⲴഒ䱏ѕᢺᦒ㻵䍘Ựޣ㓚ᇎ),” Science and Technology Daily (、ᢰᰕᣕ), 

accessed at www.stdaily.com/kjrb/content/2009-12/23/content_138159.htm on 14 May 2012, 139 “The Evolution of America’s General Aviation Grease Standards (㖾ഭ䙊⭘㡚オ⏖━㜲ḷ߶Ⲵਁኅ╄ਈ),” 

Petroleum Products Application Research (⸣⋩୶ᢰ), 2011 Vol. 6, p. 30-34. Yang Liguo and Song Baoguo, 

“Administrative Officers Learn Political Work ( 㹼᭯ѫᇈᆖ᭯ᐕ ),” accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-06/24/content_60809.htm on 14 May 2012. 

140 Information accessed at http://public.chinautn.com/20071113/23367.html on 15 May 2012. 141 Chinese Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, p. 42-43, 228. Shen Hao and Tang Xiangdong, “PLA 

Establishes 1st Regional Military-Civilian Joint Support System for Military Material Purchase,” PLA Daily Online

in English, accessed www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-08/31/content_285193.htm on 14 May 2012. 142 Xie Yongfei and Liu Jia, “Chinese PLA Concludes 1st Independent International Bidding for Logistic Material 

Procurement,” PLA Daily Online in English, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2011-04/08/content_4418129.htm on 14 May 2012. 

143Information accessed at http://bbs.jlu.edu.cn/cgi-bin/bbscon?board=Abroad&file=M.1273402683.A&num=6343 

on 8 May 2012. 
199 

x North China Military Materials Procurement Bureau (ॾेߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) located 

in Tianjin (MUCD 62402).144 

x East China Military Materials Procurement Bureau (ॾьߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) located in 

Shanghai (MUCD 62403).145

x South Central Military Materials Procurement Bureau (ѝইߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) 

located in Wuhan, Hubei (MUCD 62404).146

x Northwest Military Materials Procurement Bureau (㾯ेߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) located in 

Xi’an, Shaanxi (MUCD 62405).147

x Southwest Military Materials Procurement Bureau (㾯ইߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ) located in 

Chongqing (MUCD 62406).148

The Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel Department manages two subordinate research institutes: 

x Quartermaster Equipment Research Institute (ߋ䴰㻵༷⹄ウᡰ), formerly known as the 

Research Institute for Military Supplies and Armament Technologies, was established in 

1960 and is located in Beijing. The Institute specializes in research and development of 

military supplies and equipment. It primarily conducts research on combat uniforms and 

personal equipment, field rations and food preparation equipment, and bivouac 

equipment.149 The GLD Quartermaster Equipment Research Institute is subordinate to the 

 

144 Information accessed at www.022net.com/2012/1-12/457136222229159.html on 8 May 2012. “Deputy School 

Director Sun Xiaolei (ᆉᲃ䴧࢟ṑ䮯),” Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine (ཙ⍕ѝ५㦟བྷᆖ), last 

accessed at news12.tjutcm.edu.cn/bencandy.php?fid=36&aid=462 on 8 May 2012. Notes from CCTV-7 Military 

News (CCTV-7 ߋһ ߌъ),”Military News.” CCTV-7,, 26 May 2008. 145 Information accessed at http://xf.house.163.com/sh/0NXH.html on 8 May 2012. “GLD Northeast Military 

Materials Procurement Bureau Standardizes the Process (ᙫਾॾьߋ⭘⢙䍴䇒䍝ተ㿴㤳䟷䍝〻ᒿ),” PLA Daily,

last accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2001/12/17/20011217001182_todaynews.html on 14 May 2012. 

Information accessed at shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20110801/userobject1ai55362.htm on 14 May 2012. Shen Hao 

and Tang Xiangdong, “PLA Establishes 1st Regional Military-Civilian Joint Support System for Military Material 

Purchase,” PLA Daily Online in English, accessed www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-

08/31/content_285193.htm on 14 May 2012. 146Huang Zhaohui, Work Hard to Improve Timeliness: GLD South Central Military Materials Procurement Bureau 

Successfully Organizes to Support Argentina Emergency Procurement (൘ᨀ儈ᰦ䰤᭸⦷кл࣏ཛ˖ᙫਾѝইߋ⭘

⢙䍴䇒䍝ተᡀ࣏㓴㓷ᨤ䱯ワットᙕ䟷䍝),” China Logistics and Procurement (ѝഭ⢙⍱о䟷䍝), 2002, No. 22, p. 33. 

and “Notice for the Provincial Department of Finance on the Issuance of ‘Hubei Province Interim Measures for the 

Integrity of Accountant Personnel Information Management (ⴱ䍒᭯঵ޣҾঠਁlj(19)ेⴱՊ䇑Ӫઈ䈊ؑؑ᚟㇑⨶

Ჲ㹼࣎⌅NJⲴ䙊⸕)” www.ecz.gov.cn/structure/hjks/hjkszw_36125_1.htm, accessed 23 August 2012. 147 Zhang Wanshan and Wang Ming Kun, “Snow Mountain Oil Dragon: A New Look for the Gela Pipeline 

Renovation Project Procurement (䴚ኡ⋩嗉”ሶᦒᯠ㻵——Ṭ᣹㇑㓯᭩䙐ᐕ〻䇮༷ᤋḷ䟷䍝㔬䘠), China 

Government Procurement (ѝഭ᭯ᓌ䟷䍝), 2002, No. 7. p. 27-30. 148 Gao Baoru “What You Want First: Concept of Entering the World (俆ݸ㾱”㿲ᘥޕц),” Theoretical Studies on 

PLA Work (ߋ䱏᭯ᐕ⨶䇪⹄ウ), 2003, No. 4; and Gao Baoru, “On the Concept of Creating Learning-Type 

Leadership Classes (ሩࡋᔪᆖҐර亶ሬ⨝ᆀⲴʃᜣ), Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics (ইӜ᭯⋫ᆖ䲒

ᆖᣕ), 2003, No. 2. 1 149 Information last accessed at www.plapmic.org, www.chnfood.cn/college/colleges/institutions/show_15542.html 

14 May 2012. “General Logistics Department’s Quartermaster Equipment Research Institute (ᙫਾߋ䴰㻵༷⹄ウ

ᡰ),” Modern Weaponry (⧠ԓޥಘ), 2007:7. “General Logistics Department’s Quartermaster Equipment Research 

Institute’s Continued Research (ᙫਾߋ䴰㻵༷⹄ウᡰᤱ㔝᭫ޣ(, “PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), last accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-05/31/content_29263.htm on 14 May 2012. 
200 

Military Economics Academy (ߋһ㓿⍾ᆖ䲒). 150 For more information, see the GLD 

Headquarters Department section. 

x Fuel Research Institute (ᙫਾ⋩ᯉ⹄ウᡰ) is located in Beijing and conducts research on 

fuel storage and distribution equipment for the entire PLA. This includes research on 

automated fuel monitoring, testing, and distribution systems. Current fuel and oil 

equipment research tasks are aimed at integrating advanced communications, networking, 

ultrasonic, and optical fiber technologies into fuel equipment, fuel control platforms, and 

fuel depot information management systems. 151 The GLD Fuel Research Institute is 

subordinate to the Military Economics Academy (ߋһ㓿⍾ᆖ䲒). See the GLD 

Headquarters Department section for more information. 

Health Department (ছ⭏䜘) 

The GLD Health Department is responsible for organizing, planning, coordinating, and directing 

medical services throughout the PLA. The department’s tasks include formulating guiding 

principles, policies, regulations, and technical standards governing PLA medical services; 

drafting plans for peacetime medical services and wartime medical support; organizing and 

implementing military medical care; overseeing sanitation and epidemic prevention efforts, 

ensuring adequate quantities of medical supplies and equipment, and arranging training for all 

medical personnel.152

The department is also responsible for organizing cooperative work between China and other 

countries concerning health issues; managing the all-Army health services research, medical 

periodical publications, and health information work; and managing the daily affairs of the AllArmy Patriotic Health Campaign committee (ߋޘ⡡ഭছ⭏䘀ࣘငઈՊ),153 the All-Army 

Healthcare Leading Small Group (ڕ؍ߋޘ亶ሬሿ㓴),154 Commission of Medical Sciences and 

Technology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ५ᆖ、ᆖᢰδငઈ

Պ),155 and the All-Army Family Planning Leading Small Group (ߋޘ䇑ࡂ⭏㛢亶ሬሿ㓴).156

 

150 Su Yang, Lai Jun, and Du Shuguang, “Improve the Quality of Industry Apparel Product Specifications Nine Key,” 

accessed at www.cttc.net.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?id=454 on 14 May 2012. 

151 “Top Visitors and Exhibitors at CIPPE2012 ( 亦㓗৲㿲୶喀㚊 cippe2012)” accessed at 

www.ciooe.com.cn/2013/cn/News/ExhibitionNews/350.html, “PLA GLD Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel 

Department Inspects Grid Refining ( 䀓᭮ߋᙫਾߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘൘Ṭ⛬㘳ሏ )”accessed at 

www.cnpc.com.cn/CNPC/xwzx/qydt/䀓᭮ߋᙫਾߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘൘Ṭ⛬㘳ሏ.htm on 6 May 2012, and “General 

Logistics Department Fuel Research Institute Unveils Post-Doctoral Research Station (ᙫਾ⋩ᯉ⹄ウᡰঊ༛ਾ、

⹄ᐕ֌ㄉ᨝⡼),” Xinhua (ᯠॾ), last accessed at news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-01/12/content_10643860.htm on 14 

May 2012. 

152 Chinese Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Vol. 5, p. 1-9, 80-87. 153 Pin Dao, “Military’s Patriotic Work Continues to Improve the Quality of Water (нᯝᨀ儈ߋ䱏⡡ഭছ⭏ᐕ֌䍘

䟿≤ᒣ ),” China Military Online ( ѝഭߋ㖁 ), last accessed at 

http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/newscenter/zongbu/content/2012-04/06/content_4827995.htm on 14 May 2012. 

154 Information last accessed at www.wj-hospital.com/zjfc/14863.htm on 14 May 2012. 155 Information last accessed at www.shczyk.com/jlcg/831.html and 

www.jfjyxzz.org.cn/Introduce/Default.aspx?ID=MagIntroduce on 14 May 2012. 

156 “Li Jinai Lectures at All-Army Family Planning Leading Small Group Conference on Requiring More Solid 

Advancements in Military Family Planning Work Science Development (ᵾ㔗㙀൘ߋޘ䇑ࡂ⭏㛢亶ሬሿ㓴Պ䇞к
201 

The following organizations are subordinate to the GLD Health Department: 

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ): Oversees daily administrative tasks 

for the leadership of the Health Department and coordinates activities of the various 

departments as required. This organization has a subordinate General Office and may 

sometimes be called the General Office in publications.157 

x S&T Training Bureau (、ᢰ䇝㓳ተ): In 2003, assisted with assessment of SARS 

outbreak response.158 The first reference to this bureau is in 2002 and most recent 

reference is in a Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) statement from 2012.

159

x Hygiene and Epidemic Prevention Bureau (ছ⭏䱢⯛ተ), which is often shortened to 

(䱢⯛ተ): The bureau is responsible for the research, development, testing, and 

employment of epidemic prevention measures to prevent the spread of infectious 

diseases. Furthermore, it is responsible for providing health education and health 

technology guidance to military troops.160 The Bureau manages subordinate Hygiene 

and Epidemic Prevention teams and Health and Epidemic Inspection Institutes. In 

2008, the Bureau implemented additional preventative measures for earthquake 

disasters.161 

x Medical Administration Bureau (५⯇㇑⨶ተ): Provides oversight of health care 

activities within the PLA, publishes regulations and directives for medical personnel 

in the area of medical support. A nickname for this may be the Medical Bureau (५⯇

ተ or ५㇑ተ).162

 

䇢䈍㾱≲ᴤ࣐᡾ᇎ᧘䘋ߋ䱏Ӫਓ䇑⭏ᐕ֌、ᆖਁኅ ),” PLA Daily ( 䀓᭮ߋᣕ ), accessed at 

http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2011-02/25/content_4226734.htm on 14 May 2012. 

157 “Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up: Interviews with Authors of Selected Essays Submitted for the EssayWriting Contest on the Theme of China’s 30 Years of Reform and Opening Up,” CCTV-7 Military video, Notes 

from CCTV-7 Military News (CCTV-7 ߋһ ߌъ), 4 December 2008. China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭ

ߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Gold Shield Press, 2002, Vol. 5, p. 83. “Wei Gao and the GLD Health Department 

Sign Civil-Military Integration Strategic Cooperation Agreement for the Construction of a Medical Material 

Guarantee System (ေ儈оᙫਾছ⭏䜘ㆮ㖢ߋ≁㶽ਸ㦟ᶀ؍䳌փパーセントᔪ䇮ᡈ⮕ਸ֌ॿ䇞),” Weigao Holding 

Company, accessed at www.weigaoholding.com/h/xwzx/topic-1423.htm on 14 May 2012. 

158 Information at www.sars.ac.cn/log/show.php?id=162 last accessed 14 May 2012. 159 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Gold Shield Press, 2002, Vol. 5, p. 

83. Information accessed at http://wiki.zupulu.com/doc.php?action=view&docid=7232 and 

www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2012/201203/t20120323_93343.htm on 15 May 2012. 

160 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Gold Shield Press, 2002, Vol. 5, p. 

85. 

161 “GLD Health Department Compiles and Distributes Prevention Formulas to Earthquake Relief Forces (ᙫਾছ⭏

䜘㕆ਁᣇ䴷ᮁ⚮䜘䱏䱢⯵ਓ䇰),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-

05/19/content_1258747.htm on 27 April 2012. China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), 

Vol. 5, p. 100. “Contribute to Ensure we Have no Epidemics After the Disaster (Ѫ⚮ਾᰐ⯛ڊ䍑⥞),” PLA Daily

(䀓᭮ߋᣕ), accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-05/20/content_1260232.htm on 15 May 2012. 

Information accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/zh/2010-01/06/content_4508644.htm and 

www.eszcdc.com/show.aspx?id=1091&cid=13 on 13 May 2012.

162 Information accessed at www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohyzs/s3590/201111/53440.htm and 

http://health.youth.cn/yycj/201109/t20110930_1737376.htm on 28 April 2012. Information last accessed at 
202 

x Medical Supply Bureau (㦟૱ಘᶀተ): Responsible for procurement, production, and 

storage of medical supplies and equipment.163 The bureau has at least one subordinate 

institute: 

o Drug and Instrument Control Institute (㦟૱ԚಘỰ傼ᡰ).164 In recent years, 

the GLD has issued a series of policies that have made this institute the leader 

of the all-army medical equipment system. It is supported by the Military 

Region Drug and Control Institutes, (ߋ४㦟૱ԚಘỰ傼ᡰ), and the regional 

health equipment maintenance stations (४ฏᙗছ⭏㻵༷㔤؞ㄉ). The Drug 

and Control Institute oversees the Pharmacology Office (㦟⨶ᇔ), the Medical 

Equipment Quality Assurance Office (ছ⭏㻵༷䍘䟿؍䇱ᇔ), the Medical 

Equipment Technology Support Office ( ছ⭏㻵༷ᢰδ؍䳌ᇔ ), the 

Electronic Equipment Testing Office (⭥ᆀԚಘỰ⍻ᇔ), as well as the 

Traditional Chinese Medicine Office (ѝ㦟ᇔ). The Institute may also be 

referred to as the Institute of Inspection and Repair of Medical Instruments 

and Apparatus (५⯇ಘỠỰ؞ᡰ), and the Drug Inspection Institute (㦟૱Ự

傼ᡰ).165

x Healthcare Bureau166 (ڕ؍઼䇑ࡂ⭏㛢ተ):167 Manages the PLA hospital system to 

include national level hospitals, service hospitals, hospitals of the MR Joint Logistics 

Departments (JLDs), teaching hospitals (ᮉᆖ५䲒), sanitoriums (⯇ޫ५䲒), 

specialized medical centers ( ५ᆖу、ѝᗳ ), clinics ( 䰘䇺䜘 ), and physical 

examination detachments.168

x Compliance Services Bureau (ን㓖һ࣑ተ): Little information is available on this 

bureau other than that it was first identified in August 2003, and was last identified 

January 2009.169

x Information Center (ؑ᚟ѝᗳ): Responsible for the management of electronic 

medical records and the transmittal of health information for emergency treatment in 

 www.chemyq.com/health/ep136/1356505_4251A.htm and 

http://wenku.baidu.com/view/a8073b136edb6f1aff001f33.html on 15 May 2012. 

163 Jiang Wanliu and Du Xianzhou, “Five Days, Five Nights on Special Battlefield -- Preparations for Establishment 

of Beijing’s Xiaotangshan SARS Hospital (⢩↺ᡠ๤ӄ᲍ཌ——ेӜሿ(d)ኡ䶎ިᇊ唎५䲒참고ۉᐕ֌ピコ),” PLA 

Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/05/02/20030502001048_todaynews.html on 

15 May 2012. 

164 Information last accessed at www.showxiu.com/fan_yi/ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᙫਾऔ䜘 on 15 May 2012. 165 “All-Army Health Equipment Maintenance and Support Networking (ߋޘছ⭏㻵༷㔤؍؞䳌ᇎ⧠㖁㔌ॆ),” 9 

October 2011, PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), accessed at www.mod.gov.cn/hospital/2011-10/09/content_4303111.htm on 

22 June 2012. 

166 This bureau would typically be translated as “Family Planning Bureau.” 167 Information accessed at www.bjhi.gov.cn/htmlTemplate/8a8a8bc32ed62e04012ed638ea1d000d.html on 2 May 

2012. 

168 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, p. 81. Information accessed at 

www.bjhi.gov.cn/htmlTemplate/8a8a8bc32ed62e04012ed638ea1d000d.html on 2 May 2012. 

169 “Urgent Need of Special Drugs for Whole Army Poisoning Treatment for Elite Gathered at Qiqihar 203 Hospital 

(ߋޘѝ∂ᮁ⋫マ㤡喀㚊喀ᐲ 203 ५䲒ᙕ䴰⢩᭸㦟),” 11 August 2003, Heilongjiang Daily (唁嗉⊏ᰕᣕ), 

accessed at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-11/0038539954s.shtml. Information accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/jbzsc/2007-07/12/content_877051.htm on 15 May 2012. 
203 

remote locations. On online sources, this center is still occasionally referred to by its 

former name - Health Statistics Information Center (ছ⭏㔏䇑ؑ᚟ѝᗳ). 170 

x Health Service Research Office (ছऔ⹄ウᇔ): The Health Service Research Office 

was created by the GLD Health Department in the late 1970s. Its functions include 

research and validation of peacetime and wartime military health policies, 

regulations, organization, management, and integrated development.171 

x People’s Military Medical Publishing House/Military Medical Press (Ӫ≁ߋ५ࠪ⡸

矢).172

The GLD Health Department oversees the PLA’s extensive network of hospitals, which provide 

medical treatment, supplies, and preventative medical care to the force. While the majority of 

these hospitals are administratively subordinate to the MR JLDs and PLA Services, the GLD 

Health Department directly oversees two Beijing-based Hospitals, the PLA 301 and 302 

Hospitals as well as the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (ߋһ५ᆖ、ᆖ䲒). 

x The PLA General Hospital (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᙫ५䲒), also known as the PLA 301 

Hospital, is the most comprehensive medical support facility in the Chinese military.173

The PLA 301 Hospital provides outpatient and inpatient treatment to senior PLA and 

political leaders to include foreign leaders such as the former North Korean leader Kim 

Jung Il.174 The PLA 301 Hospital is also responsible for managing the Postgraduate 

Medical School (formerly Beijing Military Medical Academy) and conducting advanced 

medical research. 175 In 2004 the PLA 304 Hospital, which specializes in burn 

treatment,176 was merged with the PLA 301 Hospital and was re-designated the 304 

department also known as the First Affiliated Hospital of the PLA General Hospital.177 In 

2004, the PLA 309 Hospital which specializes in organ transplantation and tuberculosis 

research was also merged with the 301 Hospital, becoming the Second Affiliated 

Hospital of the PLA General Hospital, however in 2009 it was re-subordinated to become 

the General Hospital of the PLA General Staff Department (䀓᭮ߋᙫ৲䈻䜘ᙫ५䲒).178

 

170 Information accessed at 

www.moh.gov.cn/sofpro/cms/previewjspfile/mohwsbwstjxxzx/cms_0000000000000000272_tpl.jsp?requestCode=5

0701&CategoryID=8143 and www.crealifemed.com/Html/news/n3/2006-

12/19/2006121906121901194374903434.html on 13 May 2012. 

171 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, p. 125. Information accessed at 

www.chima.org.cn/pe/DataCenter/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=340 on 14 May 2012. 172 Information accessed at www.pmmp.com.cn/ on 3 May 2012. 173 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, p. 89. 174 “General Secretary Kim Jong Il Planning Visit to PRC by End of August, May Notify Nuclear Test in Advance,” 

Sankei Shimbun, 24 August 2006. 175 Ge Rile and Guo Jianyue, “China’s Medical Support for Spaceflight Develops,” PLA Daily Online in English, 

last accessed at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-08/17/content_4185153.htm on 15 May 2012. 176 Notes from CCTV-7 “Military News” (CCTV-7 ߋһ ߌъ), “Military Report.” CCTV Military News video, 20 

November 2010. 

177 Information accessed at www.301hospital.com.cn/. “Jiang Zemin Convalesces at Yuquanshan Villa (⊏◔≁ ⦹

⋹ኡࡕີ䶌伺),” Shijie Ribao Online (ц⭼ᰕᣕ), accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-

11/13/content_1544919.htm on 25 April 2012. 

178 Information accessed at www.309yy.com on 15 May 2012. 
204 

x The PLA 302 Hospital (䀓᭮ߋᅮйżҼ५䲒 AKA ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᅮ 302 ५䲒) is the 

PLA’s only national level infectious disease hospital and serves as a national center for 

the research and treatment of liver diseases. 179 The hospital is also a post-doctoral 

training station and teaching hospital for masters and post-doctoral students and was 

designated as the PLA’s training base for the prevention and control of infectious 

diseases in 2009. 180 The hospital has supported counter-terrorism and emergency 

response operations and exercises in cooperation with other PLA and PAP units.181

x Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) (ߋһ५ᆖ、ᆖ䲒), founded in 1951, is 

the PLA’s top medical research institution, commanded by a MG. Responsible for both 

military medicine and epidemic control, AMMS conducts research in surgery, hygiene, 

bacteriology, parasitology, epidemiology, physiology, biochemistry, pharmaceutical 

sciences, nutrition, pathology toxicology, and radiobiology. AMMS has 11 subordinate 

research institutes: 

o Military Veterinary Institute (ߋһޭ५⹄ウᡰ): Established in 1982, the institute 

is the PLA’s integrated veterinary science research unit focused on the prevention, 

control, and research of anthrax, tetanus, rabies, and other animal diseases.182 

o Health Service and Medical Information Institute (ছ⭏औ࣑о५ᆖᛵᣕ⹄ウᡰ): 

Established in 2003, the institute is the only organization in the PLA focused on 

the management and transmission of military health service information.183

o Institute of Radiology and Radiological Medicine (᭮ሴо䗀ሴ५ᆖ⹄ウᡰ): 

Established in 1958, the institute conducts research in radiation sickness and 

protection as well as radiological toxicology for nuclear weapon exposure.184 

o Institute of Basic Medical Sciences (ส⹰५ᆖ⹄ウᡰ): Established in 1978, the 

institute conducts research in basic medicine, clinical theory, and related 

technologies.185

o Institute of Hygiene and Environmental Medicine (ছ⭏ᆖ⧟ໍາ५ᆖ⹄ウᡰ): 

Established in 1958, the institute focuses on improving wartime troop hygiene and 

health, sanitation, nutrition, high-altitude medicine, and food safety.186

o Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology (ᗞ⭏⢙⍱㹼⯵⹄ウᡰ): Established 

in 1958, the institute studies the pathogenesis of microorganisms, epidemiological 

studies, drug research, malaria prevention, and parasitology.187

 

179 “Military Report,” CCTV Military News video, Notes from CCTV-7 “Military News” (ߋһᣕ䚃), 5 November 

2009. 

180 Jiang Wei and Dai Xin, “PLA Clinical Training Base for Prevention And Control of Infectious Diseases 

Established,” PLA Daily Online in English, accessed at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2009-

10/26/content_4097978.htm on 15 May 2012. 

181 Information accessed at www.302hospital.com/index.php?id=110 on 3 May 2012. 182 Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/14/693.html on 3 May 2012. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. Information last accessed at http://news.163.com/08/1124/19/4RHOL7FQ000120GU.html on 15 May 2012. 185 Ibid. 186Information last accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/721.html, www.ceas.org.cn/jgzj/ 

ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2594, and http://news.qq.com/a/20080328/003451.htm on 15 May 2012. 

187 Information accessed at http://ime.bmi.ac.cn/ on 3 May 2012. 
205 

o Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology (∂⢙㦟⢙⹄ウᡰ): Established in 

1958, the institute focuses on new drug formulation and synthesis, toxin detection, 

and plant chemistry research.188

o Institute of Biotechnology (⭏⢙ᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ): The institute does cellular, protein, 

and genetic engineering research aiding in vaccine development. 189

o Institute of Blood Transfusion (䟾ᡈ䗃㹰⹄ウᡰ): This institute works to 

increase blood transfusion safety.190 

o Institute of Disease Control and Prevention (⯮⯵亴䱢᧗ࡦᡰ): This institute 

deals with military disease prevention and hygiene information monitoring, 

education, policy consultation, and technology management.191

o Institute of Medical Equipment (ছ⭏㻵༷⹄ウᡰ): Established in 1958, the 

institute tests medicines and medical devices including medical kits, litters, 

mobile medical devices, ambulance and surgical vehicles, hospital shelters, and 

sterilization and water filtration systems.192 In addition, since its inception the 

AMMS Medical Equipment Research Institute has developed over 100 kinds of 

field medical equipment, received 80 National Scientific Progress Awards (ഭᇦ

、ᢰ䘋↕྆), and according to a 2009 estimate, produces approximately 80 

percent of the medical equipment used in the field.193 

The AMMS also manages the following organizations: 

o PLA Hospital 307 (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ 307 ५䲒): Specializes in oncology, the treatment 

of acute radiation sickness, blood-related diseases, and the emergency treatment of 

chemical poisoning. The PLA 307 Hospital hosts the State Key Laboratory of 

Proteomics (㳻ⲭ䍘㓴ᆖഭᇦ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) with the AMMS Institute of Radiology and 

Radiological Medicine, as well as the Pharmaceutical Chemistry Research Lab (㦟⢙ॆ

ᆖ⹄ウᇔ) and Biotechnology Research Lab (⭏⢙ᢰδ⹄ウᇔ).194

o State Key Laboratory of Pathogens and Biosecurity (⯵৏ᗞ⭏⢙⭏⢙ᆹޘഭᇦ䟽⛩ᇎ

傼ᇔ): Jointly managed by the AMMS Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology and 

the Institute of Biotechnology. Established in 2005, the Lab does pathogen detection and 

identification research on bioterrorism agents and works with highly pathogenic 

 

188 Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/719.html and http://duotai2012.86mai.com/ 3 May 2012. 189 Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/717.html on 3 May 2012. 190 Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/716.html on 3 May 2012. 191 Information accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2008-04/15/content_7974897.htm and 

www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/715.html on 3 May 2012. 

192 Information accessed at www.globalb2b.asia/province-tianjin-yexiox.html and 

www.hcn2020.org.cn/index.php?doc-view-4710 on 3 May 2012. Wu Zhijun, Li Nan, and Liu Hongliang, “Science 

and Technology’s Light Shines on ‘Life’s Heights’ (、ᢰѻݹ➗㘰⭏ભ儈ൠ),” PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 20 August 

2009, p. 12. “Military Report (ߋһᣕ䚃),” 21 May 2008 and 31 May 2008, Beijing CCTV-7. Information accessed 

at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/15/718.html on 3 May 2012. 

193 Wu Zhijun, Li Nan, and Liu Hongliang, p. 12. Information accessed at www.hcn2020.org.cn/index.php?docview-4710 and http://baike.soso.com/v6308504.htm on 3 May 2012. 

194 Information accessed at www.307hospital.com/ and www.bmi.ac.cn on 15 May 2012. Wang Shibin, “Xu Caihou 

inspects AMMS,” 25 September 2009, PLA Daily Online in English, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2009-09/25/content_4047890.htm and 

www.chinalab.gov.cn/labsite/Site/NewsPage.aspx?id=2131 on 28 April 2012. 
206 

organisms. This lab assisted in protection against a biological attack or disease outbreak 

during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and during the emergence of SARS.195

o National Bio-Protection Engineering Center (ഭᇦ⭏⢙䱢ᣔ㻵༷ᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ): 

Established in 2003, it is China’s only national-level research center for biological 

protective equipment (filters, suits, laminar flow hoods, HVAC) for the ability to quickly 

respond to terrorist attacks.196

The GLD Health Department, while not responsible for their administration, provides curriculum 

to the following universities which provide specialized military training in clinical medicine, 

preventative medicine, health management, and nursing: 

x Second Military Medical University ( ᅮҼߋ५བྷᆖ ): Located in Shanghai, the 

university provides training in naval medicine, pharmacology, and foreign training.197

Affiliated hospitals include Changhai Hospital (䮯⎧५䲒),198 Changzheng Hospital (䮯

ᖱ५䲒),199 and Eastern Hepatobiliary Surgery Hospital (ьᯩ㛍㛶५䲒).200

x Third Military Medical University (ᅮйߋ५བྷᆖ): Located in Chongqing. In 2004, its 

Chengdu Military Medical Academy was turned over to the Chengdu government for 

management.201 The university has three affiliated hospital - Southwest Hospital (㾯ই५

䲒),202 Xinqiao Hospital (ᯠẕ५䲒),203 and Daping Hospital (བྷක५䲒).204

x Fourth Military Medical University ( ᅮഋߋ५བྷᆖ ): Located in Xi’an, Shaanxi 

Province, the university provides additional training in aviation medicine and biomedical 

engineering. 205 It was formed by the merger of former Fourth Military Medical 

University (First Military Medical College) and Fifth Military Medical University (Third 

Military Medical College) in 1954.206 Its Jilin Military Medical Academy was transferred 

to local government control in 2004.207 The university’s three affiliated hospitals are the 

 

195 Information accessed at www.bmi.ac.cn/contents/16/982.html and 

www.bjkw.gov.cn/n1143/n1240/n1465/n242664/n242712/7794764.html on 28 April 2012. 

196 Information last accessed at www.npec.org.cn/, www.npec.org.cn/sfzwasp.asp?ppid=4&keyno=20, and 

www.bmi.ac.cn/channels/16.html on 14 May 2012. 

197 Wang Fuli and Li Yanzhong, “GLD Holds Emergent Medical Support Training Class for MOOTW,” PLA Daily 

Online in English, 7 November 2009. Information accessed at 

www.smmu.edu.cn/english/SMMU_About_general.htm on 3 May 2012. 

198 Information last accessed at www.chhospital.com.cn/ on 4 May 2012. 199 Information accessed at www.shczyy.com/chpage/c136/ on 4 May 2012. 200 Information accessed at www.ehbh.cn/ on 4 May 2012. 201 Xiong Xueli and Chen Xiaoxia, “First PLA Medical Train Comes off Production Line,” PLA Daily Online in 

English, 8 May 2008. 

202 Information accessed at www.swhospital.com/XNYYFore/default.aspx 3 May 2012. 203 Information accessed at www.xqhospital.com.cn/ on 4 May 2012. 204 Information accessed at www.dph-fsi.com/ on 4 May 2012. 205 Wang Shi’en and Ji Peng, “PLA Medical Center of Special Technologies Makes Steady Headway,” 7 December 

2009, PLA Daily Online in English. Information accessed at www.fmmu.edu.cn/ on 4 May 2012. 206 Information accessed at http://en.fmmu.edu.cn/btdzw.jsp?urltype=tree.TreeTempUrl&wbtreeid=2438 on 4 May 

2012. 

207 Wang Shi’en and Ji Peng, “PLA Medical Center of Special Technologies Makes Steady Headway,” 7 December 

2009, PLA Daily Online in English.
207 

Xijing Hospital (㾯Ӝ५䲒), 208 Tangdu Hospital (ୀ䜭५䲒), 209 and Stomatological 

Hospital (ਓ㞄५䲒).210

In 2006, the GLD, the NDRC, and the State Food and Drug Administration began 

commissioning civilian enterprises to stockpile medicinal materiel for military wartime 

requirements. This allowed stocks to be rotated without a financial loss, ensuring a high level of 

combat readiness at all times.211

Military Transportation Department (ߋһӔ䙊䘀䗃䜘) 

The head of the PLA’s military transportation system (ߋһӔ䙊䘀䗃パーセント㔏). Established in 1992, 

resulting from the merger of the former GLD Military Transportation Department and the former 

GLD Military Vessels Department,212 the Military Transportation Department’s responsibilities 

include drafting the regulations, standards, rules, programs, and plans for PLA military 

transportation work, overseeing training of transportation units, overseeing the management of 

common-use vehicles and ground force maritime vessels, and managing military transportation 

costs. The Department is also responsible for organizing and coordinating national transportation 

war preparedness work, leading the MR and MD transportation strategies, drafting regulations 

and plans for building a national defense transportation road network, and national defense 

transportation materials storage.213 The head of the Military Transportation Department serves 

concurrently as the head of the Transportation War Preparedness Office (Ӕ䙊ᡈ༷ޜ࣎ᇔ) of 

the National Defense Mobilization Commission (ഭᇦഭ䱢ࣘઈငઈՊ).214 

The GLD’s Military Transportation Department established and led a Traffic Joint Command 

Group (Ӕ䙊㚄ਸᤷᥕ㓴). During China’s October 2009 60th Anniversary parade, the Traffic 

Joint Command Group was composed of representatives from the Beijing Department of 

Transportation, Beijing JLD, and service transportation offices. The Command Group was 

responsible for selecting transportation routes and coordinating with armed police and public 

security forces to guarantee safety and security along the parade route and supporting lines of 

communication.215 

There is surprisingly little information available after 2002 on the organizations subordinate to 

the Military Transportation Department which makes it extremely difficult to outline its 

composition. Based on the limited available information the organizations below are possibly 

subordinate to the Military Transportation Department: 

 

208Information last accessed at http://xjwww.fmmu.edu.cn/ on 4 May 2012. 209 Ibid. 210 Information last accessed at http://kqwww.fmmu.edu.cn/structure/index on 4 May 2012. 211 Zhang Hui and Fan Juwei, “Civilian Enterprises Commissioned To Stockpile Military Medicines for Combat 

Readiness,” PLA Daily Online (䀓᭮ߋᣕ㖁㔌⡸), 20 December 2006. 212 Information accessed at www.plapic.com.cn/txt/200810a/20081006A.htm on 8 May 2012. 213 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 7, p. 1. 214 Ren Min, Science of National Defense Mobilization (ഭ䱢ࣘઈᆖ), Beijing: Military Science Press, April 2008. 

p. 55. 

215 Information accessed at www.yutong.com/news/mediareports/10/2185.shtml on 13 May 2012. 
208 

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ ): Responsible for coordinating the 

activities of the various subordinate departments to support operational requirements; 

develops comprehensive transportation plans, provides comprehensive reporting, 

assessments, and overall situational awareness of military transportation activities.216

According to a Chinese official, the Transportation Department’s General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ

) and Plans and Strategy (䇑ࡂᡈ⮕) Office were merged into the Comprehensive 

Planning Bureau in 2003.217

x Number 1 Transportation Bureau (ᅮа䘀䗃ተ): Responsible for drafting regulations and 

oversight of military rail transportation, coordinating with Ministry of Railway (䫱䚃䜘) 

authorities for military rail transport, and developing and supervising PLA-wide training 

in rail transportation planning, coordination, loading/unloading, and movement tasks. 

Other responsibilities may include overall management of PLA rolling stock and 

auxiliary equipment.218

x Number 2 Transportation Bureau (ᅮҼ䘀䗃ተ): Little information on this organization 

can be found later than 2005, though a Chinese official indicated it was still active as of 

2007. The bureau is responsible for drafting regulations and oversight of military river 

and air transportation; coordinating with Ministry of Transportation (Ӕ䙊䘀䗃䜘) 

organizations including the Civil Aviation Administration of China (ѝഭ≁⭘㡚オተ), 

Water Transport Bureau (≤䘀ተ), Changjiang River Administration of Navigational 

Affairs (Ӕ䙊䘀䗃䜘䮯⊏㡚࣑⨶㇑ተ)

219 and Zhujiang Administration of Navigational 

Affairs (Ӕ䙊䘀䗃䜘⨐⊏㡚࣑⨶㇑ተ)

220 for military inland waterway and air transport, 

and developing and supervising PLA-wide training in ship and air transportation 

planning, coordination, loading/unloading, and movement tasks. Other tasks may include 

overall management of PLA inland waterway vessels and port facilities.221

x Number 3 Transportation Bureau (ᅮй䘀䗃ተ) may also be referred to as the Motor 

Vehicles Bureau (䖖䖶㇑⨶ተ): The bureau is responsible for drafting regulations and 

oversight of military motor vehicle transportation, coordinating with the Ministry of 

Transportation’s Highway Bureau (ޜ䐟ተ), Department of Road Transportation (䚃䐟䘀

䗃ਨ), and Public Security Bureau (ޜᆹተ) for military road transport, and developing 

and supervising PLA-wide training in motorized transportation planning, coordination, 

and maneuver tasks. Other tasks may include overall management of PLA general use 

motorized vehicles.222

 

216 Dang Chongmin, ed., Staff Officer Work in Joint Operations (㚄ਸ֌ᡈ৲䈻ᐕ֌), Beijing: PLA Press, Aug. 

2006, p. 105. Li Decai, Modeling of Decision-Making in Strategic Logistics Command, National Defense University 

Publishing House, 2002, p. 104. 

217 2007 Interview with Chinese Official. 218 Information accessed at www.csa.org.cn/ch/reader/download_pdf.aspx?file_no=20110301&year_id= 

2011&quarter_id=3&falg=1 on 13 May 2012. 2007 Interview with Chinese Official. 

219 Information accessed at www.cjhy.gov.cn/hangyundongtai/zhuanxianggongzuo/2010/2010_01_wenhua/ 

wenhua6/201001/t20100129_145954.html on 15 May 2012. 

220 Information last accessed at www.zjhw.gov.cn on 15 May 2012. 221 Information last accessed at www.customs.gov.cn/tabid/419/InfoID/11843/frtid/509/SMid/1142/ 

Default.aspx on 15 May 2012. 

222 2007 Interview with Chinese Official. 
209 

x Vessel Transportation Bureau (㡩㡷㇑⨶ተ): In a 2007 interview, a Chinese official 

identified the Vessel Transportation Bureau as an active organization subordinate to the 

Military Transportation Department responsible for ocean transportation, however, no 

other information can be found after 2002 that suggests that this bureau exists.223

x S&T Training Bureau ( 、ᢰ䇝㓳ተ AKA 、䇝ተ ): 224 Supervises and evaluates 

transportation training for the entire PLA to include driving training and unit mobility 

training.225

x Transportation War Preparedness Bureau (Ӕ䙊ᡈ༷ተ): Responsible for civil-military 

coordination to ensure that national transportation systems meet PLA wartime 

transportation requirements. Tasks include the coordination of national defense 

transportation projects such as road, rail, and port construction and accurate mapping of 

national transportation networks. The director of this bureau also serves as the Deputy 

Director of National Transportation War Preparedness Office (ഭᇦӔ䙊ᡈ༷ޜ࣎ᇔ).226

x Military Representative Bureau (ߋһԓ㺘ተ ): There is currently no information 

available on a Military Representative Bureau directly subordinate to the Military 

Transportation Department. Military Representative Offices (MROs/ߋһԓ㺘ᇔ) and 

Military Representative Divisions (MRDs/ߋһԓ㺘༴) are responsible for coordinating 

with government and commercial transportation agencies to support the PLA’s 

transportation requirements. MROs are located at Ministry of Railways Rail Bureaus, 

Navigation and Shipping Administrations, and Airports.227 While the establishment of 

MROs is ultimately approved by the GLD Military Transportation Department there is 

insufficient data available to determine whether these MROs are managed by the Military 

Transportation Department or by MRs.228

The Military Transportation Department also has a subordinate National Defense Transportation 

Coordination Center (ഭ䱢Ӕ䙊䘀䗃ॿ䈳ѝᗳ), publicly known as the Chinese Prudential 

Transport Corporation (CPTC/ѝॾ؍ᗇӔ䙊ᙫޜਨ). Formed in 1993, the coordination center 

deals with emergency support, combat readiness and national defense transportation needs. 

Tasks include the organization of railway transport, transportation warehousing, and 

 

223 2007 Interview with Chinese Official. 224 Information accessed at www.hzmzxxw.com/view.asp?classid=2&id=219 on 15 May 2012. 225 Tang Houyun, “Chengdu Military Region Unidentified Group Military Division Training Brigade Protective 

Health Training Documentary (ᡀ䜭ߋ४傫⑍Ḁ䳶ഒߋਨ䇝བྷ䱏䱢ছ䇝㓳㓚ᇎ),” Science and Technology Daily 

(、ᢰᰕᣕ), accessed at www.stdaily.com/oldweb/gb/stdaily/2007-02/15/content_635886.htm on 22 June 2012. 226 Information last accessed at http://dq.xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model38/newsview.aspx?id=833389 on 15 May 

2012. 

227 “Military representative offices in Xi’an Railway Bureau,” 22 June 2007, accessed at 

www.mot.gov.cn/st2010/jiangxi/jx.../t20100911_805641.html, 30 April 2009 website of the Ministry of 

Transportation on 13 May 2012. Information accessed at www.xiancn.com/gb/rbpaper/2007-

06/22/content_1230823.htm on 13 May 2012. 

228 China Water Transport Press Agency, “Nanjing Military Region Joint Logistics Department Major General 

Comes to Jiujiang River and Yangze River Vessel Service Military Representative Office to Inspect Work (ইӜߋ

४㚄औ䜘ቁሶᶕҍ⊏䮯⊏㡚ߋ࣑һԓ㺘༴㿶ሏᐕ֌ ),” 1 April 2011. Information accessed at 

www.zgsyb.com/GB/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=97418 on 14 May 2012. 
210 

management of shipping vessels, fuel transport, and materiel transport.229 The center is likely 

subordinate to the Transportation War Preparedness Bureau. The center may also be called the 

GLD Traffic Center (ᙫਾߋӔ䘀䗃ѝᗳ). 

While not responsible for their administration, the Military Transportation Department also 

provides curriculum for the following PLA academic institutions: 

x Military Transportation Academy (ߋһӔ䙊ᆖ䲒): Established in 1973 and located in 

Tianjin. The academy is a corps deputy leader-grade organization and is the only 

academy within the PLA that trains military transportation senior engineering, leadership, 

and management personnel. 230 The academy has programs in military transportation, 

vehicle command, vehicle engineering, and loading and transportation mechanics. The 

academy also manages the Military Transportation Research Institute (ߋһӔ䙊䘀䗃⹄

ウᡰ) and Army Maritime Vessel Research Office (䱶ߋ㡩ੜ⹄ウᇔ), which researches 

army maritime transport vessels.231 

x PLA Vehicle Management Academy (䀓᭮ߋ⊨/䖖㇑⨶ᆖ䲒) Established in 1977, is a 

division-leader grade basic academy that trains motor vehicle transport leadership and 

management officers from the PLA motor vehicle units for all services. The academy is 

located in Bengbu, Anhui Province, and has academic specialties for motor vehicle 

element leadership and military transportation management. 232

x PLA Zhenjiang Watercraft College (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ䭷⊏㡩㡷ᆖ䲒):233 A division 

leader-grade organization located in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province. It is the ground force 

and air force’s only basic academy for training army maritime vessel commanders and 

technical officers. 234 The Academy has more than 10 teaching vessels, a full range of 

 

229 Information accessed at www.jobuu.com/jobs/z117327.html, www.xiemaowang.com/detail/803214.html, 

www.wines-info.com/CompanySite/OIndex.aspx?c=19185, and http://zhuzufei.fyfz.cn/art/355037.htm on 15 May 

2012. 

230 The Military Transportation Academy was established in 1973 as the Transportation Technology School (䘀䗃ᢰ

δᆖṑ), in June 1986 it became Transportation Engineering Academy (䘀䗃ᐕ〻ᆖ䲒), and in June 1999 took on 

its current designation. China Military Encyclopedia Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 714-715. Information accessed at 

zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋһӔ䙊ᆖ䲒 on 8 May 2012. 231 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/104758.htm on 8 May 2012 and www.jjxy.cn/, website of 

the Academy of Military Transportation, accessed on 13 May 2012. 

232 The PLA Vehicle Management Academy was established in December 1977 as the PLA Vehicle Management 

School (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ⊨/䖖㇑⨶ᆖṑ), and re-named the PLA Vehicle Management Academy in June 1986. In 

1992, the academy was re-named GLD NCO School (ᙫਾ༛ᇈᆖṑ), as it absorbed responsibility for all aspects of 

development work for the GLD Shiguan School, and then the current designation was re-instated in June 1993. 

China Military Encyclopedia Second Edition (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖᅮҼ⡸), Beijing: Encyclopedia of China 

Publishing House, 2007, Vol. 3, p. 715-716. 

233 Note, the English translation varies for this organization, and uses “college” rather than “academy.” PLA 

Zhenjiang Watercraft College was originally the Ground Forces Vessel Technology School (䱶ߋ㡩㡷ᢰδᆖṑ), 

which was constructed at the PLA Vehicle Management Academy in June 1983. In June 1986 it became a separate 

school, in August 1992 it became the PLAN Zhenjiang Vessel NCO School (䀓᭮ߋ⎧ߋ㡩㡷༛ᇛᆖṑ), in April 

1995 the title Ground Forces Vessel School was re-instated, and in April 1999 it took on its current designation. 

During this period, the Academy was briefly transferred from the GLD to the PLAN from October 1992, but it 

returned to the GLD in May 1995. China Military Encyclopedia Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 716-717. 234 China Military Encyclopedia Second Edition, p. 716-717. Information accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2008a/2008-05/29/content_1288151.htm on 13 May 2012. 
211 

laboratories, and special-study rooms. The Watercraft Command Specialty has been 

designated as one of the priority disciplines under Project 2110 of PLA Academies and 

Schools and the Watercraft Power Engineering Specialty has been designated as part of 

Project 530 of the GLD.235

Capital Construction and Barracks Department (สᔪ㩕ᡯ䜘) 

The lead organization of the PLA infrastructure and barracks system (สᔪ㩕ᡯパーセント㔏). The 

system is tasked with directing and supervising the construction and maintenance of military 

facilities and housing.236 This includes the mid-term and long-term planning, budgeting, design, 

and construction of military facilities; military property management; and coordination with nonmilitary entities for construction and leasing programs. The department leads the PLA 

Environmental Protection and Afforestation Committee Office (ߋޘ⧟؍㔯ॆငઈՊޜ࣎ᇔ)

237

which is responsible for pollution management and environmental protection in and around 

military facilities. The department also manages the All-Army Environmental and Engineering 

Quality Monitoring Center (ߋޘ⧟ໍາоᐕ〻䍘䟿ⴁ⍻ᙫㄉ),238 the GLD Third Guest House 

(ᙫਾᅮйᤋᖵᡰ)

239, and publishes Armed Forces Capital Construction and Barracks (ߋ䱏ส

ᔪ㩕ᡯ). 240 According to the 2002 GLD Military Logistics Encyclopedia, the name of the 

department is translated as the “Capital Construction and Barracks Department”, but the logical 

translation is the “Infrastructure and Barracks Department.”241

The following organizations are subordinate to the Capital Construction and Barracks 

Department: 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ): Oversees daily administrative tasks for the leadership of the 

Capital Construction and Barracks Department and coordinates activities of the 

various departments as required.242

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ): Coordinates among the various 

bureaus in order to draft wartime and emergency materiel support plans, identify 

resource requirements and shortfalls, and identify economic mobilization 

requirements.243

x Engineering Management Bureau (ᐕ〻㇑⨶ተ): Responsible for planning, design, 

and supervision of PLA construction projects as well as coordination with other 

government and civilian entities in the construction of national defense facilities.244

 

235 “Military Report (ߋһᣕ䚃),” CCTV-7, 08 May 2008. 236 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 12, p. 1. 237 Information accessed at www.douyar.com/article-7541-1.html, http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2011-

12/22/content_4329895.htm, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/lh/2006-10/30/content_4550837.htm, and 

www.qsck.com/product_view.asp?id=26 on 15 May 2012. 

238 Information accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-12/05/content_1573594.htm on 15 May 2012. 239 Information accessed at www.sxycsf.com/list_21/1059.aspx on 28 April 2012. 240 Information accessed at www.hbdawu.gov.cn/about/mingren/jj/6505.html on 16 May 2012. 241 Information accessed at www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gld.asp and 

http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=83532&lib=law on 15 May 2012. 

242 Information accessed at http://news.qq.com/a/20120211/000075.htm on 15 May 2012. 243 Information last accessed athttp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_495cacfa010126ij.html on 15 May 2012. 244 Information accessed at www.ccir.com.cn/detail.aspx?msgID=141337, 

www.mohurd.gov.cn/zcfg/jsbwj_0/jsbwjjzsc/201112/t20111214_207934.html, 
212 

x Barracks and Land Management Bureau (㩕ᡯ൏ൠ㇑⨶ተ): Acts as a property 

manager for all military land, buildings, and facilities. The bureau is responsible for 

drafting land and military property (real estate) utilization regulations; managing land 

and facility usage, modification, and improvements; and registration of leased and 

empty military property. Many of the duties of the Barracks and Land Management 

Bureau are carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 

Development (տᡯ઼෾ґᔪ䇮䜘) and the Ministry of Land and Resources (ഭ൏䍴

K䜘). 245 

x Housing Construction Management Bureau (տᡯᔪ䇮㇑⨶ተ): Responsible for the 

construction and management of military housing. 246 According to the People’s

Liberation Army Daily, on 21 June 2007 the PLA began comprehensive barracks 

renovation for all brigade and regimental units. This renovation is expected to take 

nine years and cost one billion yuan annually to complete. 247 It is likely that the 

Housing Construction Management is responsible for the management of these 

construction projects. 

x Environmental Protection and Afforestation Training Bureau (⧟؍㔯ॆ、䇝ተ): 

Responsible for drafting environmental protection regulations and plans, supervising 

environmental protection programs, and training personnel in related tasks. Programs 

include energy and water resource conservation and pollution reduction at military 

garrisons.248 The bureau also directs numerous landscaping programs intended to 

beautify and create more ecologically friendly military facilities. The bureau supports 

PLA camouflage, concealment, and deception programs by planting to conceal 

sensitive military facilities under a natural cover. 249 Before 1996, Environmental 

Protection and Afforestation were two separate bureaus. 

x Retired Cadres Housing Construction Bureau (㘱ᒢ䜘տᡯᔪ䇮㇑⨶ተ): Responsible 

for the construction and management of housing for retired cadres.250

The Capital Construction and Barracks Department is also associated with two Logistics 

Engineering Academy (ਾऔᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) research institutes: 

 www.bjjs.gov.cn/publish/portal4/tab1153/info29825.htm, and 

http://wenku.baidu.com/view/1088df2b915f804d2b16c14b.html on 8 May 2012. 245 “GLD Notice Recognizing Advancing Units and Individuals of the Quartermaster Warehouse (ᙫਾ䙊ᣕ㺘ᖠޘ

ߋਾᯩߋ䴰ԃᓃݸ䘋অս઼ݸ䘋њӪ)” PLA Daily, (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 7 January 2011, p.1. Information accessed at 

http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2011-01/08/content_4218163.htm, 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_495cacfa010126ij.html and 

http://sjs.bjgtj.gov.cn/tabid/3937/InfoID/69300/frtid/3943/Default.aspx on 8 May 2012. 246 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_520e45d50100smyc.html, 

http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2011-05/11/content_4241080.htm, and 

http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1328/164598616.html on 8 May 2012. 

247 Song Zhanglin and Fan Juwei, “PLA Initiates Comprehensive Barracks Renovation Project,” PLA Daily in 

English, 22 June 2007. 

248 Information accessed at http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/164598220.html and 

slpc.mwr.gov.cn/gzdt/201103/t20110307_255982.html on 15 May 2012. 

249 Information accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2006ztpd/2006-09/20/content_592507.htm, 

www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2006ztpd/2006-09/29/content_604096.htm, 

www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2006ztpd/2008-07/24/content_1377201.htm, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/lh/2012-

03/21/content_4816175.htm on 15 May 2012. 

250 Information last accessed at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/1088df2b915f804d2b16c14b.html on 15 May 2012. 
213 

x Building Design Research Institute (ᔪᅌ䇮䇑⹄ウ䲒): Established in 1950 and currently 

located in Wuhan, Hubei Province, the institute conducts the planning and construction 

design of military buildings, hospitals, warehouses, oil tanks, underground facilities, and 

pipelines.251 The institute also does work for non-PLA entities. For example, it assisted in 

designing facilities for the 2008 Beijing Olympics as well as for civilian hospitals.252

x Construction Engineering Research Institute (ᔪᅌᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ): Established in the 1980s 

and currently located in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, the institute is the only scientific 

research organization in the entire armed forces which carries out research and testing of 

equipment for field encampment, warehousing, and emergency repair and construction 

and military engineering camouflage technology. According to press reports, the institute 

employs just over 100 people and includes subordinate offices for encampment 

equipment research, and warehouse mechanization and automation research.253

Audit Office (ᇑ䇑㖢) 

The GLD Audit Office (ᙫਾऔ䜘ᇑ䇑㖢), or PLA Audit Office (䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑༴) as it is more 

commonly known,254 is the leading organization within the PLA audit system (ᇑ䇑パーセント㔏) under 

the supervision of the CMC. In the past it was known as the Audit Bureau (shenji ju; ᇑ䇑ተ), 

but its name was changed in August 1992.255 The system conducts economic evaluation, ensures 

financial discipline, improves effectiveness of financial management, and promotes the 

development of military economic activities.256 In April 1995, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, 

issued the new audit regulations to regulate and standardize auditing of the military, and 

authorized 13 supporting rules in the following ten years. 257

As of 2009, more than 20 ancillary military auditing system regulations existed, which covered 

different areas such as budget auditing, equipment auditing, and infrastructure construction.258

 

251 Information accessed at http://mall.cnki.net/magazine/Article/TMGC201111026.htm and 

www.xici.net/d82335620.htm, www.yingjiesheng.com/job-000-529-143.html on 13 May 2012. 

252 Information accessed at www.cces.net.cn/tthy/display.asp?num=T-0004, 

http://mall.cnki.net/magazine/Article/TMGC201111026.htm, and www.xici.net/d82335620.htm on 15 May 2012. 253 Zhang Qiang and Tang Yongfeng, “New Starting Point, New Blueprint, New Development: General Logistics 

Department’s Construction Engineering Research Institute’s Start on Achieving Development by Leaps and Bounds 

During the 12th Five-Year Program,” Science and Technology Daily (、ᢰᰕᣕ), 10 January 2012. Information 

accessed at www.zshg.com/zonghou01.htm on 15 May 2012. China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 12, p. 10. 254 Note, a recent China Armed Forces bilingual publication referred to the Audit Office as the PLA Audit 

Commission. Jin Hao (䠁᰺), “China’s Military Auditing (ѝഭߋ䱏Ⲵᇑ䇑),” China Armed Forces (ѝഭߋ䱏), 

2010 No. 5, p. 52-54. 

255 Although it became the Audit Office in 1992, this was officially recognized in article 7 of the “Chinese People’s 

Liberation Auditing Ordinance (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑ᶑֻ),” issued 17 April 1995. Information accessed at 

www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992195/n1994111/n1994306/2321058.html on 15 May 2012. 

256 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 12, p. 1. 257 Jin Hao, “China’s Military Auditing (ѝഭߋ䱏Ⲵᇑ䇑),” China Armed Forces (ѝഭߋ䱏), 2010 No. 5, p. 52-55. 

Note, although this special issue for the General Logistics Department provides English and Chinese versions of the 

articles, there were grave discrepancies between the two versions in terms of meaning; where discrepancies exist, 

our version relies on the Chinese version. 

258 This information was taken from Google’s 26 March 2012 cache of a 2009 press-release on a Chinese municipal 

government auditing bureau website, PLA Auditing Office Organization GLD System Audit Regulations Training 
214 

Audits generally focus on finding any irregularities associated with budgetary work, building 

projects, equipment procurement, investment, real estate projects, and profitable services.259 The 

office is also responsible for auditing the finances of officers in the PLA units at the same grade 

and below of the office.260

The military has three levels of auditing agencies: the PLA Audit Office, audit bureaus at every 

PLA “major unit” (བྷঅս), 261 and audit offices at corps leader grade units. These military audit 

organizations are supported by various corporate audit organizations and audit firms.262 

The Audit Association of PLA is the professional military group for the military’s registered 

auditors and audit firms. In December 1994, the GPD approved the establishment of the PLA 

Registered Auditing Affairs Association (ѝഭ䀓᭮ߋ⌘޼ᇑ䇑һॿՊ). Later, on 17 August 

2000, the GPD approved the change of the organization name to the current designation. It is 

responsible for resource inspection work, managing, and inspecting credentials for military audit 

firms and other personnel, organizing and scheduling personnel testing, expanding professional 

knowledge, and is responsible for information exchanges. It also coordinates relations with the 

state and local administrative organizations, and handles authorization matters for relevant 

departments and units.263

In recent years, the GLD has emphasized promoting the scientific development of military 

auditing, enhancing auditor capabilities, and organizing audit regulatory system training for GLD 

Audit Office leadership, key businesses, and relevant financial auditors. The GLD has given 

prominence to auditing tasks that involve: military readiness projects, weapons equipment, 

strategic resources reserves, and the economic responsibility of leading cadres, as well as 

improving the military audit organization’s oversight capacity for a variety of peacetime military 

operations, which include winning informationized conflicts (ᢃ䎒ؑ᚟ॆᡈҹ), border control, 

and earthquake relief.264 In 2009 the GLD Audit Office invited National Accounting Office 

personnel to share responsibility for the auditing of local economics (ൠᯩ㓿⍾) and project 

investment (ᐕ〻ᣅ䍴), and it may continue to assist in this capacity.265

 

(䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑㖢㓴㓷ᙫਾパーセント㔏ᇑ䇑⌅㿴ษ䇝). The original webpage has since been taken down. The original link 

is www.fdsj.net/ztxt01view.asp?id=721, last accessed on 10 May 2012. 259 “More on China Setting Up Military Auditing Body to Examine 1,000 Officers in 2006,” Xinhua (ᯠॾ), 20 July 

2006. 

260 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһਾऔⲮ、ޘҖ), Vol. 13, p. 36. 261 Liu Baoheng, China Audit Yearbook (ѝഭᇑ䇑ᒤ䢤), English, December 2005, p. 598-607. ; This term, “major 

units” (da danwei; བྷঅս) encompasses the CMC, Ministry of National Defense, PLA Services/Branches, each MR, 

MR grade military education institutes and research organizations, deputy MR grade organizations, the People’s 

Armed Police, and corps leader grade organizations serving deputy-military region leader grade posts. No audit 

bureau exists for the GPD. Information accessed at http://club.xilu.com/xinguancha/msgview-950389-97222.html on 

24 August 2012. 

262 Jin Hao, “China’s Military Auditing (ѝഭߋ䱏Ⲵᇑ䇑),” China Armed Forces (ѝഭߋ䱏), 2010 No. 5, p. 55 263 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 39. 264 “PLA Auditing Office Organization GLD System Audit Regulations Training (䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑㖢 㓴㓷ᙫਾパーセント㔏ᇑ

䇑⌅㿴ษ䇝)” last accessed at www.fdsj.net/ztxt01view.asp?id=721 25 July 2012; China Military Logistics 

Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 36-37. 265 Ibid. 
215 

The following organizations are subordinate to the Audit Office: 

x Comprehensive Planning Bureau ( 㔬ਸ䇑ࡂተ ): Often abbreviated as the 

Comprehensive Bureau (㔬ਸተ), this bureau was created 10 October 2003 and 

absorbed the Audit Office’s former General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ) at that time.266 The 

bureau’s responsibilities likely include drafting and issuing auditing laws, regulations, 

plans, programs, and reports; making arrangements to audit high-level PLA officers; 

coordinating PLA-wide audit structure; managing PLA-wide auditing training and 

evaluation; and managing correspondence and filing of relevant documents.267

x Operations Audit Bureau (һъᇑ䇑ተ): Responsible for auditing cost of living 

payments, public affairs, operations, education and training, fuel, and strategic 

combat expenses (ᡈ⮕֌ᡈ䍩); auditing the Finance Calculation Center (䍒࣑㔃㇇

ѝᗳ) and expenses associated with storing, using, and managing materials; and 

auditing the operating expenses of leading officers of the four General Departments 

and their directly managed work units.268

x Equipment Auditing Bureau (㻵༷ᇑ䇑ተ): Responsible for auditing the expenses 

associated with military weapons and logistics equipment purchases, equipment 

maintenance and repair, scientific research, special equipment fees, strategic materiel 

storage, foreign military aid for military sales, external reporting, and equipment 

purchase contracts. The office is also responsible for auditing the equipment expenses 

of leading officers of the four General Departments and their directly managed work 

units.269

x Capital Construction Audit Bureau (สᴥᔪ䇮ᇑ䇑ተ): Created in October 2003, it 

likely absorbed some of the responsibilities of the former Engineering Enterprise 

Audit Bureau (ᐕ〻Աъᇑ䇑ተ), making it responsible for auditing expenses related 

to capital construction for the entire PLA, including expenses related to capital 

construction plans, programs, auctions, contracts, construction preparations, drafting 

and engineering materials management.270 

Military Audit Firms (䀓᭮ߋᇑ䇑һ࣑ᡰ): Audit firms receive management, direction, and 

oversight from the military’s auditing departments, and at the same time, receive operational 

guidance from the state’s Institute of Certified Public Accountants (ഭᇦ⌘޼Պᇑ䇑ᐸՊ). The 

military audit firm supports aspects of military financial service work, including: quality, service 

support, and policy.271

 

266 Information accessed at http://sjs.eksw.net/article/ksfd/2011-09-15/12144.html 5 August 2012. 267 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 36. 268 Hu Lixue, Tian Fujun, and Yao Lixin, “Briefly on The Auditing System of Troops Acquisition (ߋ䱏䟷䍝ᇑ䇑փ

パーセントࡍ᧒),” Military Economics Research (ߋһ㓿⍾⹄ウ), 2003, Vol. 7, p. 62-63. 269 Ibid 269 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 38. 270 Information accessed at http://sjs.eksw.net/article/ksfd/2011-09-15/12144.html, and China Military Logistics 

Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 37. 

271 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, p. 37. 
216 

Logistics Bases 

The GLD has two directly subordinate national level logistics bases responsible for materiel 

stockpiling and providing strategic logistics support to commands throughout China. Both bases 

are corps leader-grade organizations led by a LG or MG.272 In addition to their wartime missions, 

both bases provide material support to domestic social stability, humanitarian assistance, and 

disaster relief operations.273

x Wuhan Rear Base (↖≹ਾᯩสൠ) is responsible for providing strategic material support 

to the entire PLA. The base has a number of subordinate units that control motor 

transport, weapons, fuel, materiel, and munitions depots spread throughout central China 

in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Shanxi Provinces. The base also has subordinate technical 

support units, training groups, hospitals and medical support teams, the 49th Motor 

Transport Regiment which provides strategic transport support, and a communications 

station.274 The base manages a war readiness command network and a joint logistics 

support network, which links the GLD command center, base organizations, and its many 

depots.275 Units associated with the base are assigned the MUCDs which fall between 

62101 and 62199.276

x The Qinghai-Tibet Depot (䶂㯿ޥㄉ䜘) is responsible for the transportation of goods and 

materials, maintaining oil pipelines and fiber optics lines along the Qinghai-Tibet 

Highway (䶂㯿ޜ䐟). The base has a number of subordinate motor transport, dual-use 

units stationed along the highway that transport over 80 percent of material and fuel to 

 

272 Information accessed at wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/hread?tid=0c1f08048654319c and 

www.cnr.cn/junshi/ztl/lh/dbwyxs/201003/t20100311_506141767.html on 13 May 2012. 

273 Information accessed at http://bbs.ahys.gov.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=435815 on 13 May 2012. Li 

Xiaomin and Tang Xiangdong, “GLD Goes All Out To Support Disaster Relief Work in Zhouqu,” PLA Daily 

Online in English. PLA General Logistics Department Military Services Station on Qinghai-Tibet Highway Assists 

Public Security Police, Armed Police Forces in Maintaining Social Stability, Harmony in Local Areas 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/2010cmfm/2010-08/13/content_4281348.htm and 

http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jsfz/2011-12/21/content_4747146.htm on 15 May 2012. 

274 Information accessed at www.cgw.cn and “The General Logistics Department, an expert mission to Wuhan rear 

base for the intelligence services,” on 13 May 2012 at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2009-

06/09/content_1792344.htm, and www.wwgc.cc/luntan/viewthread.php?tid=80838&page=4 on 13 May 2012. “PLA 

General Logistics Department’s Wuhan Rear Base Organizes 100-Odd Principal Military Commanding Officers for 

Centralized Military Training Conducted in Line With Updated Military Training Outline,” PLA Daily Online in 

English. Fan Juwei, Li Yong, and Kuang Xiaowen, “Rear Base of GLD Provides Massive Support of Disaster Relief 

Materials,” accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2009-05/28/content_1778894.htm on 13 May 2012. 

“GLD Certain Vehicle Depot Takes Measures to Improve Personnel Quality (ᙫਾḀ⊭䖖ԃᓃཊ᧚ᒦѮᨀ儈Ӫઈ

ユアン䍘),”accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2007-06/15/content_847179.htm on 13 May 2012. “PLA 

General Logistics Department Wuhan Rear Base Arms Depot Senior Engineer Chen Yongxiang Profiled, Praised for 

Dedication, Professionalism,” 15 June 2007, accessed 13 May 2012 at tp.chinamil.com.cn. “General Logistics 

Department Base Holds Strategic Support Exercise,” PLA Daily, 7 October 2006. 275 Hu Junhua ( 㜑ੋॾ ) “The General Logistics Department Wuhan Rear Base Headquarters Strengthen 

Informatization” (ᙫਾ↖≹ਾᯩสൠਨԔ䜘࣐ᕪؑ᚟ॆᔪ䇮㓚ᇎ), Xinhua (ᯠॾ), 8 December 2004, last 

Accessed 17 November 2012 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2004-12/08/content_2307707.htm. 

276 Information accessed at www.wwgc.cc/luntan/viewthread.php?tid=80838&page=4 on 13 May 2012. 
217 

PLA units and civilian companies stationed in Tibet.277 Units associated with the base are 

assigned the MUCDs which fall between 62201 and 62271.278 

The Nenjiang Base (ᄙ⊏สൠ) in Heilongjiang Province and the Chenhu Base (⊹(19)สൠ) in 

Hubei Province were major GLD agricultural enterprises dating back to the 1960s. Both bases 

were turned over to local government control in 2001. Many of the assets of these bases included 

facilities, buildings, and utility vehicles were sold or turned over to enterprises in the surrounding 

areas. As of 2012 the bases still serve as state grain reserves managed by the provincial 

governments. 279

In addition to the national-level logistics bases, each service also maintains their own rear bases 

that are responsible for strategic stockpiles of materiel.280

 

277 “Military News.” CCTV-7 Military News video, Notes from CCTV-7 Military News (CCTV-7 ߋһ ߌъ), 24 

December 2009. PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 1 April 2009, p.4. 278 Information accessed at www.gem.gov.cn/News/Show.asp?id=2113, website of the Golmud City Office, 

2007/8/31 and www.kunluncao.com/dx/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=3757 on 13 May 2012 

279 Information accessed at www.tianmen.gov.cn/root10/xzbcq/0128/200904/t20090421_25297.html, website of the 

Tianmen Peoples Government, and 

www.nmstatefarm.org/html/2012_02_03/465083_465255_2012_02_03_503262.html, website of Inner Mongolia 

agricultural and livestock Department Farm Bureau on 13 May 2012. “Zhang, chairman of his party at the north 

branch of the stored grain the Nenjiang base for visits to discuss the project, accessed at 

http:61.136.252.199/html/tmkk/dsj.htm and http://heihe.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gaikuang/200601010365516.html 

on 13 May 2012. 

280 Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Logistics Department Headquarters, Science of Strategic Logistics, p. 

152. 
218 

Appendix 1: GLD Organization Charts 

Figure 1: GLD Organization from October 1992 – October 1998 

 

ᙫਾऔ䜘

(ਨԔ䜘) 

(᭯⋫䜘)

(䍒࣑䜘) 

 (䴰䜘ߋ)

(ছ⭏䜘) 

 (һӔ䙊䘀䗃䜘ߋ)

(⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

(สᔪ㩕ᡯ䜘) 

(⭏ӗ㇑⨶䜘)

(ᇑ䇑㖢) 
219 

Figure 2: GLD Organization from October 1998 – October 2003 

 

(ᙫਾऔ䜘) 

(ਨԔ䜘) 

(᭯⋫䜘) 

(䍒࣑䜘) 

(䴰䜘ߋ)

(ছ⭏䜘) 

 (һӔ䙊䘀䗃䜘ߋ)

(⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

(สᔪ㩕ᡯ䜘) 

(ᇑ䇑㖢) 
220 

Figure 3: GLD Organization from October 2003 – Present 

(ਨԔ䜘) 

(᭯⋫䜘)

(ᙫਾऔ䜘) 

(䍒࣑䜘) 

(ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

(ছ⭏䜘) 

 (һӔ䙊䘀䗃䜘ߋ)

(ᇑ䇑㖢) 

(สᔪ㩕ᡯ䜘) 
221 

Chapter Seven: General Armament Department 

Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang 

The General Armament Department (GAD/ ᙫ㻵༷䜘 ), also referred to as the General 

Armaments Department and the General Equipment Department (GED), was created in 1998 and 

is the youngest of the four General Departments. The GAD is a Central Military Commission 

(CMC) member–grade organization (ߋငငઈ) and is led by a Director (ѫԫ) who holds the 

same grade and has the rank of general. The GAD also has a political commissar (᭯င), who 

serves as the secretary of the Party Committee and is a military region (MR) leader-grade (↓བྷ

ߋ४㙼) officer who holds the rank of lieutenant general or general. In addition, the GAD has 

averaged three to five deputy directors and one deputy political commissar, who, like the 

political commissar, have the grade of military region leader and the rank of lieutenant general or 

general. To date, no PLA Navy, Air Force, or Second Artillery officer has served as a deputy. 

The GAD is responsible for the PLA’s weapons and equipment research, development, 

acquisition, and maintenance. It determines, formulates, supervises, and implements the policies, 

laws and regulations regarding weapons and equipment for the entire military. The GAD is also 

responsible for weapons and equipment budgeting, including oversight and auditing. In 

conducting these tasks, the GAD operates China’s test, evaluation, and training bases as well as a 

network of military representative bureaus and offices. Finally, the GAD guides the direction of 

PLA modernization through its Science and Technology Committee.1 

The GAD was formed in April 1998 from elements of the General Staff Department (GSD), the 

General Logistics Department (GLD), and the now defunct Commission for Science, 

Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND/ഭ䱢、ᆖᢰδᐕъငઈ/、ᐕင) in 

an effort to establish more military control over weapons and equipment development and 

procurement. This reform resulted in a downgraded COSTIND and placed responsibility for 

procurement in the hands of the GAD. The previous procurement bureaucracy made up of 

COSTIND and the GLD had been characterized by competing interests. COSTIND, for example, 

was widely seen as representing the defense industry’s interests over the military’s interests. The 

new structure sought to correct this deficiency by centralizing control and decision-making in the 

hands of the newly formed GAD and relegated COSTIND to the diminished, but still important, 

role of managing the defense industry. 

The GAD-COSTIND relationship was further reformed in 2008 at the expense of COSTIND. 

While it appears that GAD did not directly benefit from this latest reform, COSTIND was 

downgraded to the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense (SASTIND/ഭᇦഭ䱢、ᢰᐕъተ), a ju-level organization. The new SASTIND reports 

to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT/ᐕъ઼ؑ᚟ॆ䜘), which was 

also created in 2008, and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the defense industry, 

civil-military integration, and serving as the work office for the State Council/Central Military 

 

1

 Fu Quanyou, ed., The Chinese Military Encyclopedia: Supplemental (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ: ໎㺕), Beijing: Military 

Science Press, 2002, p. 658. 
222 

Commission Special Commission, an organization made up of top leaders from the military, 

government, and the defense industry. 

This latest reform, while also aimed at consolidating military control over weapons and 

equipment development and procurement, appears to have had no effect on the organizational 

structure of the GAD. In fact, the only organizations identified as being established after 2000 

are those associated with human spaceflight. Moreover, the GAD’s increased authority does not 

appear to have translated into an increased role in weapons and equipment research, 

development, and acquisition (RDA) within the military itself. Indeed, the GAD still appears to 

be mainly involved in ground force, nuclear, and space technology development and 

informationization and is not the primary organization for Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery 

Force RDA. Weapons and equipment RDA for these organizations is managed through their 

respective equipment departments, but appears to be overseen by the GAD. 

The GAD’s responsibility for ground force RDA is exercised through its Ground Force 

Armament Scientific Research and Procurement Department (䱶ߋ㻵༷、⹄䇒䍝䜘). The GAD 

appears to exercise this responsibility through a system of military representative bureaus and 

offices. Military representative bureaus manage a network of military representative offices 

stationed in factories and research institutes that oversee research, development, and 

manufacturing of weapons and equipment, participate in the bidding selection process, sign 

contracts, ensures contractual compliance, facilitate payments, and conduct their own research on 

equipment and maintenance equipment. Military representatives also implement quality control 

measures during the entire RDA process, inspect and accept completed systems and platforms, 

and adjust prices for old equipment. In wartime, military representatives oversee the resumption 

or expansion of military production lines.2

 This system is quite extensive with over 100 different 

military representative bureaus and offices that are organized into the following seven categories: 

x Large geographic areas 

x Municipalities and districts 

x Provinces and autonomous regions 

x Cities and districts 

x Research Institutes 

x Factories 

x Defense industry companies and corporations 

It should be noted that the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery maintain their own military 

representative structure. 

The GAD is also responsible for nearly all of China’s space program. It is responsible for all 

satellite and launch vehicle RDA, with the exception of China’s lunar exploration program, 

which is managed by the China National Space Administration. Even China’s human spaceflight 

program is managed by the GAD under the auspices of the China Manned Space Engineering 

Office. In fact, China’s commitment to human spaceflight is represented by its growing 

 

2

 Zhang Fuxing, ed., China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment (ѝഭߋһ

Ⲯ、ޘҖ(ᅮҼ⡸)˖ߋһ㻵༷ᙫ䇪), Beijing: Encyclopedia Press, 2008, p. 402. 
223 

organizational support of the program. The GAD established the Basic Aerospace Medicine and 

Applications State Key Laboratory (㡚ཙ५ᆖส⹰оᓄ⭘ഭᇦ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) in 2009 and the 

Human Factors Key Laboratory (Ӫഐᐕ〻䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) in 2011 to support the human 

spaceflight program. Moreover, with the downgrade of COSTIND to SASTIND, the China 

Manned Space Engineering Office has taken over some international cooperation activities for 

human spaceflight and regularly represents China at international human spaceflight events. 

The GAD also runs China’s three launch centers at Jiuquan, Xichang, and Taiyuan, its control 

centers at Xi’an and Beijing, and a network of tracking, telemetry, and control stations based in 

China and around the world as well as three operational tracking ships. The GAD is also building 

a new launch center in Wenchang, Hainan. This launch center will be used to launch human 

spaceflight missions and communication satellites. The Wenchang Launch Center has two 

advantages over the other launch centers. Its location on the coast means that China can launch 

rockets over the ocean, reducing the chance that debris from launches or errant rockets will not 

harm the population or property. The location of the launch center closer to the equator also 

means that rockets can use less fuel or launch heavier payloads into orbit than launches from the 

other launch sites. 

Similarly, the GAD maintains China’s nuclear weapons R&D infrastructure. This includes the 

China Nuclear Test Base at Lop Nor (aka 21st Experimental and Training Base, 63650 Unit/ѝഭ

Ṩ䈅傼สൠ, ᅮ 21 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ, 63650 䜘䱏), the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology 

(㾯ेṨᢰδ⹄ウᡰ), and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP/ѝഭᐕ〻⢙⨶⹄

ウ䲒).

The GAD also appears to take a lead in promoting “informatization” within the PLA. The

Electronic and Information Infrastructure Department ˄⭥ᆀؑ᚟ส⹰䜘˅ manages all 

electronic and information technologies in the armed forces, including “electronic, 

counterelectronic, and information warfare for the Fourth Department of the GSD and other 

services of the PLA.”3

While responsibility for Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery weapons and equipment 

development still mainly resides with the services, the GAD is not completely divorced from 

their RDA activities. The GAD maintains the Services and Branches Armament Department (ߋ

ޥ⿽㻵༷䜘), a corps leader-grade organization responsible for coordinating weapons and 

equipment design, development, and procurement with Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery

Force equipment departments, which are also corps leader-grade organizations. Meanwhile, the 

GAD’s second-level Ground Force Armament Scientific Research and Procurement Department, 

a corps leader-grade organization, is responsible for ground force equipment. The GAD also has 

a role in joint weapons and equipment RDA through the General-Use Equipment Support 

Department (䙊⭘㻵༷؍䳌䜘), which is also a corps leader-grade organization. This department 

oversees the development of non-weapon systems-type equipment used by all three services and 

the Second Artillery Force, including ammunition, vehicles, and radar. 

 

3

 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 

University of California Press, p.146. 
224 

The GAD also maintains three weapons tests centers that serve all services and the Second 

Artillery Force. These include the China Huayin Weapons Test Center (ѝഭॾ䱤ޥಘ䈅傼ѝ

ᗳ), the China Baicheng Weapons Test Center (ѝഭⲭ෾ޥಘ䈅傼ѝᗳ), and the China 

Luoyang Electronic Equipment Testing Center (ѝഭ⍋䱣⭥ᆀ㻵༷䈅傼ѝᗳ) of which the first 

two are corps leader-grade and the last is a division leader-grade organization. 

One of the most important GAD organizations is the Science and Technology (S&T) Committee

(、ᆖᢰδငઈՊ). The S&T Commission is described as the “leading technical and intellectual 

brain trust” for defense S&T and serves as a nexus between military units, the CMC, and the 

defense industry.4

 The S&T Committee determines strategies for developing defense-related 

science and technology and advises the PLA leadership on weapons and equipment selection, 

military modernization, arms control, and nonproliferation. 5 In this capacity, the S&T 

Commission has direct access to the CMC.6 

The Committee is a unique organization within the PLA’s grade structure. It is a military region 

leader-grade (↓བྷߋ४㙼) organization whose director is a GAD deputy director. Normally, 

however, GAD deputy directors have the grade of MR deputy leader.7 As such, the committee is 

bureaucratically superior to other organizations within the GAD. 

The S&T Committee is staffed by up to 1,000 personnel made up of nine senior advisors, nonpermanent members, and numerous senior advisors and expert groups. The S&T Committee 

appears to mostly exercise influence over the RDA process through its system of expert 

committees. Research done for this report identified 51 expert committees covering a range of 

weapons and technology from internal medicine to satellites and from ships to tanks. These 

expert committees bring together personnel from industry, research organizations, and the 

military to identify technologies required by the military and appear to be an important conduit 

for industry to influence weapons and equipment procurement.8 Their role in determining the 

feasibility of weapons and equipment for all services and GAD’s direct channel to the CMC give 

them an essential role in deciding technology development for the entire PLA. 

Leadership 

GAD has had five directors since its inception in 1998. The majority (three of the five: Zhang 

Youxia, Chang Wanquan, and Chen Bingde) have been MR commanders. So far, the first four 

directors have moved on to other positions within the CMC after their tours as GAD director. For 

example, Cao Gangchuan and Chang Wanchuan, the first and fourth GAD directors, respectively, 

 

4

 Tai Ming Cheung, Eric Hagt, Susan Puska, Debra Geary, and Joe McReynolds, “Evolving Push-Pull Relationship 

Between the Research, Development, and Acquisition Communities,” paper presented at 

Second Annual Conference on China’s Defense and Dual-Use Science, Technology, and Industrial Base, June 30 – 

July 1, 2011, p. 16. 

5 Zhang, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment , p. 398 and 

http://news.fznews.com.cn/jszx/2006-8-23/2006823ke8re+kyba103427_2.shtml on 16 October 2012. 6

 Lu Xicheng, “GAD S&T Committee Director Lu Xicheng: National Defense S&T Battleline Brilliant Model (ᙫ㻵

༷䜘、ᢰင࢟ѫԫ঒䭑෾: ഭ䱢、ᢰᡈ㓯Ⲵݹ䖹ި㤳),” Xinhua, 11 November 2011. 7

 http://iask.sina.com.cn/b/6440208.html 

8 Cheung, et al, “Evolving Push-Pull Relationship Between the Research, Development, and Acquisition 

Communities,” p. 17. 
225 

moved on to become the Minister of Defense; Li Jinai became the director of the General 

Political Department after just two years as the GAD director; and Cheng Bingde, the third GAD 

director, became Chief of General Staff after his GAD tour ended in 2007. 

Short biographies are provided below for each of the GAD directors. 

Zhang Youxia (ᕐ৸א (

October 2012 to Present 

Zhang Youxia is the current Director of the General Armament Department. Zhang was born in 

July 1950 and joined the PLA in 1968. Zhang subsequently spent over 35 years in the Chengdu 

MR.9 He became one of the Deputy Commanders of the Beijing MR in December 2005. In 2007, 

he was promoted to Commander of the Shenyang MR. In September 2007, he became a member 

of the 17th CPC Central Committee. He was also promoted to the rank of General in July 2011. 

Recently at the 18th Party Congress, Zhang set his priorities as GAD Director on accelerating 

indigenous research and development of high-tech weapons and equipment.10 

Chang Wanquan (ᑨзޘ (

September 2007 to October 2012 

Chang Wanquan was born in 1949 and joined the PLA in March 1968 and the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) in November 1968. Between January 2002 and 2003, he was the Chief 

of Staff of the Lanzhou MR. Between 2003 and 2004, Chang was Chief of Staff of the Beijing 

MR. From December 2004 to September 2007, he was the commander of the Shenyang MR, 

where he was reportedly lauded in his efforts to secure the Chinese border with North Korea. In 

October 2012, Zhang Youxia replaced him as the director and Chang moved up to the number 

one position in protocol order as a CMC member, while he waits to replace General Liang 

Guanglie as the next Minister of Defense at the 12th National People’s Congress in March 

2013.11

Chen Bingde (䱸⛣ᗧ) 

September 2004 to September 2007 

Born in July 1941, Chen Bingde joined the PLA in 1961 and the CCP in 1962, and reached the 

rank of General in 2002.12 He was a CMC Member from 2004 until he retired in October 2012. 

He held leadership positions within the Nanjing MR from 1993 to 1999. He then became 

Commander of the Jinan MR from 1999 to 2004. Unlike his predecessors, Chen’s background 

largely drew from operational experiences, which may have been the next consideration for the 

 

9

 Mandip Singh, “The Likely Composition of the Central Military Commission of the 18th Party Congress of China,” 

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 31, 2012, accessed November 12, 2012, 

www.idsa.in/issuebrief/TheLikelyCompositionoftheCentralMilitaryCommissionofthe18thPartyCongressofChina_M

andipSingh_301012. 

10 “New Top Defense Officers Chorus Loyalty, Military Modernization,” Xinhua, November 11, 2012, accessed 

November 12, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/11/c_131966432.htm. 11 Chang Wanquan, “Chang Wanquan: Reviewing Three Years’ Participation in China’s Northeastern Frontier 

Defense (ᑨзޘ˖എ⵨৲оьे䗩䱢ᔪ䇮Ⲵйᒤ),” Liberation Army Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), January 7, 2009, 

accessed November 12, 2012, www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2009-01/07/content_1610385.htm. 12 Information accessed at www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Bingde/career on 12 November 2012. 
226 

military leadership after technical and political consolidation of GAD from its previous two 

directors. 

Li Jinai (ᵾ㔗㙀) 

November 2002 to September 2004 

Li Jinai was born in July 1942, and he joined the PLA in December 1967. He was promoted to 

the rank of General in 2000. Li became involved in the GAD in 1998, when it was established, 

and served as political commissar until 2002, when he became its Director. After his tenure at 

GAD, he served as Director of the GPD until he retired in October 2012.13 

Cao Gangchuan (ᴩࡊᐍ˅

April 1998 to November 2002 

Cao Gangchuan was born in December 1935 and joined the PLA and CCP in 1954 and 1956, 

respectively. Prior to his role as GAD Director, Cao was the minister of COSTIND. He spent an 

extensive part of his career in the GSD (from 1975 to 1996) and also worked in the GLD (from 

1963 to 1975).14 Before becoming GAD Director, Cao spent all of his career as a weapons and 

equipment officer and not in combat units.15 

Cao served as the first Director of GAD in April 1998. That year, he was also promoted to 

General. His priorities were primarily involved with bureaucratic restructuring after the 

dissolution of COSTIND and the reorganization of SASTIND under MIIT. He was also 

responsible for the acquisition of sub-organizations that were previously under the GLD and 

GSD.16 Among other priorities, Cao was also heavily focused on technical training.17 His posting 

as the Deputy Director of the GSD’s Military Equipment Department from 1982-1989 and his 

appointment as the Director of the Office of Military Trade under the Central Military 

Commission required him to travel extensively to Europe and Russia to negotiate weapons 

purchases and it is this experience which may have made him ideally qualified as the first GAD 

Director.18 After his position as Director of GAD, Cao became Minister of Defense between 

2003 and 2008, at which time he retired 

GAD’s Second-level Organizational Structure 

GAD’s second-level organizational structure is made up of ten departments, the S&T Committee, 

and a number of directly subordinate organizations, including organizations responsible for 

China’s space program, nuclear weapons program, test bases, research organizations, and 

schools and academies. The ten departments cover all aspects of GAD’s work, including political 

affairs, administration, and functional departments responsible for the R&D of general-use 

equipment as well as service specific technologies. All departments are corps deputy-leader 

grade organizations, except for the GAD S&T Committee, currently headed by Li Andong, who 

is an MR-leader grade officer. 

 

13 Information accessed at www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Jinai/career on 12 November 2012. 

14 Information accessed at www.chinavitae.com/biography/Cao_Gangchuan/career on 12 November 2012. 

15 James Mulvenon, “Cao Gangchuan: A Political Biography,” China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2002. 16 Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” p. 305. 

17 Ibid, p. 282-283. 

18 Mulvenon, “Cao Gangchuan: A Political Biography.” 
227 

Figure 1: GAD Organizational Structure 
228 

Headquarters Department 

The Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘) manages all administrative affairs within the GAD.1

 It is 

composed of 11 organizations, including the General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), Secretariat (〈Җተ), 

Management Bureau (㇑⨶ተ), Aerospace Bureau (㡚ཙተ), Combat Testing Bureau (֌ᡈᇎ傼

ተ alternatively ֌䈅 or ֌ᡈ䈅傼ተ), Communications Bureau (䙊ؑተ)

,2 Telemetry and 

Control Bureau (⍻᧗ተ), Confidential Bureau (χ㾱ተ), Military Training Bureau (ߋ䇝ተ), 

Meteorological Division (≄䊑༴), and Engineering Bureau (ᐕ〻ተ).3 Little information is 

available for most of these organizations. 

The Aerospace Bureau is involved in Shenzhou spacecraft launches, Chang’e lunar probes, and 

manned spaceflight/space station missions.4 The bureau is also involved in international space 

cooperation efforts.5 The Telemetry and Control Bureau most likely is involved in managing 

China’s telemetry, tracking and control (TT&C) network. The bureau is involved in China’s 

aerospace activities, including spacecraft, satellites, lunar probes, manned spaceflight, and space 

station missions.6 It works with other GAD departments, SASTIND, and Beijing Aerospace 

Control Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences among other similar units.7 

The Military Training Bureau, on the other hand, is involved in education initiatives that promote 

national policies and regulation. 8 It is also involved in the establishment of schools and 

educational institutions, such as the Materials Electronic Theory Research Laboratory and 

Materials Interface Laboratory.9 Finally, the Meteorological Office provides weather forecasting 

for China’s space launches.10 

Science and Technology Committee 

The Science and Technology Committee (、ᆖᢰδငઈՊ) is responsible for guiding 

weaponry and defense science and technology development and assisting in developing 

strategies for weapons and equipment development. The Committee is assigned the grade of MR 

leader.11 

The S&T Committee is led by nine senior advisors, non-permanent members, and numerous 

senior advisors. The Committee is made up of at least 51 expert groups which advise the CMC 

on a range of defense-related science and technology issues.12 These expert groups include: 

 

1

 www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gad.asp 

2

 www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-WXDT200306005.htm 

3

 http://wenku.baidu.com/view/60b7d702b52acfc789ebc976.html 

4

 www.siat.ac.cn/xwzx/zkyxw/200809/t20080927_2094599.html 

5

 www.people.com.cn/h/2011/1118/c25408-1-4250625704.html and www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472 

/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/13467364.html (cached copy) accessed 25 March 2012. 6

 www.hebstd.gov.cn/content/2012-03/26/content_57726.htm 

7

 www.hebstd.gov.cn/content/2012-03/26/content_57726.htm; www.sti.gov.cn/qth/info.php?infos_id=280 

8

 http://news.cufe.edu.cn/zckx/2748.htm; www.qikancn.com/qikan/shehui/qitajiaoyu/685.html 9

 http://youth.hdpu.edu.cn/weekly/show.aspx?id=5560 

10 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2003-11-22/165159.html 

11 http://iask.sina.com.cn/b/6440208.html 

12 Cheung, et al, “Evolving Push-Pull Relationship Between the Research, Development, and Acquisition 

Communities,” p. 17. 
229 

x Advanced Manufacturing Technology(ݸ䘋ࡦ䙐ᢰδуъ㓴)

13

x Advanced Materials (ݸ䘋ᶀᯉуъ㓴)

14

x Aircraft (伎χуъ㓴)

15

x Air Propulsion (オ≄࣋ࣘᆖуъ㓴)

16

x Aircraft Systems (χ䖭パーセント㔏уъ㓴)

17

x Armored Vehicle Technology (㻵⭢䖖䖶ᢰδуъ㓴)

18

x Chinese Medicine (ѝ५уъ㓴)

19

x Comprehensive Electronic Circuit Lines (㔬ਸ⭥ᆀ㓯䐟уъ㓴)

20

x Comprehensive Electronic Warfare (㔬ਸ⭥ᆀᡈуъ㓴)

21

x Computer and Software Technology (䇑㇇χ৺䖟Ԧᢰδуъ㓴)

22

x Conventional Propulsion (ᑨ㿴࣋ࣘᢰδуъ)

23

x Detonator Technology (ᕅؑᢰδуъ㓴)

24 

x Detonator and Initiators (ᕅؑ⚛ᐕ૱уъ㓴)

25

x Electro-optical Technology (ݹ⭥ᆀуъ㓴)

26

x Electromagnetic Compatibility and Defense Technology (⻱ެᇩ৺䱢ᣔᢰδуъ㓴)

27

x Electronic Information Systems (⭥ᆀؑ᚟パーセント㔏уъ㓴)

28

x Electronic Warfare Technology (⭥ᆀሩᣇᢰδуъ㓴)

29

x Equipment Maintenance Engineering (㻵༷㔤؞ᐕ〻ᢰδу)

30

x Explosives (⚛⛨㦟уъ㓴) 

x Firearms, Artillery, and Missiles (ᷚ⛞ᕩ㇝уъ㓴)

31

x Internal Medicine (޵、уъ㓴)

32

x Inertial Technology (ᜟᙗᢰδуъ㓴)

33

x General-use Sensing Technology (䙊⭘⍻䈅ᢰδуъ)

34

x Ground Force Support Equipment (䱶؍ߋ䳌㻵༷ᢰδуъ㓴)

35

 

13 http://today.hit.edu.cn/articles/2010/01-13/0115434950.htm 

14 http://scbg.jourserv.com/NewsInfo.aspx?id=95 15 www.fyjs.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=220846 

16 http://baike.baidu.com/view/5532456.htm 

17 www.ctrxjh.cn/hotnews/1115862.html 

18 www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%9F%B4%E7%8E%AE%E5%B2%A9 

19 www.306.cn/zjjs/zjjs_show.asp?t_id=628&c_id=83 

20 www.xidian.edu.cn/jyjx/szdw/zhaoguoqing.htm 

21 http://grd.bit.edu.cn/index.asp?modelname=dsqk_nr&recno=392 

22 http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A8%84%E5%8B%A4%E4%BF%AD 

23 www.fyjs.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=220846 

24 http://job.sdu.edu.cn/specialR/50.html 

25 http://yz.chsi.com.cn/sch/schoolInfo--schId-368530,categoryId-487647,mindex-2.dhtml 26 www.cust.edu.cn/web/xxgk/szdw.html 

27 www.mwjournal.org/ch/reader/view_news.aspx?id=2012041141647001 

28 www.syit.edu.cn/xinxi/introduce4.htm 

29 www.hlhl.org.cn/news/findnews/showsub.asp?id=1043 

30 www.weldr.com/article/2008/1021/article_11302.html 31 jxtd.zlgc.org/Upload/20090701151423468.doc 

32 www.jkb.com.cn/document.jsp?docid=137616 

33 www.csit.org.cn/Newsdetail.asp?id=329 34 www.50.sh.cn/v.asp?id=1273 
230 

x Helicopter Technology (ⴤॷχᢰδуъ㓴)

36

x Low Observable Technology (䳀䓛ᢰδуъ㓴)

37

x Military Batteries (ߋ⊏⭥⭘уъ㓴)

38

x Military Computers (ߋ⭘䇑㇇χуъ㓴)

39

x Military Electronic Components and Electrical Power Sources (ߋ⭥⭘ᆀݳಘԦ৺⭥K

уъ㓴)

40

x Military Microelectronics (ߋ⭘ᗞ⭥ᆀуъ㓴)

41

x Military Target Recognition (ߋ⭘ⴞḷ⢩ᙗуъ㓴)

42

x Missile Technology (ሬᕩᙫփᢰδуъ㓴)

43

x Navigation, Positioning, and Control Technologies (ሬ㡚,ᇊսо⍻᧗ᢰδуъ㓴)

44

x NBC Defense Technology (䱢ॆᢰδуъ㓴)

45

x Nuclear Propulsion and Basic Nuclear Technology (Ṩ࣋ࣘоṨᢰδส⹰уъ㓴)

46

x Precision Guidance Technology (マ⺞ࡦሬуᇦ㓴)

47

x Radar Sensing Technology (䴧䗮᧒⍻ᢰδуъ)

48

x Radiation Hardening (ᣇ䗀ሴ࣐പᢰδуъ㓴) 

x Reliability (ਟ䶐ᙗуъ㓴)

49

x Rocket Propulsion and Solid Propulsion (⚛㇝ਁࣘχоപփ᧘䘋ࡲуъ㓴)

50

x Satellite Systems Technology (ছᱏパーセント㔏ᢰδуъ㓴)

51

x Satellite Technology (ছᱏᢰδуъ㓴)

52

x Satellite Payload (ছᱏM᭸䖭㦧уъ㓴)

53

x Ship Technology (㡠㡷ᢰδуъ㓴)

54

x Simulation Technology (ԯⵏᢰδуъ㓴)

55

x Tank and Armored Vehicles (ඖݻ㻵⭢䖖䖶уъ㓴)

56

 35 www.biochip.org.cn/yjjy/14409.shtml 

36 www.allzg.com/html/c644/2009-12/64084.html 

37 www.fyjs.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=220846 

38 www.qic.com.cn/news/exhibit-news-detail_21_0ac7f86b-e245-430f-86f7-37ab52d20125.html 

39 http://gtjuh.tongji.edu.cn/person/intro/new_page_120.htm 

40 www.gzbs.cn/news/guizhou/2012/0401/71170.html 

41 http://news.hfut.edu.cn/html/bgjz/2012/0504/2953.html 

42 www.chinadegrees.cn/xwyyjsjyxx/xw30/jzssn/yxxwhdz/273063.shtml 

43 http://see.xidian.edu.cn/news/200912/20091203105517.htm 

44 http://oc.xjtu.edu.cn/detail.do?method=msfc&article_id=1738 

45 www.cnedu.cn/new/201204/xu2012042609413324104569.shtml 

46www.chinweb.com.cn/cgi-bin/chemport/getfiler.cgi?ID= 

IclXaBpVqeJiILKlcQqhn8renNq1OMrpkjSLRjfg4PLtWZxAm4J6zqwFirOFNS0J&VER=C 

47 www.casic.com.cn/n16/n1250/n10984/n17506/17672.html 48 http://book.douban.com/subject/4279099/ 

49 www.cannews.com.cn/2011/0324/108072.html 

50 http://xyh.nwpu.edu.cn/Q_pinglun.action?Q_info.id=576.0 

51 www.360doc.com/content/12/0320/16/276037_196013057.shtml 

52 http://jwc.cicp.edu.cn/resource/data/071101/U/151/apply/teacher/index.html 53 http://202.127.1.12/HYZJ/ghx.htm 

54 www.cssrc.com.cn/person/xkdt.asp 

55 www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%9F%B4%E7%8E%AE%E5%B2%A9 

56 www.edu.cn/tepin_4798/20080226/t20080226_281656.shtml 
231 

x Waterborne Weapons Technologies (≤ѝޥಘᢰδуъ㓴)

57

x Weapon Fire Control and Electro-optical Technology (ޥಘ⚛᧗оݹ⭥ᓄ⭘ᢰδуъ㓴

)

58

x Weapons and Equipment Human Environment ↖ಘ㻵༷Ӫχ⧟уъ㓴59

x Vehicles (䖖䖶уъ㓴у)

60

x Water Propulsion (≤࣋ࣘᆖуъ㓴)

61

Political Department 

The GAD Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) manages all political affairs of the GAD, including 

cadre personnel, party affairs, security, discipline inspection, propaganda, and civilian-military 

relations. 62 It focuses on leadership education and training, adherence to law, innovation 

cultivation, and cultivating accountability within the organization.63 It is made up of a General 

Office, an Organization Department, a Cadre Department, a Propaganda Department, a Security 

Department, a Liaison Office, and a Party Committee. 64 

Logistics Department 

The Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘˅supports GAD functions by providing supplies, financial, 

and health care services. It is made up of a Headquarters Department, a Political Department, a 

Capital Construction and Barracks Bureau, a Finance Bureau, a Quartermaster, Materials, and 

POL Bureau, a Health Bureau, a Testing Equipment and Materials Procurement Bureau, an 

Equipment Transportation Bureau, and a General Hospital.65

Comprehensive Planning Department 

The Comprehensive Planning Department (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ䜘) is responsible for the planning and 

policymaking for weapons development and procurement. In this regard, it appears to be 

involved in a variety of functions, including procurement, wartime support, and research. This 

department is made up of a General Office, Combat Service Support Bureau, Comprehensive 

Bureau, Equipment Finance Bureau, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Maintenance and Repair Bureau,66

Management and Support Bureau, Project Preliminary Research Bureau, and a Scientific 

Research Bureau. 

The Project Preliminary Research Bureau likely manages the earlier stages of the R&D process 

for military and national defense applications.67 Such tasks can include dictating the focus, depth, 

and breadth of pre-research topics in core technologies during China’s five-year plans. 68

 

57 www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1056/2325.htm 

58 www.cust.edu.cn/web/xxgk/szdw.html 

59 http://yjszs.smmu.edu.cn/professor.aspx?pID=129 

60 www.edu.cn/tepin_4798/20080226/t20080226_281656.shtml 

61 www.cssrc.com.cn/person/xkdt.asp 

62 www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gad.asp 

63 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2009-04/04/content_1714482_10.htm on 25 March 2012. 

64 www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/12/10/20031210001093_gdyl.html, 

www.fjrclh.com/news/show.asp?articleid=5862, http://wuxizazhi.cnki.net/Article/JIJY201108026.html, 

http://roll.sohu.com/20110518/n307909582.shtml 

65 http://wenku.baidu.com/view/60b7d702b52acfc789ebc976.html 

66 http://cp1980cp.blog.163.com/blog/static/55819825200823162134390/ 

67 http://wqxtygc.njust.edu.cn/html/20111210165218.htm 
232 

The Comprehensive Bureau is involved with strategic military planning. Its obligations range 

from Beidou satellite operations to weapons development and procurement to wartime 

mobilization. 69 It works in conjunction with superordinate departments and state owned 

enterprises to plan and secure military-related procurements70 in order to “continue to serve 

China’s national development and security strategies.”71 Other objectives include accelerating 

the development of high-tech weaponry, developing third-generation weapons and equipment for 

national defense.72 The Bureau is also involved in non-war military operations, such as disaster 

relief and international peacekeeping.73

Services and Branches Equipment Department 

The Services and Branches Equipment Department (ޥߋ⿽㻵༷䜘) manages weapons and 

equipment design, development, and procurement for the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery 

Force.74 This department is also said to be responsible for specialized equipment for the armored 

forces, field artillery, army aviation, military engineers, chemical defense troops, signal troops, 

and transportation troops. 75 It was formed from the former Special Arms Department and 

Equipment Departments of GSD and the Ordnance Department and Military Supplies Production 

Department of GLD—all of which were merged into the GAD in 1998.76 Interestingly, the 

department does not have an Air Force Equipment Bureau and instead has an Aviation 

Equipment Bureau, suggesting that this bureau covers all of the PLA’s aviation, including naval 

and ground force aviation. 

The Department is made up of a Comprehensive Bureau, Aviation Equipment Bureau, 77 Navy 

Equipment Bureau, 78 and a Second Artillery Equipment Bureau.79 

Ground Force Armament Scientific Research and Procurement Department 

The Ground Force Equipment Scientific Research and Procurement Department (䱶ߋ㻵༷、⹄

䇒䍝䜘) manages the research, development, and procurement of conventional weapons for 

ground forces. No sources found for this chapter provided a comprehensive overview of this 

department. Besides the existence of a Comprehensive Bureau, its organizational structure 

indicates that the majority of the departments work is carried out through military the GAD’s 

military representative system as well as several procurement bureaus. 

 68 http://wqxtygc.njust.edu.cn/html/20111210165218.htm; http://nust.baike.com/article-99904.html 69 http://news.usqiaobao.com/2009-04/14/content_207256.htm 

70 www.chinatruck.org/2005/10/11008.htm; www.sfic.org.cn/focus/news1_main.jsp?messageID=2592 

71 http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=77615297 

72 http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=77615297 

73 http://news.timedg.com/2011-04/01/content_3309546.htm 

74 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, p.144. 75 Jencks, “The General Armament Department, “ p. 277. 

76 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, p.144. 77 www.zhanhua.gov.cn/Item/881.aspx 

78 http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-05/30/content_8280575.htm 

79 www.casc42.com/tjaq/NewsView.asp?ID=79 
233 

Military Representative Bureau 

The Military Representative Bureau (ߋԓ㺘ተ) manages a network of military representative 

offices stationed in factories and research institutes that oversee research, development, and 

production of weapons and equipment, participate in the bidding selection process, sign contracts, 

insures contractual compliance, facilitate payments, and conduct their own research on 

equipment and maintenance equipment. Military representatives also implement quality control 

measures during the entire R&D process, and inspects and accepts completed systems and 

platforms.

80

Chemical Defense Military Representative Bureau 

The Chemical Defense Military Representative Bureau (䱢ॆߋһԓ㺘ተ) coordinates with 

military and government entities and companies to secure products and to promote nuclear, 

biological, and chemical defense equipment R&D.81 The bureau has been involved in nationallevel security issues, including the 2008 Beijing Olympics security,82 Wenchuan earthquake, and 

SARS outbreak. For example, the bureau was involved in the manufacture of nuclear radiation 

detection equipment in response to the Wenchuan earthquake.83 The bureau also has patents for 

protective materials, such as positive pressure protective hoods and protective medical 

clothing.84

Armored Forces Military Representative Bureau85

The Armored Forces Military Representative Bureau (㻵⭢ߋޥһԓ㺘ተ) works with localand provincial-level government, state-owned enterprises, and civilian companies on the R&D 

and procurement weapons and equipment related to armored vehicles.86

Corps of Engineers Military Representative Bureau 

The Corps of Engineers Military Representative Bureau (ᐕ〻ߋޥһԓ㺘ተ) appears to 

perform both military and civilian tasks. Some of the bureau’s research and products include 

earthquake relief and rescue kits for emergency disaster relief put into use after the 2010 Yushu 

earthquake. 87 The 87 different kinds of equipment include detectors, search, rescue, lifting, 

resuscitation, warning, lighting, and power tools.88 Other equipment developed and produced by 

the bureau include assault boats (ߢ䬻㡏㡧).89

The Engineering and Chemical Defense Bureau 

The Engineering and Chemical Defense Bureau (ᐕॆተ) appears to oversee engineering and 

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense equipment procurement. 

 

80 Encyclopedia, p. 403, www.docin.com/p-107854790.html, and 

www.chinabaike.com/article/baike/1000/2008/200805111456757.html. 

81 www.china-htdl.com/_info/content_465.htm; www.gzrubber.com/cn/list.asp?id=174&temp=news 

82 www.fsfyjs.com/viewnews.asp?id=43 

83 http://wjj.cq.gov.cn/qdgy/jqgy/zbgy/9220.htm 

84 www.bwppe.com/product.php?id=26; www.chinamil.com.cn/item/sars/content/330.htm 

85 www.oestar.com.cn/CasenewsInfo.asp?id=125 

86 www.bj-hightech.com/bencandy.php?fid=2&id=1134 

87 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/zz/2010-04/17/content_4509155.htm 

88 http://news.mod.gov.cn/action/2010-04/17/content_4146532.htm; a patent search has also revealed specific 

technologies the bureau has developed. 

89 http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2008-07/11/content_8527331.htm 
234 

Military Procurement Bureau 

The Military Procurement Bureau (ߋһ䟷䍝ተ) is likely responsible for domestic and foreign 

military procurement.90

Armor Scientific Research and Procurement Bureau 

The Armor Scientific Research and Procurement Bureau (㻵⭢、⹄䇒䍝ተ) is likely responsible 

for the RDA for armored vehicles. 

Vehicle and Vessel Scientific Research and Procurement Bureau 

The Vehicle and Vessel Scientific Research and Procurement Bureau (䖖㡩、⹄䇒䍝ተ) is 

likely responsible for the research and procurement of military vehicles and vessels, though the 

collaborating parties may also be private enterprises.91

General-Use Equipment Support Department 

The General-Use Equipment Support Department (䙊⭘㻵༷؍䳌䜘) manages the life cycle of 

conventional equipment common to all services and branches. General-use equipment can 

include armored, chemical defense, and general purpose vehicles, boats, and C4ISR, electronic 

warfare, surveying and monitoring, and meteorological equipment. 92 It is made up of the 

following organizations: 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

x Ammunition and Missile Bureau (ᕩ㦟ሬᕩተ) 

x Armor Bureau (㻵⭢ተ) 

x Enterprise Labor and Personnel Bureau (ԱъࣣࣘӪһተ) 

x Factory Management Bureau (ᐕল㇑⨶ተ) 

x Ordnance Bureau (ߋỠተ) 

x Vehicle and Vessel Technical Support Bureau (䖖㡩ᢰδ؍䳌ተ) 

x Weapons and Radar Bureau (↖ಘ䴧䗮ተ) 

Electronic and Information Infrastructure Department 

The Electronic and Information Infrastructure Department ˄⭥ᆀؑ᚟ส⹰䜘˅manages RDA 

for electronic and information technologies in the armed forces, including electronic warfare and 

information warfare.”93 The Department has published and edited books on military electronic 

components, missile weapons and spacecraft equipment, and nuclear weapons.94 The Department 

 

90 www.china.com.cn/chinese/junshi/217734.htm 

91 www.zkppw.com/?thread-10089-1.html 

92 “General Purpose Equipment (䙊⭘㻵༷),” in China Military Encyclopedia: A General Introduction to Military 

Equipment (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖ: ߋһ㻵༷ᙫ䇪 p. 146. 93 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, p.146. 94 http://book.douban.com/search/%E6%80%BB%E8%A3%85%E5%A4%87%E9%83%A8%E7%94%B5% 

E5%AD%90%E4%BF%A1%E6%81%AF%E5%9F%BA%E7%A1%80%E9%83%A8%20%E7%BC%96 
235 

is made up of a General Office, Comprehensive Bureau, and an Aviation Bureau95 as well as the 

following organizations: 

Aerospace S&T Equipment Bureau 

The Aerospace S&T Equipment Bureau (㡚ཙ、ᢰ㻵༷ተ) is involved in aerospace science and 

technology equipment with other GAD entities and government ministries.96

Electronic Equipment Bureau 

The Electronic Equipment Bureau (⭥ᆀ㻵༷ተ) is involved in the R&D and procurement 

process of electronic equipment for the military. It coordinates with military and civilian firms 

and research institutes.97

Equipment Technology Cooperation Bureau 

The Equipment Technology Cooperation Bureau (㻵༷ᢰδਸ֌ተ) organizes and holds 

conferences such as the China International Defense Electronics Exhibition (CIDEX), which 

highlights and provides exchanges within the military electronics industry. No other information 

is known about the bureau.98

New Technology Bureau 

The New Technology Bureau (ᯠᢰδተ) is involved in the planning and implementation of 

research and development of new technology, which includes extensive involvement with the 

863 Program.99

Technology Infrastructure Bureau

The Technology Infrastructure Bureau (ᢰδส⹰ተ) is involved in the review and quality 

control of the military’s technical equipment.100 

Standards Research Center 

The Electronic Information Basic Department Standardization Research Center (ḷ߶ॆ⹄ウѝ

ᗳ)is located at the AVIC’s 301 Research Institute along with the National Defense Science and 

Technology Standardization Research Center (ഭ䱢、ᢰᐕъḷ߶ॆѝᗳ).The Center assists 

the GAD in determining guidelines, policies, development strategies, medium and long term 

development plans and regulations. It researches the system of military standards, and proposes 

improvements.101

 

95 http://nust.baike.com/article-99904.html 

96 www.sbsm.gov.cn/article/chdsj/dsjs/200711/20071100012445.shtml?10 

97 www.gatechcorp.com/CompanyNewsDetails.aspx?ID=172; 

www.cecexpo.com.cn/newshow.asp?id=11&newid=128; www.news.uestc.edu.cn/NewsRead.aspx?newsID=12791 98 www.haozhanhui.com/exhreport/exh_report_ehfnj.html; 

http://publish.it168.com/2002/0410/20020410000401.shtml 

99 www.most.gov.cn/kjbgz/201110/t20111018_90339.htm 

100 www.capumit.org.cn/show.aspx?id=1247&classid=17; www.avic.com.cn/xwzx/jtxw/364941.shtml; 

www.gfjl.org/thread-139634-1-1.html 

101 www.hudong.com/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E8%88%AA%E7%A9%BA%E7% 

BB%BC%E5%90%88%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%89%80 
236 

Military Electronic Components Testing Center 

The Military Electronic Components Testing Center (ߋ⭥⭘ᆀݳಘԦỰ⍻ѝᗳ) main 

responsibilities include new product identification and reliability testing of military electronic 

components, national military standard products, and other products; failure analysis of key 

defense project components; and conduct research on the reliability of and applications for 

military electronic components.102 There are five sub-centers: Beijing No. 1 Testing Center, 

Beijing No.2 Testing Center, Beijing No. 3 Testing Center, Guangzhou Testing Center, and 

Detection Technology Research Center. 103 The No. 1 Testing Center conducts electrical 

performance tests, aging tests, mechanical tests, environmental tests, DPA tests, and failure 

analysis and reliability tests. The center also conducts ultrasonic, micro-focus x-ray, scanning 

electron microscopy, and electrostatic sensitivity tests.104

International Cooperation Department 

The International Cooperation Department (ഭ䱵ਸ֌䜘) works with other government entities 

(such as the Ministry of National Defense) and conducts international exchanges with other 

countries. It has a range of responsibilities, including establishing or strengthening bi- and multilateral military exchanges and overseeing national and international military exhibitions.105

Science and Technology Department (、ᆖᢰδ䜘, or 、ᢰ䜘) 

No information is available on the Science and Technology Department (、ᆖᢰδ䜘, or 、ᢰ

䜘). Only one subordinate organization has been identified, the New Technology Bureau (ᯠᢰ

δተ).106

 

102 http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-03/28/content_7874705.htm 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 See: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-05-26/104620349566.shtml; 

http://news.iqilu.com/guoji/20091204/134332.shtml; http://mil.eastday.com/m/20090527/u1a4398712.html; 

http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/115150/11840137.html; 

106 http://wenku.baidu.com/view/60b7d702b52acfc789ebc976.html 
237 

Directly Subordinate Organizations 

Manned Spaceflight Organizations 

China Manned Space Engineering Office 

The China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO/ѝഭ䖭Ӫ㡚ཙᐕ〻ޜ࣎ᇔ) was 

approved on September 21, 1992 and is responsible for planning, overall technology 

development, engineering, facilities, outlays, international cooperation, and promotion of the 

human spaceflight program. CMSEO manages the human spaceflight program through the entire 

process of technology development, astronaut training, and operations. CMSEO has five 

divisions and eight subdivisions that encompass astronautics; spacecraft development and 

operation; launch vehicle development and operation; launch site operations; telemetry, tracking 

and communications; landing; life support systems and space applications. The divisions are:107

Science & Technology Planning Bureau 

The Science & Technology Planning Bureau (、ᢰ䇑ࡂተ) is responsible for programming, 

planning, outlays, development, quality, and flight mission management.

Infrastructure Construction Bureau 

The Infrastructure Construction Bureau (ᐕ〻ᔪ䇮ተ) is responsible for supporting construction 

of facilities related to the human spaceflight program 

Overall System Design Bureau 

Overall System Design Bureau (ᙫփᢰδተ) is responsible for overall blue print design and 

overall technology coordination.

International Cooperation Bureau 

International Cooperation Bureau (ഭ䱵ਸ֌ተ) is responsible for international cooperation and 

communication. 

Information and Publicity Bureau 

Information and Publicity Bureau (ᯠ䰫ᇓՐተ) is responsible for media relations. 

Other Units 

CMSEO is also made up of a Communications Support Department (䙊ؑ؍䳌䜘),108 a survey 

station (⍻䟿ㄉ) in Sichuan Province,109 and an unidentified Base in Henan that has worked on 

large-scale radar simulation training systems.110

 

107 www.cmse.gov.cn/AboutUs/list.php?catid=9 108 Yang Fengbing, Zhao Peng, and Zhang Pengfei, “Build a New Armored Armament Management System Under 

Informatized Conditions (ʃᔪؑ᚟ॆᶑԦл㻵⭢㻵༷㇑⨶ᯠփパーセント),” War Friend News (ᡈ৻ᣕ), 4 November 

2008. 

109 China Defense Industry News (ѝഭߋᐕᣕ), 2 January 2011, p. 4. 110 Hu Baojie and Wang Peng, “Unidentified Station in Henan Explores Equipment Management Mode and Raises 

Support Capability (傫䊛Ḁㄉ᧒リラ㻵༷㇑⨶⁑ᔿᨀॷ؍䳌㜭࣋(, “China Defense Industry News (ѝഭߋᐕᣕ), 

16 August 2011, p. 2. 
238 

China Astronaut Scientific Research and Training Center 

The China Astronaut Scientific Research and Training Center (ѝഭ㡚ཙઈ、⹄䇝㓳ѝᗳ aka

ѝഭ㡚ཙઈѝᗳ) is located at “Beijing Space City” in northwest Beijing. The Center is the 

former Astronautic Medicine and Program Research Institute (ᆷᇉ५ᆖ৺ᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ). It is 

responsible for the selection of astronauts, their training, the selection of astronauts for particular 

missions, and for ensuring the safety and health of China’s astronauts through research. The 

Center is the third astronaut training center to be established behind Russia’s Gagarin Cosmonaut 

Training Centre and the U.S. Johnson Space Center. 

The Center is involved in a numerous studies to advance human spaceflight, including research 

on spacesuit technology, life support systems, space medicine, space nutrition, and the 

ergonomic design of China’s manned spacecraft. The Center also has Asia’s largest pool to 

simulate weightlessness and has a spacesuit test chamber to train astronauts in the depressurized 

environment of space. 

The Center is also focusing on human habitation on the moon. This includes research on lunar 

space suit technology, controlled ecological life support technology, key technology research; 

radiation biology, the physical and psychological effects of lunar gravity, moon farm 

technology.111

Aerospace Medical Engineering Research Institute112 

The Aerospace Medical Engineering Research Institute (㡚ཙ५ᆖᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ) was established 

in April 1968 and combines research on humans, machines, and the environment to safeguard 

astronaut safety, health, and effectiveness. The research institute participates in astronaut 

selection and training, medical checkups and maintenance of health, and space capsule 

environmental control and life support systems, spacesuits, and space food. It has 15 laboratories 

and one test workshop.113

The Basic Space Medicine and Applications State Key Laboratory 

The Basic Space Medicine and Applications State Key Laboratory (㡚ཙ५ᆖส⹰оᓄ⭘ഭᇦ

䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) was founded on December 1, 2009 to advance China’s human space flight program. 

The laboratory researches space medicine, the space environment, physiology, and space health. 

This includes the temperature environment, vibration environment, sonic environment, and 

radiation environment. The research is also done on microgravity, g forces, space sickness, and 

space psychology. The key laboratory has 10 chief scientists, a 5,000 square meter research 

facility, and 40 million yuan in facilities and equipment.114

 

111 Pan Feng, Fan Qin, and Xiao Zhijun, “An Account of China’s “Astronaut Scientific Research and training Center” 

Innovation and Development ( ѝ ഭ ” 㡚ཙઈ、⹄䇝㓳ѝᗳ ” ࡋᯠਁኅ㓚ᇎ ( 㓴 മ )),” accessed at 

http://sci.ce.cn/yzdq/ht/htxw/201003/11/t20100311_21099765.shtml on 12 February 2012. 

112

www.iweeeb.com/w/%E8%88%AA%E5%A4%A9%E5%8C%BB%E5%AD%A6%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B%E

7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%89%80 

113 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 114 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/4796340.htm and 

www.cmse.gov.cn/news/show.php?itemid=470 on 21 February 2012. 
239 

Human Factors Key Laboratory 

The Human Factors Key Laboratory (Ӫഐᐕ〻䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) laboratory was established in 

March 2011 and is dedicated to research on how the use of machines and the design of 

environmental systems affect a person’s physiology and psychology in order to improve safety, 

health, and efficiency. This laboratory is aimed at improving human space flight.115

Launch Facilities 

Figure 2: China’s Launch Centers 

Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (20th Testing and Training Base, 63600 Unit) 

The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (JSLC/ѝഭ䞂⋹ছᱏਁሴѝᗳ), also known as the 20th

Training Base (ᅮ 20 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ/ 63600 䜘䱏) is China’s oldest and largest launch center 

and conducts launches of spacecraft into low, medium, and high inclination orbits. Although the 

launch center is named after the city of Jiuquan in Gansu Province, it is actually located 210 

kilometers from Jiuquan in Inner Mongolia. It is the only launch center that conducts human 

space flight launches. Construction on the launch center was begun in 1958 and encompasses 

2,800 square kilometers.116 

 

115 Zhao Zhuqing, “Our Space Program Established Two Key Laboratories to Solve Difficult Problems of Flight (ᡁ

㡚ཙєབྷ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔᡀ・ ⹤䀓伎㹼࣋ࣘ䳮仈), People’s Daily, 30 March 2011. 116 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012 and 

www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchSite/JSLC.html. 
240 

The launch center is composed of a northern launch pad and a southern launch pad. The northern 

launch pad launches Long March 2C and 2D rockets while the southern launch pad launches 

Long March 2E and 2F rockets. In addition to the launch pads, the launch center has a command 

and control center, a rocket fuel storage area, and a tracking station. A technology monitoring 

station has a satellite and launch vehicle assembly station, a solid fuel rocket assembly station, a 

testing laboratory, a computer room, and other support facilities.117 

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (25th Testing and Training Base/63710 Unit) 

The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (ѝഭཚ৏ছᱏਁሴѝᗳ), also known as the 25th

Experiment and Training Base ( ᅮ 25 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ ) is located in Taiyuan, Shanxi. 

Construction on the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center began in 1967. The launch center conducts 

launches of satellites into sun synchronous and low earth orbits, including meteorological, 

remote sensing, and communications satellites. The Center consists of a launch site, a command 

and control center, and a technology testing area. The launch site consists of a single launch pad. 

The technology testing center consists of a satellite and solid and liquid fueled rocket assembly 

facility. The Center is also equipped with optical, radar, and telemetry equipment.118

Xichang Satellite Launch Center (63790 Unit) 

The Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC/ѝഭ㾯᰼ছᱏਁሴѝᗳ), also known as the 27th

Testing and Training Base (ᅮ 27 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ). It is also called “Xichang Satellite City” and 

is located 60 kilometers north of Xichang, Sichuan. Construction on the launch center began in 

1970. This launch center launches of satellites into geosynchronous orbits, including 

communication, broadcast, and meteorological satellites. The launch center is composed of a 

headquarters department, a launch site, a communication station, a command and control center, 

a technology testing station, and three tracking stations. The technology testing station has a 

launch vehicle testing facility, a satellite assembly and testing facility, and a rocket engine 

assembly, testing, and flaw detection. The three tracking stations have optical, radar, and 

telemetry systems that supply TT&C data to the launch center and to Beijing Aerospace Control 

Center and to the Xi’an Satellite Control Center.119

Space Control Centers 

China satellite TT&C network consists of the Xi’an Satellite Control Center, fixed land-based 

TT&C stations, mobile TT&C stations, and space tracking ocean ships. In different combination 

configurations according to the coverage requirements of the tracking telemetry mission, the 

network provides tracking telemetry support for different satellites. 

 

 

117 Zhang, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment, p. 434-436. 118 Ibid, p. 438-439. 119 Ibid, p. 436-438. 
241 

Figure 3: China’s Telemetry, Tracking and Control Network 

Beijing Aerospace Control Center 

The Beijing Aerospace Control Center (ेӜ㡚ཙ伎㹼᧗ࡦѝᗳ) was established in December 

1995. It is responsible for the command, control, analysis, and data processing for China’s 

human spaceflight and lunar exploration projects. Of the 274 personnel, more than 85 percent are 

younger than 30.120

Xi’an Satellite Control Center (26th Experiment and Training Base, 63750 Unit) 

The Xi’an Satellite Control Center (XSCC/ѝഭ㾯ᆹছᱏ⍻᧗ѝᗳ), also known as the 26th

Experiment and Training Base (ᅮ 26 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ 63750 䜘䱏˅is the management 

organization for China’s space TT&C network and is responsible for satellite TT&C, data 

transmission, and information processing for satellites, human space flight missions, and long 

range missiles. Construction on the center began in the 1967.121

China’s satellite TT&C network is equipped with C-band unified control system, S-band unified 

control system, ultra-short wave unified control system, and single pulse precision radar. All the 

main TT&C stations and ships have data processing capabilities. 

A network of satellite communication and wired communication connects XSCC with TT&C 

stations (ships) in supporting data, voice, telegram, and fax communication. 

 

120 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012 and Liao 

Wengen, “Visiting he Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center (䎠䘁ेӜ㡚ཙᤷᥕ᧗ࡦѝᗳ),”Renmin 

Wang, 25 March 2005. 121 Zhang, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment, p. 439-441. 
242 

Between XSCC and land-based TT&C stations, the main means of transmission is via satellites. 

Wired communication serves as a supplementary method. Communications between XSCC and 

surveillance ships and between XSCC and foreign satellite operation centers is accomplished via 

satellites. 

The fixed TT&C stations are Kashi station, Weinan station, Nanning station, Xiamen station, 

Changchun station, Qingdao station, and Minxi station. In addition, TT&C stations at the launch 

sites can also be exploited when necessary. 122

Telemetry Tracking and Control Stations 

The country’s tracking and control-station network includes, but may not be limited to (in 

alphabetical order): 

x Changchun Tracking & Control Station (Changchun, Jilin) 

x Dongfeng Tracking & Control Station (Jiuquan, Gansu) 

x Guiyang Tracking Station (Guiyang, Guizhou) 

x Hetian Tracking & Control Station (Hetian, Xinjiang) 

x Jiamusi Tracking & Control Station (Jiamusi, Heilongjiang) 

x Kashi Tracking & Control Station (Kashi, Xinjiang) 

x Lushan Tracking & Control Station (Jiujiang, Jiangxi) 

x Lvliang Command Post (Lvliang, Shanxi) 

x Minxi Tracking & Control Station (Shaxian, Fujian) 

x Nanhai Tracking & Control Station (Foshan, Guangdong) 

x Nanning Tracking & Control Station (Nanning, Guangxi) 

x Qingdao Tracking & Control Station (Weihai, Shandong) 

x Sanya Tracking Station (Sanya, Hainan) 

x Taiyuan Tracking & Control Station (also known as Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center) 

(Kelan County, Shanxi) 

x Tianshan Tracking & Control Station (Urumuqi, Xinjiang) 

x Weinan Tracking & Control Station (Weinan, Shaanxi) 

x Xiamen Tracking & Control Station (Xiamen, Fujian) 

x Xi’an Satellite Control Center (Xi’an, Shaanxi) 

x Zhanyi Tracking & Control Station (Qujing, Yunnan) 

Sanya Station 

The Sanya tracking station (йӊㄉ)was put into use in April 2008.123 Along with the monitoring 

stations in Kashi and Jiamusi, the three monitoring stations are an important fulcrum in China’s 

land-based TT&C network. This “big triangle” provides a wide geographical advantage and 

vastly increases coverage of the TT&C network. 

 

122 Tang Yixiang, Zhang Fengxiang, Wu Zhizhong, Li Jisheng, and Zhao Gang, National Military Standards: China 

Satellite TT&C Network (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭߋ⭘ḷ߶˖ѝഭছᱏ⍻᧗㖁⭘ᡧᤷই), July 27, 1998. 123 www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-04/25/content_953727.htm 
243 

Kashi Station 

Kashi station (ரӰㄉ) was built in 1968 and is located in the city of Kashi, Xinjiang 

Autonomous Region. It is equipped with S-band unified TT&C system (12m antenna), ultrashortwave unified TT&C system, data processing system, time-frequency facility, VSAT 

satellite communication station and data, voice communication equipment. Kashi station is 

capable of TT&C missions for satellites in low earth orbit and sun-synchronous orbits.124

Weinan Station 

Weinan station˄⑝ইㄉ˅is located in the city of Weinan in Shaanxi Province, it is equipped 

with C-band unified TT&C system, S-band unified TT&C system (10m antenna), limited motion 

antenna C-band unified TT&C system, C-band remote receiving station, single pulse precision 

radar (10m antenna), data processing system, time-frequency equipment, and data, voice 

communication equipment. 

Weinan station can independently accomplish TT&C missions for the entry orbit segment, 

transfer orbit segment, drift orbit segment, fixed point capture, and long term management of the 

satellites in geosynchronous, low earth, and sun synchronous orbits. 

Nanning Station 

Nanning station ˄ইᆱㄉ˅is located in the city of Nanning, Guangxi Autonomous Region. 

Nanning station is capable of performing TT&C missions for satellites in low earth and sunsynchronous orbit. It is equipped with S-band unified TT&C system (12m antenna), single pulse 

precision radar (4.2m antenna), ultra-shortwave unified TT&C system, data processing system, 

time-frequency equipment, VSAT satellite communication station, and data, voice 

communication equipment. 

Xiamen Station 

Xiamen station ˄৖䰘ㄉ˅is located in the city of Xiamen, Fujian Province and is capable of 

TT&C missions for satellites in low earth orbit and sun-synchronous orbits. It is equipped with 

C-band unified TT&C system, S-band unified TT&C system (10m antenna), single-pulse 

precision radar (3.6m antenna), data processing system, time-frequency equipment, VSAT 

satellite communication station, and data, voice communication equipment. 

Xiamen station is mainly charged with carrying out TT&C missions for the entry orbit segment, 

transfer orbit segment, drift orbit segment, fixed point capture, and long term management of 

geosynchronous orbit satellites. 

Changchun Station 

Changchun station ˄䮯᱕ㄉ˅is located in the city of Changchun, Jilin Province and performs 

TT&C missions for satellites in low earth orbit and sun-synchronous orbit satellites. It is 

equipped with ultra-shortwave unified TT&C system, data processing system, time-frequency 

equipment, VSAT satellite communication station, and data, voice communication equipment. 

 

124 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2002-06-16/70882.html 
244 

Qingdao Station 

Qingdao station ˄䶂ዋㄉ˅is located in the city of Qingdao, Shandong Province and performs 

TT&C missions for satellites in low earth orbit and sun-synchronous orbit satellites. It is 

equipped with S-band unified TT&C system (10m antenna), single-pulse precision radar (10m 

antenna), data processing system, time-frequency equipment, VSAT satellite communication 

station, and data, voice communication equipment. 

Minxi Station 

Minxi station(䰭㾯ㄉ˅is located in Shaxian, Fujian Province and performs TT&C missions for 

satellites in low earth and sun-synchronous orbits. It is equipped with ultra-shortwave unified 

TT&C system, data processing system, time-frequency equipment, VSAT satellite 

communication system, and data, and voice communication equipment. 

Dongfeng Station 

Dongfeng station ˄ь仾ㄉ˅is located at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in Gansu 

Province. It is equipped with single-pulse precision radar, S-band unified TT&C system, data 

processing system, time-frequency equipment, and data, voice communication equipment. 

Dongfeng station performs TT&C missions for the motion segment and the return segment of 

low earth orbit satellites. 

Xingxian Station 

Xingxian station ˄ޤ৯ㄉ˅is located in Xingxian, Shanxi Province and performs TT&C 

missions for satellites in low earth and sun-synchronous orbits. It is equipped with single-pulse 

precision radar, data processing system, time-frequency equipment, and data, voice 

communication equipment. 

Yibin Station 

Yibin station (ᇌᇮㄉ˅is located in the city of Yibin, Sichuan Province and performs TT&C 

missions for satellites in low earth orbit. It is equipped with single-pulse precision radar, data 

processing system, time-frequency equipment, and data, voice communication equipment. 

Korla Station 

Korla station (ᓃቄंㄉ˅is located in the city of Korla, Xinjiang Autonomous Region and 

performs TT&C missions for satellites in low earth orbit. It is equipped with single-pulse 

precision radar, data processing system, time-frequency equipment, and data, voice 

communication equipment. 

Mobile TT&C Stations 

Mobile TT&C stations are mounted on vehicles and include the first mobile station, the second 

mobile station, and the landing field station. 

First Mobile Station 

The first mobile station˄ᅮа⍫ࣘㄉ˅ performs TT&C missions for near-earth orbit satellites 

and sun-synchronous orbit satellites. It is equipped with single-pulse precision radar (2.5m 

antenna), ultra-shortwave unified TT&C system, data processing system, time-frequency 

equipment, VSAT satellite communication station, and data and voice communication equipment. 
245 

Second Mobile Station 

The second mobile station˄ᅮҼ⍫ࣘㄉ˅performs TT&C missions for near-earth orbit 

satellites and sun-synchronous orbit satellites. It is equipped with S-band general system (5.5m 

antenna), ultra-shortwave unified TT&C system, data processing system, time-frequency 

equipment, VSAT satellite communication station, and data and voice communication equipment. 

Landing Field Stations 

Landing field stations ˄䘉䱶ㄉ˅are responsible for tracking, positioning, searching, hoisting, 

and transporting re-entry capsules. They can also perform other TT&C missions for near-earth 

orbit satellites and sun-synchronous orbit satellites. The landing field station is equipped with Sband unified TT&C system (5.5m antenna), meteorological measurement radar, directional 

searching equipment, recovery helicopter, data processing system, time-frequency equipment, 

VSAT satellite communication station, and data, voice communication equipment. 

China Maritime Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Department (23rd Experiment and 

Training Base˅

The Maritime Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Department(ѝഭছᱏ⎧к⍻᧗䜘), also known 

as the 23rd Experiment and Training Base (ᅮ 23 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ) was established in 1978 to 

provide sea-based TT&C services for China’s launches. It is located in Jiangyin, Jiangsu 

Province. Currently there are six ships under this department, three of them operational, named 

Yuanwang (䘌ɛ, which are deployed to the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans.125

Tracking Ships 

China has had a total of six tracking ships˄⍻䟿㡩˅: Yuanwang-1, Yuanwang-2, Yuanwang-3, 

Yuanwang-4, Yuanwang-5, and Yuanwang-6. Only three of the six ships are operational today: 

the Yuanwang 3, 5, and 6. Based on mission requirements, these tracking ships may be deployed 

to operate in any waters except for those in the polar zones.126

The Yuanwang program was conceived to support China’s intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) sea tests. The Yuanwang ships also serve as geostationary communications satellite 

tracking, comprehensive tracking capability for space assets, and manned space flights. These 

ships have a tracking range of 400,000km (248,550 miles). 

Between 2011 and 2012, Yuanwang 3, 5, and 6 traveled a total of 120,000 nautical miles and 

539-days at sea to provide space tracking and control support for the docking of the Tiangong-1 

space lab module and Shenzhou-8 spacecraft.127

The Yuanwang 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 has a “C- and S-band monopulse tracking radar, a Cinetheodolite 

laser ranging and tracking system, a velocimetry system, and onboard computers to track and 

 

125 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 126 “A ‘Maritime Science City’ that Can Resist Winds Stronger than Force Twelve --- Secrets of the Yuanwang 5 

Revealed,” Guangzhou Nanfang Dushi Bao, 25 September 2008, OSC ID: CPP20080925705007. 127 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-02/02/c_111482472.htm 
246 

control the spacecraft. They use a combination of inertial, satellite, and stellar for navigation and 

positioning” 128 to ensure missiles, satellites, and spacecraft measurements are correct. 

Communications technologies include “HF, ULF, UHF, and SATCOM, in the form of secured 

telephone, radio, fax and data link.” 129 The ships’ weather forecasting equipment includes a 

“weather radar, weather balloon, and meteorological satellite image receiving terminal.”130 

Yuanwang-1 Tracking Ship 

Yuanwang 1˄䘌ɛаਧ⍻䟿㡩˅completed construction in August 1977, was commissioned in 

1978, and was decommissioned in October 2010. The Yuanwang-1 tracking ship is equipped 

with S-band unified TT&C system (9m antenna), single-pulse precision radar (9m antenna), Cband satellite telemetry reception and demodulation equipment, data processing system, timefrequency equipment, satellite communication station, data, voice communication equipment, 

and ship attitude, ship location tracking equipment. It carried out TT&C missions for 

geosynchronous satellites and other space vehicles. 

Yuanwang-2 Tracking Ship 

Yuanwang-2 ˄䘌ɛҼਧ⍻䟿㡩˅was launched in September 1978 and was decommissioned 

at an unknown time. This tracking ship was equipped with S-band unified TT&C system (9m 

antenna), C-band unified TT&C system (9m antenna), data processing system, time-frequency 

equipment, satellite communication station, data and voice communication equipment, and ship 

attitude, ship location tracking equipment. It carried out TT&C missions for geosynchronous 

satellites and other space vehicles. 

Yuanwang-3 Tracking Ship 

Yuanwang 3 ˄䘌ɛйਧ⍻䟿㡩˅was launched on 26 April 1994 and commissioned on 28 

May 1995. It is equipped with S-band unified TT&C system (12m antenna), single-pulse 

precision radar (9m antenna), data processing system, time-frequency equipment, satellite 

communication station, data and voice communication equipment, and ship attitude, ship 

location tracking equipment. It can carry out TT&C missions for geosynchronous satellites and 

other space vehicles.131

Yuanwang-4 Tracking Ship 

In 1998, an oceanographic survey ship constructed in the 1970s to support China’s ICBM test 

program, Xiangyanghong 10, was converted into a space tracking ship and renamed Yuanwang-4

˄䘌ɛഋਧ⍻䟿㡩˅. Technological modifications included the addition of a “large-scale 

remote monitoring equipment with new frequency bands on the vessel, upgrad[ing] the vessel’s 

communications and computer facilities, and adjust[ing] antennas and equipment on the deck 

 

128 Sinodefence, www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-1_2.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-3.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-5_6.asp 

129 Sinodefence, www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-1_2.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-3.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-5_6.asp 

130 Sinodefence, www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-1_2.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-3.asp; Sinodefence, 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/research_survey/yuanwang-5_6.asp 

131 Tang, Zhang, Wu, Li, and Zhao, National Military Standards: China Satellite TT&C Network. 
247 

through a combination of technical upgrade and replacement to create a more rational layout and 

further improve the vessel’s stability.”132 On 5 August 2007, Yuanwang-4 was damaged in a 

collision with a coal tanker and suffered extensive fire damage. It was decommissioned on 14 

December 2011 after 36 years of service. Yuanwang 4 lacked the ability to control spacecraft 

and only monitors and tracks spacecraft. 

Yuanwang-5 

Yuanwang-5 ˄䘌ɛӄਧ⍻䟿㡩˅was commissioned in September 2007. 

Yuanwang-6 

Yuanwang-6 ˄䘌ɛޝਧ⍻䟿㡩˅was commissioned in April 2008. Its maiden voyage 

occurred in September 2008, when it provided tracking for the Shenzhou-7 mission. 

Test Organizations 

Figure 4: Testing and Training Bases 

China Nuclear Test Base (21st Experimental and Training Base/63650 Unit) 

The China Nuclear Test Base (ѝഭṨ䈅傼สൠ), also known as the 21st Experiment and 

Training Base (ᅮ 21 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ), is located in Lop Nur, Xinjiang Autonomous Region and 

is China’s only nuclear weapons test base. It is also reported that the base could be a major site 

for China’s nuclear weapons stockpile.133 According to a 1999 State Department “Fact Sheet,” 

China initiated a program “to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons” at Lop 

Nur,134 implying that China could be conducting sub-critical nuclear tests at the base.135 

 

132 Su Kuoshan and Xu Dianlong, “Fourth Space Survey Vessel Enters Service,” Xinhua, 18 July 1999. 133 Information accessed at www.nti.org/facilities/710/?s=Lop%20Nor%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Test%20Base 

on 19 September 2012. 

134 U.S. State Department, “CTBT: Regional Issues and U.S. Interests,” 8 October 1999. 
248 

Different sources provide different estimates of the base’s size. According to one Chinese source, 

the base encompasses 470,000 square kilometers.136 One Western report, however, give its size 

as 100,000 square kilometers.137 In addition to nuclear weapons related work, the base is also 

used to conduct directed energy weapons testing.138 

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (29th Testing and Training 

Base/ 63820 Unit˅

China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (ѝഭオ≄࣋ࣘ⹄ウоਁኅѝᗳ), also 

known as the 29th Testing and Training Base (ᅮ 29 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ), is the country’s largest and 

most comprehensive aerodynamic flight experimentation, research, and development 

organization and is the only organization which can conduct large, medium, and small 

experiments on low speed, high speed, and supersonic flight dynamics and aerodynamic heating, 

aerodynamic physics, and aerodynamic optics. It is located in Mianyang City, Sichuan Province. 

It conducts research using wind tunnels, numerical computation, and the modeling of aircraft, 

dirigibles, missiles, and spacecraft. The center is home to Asia’s largest transonic wind tunnel at 

2.4 meters. The center has participated in research and development of the Shenzhou space 

capsule and its escape system. 

The Center was first proposed by prominent researchers Qian Xuesen and Guo Yonghuai in the 

1960s and was established in 1968. The Center has a number of wind tunnels, including 8 X 6, 

16 X 12, and 4 X 3-meter low speed wind tunnels; 3.2-meter subsonic wind tunnel, a 5-meter 

vertical wind tunnel, and 2.4 X 2.4-meter transonic wind tunnel, a 1.2 X 1.2-meter transonic and 

supersonic wind tunnel; a 0.5-meter supersonic wind tunnel, a 2-meter shock wave tunnel, a 1 

meter hypersonic wind tunnel, a 0.3-meter hypersonic low density wind tunnel, and a 200 meter 

free flight ballistic test.139

The Center has one Chinese Academy of Sciences academician, 300 senior technicians, 10 postdoctoral students, 50 Ph.D.s, and 200 master’s degree holders.140

China Baicheng Conventional Weapons Test Center (31st Testing and Training 

Base/63850 Unit) 

The Baicheng Weapons Test Center (ѝഭⲭ෾ᑨ㿴ޥಘ䈅傼ѝᗳ), also known as the 31st

Testing and Training Base (ᅮ 31 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ /63850 䜘䱏˅is located in Baicheng City, Jilin 

Province. It is the oldest and most authoritative national-level conventional weapons test center. 

It encompasses 2,000 square kilometers and was established in 1954 and conducts weapons test 

 135 Jeffrey Lewis, “Subcritical Testing at Lop Nor,” Arms Control Wonk, 3 April 2009, 

http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com. 

136 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 137 Information accessed at www.nti.org/facilities/710/?s=Lop%20Nor%20Nuclear%20 

Weapons%20Test%20Base on 19 September 2012. 

138 www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%80%BB%E8%A3%85%E5%A4%87%E9%83%A8 139 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/656100.htm 17 May 2012. 140 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 
249 

on ground force, naval, and air force conventional weapons from small arms to large missiles. 

Testing includes reliability testing, environmental suitability, electromagnetic compatibility, 

service life, and maintainability. More than 95 percent of conventional weapons have been tested 

at this center.141 

China Huayin Weapons Test Center (32nd Testing and Training Base/63870 Unit) 

The China Huayin Weapons Test Center (ѝഭॾ䱤ޥಘ䈅傼ѝᗳ), also known as the 32nd

Testing and Training Base (ᅮ 32 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ), was established in 1969 and is one of China’s 

most authoritative conventional weapons test site for all three services, including conventional 

precision weapons, detonators, guided weapons, optical equipment, radar, and UAVs. The center 

is also said to fire thousands of artillery rounds every year.142 The base has Asia’s largest 

comprehensive environmental modeling laboratory that can be used to test the performance of 

weapons and equipment in different types of simulated weather conditions.143 

China Luoyang Electronic Equipment Testing Center (33rd Test and Training 

Base/63880 Unit) 

The China Luoyang Electronic Equipment Testing Center (ѝഭ⍋䱣⭥ᆀ㻵༷䈅傼ѝᗳ), also 

known as the 33rd Test and Training Base (ᅮ 33 䈅傼䇝㓳สൠ˅is China’s joint electronic 

warfare weapons testing base. It has 100 senior researchers and 150 personnel with graduate or 

Ph.D.s.144

Ammunition Testing Center 

The Ammunition Testing Center (ᕩ㦟䈅傼ѝᗳ) is located in Wuhan, Hebei Province. No other 

information is available. 

Project Design Research Academy 

The Project Design Academy (ᙫ㻵༷䜘ᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウᙫ䲒) was established in 1958 in Beijing. 

It has a staff of 600 and is the PLA’s largest comprehensive investigative design research 

organization. It conducts feasibility analysis for all missile, satellite, and human spaceflight 

launch sites. It has played a role in designing satellite launch centers, the human spaceflight 

launch center, a climate and environment modeling laboratory, Beijing’s Olympic Park, and 

hundreds of national defense and civilian projects. It has won close to 200 national and military 

awards. The Academy has a number of departments, including architecture, planning, structure, 

sewage, heating and ventilation, environmental engineering, electrical distribution, interior 

design, engineering costs, mechanical engineering, oil and gas supply, automatic controls, 

 

141 Zhang Fuxing, ed., China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment (ѝഭߋ

һⲮ、ޘҖ (ᅮҼ⡸)˖ߋһ㻵༷ᙫ䇪), Beijing: Encyclopedia Press, 2008, p. 441-442 and “PLA General 

Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩᗳ) accessed at 

www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 

142ѝഭॾ䱤ޥಘ䈅傼ѝᗳ᨝ᇶ 143 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 144 Ibid. 
250 

communications engineering, surveying, geology, bridging, computers, and engineering 

management.145

Academic Institutions

Academy of Equipment Command and Technology 

The Academy of Equipment Command Technology (㻵༷ᤷᥕᢰδᆖ䲒) is a corps leader grade 

institution aimed at the development of weaponry and equipment, training command and 

management personnel, training senior engineering and technical personnel for national defense 

scientific research and applications.146 It was founded in 1978 and changed to its present name in 

1999 (formerly known as COSTIND Command Institute of Technology). The academy is 

located in Huairou, Beijing. The academy has a testing and launch site, TT&C facility, electrooptical tracking measurement facility, command and control facility, and a communications 

facility.147 Some of the major fields of study include: aircraft testing and launching, computer 

and applications, TT&C engineering, communication engineering, optoelectronic measuring 

equipment, radio telemetry remote control, conventional weapons testing equipment, and 

aerospace communications.148

Armored Corps Engineering Academy 

Armored Corps Engineering Academy (㻵⭢ޥᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) is a deputy corps leader organization 

and is a professional and technical institution to train armored equipment and technical support 

personnel for the military’s armored mechanized units.149 It was founded in 1953 and is formerly 

known as the Harbin Military Engineering College Armored Forces Department. In 1961 it was 

expanded to Xi’an and was called the Armored Forces Engineering College and in 1969 it was 

moved to Beijing.150

The academy has 30 fields of study and has specialized laboratories, field training ground and 

other training simulation centers, a computer center, and language laboratory.151

It has close to 200 laboratories (including one National Key Laboratory), a computer center, an 

electro-optical measurement center, a combat simulation center, and a teaching command 

center.152 It has one Ph.D. science and research post-doctoral flow station, and 31 research areas.

153 Fields of study include: applied engineering, military opto-electric engineering, computer 

science and technology, engineering simulation, weapons and missile engineering, mechanical 

 

145 www.ccnf.com/exhibitor/20060113/trandterminal_200601130386_0.shtml and 

http://search.chenhr.com/company/5369423.html 

146 www.mod.gov.cn/service/2007-07/09/content_4085968.htm; http://baike.baidu.com/view/663806.htm 147 www.mod.gov.cn/service/2007-07/09/content_4085968.htm 148 www.mod.gov.cn/service/2007-07/09/content_4085968.htm 149 http://baike.baidu.com/view/104761.htm 150 www.cnedu.cn/school/school/jj/661120314852350021224736200.html 151 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/milschools/2007-07/09/content_871312.htm 152 www.cnedu.cn/school/school/jj/661120314852350021224736200.html; http://baike.baidu.com/ 

view/104760.htm 

153 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 
251 

engineering and automation, electrical engineering and automation, and military materials 

engineering.154

Armored Corps Technology Academy 

The Armored Corps Technology Academy (㻵⭢ޥᢰδᆖ䲒) is a division leader grade 

organization155 formed in 1951 to train technology personnel on the maintenance of armored 

equipment. The Academy has 2,000 students taught by 400 instructors in three academic 

departments: vehicle, mechanizes, and electronics.156 

Beijing PLA Chemical Defense Academy 

The Beijing PLA Chemical Defense Academy (ेӜ䀓᭮ߋ䱢ॆ⹄ウ䲒) is a comprehensive 

research organization conducting research on NBC defense. It has 24 research areas and two 

post-doctoral flow stations and an international key laboratory sponsored by the International 

Chemical Weapons Convention Organization. It was deployed during the Korean War to 

research defensive equipment and during China’s nuclear weapons test to provide scientific data.

157 The Academy has an All Army Environmental Research Center, a Chemical Defense 

Equipment Evaluation Center, an organization associated with the Organization for the 

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Laboratory, a National Civil Defense Project NBC Defense 

Research Experiment Center. It also conducts assessments of NBC defense equipment, applied 

research, and assessments of experiments. 158

Ordnance Engineering College (also known as Ordnance Engineering Academy) 

The Ordnance Engineering College (ߋỠᐕ〻ᆖ䲒), also known as the Ordnance Engineering 

Academy, was founded in 1949 and changed to its current name in 1986.159 The school is located 

in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province. In addition to training command cadres, the college also trains 

ordnance and equipment engineering technology, and management and command personnel.160 It 

has a weapons testing center (ޥಘ⍻䈅ѝᗳ), an electronic testing center (⭥ᆀ⍻䈅ѝᗳ) and 

13 large-scale testing centers. 161 The college has 353 classrooms and 132 laboratories (some of 

which are National Key Laboratories).162

Wuhan Ordnance NCO School 

The Wuhan Ordnance NCO School (↖≹ߋỠ༛ᇈᆖṑ) was formally established in December 

1992, when it was separated from the Ordnance Engineering College.163 The school trains NCOs 

 

154 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/104760.htm on 12 November 2012 155 “Armored Force Technical College of the CPLA (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ㻵⭢ᢰδᆖ䲒),” in Zhao Yiping, The 

Military History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋһ), Beijing: China Encyclopedia 

Press, 2007, p. 732. 

156 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/104761.htm on 12 November 2012. 157 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 158 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2004-10-02/2125232507.html 159 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2008a/2008-06/02/content_1294567.htm 160 Ibid. 161 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 162 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2008a/2008-06/02/content_1294567.htm 163 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-07/24/content_1376804.htm 
252 

on weapons and equipment common to all services. It is located in the Wuhan New Technology 

Development Zone.164 The school focuses on training ordnance technicians and ammunition 

laboratory technicians, as well as providing specialized ordnance technical training. 165 The 

school has 22 fields of study.166 These include: photonics (optics, surveying), radar systems, 

guns and artillery, and ammunition and missiles. In addition to technical training Wuhan 

Ordnance NCO school also trains NCOs in skill set building.167

Research Organizations 

Beijing Systems Engineering Research Institute 

The Beijing Systems Engineering Research Institute (ेӜパーセント㔏ᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ) was established in 

1986. It researches national defense science and technology development strategy, national 

defense system analysis and decision making, software engineering and computer network 

technology research, and new technology. In regards to strategic research, it conducts economic 

analysis, assessments, feasibility studies, and systems integration of decision making and large 

projects and provides its analysis to high level leaders and organizations.168 

Beijing Weapons and Equipment Feasibility Research Center 

Beijing Weapons and Equipment Feasibility Research Center (ेӜ↖ಘ㻵༷䇪䇱⹄ウѝᗳ) 

was originally the Naval Weapons Feasibility Research Center (⎧ߋ㻵༷䇪䇱⹄ウѝᗳ). It has 

close to 70 laboratories and was established in 1983. It is responsible for feasibility studies of 

naval equipment.169 

Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications Technology 

The Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications Technology (BITTT/ेӜ䐏䑚о䙊

ؑᢰδ⹄ウᡰ) is located in the Haidian District of Beijing in Beijing’s “Space City.” It was 

established in 1965 and is China’s comprehensive design organization for space TT&C. It 

conducts planning and design for TT&C centers, stations, and ships. It has completed overall 

technology planning and design of the TT&C of flights for many launch vehicles and satellites. It 

conducts research on TT&C technologies, wireless radio equipment, computer information 

management.170

Space Flight Dynamics Technology Key Laboratory ( 

The Space Flight Dynamics Key Laboratory 㡚ཙ伎㹼࣋ࣘᆖᢰδ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) was established 

by the Beijing Aerospace Control Center and Northwest Polytechnic University in 2011. The 

laboratory is the country’s largest and most comprehensive said to be aimed at the cutting edge 

of international space flight dynamics research and to conduct basic research on space flight 

dynamics, and strategic key technical problems. It conducts orbital calculations and analysis for 

 

164 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 165 www.allzg.com/n52503c628.aspx 166 www.mod.gov.cn/service/2009-09/09/content_4086558.htm 167 www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-07/24/content_1376804.htm 168 “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core (䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘:ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩ

ᗳ) accessed at www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 
253 

deep space probes orbit determination and mission planning. The laboratory has more than 50 

researchers and occupies more than 3,000 square meters of research space with more than 40 

million yuan in support facilities and equipment.171

Engineering Research and Design Institute (ᐕ〻⹄ウ䇮䇑⹄ウᙫ䲒) 

No information was found on this organization. 

Ordnance Technology Institute (ᙫ㻵༷䜘ߋỠᢰδ⹄ウᡰ) 

No information was found on this organization. 

Military Software Test Center 

Approved by the GAD in 2005, the Military Software Test Center (ߋ⭘䖟Ԧ⍻䇴ѝᗳ) 

conducts strict quality management and control and formulates and implements regulations. It 

has gathered several thousand test cases designed during test work over the years for the use of 

scientific personnel.172 

China National Defense Science and Technology Information Center 

The China National Defense Science and Technology Information Center (ѝഭഭ䱢、ᢰؑ᚟

ѝᗳ) was established in March, 1959 and is a national-level information organization. Its library 

has over 2.6 million documents as well as extensive databases on weapons and equipment. In 

effect, the Center is an overt intelligence collection organization with a wide range of military 

and technical magazines and journals in just about every language. The Center also conducts 

research on military high technology, weapons systems development, and arms control, weapons 

and equipment management.173

Artillery and Air Defense Equipment and Technology Research Institute 

The Artillery and Air Defense Equipment and Technology Research Institute (⛞ޥ䱢オޥ㻵༷

ᢰδ⹄ウᡰ) conducts research on artillery and air defense equipment. In doing so it conducts 

theoretical research on innovation and incremental improvements to these weapons as well as 

researches new technologies and new materials. It conducts research on ground-to-ground 

missiles, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery.174 

China Academy of Engineering Physics 

The China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP/ѝഭᐕ〻⢙⨶⹄ウ䲒) was founded in 

1958 and is located at Mianyang, Sichuan Province. CAEP is a technology complex responsible 

for the research, development and testing of China’s nuclear weapons.175 It has 12 research 

 

171Chen Zhongchang, “Northwest Polytechnic University Participates in Building the Space Flight Dynamics 

Technology Key Laboratory (㾯ᐕབྷ৲оᔪ䇮㡚ཙ伎㹼࣋ࣘᆖᢰδ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ),” access at on 8 February 2012. 172 Liang Wei, “Pass Onsite Assessment by Military Laboratory Approval and Assessment Panel of General 

Armament Department, (䙊䗷ᙫ㻵ߋ⭘ᇎ傼ᇔ䇔ਟ䇴ᇑ㓴⧠൪䇴ᇑ), China Defense Industry News˄ѝഭߋᐕ

ᣕ˅, 16 August 2011, p. 2. 173 Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” p. 285 and “PLA General Armament Department: China Defense 

Industry System Core ( 䀓᭮ߋᙫ㻵༷䜘 : ѝഭߋᐕパーセント㔏Ṩᗳ ) accessed at 

www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml on 5 February 2012. 

174 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2004-10-02/0902232385.html 175 www.nti.org/facilities/702/ 
254 

institutes, 100 laboratories, and more than 30 workshops, including six national defense key 

laboratories. CAEP’s research areas include shock wave and detonation physics, nuclear physics, 

plasma and laser technology, material engineering, electronics, chemistry and chemical 

engineering, computers, and computational mathematics. It has more than 8,000 personnel, of 

whom 2,000 are technicians, nine are CAS academicians, and seven are CAE academicians.176 

CAEP also educates graduate and undergraduate students with 180 graduate fields of study and 

220 undergraduate fields of study.177 

CAEP has a number of subordinate organizations:178

x Applied Electronics Research Institute (ᓄ⭘⭥ᆀᆖ⹄ウᡰ) 

x Beijing Applied Physics and Computer Mathematics Research Institute (ेӜᓄ⭘⢙⨶

о䇑㇇ᮠᆖ⹄ウᡰ) 

x Beijing Graduate Student Department (ेӜ⹄ウ⭏䜘) 

x Center for Environmental Protection Engineering Research (⧟ໍາ؍ᣔᐕ〻⹄ウѝᗳ) 

x Chemical Engineering and Materials Research Institute (ॆᐕᶀᯉ⹄ウᡰ) 

x Computational Physics National Defense S&T Key Lab (䇑㇇⢙⨶ഭ䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) 

x Computer Application Research Institute (䇑㇇χᓄ⭘⹄ウᡰ) 

x Electronic Engineering Research Institute (⭥ᆀᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ) 

x Fluid Physics Research Institute (⍱փ⢙⨶⹄ウᡰ) 

x General Engineering Research Center (ᙫփᐕ〻⹄ウᡰ) 

x High-Power Laser Technology and Physics National Defense S&T Key Lab (儈࣏◰⦷

ݹᢰδо⢙⨶ഭ䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ)

179

x High-Power Radiation National Defense S&T Key Lab (儈࣏⦷ᕪ䗀ሴഭ䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ

傼ᇔ) 

x High-Temperature and High-Density Plasma National Defense S&T Key Lab (儈⑙儈ᇶ

ᓖᄬ⿫ᆀփഭ䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) 

x Laser Fusion Research Center(◰ݹ㚊ਈ⹄ウѝᗳ) 

x Mechanical Manufacturing Technology Research Institute (χỠࡦ䙐ᐕ㢪⹄ウᡰ) 

x National Center for Nuclear Technology (NCNT/ഭᇦṨᢰδᐕъᓄ⭘ᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝ

ᗳ)

180

x National Engineering Research Center for Flue Gas Desulfurization (ഭᇦ✏≄㝡⺛ᐕ〻

ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ)

181

x National Municipal Pollution Processing and Resource Engineering Technology 

Research Center (ഭᇦ෾ᐲ⊑≤༴⨶৺䍴Kॆᐕ〻ᢰδ⹄ウѝᗳ)

182

 

176 Information accessed at www.edu.cn/20011226/3015418.shtml on 19 September 2012. 177 Ibid. 178 http://baike.baidu.com/view/196985.htm on 19 September 2012. 179 See the Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Department description online at 

www.caep.ac.cn/xkfz/wu/huaxue.htm, accessed 7 April 2005. 

180 www.ncnt.com.cn/show.aspx?id=3&cid=13 on 19 September 2012. 181 www.caep-tech.com/aboutus.asp?title=%C6%F3%D2%B5%BC%F2%BD%E9 on 19 September 2012. 182 www.nwtr.cn/about.aspx on 19 September 2012 
255 

x National X-Ray Digital Imaging Center (ഭᇦ X ሴ㓯ᮠᆇॆᡀۿԚಘѝᗳ)

183

x Nuclear Physics and Chemistry Research Institute (Ṩ⢙⨶оॆᆖ⹄ウᡰ) 

x Radiation Key Laboratory (ᕪ䗀ሴ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) 

x Shanghai Laser and Particle Physics Research Institute (к⎧◰ݹᄬ儈⿫ᆀփ⹄ウᡰ)

184

x Shock Wave Physics and Explosive Physics National Defense S&T Key Lab (ߢࠫ⌒⢙

⨶о⠶䖠⢙⨶ഭ䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ) 

CAEP has also established one company, CAEP Technology LLC (ഋᐍѝ⢙ᢰδM䲀䍓ԫޜ

ਨ), to promote the transfer of technologies from CAEP to other companies. 

Engineering Design Research Institute 

The Engineering Design Research Institute (ᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウᙫ䲒)was established in 1958.185 In 

addition to military research,186 this institute also builds stages and performance venues, such as 

large mechanized stage and theatre equipment.187

Corps of Engineers No. 1 Scientific Research Institute (ᐕ〻ޥ⹄、аᡰ) 

The Corps of Engineers No. 1 Scientific Research Institute (ᐕ〻ޥ⹄、аᡰ) research institute 

is located in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. It specializes in research on river crossing bridge 

equipment, military engineering machinery, camouflage equipment, landmine equipment, and 

mine detection and engineering reconnaissance equipment development.188 The institute has 

facilities with an advanced structural mechanics laboratory; an explosion laboratory; a proximity 

fuze technology laboratory; engineering mechanical drive performance laboratory; an optics, 

infrared, and microwave measurement laboratory; a detection and signals processing laboratory; 

an applied chemistry laboratory; and CAD workstations. The institute is also pursuing a NearGround and Shallow Surface Target Detection and Recognition Positioning Technology National 

Defense Science and Technology Key Laboratory (䘁ൠ৺ൠ㺘⍵ቲⴞḷ᧒⍻䇶࡛ᇊսᢰδ”ഭ

䱢、ᢰ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ).189

Corps of Engineers No. 2 Scientific Research Institute (ᐕ〻ޥ⹄、Ҽᡰ) 

The Corps of Engineers No. 2 Scientific Research Institute (ᐕ〻ޥ⹄、Ҽᡰ) is located in 

Beijing, and conducts research similar to the Corps of Engineers No. 1 Scientific Research 

Institute.190 

Vehicle and Vessel Testing and Certification Research Institute (䖖㡩䇪䇱䈅傼⹄ウ

ᡰ, Unit 63969) 

This research institute is located in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. 

 

183 http://nxdic.cn813.xx6xx.com/About.asp on 19 September 2012. 184 www.yingjiesheng.com/job-000-325-112.html on 19 September 2012. 185 www.palmexpo.com/webceta/MoveMentDetail.aspx?ArcileD=4885 186 Inference made based on a search for “ᙫ㻵༷䜘ᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウᙫ䲒” at Soopat.com on 6 May 2012. 187 www.nacta.edu.cn/node/5464; www.palmexpo.com/webceta/MoveMentDetail.aspx?ArcileD=4885 188 www.zsr.cc/PostdoctorHome/PostdoctorRecruit/200605/26205.html 189 Ibid. 190 Francis and Puska listed under GAD Centers and RIs 
256 

Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology 

The Northwest Nuclear Technology Research Institute (NINT/㾯ेṨᢰδ⹄ウᡰ) is one of 

China’s premier organizations conducting nuclear-related research. It is located in Xi’an, 

Shaanxi Province. NINT provided diagnostic support for China’s nuclear weapons test program 

in China and now plays a role in verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty.191 The Institute is also reported to be involved in the development of directed energy 

weapons, specifically high powered microwave weapons. 192 The Institute contains a large 

archive on nuclear explosions, nuclear warfare, and nuclear weapons design193 and has more than 

700 S&T staff, including approximately 200 researchers, associate researchers, and high-level 

engineers. It also has eight Chinese Academy of Sciences and China Academy of Engineering 

academicians.194

NINT has 11 laboratories, a technology development department, a cobalt radiation research 

center (䫤K䗀➗⹄ウѝᗳ), a fiber optic technology center(ݹ㓯ᢰδѝᗳ), an acoustic 

positioning technology center(༠ᇊսᢰδѝᗳ), and a heat shrinking plant (✝㕙ᶀᯉল), a 

computing center, an experimental processing plant ( ᇎ傼࣐ᐕল ), an electrical and 

radiometrology station (⭥ᆖ઼᭮ሴᙗ䇑䟿ㄉ), the Shanxi National Defense Zone Measurement 

Station (䲅㾯ⴱഭ䱢४ฏ䇑䟿ㄉ), and the Sixth Standards Laboratory (ᅮޝṑ߶ᇎ傼ᇔ).195

NINT also is home to the Laser and Material Interaction Utilization State Key Lab (◰ݹо⢙䍘

⴨ӂ֌⭘ഭᇦ䟽⛩ᇎ傼ᇔ). 

NINT offers doctorates in nuclear technology and applications, and graduate degrees in 

inorganic chemistry, engineering mechanics, physical electronics, electromagnetic fields and 

microwave technologies, signal and information processing, and nuclear technology and 

applications.196

The U.S. Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) in 1999 added NINT to the Entity List along 

with five other Chinese entities. As a result of these additions to the Entity List, a license is 

required for the export or re-export of all items subject to the Export Administration Regulation 

(EAR) to NINT.197 

NINT’s research areas include: 

x Computer applications 

 

191 Information accessed at www.nti.org/facilities/711/ on 19 September 2012. 192 Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 1999, p. 203. 

193 Information obtained from the Nuclear Threat Initiative website at www.nti.org/db/China/nwint.htm accessed on 

26 August 2008. 

194 Background information obtained from the College and University Student Recruitment Network (儈ṑᤋ⭏㖁) 

at www.baokao.net/mbyx/school8.asp?classid=117102101&username= 

%CE%F7%B1%B1%BA%CB%BC%BC%CA%F5%D1%D0%BE%BF%CB%F9, accessed on 26 August 2008. 195 Information accessed at http://cy.eol.cn/20011213/3013923.shtml on 24 September 2012. 196 Ibid. 197 Information accessed at www.nti.org/facilities/711/ on 19 September 2012. 
257 

x Computational physics 

x Computational mathematics Electronic field and microwave technology 

x Control theory and control engineering 

x Electromagnetic pulse technology 

x Engineering mechanics 

x Explosion theory and application technology 

x High powered microwaves 

x Inorganic chemistry 

x Inorganic fluoride synthesis and application technology 

x Lasers 

x Mechanical diagnostic technology 

x Nuclear radiation effects 

x Nuclear technology and applications 

x Particle physics 

x Physical electronics 

x Pulse power technology 

x Pulsed radiation monitoring technology 

x Radiation and its interaction with materials 

x Radiation chemistry and radiation analytical chemistry 

x Radiation fluid dynamics 

x Radiation monitoring and imagining 

x Shock, vibration and noise, and automatic control technology Signal and information 

processing 

x Solid material dynamic properties of the strong-dynamic loading experiments198

NWINT has a comprehensive laboratory system, which has reportedly developed the following 

products: 

x 300,000 Curie cobalt bombs (30 зት䟼䫤K) 

x “Dawn” Accelerator (“Იݹਧ”࣐䙏ಘ) 

x DPF-200 Pulse X-beam (DPFˉ200 㜹ߢ X ሴ㓯) 

x Pulse reactor (ྲ㜹ߢ৽ᓄึ) 

x “Flash 2” High-current Relativity Electron Beam Accelerator (“䰚ݹҼਧ”ᕪ⍱⴨ሩ䇪

⭥ᆀᶏ࣐䙏ಘ) 

x “Glare” High-dosage Gamma and X-Beams (“ᕪݹаਧ”儈ࡲ䟿⦷ ã ઼ X ሴ㓯) 

x High-power microwave using alternative power sources (н਼࣏⦷Ⲵ儈࣏⦷ᗞ⌒K) 

x Laser resonating ionization mass spectrum system (◰ޡݹᥟ⭥⿫䍘䉡パーセント㔏) 

x Milky Way-III 10,000,000,000 parallel machines and large-scale experimentation 

equipment (䬦⋣ˉċⲮӯ1⁄9ᒦ㹼䇑㇇χᄬབྷරᇎ傼䇮༷)

 199

x Neutron generator (ѝᆀਁ⭏ಘ) 

x Series of accurate member lasers (パーセントࡇ߶࠶ᆀ◰ݹಘ) 

 

198 Information accessed at http://baike.baidu.com/view/4796175.htm on 24 September 2012. 199 Ibid. 
258 

x “Spring Thunder” Large-scale Boundary Wave Electromagnetic Pulse Analog Calculator 

(“᱕䴧ਧ”བྷරM⭼⌒⭥⻱㜹ߢ⁑ᤏ㻵㖞) 

Small Arms Theoretical Evaluation Research Institute (䖫↖ಘ䇪䇱⹄ウᡰ) 

No information is available on this institute. 
259 

Chapter Eight: The PLA Army/Ground Forces 

Dennis J. Blasko1

The Chinese government has set out the general outline of its strategic intentions for the 

modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its series of White Papers on national 

defense since 1998.2 Details about the PLA’s force structure, strategy, doctrine, and progress in 

training have been defined further in many books, essays, and articles in the Chinese military and 

security media, though finding and extracting relevant details often can be difficult. Additionally, 

continuing analysis of changes to PLA force structure and doctrine, based on new and/or more 

accessible Chinese sources, has added to and refined outside knowledge of recent developments. 

While much can be learned from a close reading of the White Papers and official Chinese media, 

many operational-level and tactical-level details have not been discussed fully in official sources. 

For example, the Chinese government still has not revealed how many personnel are assigned to 

each of the services nor has it stated the size of each service’s annual budget. 

Despite cuts of about 700,000 personnel executed in two rounds of force reductions since 1997, 

the PLA Army (or ground force) is estimated to remain the largest of the services, with 

somewhere in the range of 1.6 million personnel (although it is likely getting smaller), 

comprising over 60 percent of the total active-duty force.3 Though priority in development has 

been given to the Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery (PLASAF), the 

Army also has undergone tremendous change over the past 15 years.4

The Army is now over 25 percent smaller in manpower with at least 25 percent fewer main force 

troops units than in 1997; border and coastal defense units do not appear to have undergone 

similar cuts. Over that same period, it has created or expanded a relatively small number of new, 

more technologically-advanced units (such as special operations, helicopter, transport ship, and 

information units) in all military regions and downsized and restructured many older units 

(particularly infantry and tank units). It has also introduced a wide array of new equipment, but, 

for the most part, older legacy weapons and equipment continue for the time being to outnumber 

the newer items in the inventory. The Army has become more mechanized and better equipped 

with modern communications and electronics (as part of the “informationization” of the force), 

but is estimated to take the remainder of this decade before it can claim to be fully mechanized 

 

1

 This chapter draws from, updates, and expands information found in the second edition of the author’s book, The 

Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London: Routledge, 2012. Thanks to 

McKenzie A. Hall for creating the maps found in the appendixes. 

2 Links to English-language translations of all Chinese government White Papers are found at 

http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm. Chinese language versions are found at 

www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-06/02/content_3618.htm. 

3

 James Hackett (ed.), The Military Balance 2012, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 

235. The U.S. Department of Defense report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2011, p. 70 states the total number of ground force personnel is 1.25 million, but it does not provide numbers 

for the other services. If DoD is correct and the Chinese number of 2.3 million for active-duty PLA forces is correct, 

then there has been significant growth in the size of the Navy, Air Force, and/or Second Artillery. 4 China’s National Defense in 2004, December 2004, accessed at http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-

07/28/content_18078.htm on 18 November 2012. 
260 

and decades beyond that before it becomes fully informationized. Its system of professional 

military education institutions is making adjustments to accommodate the changes in PLA 

personnel size, force structure, doctrine, and training. Despite the reduction in the number of 

personnel and units, the Army’s combat and non-traditional security capabilities have improved 

due to force structure and equipment changes and improvements in training and logistics (which 

will not be examined in this chapter). Nonetheless, many obstacles remain to be overcome, not 

least of which are in command and control and training, before the Central Military Commission 

(CMC) is confident in the Army’s ability to conduct joint and combined arms operations. 

This chapter describes China’s intentions for building the Army as described in the White Papers, 

changes in the overall composition of the Army, force structure from military region (MR) down 

to division/brigade level, and the professional military education organizations involved in 

preparing PLA personnel to plan for and execute its new doctrine from 1997 to late 2012. 

Among its conclusions is that PLA Army force structure is consistent with the PLA’s selfdefensive doctrine and multi-level deterrence strategy.5

China’s Strategic Intentions in “Army Building” 

In 1998, the first China’s National Defense described the following objectives in a section on 

“Streamlining the army the Chinese way”: 

Reducing quantity and improving quality is a basic principle upon which the army 

is to be modernized. The Chinese army strengthens itself by relying on science 

and technology, and strives to make the transition from a numerically superior 

type to a qualitatively efficient type, and from a manpower-intensive type to a 

technology-intensive type. In view of the characteristics of modern wars, no effort 

will be spared to improve the modernization level of weaponry, reform and 

perfect the army system and setup, and improve the training of troops and 

curricula and teaching methods of military academies.6

The PLA’s main objective is to create a smaller, more technologically-advanced force. Weapons 

and technology are important, but force structure changes (“the army system and setup”) and 

training and education also are highlighted. The PLA consistently has identified the “software” 

component of its modernization process to be of equal importance as upgrading its “hardware.” 

The 1998 White Paper identified the “basic objectives of China’s defense policy” as 

“Consolidating national defense, resisting aggression, curbing armed subversion, and defending 

the state’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security.... to avoid and curb [deter] war, 

and to solve international disputes and questions left over by history through peaceful means.” 

China’s defense policy also contains the following components, the most basic of which are the 

subordination of military modernization to national economic development and its strategically 

defensive posture: 

 

5

 China’s concept of deterrence is explained in Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), The Science of Military 

Strategy (ᡈ⮕ᆖ), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, pp. 213-229. 6 China’s National Defense, “National Defense Policy,” July 1998, accessed at www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.2.htm 

on 18 November 2012. 
261 

x “Subordinating national defense work to, and placing it in the service of, the nation’s 

overall economic construction, and achieving the coordinated development of these two 

kinds of work. This is China’s long-term basic policy for its work in defense.” 

x “Strategically China pursues the defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining 

mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck... China upholds the principle of selfdefense by the whole people and the strategic concept of people’s war, and works hard to 

enhance the defense consciousness of the whole people, perfect the defense mobilization 

system and intensify the building of the reserve force for defense. On the basis of its 

existing weaponry, China carries forward and develops its fine traditions.” 

x “China does not seek hegemonism, nor does it seek military blocs or military expansion. 

China does not station any troops or set up any military bases in any foreign country. 

China opposes the arms race...” 

Subsequent White Papers have shifted priorities slightly or modified some of the wording, but 

the basic principles and objectives of PLA modernization continue intact despite a defense 

budget that has grown from about $10 billion (81.257 billion yuan at an 8.29 exchange rate) in 

1997 to roughly $106 billion (670 billion yuan at a 6.3 exchange rate) in 2012.7

The 2006 White Paper defined “the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and 

being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.”8 That objective was 

modified in 2008 to “by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed 

forces by the mid-21st century.”9 This latter modification leaves open the specifics of what type 

of war the PLA should be prepared to fight in 2049, thus allowing for continued modifications to 

PLA force structure and doctrine based on conditions at the time. 

The 2010 White Paper added “maintaining social harmony and stability” as a “critical task” for 

all the armed forces (which include the PLA, People’s Armed Police, and militia) and specified 

that “accomplishing mechanization and attaining major progress in informationization by 2020” 

was the PLA’s primary near-term goal.10 This statement recognizes that all of the PLA will not

be fully informationized by 2020. Moreover, it does not specify any particular warfighting 

objectives to be accomplished by that date. 

The development of the Army over the past 15 years has followed all these principles as it has 

made “its units small, modular and multi-functional in organization through appropriate 

downsizing and structural reform.” Currently, the Army “is accelerating the development of 

aviation, light mechanized and information countermeasure forces, and gives priority to the 

 

7 Ibid and “China’s defense budget to grow 11.2 pct in2012: spokesman,” Xinhua, 4 March 2012, accessed at 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102775/204254/204390/7747223.html on 21 July 2012. It is worth noting that 

while the dollar amount of the officially announced Chinese defense budget has grown by a factor of about 10.6 

since 1997, the amount of growth in terms of renminbi is about 8.2 times the 1997 budget reflecting the difference in 

exchange rates. 

8 China’s National Defense in 2006, “National Defense Policy,” December 2006, accessed at 

www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm on 18 November 2012. 

9 China’s National Defense in 2008, “National Defense Policy,” January 2009, accessed at 

http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm on 18 November 2012. 10 China’s National Defense in 2010, “National Defense Policy,” March 2011, accessed at 

http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-03/31/content_1835499_4.htm on 18 November 2012. 
262 

development of operational and tactical missile, ground-to-air missile and special operations 

forces.”11 Underscoring the priorities listed above, in April 2012 the Army paper, the PLA Daily, 

stated that the army aviation force has been given precedence for development during the 12th

Five-Year Plan.12

The Army’s operational goals are to build capabilities for “mobile operations and threedimensional offense and defense” as it moves “from regional defense to trans-regional 

mobility... to increase its capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long-distance 

maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations.”13 For the PLA, as demonstrated in a series of 

exercises conducted beginning in 2006, “trans-regional mobility” means the ability to deploy 

forces from one military region to another and along China’s coast, not the capability to project 

force far beyond China’s borders. 

The remainder of this chapter provides information about the Army’s organization and force 

structure that demonstrates the pursuit of these goals. In addition (though beyond the scope of 

this chapter), a review of the Army’s training program over the past decade would also indicate 

that the reorganized force is training to achieve these objectives. Thus, the White Papers have 

presented the general blueprint for Army development and the official Chinese media have 

provided many confirming details. 

Army Force Structure Changes 

Prior to the beginning of the 1997 force reduction (and before the first White Paper was issued),

The Military Balance 1996/97 gave the size of the Army to be 2,200,000 (out of about 2,935,000 

total active-duty personnel). Its forces were assigned to 24 group armies or under the command 

of military region or military district headquarters as “independent” or “local forces.” Maneuver 

forces (infantry and armored units) assigned to the group armies consisted of 73 infantry 

divisions (including two to five mechanized infantry divisions), 11 tank divisions, and 13 tank 

brigades. Independent units were listed as five infantry divisions, one tank division, and two 

infantry brigades. Local forces (garrison, border, and coastal) included 12 infantry divisions, one 

mountain brigade or division, four infantry brigades, 87 infantry regiments, and seven helicopter 

regiments.14 In total, this amounted to 102 infantry and tank divisions and 20 brigades. (Not 

included in this summary were the 87 infantry regiments, most of which likely were border and 

coastal units, tasked mainly with early warning and static defense missions, with only limited 

offensive and maneuvering capability). 

In 2012, as mentioned earlier, the total number of ground force personnel is estimated to be 

about 1.6 million, at least 600,000 fewer (27 percent smaller) than before the reductions. The 

Chinese White Papers list 18 group armies (which can be independently confirmed through 

media sources as accurate), six fewer (25 percent smaller) than in 1997. 

 

11 China’s National Defense in 2008. 12 “Writing Good ‘Strategies and Plans’ for an Army That is Becoming Airborne” (߉ྭ伎㹼ॆ䱶ߋⲴ”䲶ѝሩ”), 

PLA Daily, accessed 26 April 2012, at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/tzjl/2012-04/26/content_4844689.htm on 21 July 

2012. 

13 China’s National Defense in 2008. 

14 The Military Balance 1996/97, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 179. The late 

1990s, the PLA began calling “tank” units “armored” units. 
263 

Based on the order-of-battle listing to follow, the number of infantry and armored divisions now 

is about 30, which is 72 fewer than before, along with a total of about 48 infantry and armored 

brigades, 28 more than before the force reductions. (These numbers do not include border and 

coastal defense units.) Most of the reduction in the number of divisions comes from the infantry 

force (down from 90 divisions to 26), with the armored force now amounting to four divisions 

and 14 brigades (down from 12 divisions and 13 brigades). Moreover, mechanized infantry units 

currently are found in all of the military regions, for a total of 10 divisions and ten brigades, 

amounting to nearly half of the infantry force, up from only about five percent of infantry 

divisions before reductions started. The size of the Army Aviation Corps has also expanded in 

number of units as well as the number of aircraft. The number of Army Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) has expanded slightly and possibly in the number of personnel in each unit. These 

force structure changes are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 and, along with information in the 

remainder of this chapter, are consistent with the objectives identified in the 2008 White Paper. 

(The entry for “Brigade-equivalents” in the table below is a rough illustration of the decrease in 

the number of infantry and armored “boots on the ground” that can be generated by the Army’s 

force structure over time. This decrease in number would be offset by increased capabilities in 

the units though new equipment and firepower and the additional capabilities added by the 

increased numbers of helicopter, SOF and information units.) 

Table 1: Army Maneuver (Infantry, Armored, Helicopter, and SOF) Units 

Army Maneuver 1997 2012 

Group armies 24 18 

Infantry divisions 90 26 

Armored divisions 12 4 

Infantry brigades 7 34 

Armored brigades 13 14 

Brigade-equivalents* 224 108 

Army aviation regiments/brigades 7/0 9/4 

SOF groups/regiments/brigades 7/0/0 3/1/5 

* Brigade equivalent = 5 battalions; 1 division = 2 brigade equivalents. 

As main force units (or mobile combat units/χࣘ֌ᡈ䜘䱏) have been reduced in number and 

size, but upgraded in firepower and mobility, the number of static Army border (䗩䱢) and 

coastal (⎧䱢) units has not changed significantly since 1997 (though we now may have a better 

understanding of this force’s structure). Currently the ground force includes approximately 56 

border defense regiments, nine border defense battalions (not part of regiments), five patrol craft 

(small boat) units, two coastal defense divisions, three coastal defense brigades, 32 coastal 

defense and artillery regiments, and four coastal defense battalions. In total, approximately 

200,000 or more active-duty PLA ground force personnel are assigned to this mission (over 12 

percent of all Army personnel).15

 

15 These numbers are found in Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization And Mission Diversification: 

Underway In All Military Regions,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (eds) Right-Sizing the People’s 

Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 309. 
264 

Table 2: Army Maneuver Divisions and Brigades by Military Region 

Mechanized 

Infantry 

Divisions 

Motorized 

Infantry 

Divisions 

Armored 

Divisions 

Mechanized 

Infantry 

Brigades 

Motorized 

Infantry 

Brigades 

Armored 

Brigades 

SYMR 2 2 3 5 3 

BJMR 2 2 2 2 4 1 

LZMR 1 4 2 2 2 

JNMR 1 1 1 1 4 2 

NJMR 1 2 1 1 5 2 

GZMR 2 2 2 2 

CDMR 1 3 1 2 2 

Total 10 16 4 10 24 14 

Changes to the Army’s force structure and reductions in the number of units and personnel have 

occurred through a variety of means. 

x First, entire units were disbanded. This happened to headquarters, such as the six group 

army headquarters that were abolished, as well as to full divisions and brigades and many 

other support units. 

x Some units previously assigned to headquarters that were disbanded were transferred to 

other headquarters that remained. 

x Many divisions were downsized to brigades. This mostly happened to infantry divisions, 

but since late 2011 armored divisions also have been restructuring. 

x The infantry and armored divisions that remain in the force were restructured to be 

composed of only three maneuver regiments instead of the four regiments as previously 

found in a full-strength division based on the Soviet model. 

x Remaining divisions and brigades were reorganized to become different types of units, 

such as the creation of amphibious mechanized infantry divisions and light mechanized 

infantry divisions and brigades. 

x Some units were transferred to other services or the People’s Armed Police (PAP). In the 

late 1990s, an infantry division was transferred to the PLAN and downsized to become 

the second Marine brigade. At about the same time, 14 Army divisions were transferred 

to the PAP and reorganized to become “mobile divisions” responsible for domestic 

security. At the end of 2010, two short-range ballistic missile brigades, which had been 

created earlier in the decade as Army units in the Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs, were 

reflagged as Second Artillery brigades.16

x Some units were transferred from the active-duty PLA force into the PLA reserves. 

 

16 Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” AsiaEye, April 18, 2011, 

accessed at http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html on 21 July 2012. 
265 

At the same time, several new units were added to the force and a few were expanded in size and 

organizational level. But the number of new and expanded units is much smaller than the number 

of units that were eliminated or downsized. 

New equipment of all types has been added to the inventory as many older pieces have been 

retired. Simultaneously, many existing models of weapons and equipment have been upgraded 

with more advanced communications and computers and subcomponents as part of the larger 

trend of informationization of the force. Because the overall size of the force is smaller, not as 

much new equipment is now necessary as would have been required prior to the force reductions 

and restructuring. 

Nonetheless, most units still are composed of a mix of older and newer equipment. A review of 

the numbers found in The Military Balance for the various types of equipment in the Army 

concludes that only about a third of all ground force major equipment would be considered “new” 

or “modern.” For example, according to The Military Balance, out of a total of over 7,400 main 

battle tanks, 4,300 are Type 59-series with only 1,800 Type 96/96A/96G and 500 Type 

98A/99/99A2 (the two newer types accounting for about 31 percent of all main battle tanks).17

Both the Type 96 and Type 98 were displayed in the 1999 military parade in Beijing. Their 

numbers can only be described as growing gradually over the following 13-year period (on 

average being assigned to one or two regiments per year) and are now found in all military 

regions. The fact that multiple types and variants of the same class of equipment are deployed to 

the force complicates the logistics and training problems facing the PLA as it modernizes. For 

example, The Military Balance lists five different types of main battle tanks in the PLA 

inventory (Type 59, Type 79, Type 88, Type 96, and Type 98/99), each with multiple variants. 

The same situation exists for infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and 

helicopters. 

Over the past 15 years, the PLA has introduced a number of different types of unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) into the force. Some of them are short-range, hand-held models, while others 

are larger with longer ranges and flight duration. Artillery, reconnaissance, SOF, electronic 

warfare, and communications units have experimented with using UAVs mostly for 

reconnaissance and communications relay purposes.18 So far, no armed UAVs are reported to 

have entered the Army’s inventory. 

Unit reorganization and restructuring continues in the second decade of the new century using 

many of these same methods. Evidence clearly shows that the PLA Army is becoming both 

smaller quantitatively and more technologically-advanced, just as the Chinese government 

publicly defined its goals in 1998. 

Current Army Force Structure 

The PLA ground force is composed of numerous branches or arms (ޥ(⿽, specialized units (у

ъ䜘䱏), and support units (؍䳌䜘䱏): 

 

17 The Military Balance 2012, p. 234. 18 CCTV-7, Military Report, 25 December 2010, 26 July 2011, 17 September 2011, 9 October 2011, and 29 October 

2011. 
266 

x Infantry, divided into motorized (using trucks), light and heavy mechanized (using 

wheeled or tracked armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles), and mountain 

units 

x Armored, with both tank and mechanized infantry units 

x Artillery, using both towed and self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and 

anti-tank guns and missiles 

x Air defense, including anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) 

units (army formations with a combination of AAA guns and SAMs are called “air 

defense” units; part of the modernization process includes transforming older AAA units 

to air defense units by introducing SAMs into existing units) 

x Army aviation, primarily using helicopters, but also with a few small fixed-wing aircraft 

x Engineers, including combat and construction, pontoon bridge, camouflage, and water 

supply units 

x Chemical defense, providing nuclear, biological, and chemical defense and including 

flame thrower and smoke generating units 

x Communications, both mobile and fixed 

x Electronic warfare (EW), including electronic countermeasure (ECM) units 

x Reconnaissance 

x Mapping 

x Logistics, including supply (quartermaster), petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), medical, 

and transportation units including both truck and ship units 

x Armament units, responsible for equipment maintenance, repair, and ammunition 

storage19

To augment existing reconnaissance units, in the 1990s Special Operations Forces (⢩ᡈ䱏) were 

created to add new capabilities and extend the Army’s operational reach. Each military region 

eventually was assigned an SOF group (བྷ䱏). (In a parallel development, PLAN Marine and 

PLAAF airborne units also have created SOF units.) In 2011 and 2012, five SOF groups were 

identified as having been upgraded to brigades (in the Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, 

and Chengdu MRs).20 In what may be a related development, an SOF regiment appears to have 

been established in the Xinjiang Military District in addition to the SOF group assigned to the 

 

19 The list of arms and branches is found in China’s National Defense in 2002. Chinese sources do not include 

logistics and armament units as separate branches. They are included in this listing because of their increasing 

importance to the PLA. 

20 The Beijing MR SOF brigade is mentioned in “Special Operations Vanguards Focus on Mission Strengthening 

Skills ( ⢩⿽ቆޥ⵬⵰֯ભᕪᴥ亶 ),” PLA Daily, 17 July 2012, accessed at 

http://reader.chinamil.com.cn/ldxc/content/2012-07/17/content_4953445.htm; the Lanzhou SOF brigade is the 

subject of “Lanzhou MR SOF Brigade Passes through Helan Mountains (ޠᐎߋ४Ḁ⢩⿽֌ᡈ᯵䰟ޣ䍪ޠኡ),” 

Xinhua, 4 June 2012, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-06/04/c_123231731.htm; the Nanjing MR 

SOF brigade is referenced in “Nanjing MR SOF Brigade: ‘Returnees’ Eat “meat and Potatoes’(ইӜߋ४Ḁ⢩⿽֌

ᡈ᯵˖”⎧ᖂ”઻ᡀ”俉侭侭”),” PLA Daily, 20 February 2012, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wy/2012-

02/20/content_4795528.htm; the Guangzhou MR SOF brigade is mentioned in “Chinese Eagles Bright Wings Andes 

(ѝഭ䳴咠Ӟ㗵ᆹᅮᯟኡ),” PLA Daily, 11 July 2011, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/2011-

07/11/content_4462756.htm; and the Chengdu MR SOF brigade at “MND Organizes Attache Trip to Chengdu MR 

( ഭ䱢䜘㓴㓷傫ॾ↖ᇈ䎤ᡀ䜭ᡈ४৲㿲㘳ሏ ),” PLA Daily, May 15, 2012, accessed at 

www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2012-05/15/content_5246.htm on 1 August 2012. 
267 

Lanzhou MR.21 Likewise, Tibet Military District also has its own SOF group in addition to the 

Chengdu MR SOF group. 22 The appearance of these two new units reflects the size and 

remoteness of Xinjiang and Tibet as well as Chinese perceptions of terrorist threats to western 

China. 

As part of the attention paid to the PLA’s electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities, over 

the past decade foreign analysis has shed light upon ten Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (ᢰ

δזሏተ) assigned to the military regions. These units are part of the system overseen by the 

General Staff Department Third Department (Technical Reconnaissance). They conduct 

“communications intelligence, direction finding, traffic analysis, translation, cryptology, 

computer network defense, and computer network exploitation” in support of military region 

operations. 23 The importance of cyber operations in modern warfare has increased the 

significance of these units in understanding PLA force structure and doctrine. 

PLA Army units come under the command of headquarters at the MR, provincial military district 

(MD)/garrison level, and military subdistrict (MSD)/garrison levels. People’s Armed Forces 

Departments (PAFD) headquarters are found at county and grassroots (township or sub-district) 

levels. MD, MSD, and PAFD are considered local headquarters. 

Military Regions – Regional Headquarters 

The Chinese mainland is divided into seven large military regions each covering two or more 

provinces, autonomous regions, or four centrally-administered cities (municipalities). Military 

regions have military region leader level organizational grade levels and are named after the city 

in which their headquarters is located. In 2012, the seven MRs (in protocol order) are structured 

as follows: 

x Shenyang MR, consisting of the Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang MDs and includes the 

northeastern part of Inner Mongolia (mostly east of the 120 degree line of longitude24) 

x Beijing MR, consisting of the Beijing and Tianjin Garrisons and the Hebei, Shanxi, and 

Inner Mongolia (west to about the 107 degree line of longitude and east to about the 120 

degree line of longitude) MDs 

 

21 “Sky Wolf Strike – Note: Xinjiang Military District Regimental Commander Wang Junxian (“ཙ⤬”ケࠫ——䇠

ᯠ⮶ߋ४Ḁഒഒ䮯⦻ߋ䍔 ),” PLA Daily, 1 April 2012, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jr/2012-

04/01/content_4825955.htm on 21 July 2012. 

22 “National Dedicates Exemplary Candidates 420 Jiangyong Xirao (ޘഭᮜъླཱྀ⥞⁑㤳ى䘹Ӫ 420 ⊏ࣷ㾯㔅),” 

Guangming Net, 19 June 2009, accessed at www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2009-06/19/content_936885.htm on 21 July 2012. 

A Chinese blog listed all PLA SOF units as of February 2012, but is no longer available, accessed at 

http://duchuanren.blog.163.com/blog/static/31648781201211015056368/ on 13 April 2012. 

23 Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L. C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence 

and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011, pp. 11-13 accessed at 

http://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf on 21 July 2012. This 

study is an exemplary model of open source analysis, adding another feather to Mark Stokes’ already well-adorned 

cap. 

24 The boundaries of the Shenyang, Beijing, and Lanzhou MRs are depicted differently from previous maps of the 

Military Regions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” p. 73. 
268 

x Lanzhou MR, consisting of the Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Nanjiang 

(southern Xinjiang) MDs and the western part of Inner Mongolia (east to about the 107 

degree line of longitude) 

x Jinan MR, consisting of the Shandong and Henan MDs 

x Nanjing MR, consisting of the Shanghai Garrison and the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, 

Fujian, and Jiangxi MDs 

x Guangzhou MR, consisting of the Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and Hubei MDs 

x Chengdu MR, consisting of the Chongqing Garrison and the Sichuan, Xizang (Tibet), 

Guizhou, and Yunnan MDs 

Each MR commander shares responsibility with a political commissar (PC), both are military 

region leader-grade officers. The commander is assisted by three to five Army deputy 

commanders (who are military region deputy leader-grade officers), the regional air force 

commander (dual-hatted as an MR deputy commander), and a naval fleet commander in the 

Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou MRs (also dual-hatted as an MR deputy commander). Army 

deputy commanders each are assigned individual portfolios, such as operations, logistics, or 

armament. The MR political commissar is assisted by two or three deputy political commissars. 

These personnel form the nucleus of the MR-level party committee with the political commissar 

normally acting as first secretary. 

Figure 1: Military Region Structure 
269 

* In peacetime, the chain of command for PLAN and PLAAF units located in an MR also runs to 

service headquarters in Beijing. In time of war, they may be assigned to war zone headquarters to 

take part in military operations. 

MR staffs parallel, but are smaller than, the organization of the four General Departments. Each 

MR has a Headquarters Department (consisting of operations, intelligence, informationization, 

etc.) overseen by a chief of staff, Political Department, Joint Logistics Department (JLD), and 

Armament Department. In addition to leading the work of the headquarters department, the chief 

of staff oversees the directors of the JLD and Armament Department. The chief of staff and 

director of the Political Department are military region deputy leader-grade officers, while the 

directors of the directors of the JLD and Armament Department are corps leader-grade officers. 

The directors of the second-level staff departments (operations, intelligence, informationization, 

etc.) in MR headquarters are division leader-grade officers. Each department is manned by a 

number of lower-grade staff officers whose job it is to assist the commander, PC, and their 

deputies to plan, coordinate, monitor, and supervise their respective functional activities within 

the MR, such as training, intelligence, firepower support, logistics, etc. They interact routinely 

with the four General Departments in Beijing, with their respective staff offices in lower-level 

headquarters in the MR and with the staff offices in other MRs and services as necessary. 

The following table provides information about the grade and rank structure for MR 

headquarters. 

 
270 

Table 3: Military Region Headquarters Organization25

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Joint 

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Armament 

Department 

(Ranks) 

MR Leader MR Commander 

and PC (GEN/LTG) 

 

MR Deputy 

Leader 

Deputy 

Commanders & 

Deputy PCs 

(LTG/MG) 

Chief of Staff 

(LTG/MG) 

Director 

(LTG/MG) 

 

Corps Leader Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff 

(MG/LTG) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy 

Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Deputy Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader 2nd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments and 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Subordinate to MR headquarters are: 

1) Main force army units organized into group armies or independent units of division, 

brigade, or regimental size 

2) Logistics units organized into joint logistics subdepartments (JLSD/㚄औ࠶䜘) and 

armament support (repair/maintenance) units 

3) Provincial Military Districts and Garrison Commands for the four centrallyadministered cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing controlling local forces 

that may include both active and reserve combat and logistics/armament units as well as 

border and coastal defense units. 

PLAN and PLAAF units in the region apparently have a dual chain of command, reporting 

directly to service headquarters in Beijing in peacetime, but may come under direct MR (or 

theater/war zone) command during war. Second Artillery units located in the MR report directly 

to Second Artillery headquarters in Beijing; conventional Second Artillery units may be assigned 

to support war zone operations in time of war. 

 

25 Adapted from Kenneth W. Allen’s chart within this volume. 
271 

During peacetime, MR headquarters are administrative organizations charged to prepare the 

forces in their regions to accomplish the specific missions assigned to each MR. Depending on 

their location and geographical situation, the various MRs have differing orientations and force 

composition. 

In time of emergency, MR headquarters are likely to be formed into temporary operational war 

zone headquarters to conduct military or non-traditional security operations. These ad hoc 

wartime headquarters would be formed around the structure of an MR headquarters, but could be 

augmented, and perhaps commanded, by officers from higher headquarters in Beijing. The 

boundaries of a war zone will not necessarily correspond directly with the pre-existing MR 

boundaries, but will vary according to the operational objectives assigned to the war zone. 

Local Headquarters 

Each Military District headquarters is responsible for a single province or autonomous region 

and bears its province or region’s name, such as Hebei MD, and, with one exception, are corps 

leader-grade organizations. The Xinjiang MD is different from the other MDs as it is assigned a 

military region deputy leader organizational grade.26 As such, Xinjiang MD is able to have under 

its command the corps leader-grade Nanjiang MD (southern Xinjiang). 

The Beijing Garrison is called a weishuqu (ছᠽ४) and is an MR deputy leader-grade 

organization. As such, the Beijing Garrison commander is concurrently a Beijing MR deputy 

commander. The garrison headquarters for the other three municipalities of Tianjin, Shanghai, 

and Chongqing are called jingbeiqu (䆖༷४) and share the same corps leader organizational 

grade level and responsibilities as MD headquarters. 

MD commanders and political commissars are responsible for local and reserve forces (both 

reserve units and militia units) in their province and for mobilization preparations. MD 

commanders and political commissars are assisted by deputy commanders, deputy political 

commissars, and staffs similar to, but smaller than, MR headquarters. 

Active-duty local forces under MD command may include coastal and border defense units, as 

well as infantry, armor, or artillery units. MD headquarters also oversee logistics depots and 

bases and armament units, such as repair and maintenance depots, in their province. MD 

headquarters command PLA reserve units in their province or autonomous region. 

Each MD is divided into division leader-grade military subdistricts (࠶ߋ४) and garrisons (䆖༷

४). MSDs are found in prefectures or cities and counties and take the name of their prefecture, 

city, or county. Since 2003 and 2004, MSDs in provincial capital cities, such as Shijiazhuang, 

 

26 Thanks to Ken Allen for pointing out the grade of Xinjiang MD. See China Military Encyclopedia Second Edition 

(ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖᅮҼ⡸), Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2007, p. 609. Photos of the 

commander and political commissar wearing military region deputy leader-grade ribbons are found, respectively, at 

“Peng Yong, Xiong Xuanguo Appointed to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee Standing 

Committee (ᖝࣷǃ➺䘹ഭԫᯠ⮶㔤੮ቄ㠚⋫४ފငᑨင ),” September 7, 2011, accessed at 

http://zt.rednet.cn/c/2011/09/07/2369346.htm and “Xinjiang Carries Out Military-Civilian Building Beautiful 

Spiritual Home Activities ( ᯠ⮶ᔰኅߋ≁ޡᔪ㖾ྭマ血ᇦഝ⍫ࣘ( , “March 30, 2012, accessed at 

www.xjskw.org.cn/article/List.asp?SelectID=2274&ClassID=66&SpecialID on 24 July 2012. 
272 

Taiyuan, Hohhot, Chengdu, and Lhasa and some other important cities, such as Guilin, Shantou, 

Sanya, and Lianyungang, have been designated as “garrisons.” The most recently formed 

garrison is the Sansha Garrison Command, part of Hainan MD, in the Paracel Islands in the 

South China Sea, established in July 2012.27

In 2012, there are approximately 296 MSD and 39 garrison headquarters at the division leader 

grade. (Two “fort districts,” yaosaiqu, 㾱ຎ४, headquarters are also found at this level: 

Waichangshan in Shenyang MR and Neichangshan in Jinan MR.) Both MSD and these garrison 

headquarters are responsible for formulating mobilization plans, organizing conscription, 

supporting reserve and militia training, and supervising the activities of PAFDs in their areas. In 

border regions, MSD/garrison headquarters are in charge of PLA border defense troops and their 

operations.28

In addition to the duties described above, garrison units guard military facilities and maintain 

order among the troops when they are outside of their military barracks on pass, leave, or official 

duties, similar to Military Police functions in other armies. According to the 1998 White Paper, 

garrison units in large and medium-sized cities are responsible to “check, inspect and handle 

cases of infringements of military discipline by military personnel as well as cases of violations 

of relevant rules by military vehicles.” 29 Soldiers performing garrison duty are often seen 

patrolling the streets on foot or in vehicles or setting up “military vehicle checkpoints.” These 

soldiers have authority only over members of the PLA and are not involved in the law 

enforcement activities of the local public security apparatus. 

People’s Armed Forces Departments are found at county, city, district, township (town) or subdistrict levels, and sometimes work unit level, such as in large factories. PAFD are primarily 

responsible for meeting local conscription quotas for the active force and the militia as 

determined by MSD and MD headquarters. They also assist in logistics support for units in their 

area and are involved with supporting demobilized soldiers and organizing reserve and militia 

training. Grassroots PAFDs provide peacetime command for militia units in their areas of 

responsibility. 

County, city, and municipal district PAFD headquarters are led by active-duty PLA officers and 

are regiment leader-grade organizations. Below them, grassroots PAFD headquarters at township 

or sub-district levels are non-active-duty organizations (䶎⧠ᖩχʃ). 30 Grassroots PAFD 

headquarters are manned by local civilian cadre who wear PLA uniforms but have distinctive 

insignia and rank epaulets different from PLA insignia and ranks. These local civilian PAFD 

cadre are called zhuanzhi renminwuzhuang ganbu (у㙼Ӫ≁↖㻵ᒢ䜘), which is often 

shortened to zhuanwu ganbu (у↖ᒢ䜘); unfortunately, neither term has a consistent English 

 

27 “China To Deploy Military Garrison in South China Sea,” China Daily, 20 July 2012, at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2012-07-20/content_6499218.html on 21 July 2012. 

28 China’s National Defense in 2004 and China’s National Defense in 2006. The change in name from MSD to 

garrison headquarters can be seen by comparing the listings in the 2003 and earlier volumes of the Directory of PRC 

Military Personalities with later editions. 29 China’s National Defense, July 1998. 30 China’s National Defense in 2006. 
273 

translation. The number of civilian zhuanwu ganbu supporting the Chinese armed forces is not 

known and they are probably counted among the total number of militia personnel. 

In addition to falling under the MR chain of command, all local headquarters from MD to PAFD 

levels are departments of the corresponding Communist Party committees and serve as local 

government organizations responsible for military work.31 In order to maintain party supervision 

of military affairs, the local civilian party secretary is dual-hatted as the first secretary of the 

party committee of the corresponding PLA headquarters. Local party committees are required to 

have at least two meetings a year on military affairs and local government and party leaders 

should also spend at least two days a year studying military knowledge.32 Based on individual 

personalities, the relationship between military officers and local party secretaries and other 

party officials probably varies from place to place. 

Operational and Tactical Units 

PLA Army operational and tactical units are organized as 

x Group armies (䳶ഒߋ/corps leader-grade organizations), previously considered to be the 

equivalent of a corps-level organization in other militaries 

x Divisions and logistics subdepartments (division leader-grade organizations) 

x Brigades (division deputy leader-grade organizations) 

x Regiments or groups (བྷ䱏), also logistics depots (regiment leader-grade organizations) 

x Battalions or squadrons (battalion leader-grade organizations) 

x Companies (company leader-grade organizations) 

x Platoons (platoon leader-grade organizations) 

x Squads or weapons crews (since squads are led by noncommissioned officers, they have 

no grade level) 

Organizations from group army down to regiment level are known as budui (䜘䱏), usually 

translated as “unit” and are assigned MUCDs. Organizations from battalion down to squad level 

are known as grassroots level units or fendui (࠶䱏), and usually would be best translated as 

“subunit” or “small unit.” 

Group Armies 

Group armies are composed of combinations of divisions, brigades, and regiments. The total 

number of personnel assigned to group armies probably varies from roughly 30,000 to about 

50,000 depending on the number of divisions and brigades. 

 

 

31 China’s National Defense in 2006. 

32 Details of the two-way relationship between military leaders and local party/government officials are found in 

Zhiyue Bo, “The PLA and the Provinces,” in David Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds) Civil-Military Relations 

in Today’s China Swimming in a New Sea, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, pp. 96-130. 
274 

Figure 2: Group Army Structure 

After the reductions of the late 1990s, the variation in group army structure has increased 

considerably from previous years. A few group armies have only divisions as their main 

maneuver elements; a few others are composed of all maneuver brigades. The majority of group 

armies contain a mix of both maneuver divisions and brigades usually ranging from three to five 

in number. Most group armies have a combination of: 

x Two or three infantry divisions or brigades 

x One armored division or brigade 

x One artillery division or brigade 

x One AAA or air defense brigade 

x An engineer regiment 

x A communications regiment 

x A chemical defense regiment or battalion 

x A reconnaissance battalion 

x Army aviation brigade or regiment (in some group armies) 
275 

x SOF brigade or group (in some group armies) 

x Logistics and armament support units 

Over the past decade several group armies appear to have been assigned army aviation brigades 

and regiments. Currently, the ground force has about 13 army aviation brigades and regiments, 

with three regiments (two training and one operational) and a test group (䈅伎བྷ䱏) under the 

control of the General Staff Department. The other army aviation units are assigned to MD or 

group army command. In 2009 the army aviation regiment in Xinjiang was reported as having 

been upgraded to a brigade. In late 2011 and early 2012, three more regiments (one each in the 

Nanjing, Chengdu, and Guangzhou MRs) were identified as brigades in the Chinese media.33

Flight groups (伎㹼བྷ䱏) are subordinate to both army aviation brigades and regiments.34 The 

difference in the structure between a brigade and regiment has not been identified, but previously 

regiments were assessed to have about 30 helicopters of all types. Brigades are assumed to have 

more aircraft. 

The expansion of regiments into brigades indicates the size of the helicopter force gradually is 

growing in numbers above the roughly 500 reported during the Wenchuan earthquake relief 

efforts in 2008.35 The Military Balance 2012 counts about 650 helicopters of all types in the 

Army.36 In addition to transport helicopters, dedicated helicopter gunships (of two types, the Z10 and the smaller Z-19, a modified Z-937) are beginning to enter the force. Nonetheless, for an 

Army with over a million personnel, the number of helicopters to support force of that size is 

extremely small and limits the amount of airmobile training the various units can conduct. As a 

result, helicopter units often support SOF troops in training. 

Some group armies are assigned an SOF group or brigade. Over the years these units appear to 

have been pushed down from direct control by military region headquarters to come under the 

command of group army headquarters. However, not all group armies have SOF units. SOF 

regiments are estimated to have about one thousand personnel each, but the number of personnel 

 

33 For identification of the Nanjing brigade, see “Award Ceremony for Contemporary Revolutionary Soldiers 

Practicing Core Values Held in Beijing (䐥㹼ᖃԓ䶙ભߋӪṨᗳԧ٬㿲ᯠ䰫Ӫ⢙亱྆ި目൘ӜѮ㹼)” Xinhua, 

December 30, 2011, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-12/30/c_122507358.htm 21 July 2012. The 

Chengdu brigade was identified on the “Military Report” on Chinese television on 5 January 2012, accessed at 

http://military.cntv.cn/program/jsbd/20120105/124713.shtml on 21 July 2012. The Guangzhou brigade was 

identified in “PLA army aviation force conducts first coastal defense patrol,” PLA Daily, 2012, 19 March 2012, 

accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2012-03/19/content_4814413.htm on 21 

July 2012. 

34 For reference to a flight group subordinate to an army aviation brigade see, “China Army Aviation Old Fighter 

Aircraft in Service for 25 Year, Its Power Unabated (Photo)” (ѝഭ䱶㡚㘱ᡈχȢᖩ 25 ᒤ ေ࣋н߿ᖃᒤ(മ)), 

PLA Daily, 20 June 2012, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wq/2012-06/20/content_4901203.htm on 18 

November 2012. For reference to a flight group subordinate to an army aviation regiment see, “‘Hero Army 

Aviation Regiment’ Asserts Its Prowess in China-Australia Joint Disaster Relief Exercise” (“㤡䳴䱶㡚ഒ”ѝ◣єߋ

ᮁᨤ߿⚮㚄ਸ╄㓳޽ᱮ血ေ ), PLA Daily, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/lh/2011-

12/10/content_4740897.htm on 18 November 2012. 

35 “Helicopter corps aims to build on quake experience,” China Daily, 5 July 2008, accessed at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/05/content_6821846.htm on 21 July 2012. 

36 The Military Balance 2012, p. 235. 37 Richard Clements, “China’s Light Attack Helicopter Z-19: a silent (rather than radar evading) chopper,” February 

1, 2012, accessed at http://theaviationist.com/2012/02/01/china-z19/ on 21 July 2012. 
276 

in a brigade is unknown. Nonetheless, despite their growth in recent years, the number of SOF 

personnel also is relatively small for such a large Army and their missions are mostly focused on 

commando-style operations. 

Though group armies often are considered to be corps-sized units, in reality they control many 

fewer personnel and units than do corps in the U.S. military. A group army with an all brigade 

maneuver force would be more comparable to a U.S. division than a corps. Likewise, PLA 

divisions are much smaller than U.S. Army and Marine Corps divisions. 

Divisions 

PLA divisions are structured with regiments as their next lower organizational level. Unlike 

some other militaries, PLA division headquarters do not command brigades. (In addition to 

infantry and armored divisions, the active-duty force also has a few artillery divisions.) 

Figure 3: Division (Infantry or Armored) Structure 

Infantry divisions now command two infantry regiments, an armored regiment, an artillery 

regiment, and an AAA or air defense regiment, plus reconnaissance, chemical defense, engineer, 
277 

communications, and logistics (medical, supply, maintenance, repair, etc) battalions or 

companies. In total, a division has 10 direct combat (maneuver) battalions, three per regiment 

and the recon battalion. An infantry division’s manpower strength is about 10,000 personnel. 

Divisions are often characterized as having “a thousand” vehicles, which would include tanks, 

armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, trucks, and smaller vehicles. 

Armored divisions now command three armored regiments (each with a mechanized infantry 

battalion), an artillery regiment, and an AAA or air defense regiment, plus similar support units 

as found in an infantry division. Their total strength is about 8,000 personnel with about 300 

tanks and armored personnel carriers.38 In late 2011, the Chinese internet carried reports of 

armored divisions splitting to become an armored brigade and a mechanized infantry brigade. So 

far official media reports support the creation of two armored brigades out of the former 3rd and 

4th Armored Divisions in the Shenyang MR, along with the formation of one mechanized 

infantry brigade from the 4th Armored Division.39 The same process appears to have occurred in 

the Lanzhou MR with the former 12th Armored Division and in the Jinan MR with the 2nd and 

11th Armored Divisions.40 (The concurrent formation of new mechanized infantry brigades along 

with the new armored brigades has not been confirmed for all the divisions downsized so far, but 

seems likely.) As of late 2012, four armored divisions appear to be operational. 

Brigades 

Operationally brigades appear to have become equivalent to divisions now that many former 

divisions have been downsized to brigades. However, brigades hold a division deputy leader 

organizational grade. In the active-duty force, infantry, armor, artillery, AAA or air defense, and 

army aviation units all may be organized as brigades. An engineer brigade also is found in the 

 

38 For a description of the 6th Armored Division’s organization, see “China to Honor Commitment to Olympic “Zero 

Defect” Attitude (⢩は˖ѝഭށ⧠ྕ䘀䟷䇯”䴦ᤂ㔍”᢯䈪ᯠုᘱ)” Xinhua, 1 August 2008, accessed at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-08/01/content_8898068.htm on 21 July 2012. 39 The political commissar of the armored brigade is named in “Shenyang MR Armored Brigade Strengthens 

Headquarters Cadres Responsibility to Grassroots (⊸䱣ߋ४Ḁ㻵⭢᯵ᕪॆχޣᒢ䜘ᑞᑖสቲ䍓ԫᗳ)” PLA 

Daily, 17 December 2011, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/zgjq/2011-12/17/content_4744151.htm; the same 

person previously was identified as political commissar of the unit in Meihekou in a local report “Meihekou Holds 

Ceremony for ‘National Dual Support Model County’ (ẵ⋣ਓᐲਜᔰ㦓㧧”ޘഭৼᤕ⁑㤳৯”〠ਧᒶ虫Պ䇞)” 1 

March 2012 accessed at http://mhk.114chn.com/NewsHtml/220581/news120306000406.htm on 21 July 2012. The 

name of a former armored division commander is now found as a brigade commander in “Shenyang MR Officers 

and Soldiers View Xuesu Ice Works (മ㿸⊸䱣ߋ४Ḁ䜘ᇈޥⲴߠ䴅䴚ກ֌૱),” 19 December 2011 accessed at 

http://mil.fjsen.com/2011-12/19/content_7331954_2.htm on 21 July 2012. The new mechanized infantry brigade, 

commanded by Li Baodong, is referred to in “Seven-time ‘Blue Army Commander’ Talks About Leapfrog 

Development ( г ԫ ” 㬍ߋਨԔ ” ޡ䈍䐘䎺ਁኅ ),” PLA Daily, 5 April 2012, at 

http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/zgjq/2012-04/05/content_4826882.htm on 21 July 2012. 

40 The transformation of the 12th Armored Division can be inferred from “Chengdu MR Armament Department 

Director Visits Jiuquan Iron and Steel Group (ᡀ䜭ߋ४㻵༷䜘䜘䮯ࡠ䇯䞂䫒),” November 3, 2011, accessed at 

www.chinasie.org.cn/news_info.aspx?lei=4&id=104207 and that of the 11th Armored Division from “MilitaryCivilian Building Contract Signing Ceremony Held In Company Square (ߋ≁ޡᔪㆮ㓖᨝⡼Ԛᔿ൘ޜਨᒯ൪䲶䟽

Ѯ 㹼 ),” 21 July 2012, accessed at www.hbnkt.com/news_detail/newsId=dc1f9a4f-3375-4d93-b490-

15f4230b9046.html on 30 July 2012. The 2nd Armored Division is not mentioned in the report “City Leaders Visit 

Units in Xuzhou Bringing Holiday Gifts” (ᐲ亶ሬ䎠䇯ហ䰞傫ᗀ䜘䱏ᇈޥ 䘱к㢲ᰕⲴ䰞ى઼ហ䰞䠁), Huaihai 

TV, 2 August 2012 accessed at http://news.huaihai.tv/xuzhounews/2012/0802/2012-08-02269710.html on 18 

November 2012. Instead among the units in the city, the report mentions an armored and mechanized infantry 

brigade. 
278 

Beijing MR and, most recently, an ECM brigade was identified in the Nanjing MR.41 Depending 

on the type, brigades probably range from 2,000 to 6,000 personnel, with numbers and types of 

vehicles assigned varying greatly (often characterized as in the hundreds). Infantry and armored 

brigades appear generally to command four or five combat battalions; an artillery regiment, 

which includes tube artillery, anti-tank weapons, and multiple rocket launchers, but is smaller 

than a divisional artillery regiment; an air defense battalion; and logistics and armament support 

units (likely of company size).42

Figure 4: Brigade/Regiment Commander and Political Commissar 

PLA regulations treat brigade and regiment headquarters at an equivalent administrative level 

with similar staff functional structures (though brigade headquarters have “departments” while in 

 

41 The ECM brigade is mentioned in “Reflections on Soldiers with Shaved Heads (ᡈ༛⨶ݹཤᑖᶕⲴᙍ㘳),” PLA 

Daily 12 April 2012 accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2012-04/12/content_2879.htm on 21 July 

2012. It is likely that the brigade was formed from a preexisting regiment already located in the MR. 42 See The Military Balance 2011, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. 199, for a 

description of the organization of a mechanized brigade. 
279 

regimental headquarters equivalent organizations are called “divisions”). 43 Reflecting the 

difference in organizational levels, brigade commanders usually are senior colonels and 

regimental commanders usually are colonels. Both share responsibility with a political 

commissar, usually of equal rank and grade. They are assisted by deputy commander(s), deputy 

political commissar(s), and a chief of staff. The director of the political department/division 

reports to both the commander and political commissar. The chief of staff is the senior officer of 

the headquarters department responsible for coordinating the work of several staff officers and 

their subordinates. Reporting directly to the chief of staff is at least one deputy chief of staff, the 

director of the logistics department/division, and the director of the armament or equipment 

department/division. All of these officers have specialized staff personnel to perform the 

functions of the various systems for which they are responsible. The deputy chief of staff is 

responsible for planning operations and has several assistants who perform other operationsrelated functions such as intelligence, fire support, and engineer planning. Answering to the 

director of logistics is the chief of the medical team and director of the service center, which 

works directly with subordinate companies to ensure proper supply and preparation of food for 

all units. 

Regiments and Groups 

Regiments usually are composed of numbered companies (identified by numbers one through 

nine or higher) of their basic type (infantry, armored, etc), which are assigned under the 

command of three battalion headquarters. In addition to maneuver battalions, combat regiments 

will have artillery or mortar and AAA units permanently assigned. Regimental headquarters may 

also command engineer, chemical defense, and logistics and armament support units, usually of 

company size. Depending on the type of unit, regiments may have from about 1,000 to over 

2,500 personnel with over 100 armored vehicles in armored and mechanized units. 

Under the Soviet system of organization, the combined arms regiment was the basic combat 

maneuver unit in the PLA Army. Regiment headquarters commanded and supported operations 

directly down to individual companies, with the battalion level headquarters having little actual 

planning and logistics responsibility (unlike the U.S. and many other foreign armies). Over the 

past decade, PLA doctrine has attempted to shift the focus of the basic combat maneuver unit 

down to the battalion level, emphasizing the temporary formation of “modular” (⁑ඇॆ) 

combined arms battalions (ਸᡀ㩕), using a process similar to what is known in the West as 

“task organization” for specific missions and tasks. 

The Army has roughly 17 ship groups to perform a variety of functions.44 Four patrol craft 

groups (ᐑ䙫㡷བྷ䱏) and at least one separate battalion level unit (ѝ䱏) are assigned to interior 

border defense units to conduct river patrol missions. These units appear to be assigned up to 10 

 

43 See Introduction Chapter for specific terminology. 

44 A Chinese blog listing Army and Air Force ship units as of February 2012 was found at 

http://duchuanren.blog.163.com/blog/static/31648781201211015159938/ but is no longer available as of 21 July 

2012. This list is generally consistent with findings based on other internet research. The Nyingchi unit is the subject 

of “Gaoqing: The Only Army Ship Unit in Tibet (儈␵˖㾯㯿ୟа䱶ߋ㡩㡷䜘䱏),” Xinhua, June 28, 2011 

accessed at http://news.anhuinews.com/system/2011/06/28/004184936.shtml; the Hetian unit is the subject of 

“ Going to the Highest Inland Sea Waterborne Squadron (䎠䘁傫ൠ⎧ᤄD儈Ⲵ≤кѝ䱏),” PLA Daily October 10, 

2011 accessed at http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/video/content/2011-10/12/content_4694886.htm on 21 July 2012. 
280 

small, lightly armed speedboats capable of operating on rivers and inland lakes. (Additional 

smaller units may be assigned to some border defense regiments. For example, a patrol boat unit 

of undetermined size has been reported to be subordinate to a Guangxi border defense 

regiment.45) Approximately 12 ship transport groups (㡩䘀བྷ䱏) are assigned to joint logistics 

subdepartments and border defense units, including a unit in Nyingchi, Tibet, a battalion leadergrade unit in Hetian, Xinjiang, and the unit in Guangxi. Some units also have reconnaissance 

missions in addition to their transport tasks, which often are focused on supplying coastal 

defense units stationed on small islands. One unique ship group (㡩㡷བྷ䱏) in the Nanjing MR 

is stationed at the Dongshan Island amphibious training area to provide operational support to 

amphibious training.46 This unit consistently trains in amphibious assault missions, unlike the 

other transport ship groups that are primarily utilized for logistics (and some reconnaissance) 

tasks, but occasionally participate in amphibious training. In general, however, because of their 

size and limited seaworthiness, the landing craft assigned to these units likely would be 

unsuitable for a long amphibious mission over open seas, as would be required for an invasion of 

Taiwan. 

Battalions 

Battalions are generally composed of three to five companies under the command of a battalion 

commander and political instructor. They are assisted by a small staff consisting of deputy 

battalion commander(s), deputy political instructors(s), and the director of a battalion medical 

clinic. The size of the battalion staff indicates that many command and staff functions 

traditionally have been conducted at regiment or brigade headquarters and not in the battalion 

headquarters. The total number of personnel in a battalion varies according to unit type, but 

probably ranges from about 200 to 700, with around 30 armored vehicles (or 18 to 24 artillery or 

air defense weapons) with additional trucks and jeeps in support. 

Currently units are experimenting how to augment the battalion staff with personnel to perform 

the coordination and planning work required when additional units are assigned temporarily to 

form a combined arms battalion. In some cases junior officers from subordinate companies have 

been brought up to battalion level; in other cases a few NCOs have been assigned to battalion 

headquarters to perform staff functions. Eventually, once such experiments are over, it is likely 

that the table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for battalion headquarters will be adjusted 

by permanently assigning more personnel to the headquarters staff. But this process could take 

several more years before it is implemented throughout the entire Army. 

Main Force Units 

The bulk of the Army’s combat power is found in the units assigned to the group armies and 

several important independent units assigned to Military Districts. The Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, 

and Nanjing MRs each have three group armies under their command. Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and 

Chengdu MRs each command two group armies, with significant independent combat forces 

 

45 “Officer and Soldier Drivers of a Guangxi Border Defense Regiment Undergo Informationization Upgrades to 

Perform Patrol Mission (ᒯ㾯Ḁ䗩䱢ഒᇈޥ傮傦㓿䗷ؑ᚟ॆॷ㓗Ⲵᐑ䙫㡷ᢗ㹼ᐑ䙫ԫ࣑(, “PLA Daily, July 21, 

2012, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jdtp/2012-07/21/content_4964264.htm on 21 July 2012. 46 “Speaking with Nanjing MR Ship Group Commander Fang Rongsong (ሩ䈍ইӜߋ४Ḁ㡩㡷བྷ䱏བྷ䱏䮯ᯩ㦓

ɲ ),” PLA Daily, March 30, 2010, accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/2006jswy/2010-

03/30/content_4168117.htm on 21 July 2012. 
281 

stationed in the remote regions of Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs (in Xinjiang and Tibet, 

respectively). See Appendix 1 for a map of main force unit locations. 

The following pages provide an order-of-battle listing of main force units by military region with 

information current as of November 2012. Details are subject to change as additional open 

source reporting becomes available.47

Shenyang MR (MUCD block 65XXX)

16th Group Army, 65301 Unit, Changchun, Jilin 

46th Motorized Infantry Division (“Red Army Division”), 65316 Unit, Changchun, Jilin 

69th Motorized Infantry Division, 65426 Unit, Harbin, Heilongjiang 

48th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 65367 Unit, Tonghua, Jilin 

68th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 65447 Unit, Qiqihar, Heilongjiang 

67th Mechanized Infantry Brigade 

4th Armored Brigade, 65352 Unit, Meihekou, Jilin 

Artillery Brigade, 65334 Unit, Yanbian, Jilin 

AAA Brigade, 65370 Unit, Changchun, Jilin 

39th Mechanized Group Army, 65521 Unit, Liaoyang, Liaoning 

115th Mechanized Infantry Division, 65535 Unit, Yingkou, Liaoning 

116th Mechanized Infantry Division, 65547 Unit, Haicheng, Liaoning 

190th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 65559 Unit, Benxi, Liaoning 

202th Mechanized Infantry Brigade 

3rd Armored Brigade, 65571 Unit, Siping, Jilin 

7th Artillery Brigade, 65583 Unit, Liaoyang, Liaoning 

Air Defense Brigade, 65585 Unit, Dalian, Liaoning 

9th Army Aviation Regiment, 65529 Unit, Liaoyang, Liaoning 

Special Operations Group, 65037 Unit, Huludao, Liaoning 

40th Group Army, 65631 Unit, Jinzhou, Liaoning 

118th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 65651 Unit, Yixian, Liaoning 

119th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 65655 Unit, Chifeng, Inner Mongolia 

5th Armored Brigade, 65667 Unit, Fuxin, Liaoning 

11th Artillery Brigade, 65659 Unit, Jinzhou, Liaoning 

7th Air Defense Brigade, 65663 Unit, Jinzhou, Liaoning 

Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

191st Motorized Infantry Brigade, 65735 Unit, Dandong, Liaoning 

EW Regiment, 65941 Unit 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 65016 Unit, Shenyang 

Beijing MR (MUCD block 66XXX)

27th Group Army, 66267 Unit, Shijiazhuang, Hebei 

80th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 66172 Unit, Luquan, Hebei 

82nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 66173 Unit, Datong, Shanxi 

188th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 66016 Unit, Xinzhou, Shanxi 

235th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 66220 Unit, Xingtai, Hebei 

 

47 The list of active-duty main force units is based primarily on the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 

2011, updated by information from the Chinese media through November 2012. 
282 

7th Armored Brigade, 66075 Unit, Datong, Shanxi (Blue Force for the Zhurihe Combined 

Arms Training Base in Inner Mongolia) 

12th Artillery Brigade, 66077 Unit, Handan, Hebei 

AAA Brigade, 66010 Unit, Shijiazhuang, Hebei 

38th Mechanized Group Army, 66393 Unit, Baoding, Hebei 

112th Mechanized Infantry Division, 66336 Unit, Gaobeidian, Hebei 

113th Light Mechanized Infantry Division, 66069 Unit, Baoding, Hebei 

6th Armored Division, 66325 Unit, Nankou, Beijing 

6th Artillery Brigade, 66362 Unit, Pinggu, Beijing 

Mechanized Air Defense Brigade, 66440 Unit, Shijiazhuang, Hebei 

Engineer Regiment, Fangshan, Beijing 

8th Army Aviation Regiment, 66347 Unit, Baoding, Hebei 

Special Operations Brigade, 66413 (or 66011?) Unit, Daxing, Beijing 

65th Group Army, 66455 Unit, Zhangjiakou, Hebei 

193rd Division (“Red 1st Division”), 66195 Unit, Xuanhua, Hebei 

70th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 66028 Unit, Chengde, Hebei 

1st Armored Division, 66166 Unit, northern Tianjin municipality 

Artillery Brigade, 66081 Unit 

Beijing Garrison 

1st Garrison Division, 66400 Unit, Beijing (provides guards and street patrols for city, is 

not a TO&E infantry division) 

3rd Garrison Division, 66055 Unit, Shunyi 

Chemical Defense Regiment, 66114 Unit 

Tianjin Garrison 

196th Infantry Brigade, 66481 Unit, Yangcun, Tianjin municipality 

Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

AAA Brigade, 66109 Unit, Qinhuangdao, Hebei 

Engineer Brigade, Nankou, Beijing (UN PKO force) 

Engineer Water Supply Regiment 

Chemical Defense Regiment, 66321 Unit 

EW Regiment, 66018 Unit 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 66407 Unit, Beijing 

4th Army Aviation Regiment, Tongzhou (subordinate to GSD) 

Army Aviation Training Unit, Tongzhou (subordinate to GSD) 

Army Aviation Training Unit, Linfen, Shanxi (subordinate to GSD) 

Central Guard Regiment, 61889 Unit, Beijing (subordinate to GSD) 

Lanzhou MR (MUCD block 68XXX – 69XXX)

21st Group Army, 68210 Unit, Baoji, Shaanxi 

61st Division (“Red Army Division”), 68202 Unit, Tianshui, Gansu 

62nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade 

12th Armored Brigade, 68203 Unit, Jiuquan, Gansu 

Artillery Brigade, 68205 Unit, Yinchuan, Ningxia 

Air Defense Brigade, 68206 Unit, Linxia, Gansu 

Special Operations Brigade, 68216 Unit, Qingtongxia, Ningxia 

47th Group Army, 68310 Unit, Lintong, Shaanxi 
283 

55th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 68307 Unit, Zhangye, Gansu 

56th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 68303 Unit, Wuwei, Gansu 

139th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 68302 Unit, Weinan, Shaanxi 

9th Armored Brigade, 68304 Unit, Chengcheng, Shaanxi 

1st Artillery Brigade, 68305 Unit, Yongdeng, Gansu 

Air Defense Brigade, 68306 Unit, Lintong, Shaanxi 

Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

4th Division (“Red Army Division”), 69220 Unit, Kuqa, Xinjiang MD 

6th Mechanized Infantry Division, 69210 Unit, Hetian, Xinjiang MD 

8th Motorized Infantry Division, 69230 Unit, Tacheng, Xinjiang MD 

11th Motorized Infantry Division, 69240 Unit, Urumqi, Xinjiang MD 

Artillery Brigade, 69250 Unit, Xinjiang MD 

Air Defense Brigade, 69260 Unit, Bayan Gol, Xinjiang MD 

Special Operations Regiment, 69290 Unit, Xinjiang MD 

3rdArmy Aviation Brigade, 69008 Unit, Hetian, Xinjiang MD 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 68002 Unit, Lanzhou 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 69010 Unit, Urumqi 

Chemical Defense Regiment, 68231 Unit 

Jinan MR (MUCD block 71XXX -72XXX)

20th Group Army, 71320 Unit, Kaifeng, Henan 

58th Light Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 71622 Unit, Xuchang, Henan 

60th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 71897 Unit, Minggang, Xinyang, Henan 

Armored Brigade, 71669 Unit, Nanyang, Henan 

Artillery Brigade, 71262 Unit, Queshan, Henan 

Air Defense Brigade, 71315 Unit, Shangqiu, Henan 

Engineer Regiment, Xinyang, Henan 

26th Group Army, 71146 Unit, Weifang, Shandong 

77th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 71613 Unit, Haiyang, Shandong 

138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 71217 Unit, Laiyang, Shandong 

199th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 71345 Unit, Zibo, Shandong 

8th Armored Division, 71375 Unit, Weifang, Shandong 

8th Artillery Brigade, 71602 Unit, Weifang, Shandong 

Air Defense Brigade, 71939 Unit, Jinan, Shandong 

7th Army Aviation Regiment, 71901 Unit, Liaocheng, Shandong 

Special Operations Group, 71770 Unit, Laiwu, Shandong 

54th Group Army, 71521 Unit, Xinxiang, Henan 

127th Light Mechanized Infantry Division, (Tie Jun, includes Ye Ting Independent 

Regiment), 71282 Unit, Luoyang, Henan 

162nd Motorized Infantry Division (“Ferocious Tigers”), 71352 Unit, Anyang, Henan 

11th Armored Brigade, 71811 Unit, Xinyang, Henan 

Artillery Brigade, 71426 Unit, Jiaozuo, Henan 

1st Air Defense Brigade, 71834 Unit, Xingyang, Zhengzhou, Henan 

1st Army Aviation Regiment, 71687 Unit, Xinxiang, Henan 

Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

EW Regiment, 71799 Unit, Zibo, Shandong 
284 

3rd Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 72959 Unit, Jinan, Shandong 

Chemical Defense Regiment, 71988 Unit, Jinan, Shandong 

Nanjing MR (MUCD block 73XXX)

1st Group Army, 73011 Unit, Huzhou, Zhejiang 

1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, 73021 Unit, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 

3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 73051 Unit, Jinhua, Zhejiang 

10th Armored Division, 73041 Unit, Suzhou, Jiangsu 

9th Artillery Division, 73031 Unit, Wuxi, Jiangsu 

Air Defense Brigade, 73056 Unit, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 

5th Army Aviation Brigade, 73602 Unit, Nanjing, Jiangsu 

12th Group Army, 73061 Unit, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 

34th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 73091 Unit, Chuzhou (Sanjie), Anhui 

36th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 73071 Unit, Xinyi, Jiangsu 

179th Motorized Infantry Brigade (“Linfen Brigade”), 73096 Unit, Nanjing, Jiangsu 

Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 

Armored Brigade, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 

Artillery Brigade, 73101 Unit, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 

Air Defense Brigade, 73106 Unit, Huai’an, Jiangsu 

31st Group Army, 73111 Unit, Xiamen, Fujian 

86th Motorized Infantry Division, 73121 Unit, Fuzhou, Fujian 

91st Motorized Infantry Division, 73131 Unit, Zhangzhou, Fujian 

92nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 73141 Unit, Nan’an, Quanzhou, Fujian 

Amphibious Armored Brigade, 73156 Unit, Zhangzhou, Fujian 

3rd Artillery Brigade, 73146 Unit, Quanzhou, Fujian 

13th Air Defense Brigade, 73151 Unit, Xiamen, Fujian 

10th Army Aviation Regiment, 73159 Unit, Hui’an, Fujian 

Special Operations Brigade, 73653 Unit, Quanzhou, Fujian 

Shanghai Garrison 

1st Coastal Defense Brigade, 73171 Unit 

2nd Coastal Defense Brigade, 73176 Unit 

Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

ECM Brigade 

31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade, 73211 Unit, Jiangsu MD 

Chemical Defense Regiment, 73017 Unit, Nanjing, Jiangsu 

Ship Group (Amphibious Training), Dongshan Island 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 73610 Unit, Nanjing 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 73630 Unit, Fuzhou 

Guangzhou MR (MUCD block 75XXX – 76XXX)

41st Group Army, 75100 Unit, Liuzhou, Guangxi 

121st Infantry Division, 75120 Unit, Guilin, Guangxi 

123rd Mechanized Infantry Division, 75130 Unit, Guigang, Guangxi 

Armored Brigade, 75160 Unit, Guilin, Guangxi 

Artillery Brigade, 75140 Unit, Liuzhou, Guangxi 

19th Air Defense Brigade, 75150 Unit, Hengyang, Hunan 
285 

42nd Group Army, 75200 Unit, Huizhou, Guangdong 

124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, 75210 Unit, Boluo, Guangdong 

163rd Division, 75220 Unit, Chaozhou, Guangdong 

9th Armored Brigade, 75250 Unit, Guangzhou, Guangdong 

1st Artillery Division, 75230 Unit, Qujiang, Guangdong 

Air Defense Brigade, 75240 Unit, Chaozhou, Guangdong 

Special Operations Brigade, 75738 Unit, Guangzhou, Guangdong 

6th Army Aviation Brigade, 75752 Unit, Foshan, Guangdong 

Hong Kong Garrison, 75600 Unit 

Infantry Brigade, 75620 Unit 

Macao Garrison, 75640 Unit 

Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

132nd Infantry Brigade, 75560 Unit, Wuzhishan, Hainan 

32nd Pontoon Bridge Brigade, 75310 Unit, Hubei MD 

EW Regiment, 75737 Unit 

Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 75770 Unit, Guangzhou, Guangdong 

Chengdu MR (MUCD block 77XXX - 78XXX)

13th Group Army, 77100 Unit, Chongqing 

37th “Red Army” Division, 77126 Unit, Chongqing 

149th Mechanized Infantry Division, 77156 Unit, Leshan, Sichuan 

Armored Brigade, 77113 Unit, Pengzhou, Sichuan 

Artillery Brigade, 77115 Unit, Chongzhou, Sichuan 

AAA Brigade, 77123 Unit, Mianyang, Sichuan 

2nd Army Aviation Brigade, 77116 Unit, Chengdu, Sichuan 

Special Operations Brigade, 77118 Unit, Chengdu, Sichuan 

14th Group Army, 77200 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

31st Division, 77263 Unit, Dali, Yunnan 

40th Division, Kaiyuan, 77283 Unit, Yunnan 

Armored Brigade, 77223 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

Artillery Brigade, 77225 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

Air Defense Brigade, 77226 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

29th Chemical Defense Regiment, 77221 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

Chongqing Garrison 

Other Units Subordinate to MR or MD 

52nd Mountain Infantry Brigade, 77675 Unit, Nyingchi, Xizang 

53rd Mountain Infantry Brigade, 77680 Unit, Nyingchi, Xizang 

54th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Lhasa 

Special Operations Group, 77606 Unit, Lhasa 

Army Aviation Regiment, Tibet MD 

Army Aviation Training Unit, Yibin, Sichuan 

1st Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 78006 Unit, Chengdu, Sichuan 

2nd Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, 78020 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

EW Regiment, 77108 Unit 

Chemical Defense Technical Group, 78668 Unit 
286 

Border and Coastal Defense Units 

Army border defense and coastal defense units are commanded by Military Subdistrict 

headquarters. Border defense units are mostly organized into light infantry regiments that man 

fixed observation posts and patrol the borders on foot and by various other methods (horses, 

snowmobiles, etc.) depending on the terrain in their area of responsibility. Infantry units are 

augmented by a few patrol craft units, which operate on rivers and lakes. Two horse cavalry 

battalions and several cavalry companies (probably subordinate to border defense regiments) can 

be found in the force.48 Coastal defense units may be infantry or artillery and are often stationed 

on small islands. Coastal defense units are supported by ship transport groups that also may 

perform reconnaissance missions. 

Border and coastal defense regiments probably are manned by about 2,000 personnel each and 

have limited mobility for offensive maneuvering during combat situations. These are purely 

defensive and early warning units.49 Army coastal defense units may be equipped with artillery, 

but are not known to employ anti-ship cruise missiles (unlike PLAN coastal defense units). 

Shenyang MR

Heilongjiang 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 65911 Unit, Dongning 

2nd Border Defense Regiment, 65915 Unit, Mishan 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 65919 Unit, Raohe 

4th Border Defense Regiment, 65923 Unit, Fuyuan 

5th Border Defense Regiment, 65927 Unit, Luobei 

6th Border Defense Regiment, 65931 Unit, Jiayin 

7th Border Defense Regiment, 65935 Unit, Heihe 

8th Border Defense Regiment, 65939 Unit, Tahe 

9th Border Defense Regiment, 65943 Unit, Mohe 

1st Patrol Craft Group, 65947 Unit, Jiamusi 

2nd Patrol Craft Group, 65951 Unit, Heihe 

Jilin 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 65827 Unit, Linjiang 

2nd(?) Border Defense Regiment, 65831 Unit, Tumen 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 65811 Unit, Hunchun 

Patrol Craft Group, 65835 Unit, Ji’an 

Liaoning 

Waichangshan Fort, 65711 Unit 

Unit Border Defense Regiment, 65755 Unit, Dandong 

Coastal Defense Regiment, 65715 Unit, Haiyangdao 

Coastal Defense Regiment, 65719 Unit, Zhangzidao 

Coastal Defense Regiment, 65723 Unit, Shichengdao 

 

48 “Cavalry style remains in border area,” PLA Daily, 18 April 2012, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2012-04/18/content_4838835.htm on 21 July 2012. 

49 The order-of-battle list for border and coastal defense units is derived primarily from a 2009 Chinese list “Chinese 

PLA Border and Coastal Defense Units ( ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ䗩䱢⎧䱢䜘䱏 ),” accessed at 

http://bbs.junhunw.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=626 on 21 July 2012. The information in this list was 

crossed-checked with other sources. 
287 

4th Coastal Defense Regiment, 65727 Unit, Guangludao 

Coastal Defense Regiment, 65743 Unit, Zhuanghe 

Ship Transport Group, 65731 Unit, Dalian 

Beijing MR

Inner Mongolia 

1st Border Defense Regiment, Wulatezhongzhen 

2nd Border Defense Regiment, Erlianhaote 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 66156 Unit, Dongwuzhumuqinzhen 

4th Border Defense Regiment, Ejinazhen 

5th Border Defense Regiment, Baotou Guyang 

6th Border Defense Regiment, 66355 Unit, Haila’er 

7th Border Defense Regiment, 66127 Unit, Manzhouli 

8th Border Defense Regiment, 66379 Unit, Xinbaerhuzuozhen 

9th Border Defense Regiment, 66056 Unit, A’ershan 

Patrol Craft Group, 66423 Unit, Ergun 

Lanzhou MR

Xinjiang 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 69330 Unit, Balikun 

2nd Border Defense Regiment, 69332 Unit, Qitai 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 69344 Unit, Habahe 

4th Border Defense Regiment, 69340 Unit, Fuyun 

5th Border Defense Regiment, 69337 Unit, Emin 

6th Border Defense Regiment, 69338 Unit, Tuoli 

7th Border Defense Regiment, 69339 Unit, Bole 

8th Border Defense Regiment, 69348 Unit, Huochenghuiyuan 

9th Border Defense Regiment, 69349 Unit, Zhaosu 

10th Border Defense Regiment, 69312 Unit, Wushen 

11th Border Defense Regiment, 69313 Unit, Wuqia 

12th Border Defense Regiment, 69315 Unit, Tashenku’ergan 

13th Border Defense Regiment, 69316 Unit, Poskam, including a “Lake (Patrol Craft) 

Zhongdui” (battalion grade unit), Hetian 

Border Defense Battalion, Hami 

Border Defense Battalion 

Kashen Border Defense Battalion 

Plus eight Border Defense Companies, one independent Border Defense Battalion 

Jinan MR

Shandong 

Neichangshan Fort, 71187 Unit, with Reconnaissance and Ship Transport Group 

1st Coastal Defense Regiment, 71281 Unit, Chenghuangdao 

2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, 71496 Unit, Changshandao 

3rd Coastal Defense Regiment, 71867 Unit, Penglai 

4th Coastal Defense Regiment, 71761 Unit, Yantai 

5th Coastal Defense Regiment, 71670 Unit, Rushan 
288 

Coastal Defense Regiment, 71251 Unit, Weihai 

8th Coastal Defense Regiment, 71271 Unit, Laoshan 

9th Coastal Defense Regiment, Rizhao 

Reconnaissance and Ship Transport Group, 71210 Unit, Yantai 

Reconnaissance and Ship Transport Group, 71115 Unit, Qingdao 

Nanjing MR

Jiangsu 

2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, 73201 Unit, Lianyungang 

Artillery Regiment, 73202 Unit, Guanyun 

3rd Coastal Defense Regiment, 73206 Unit, Nantonghaimen 

Coastal Defense Battalion, Sheyang 

Zhejiang 

13th Coastal Defense Regiment, 73231 Unit, Shengsi 

15th Coastal Defense Regiment, 73232 Unit, Daishan 

17th Coastal Defense Regiment, 73233 Unit, Putuo 

18th Coastal Defense Regiment, 73235 Unit, Dinghai 

Artillery Regiment, 73236 Unit, Dinghai 

Shipu Coastal Defense Battalion, Xiangshan 

Dachen Coastal Defense Battalion, Taizhou 

Wenzhou Coastal Defense Battalion 

Ship Transport Group, 73237 Unit, Zhoushan 

Fujian 

11th Coastal Defense Brigade, 73331 Unit, Lianjiang 

12th Coastal Defense Division, 73301 Unit, Changle, with Ship Transport Group, 73306 

Unit, Putian 

13th Coastal Defense Division, 73311 Unit, Jinjiang 

52nd Coastal Defense Regiment, 73322 Unit 

54th Coastal Defense Regiment, 73323 Unit, Dadeng 

Artillery Regiment, 73325 Unit 

56th Coastal Defense Regiment, Zhangzhou Dongshan 

Ship Transport Group, 73326 Unit, Haotou in Xiamen 

Guangzhou MR

Guangdong 

1st Coastal Defense Regiment, 75403 Unit, Nan’ao 

2nd Coastal Defense Regiment, 75406 Unit, Guishan 

4th Coastal Defense Regiment, 75407 Unit, Xuwen 

Ship Transport Group, 75411 Unit, Zhuhai 

Hainan 

10th Coastal Defense Regiment, 75571 Unit, Wenchang 

11th Coastal Defense Regiment, 75574 Unit, Danzhou 

Vehicle and Ship Transport Group, 75564 Unit, Qiongshan 

Guangxi 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 75475 Unit, Fancheng Huashishen 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 75482 Unit, Pingxiang 
289 

4th Border Defense Regiment, 75485 Unit, Longzhou 

5th Border Defense Regiment, 75486 Unit, Jingxi 

Artillery Regiment, 75483 Unit 

12th Coastal Defense Regiment, 75494 Unit, Weizhoudao 

Chengdu MR

Yunnan 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 77318 Unit, Funing 

2nd Border Defense Regiment, 77322 Unit, Malipo 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 77323 Unit, Hekou 

4th Border Defense Regiment, 77325 Unit, Pingbian 

5th Border Defense Regiment, 77326 Unit, Jinping 

7th Border Defense Regiment, 77328 Unit, Jiangcheng 

8th Border Defense Regiment, 77330 Unit, Mengla 

9th Border Defense Regiment, 77335 Unit, Diqing 

10th Border Defense Regiment, 77327 Unit, Lancang 

11th Border Defense Regiment, 77329 Unit, Cangyuan 

12th Border Defense Regiment, 77332 Unit, Dehong 

Xizang 

1st Border Defense Regiment, 77629 Unit, Shannanlongzi 

2nd Border Defense Regiment, 77635 Unit, Cuonei 

3rd Border Defense Regiment, 77639 Unit, Dingri 

4th Border Defense Regiment, 77643 Unit, Changdu 

5th Border Defense Regiment, 77646 Unit, Saga 

6th Border Defense Regiment, 77649 Unit, Yadong 

Jiangzi Battalion 

Gangba 2nd Battalion 

Luozha 5th Battalion 

Milin Battalion 

Motuo Battalion 

Nyingchi Ship Transport Unit 

Logistics Subdepartments 

Joint logistics subdepartments (JLSDs) consist of fixed supply and repair depots/bases as well as 

the support units assigned to these bases and depots. JLSDs are division leader-grade 

headquarters that manage support units such as material and POL depots, central hospitals, 

transportation units, maintenance and repair units. JLSDs also run large farms for sideline 

production. 

Approximately 27 JLSDs are distributed among the seven military regions and are under the 

supervision of the MR headquarters JLD.50 Each has a unique structure usually consisting of 

roughly 10 to 15 subordinate regiment leader-grade units. While some JLSDs command units in 

 

50 The list of joint logistics subdepartments is based on a 2009 blog entry found at 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4de8461c0100cx0b.html accessed on 25 January 2011, but the content has since been 

changed. The original list was modified and confirmed through internet searches on individual MUCDs. 
290 

only one province, others have subordinate units stationed in multiple provincial-level 

jurisdictions. 

At least two ship transport groups (estimated to command about 10 small amphibious craft each) 

are assigned to Nanjing MR JLSDs (in Shanghai and Nanjing). These vessels are used for river 

and coastal transport (including POL supplies). 

Mobile POL pipeline units (㇑㓯䜘䱏) have been identified in Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, 

and Chengdu MRs. Nanjing MR’s 73833 pipeline unit was established in 2001 and has been 

named the “All-Army” pipeline unit.51

Shenyang MR

1st Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 65117 Unit, Jilin 

2nd Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 65133 Unit, Shenyang, Liaoning 

4th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 65152 Unit, Jinzhou, Liaoning 

40th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 65165 Unit, Harbin, Heilongjiang 

Beijing MR

5th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 66401 Unit, Taiyuan, Shanxi 

6th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 66040 Unit, Fengtai, Beijing 

7th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 66296 Unit, Shijiazhuang, Hebei 

8th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 66356 Unit, Tianjin 

Lanzhou MR

25th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 68060 Unit, Xining, Qinghai 

27th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 68070 Unit, Lanzhou, Gansu 

28th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 68090 Unit, Xi’an, Shaanxi 

29th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 69050 Unit, Shawan, Xinjiang 

30th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 69052 Unit, Urumqi, Xinjiang 

31st Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 69064 Unit, Korla, Xinjiang 

Jinan MR

9th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 72433 Unit, Jinan, Shandong 

33rd Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 72495 Unit, Zhengzhou, Henan 

Nanjing MR

13th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 73801 Unit, Wuxi, Jiangsu, with Ship Transport 

Group, 73807 Unit 

15th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 73821 Unit, Huai’an, Jiangsu 

16th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 73841 Unit, Nanjing, Jiangsu, with Ship Transport 

Group, 73857 Unit 

17th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 73861 Unit, Yingtan, Jiangxi 

18th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 73881 Unit, Fuzhou, Fujian 

 

51 See “‘Oil Dragons’ Dance 1,000 Li (“ ⋩ 嗉 ” 㡎ॳ䟼 ),” PLA Pictorial, June 2009, accessed at 

www.plapic.com.cn/txt/200906b/20090608-3B.htm on 21 July 2012. 
291 

Guangzhou MR

19th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 76110 Unit, Changsha, Hunan 

20th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 76140 Unit, Guilin, Guangxi 

21st Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 76160 Unit, Guangzhou, Guangdong 

Chengdu MR

22nd Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 78300 Unit, Kunming, Yunnan 

37th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 78379 Unit, Chongqing 

38th Joint Logistics Subdepartment, 78438 Unit, Chengdu, Sichuan 

Reserve Units 

The reserve force (consisting of PLA reserve units and the militia) has been reorganized and 

updated along with the modernization of the active-duty force since 1997. PLA reserve units 

were reported to number about 510,000 personnel in 2009, but this figure is probably increasing 

as the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF add reserve units and personnel.52 

The bulk of the PLA reserve unit strength still supports the Army. Reserve units are organized in 

divisions, brigades, and regiments based on provincial boundaries and are commanded by their 

respective MD headquarters. In total, the Army reserve force consists of approximately 38 

divisions, 25 brigades, and several regiments. Fully one-third of Army reserve units (24 out of 63 

divisions and brigades) are dedicated to local air defense and are equipped mostly with AAA 

guns. A reserve logistics support brigade ( 亴༷ᖩਾऔ؍䳌᯵) has been created in each military 

region since 1997.53

Shenyang MR 

Liaoning Army Reserve 192nd Infantry Division, Shenyang 

Liaoning Army Reserve 1st AAA Division, Shenyang 

Liaoning Army Reserve 2nd AAA Division, Dalian 

Liaoning Jinzhou Reserve Logistics Support Brigade 

Liaoning Army Reserve Communications Regiment, Anshan 

Jilin Army Reserve 47th Infantry Division, Jilin city 

Jilin Reserve Artillery Division, Changchun 

Jilin Reserve Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, Baicheng 

Jilin Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Changchun 

Jilin Army Reserve Communications Regiment, Tonghua 

Reserve Water Supply Engineer Regiment 

Heilongjiang Army Reserve Infantry Division 

Heilongjiang Army Reserve AAA Division, Daqing 

Heilongjiang Reserve Artillery Brigade, Harbin 

Reserve AAA Brigade, Jiamusi, Heilongjiang 

Heilongjiang Army Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment, Harbin 

 

52 “National Defense Reserve Strength” ( ഭ䱢ਾ༷࣋䟿 ), Xinhua, 22 September 2009, accessed at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-09/22/content_12098695.htm on 21 July 2012. 53 The list reserve units is based primarily on the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2011, updated by 

information from the Chinese media. 
292 

Beijing MR

Beijing Garrison Reserve AAA Division 

Beijing Garrison Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment 

Tianjin Army 1st Reserve AAA Division 

Hebei Army Reserve Artillery 72nd Division, Tangshan 

Hebei Army Reserve Infantry Division, Shijiazhuang 

Hebei Army Reserve Artillery Brigade, Handan 

Hebei Army Reserve Artillery Brigade, Qinhuangdao 

Hebei Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Zhangjiakou 

Hebei Langfang Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade 

Shanxi Army Reserve Infantry 83rd Division, Xinzhou 

Shanxi Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Taiyuan 

Neimenggu Army Reserve 30th Infantry Division, Hohhot 

Lanzhou MR

Shaanxi Army Reserve 141st Infantry Division 

Shaanxi Army Reserve AAA Division, Xi’an 

Shaanxi Baoji Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade 

Gansu Army Reserve Infantry Tianshui Brigade 

Gansu Army Reserve AAA Division, Lanzhou 

Xinjiang Army Reserve Infantry Division 

Qinghai Army Reserve Infantry Brigade 

Jinan MR

Shandong Army Reserve 76th Infantry Division, Yantai 

Shandong Reserve Artillery Division, Jining 

Shandong Reserve AAA Division, Qingdao 

Shandong Reserve Army Logistics Support Brigade, Dezhou 

Henan Army Reserve 136th Infantry Division, Kaifeng 

Henan Army Reserve AAA Division, Zhengzhou 

Jinan Army Reserve Pontoon Bridge Regiment, Mangshan, Luoyang, Henan 

Nanjing MR

Shanghai Army Reserve AAA Division 

Jiangsu Reserve AAA Division, Nanjing 

Jiangsu Army Reserve 2nd AAA Division, Yangzhou 

Anhui Army Reserve Infantry Division, Hefei 

Anhui Army Reserve AAA Brigade, Wuhu 

Fujian Army Reserve AAA Division, Fuzhou 

Fujian Zhangzhou Reserve Logistics Support Brigade, with Ship Transport Group 

Jiangxi Army Reserve Infantry Division, Nanchang 

Jiangxi Army Reserve Artillery Brigade, Shangrao 

Zhejiang Army Reserve Infantry Division 

Reserve Coastal Defense Regiment, Ningde 
293 

Guangzhou MR

Hunan Army Reserve Infantry Division, Changsha 

Hunan Hengyang Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade 

Guangdong Reserve AAA Division 

Guangdong Zhanjiang Reserve AAA Brigade 

Guangxi Army Reserve Infantry Division, Nanning 

Hainan Army Reserve Division 

Hubei Army Reserve AAA Division, Wuhan 

Hubei Xiangyang Army Reserve Artillery Brigade 

Hubei Yichang Reserve AAA Brigade 

Shenzhen Reserve Chemical Defense Regiment 

Chengdu MR

Sichuan Leshan Reserve Infantry Brigade 

Sichuan Army Reserve AAA Division 

Sichuan Dazhou Army Reserve Artillery Brigade 

Chongqing Reserve AAA Division 

Chongqing Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade 

Guizhou Army Reserve Infantry Division 

Yunnan Army Reserve Infantry Division 

Tibet Army Reserve Mixed Brigade 

Professional Military Education Organizations 

The Army’s slice of the PLA’s professional military education system consists of dozens of 

basic-level universities, institutes or academies, and schools for officer and NCO education as 

well as several intermediate level command academies for mid-career officer education. These 

institutions can be categorized into the four officer category systems (military/operations, 

political, logistics, and armament) and are found throughout the country. Like the rest of the 

ground forces, they have undergone tremendous organization and functional change over the past 

15 years to keep up with the trends requiring fewer junior officers in fewer units, more NCOs in 

all units, greater emphasis on joint and combined arms operations, and an overall more 

technologically-advanced force. Several structural changes occurred in mid-to-late 2011; more 

are likely to follow in the coming decade. 

Despite the new operational doctrine issued in the late 1990s, the academies appear to have been 

slow to adapt to educating officers and NCOs to prepare for the new demands that will placed 

upon them once they arrive in their units. For example, in February 2012, PLA Daily reported 

“80 commanders at regiment and battalion levels selected from the army, navy, air force and the 

Second Artillery Force” of the Guangzhou MR will take part in the first “cultivation and training 

class” for joint operation staff officers at the National University of Defense Technology. 

Eventually this year-long class will be held twice annually and rotated among the military 

regions.54 This “first” apparently is a “first” for the National University of Defense Technology, 

but coming somewhat late after the system for providing education in joint operations was 

identified in the 2004 White Paper: 

 

54 “First training class for joint-operation staff officers launched at NUDT,” PLA Daily, February 16, 2012 at 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2012-02/16/content_4792579.htm on 21 July 2012. 
294 

The military educational institutions have intensified their joint operations 

training. The elementary command colleges offer basic courses in joint operations. 

The intermediate command colleges offer courses on service campaigns and 

combined operations. The advanced command university offers courses on 

strategic studies and joint operations.55

Apparently, the system described in 2004 has not been working as effectively as required, 

prompting the changes in organization described below. 

Likewise, the education system is only beginning to train officers at the battalion grade level and 

below to command and control combined arms operations. The Mechanized Infantry Academy at 

Shijiazhuang appears to be at the forefront of this effort to integrate officers of different 

specialties into cohesive organizations.56 This sort of pre-assignment education will become 

increasingly important if the PLA intends to expand the number of combat brigades in the force 

and eliminate most regimental and division level headquarters. 

Changes in Army educational institutions have been made to reflect the current needs and 

functional requirements of the force. Two basic officer academies have been transformed into 

NCO schools: the Vehicle Management Academy has become the Bengbu Vehicle NCO School 

and the Bethune Military Medical College has been changed to the Bethune Military Medical 

NCO School. These are added to the three ground force NCO Schools that previously existed: 

Beijing Mechanics NCO School, Wuhan Ordnance NCO School, and Xuanhua Communications 

NCO School (the other services each also have one NCO school). 

Prior to 2011, ten Army command academies were found in the force. Now only three Army 

command academies (or colleges) appear to remain after the recent round of reorganization: 

x Army Command Academy, Nanchang 

x Army Command Academy, Nanjing 

x Army Command Academy, Shijiazhuang 

Seven former command academies have had their names changed and are no longer considered 

“command” institutes. These changes may reflect a lowering of the organizational grade for 

these academies. 

x The Artillery Command Academy in Xuanhua has been disbanded and the educational 

element merged with an Artillery Academy in Nanjing; the remainder of the organization 

has become a GSD Artillery Training base, which is not part of the professional military 

education system. 

x The Communications Command Academy in Wuhan is now called the National Defense 

Information Academy. 

 

55 China’s National Defense in 2004. 

56 “Student Combined Battalions Mixed on Training Field (ᆖઈਸᡀ㩕ᨵ⍫╄ޥ൪),” PLA Daily, March 24, 2012, 

accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2012-03/24/content_1371.htm on 21 July 2012. 
295 

x The Air Defense Command Academy, Zhengzhou has been renamed the Air Defense 

Academy. 

x The Chemical Defense Command and Engineering Academy in Yangfang, Beijing has 

been renamed the Chemical Defense Academy. 

x The Engineer Command Academy in Xuzhou has been renamed the Engineer Academy. 

x The Logistics Command Academy in Beijing has become the Logistics Academy. 

x The Armament Command and Technology Academy in Huairou, outside of Beijing has 

become the Armament Academy.57

The following basic-level academies fall under the General Staff Department’s 

military/operations system:58

x Air Defense Academy, Zhengzhou 

x Armored Force Academy, Bengbu 

x Army Academy, Kunming 

x Army Academy, Nanchang 

x Army Academy (Mechanized Infantry), Shijiazhuang 

x Border Defense Academy, Xi’an 

x Army Academy (Military Medicine), Urumqi 

x Army Aviation Corps Academy, Beijing 

x Army Guided Missile Academy, Langfang (status uncertain) 

x Army Officers Academy, Hefei 

x Artillery Academy, Nanjing, with Xuanhua branch 

x Artillery Academy, Shenyang 

x Chemical Defense Academy, Yangfang, Beijing 

x Communications Academy, Chongqing 

x Communications Academy, Xi’an 

x Electronic Engineering Academy, Hefei 

x Engineer Academy, Xuzhou 

x Foreign Languages Academy, Luoyang 

x Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou (with four campuses) 

x International Relations Academy, Nanjing 

x National Defense Information Academy, Wuhan 

x Physical Education Academy (with Communications Training Group), Guangzhou 

x Science and Engineering Technology University, Nanjing (with Engineer Corps School) 

It is noteworthy that the former Xi’an Army Academy has been renamed the Border Defense 

Academy indicating the continuing requirement for officers to fill border defense billets. The 

former Artillery Academy in Hefei has been renamed the Army Officers Academy to reflect its 

 

57 “The Strategy Behind Military Academy Reform (ѝഭߋṑ᭩䶙㛼ਾⲴᡈ⮕ᤷੁ),” PLA Daily, January 9, 2012, 

accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/content_4763254.htm on 21 July 2012. 58 The lists of Army academies are based primarily on the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2011, 

updated by information from the Chinese media. 
296 

more combined-arms orientation and will train infantry, armored, artillery, and air defense 

officers.59

The academies that fall under the General Political Department’s political system are: 

x Art Academy (or College) 

x Political Academy, Nanjing (with Shanghai branch) 

x Political Academy, Xi’an 

The academies that fall under the General Logistics Department’s logistics system are: 

x Logistics Academy, Beijing 

x Logistics Engineering Academy, Chongqing 

x Military Transportation Academy, Tianjin 

x Military Economics Academy, Hubei 

x Military Medical Sciences Academy, Beijing (with Military Veterinary Research Institute 

in Jilin) 

x Second Military Medical University, Shanghai 

x Third Military Medical University, Chongqing 

x Fourth Military Medical University, Xi’an 

x Vessels (Army Ship) Academy, Zhenjiang 

The academies that fall under the General Armament Department’s armament system are: 

x Armament Academy, Huairou, Beijing 

x Armored Force Engineering Academy, Changxindian, Beijing 

x Armored Force Technical Academy, Changchun 

x Ordnance Engineering Academy, Shijiazhuang 

Many of the officer academies also have classes (instruction departments) for NCOs. 

Conclusion 

The Chinese government has presented a broad, general outline of how the PLA Army will 

modernize. Analysis of publicly available data provides evidence to support the implementation 

of China’s officially stated intentions. There is no doubt the PLA is smaller but more 

technologically-advanced than it was 15 years ago. The Army is estimated to be at least 25 

percent smaller in number of personnel with a similar reduction in the number of mobile combat 

units and the downsizing of many remaining divisions. All the while, its equipment has been 

upgraded through the introduction of new technology on new weapons platforms and new 

technologies added to older weapons still in the inventory. Nonetheless, less than half of the 

equipment in the force can now be considered modern (much less state-of-the-art) and the 

modernization of the full force is still many years away. Even the public 2020 goal calls only for 

“accomplishing mechanization and attaining major progress in informationization.” Achieving 

 

59 “PLA Army Officers Academy Established, Previously Was PLA Artillery Academy (䀓᭮ߋ䱶ߋߋᇈᆖ䲒ᡀ・

ࡽ䓛ᱟ䀓᭮ߋ⛞ޥᆖ䲒),” Xinhua, 2 November 2012, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-

11/02/c_111141649.htm on 21 July 2012. 
297 

full informationization will be sometime in the more distant future. Future personnel and force 

structure cuts could speed up this process by requiring fewer items of new equipment to be 

issued to a smaller force. 

National and Local Command Structures Still Focus on Mainland Defense 

While rumors of additional cuts to PLA personnel and force structure are common, no plans have 

been announced officially. If future cuts are made, many headquarters and combat maneuver 

units would likely be affected either through complete elimination or downsizing. Serious cuts in 

officer billets could be achieved by restructuring the MR, MD, MSD/garrison, and PAFD chain 

of command. Many billets in the 30-plus corps leader-grade provincial MDs and over 300 

division leader-grade MSD and garrison headquarters appear to accommodate senior officers in 

the last years of their careers before they retire. Abolishing or adjusting the size of many of these 

headquarters and redistributing their responsibilities could save the PLA money, which could 

then be applied to other uses. Such a restructuring, however, would almost certainly encounter 

significant bureaucratic opposition. Reforming the PLA’s top-heavy organization will not be 

easy, but could be justified in part by advances in communications and organizational 

effectiveness that allow fewer headquarters to command and control more units, as well as the 

monetary savings that would accrue. 

Even if potential future personnel cuts of several hundred thousand active-duty PLA personnel 

were to be borne primarily by the Army, the Army would still remain the largest service. Its 

officers would continue to dominate headquarters from Beijing to county-level through the MRMD-MSD-PAFD chain of command. This command system reflects a traditional continental, 

defensive orientation, which is only gradually being expanded beyond China’s borders and 

coastal waters. Despite the low probability of a major land invasion of the mainland, the PLA’s 

chain of command still is structured mainly to cope with such a threat by implementing defense 

mobilization at the regional or national level. The existing chain of command also appears 

structured to react to (and in some cases deter) a variety of domestic non-traditional security 

challenges, such as internal stability, terrorism, disaster relief, medical emergencies, etc. For 

these missions, local PLA reserve and militia units, commanded by MD, MSD, and PAFD 

headquarters, often are first-responders and provide manpower and equipment support before 

out-of-area forces of many types (military, paramilitary, and civilian) reach the scene. 

To date, though there has been significant change to the PLA force structure, there is little 

evidence to suggest the command and logistics structures have adapted to address the more likely 

combat and non-traditional security contingencies that may occur beyond China’s borders and 

near seas. PLA doctrine foresees many forms of joint campaigns executed beyond the Chinese 

mainland that will put naval, air force, or missile units in the lead role. Currently the existing 

peacetime chain of command will have to shift to an ad hoc wartime war zone command 

structure to accommodate the operational changes necessary to accomplish these long-distance 

joint missions. More efficient command structures have been discussed in the Chinese military 

media (mostly talk about flattening the command system), but major changes to the command 

structure (beyond the reduction of the number of MRs in the 1980s) that was created decades ago 

in a much different threat environment have yet to be implemented. Imagine the impact on PLA 

culture if a coastal MR were to be commanded by a naval officer or if the Beijing MR were to be 
298 

commanded by an air force officer because of the threat from long-range, precision aerospace 

weapons. 

Operational and Tactical Force Structure Reflects Strategically Defensive Orientation 

Over the past 15 years downsizing has occurred in all military regions, even those in which no 

group armies were eliminated. In particular, despite the planning focus afforded the Taiwan 

contingency over this time period, the number of maneuver battalions in the three military 

regions opposite Taiwan (Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs) has been reduced considerably 

due to the downsizing of divisions to brigades and the changes in structure of the remaining 

divisions. (See Table 4.) At the same time, new equipment and weapons with longer ranges have 

increased the capabilities of the smaller force (though this has yet to be proved in actual combat). 

Perhaps the eventual plan is to transform all divisions into brigades, but before that is 

accomplished the educational system and force structure must be changed to build battalion 

headquarters that can function without the need for intervening regimental headquarters. 

Table 4. Army Maneuver (Infantry, Armored, Helicopter, and SOF) Units Opposite 

Taiwan 

Army Maneuver 1997 2012 

Group armies 9 8 

Infantry/Armored divisions 29 11 

Infantry/Armored brigades 5 19 

Brigade equivalents* 63 40 

Helicopter regiments/brigades < 3 3/2 

SOF groups/brigades < 3 1/2 

* Brigade equivalent = 5 battalions; 1 division = 2 brigade equivalents. 

While Army units have become more mechanized and informationized, their deployments 

continue to reflect a strategically defensive posture, emphasizing the Army’s mission to deter 

aggression against the Chinese mainland. Group armies and independent units have both 

offensive and defensive capabilities at the operational and tactical levels. The manner in which 

they will operate (offensively or defensively) depends on the military situation and the tasks 

assigned them, not on the location of their home garrisons. With only a few exceptions, large 

formations of ground troops are stationed at considerable distances from borders and would 

require long-distance movements to get into assembly areas and offensive positions. In nearly all 

cases, Army units would be required to move significant distances using land (road and rail), air, 

and water (sea or river) means of transportation (to say nothing of the logistics build-up 

necessary for any offensive action). In the era of satellite reconnaissance and social media, such 

movements are unlikely to be made in secret reducing the chances of ground forces attaining 

strategic surprise to close to zero. (Achieving operational and tactical surprise, however, could be 

possible through the use of deception and concealment measures.) 

Further reflecting the PLA’s strategically defensive and deterrence posture is the limited longdistance airlift capacity in the PLAAF, the limited number of medium and large amphibious 
299 

vessels in the PLAN, and the relatively small size of the Army’s helicopter force. The PLA’s 

logistics infrastructure remains focused on interior lines of communications, with minimal 

capacity to project and sustain forces on exterior lines. In order to conduct long-distance 

movements for large units, the use of civilian transportation and logistics/maintenance support is 

essential. PLA doctrine calls for the mobilization of civilian forces to support military campaigns. 

Such mobilization also is likely to compromise strategic surprise in the modern era. Mobilization 

could, however, be used to signal China’s intentions as part of China’s strategy of deterrence. 

As the Army continues to be reduced in size a major development to watch will be whether the 

PLA’s long-range sea and airlift capabilities are built up using some of the manpower billets and 

funds saved by shrinking the size of the ground force. A more mechanized Army requires much 

greater rail, sea, and air transport capacity and much larger fuel and repair requirements than the 

truck or foot-mobile forces of the past. The Army’s amphibious units outnumber the PLAN’s 

Marine force by two-to-one (two Army amphibious mechanized infantry divisions and one 

amphibious armored brigade to two Marine brigades). Yet most navy amphibious ships 

(including both Type 071 amphibious assault ships that have been commissioned) are assigned to 

the South Sea Fleet and provide support mainly to the two PLAN Marine brigades. The Army’s 

ship transport units provide transport, logistics, and reconnaissance support mostly to coastal 

defense units, but would be of little help in moving large formations over long distances at sea. 

Thus, the PLA’s potential for long-range amphibious operations appears for now to be found in 

the Marine brigades and not the Army. Likewise, except for some Army reconnaissance and SOF 

parachute capabilities, the vast majority of the PLA’s airborne (parachute) assault capability is 

found in the PLAAF’s three airborne divisions. 

Army aviation (helicopter) and special operations forces represent the Army’s main potential for 

putting boots on the ground in distant operational areas. (Unlike SOF units in some other 

countries, PLA SOF units are not supported by a wide array of special mission fixed wing and 

rotary wing aircraft and other enabling units to provide stealthy transport, firepower, and 

logistics support.) It appears likely that helicopter forces will continue to grow in size and 

diversify their mission capabilities. The creation of an airmobile force of brigade or multibrigade size is possible, but would require the addition probably of at least a hundred more 

helicopters in one region for such a force to be capable of operating on its own (without drawing 

on helicopters from other MRs).60 Moreover, a PLA airmobile force would take a number of 

years (if not a decade or more) to develop doctrine and practice helicopter operations up to and at 

the brigade level to attain the proficiency necessary for PLA leaders to have confidence in its 

employment. 

A final element indicating the PLA’s strategically defensive posture is the fulltime commitment 

of least 12 to 13 percent of the Army’s combat units to border and coastal defense. (Probably 

even larger percentages of PLAN and PLAAF units have primarily coastal/littoral defense or air 

defense of the mainland missions.) These units, located immediately on China’s borders, have 

defensive, early warning missions and are not suited for cross-border offensive operations. 

 

60 For the sake of comparison, according to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center website, the 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault) is “capable of inserting a 4,000 soldier combined arms task force, 150-kilometers into enemy 

terrain in one lift, and possess[es] 281 helicopters, including three battalions of Apache attack helicopters...” See 

“101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=21 on 21 July 2012. 
300 

Furthermore, they are unlikely to be moved from one region to another as reinforcements during 

times of emergency. The creation of the Border Defense Academy from the Xi’an Army 

Academy suggests that border defense units will continue to be an important part of the Army 

force structure. 

Smaller Forces Require Higher Readiness and Training Levels and a Positive Image 

The smaller Army, now and in the future, means that training will become even more important 

so that all units maintain a high level of operational readiness. A smaller force loses the luxury of 

designating only some forces as having priority for modernization or being assigned rapid 

reaction missions. In fact, over the past decade unit modernization is occurring in all military 

regions and all units are training more to achieve operational readiness. The emphasis on 

preparing all units for their deterrence, wartime, and non-traditional security missions is seen by 

the fact that units from all military regions take part in training with foreign militaries, are 

assigned UN peacekeeping missions, and respond to disaster relief and other emergencies as 

necessary. New equipment is found in all military regions, as is old equipment. Major training 

themes observed in all military regions include experimentation with command and control 

structures for joint operations, how to conduct combined arms operations at battalion level, 

testing trans-regional deployments within China, improving land-air integration, and conducting 

operations in complex electromagnetic environments on widely dispersed battlefields connected 

by improved communications and computer networks. 

Senior PLA leaders are well aware of the capabilities of their force. They have made realistic 

evaluations of the many obstacles to modernization yet to be overcome and are cognizant of the 

gap between PLA capabilities and that of other advanced militaries. Realistic evaluations of 

personnel qualities, force structure, training, logistics, and technological shortcomings are 

common in the PLA’s own internal writings. Such assessments are found much less frequently in 

the English-language PLA Daily, in their White Papers, and on Chinese television, all of which 

are used in media warfare campaigns to present the positive image China’s leaders want their 

own public and foreign audiences have about the PLA. 

This positive image the propaganda system seeks to portray to domestic and foreign audiences 

also is part of the PLA’s overall deterrence posture as it emphasizes newly developed capabilities 

and China’s willingness to use force to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. PLA 

leaders must silently smile to themselves as the foreign media exaggerate and sensationalize 

PLA capabilities and weapons systems in existence, in development, or in the form of plastic 

models. They probably also approve of the headline catching statements made by their own 

military punditry, both active duty and retired, who have no personal responsibilities for PLA 

readiness, but command the unquestioning attention of the domestic and foreign general media. 

Such bloviations may further the cause of deterrence, but if too extreme can be officially 

disavowed as the pundit’s “private opinion” and not reflecting Chinese policy. PLA leaders can 

be sure that such statements will receive more foreign attention than the actual progress the force 

is making, or problems it is facing, in accomplishing its modernization goals. 

PLA leaders probably have concluded that no amount of openness and transparency will satisfy 

their foreign critics. Therefore, they likely will continue to limit the amount of operational and 

tactical level details released in the White Papers. However, some important details will continue 
301 

to be published by their own media aimed at the domestic military and security audience. 

Individual details found in these sources are unlikely to attract widespread foreign public 

attention and the General Political Department system will constantly be alert for security 

violations. 

Understanding the PLA as organization will never be easy (in part because it is always changing), 

but some degree of comprehension is possible through the long-term analysis of the information 

available. In doing so, however, foreign analysts must not apply their own templates and 

predispositions to PLA intentions, capabilities, and force structure. As much as the PLA studies 

other militaries, it inevitably finds its own way of organizing its forces to achieve the objectives 

set for it by the Chinese Communist Party leadership. 
302 

Appendix 1: Maps of Ground Force Units, Subdepartments, and Reserves 

Figure 1: PLA Major Ground Units 

 
303 

Figure 2: PLA Joint Logistics Subdepartments 

 
304 

Figure 3: PLA Reserve Divisions and Brigades 
305 

Chapter Nine: The People’s Liberation Army Navy as an Evolving 

Organization 

Nan Li 

Introduction 

This chapter examines the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as an evolving organization. 

It addresses three sets of research questions. The first set deals with the issue of headquarterslevel concepts and command, control, and coordination. Specifically, what are the PLAN’s roles 

and missions? What constitutes the PLAN’s leadership and administrative and functional and 

departments (⎧ߋ亶ሬχޣ(, and what are their grades and ranks? How does the Party 

Committee decision style reconcile with the need for “singularly exercising power” (“уаһᵳ”) 

for a military organization such as the PLAN, and what is the relationship between the navy 

leadership and the PLAN headquarters’ first-level departments (а㓗䜘)? What organizational 

changes have occurred in the PLAN Headquarters’ first-level departments, and what subordinate 

departments constitute them? What are the selection trends of the PLAN leadership? 

The second set of questions has to do with the PLAN below the headquarters-level, including the 

fleet, base, and zhidui levels. What are the major combatant, research, and professional military 

education (PME) organizations that constitute the PLAN? What are their grades and ranks? What 

major organizational changes have been introduced to them? 

The third set of questions concerns the relationship between the evolution of the PLAN as an 

organization and China’s evolving naval strategy, as well as the relationship of the PLAN with 

other elements of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and defense industry organizations, 

mainly in terms of joint operations and naval equipment and armament development. How has 

the PLAN evolved with the changing Chinese naval strategy? What organizational changes have 

been introduced to enhance the coordination between the PLAN and non-PLAN organizations 

for joint operations and for naval equipment and armament development? 

It is important to note that this chapter intends to highlight the recent state of the PLAN, but not 

the history of the PLAN as an organization, except for where there have been important 

organizational changes over time. Neither is it about the future PLAN as an organization, even 

though it may provide a conceptual basis for thinking more meaningfully about future evolution 

of the PLAN as an organization. Moreover, it intends to stress the more important organizational 

aspects of the PLAN and related issues, rather than numerous organizational details of the PLAN. 

The author believes that these emphases are warranted by limits of space and the need for 

sharpened understanding of more important organizational issues. 

The chapter has three sections, each of which addresses the three sets of questions note above. 

Section 1 examines major issues associated with PLAN roles, missions, and headquarters-level 

leadership. Section 2 discusses the PLAN fleet and below organizations. Section 3 addresses 

major issues related to the relationship between the PLAN and the evolving naval strategy, joint 

operations, and civil-military integration. For major leaders and their background, administrative 

and functional departments, combat units, and research and PME institutions that constitute the 

PLAN, see the appropriate tables. In addition, a list of key terminology, such as zhidui and dadui, 
306 

can be found in the Introduction chapter. Finally, for a good overview of the PLAN’s 

organizational structure, see the Office of Naval Intelligence’s China’s Navy 2007.

1

PLAN Roles, Missions, and Headquarters-level Leadership 

China’s National Defense 2010 specifies the primary objectives and missions (ⴞḷ઼ԫ࣑ (of 

China’s national defense as “safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development 

interests,” particularly in terms of “defending the security of sovereign lands, inner and territorial 

waters, and sovereign air space,” “safeguarding maritime rights and interests ...” “opposing and 

deterring ‘Taiwan independence’...” and “safeguarding the important strategic opportunity for 

national development.” It also stresses the role of the PLA in “safeguarding world peace and 

stability” by “participating in United Nations peacekeeping, in maritime escort, in international 

counter-terrorism, and in disaster-relief operations.”2

These objectives and missions have clearly informed the roles and missions of the PLAN, which 

“places emphasis on modernizing the comprehensive combat capabilities and strengthening 

strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities as required by the near-seas defense strategy 

(䘁⎧䱢ᗑᡈ⮕), and on developing far-seas capabilities for cooperation and for coping with 

non-traditional security threats (ਁኅ䘌⎧ਸ֌оᓄሩ䶎Ր㔏ᆹޘေ㛱㜭࣋(.“3 In late 2011, 

PLAN commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, also stressed that “the scientific development of navy 

construction is the unified (balanced) development to enhance both near-seas capabilities (䘁⎧

㜭࣋ (and far-seas protection capabilities (䘌⎧䱢ছ㜭࣋(.“4 The near-seas defense strategy 

clearly aims to safeguard Chinese sovereign waters and maritime rights and interests in the “near 

seas” (Yellow, East and South China Seas); to oppose “Taiwan independence”; and to deter 

maritime territorial and interests disputes in the near seas from escalating to military conflicts 

that may jeopardize the window of strategic opportunity for national development. Far-seas 

strategy, on the other hand, intends to safeguard the expanding Chinese overseas development 

interests such as investment and personnel safety, particularly in times of crisis; and to enhance 

the security of vital sea lanes, on which shipment of goods and resources depends, against piracy 

and terrorism. The PLAN, for instance, deployed a naval frigate to the Mediterranean briefly in 

February 2011, to support evacuation of Chinese nationals during the Libyan crisis. But more 

importantly, since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed naval escort groups to Gulf of Aden 

(Horn of Africa) for continuous patrol to keep the sea lanes open against piracy.5

 

The PLAN’s Headquarters in Beijing, which is composed of leaders and administrative and 

functional departments, is the most important organization that operationalizes the objectives and 

missions of China’s national defense into the roles and missions of the PLAN and supervises the 

implementation of these roles and missions. Major components include the commander and 

 

1 China’s Navy 2007 can be found at www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. 2

 “China’s National Defense in 2010” (“2010 ѝഭⲴഭ䱢”), Xinhua, March 31, 2011. 3

 Ibid. 

4

 Wu Shengliˈ”Deeply Implement Important Strategic Thought of Primary Theme and Primary Line, Actively 

Push Better and Faster Development of Navy Construction” (“␡ޕ䍟ᖫѫ仈ѫ㓯䟽བྷᡈ⮕ᙍᜣˈ〟ɵ᧘ࣘ⎧ߋ

ᔪ䇮৸ྭ৸ᘛਁኅ”), People’s Navy (Ӫ≁⎧ߋ(, September 20, 2011. People’s Navy is a daily newspaper 

published by PLAN’s Political Department. 

5

 See “The Navy Convenes the Symposium on the 3rd Anniversary of Naval Escort in Gulf of Aden” (“⎧ߋਜᔰӊ

б(s)ᣔ㡚йઘᒤᓗ䈸Պ”). People’s Navy (Ӫ≁⎧ߋ(, January 12, 2012. 
307 

political commissar of the PLAN and their deputies; the PLAN Party Committee and its Standing 

Committee; and the four first-level departments, namely the Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘), 

Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘), and Equipment Department (㻵

༷䜘), which is often identified as the Armament Department. The second-level departments 

within each of these four departments reflect their specialized functions. The second-level 

departments are not necessarily in the correct protocol order, but represent the best estimate. See 

Table 1. 

 
308 

Table 1: Major Headquarters-level Departments

First-level 

departments 

Headquarters 

Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

Political 

Department (᭯

⋫䜘) 

Logistics 

Department (ਾऔ

䜘) 

Equipment Department 

(㻵༷䜘) 

Major 

second-level 

departments 

x General Office (ޜ࣎

ᇔ) 

x Operations 

Department (֌ᡈ䜘) 

x Intelligence 

Department (ᛵᣕ䜘, 

including technical 

bureau, or ᢰδተ, a 

third-level 

department) 

x Electronics 

Department (⭥ᆀ䜘) 

x Informatization 

Department (ؑ᚟ॆ

䜘, formerly 

Telecommunications, 

or 䙊ؑ䜘) 

x Training Department 

(䇝㓳䜘) 

x Military Affairs 

Department (࣑ߋ䜘, 

handling affairs for 

enlisted) 

x Naval Aviation 

Department (⎧㡚䜘) 

x Mobilization 

Department (ࣘઈ䜘) 

x Navigation Support 

Department (㡚؍䜘) 

x General Office 

x Organization 

Department (㓴

㓷䜘, handling 

party work) 

x Cadre 

Department (ᒢ

䜘䜘, handling 

personnel work 

for officers) 

x Propaganda 

Department (ᇓ

Ր䜘) 

x Liaison 

Department (㚄

㔌䜘) 

x Security 

؍) Department

ছ䜘, handling 

internal 

security) 

x Procuratorate 

(Ựḕ䲒) 

x Court (⌅䲒) 

x Headquarters 

Department (ਨ

Ԕ䜘) 

x Political 

Department (᭯

⋫䜘) 

x Combat services 

Department (ᡈ

औ䜘) 

x Finance 

Department (䍒

 (䜘࣑

x Quartermaster, 

Materials, and 

POL Department 

ᯉ⋨䴰⢙䍘ߋ)

䜘) 

x Military Ports, 

Airfields, and 

Barracks 

ߋ) Department

⑟ˈχ൪ˈ㩕ᡯ

䜘) 

x Health 

Department (ছ

⭏䜘) 

x Auditing Bureau 

(ᇑ䇑ተ) 

x Headquarters 

Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

x Political Department 

(᭯⋫䜘) 

x Supervision and 

Management 

Department (ⴁⶓ㇑

⨶䜘) 

x Comprehensive 

Planning Department 

(㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ䜘) 

x Ships and Vessels 

Department (㡠㡩䜘) 

x Electronics 

Department (⭥ᆀ䜘) 

x Weapons Department 

 (ಘ䜘ޥ)

x General-use 

Armament Support 

Department (䙊⭘㻵

 (䳌䜘؍༷

x Ship Technology 

Support Department 

(㡠㡩ᢰδ؍䳌䜘) 

x Aviation Technology 

Support Department 

(㡚オᢰδ؍䳌䜘) 

x Ordnance Support 

؍Ỡߋ) Department

䳌䜘) 

x Military 

Representative 

Bureaus (ߋԓተ) in 

Shanghai, 

Guangzhou, Wuhan, 

Shenyang, Xian, 

Chongqing, and 

Tianjin 

The PLAN is a military region (MR) leader-grade (↓བྷߋ४㙼) organization. As noted in the 

book’s Introduction, although the PLAN is an MR leader-grade organization, in 2004, Admiral 
309 

Zhang Dingfa was appointed to the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is China’s 

highest military policy making institution, and was assigned the grade of CMC member (ߋငင

ઈ).6

 However, the political commissar (PC), who serves as the Party Committee secretary, is an 

MR leader-grade officer. The grade and rank structure for the key leaders is shown in Table 2 

below. Note that each grade has a primary and secondary rank. See Section 2 and Appendix B in 

the Introduction chapter for information about the primary and secondary ranks for each grade. 

Table 2: Grade and Rank Structure for Headquarters-level Leadership 

Grade Leaders 

(Ranks) 

Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Political 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks) 

CMC 

Member 

PLAN 

Commander 

(ADM) 

 

MR 

Leader 

PLAN PC 

(ADM/VADM) 

 

MR 

Deputy 

Leader 

Deputy 

Commanders & 

Deputy PCs 

(VADM/RADM

) 

Chief of Staff 

(VADM/RADM) 

Director 

(VADM/ 

RADM) 

 

Corps 

Leader 

 Deputy Chiefs of 

Staff (RADM/ 

VADM) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(RADM/ 

VADM) 

Director/PC 

(RADM/ 

VADM) 

Director/PC 

(RADM/VADM

) 

Corps 

Deputy 

Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Deputy Directors 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Division 

Leader 

 2nd Level 

Departments 

(SCPT/RADM) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(SCPT/RADM) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(SCPT/RADM) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(SCPT/RADM) 

Because the PLAN’s grade is the same as the seven MRs where army officers hold the position 

of MR commanders, this MR/army-dominated PLA structure is clearly biased against non-army 

services such as the PLAN. This bias, however, may be gradually corrected. As noted above, 

Zhang Dingfa became a CMC Member in 2004, and his successor, Wu Shengli, was appointed as 

a CMC Member after he met the grade and rank time requirements in October 2007. Meanwhile, 

 

6

 When Zhang Dingfa died in mid-2006, Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, who at the time was serving as one of the 

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, was appointed as the new PLAN commander in August 2006. He did not receive 

his third star as an admiral until July 2007 and was not appointed as a CMC member until the 17th Party Congress in 

October 2007. See Section 2 of the Introduction Chapter for an explanation. Zhang was only the second PLAN 

commander to serve as a CMC member. The first was Xiao Jinguang, who was the commander from January 1950 

to December 1979 and served as a CMC member from November 1956 to September 1982. For information on Xiao, 

see Dictionary of China’s Communist Party Central Committee Members for 1921-2003, Beijing, Chinese 

Communist Party History Press, 2004, p. 864-865. 
310 

the seven MR commanders are not CMC Members.7

 Furthermore, if the plan to establish the 

PLA Army Headquarters in Beijing is implemented, the number of MRs and group armies and 

their sizes are likely to be further reduced to the extent that MRs may become genuine theater 

joint operations headquarters, where commanding officers from non-army services such as the 

PLAN may become MR commanders.8

At the headquarters level, important decisions are made by the PLAN Party Committee Standing 

Committee and important orders are cosigned by the commander, who serves as the Party deputy 

secretary, and the political commissar, who serves as the Party secretary. This committee-style 

decision and dual-command process may minimize the chances of arbitrary decisions, and may 

also allow for more time to search for political solutions in times of crisis. On the other hand, the 

general perception is that this consensus-building decision style may be too divisive and slow for 

crisis response, causing loss of opportunities and initiatives that may incur a high cost for the 

PLAN. 

While this perception may be true to a certain extent, it is also important to note that these 

processes are mostly for administrative decisions in times of peace, and should not be confused 

with operational or combat command, or making decisions in times of war. As explained by the 

PLA’s leading expert on operational command and control: 

The basic characteristic of operational command is centralized power (䳶ᵳ). 

That is, to let the commander make the operational decision on operational 

objective, force deployment, and basic fighting methods, and take personal 

responsibility for operational processes and victory and defeat. Power-sharing and 

making excuses are absolutely disallowed...Our army has consistently adhered to 

the principle that while both principal military and political officers hold common 

responsibility, the principal military officer is the first responsible person (ߋ᭯ѫ

ᇈޡ਼䍏䍓ˈߋһѫᇈѪᅮа䍏䍓Ӫ), enabling him to exercise power to 

command operations...Making timely decisions is the commander’s first 

responsibility and fundamental power (俆㾱㙼䍓઼สᴥᵳ࣋(. Any level of 

 

7

 Prior to the 12th Party Congress in 1982, the CMC had over 60 members, including all of the senior Army leaders. 

Since the 12th Party Congress, the number was decreased to only the senior General Department leaders, the 

Minister of Defense, and, since 2004, the commanders of the PLAN, Air Force, and Second Artillery. See “The 

Central Military Commission,” in Hu Guangzheng, ed., China Military Encyclopedia Version 2, Military 

Organization (ࡦߋ (Volume 1, Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, July 2007, p. 22-31. 8

 The December 2008 CMC meeting, for instance, allegedly reached a general consensus that the PLA would be 

gradually be downsized by 700,000 billets, mainly through eliminating more group armies and MR bureaucracies by 

consolidating the seven MRs into four, and by establishing an Army headquarters in Beijing to command all the 

remaining army units. Conversations with informed sources in Beijing in 2009. See also citations of two anonymous 

sources and Xu Guangyu, a retired PLA major general, in Benjamin Kang and Lucy Hornby, “China Air, Naval 

Boost Risks Raising Tension,” Reuters, September 30, 2009. Xu Guangyu, “Forecast on Important Changes in the 

Chinese Army Over the Next 20 Years,” Beijing Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Chinese, 27 July 2010. Du 

Gang, “Discussion of Requirements for Developing China’s Military Strength as Part of China’s Peaceful 

Development” (䇪ѝഭ઼ᒣਁኅѝⲴߋһ࣋䟿䴰≲), Strategy and Management (ᡈ⮕о㇑⨶), 2004-3, p. 56. 

Found at www.aisixiang.com/data/5096.html. 
311 

organizations cannot be allowed to substitute or weaken them under any excuse or 

in any form.9

Another commonly held perception is that the so-called “command relationship” (“ᤷᥕχޣ(“, 

whereby the PLAN first-level departments exercise command and control over the lower-level 

combat units.10 This may be a misperception because: 

Departments are the commander’s departments (χޣᱟᤷᥕઈⲴχޣ...(They 

assist (䖵ࣙ (the commander to command, but do not substitute for his command. 

They are the departments for that particular level of commander, but not for 

higher levels. Nor is the relationship to (lower-level) units a command 

relationship...The act of frequently issuing directives to lower-level corresponding 

departments must be forbidden, so that the highly effective functioning of the 

chain of command of “commander-units” can be ensured.11

It seems that the PLA’s understanding of intra-organizational relationships is not fundamentally 

different from the conception of “line and staff” developed by Western organizational theorists, 

namely that a formal organization consists of two major components: the vertical line-based 

formal authority consisting of officials with different grades or ranks; and the staff made up of 

professional and technical specialists who furnish specialized and technical advice to the line 

officials at a particular level.12

PLAN Headquarters Organizational Reforms 

The PLAN Headquarters’ first-level departments have experienced two major organizational 

changes since 1998, when the PLA created the General Armament Department (GAD) and each 

MR created a comparable Equipment Department. The first change involved creating an 

Equipment Department and the second involved abolishing the Naval Aviation Headquarters. 

PLAN Equipment Department Reforms 

In early 1961, the PLAN began reorganizing its equipment organizational structure into the 

following two departments to overcome various repair and maintenance problems: The Ship 

Repair and Building Department became the Equipment, Procurement, and Production 

Supervision Department (⎧ߋ㻵༷䇒䍗ᔪ䙐䜘); and The Logistics Department’s second-level 

 

9

 Senior Colonel Sun Ruling, “Singularly Exercise Power: Iron Law of Operational Command” (“ԕаһᵳ: ֌ᡈᤷ

ᥕⲴ䫱ࡉ(“, Study Times (ᆖҐᰦᣕ), March 26, 2012. Other works by Sun include Basic Theory for Operational 

Command (֌ᡈᤷᥕส⹰ᾲ䇪) (Beijing: National Defense University [NDU] Press, 2011), and Strategic 

Command Study (ᡈ⮕ᤷᥕ⹄ウ) (Beijing, NDU Press, 2009). Study Times is a weekly published by the Central 

Party School in Beijing. 

10 For a good explanation of command relationships, see PLA Military Terminology (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋ䈝), 

Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, December 2011, p. 175. 11 Sun, “Singularly Exercise Power.” 

12 See Peter M. Blau and W. R. Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1963), p. 172. 
312 

Armament Department (ਾऔ䜘ߋỠ䜘) became the Equipment Repair Department (㻵༷؞⨶

䜘).13

In 1963, the two departments were merged to become the Equipment Department (⎧ߋ㻵༷䜘). 

However, in 1974, following the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, a new Equipment and 

Technical Department (㻵༷ᢰδ䜘) was formed to supervise equipment R&D, building 

inspection, and repair. In 1985, the Navy re-established the Equipment Repair Department as a 

separate entity from the Equipment and Technical Department. The Equipment Repair 

Department incorporated repair for weapon systems, communications, radar, sonar, navigation 

support equipment, and defense rescue equipment. Following the establishment of the GAD in 

1998, the PLAN again combined the Equipment Repair Department with the Equipment and 

Technical Department, along with the Headquarters Department’s subordinate Equipment 

Department, as well as the Logistics Department’s subordinate Armament Department, into the 

Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘), and made it responsible for all naval equipment except 

vehicles, which remains the responsibility of the Logistics Department.14 

PLAN Naval Aviation Headquarters Reforms 

In approximately 1986, the Naval Aviation Department was re-subordinated under the 

Headquarters Department.15 In April 1952, the PLAN formally established the Naval Aviation 

Department as one of six separate administrative departments within PLAN Headquarters. Naval 

Aviation also became one of the PLAN’s five operational arms, along with the submarine, 

surface, marine corps, and coastal defense branches. Besides school closings, the Cultural 

Revolution had disastrous consequences across the board for Naval Aviation. The primary 

person responsible for Naval Aviation’s demise was the PLAN’s political commissar, Li 

Zuopeng, who was part of Defense Minister Lin Biao’s clique. Besides closing Naval Aviation 

schools, Li abolished Naval Aviation headquarters and its entire command staff in November 

1969. Therefore, aviation units within the fleets were left to themselves without guidance from 

the PLAN headquarters. The headquarters was not reestablished until May 1978.16

In October 2003, the CMC again abolished Naval Aviation Headquarters and assigned all of its 

directly subordinate units to fleet Naval Aviation Headquarters, which have existed since at least 

the 1980s. Since then, PLAN Headquarters has had a second-level Naval Aviation Department 

subordinate to the Headquarters Department and a second-level Naval Aviation Technical 

Support Department (i.e., aircraft maintenance) subordinate to the Equipment Department.17

To the extent that a first-level department tends to contribute to bloating of headquarters-level 

bureaucracy because it usually has numerous second and third-level departments, this change has 

 

13 China Today: Navy (ᖃԓѝഭ⎧ߋ(, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1989, p. 246, 253-254, 324, and 554-

555. See also “Historical Evolution of the PLAN’s Equipment Department” (“ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ⎧ߋ㻵༷䜘শਢ⋯

䶙”), February 10, 2011, www.360doc.com/content/11/0210/11/955164_91807512.shtml. 14 World Military Yearbook, 1999. 15 World Military Yearbook, 1987. 16. William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71, Praeger, 

New York, Washington, London, 1973, p. 550. Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: A Legacy of Turmoil, Penguin 

Books, New York, 1972, p. 429. China Today: Air Force, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1989, p. 481. 

17 http://blog.huanqiu.com/?uid-94458-action-viewspace-itemid-113448. 
313 

clearly helped to streamline the headquarters-level bureaucracy. But more importantly, it has 

helped to integrate naval aviation forces into the fleet command and operational structure. This is 

because rather than answering to a headquarters-level naval aviation bureaucracy, which tends to 

divorce these forces from the combat fleet, these forces now answer directly to the fleet 

commander through its fleet-level organization. 

Leadership 

What are the trends in PLAN leadership selection? Some criteria are quite constant and equal to 

candidates eligible for promotion to more senior grades or higher ranks. These are college 

education, political trustworthiness (all officers in commanding/leadership billets must be Party 

members), and age and term limits for different grades.18 What can make a difference in career 

prospects for different officers, or why some are promoted in grade and/or rank while others are 

not, seems to be related to naval arms specialization. As Tables 3 and 4 show, for instance, even 

though the PLAN lists submarines as first in protocol order of the five arms, followed by surface, 

aviation, marines, and coastal defense, the majority of flag officers (excluding political officers) 

specialize in surface warfare. Some may attribute this surface bias to the fact that PLAN 

commander Wu is a surface warfare officer. But this bias still existed when Zhang Dingfa, a 

submariner, was PLAN commander (2003-2006), or when Shi Yunsheng, a naval aviator, held 

this position (1996-2003). 

A more plausible explanation for this bias may be that surface ships have always constituted the 

biggest proportion of the PLAN forces. Because surface ships are more manpower-intensive if 

compared with naval combat aircraft and submarines, and PLAN marines and shore-based 

coastal defense arms are relatively small, they occupy the majority of PLAN manpower. This 

suggests that surface warfare officers form the largest pool for eligible officers to be selected for 

promotion. Also, because China has not been involved in a major maritime conflict for decades, 

the best ways to evaluate the performance and competence of naval officers selected for 

promotion include naval exercises and peacetime missions such as naval diplomacy and counterpiracy, which are most likely to involve surface ships rather than the other arms (See Tables 3 

and 4). 

 

 

18 See Law on Active Duty Officers of The People’s Republic of China (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⧠ᖩߋᇈ⌅) (Amended 

and issued by National People’s Congress [NPC] based on the decision at the 19th Meeting of the 9th NPC to amend 

this law on December 28, 2000); Regulations on PLA Officers and Ranks (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋᇈߋ㺄ᶑֻ) 

(Amended and issued by the NPC based on the decision at the 7th Meeting of the 8th NPC Standing Committee to 

amend these regulations on May 12, 1994); and Regulations on Appointing and Dismissing PLA Active Duty 

Officers (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ⧠ᖩߋᇈ㙼࣑ԫݽᶑֻ) (Issued by the CMC, January 4, 2002). 
314 

Table 3: Major PLAN Commanding Officers* 

Position and rank 

Party 

Committee 

Standing 

Committee 

Date of 

birth Unit origin Specialty 

Date of 

current 

position 

Previous position 

Wu 

Shengli 

Commander, 

ADM 

Deputy 

Secretary 

1945 East Sea 

Fleet (ESF) 

Surface 2006 Deputy Chief of 

PLA General Staff 

Liu 

Xiaojiang 

Political 

commissar (PC), 

ADM 

Secretary 1949 Railway 

Engineering 

Corps, Liu 

Huaqing’s 

personal 

secretary 

Political 

work 

2008 Deputy political 

commissar (DPC), 

PLAN 

Zhang 

Yongyi 

Deputy 

commander 

(DCDR), VADM 

Member 1950 North Sea 

Fleet (NSF) 

Naval 

aviation 

2004 Deputy chief of 

staff (DCOS), 

PLAN 

Ding 

Yiping 

DCDR, VADM Member 1951 South Sea 

Fleet (SSF) 

Surface 2006 DCOS, PLAN 

Su Shiliang DCDR, VADM Member 1950 NSF Surface 2010 Chief of staff 

(COS), PLAN 

Xu 

Hongmeng 

DCDR, VADM Member 1951 ESF Submarine 2009 Commander, ESF 

Liu Yi DCDR, VADM Member 1955 NSF Submarine 2011 DCDR, ESF 

Wang 

Zhaohai 

DPC, VADM Member 1950 NSF Political 

work 

2011 Director, PLAN 

Political 

Department 

Cen Xu DPC, VADM Member 1952 Unspecified Political 

work 

2011 ESF PC 

Du 

Jingcheng 

COS (chief of 

Headquarters 

Department) , 

VADM 

Member 1952 NSF Surface 2010 Commander, ESF 

Ma 

Faxiang 

Director, Political 

Department, 

VADM 

Member Unspecified Unspecified Political 

work 

2011 PC, PLAN Test 

and Training Base 

(Huludao) 

Xu Weibin Director, Logistics 

Department, 

RADM 

Member 1954 ESF Surface 2011 Commandant, 

Nanjing Naval 

Command College 

Hu Yuhao Director, 

Equipment 

Department, 

specialized and 

technical RADM 

(уъᢰδቁሶ) 

Member Unspecified Navy 

Equipment 

Department 

Navy 

engineer 

2010 Director, Shanghai 

Military 

Representative 

Bureau of PLAN 

Equipment 

Department 

*Materials in all the tables are gleaned from the Chinese military websites such as junshi.xilu.com (㾯䱶ߋһ㖁), 

conversations with informed sources in China, and People’s Navy. 
315 

Table 4: Fleet Commanding Officers 

Position and 

rank 

Date of 

birth Unit Origin Specialty 

Date of 

current 

position 

Previous 

position 

Tian Zhong Commander, 

NSF/ DCDR, 

Jinan MR, 

VADM 

1956 SSF Surface 2007 COS, NSF 

Bai Wenqi PC, NSF, RADM 1956 ESF Political 

work 

2012 PC, NSF 

Aviation 

Su Zhiqian Commander, ESF/ 

DCDR, Nanjing 

MR, VADM 

1955 SSF Surface 2010 Commander, 

SSF 

Ding Haichun PC, ESF/ DPC, 

Nanjing MR, 

VADM 

1955 Deng 

Zhaoxiang’s 

personal 

secretary 

Political 

work 

2011 PC, PLAN 

Logistics 

Department 

Jiang Weilie Commander, SSF/ 

DCDR, 

Guangzhou MR, 

VADM 

1955 ESF Surface 2010 Director, 

PLAN 

Equipment 

Department 

Wang 

Dengping 

PC, SSF/ DPC, 

Guangzhou MR, 

VADM 

1952 An 

unspecified 

group army 

Political 

work 

2012 PC, NSF 

On the other hand, the PLAN’s submarine force and naval aviation are usually represented in the 

top leadership echelon of the PLAN, even though they are not likely to constitute the majority 

that can dominate this echelon. These two arms are represented mainly because of their relative 

importance in combat. The submarine force, for instance, is the most survivable and therefore 

potent capabilities for both naval operations and strategic deterrence, while naval aviation is 

indispensable in providing air cover for naval operations, and may become increasingly 

important because of the introduction of aircraft carriers. Finally, because PLAN marines and the 

coastal defense arms are relatively small, they may occasionally but not regularly find 

representation in the PLAN leadership. 

Some may suggest that personal connections to the PLAN commander may make a big 

difference about career prospects of officers, that is, those who are from the East Sea Fleet (ESF), 

the unit origin of Admiral Wu, are more likely to be promoted. But as Table 4 shows, among the 

headquarters-level commanding officers (excluding political officers), four are from the North 

Sea Fleet (NSF), two (excluding Wu) from the ESF, and only one from the South Sea Fleet 

(SSF). Adding fleet-level commanding officers (see Table 5), those from the ESF and SSF rise to 

three. 

There are two plausible explanations for this seemingly balanced representation of the three 

fleets. One is that the higher-level, such as the CMC, has intentionally adjusted top PLAN 

personnel to achieve a more proportional representation of the three fleets. The other is that this 

more balanced representation is a random outcome. This is because the three fleets are similar in 
316 

size and therefore have similar pools of officers to be selected for promotion, which is likely to 

produce a similar number of senior officers from each of the three. 

On the other hand, if all other things - belonging to the right age group, sufficient time in grade 

and service, outstanding performance in commanding exercises or naval diplomacy and counterpiracy-related missions, and getting along with colleagues - are relatively equal among the 

candidates for promotion, then having close personal relations with the PLAN commander or PC 

are likely to make a difference as to who may be selected for promotion. 

Promotions, however, of senior political officers appears to be more related to personal 

connections such as serving as personal secretaries of former senior PLAN officers. Finally, 

some senior political officers did not rise through the ranks from within the PLAN, but were 

transferred to the PLAN from the Army. It is not clear why this has happened. Is it because, 

unlike professional and technological work, political work is more interchangeable for all 

services, or because this may enhance jointness? Or is it because these officers have personal 

connections to top PLA or Party leaders and therefore are freer to pick senior positions to take 

from different services? It is also not clear how this may be perceived within the PLAN, where 

many officers have worked hard in order to be promoted to these few top positions. 

PLAN Fleet and Below Organizations 

Since 2000, major organizational changes have occurred at the fleet and below levels, including 

the status of the fleet Logistics Department and Equipment Department, re-designation and 

changing of the grades for the eight corps-level bases that existed in 2000, and the restructuring 

of the combat and support vessels into different types of zhidui. Each of these reforms are 

discussed below. 

Fleet Headquarters Reforms 

Below the headquarters-level, the PLAN is organized into three geographically oriented fleets, 

namely, the NSF, ESF, and SSF. Since 1988, each fleet has been an MR deputy leader-grade 

organization, and headed by a commander and PC who hold the primary rank of vice admiral 

and secondary rank of rear admiral. Today, each fleet headquarters is composed of leaders and 

four first-level departments, which mirror PLAN Headquarters. 

In 1985, the PLAN changed the existing four-tiered logistics supply structure—PLAN 

Headquarters, Fleet Headquarters, support base, and units—to a three-tiered structure—PLAN 

Headquarters, support base, and units. As such, the three fleet headquarters no longer had a 

logistics administrative structure. Based on a review of available articles, it appears, however, 

that each fleet reinstituted a Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘) in early 2012.19 

 

19 See www.qd.chinanews.com/sailor/fc/201201/2411172.html, www.nbzx.org/info.aspx?aid=6896, and 

http://szb.gdzjdaily.com.cn/zjrb/html/2012-04/01/content_1572163.htm for references to the NSF, ESF, and SSF 

Logistics Department, respectively. On the newly established ESF Logistics Department tackling issues, see “A Real 

Account of the ESF Logistics Department Accelerating Resolution of Difficult Issues of Logistics Support” (“ь⎧

㡠䱏ਾऔ䜘࣐ᘛ⹤䀓؍䳌䳮仈㓚ᇎ”), People’s Navy (Ӫ≁⎧ߋ(, 30 March 2012. On a command and control 

exercise of the newly established NSF Equipment Department, see “An Account of the NSF Equipment Department 

Exploring Massive-Scale Equipment Support”) (“े⎧㡠䱏㻵༷䜘᧒リラབྷ㿴⁑㻵༷؍䳌㓚һ”), People’s Navy (Ӫ

≁⎧ߋ(, 22 May 2012. These articles mention that these departments are “just established” (“ࡊࡊᡀ・”). 
317 

A review of available information also indicates that none of the three fleets had an Equipment 

Department (㻵༷䜘) prior to 2012; however, it appears that each fleet created one in early 

2012.20 As a result, each fleet headquarters now mirrors the four first-level departments in PLAN 

Headquarters. 

Table 6 provides an overview of the fleet-level leader positions and first and second-level 

departments, along with the assigned primary and secondary ranks. 

Table 5: Grade and Rank Structure for Fleet-level Leadership

Grade Leaders 

(Ranks) 

Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Political 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks) 

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks) 

MR Deputy 

Leader 

Fleet 

Commander & 

PC 

(VADM/RADM) 

 

Corps Leader Deputy 

Commanders & 

PCs 

(RADM/VADM) 

Chief of Staff 

(RADM/VADM) 

Director 

(RADM/VADM) 

 

Corps Deputy 

Leader 

 Deputy Chiefs of 

Staff 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Deputy Directors 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Director/PC 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Director/PC 

(RADM/SCPT) 

Division 

Leader 

 Deputy 

Directors 

(SCPT 

/RADM) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(SCPT 

/RADM) 

Division 

Deputy Leader 

 2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/SCPT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/SCPT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/SCPT) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

(CPT/SCPT) 

Fleet Aviation 

The fleet aviation (⎧ߋ㡚オޥ (organization, which answers to the fleet commanding officers, 

is a corps leader-grade organization. The commander and PC have the rank of RADM or VADM, 

and concurrently serve as one of the fleet’s deputy commanders and deputy political commissars, 

respectively. Naval aviation units are organized into a traditional hierarchy of division (ᐸ), 

regiment (ഒ) battalion-level flight dadui (伎㹼བྷ䱏), and company-level flight zhongdui (伎㹼

ѝ䱏).21 As noted in the PLA Air Force chapter, the PLAAF began creating air brigades in 2012 

and Army Aviation has had air brigades for a few years, which may indicate that Naval Aviation 

 

20 See http://news.bandao.cn/news_html/201203/20120303/news_20120303_1827521.shtml, http://news. 

cntv.cn/20120716/114975.shtml, and http://news.china.com.cn/live/2012-10/21/content_16744239.htm for 

references to the NSF, ESF, and SSF Equipment Department, respectively. 21 It is important to note, however, that a flight dadui is different from a surface ship dadui (㡠㡷བྷ䱏) in grades 

(see Introduction chapter, Appendix A). While the former is of a battalion leader-grade organization and usually 

headed by a lieutenant commander or commander, the latter is of a regiment leader-grade organization and is headed 

by a captain or commander. 
318 

will soon begin transitioning to air brigades as well. Currently, except for helicopters that are 

shore-based but can be deployed onto certain vessels, all the other operational naval air 

capabilities are shore-based. As a result, naval air units also have their own AAA units to provide 

security of their airfields and assets against air and missile attacks.22 They also have subordinate 

radar units that provide maritime target acquisitions and navigation support. 

Restructuring of the PLAN’s Bases in 2004 

Based on a review of the Internet and the PLAN’s newspaper, People’s Navy (Ӫ≁⎧ߋ(, prior 

to 2004, each fleet had several subordinate bases (สൠ), which were either a corps leader- or 

corps deputy leader-grade organization, and could be categorized into three types: operations 

bases, test bases, and training bases. Of the total number of bases, the following eight were 

considered major operations bases: 

x North Sea Fleet 

 Qingdao, Shandong Province 

 Dalian (Lushun), Liaoning Province 

x East Sea Fleet 

 Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province 

 Fujian, Fujian Province 

 Shanghai 

x South Sea Fleet 

 Guangzhou, Guangdong Province 

 Yulin, Guangdong Province 

 Zhanjiang, Guangxi Autonomous Region 

x The PLAN also has four other specialized bases shown below: 

 Huludao, Liaoning Province is a missile test, research and development (R&D), and 

training base or test and training base. This base is sometimes noted simply as a Navy 

Test and R&D Base. Huludao is not an operational base like the eight bases noted 

above. 

 Jianggezhuang, Shandong Province, is for the PLAN’s ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBN) only. 

 Xiaopingdao, Liaoning Province (located in the NSF), was identified as housing a 

submarine zhidui but it is not considered a base 

 Daxiedao (Daxie Island), Zhejiang Province (located in the ESF), is a wharf or 

gangkou (⑟ਓ) only, and is not considered a base 

x A third type of base, which may or may not be co-located with an operational base, is a 

training base (䇝㓳สൠ) or training center (䇝㓳ѝ ᗳ). Whereas the head of each 

operational base is identified as the commander (ਨԔઈ), the head of a training base is 

identified as the director (ѫӪ). 

Administratively, each base has the same four first-level departments as PLAN Headquarters—

Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment Departments. 

 

22 During the 1980s, Naval Aviation had subordinate surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, but no longer has them. See 

China’s Navy 2007, Chapter 7 (Naval Aviation). 
319 

To create an organization capable of performing the types of missions the PLAN aspires to, in 

2004 the PLAN downgraded all eight of its bases from corps leader grade by one grade to corps 

deputy leader grade support bases (؍䳌สൠ). The responsibilities for the mew support bases 

following the downsizing included: 

x Equipment technical support 

x War materiel replenishment 

x Defensive operations 

This event marked a major change in the PLAN’s operational command and logistics structure: 

Command for destroyer zhidui, nuclear and conventional submarine units, landing ship zhidui, as 

well as other large and medium-sized vessels was removed from the eight downgraded bases and 

centralized into the three fleet headquarters.23 With their command and training responsibilities 

significantly reduced, support bases were now primarily responsible for providing logistics and 

equipment support to units stationed within their area of jurisdiction. Two major themes starting 

in 2004 focused on the PLAN first struggling to implement these new command relationships, 

and second, dealing with the confusion created by the reforms concerning units’ roles, 

relationships, and missions. 

The significance of the support base downgrading cannot be overstated. As a result of this 

downgrading, every billet in the command staff was downgraded, relationships with subordinate 

and higher-level units changed, and personnel were shuffled around. Support bases’ organization 

and missions were completely redefined. Additionally, within the support base structure, a 

number of administrative departments were merged and consolidated to eliminate unnecessary or 

redundant functions. For example, the Quartermaster Division, Materials Division, and POL 

Division were all combined into one single Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Division. 

Referred to as “binding” (᥶㔁), similar consolidations of roles and missions were implemented 

throughout all of the support bases’ divisions. 

According to a 14 July 2004 PLA Daily “National Defense Forum” article concerning the 

restructuring, the author stated that in early 2004 PLAN vessel units were reorganized into three 

separate levels according to their combat missions.24 Details from the article are shown below: 

x One purpose of the restructuring is for the Navy to reduce the number of command layers. 

Vessel zhidui with offensive combat capabilities will be directly subordinate to the fleet 

command, naval aviation will be delegated to the fleets, and the importance of the fleet 

level will be enhanced. In accordance with the strategic aim of offshore defense and the 

aim of Taiwan Strait combat missions, the navy will organize its combat ships into three 

layers for dealing with different combat missions and functions. 

 

23 Lou Douzi, “Looking at Navy and Air Force Dispositions Following Establishment Restructuring,” PLA Daily in 

Chinese, 14 July 2004. 

24 Ibid.
320 

x The first level consists of the frontline ship units, the navy’s fist units, the large- and 

medium-sized ships such as nuclear and conventional submarine zhidui, destroyer zhidui, 

and landing craft zhidui, and naval aviation long-range combat aircraft such as the J-8II, 

H-6, JH-7, and SU-30MK2. After the restructuring, these units will be directly 

commanded by the fleets, and will no longer be subordinate to support bases. In 

particular, the destroyer zhidui and nuclear and conventional submarines can undertake 

blue-water combat missions; at present they can fight up to the first island chain, and the 

submarines can fight up to the second island chain. 

x The second level consists of the units undertaking offshore combat missions; the offshore 

areas usually come under the economic zone, meaning the sea area within the first island 

chain. The ships undertaking combat missions in these areas are mainly medium-sized 

and small vessels such as frigates, minesweepers, submarine hunters, and guided missile 

escort boats. These ships can act as street sweepers in the strait in a Taiwan Strait 

campaign, or undertake blockade, mine laying, and other tasks. 

x The third level consists of combat support vessels, such as service ships, and defense and 

rescue vessels. From the material revealed so far, the three main fleets have newly 

organized three to four combat support vessel zhidui, and large supply ships for working 

with the large surface ships in blue-water combat will soon proceed from the shipyards to 

the military wharves. 

Restructuring of the PLAN’s Bases in 2012 

It appears that the PLAN began downgrading at least some of its eight support bases to division 

leader-grade garrisons (≤䆖४) during 2012 as noted below: 

x In February 2012, the Zhoushan Support Base was renamed the Zhoushan Garrison (㡏ኡ

≤䆖४).25 

x In July 2012, the Shanghai Support Base was renamed the Shanghai Garrison (к⎧≤䆖

४) with the responsibility of supporting minesweeping and chemical defense combat 

missions.26 

 

 

25 See “Zhoushan Garrison is Created,” 12 February 2012 at www.xici.net/d163458641.htm. 

26 Zhang Jun, “Naval Shanghai Garrison Created to Provide Minesweeping and Chemical Defense Support to 

Combat Missions (⎧ߋк⎧≤䆖४ᡀ・ 㛙䍏ᢛ䴧䱢ॆ᭟ᨤ֌ᡈԫ࣑“(, PLA Daily, 12 July 2012, found at 

http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_07/12/15976180_0.shtml. 
321 

Figure 1: Location of PLA Navy Fleets 

As of late 2012, the Qingdao, Guangzhou, Dalian, and Fujian support bases were still in 

existence.27 No information was found either way to indicate that the Yulin and Zhanjiang 

support bases had become a garrison. See Tables 6, 7, and 8 for details of these bases. 

 

 

27 See www.sdchangwei.com/yiyuandongtai/370.html, www.gzmz.gov.cn/business/htmlfiles/gzsmzj/qxdt/ 

201210/994118.html, www.hynews.net/2012/0907/145512.shtml, and http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-03-

31/082422213782.shtml, respectively 
322 

Table 6: North Sea Fleet 

Leaders and departments 

(Qingdao) 

Fleet Aviation (㡠䱏㡚オ

 (Qingdao) (ޥ

Dalian Support Base (؍

䳌สൠ) 

1st Submarine 

Base (▌㡷สൠ) 

(Qingdao) 

x Commander and PC ( MR 

deputy leader-grade) and 

their deputies (corps 

leader-grade) 

x Command, political, 

logistics and armament 

departments 

x Directly subordinate units 

(ⴤ኎䱏) include 

Electronic Confrontation 

Regiment (Jiaonan of 

Shandong), and 

Telecommunications 

General Station (䙊䇟ᙫㄉ, 

regiment-grade, Qingdao) 

x Fleet Training Base 

(Lushun): leaders and 

departments, and four 

training dadui (two in 

Qingdao, one in Lushun 

and one in Weihai) 

x Ship Training Center 

(Qingdao): leaders and 

departments, and training 

dadui 

x Submarine Testing and Sea 

Trial and Training Base 

(Dalian), with Great Wall 

200 Submarine 

x Warship and Submarine 

Armament Testing and Sea 

Trial Base (Dalian): leaders 

and departments, 

Subsurface Armament Test 

Institute, 1st Test Zone 

(missiles), 3rd Test Zone 

(electronic confrontation), 

and 4th Test Zone 

(subsurface weapons) 

x Navy Testing and Training 

Base (Huludao of 

Liaoning) 

x Commander and PC 

(corps leader-grade) 

and their deputies 

x Command, political, 

logistics and 

armament 

departments 

x 2nd Division (Dalian): 

leaders and 

departments, 4th 

Regiment (Laiyang, 

Y8J AEWs and other 

Y8 variants), 5th

Regiment (Qingdao, 

floatplanes), 6th

Regiment (Dalian, H6 

variants) 

x 5th Division (Yantai): 

leaders and 

departments, 14th

Regiment (Laishan, 

JH7As), and 15th

Regiment (Jiaozhou, 

J8 variants) 

x 6th Independent 

Regiment (Qingdao, 

ship-borne 

helicopters) 

x 2nd Air Defense 

Regiment (Qingdao) 

x 4th Radar Brigade 

(Qingdao) 

x Commander and PC 

(corps deputy leadergrade) and their 

deputies (division 

leader-grade) 

x Command, political, 

ship shore services 

departments (㡠㡷የ

औ䜘), armament 

x Rescue and Salvage 

Ship Dadui (བྷ䱏) 

(regiment-grade): 

Rescue Ships 137 and 

138, Tugboat 618, 

salvage zhongdui (ѝ

䱏) 

x Service Ship Dadui: 

Service Ship 736, 

Inspection Ship 02, 

Oil Supply Ships 563, 

560, 555, Water 

Supply Ship 572 

x Ship technology 

support dadui, field 

fuel pipeline dadui, 

and 

telecommunications 

station 

x First Observation and 

Communications (㿲

䙊) Regiment 

x Leaders and 

departments 

similar to 

Lushun NB 

x Nuclear 

submarines 

x Crew Teams 

(㡷ઈ䱏) 

Submarine 

support 

facilities and 

capabilities 

such as 

tenders 

 
323 

Table 7: East Sea Fleet 

Leaders and Departments (Ningbo) Fleet Aviation (Ningbo) Fujian Support Base 

x Same as in Table 4 

x Directly subordinate units include 

Electronic Confrontation Regiment 

(Ningbo) and Telecommunications 

General Station (Ningbo) 

x Fleet Training Base (Wusong): 

leaders and departments, and three 

training dadui

x Ship Training Center (Ningbo): 

leaders and departments, training 

dadui

x Leaders and departments 

same as in Table 4 

x 44th Division (Taizhou of 

Zhejiang): leaders and 

departments, 10th Regiment 

(Feidong of Anhui, 

SU30MK2s), 11th Regiment 

(Ningbo, KA28s), and 12th

Regiment (Taizhou, J10As) 

x 6th Division (Dachang of 

Shanghai): leaders and 

departments, 16th Regiment 

(Dachang, JH7s), 17th

Regiment (Changzhou, H6 

variants), and 18th Regiment 

(Yiwu, JH7As) 

x 4th Independent Regiment 

(Ningbo, ship-borne 

helicopters) 

x Second Radar Brigade 

(Wenling) 

x 8th Air Defense Brigade 

x Leaders and departments 

same as in Table 4 

x 3rd Frigate Dadui

(Sandu’ao): Frigates 515, 

516, 517, 518, 533, 534 

x Service Ship Dadui

(Ningde) 

x 1st Observation and 

Communications Brigade 

 
324 

Table 8: South Sea Fleet 

Leaders and departments 

(Zhanjiang) Fleet Aviation (Haikou) Yulin Support Base 2nd Submarine Base (Yalongwan) 

x Same as in Table 4 

x Directly subordinate units 

include Electronic 

Confrontation Regiment and 

Telecommunications General 

Station 

x Fleet Training Base 

(Dongguan): leaders and 

departments, and four training 

dadui

x Ship Training Center 

(Zhanjiang): leaders and 

departments, and training dadui

x Navy Special Operations Dadui

(Sanya) 

x Hong Kong Ship Dadui: leaders 

and departments, Escort Crafts 

770, 771, 772, and 773, 

Landing Crafts 7593, 7594, and 

7595, Transport Ships 85 and 

86, Tugboat 169, patrol craft 

zhongdui

x Leaders and 

departments 

x 8th Division (Jialai of 

Hainan): leaders and 

departments, 22nd

Regiment (Jialai, 

JH7As), 23rd Regiment 

(Guiping of Guangxi, 

H6 variants), 24th

Regiment (Jialai, J7Bs) 

x 9th Division (Lingshui 

of Hainan): leaders and 

departments, 25th

Regiment (Lingshui, J8 

variants), and 27th

Regiment (Ledong, 

JH7As) 

x 7th Independent 

Regiment (Sanya, shipborne helicopters) 

x 7th Air Defense 

Brigade (Sanya) 

x 3rd Radar Brigade 

(Haikou) 

x Yongxindao Island Air 

Station 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Replenishment Ship 

863 

x Rescue and Salvage 

Ship Dadui (Sanya): 

Salvage Ships 502, 

503 and 519, Tugboat 

154, and a diving 

zhongdui

x Service Ship Dadui

(Sanya): Water 

Supply Ships 960 and 

964, Transport Ships 

831 and 832, Service 

Ship 202, Oil Supply 

Ship 967, Medical 

Ship 09 

x 46th Independent 

Shore-based Missile 

Battalion 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Nuclear 

submarines 

x Crew teams 

x Submarine support 

facilities and 

capabilities 

PLAN Garrisons 

The PLAN also has several garrisons (≤䆖४), which are division leader-grade organizations. 

Garrisons are responsible primarily for coastal patrol, coastal defense, and protecting fishing 

boats in their area of responsibility. Garrisons generally have only boats (㡷) rather than ships 

(㡩 and 㡠) assigned to them. As a result, they possess short-range, surface anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW), anti-ship, and minesweeping capabilities. They also have shore-based anti-ship 

cruise missile capabilities. For details of these garrison districts, see Tables 9, 10, and 11. As of 

late 2012, the PLAN had at least eight subordinate garrisons as shown below: 

x North Sea Fleet: Dalian and Weihai 

x East Sea Fleet: Xiamen, Shanghai, and Zhoushan 

x South Sea Fleet: Shantou, Beihai, and Xisha (Paracel Islands) 

 The South Sea Fleet also has a subordinate organization called a shoubei budui (ᆸ༷

䜘䱏), which is usually also translated as “garrison,” in the Nansha (Spratly Islands). 

It is not clear what the grade level for this organization is, but it is most likely below 

that of a division. 
325 

Table 9: North Sea Fleet 

Weihai Garrison Dalian Garrison 

x Leaders and departments similar to Qingdao 

Garrison 

x 71st Sub-chaser Dadui: Sub-chasers 606, 610, 

619, 621, 622, 624, 625, 62782nd Sub-chaser 

Dadui: Sub-chasers 611, 612, 613, 634, 635, 

705, 710, 711) 

x 11th Shore-Based Missile Regiment (Weihai): 

leaders and departments, and YJ62 battalions 

x Leaders and departments 

x 11th Minesweeper Dadui (Lushun): 

Minesweepers 811, 812, 813, Minelayer 814 

x 77th Sub-chaser Dadui (Dalian): Sub-chasers 

620, 626, 628, 632, 633, 708, 709 

x 80th Sub-chaser Dadui (Dalian): Sub-chasers 

614, 629, 630, 631, 700, 701, 706, 70712th

Shore-based Missile Regiment (Dalian): 

leaders and departments, and missile 

battalions 

Table 10: East Sea Fleet 

Zhoushan Garrison (formerly a 

support base) 

Shanghai Garrison (formerly a 

support base) Xiamen Garrison 

x Leaders and departments

x 9th Minesweeper Dadui (Daishan): 

Minesweepers 807, 808, 833, 834 

x 72nd Sub-chaser Dadui (Putuo): 

Sub-chaser 688, 693, 741, 743, 

744, 761, 762, 763 

x Service Ship Zhongdui

x 13th Integrated Regiment 

(Dinghai): air-defense and shorebased anti-ship cruise missile 

battalions 

x Ship technology support dadui, 

ordnance technology support 

dadui, fuel technology support 

dadui, missile technology station, 

port management office, 

telecommunications station, signals 

station, meteorological station, 

materiel supplies station, ordnance 

repairs factory, vehicle repairs 

factory, navigation support repairs 

factory, ordnance and fuel storage 

depots, observation and 

communications battalion, vehicle 

battalion 

x Leaders and departments 

x 8th Frigate Dadui (Wusong): 

Frigates 511, 512, 513, 514 

x 79th Sub-chaser Dadui

(Wusong): Sub-chasers 650, 

686, 687, 689, 692 

x 4th Minesweeper Dadui

(Wusong): Minesweepers 

800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 

806, 830, 831, 832 

x 21st Escort Craft Dadui

(Hengsha): two zhongdui

x Service and Transport Ship 

Dadui (Gaoqiao): Transport 

Ship 755, Oil Supply Ships 

621 and 632, Tugboat 852, 

service ship zhongdui 

x Leaders and departments 

x 83rd Sub-chaser Dadui

(Xiamen): Sub-chasers 685, 

695, 696, 699, 712, 713, 742 

x 29th Escort Craft Dadui

(Pingtan): three zhongdui
326 

Table 11: South Sea Fleet 

Shantou Garrison Beihai Garrison Xisha Garrison (Changxindao 

Island) 

x Leaders and departments 

x 2nd Frigate Dadui (Shantou): 

Frigates 560, 561, 562, 563 

x 5th Missile and Escort Crafts 

Dadui (Shantou): Type 022 

missile FACs, Escort Crafts 674, 

677, 766, 767, 774, 775 

x Shore-based missile regiment 

(Shantou): leaders and 

departments, and YJ62 battalions 

x Ordnance technology support 

dadui

x Leaders and departments 

x 76th Sub-chaser Dadui (Xuwen): 

Sub-chasers 678, 720, 724, 725, 

726, 730 

x 81st Sub-chaser Dadui (Beihai): 

Sub-chasers 721, 722, 723, 728, 

729, 732 

x Leaders and departments 

x Escort Craft Zhongdui

x Xisha garrison unit (regimentgrade) 

x Nansha garrison unit 

(regiment-grade) 

Combatant and Support Zhidui and Below Organizations 

The mobile, operational components of the three fleets are the combatant zhidui (᭟䱏), which 

are supported by combat support vessel zhidui (֌ᡈ᭟ᨤ㡠᭟䱏). (See Introduction chapter 

Appendix A for discussion of zhidui, dadui, and zhongdui terminology.) These zhidui are 

differentiated by roles and missions mainly in terms of near-seas surface operations, subsurface 

operations, amphibious operations, and combat support. Every organization and vessel has a 

commander and political officer who have the same grade and are assigned one of two ranks. 

The PLAN’s surface forces are organized into three levels of headquarters as follows:28 

x Zhidui are division-leader organizations and the commander and political commissar 

have the rank of senior captain or rear admiral 

x Dadui are regiment-leader organizations and the commander and political commissar 

have the rank of captain or commander 

x Zhongdui are battalion-leader organizations and the commander and political officer have 

the rank of lieutenant commander or commander. 

Because the PLA’s organizational structure does not allow for an organization at one level to be 

subordinate to another organization at the same level, each PLAN vessel has a lower grade than 

its headquarters. Table 12 shows the types of headquarters and their assigned grade. In addition, 

the assigned grade for each type of the PLAN’s surface vessels is shown.

 

 

28 Information in this subsection comes from China’s Navy 2007, Chapter 6 (Surface Forces). 
327 

Table 12: Surface Force Headquarters and Vessel Grades 

PLA Grades Naval Headquarters Levels Vessel Types and Grades 

MR Leader Navy HQ None 

MR Deputy Fleet HQ None 

Corps Deputy Support Base None 

Division Leader Garrison 

Zhidui 

None 

Regiment Leader Dadui Destroyers 

Regiment 

Deputy 

None Frigates and service ships 

Battalion Leader Zhongdui Escort boats (3-digit hull numbers) 

Landing ships (3-digit hull numbers) 

Minesweeper ships (3-digit hull 

numbers) 

Service ships and submarine chasers 

Company Leader None Escort boats (4-digit hull numbers) 

Landing craft (4-digit hull numbers) 

Minesweeper boats (4-digit hull 

numbers) 

Missile boats (4-digit hull numbers) 

Missile speedboats (4-digit hull numbers) 

Service ships 

In the early 2000s, the PLAN began restructuring its surface forces’ organizational structure to 

better meet its operational needs. Today, each fleet has a destroyer zhidui that is composed of 

subordinate destroyers and frigates. Whereas the destroyers are directly subordinate to the zhidui, 

the frigates are subordinate to a dadui, which is subordinate to the zhidui. The reason for this is 

that the PLAN’s destroyers are considered regiment leader-grade organizations, so they cannot 

be subordinate to a dadui, which is also a regiment leader-grade organization. Therefore, they are 

directly subordinate to the division leader-grade zhidui. However, frigates, which are regiment 

deputy leader-grade organizations, are subordinate to a dadui, which is, in turn, subordinate to 

the destroyer zhidui. Table 13 shows the organizational relationship for destroyers and frigates 

within each fleet. 

 
328 

Figure 2: PLAN Destroyer Zhidui Structure 

In addition, in 2004 the PLAN created a new zhidui-level organization identified as a Combat 

Support Vessel Zhidui (֌ᡈ᭟ᨤ㡠᭟䱏) in each fleet. Several existing vessel dadui were resubordinated to the zhidui to provide better guidance for support for combat vessels at sea. Table 

14 provides a general overview of the types of zhidui, dadui, and zhongdui subordinate to each 

fleet headquarters.

Figure 3: Types of Surface Force Zhidui, Dadui, and Zhongdui by Fleet 

When vessels from the same or different zhidui and dadui are organized into task forces (㕆䱏), 

the task force is assigned the grade of the vessel with the highest grade, not that of the officer 

with the highest grade. For example, if a deputy fleet commander, who is a corps leader-grade 

officer, is the task force commander and is aboard a destroyer, the grade of the task force is still 
329 

that of the regiment leader-grade destroyer. For details of each fleet’s zhidui, see Tables 13, 14, 

and 15. 

Table 13: North Sea Fleet 

1st Destroyer 

Detachment 

(᭟ 䱏) (DD) 

(Qingdao) 

10th DD 

(Lushun) 

2nd Submarine 

Detachment 

(SD) 

(Qingdao) 

12th SD 

(Lushun) 

1st Fast 

Attack Craft 

Detachment 

(FACD) 

(Qingdao) 

1st Combat Support Ship 

Detachment (CSSD) 

(Qingdao) 

x Commander 

and PC 

(division 

leadergrade) and 

their 

deputies 

x Command, 

political, 

ship shore 

services, 

and 

armament 

departments 

x Destroyers 

106, 107, 

108, 109, 

112, 113, 

115, 11614th 

x Frigate 

Dadui: 

Frigates 

535, 536, 

537 

x Leaders 

and 

Departm

ents 

x Destroye

rs 105, 

110, 163, 

164 

x Frigates 

538 and 

550 

x 7th

Frigate 

Dadui

(Dalian): 

Frigates 

519, 543, 

545 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Boats 274, 

315, 316, 

317, 335, 

341, 342, 

349, 352, 

353, 354, 

355 

x Crew teams 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Boats 350, 

356, 357, 

358, 359, 

360, 361, 

362, 363 

x Crew teams 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Missile 

Craft 

Dadui: 

Type 022 

missile 

FACs 

x 4th Escort 

Craft 

Dadui: 

Escort 

Crafts 651, 

652, 653, 

654, 655, 

656 

x 1st Landing 

Craft 

Dadui: 

Landing 

Crafts 911, 

912, 3111, 

3113, 3115, 

3116, 3117, 

3128, 3129 

x Engineering 

Ship Dadui

(Qingdao) 

x Leaders and departments 

x Replenishment Ships 861 

and 881 

x Service Ship Dadui: 

Tugboat 717, Service 

Ship 735, Oil Supply 

Ships 400 and 565, Water 

Supply Ship 590Rescue 

and Salvage Ship Dadui: 

Salvage Ship 122, 

Tugboats 710 and 711, 

Salvage Ship Zhongdui

x Surveillance and 

Measurement Ship 

Dadui: Survey Ships 900 

and 998, Icebreakers 721, 

722 and 723, 

Measurement Ship 943, 

Buoy Tenders 982 and 

983, Fishing Trawlers 

425 and 427 

 
330 

Table 14: East Sea Fleet 

3rd DD 

(Zhoushan) 

6th DD 

(Zhoushan) 

22nd SD 

(Ningbo) 

42nd SD 

(Xiangshan 

of 

Zhejiang) 

16th FACD 

(Wenzhou) 

21st FACD 

(Ningde) 

2nd CSSD 

(Zhoushan) 

5th Landing 

Craft 

Detachment 

(LCD, 

Wusong) 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x Destroyer

s 136, 

137, 138, 

139 

x Frigates 

525, 526, 

527, 528, 

529, 530 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x Destroyer

s 131, 

132, 133, 

134 

(flagship) 

x Frigates 

521, 522, 

523, 524, 

539, 540, 

541, 542, 

548, 549 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x Boats 

279, 314, 

320, 321, 

322, 323, 

324, 325 

x Crew 

teams 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x Boats 

364, 365, 

366, 367, 

368, 369 

x Crew 

teams 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x Missile 

Craft 

Dadui: 

Type 022 

missile 

FACs 

x 26th

Escort 

Craft 

Dadui

(Wenzho

u): three 

zhongdui

x 72nd Subchaser 

Dadui

(Zhousha

n): Subchasers 

688, 693, 

741, 743, 

744, 761, 

762, 763 

x 3rd

Landing 

Craft 

Dadui

(Ningbo): 

Landing 

Crafts 

941, 942, 

943, 944. 

3229, 

3232, 

3233, 

3234, 

3235, 

3244 

x Leaders 

and 

departme

nts 

x 31st

Missile 

Craft 

Dadui

(Fuding): 

Type 022 

missile 

FACs 

x 3rd Escort 

Craft 

Dadui

(Fuding): 

Escort 

Crafts 

757, 758, 

759, 760, 

764, 765 

x 78th Subchaser 

Dadui

(Sandu’ao

): Subchasers 

680, 681, 

682, 683, 

740 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Replenishm

ent Ships 

882, 862 

and 886 

x Salvage and 

Rescue Ship 

Dadui

(Fenghua): 

Rescue 

Ships 304 

and 332, 

Tugboat 830 

x Surveillance 

and 

Measureme

nt Ship 

Dadui

(Ningbo): 

Measureme

nt Ships 

226, 227 

and 229, 

Survey 

Ships 223 

and 232 

(Ship 851) 

x Service Ship 

Dadui

(Zhoushan): 

Service 

Ships 3226, 

3227, 3228, 

Oil Supply 

Ship 626 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x 14th Dadui

(Wusong): 

Landing 

Crafts 927, 

928, 929, 

930, 931, 

932, 933 

x 15th Dadui

(Wusong): 

Landing 

Crafts 905, 

906, 907, 

908, 909, 

910, 913, 

939, 940 

 
331 

Table 15: South Sea Fleet 

Leaders and departments 

(Zhanjiang) Fleet Aviation (Haikou) 

Yulin Naval Base 

(formerly a support 

base) 

2nd Submarine Base 

(Yalongwan) 

x Same as in Table 4 

x Directly subordinate units 

include Electronic 

Confrontation Regiment and 

Telecommunications General 

Station 

x Fleet Training Base 

(Dongguan): leaders and 

departments, and four training 

dadui

x Ship Training Center 

(Zhanjiang): leaders and 

departments, and training dadui

x Navy Special Operations Dadui

(Sanya) 

x Hong Kong Ship Dadui: leaders 

and departments, Escort Crafts 

770, 771, 772, and 773, 

Landing Crafts 7593, 7594, and 

7595, Transport Ships 85 and 

86, Tugboat 169, patrol craft 

zhongdui

x Leaders and 

departments 

x 8th Division (Jialai of 

Hainan): leaders and 

departments, 22nd

Regiment (Jialai, 

JH7As), 23rd Regiment 

(Guiping of Guangxi, 

H6 variants), 24th

Regiment (Jialai, J7Bs) 

x 9th Division (Lingshui 

of Hainan): leaders and 

departments, 25th

Regiment (Lingshui, J8 

variants), and 27th

Regiment (Ledong, 

JH7As) 

x 7th Independent 

Regiment (Sanya, shipborne helicopters) 

x 7th Air Defense 

Brigade (Sanya) 

x 3rd Radar Brigade 

(Haikou) 

x Yongxindao Island Air 

Station 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Replenishment Ship 

863 

x Rescue and Salvage 

Ship Dadui (Sanya): 

Salvage Ships 502, 

503 and 519, Tugboat 

154, and a diving 

zhongdui

x Service Ship Dadui

(Sanya): Water 

Supply Ships 960 and 

964, Transport Ships 

831 and 832, Service 

Ship 202, Oil Supply 

Ship 967, Medical 

Ship 09 

x 46th Independent 

Shore-based Missile 

Battalion 

x Leaders and 

departments 

x Nuclear 

submarines 

x Crew teams 

x Submarine support 

facilities and 

capabilities 

The PLAN’s two marine brigades are under the command of the SSF. Stationed in Zhanjiang, 

Guangdong Province where the SSF headquarters is located, both are division deputy leadergrade organizations, whose commander and PC are captains or senior captains. Converted from 

infantry units, these marine brigades are clearly intended for amphibious operations in possible 

armed conflicts in the South China Sea. See Table 18 for locations, types, and sizes of the PLAN 

marine units. 

 
332 

Table 16: South Sea Fleet 

6th LCD (Zhanjiang) 1st Marine Brigade (Zhanjiang) 164th Marine Brigade (Zhanjiang) 

x Leaders and departments 

x LPDs 989, 998, 999, and LCAC 

3320 

x 2nd Dadui (Zhanjiang): Landing 

Crafts 934, 935, 936, 937, 990, 

991 

x 16th Dadui (Zhanjiang): Landing 

Crafts 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 

997 

x 17th Dadui (Guangzhou): 

Landing Crafts 946, 947, 948, 

949, 950 

x Leaders and departments 

x 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Battalions 

x Armor Regiment 

x Missile, artillery, guard and 

telecommunications, engineering 

and chemical defense, and 

repairs battalions 

x Amphibious Reconnaissance 

Dadui (єṆזሏབྷ䱏) (Suixi) 

x Leaders and departments 

x Marine, artillery, missile, guard 

and telecommunications, 

engineering and chemical 

defense, and repairs battalions 

x Armor Regiment 

x Amphibious Reconnaissance 

Dadui (Zhanjiang) 

Finally, the PLAN’s only aircraft carrier, which was commissioned on 25 September 2012,29 is a 

division leader-grade organization, whose commander and PC currently have the rank of senior 

captain but can eventually receive a rank promotion to rear admiral. Because it is a scientific 

research and training ship, it is likely to answer to the PLAN headquarters, but not to any of the 

three fleet headquarters. It is not clear, however, which specific organization within PLAN 

Headquarters, such as the Operations Department or Training Department. 

PLAN Research and Academic Organizations 

Besides the three fleets, PLAN equipment research and academic organizations are also below 

the headquarters-level. Even though most of them are located outside Beijing, they answer to the 

PLAN leadership and first-level departments in Beijing, but not to the leadership of the three 

fleets. 

In 1983, the PLAN created the Naval Equipment Demonstration Center (NRC) in Beijing as a 

part of the Navy’s Equipment and Technology Department (⎧ߋ㻵༷ᢰδ䜘). In October 2003, 

it was upgraded to a corps deputy leader-grade organization and renamed the Naval Equipment 

Research Academy (⎧ߋ㻵༷⹄ウ䲒) to match the name of the PLAAF’s Equipment Research 

Academy and Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy, which were also created at 

around the same time. The Academy’s R&D work is wide ranging, covering both strategic and 

tactical naval issues involving ships, airplanes, missiles, underwater weapons, battle systems, 

electronic equipment, and command automation. Other specific research areas include:30

 

29“China’s First Aircraft Carrier Commissioned,” Xinhua, September 25, 2012. 30 Information found in Fu Zanying, “Naval Research Center (English as in original) (⎧ߋ㻵༷䇪䇱⹄ウѝᗳ),” in 

Chinese Naval Encyclopedia Editorial Committee (Chinese Naval Encyclopedia), Vol. 1, Beijing: Haichao Press (⎧

▞ࠪ⡸矢), 1998, pp. 682-683, and Guo Wei, Zhang Jianfang, and Zhan Huayun, “The ‘Light Cavalry of the 

Invisible Terrain’ – An Account of the Naval Equipment Demonstration Center Ship Defense Laboratory ( 䳀䓛亶

ฏ”䖫僁ޥ——“䇠⎧ߋ㻵༷䇪䇱⹄ウѝᗳ㡠㡩䱢ᣔ⹄ウᇔ)”PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᰕᣕ), 16 April 2003. See also 

www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/15/20000810/181957.html, 
333 

x Ship stealth 

x Air antisubmarine operations 

x Electronic countermeasures 

x Aircraft carriers 

x Combat command automation 

x Guided missile beyond-the-horizon attack 

In addition, the PLAN Headquarters Department (particularly its Training Department and 

Military Affairs Department) and Political Department (particularly its Cadre Department) 

interact regularly with the PLAN’s academic institutions, mainly in terms of providing guidance 

on training and personnel issues. These relationships, however, are “functional guidance” (“ъ࣑

ᤷሬ”) relationships, and should not be confused with the superior-subordinate relationship 

between the PLAN leadership and these organizations. For organizational information on the 

PLAN Equipment Research Academy and academic institutions, see Tables 19 and 20. 

 

 http://yz.chsi.com.cn/kyzx/zsjz/200709/20070905/1113418.html and 

http://wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/thread?tid=44e23a81845e1877, accessed on 12 April 2010. 
334 

Table 17: Research, Cadet, and PME Institutions 

Navy Equipment 

Research 

Academy (⎧ߋ㻵

༷⹄ウ䲒) 

(Beijing) 

Navy 

Command 

ߋ⎧) College

ইӜᤷᥕᆖ

䲒) (Nanjing) 

Navy Engineering 

University (⎧ߋᐕ

〻བྷᆖ) (Wuhan) 

Dalian Navy Ship 

Academy (བྷ䘎⎧

 (㡠㡷ᆖ䲒ߋ

Navy Submarine 

Academy (⎧ߋ▌㡷

ᆖ䲒) (Qingdao) 

Leaders and 

departments 

Commandant and 

PC (corps deputy 

leader-grade) 

Command, 

political, scientific 

research (、⹄䜘), 

and academy 

affairs (䲒࣑䜘) 

departments 

Commandant 

and PC (corps 

leader-grade) 

Training, 

political, 

scientific 

research, and 

college affairs 

departments 

Commandant and 

PC (corps leadergrade) 

Training, political, 

scientific research, 

and university 

affairs departments 

Commandant and 

PC (corps deputy 

leader- grade) 

Training, political, 

scientific research, 

and academy affairs 

departments 

Commandant and PC 

(corps deputy leadergrade) 

Training, political, 

scientific research, 

and academy affairs 

departments 

Major 

academic 

departments 

x Research 

institutes such as 

comprehensive 

systems, ship, 

aviation, 

electronics and 

weapons proof 

studies (䇪䇱⹄

ウ) institutes 

x Ten key research 

labs including 

computing 

simulation center, 

campaign and 

tactical 

confrontation 

simulation lab, 

ship tactical 

application 

software 

development lab, 

navy software 

development 

center, and navy 

reliability studies 

center 

x Navy 

campaign 

x Navy 

combined 

arms 

tactical 

command 

x Logistics 

and 

armament 

command 

x Informatio

n warfare 

studies 

x Political 

work 

x Foreign 

students 

training 

x Ships and 

oceanic 

engineering 

x Electrical 

engineering 

x Weapons 

engineering 

x Thermo-power 

engineering 

x Nuclear energy 

science and 

engineering 

x Communications 

engineering 

x Electronics 

engineering 

x Information 

engineering and 

security 

x Management 

engineering 

x Logistics 

command and 

engineering 

x Foreign students 

training 

x Basics 

x Armament 

systems and 

automation 

x Information and 

communications 

engineering 

x Navigation 

x Ship-borne 

weapons 

x Combat 

command 

x Oceanic and 

measurement 

and mapping 

sciences 

x Political work 

x Foreign students 

training 

x Navigation 

x Observation and 

communications 

x Strategic missile 

and subsurface 

weapons 

x Combat 

command 

x Salvage and 

rescue 

x Submarine 

specialized and 

technical NCO 

x Training 

x Foreign students 

training 

 
335 

Table 18: Research, Cadet, and PME Organizations 

Navy Aeronautical 

Engineering 

Academy (⎧ߋ㡚オ

ᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) (Yantai 

and Qingdao) 

Marine Corps 

College (⎧ߋ䱶ᡈ

ᆖ䲒) (Guangzhou) 

Navy Aviation 

Academy (⎧ߋ㡚オ

 (伎㹼ᆖ䲒ޥ

(Huludao) 

Navy Noncommissioned 

Officer School (⎧ߋ༛ᇈ

ᆖṑ) (Bengbu) 

Leaders and 

departments 

Commandant and PC 

(corps deputy leadergrade) 

Training, political, 

scientific research, 

and academy affairs 

departments 

Commandant and 

PC (division leadergrade) 

Training, political, 

scientific research, 

and college affairs 

departments 

Commandant and PC 

(division leader-grade) 

Command, political, 

logistics and 

armament departments 

Commandant and PC 

(division leader-grade) 

Training, political, and 

school affairs departments 

Major academic 

departments or 

majors and training 

units 

x Aircraft and 

engine 

engineering

x Missile and 

engine 

engineering

x Navigation 

engineering

x Radar 

engineering

x Missile launch, 

control and 

measurement 

engineering

x Electrical 

engineering and 

automation

x Mechanical 

engineering and 

automation

x Systems 

engineering

x Simulation 

engineering

x Amphibious 

operations 

command 

x Aviation and 

ship command 

x Surface ship, 

submarine, 

naval aviation, 

marine corps, 

and shorebased missile 

force midgrade 

command 

x Naval aviation 

flight, navigation, 

and command 

x Air-borne Antisubmarine sonar 

operations 

x Three flight 

training regiments 

x Basics 

x Navigation 

x Information 

technologies 

x Mechanics and 

electricity 

x Weapons 

Students Cadet; graduate 

studies 

Pre-assignment 

training of company 

and battalion leadergrade officers 

Train entry-level naval 

fighter, bomber, 

fighter-bomber, 

helicopter, and 

transport pilots and 

navigators, and airborne Anti-submarine 

sonar operators; preassignment training of 

naval aviation officers 

Pre-assignment training of 

mid-grade and senior 

NCOs 
336 

PLAN, Evolving Naval Strategy, “Jointness,” and Civil-Military Integration 

PLA Naval Strategy 

This subsection discusses how the PLAN as an organization has evolved with the evolution of 

China’s naval strategy. In the 1950s when the three PLAN fleets were established, China’s naval 

strategy was “near-coast defense” (“䘁የ䱢ᗑ”), a strategy intended to defend China’s territorial 

waters up to a dozen nautical miles from China’s coastline. Because China’s long coastline 

makes it difficult to establish effective control of such a long and narrow span at all times, naval 

defense was largely focused on particular straits and waterways of strategic importance, or those 

that could be exploited by the enemy to invade China by sea to conquer strategically important 

land targets. These include the Strait of Bohai, which is the maritime gateway to Tianjin and 

Beijing; the Strait of Taiwan, which relates to the security of China’s east coast, the reunification 

of Taiwan with the mainland, and the security of sea lanes of communications around the island; 

and the Strait of Qiongzhou, which is central to securing Hainan Island and China’s south coast. 

The deployment of the three PLAN fleets correlates well with the defense of the three straits and 

the adjacent waters.31 

By mid-1980s, however, a new naval strategy of “near-seas defense” (“䘁⎧䱢ᗑ”), which is 

sometimes translated as off-shore defense, was endorsed to replace the near-coast defense 

strategy. In comparison, the near-seas defense strategy covers much larger sea areas and requires 

much more substantial naval capabilities.32 In such a strategy, for instance, the PLAN is required 

to develop capabilities to operate effectively, or establish local and temporary sea control and 

denial in the so-called three “near seas,” namely, the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South 

China Sea. 

This new strategy represents a clear departure from the near-coast defense, which defines the 

PLAN as a coastal defense navy operating mainly in coastal waters to assist land operations. This 

change, however, did not require fundamental reorganization of the three fleets, because the 

three fleets were named after the three near seas, and as a result, they correlated well with the 

changing naval strategy. On the other hand, the three fleets were clearly required by the new 

strategy to incorporate new naval capabilities to extend the effective operational range of the 

PLAN from the coastal waters to the three near seas. 

By the mid-2000s, the concept of “far-seas operations” (“䘌⎧֌ᡈ”) was advanced, which 

requires the PLAN to develop capabilities to operate in the waters beyond the three near seas.33

This new concept also coincides with new top leader Hu Jintao’s call for the PLA to fulfill New 

Historic Missions, which among many other things involve security of China’s newly emerging 

overseas interests. These interests include Chinese investment and personnel, and vital sea lanes 

on which shipment of goods and resource depends. 

There are several reasons why the new concept of “far-seas operations” would not bring about 

 

31 See Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to 

‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, p. 146. 32 Ibid, p. 150. 

33 Ibid, p. 160. 
337 

reorganization of PLAN’s three near-seas fleets into far-seas ones in the immediate future. One 

has to do with the goal of China’s naval modernization, which is regionally focused rather than 

globally oriented. China’s naval strategists, for instance, divide the world’s navies into three 

categories: the far-oceans offensive type (䘌⌻䘋᭫ර) or global blue-water type, regional 

defensive and offensive type (४ฏ䱢ᗑ䘋᭫ර) or regional blue-water type, and coastal 

defensive type (⋯የ䱢ᗑර). The U.S. Navy belongs to the first category, while the British, 

French, German, Italian, Japanese, Russian and arguably Indian Navies belong to the second 

category. All other navies, on the other hand, belong to the third category.34 

The near-term goal of China’s naval modernization is for the PLAN to develop into a regionaltype navy (४ฏර⎧ߋ(, or to become the second type. This type of navy can operate effectively 

within its own region, or for the PLAN, in the near seas. In the meantime, it also possesses the 

capabilities to project power occasionally beyond its own region and operate effectively in other 

oceans, as the British Navy did during the Falklands War.35 Recent deployment of PLAN combat 

ships to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy missions may be regarded as another example. Such 

out-of-region force projection, however, are an exception rather than the norm. 

This regional navy concept is also consistent with the1985 strategic transition, which requires the 

PLA to shift its focus on preparing for “early, total and nuclear war” against a possible Soviet 

invasion to preparing for local, limited war to deal with territorial and interests disputes on the 

margins of China. When the PLAN is likely to organize task forces for occasional force 

projection to the far seas, these exceptional instances are unlikely to fundamentally change the 

current structure of the three near-seas fleets in the near future. 

Moreover, China’s naval strategists argue that major maritime security challenges to China are 

concentrated in the near seas. These challenges include reunification with Taiwan, foreign 

military threats and pressures, and disputes with neighboring countries about sovereignty over 

islands and reefs in the near seas and about jurisdiction over continental shelves and exclusive 

economic zones. Non-traditional security issues in the near seas include smuggling, human 

trafficking, transnational crimes, and maritime environmental pollution.36 As a result, “at present 

and in a long time to come, safeguarding near-seas security should be the primary goal of 

China’s maritime security strategy (㔤ᣔ䘁⎧ᆹޘᓄᖃᱟѝഭ⎧кᆹޘᡈ⮕Ⲵѫ㾱ⴞḷ).”37

Also, “better near-seas security creates favorable conditions for marching to the far seas (Ѫ䎠ੁ

䘌⎧ࡋ䙐M࡙ᶑԦ) to meet not only the need for deepening and widening the defense space 

against foreign threats, but also the needs to enhance the security of sea lanes and China’s newly 

emerging overseas economic interests, to promote international cooperation, and to raise China’s 

 

34 See Liu Huaqing, “Naval Strategy and Future Maritime Operations” (“⎧ߋᡈ⮕оɯᶕ⎧к֌ᡈ”) (April 29, 

1986), in Liu Huaqing, Selected Military Works of Liu Huaqing, Book One (ࡈॾ␵ߋһ᮷䘹ˈкধ) (Beijing: 

Liberation Army Press, 2008), p. 457; Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs (ࡈॾ␵എᗶᖅ) (Beijing: Liberation 

Army Press, 2004), p. 437. Liu was PLAN commander during 1982-1988. 

35 Ibid. 

36 See Senior Captain Feng Liang, Senior Captain Gao Zichuan, and Captain Duan Tingzhi, China’s Peaceful 

Development and Maritime Security Environment (ѝഭⲴ઼ᒣਁኅо⎧кᆹޘ⧟ໍາ) (Beijing: World Knowledge 

Press, 2010), p. 300, 301. Feng, Gao and Duan are professors at China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing. 

37 Ibid, p. 300. 
338 

international status.”38 Furthermore, “marching to the far seas with clear and selective objectives 

(M䪸ሩᙗൠ, M䘹ᤙൠ䎠ੁ䘌⎧) offers forceful support and coordination for resolving nearseas security issues.”39 As a result, the primacy of the near-seas issues reinforces the argument 

for maintaining the current three near-seas fleets. 

Finally, there are major vulnerabilities and limits that may impede the PLAN’s far-seas 

operations. China, for instance, has neither overseas naval bases nor regularized access points in 

the far seas of the Indian Ocean. A limited number of at-sea replenishment ships and occasional 

port visits for re-supply and crew rest may help in logistics support (ਾऔ؍䳌), but not in 

combat support (ᡈᯇ؍䳌) such as reloading missiles to sustain high-intensity conventional 

naval battles. The PLAN is also quite weak in its ASW capabilities, which leaves Chinese 

warships exposed to submarine attacks in the far seas. These may explain why China’s naval 

escort groups in the Gulf of Aden remain as small as only two combat ships supported by one 

large replenishment ship, and their missions are confined to dealing with low-intensity, nontraditional security issues such as piracy. 

Some Chinese naval strategists argue that China should develop overseas naval bases in the 

Indian Ocean.40 But this argument has not translated into any change in Chinese policy. A major 

reason is that China’s non-aligned, independent foreign policy forbids China to develop military 

alliances with other countries. This makes it difficult to establish overseas military bases because 

they usually are located in territories of close allies. Also, because overseas bases are associated 

with the legacy of colonialism and a lack of sensitivity toward national sovereignty, China may 

pay an image cost if it acquires any. Acquiring overseas bases may also not serve China’s 

national interests well because it may entangle China in regional and domestic disputes and 

conflicts.41 As a result, the PLAN is unlikely to launch permanent far-seas fleets until it develops 

overseas naval bases or regularized access points that can offer combat support, or build large 

number of ocean-going replenishment ships, and until it develops robust ASW capabilities. 

Joint Operations 

How has the PLAN as an organization adapted to the new requirement of inter-service joint 

operations, which aims to exploit the comparative advantages of four services and arms to 

achieve operational efficiency and effectiveness of the PLA as a whole? With the exception of 

the 14-month period after Wu Shengli became the commander in August 2006, the PLAN 

commander has been a CMC member since 2004 and has clearly benefited the PLAN’s 

participation in jointness at the highest level of the PLA. This is because the PLAN can now 

have direct professional and technical input into the joint PLA strategic planning through its 

highest commanding officer. 

 

38 Ibid. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Senior Captain Li Jie cited in “Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing Land-based Support Center 

in East Africa” (“ߋһуᇦ˖ѝഭᓄ㘳㲁൘ь䶎䇮䱶к᭟ᨤѝᗳ”), China Review News Agency (ѝഭ䇴䇪䙊䇟

矢), May 21, 2009. China Review News Agency is a pro-China news agency in Hong Kong, and Li is an analyst in 

Naval Military Art Studies Institute in Beijing. 

41 For these reasons, see Senior Colonel Huang Yingxu, “What Kind of Military Force Does Future China Need?” 

(“ɯᶕѝഭ䴰㾱ӰѸṧⲴߋһ࣋䟿?”) Study Times, April 27, 2009. Huang is director of Academy of Military 

Science’s Mao Zedong Military Thought Studies Institute. 
339 

Moreover, since 2004, the PLAN has had a permanent billet as one of the Deputy Chiefs of the 

General Staff, which is an MR leader-grade billet. This organizational arrangement also 

enhances jointness, because, as discussed earlier, a major function of a staff department such as 

the General Staff Department (GSD) is to assist PLA leadership to make operational decisions. 

Furthermore, a third-level Naval Operations Bureau (⎧ߋ֌ᡈተ ) exists in the GSD’s 

Operations Department. This bureau clearly is intended to ensure more detailed naval input into 

the GSD’s joint operational planning as well as to enhance inter-service coordination in joint 

operations. 

At the MR level, since 1988, the commanders of the three fleets have served as one of the deputy 

commanders of the three MRs that have a maritime component, namely, the Jinan, Nanjing and 

Guangzhou MRs. This senior naval representation, however, is more symbolic than substantive. 

This is because naval officers may find it difficult to penetrate the MR headquarters structure 

because of Army dominance. 

For instance, as part of the PLA’s 200,000-man downsizing that began in late 2003, the PLAN 

had to reduce the number of one-star flag officers by about 60 billets. One way to accomplish 

this was to downgrade all eight bases from corps leader to corps deputy leader grade 

organizations, which also fit into the PLAN’s restructuring of its combat and support 

organizations. As a result, the PLAN had to find new billets for some of the base leaders until 

they could retire in grade. To accomplish this, some of them were assigned as deputy chiefs of 

staff in the MRs that host the three fleets. Once they reached their mandatory retirement age, 

they were not replaced with naval officers. 
340 

Chapter Ten: PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012 

Kenneth W. Allen 

To satisfy the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations, the 

modernization and transformation of the PLA Air Force follows a carefully-structured plan. The 

PLAAF has under it an air command in each of the seven military area commands of Shenyang, 

Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. It also has under its command an 

airborne corps. Under each air command at military area level are aviation divisions, ground-toair missile divisions (brigades and regiments), anti-aircraft artillery brigades (regiments), radar 

brigades (regiments), electronic countermeasures regiments (battalions), and other units. An 

aviation division has under its command aviation regiments and related stations. 

China’s National Defense 2010 

Introduction 

Over the past decade, the PLAAF has clearly begun shifting its force toward a brigade-centric 

structure by creating aviation, surface-to-air missile (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and 

radar brigades. It is also continuing to revise its headquarters, command and control (C2), and 

academic institution structure to be able to operate in combined-arms and joint operations. Given 

that the PLAAF’s three airborne divisions were upgraded from brigades in 1993 and currently do 

not have enough airlift support, there is a possibility that they might also be downgraded to 

brigades in the near future. 

The purpose of this chapter is to update information on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

(PLAAF/ 䀓᭮ߋオߋ (from The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, which was 

published in 2002.1 That book, along with several other publications, provided a good foundation 

for examining the historical background of the PLAAF’s organizational structure as well as the 

changes that have occurred over the past decade. The primary sources of information on the 

PLAAF’s organizational structure are shown below: 

x China Air Force Dictionary (1996)2

x China Air Force Encyclopedia3 (2005)

x China’s National Defense4 (1998 – 2010)

x People’s Liberation Army Air Force 20105 (2011)

x People’s Liberation Army Military History6 (2007)

 

1

 Ken Allen, “PLA Air Force Organization,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s 

Liberation Army as Organization, Washington DC: RAND, 2002, Chapter 9, p. 346-457. The paper was submitted 

at the conference, which was held in August 2000. 

2

 Zhu Rongchang, ed. Air Force Dictionary (オߋབྷ䗎ި), (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, September 1996). 3

 Yao Wei, ed., China Air Force Encyclopedia (ѝഭオߋⲮ、ޘҖ), Beijing: Aviation Industry Press, November 

2005. Henceforth identified as Air Force Encyclopedia. 4 China’s National Defense (ѝഭⲴഭ䱢) has been published biennially from 1998 through 2010 by the PRC State 

Council’s Information Office. This publication is usually referred to as the defense white paper (ⲭⳞҖ). 5 People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010, Dayton, OH: National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), 

August 1, 2010. Henceforth identified as PLAAF 2010. 
341 

x PLA Air Force Enlisted Force Handbook7 (2006)

x PLA Air Force: Lessons Learned 1949-20028 (2003)

x PLA Air Force Officer Handbook (2006)9

x The Organizational Structure of the PLAAF10 (2012)

x The Ten Pillars of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force: An Assessment11 (2011)

x The Internet

Using The People’s Liberation Army as Organization as a base, this chapter focuses on the key 

organizational changes that have occurred since the conference was held in 2000, some of which 

are discussed in greater detail in the other publications noted above. The chapter is organized 

into the following 14 sections: 

x Section 1: PLAAF Missions, Responsibilities, and Strategy 

x Section 2: Leadership 

x Section 3: PLAAF Headquarters Changes 

x Section 4: Branches and Specialty Units 

x Section 5: The PLAAF’s Force Restructuring 

x Section 6: Aviation Branch 

x Section 7: Surface-to-Air Missile Branch 

x Section 8: Antiaircraft Artillery Branch 

x Section 9: Radar Branch 

x Section 10: Airborne Branch 

x Section 11: Specialty Units 

x Section 12: Equipment Research Academy 

x Section 13: Academic Institution Reforms 

x Section 14: Conclusions 

Given that the focus of this chapter is on the PLAAF’s organizational structure, it does not 

discuss the PLAAF’s doctrine, weapons, and equipment, all of which are covered in other 

publications such as The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities.

12 In 

 6

 Zhao Yiping, ed., People’s Liberation Army Military History (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋਢ) Volume III in China 

Military Encyclopedia Second Edition (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖᅮҼ⡸), Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing 

House, 2007. 

7 PLA Air Force Enlisted Force Handbook (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋオߋ༛ޥ᡻޼(, Beijing: Blue Sky Press, November 

2006. Henceforth identified as Enlisted Force Handbook. 8

 Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force: Lessons Learned 1949-2002,” in The Lessons of History: The Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army at 75, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, September 2003. Henceforth identified as 

Lessons Learned. 9 People’s Liberation Army Air Force Officer’s Handbook (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋオߋߋᇈ᡻޼) (Beijing: Blue Sky 

Press, November 2006). Henceforth identified as Officer Handbook. 10 Kenneth W. Allen, “The Organizational Structure of the PLAAF” in Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip 

C. Saunders, eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles and Capabilities, Washington, D.C.: National 

Defense University, 2012. Henceforth identified as PLAAF Structure. This chapter updates information in PLAAF 

2010 concerning the PLAAF’s organizational structure based on new information. 11 Kenneth Allen, The Ten Pillars of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force: An Assessment, Washington DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, April 2011. Henceforth identified as PLAAF Ten Pillars. 12 Hallion, The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles and Capabilities. 
342 

addition, the chapter does not provide information on the orders-of-battle for the aviation, SAM, 

AAA, or radar branches. The reason for this is that there are no authoritative open source 

materials on the orders-of-battle. For example, the 2006 to 2011 editions of the Department of 

Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China are not consistent concerning the number and location of the 

PLAAF’s air divisions. The report also sometimes identifies the 13th Transport Air Division as 

being subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters and sometimes as being subordinate to the 

Guangzhou Military Region Air Force (MRAF).13 In addition, the PLAAF has begun to field 

new operational and flight college training air brigades as of December 2011. Furthermore, the 

DoD reports have not provided any information about the number or location of SAM and AAA 

brigades, nor are there any reliable websites available. 

PLA Air Force Missions, Responsibilities, and Strategy 

This section provides information concerning reforms in the PLA Air Force’s missions and 

responsibilities. It also briefly discusses the PLAAF’s first ever strategy that was approved in 

2004. 

In the mid-1990s, the PLAAF’s primary air defense responsibilities were to protect China’s 

airfields, principal political and economic centers, heavy troop concentrations, and major 

military facilities and transportation systems.14 As a result, most fighter airfields and virtually all 

of the SAMs were concentrated around China’s large cities. But given the short ranges of most 

Chinese fighters, the lack of an appreciable aerial refueling capability, and the inability to fly at 

night, the PLAAF’s ability to mount an effective air defense of China remained questionable. In 

addition, the PLAAF’s bomber and attack force were limited in size with poor capabilities. The 

PLAAF described its secondary mission as support of the Army and Navy but emphasized that 

this must be indirect support only (i.e., airlift and interdiction), because it was largely incapable 

of providing direct fire support to the ground forces. Moreover, only a small portion of the 

overall force structure had the capability to deliver air-to-surface ordnance and the PLAAF did 

not possess any precision-guided weapons. Furthermore, coordination among the three services 

and joint training remained extremely limited. 

During the 2000s, as a result of acquiring a vast array of new weapon systems with longer ranges, 

including aircraft and missiles (SAMs, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-surface missiles), that are 

capable of operating in all weather conditions and at night, the PLAAF has been able to expand 

its defensive capabilities from point defense to area defense and, in conjunction with its new 

strategy in 2004, to begin transitioning toward the ability to conduct simultaneous offensive and 

defensive operations. 

 

13 Since 2006, the annual Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China has included a map with the number of air division by type 

assigned to PLAAF Headquarters and to each Military Region Air Force. Furthermore, the MUCD for the 13th

Transport Air Division (95006) indicates that it is subordinate to the Guangzhou MRAF, not the PLAAF 

Headquarters. An example of a blog that tries to identify PLAAF units is 

http://629152194.blog.sohu.com/164942085.html. 14 The information in this paragraph comes from Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, 

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, p. xiv-xv. 
343 

A summary of the PLAAF’s missions and responsibilities that were published in the 2002 to 

2010 versions of China National Defense state that the PLAAF is a strategic service and the 

main force for carrying out air operations.15 The PLAAF’s primary missions are organizing 

homeland air defense to protect territorial air with an emphasis on defending the capital as the 

center and defending coastal and border areas as the key. The PLAAF will accomplish this by 

organizing air offensive operations independently or jointly with the Army, Navy, or Second 

Artillery Force, engaging in joint operations against enemy invasion from the air, and conducting 

air strikes against the enemy. To satisfy the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive 

and defensive operations, it is working to ensure the development of a combat force structure 

that focuses on air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, to improve its 

leadership and command system and build up an informatized, networked support system. It 

conducts training on confrontation in complex electromagnetic environments (CEME), and 

carries out maneuvers, drills, and combat training in different tactical situations. It has carried 

out missions other than war (MOOTW), such as air security for major national events, 

emergency rescue and disaster relief, international rescue, and emergency airlift. 

Unfortunately, a review of available PLA sources did not find any statements concerning the role 

of PLAAF Headquarters and the MRAF Headquarters and their relationship to the Chinese 

Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), four General Departments, and seven 

Military Regions (MRs) or theaters. Although the PLAAF most likely has a document, such as a 

gangyao (㓢㾱), that clearly lays out these relationships, the only information found was in 

China’s National Defense for 2008. That document stated that, in peacetime, the PLAAF 

practices a leadership system that combines operational command with administrative 

organizations in order to build (ᔪ䇮) all components of the Air Force. To accomplish this, the 

Air Force consists of a headquarters, seven MRAFs, corps- and division-level command posts, 

divisions, brigades, and regiments.16

Based on analysis of what PLAAF Headquarters and the MRAF Headquarters actually do, it 

appears that PLAAF Headquarters is structured to fill the same basic functions as USAF 

Headquarters (HAF) and deals with the MRAFs in the same basic way HAF deals with the Major 

Commands (MAJCOMs), such as Pacific Air Force (PACAF) Headquarters. For comparison 

purposes, the USAF’s Air Force Mission Directive 1, dated April 2011, identifies the mission, 

command structure, and responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force Headquarters as 

follows:17

x Missions: The HAF develops policies, plans, and programs, establishes requirements, 

and provides resources to support the Air Force’s mission to defend the United States and 

protect its interests through the use of air and space and cyberspace power. 

x Command: The Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) is the head of the Department of the 

Air Force and is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of 

the Department of the Air Force. The chain of command for purposes other than 

operational control of forces assigned to combatant commands runs from the Secretary of 

 

15 The information is this paragraph is compiled from the information about the PLAAF in the PRC’s seven biennial 

China’s National Defense since 1998. 16 China’s National Defense 2008. 17 Information accessed at www.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFMD1.pdf on 30 April 2012. 
344 

Defense (SecDef) to SecAF. All Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMS) report to the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF). The CSAF performs his duties under the 

authority, direction, and control of the SecAF, presides over the Air Staff, and is the 

principal military advisor to the SecAF on Air Force activities. The CSAF also serves as 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Armed Forces Policy Council. 

x Responsibilities: SecAF is responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, 

training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering personnel, military 

equipment, and facilities. CSAF is responsible for presiding over the Air Staff, 

transmitting Air Staff plans and recommendations to SecAF, advising the SecAF with 

regard to such plans and recommendations, acting as SecAF’s agent in carrying out the 

plans or recommendations of the Air Staff, exercising supervision, consistent with the 

authority assigned to the combatant commanders, over such members of the Air Force as 

the SecAF determines. 

The PLAAF’s New Strategy 

Although this chapter is about the PLAAF’s organizational structure, it is important to note that, 

in 2004, the CMC approved the PLAAF’s first-ever component of the PLA’s Active Defense (〟

ɵ䱢ᗑ) strategy, which is known as “Integrated Air and Space Operations, Simultaneous 

Offensive and Defensive Operations” (オཙаփ,᭫䱢ެ༷). 

According to PLAAF 2010, at the strategic level of discourse, the PLAAF today is beginning to 

rethink the roles and missions it must assume, and the capabilities it must have, to conduct 

aerospace operations that will achieve Beijing’s larger national objectives. Exactly what is meant 

when the PLAAF is exhorted to become a “strategic air force” is still unfolding. What is clear at 

this point is that the PLAAF is no longer viewed as being solely a tactical adjunct to ground 

force operations or a service mainly concerned with territorial air defense. It is evident that the 

leadership of the PLA is looking to the PLAAF to be capable in the future of offensive 

operations in larger joint campaigns and even to “...execute long-range precision strikes and 

strategic projection operations”—although at the moment these latter two missions are 

challenging. Bureaucratically, this was a big moment for the PLAAF. The PLA Navy (PLAN) 

was issued its own service strategy (Offshore Active Defense) in 1986 and the PLAAF had 

lobbied unsuccessfully since 1987 to follow suit. 

This new strategy has helped lay the doctrinal foundation for the PLAAF’s organizational 

reforms since 2004. See Murray Scot Tanner’s “The Missions of the People’s Liberation Army 

Air Force” for detailed information on this strategy.18

Leadership 

According to PLAAF 2010, PLAAF Structure, and PLAAF Ten Pillars, one noteworthy trend 

during the 2000s is the assignment of PLAAF general officers to important national-level 

military assignments, although not all of them are permanent PLAAF billets. 19 While this 

phenomenon does not speak to what the PLAAF as a service is doing to enable the larger 

 

18 Murray Scot Tanner, “The Missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force,” in Hallion, The Chinese Air 

Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles and Capabilities, Chapter 5. 19 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 5 (Leadership). 
345 

objectives of the greater PLA, it does speak to how the PLAAF is beginning to be viewed as an 

important player. The PLA has traditionally been dominated by “army green” and, to a certain 

extent, it still is. However, more blue uniforms (Air Force) and white uniforms (Navy) are 

showing up in venues that matter as the greater PLA reflects more “jointness” in the make-up of 

its national-level leadership relative to the past. In this regard, the air force is showing up in 

places of note. 

PLAAF in Military Region Deputy Leader and Above Organizations 

Starting in 2003, PLAAF officers began filling key military region leader-grade organizations 

shown below. Equally important, they continued to wear their Air Force uniform. 

x CMC Member: Prior to 2004, only three of the PLAAF’s eight commanders—Liu 

Yalou, Wu Faxian, and Zhang Tingfa—had served as a member of the CMC. In 

September 2004, the CMC added the commander of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second 

Artillery as permanent members. Since then, PLAAF commanders Qiao Qingchen, Xu 

Qiliang, and Ma Xiaotian have served in this billet. 

x Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DGOCS): In July 2004, Lieutenant General Xu 

Qiliang was appointed as the first PLAAF officer to serve as one of the DCOGSs. When 

he became the PLAAF commander in September 2007, he was replaced by Lieutenant 

General Ma Xiaotian. Ma received his third star in 2009. Although it appeared that at 

least one of the DCOGS billets was designated as a permanent PLAAF billet, Ma was not 

replaced by a PLAAF officer when he became the PLAAF commander in November 

2012, which implies that this is not the case. 

x Deputy Director of the General Political Department (GPD): In 2005, Lieutenant 

General Liu Zhenqi was appointed as the first PLAAF officer to serve as a deputy 

director of the GPD. He received his third star in 2008. He retired in 2011 and was not 

replaced by a PLAAF officer. 

x Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department (GLD): In 2005, Lieutenant 

General Li Maifu was appointed as the first PLAAF officer to serve as a deputy director 

in the GLD. He retired in 2010 and was not replaced by a PLAAF officer. 

x Deputy Director of the General Armament Department (GAD): GAD has never had a 

non-Army officer serve as a deputy director. 

x Academy of Military Science (AMS): In 2003, PLAAF Lieutenant General Zheng 

Shenxia became the first air force officer to be selected as head of the prestigious AMS. 

His successor in 2007, Lieutenant General Liu Chengjun, is also a PLAAF officer and 

will most likely remain in that billet until his mandatory retirement age of 65 in 2015.20

Both of them received their third star. 

x National Defense University (NDU): In August 2006, PLAAF Lieutenant General Ma 

Xiaotian was appointed as the first PLAAF officer to serve as Commandant of NDU. In 

December 2009, Lieutenant Liu Yazhou became the first PLAAF officer appointed as 

NDU’s political commissar (PC), where he will most likely remain until his mandatory 

retirement age of 65 in 2017, which will coincide with the 19th Party Congress.21

 

20 Liu Chengjun’s biography can be found at http://baike.baidu.com/view/1141118.htm. 

21 Liu Yazhou’s biography can be found at http://baike.baidu.com/view/270429.htm. Although Liu has been 

identified as a PLAAF officer, he shifted between Air Force and Army political officer billets throughout his career. 

Most importantly, however, he currently wears an Air Force uniform as the NDU PC. 
346 

x Military Regions (MR): Since 1988, the practice of concurrently “dual-hatting” each 

MRAF commander as one of the MR deputy commanders has been institutionalized.22

No PLAAF officers have ever apparently served as a director of one of the four first-level 

departments in an MR Headquarters. Of note, only some of the seven MRAF PCs serve 

as concurrent MR deputy PCs. According to the Officer Handbook and a search of the 

Internet, only the PCs for the Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Nanjing and Shenyang MRAFs are 

concurrently serving as MR deputy PCs. It is not clear why the Beijing, Chengdu, and 

Jinan MRAF PCs are not concurrent MR deputy PCs.23

PLAAF Leadership Changes at the 18th Party Congress 

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) 18th Party Congress in November 2012 saw a major 

change in the PLA’s leadership. The key PLAAF leadership changes that occurred during the 

congress are as follows: 

x General Xu Qiliang, who became the PLAAF commander in 2007, was promoted to 

become one of the two CMC vice chairmen and a concurrent CCP Politburo member. Xu 

is the first PLAAF officer to become a CMC vice chairman. In terms of protocol order, 

Xu is listed behind the other vice chairman, General Fan Changlong, who had never 

served in a CMC member-grade billet and, as such, skipped a grade to become a vice 

chairman. Of particular significance is that Xu is identified as an Air Force general and 

continues to wear an Air Force uniform. 

x General Ma Xiaotian, who has served as a DCOGS since 2007 and received his third star 

in 2009, replaced Xu as the 11th PLAAF commander, Party deputy secretary, and CMC 

member. While serving as a DCOGS, Ma received his third star in 2009 and had the 

intelligence and foreign affairs portfolios. Ma is currently listed seventh out of eight in 

protocol order among the CMC members. Given his age, Ma will most likely serve as 

the commander only until the 19th Party Congress in 2017. 

x General Tian Xiusi replaced General Deng Changyou as the PLAAF’s 12th political 

commissar and Party secretary. Tian, who received his third star in July 2012, never 

served in the Air Force and was the Chengdu MR political commissar since 2010. Tian 

was born in 1950 and will have to retire at age 65 in 2015.24 According to PLAAF 2010, 

the PLAAF has had 11 previous PCs from 1949 until Tian was selected, and, as shown 

below, there is no discernible pattern in selecting them: 

 

22 The reason why MRAF commanders were not concurrent MR deputy commanders prior to 1988 is because, from 

1979 to 1988, the PLA had 18 grades instead of 15. Prior to 1988, MRAF Headquarters had the grade of bingtuan 

leader (↓ޥഒ), which was between the corps leader and MR deputy leader grade. In 1988, the PLA abolished the 

bingtuan level and upgraded all of the bingtuan leader-grade organizations, including the MRAF Headquarters, to 

MR deputy-leader grade organizations and downgraded all of the bingtuan deputy leader-grade organizations to 

corps leader. As a result, the MRAF commanders were concurrently made MR deputy commanders to match their 

new grade. 

23 According to the PLAAF Officer Handbook (p. 35), only the Guangzhou and Nanjing MRAF PCs are authorized 

to be concurrent MR deputy PCs; however, based on a search of the Internet in early 2012, the PCs for the Lanzhou 

and Shenyang MRAFs have apparently been added to the list. 

24 “Tian Xiusi Becomes the PLA Air Force Political Commissar and Has Real War Experience,” caixin.co, 30 

October 2012, found at http://china.caixin.com/2012-10-30/100454054.html. His bio can be found at 

http://baike.baidu.com/view/585708.htm. 
347 

 The first eight PCs began their careers in the Army and then transferred to the 

PLAAF. The last three served their entire careers in the PLAAF. 

 Two alternated between PLAAF and General Political Department political officer 

billets. The other nine PCs served only in PLAAF billets once they joined or 

transferred to the PLAAF. 

 Only four deputy PLAAF PCs have become the PLAAF PC. 

 Only one MRAF PC has become the PLAAF PC. 

PLAAF Headquarters Changes 

The PLA Air Force, which is often called the Central Military Commission Air Force (ߋငオ

ߋ(, does not have a specific term for headquarters. For example, the term Air Force (オߋ (can 

refer to the PLAAF as a whole or to PLAAF Headquarters. The same is the case for the term 

Military Region Air Force (ߋ४オߋ(, which can refer to the MRAF Headquarters or to the 

MRAF in general; however, the meaning is usually clear from the context. 

This section provides information about the first- (а㓗) and second-level (Ҽ㓗) departments in 

PLAAF Headquarters, the reforms that have been noted in those departments since 2000, and the 

first-, second-, and third-level departments noted in the seven MRAF Headquarters. 

Administrative and Functional Departments 

As shown in Figure 2, all headquarters at the regiment level and above have four first-level (а

㓗) administrative (㹼᭯) and functional (ъ࣑ (departments (䜘䰘/χޣ(: Headquarters, 

Political, Logistics, and Equipment. Every level of the PLAAF down to at least regiment level 

also has more than one deputy commander and deputy political commissar. Figure 2 also shows 

the leaders for each component for PLAAF Headquarters. 

Figure 1: PLAAF Headquarters Administrative and Functional Departments 

Each of these departments has second- and third-level (й㓗) departments. Although the generic 

term is “department,” this includes departments (䜘), bureaus (ተ), divisions (༴), offices (、), 

and branches (㛑). The PLA is just beginning to create a Headquarters Department in a few 

independent battalion-level organizations, which are treated like regiments. The first-level 

departments are shown in Table 1 below: 
348 

Table 1: First-Level Departments 

Headquarters Headquarters 

Department 

Political 

Department 

Logistics 

Department 

Equipment 

Department 

PLAAF HQ Department Department Department Department 

MRAF HQ Department Department Department Department 

Corps Department Department Department Department 

Division Department Department Department Department 

Brigade Department Department Department Department 

Regiment Department Division Division Division 

Battalion (Department) None None None 

PLAAF 2010 and PLAAF Structure provide information about each of PLAAF Headquarters’ 

four first-level administrative and functional departments (Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and 

Equipment) and their second-level departments.25 This information is discussed in the following 

subsections. 

PLAAF Headquarters Grade Structure

As discussed in the book’s Introduction, each organization and each officer is assigned a grade. 

In addition, each grade from military region leader down to company deputy leader is assigned 

two ranks. Table 2 provides the grade and rank structure for PLAAF Headquarters. 

 

 

25 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 
349 

Table 2: PLAAF Headquarters Grade and Rank Structure 

Grade Leaders (Ranks) Headquarters 

Department 

(Ranks)

Political 

Department 

(Ranks)

Logistics 

Department 

(Ranks)

Equipment 

Department 

(Ranks) 

CMC Member Commander 

(GEN) 

 

MR Leader Political 

Commissar 

(GEN/LTG) 

 

MR Deputy 

Leader

Deputy 

Commanders & 

Deputy PCs 

(LTG/MG) 

Chief of Staff 

(LTG/MG) 

Director 

(LTG/MG) 

 

Corps Leader Deputy Chiefs of 

Staff (MG/LTG) 

Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Director/PC 

(MG/LTG) 

Corps Deputy 

Leader

 Deputy 

Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Deputy Directors 

(MG/SCOL) 

Division Leader 2nd

 Level 

Departments and 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments 

and Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

2nd Level 

Departments and 

Directors 

(SCOL/MG) 

Division Deputy 

Leader 

 2nd

 Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

2nd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(COL/SCOL) 

Regiment Leader 3rd

 Level 

Directors and 

Leaders 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Directors and 

Leaders 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Directors and 

Leaders 

(COL/LTC) 

3rd Level 

Directors and 

Leaders 

(COL/LTC) 

Regiment Deputy 

Leader 

 3rd

 Level Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level 

Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

3rd Level Deputy 

Directors 

(LTC/MAJ) 

Headquarters Department 

The Headquarters Department (オਨ/オߋਨԔ䜘) is the highest-level administrative and 

functional organization within PLAAF Headquarters that is responsible for what the PLAAF 

calls military (ߋһ) or command (ᤷᥕ) work on behalf of the PLAAF’s Party committee and 
350 

leadership.26 Its primary responsibilities include managing air force unit deployments, battlefield 

development, and combat command. It is also responsible for the PLAAF’s organizational 

structure, personnel management, enlisted force personnel records, intelligence, communications, 

radar, air traffic control, and weather support, as well as researching air force military theory, 

and managing education and safety.27

The leader of the PLAAF’s Headquarters Department is the chief of staff (৲䈻䮯), who is the 

department director and has the same grade (MR deputy leader/࢟བྷߋ४㙼) as the deputy 

commanders. The chief of staff is responsible for organizing all “military” (ߋһ) activity within 

a unit and for coordinating and executing everything within the Headquarters Department 

concerning the campaign decision, plan, and control, as well as guiding the relevant work by the 

Logistics Department and Equipment Department” 28 The Headquarters Department also has 

several deputy chiefs of staff (࢟৲䈻䮯).29 Based on information from interviews with PLAAF 

personnel over a 25-year period, each deputy chief of staff is responsible for guiding and 

monitoring activities in two or more second-level departments. 

The Headquarters Department’s primary second-level departments, each of which has 

subordinate third-level departments, are shown below. It is not clear what the protocol order for 

the departments is, but the list is based on a best estimate. 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ) 

x Directly Subordinate Work Department (ⴤᐕ䜘) 

x Operations Department (֌ᡈ䜘) 

x Intelligence Department (ᛵᣕ䜘) 

x Informatization Department (ؑ᚟ॆ䜘) 

x Military Training Department (ߋһ䇝㓳䜘)

30

x Military Affairs Department (࣑ߋ䜘)

31

 

26 The PLAAF often refers to certain officers as “military officers” or “military cadre.” This means that they are in 

the military/command track. The PLAAF traces this concept back to the early days of the Red Army, when officers 

were designated as either military/command cadre or political cadre in order to differentiate between them and the 

peasants who made up the remainder of the force. 

27 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 28 Yuan Wenxian, ed., Discussion of Headquarters Department Building (ਨԔ䜘ᔪ䇮䇪), Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, July 2003, p. 152-153. Zhang Yuliang, Science of Campaigns (ᡈᖩᆖ), Beijing: NDU 

Press, May 2006, p. 145. 

29 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 30 The Military Training Department has an Air Crew Academic Institution Division (オऔ䲒ṑ༴). 31 The Military Affairs Department is responsible for the organizational structure of the PLAAF, including the table 

of organization and equipment (TO&E), and billet management, as well as assigning military unit cover designators 

(MUCDs) and aircraft bort numbers. It also serves as the personnel office for the enlisted force. In 2010, Xu 

Huiqing (䇨ᜐ䶂) became the department’s director. A photo of him in the 2012-2 issue of National Defense

(Guofang) magazine (p. 26) as a recipient of the 2011 National Mobilization Development Award shows him with 

the rank of senior colonel and, based on his ribbons, the grade of division deputy leader (࢟ᐸ㙼). However, the 

same article and a different photo of him in an 11 January 2012 Internet article shows his grade as that of a division 

leader (↓ᐸ㙼), which is most likely correct and means that the Military Affairs Department is also assigned that 

grade. Information accessed at www.mod.gov.cn/reports/201201/gfdy/2012-01/14/content_4337744.htm on 4 May 

2012. 
351 

x Ground-Based Air Defense Troops Department (ൠ䶒䱢オޥ䜘) 

x Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department (⭥ᆀሩᣇ䴧䗮䜘) 

x Air Traffic Control Department (㡚オ㇑ࡦ䜘) 

x Military Theory Research Department (ߋһ⨶䇪⹄ウ䜘)

32

x Pilot Recruitment Bureau (ᤋ伎ተ)

33

x Technology Bureau (ᢰδተ)

34

x Weather Bureau (≄䊑ተ) 

x Flight Safety Bureau (伎㹼ᆹޘተ) 

The PLAAF Headquarters’ command post (CP) is subordinate to the Headquarters Department, 

with the Chief of Staff as the director. Personnel from throughout the Headquarters Department, 

especially the Operations Department, as well as relevant personnel from the Logistics and 

Equipment Departments, man the CP on a rotational basis.35

Other organizations identified in the Headquarters Department are shown below, but it is not 

clear which organizations they are subordinate to: 

x Grassroots Work Division Equipment Office (สቲᐕ֌༴㻵༷、) 

x Legal Consultant Division (⌅ᖻ亮䰞༴) 

x Retired Cadre Services Division (⿫Ձᒢ䜘Ȣ࣑༴) 

PLAAF Security Committees 

As discussed in the Introduction chapter, every PLA organization at the regiment and above level 

has a Security Committee (؍ᇶငઈՊ), which is responsible to that level’s Party Committee 

and the next higher level’s Security Committee for oversight of classified material.36 As such, 

PLAAF Headquarters has its own Security Committee and subordinate General Office (オ؍ߋ

ᇶငઈՊޜ࣎ᇔ/オ؍ߋᇶ࣎(.37 The committee also has a subordinate Technology Security 

Inspection Division (ᢰδᆹޘỰḕ༴/ᢰỰ༴) and Technology Security Inspection Office (ᢰ

 

32 This department was established around 1999. It is noted in the comments section of Cai Fengzhen and Tian 

Anping, The Science of Integrated Air and Space Operations (オཙ䚇փ֌ᡈᆖ), Beijing, PLA Publishers, August 

2006, p. 308. 

33 This bureau has subordinate selection centers in each of the seven MRAF headquarters. For example, the bureau 

has a Lanzhou Selection Center (ޠᐎ䘹ᤄѝᗳ). 34 As early as October 2005, the Headquarters Department created a subordinate Technology Bureau as a result of 

the 2003-2004 downsizing by merging several units that were dispersed throughout the PLAAF. When it was 

created, the bureau confronted a situation where it did not have any regiment-level organizations to carry out the 

necessary work for the bureau staff. This bureau is responsible for unidentified units in Sichuan, Yunnan, Xinjiang, 

Tibet, and Guangdong. 

35 Interviews with PLA personnel in Beijing in November 2009. 

36 “Security Committee,” in PLA Military Terminology, December 2011, p. 198. Although this dictionary translates 

baomi (؍ᇶ) as security, other dictionaries translate it as secret or secrecy. See A New English-Chinese ChineseEnglish Dictionary of Military Terms, Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, October 1999, p. 254. While baomi

security covers classified material and its transmission from one point to another, baowei (؍ছ) security covers 

personal and facilities security; however, the two types of organizations work closely together to security classified 

information. 

37 http://bm.songyang.gov.cn/xmal/200902/t20090228_86445.htm. 
352 

δᆹޘỰḕޜ࣎ᇔ). 38 Besides the PLAAF Security Committee, the security organizations 

found for each for the four first-level departments are discussed below: 

x Headquarters Department Security Committee General Office (オਨ؍ᇶޜ࣎ᇔ/؍ᇶᇔ

)

39

x Political Department Security Committee General Office (オ᭯؍ᇶޜ࣎ᇔ/؍ᇶᇔ) and 

Security Documents Office (オ᭯؍ᇶẓṸᇔ)

40

x Although no Security Committee General Office was found for the Logistics Department, 

one was found for the Nanjing MRAF Logistics Department (ইӜオਾ؍ᇶᇔ), which 

implies that the PLAAF Headquarters Logistics Department most likely has one also41

x Equipment Department Security Committee General Office (オ㻵؍ᇶޜ࣎ᇔ/؍ᇶᇔ), 

which published a document entitled “Air Force Equipment Security Work Basic 

Requirements (オ㻵؍ᇶᐕ֌สᴥ㾱≲).”42

In addition, each MRAF Headquarters has its own Security Committee and subordinate General 

Office, and each command post, division, brigade, and regiment has its own Security 

Committee.43

Headquarters Department Reforms 

Concerning the Headquarters Department and its counterparts down to the regiment level, at 

least four significant organizational changes occurred since 2000. First, it appears that the 

PLAAF renamed its Communications Department (䙊ؑ䜘) as the Informatization Department 

( ؑ᚟ॆ䜘 ) to correspond with the General Staff Department (GSD) renaming its 

Communications Department the Informatization Department in July 2011.44 Although the GSD 

created a Strategic Planning Department (ᡈ⮕㿴ࡂ䜘) in November 2011, there are no 

indications that PLAAF Headquarters created a similar department. 

Second, the Directly Subordinate Work Department was created in 2003 by merging two 

organizations within the Headquarters Department: The Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) and the 

Management Bureau (㇑⨶ተ), which was the logistics organization for the Headquarters 

 

38 http://news.ifeng.com/mil/gundong/detail_2010_12/31/3817321_0.shtml and http://wenku.baidu.com/view/ 

52c3aa0b763231126edb1115.html. 

39 http://bbs.whu.edu.cn/bbsanc.php?path=%2Fgroups%2FGROUP_4%2FHistory%2F788888%2FD.979521336. 

A%2FM.979393853.A. 

40 http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=6897317 and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_63ff99370102e1u0. 

html. 

41 www.hosane.com/productdetail.asp?auctionid=S09123&pieceCode=5573. 42 gfkgb.ah.gov.cn/news/vi...asp?id=278 and www.chinadmd.com/file/tzoiarpur3ewesz33etu6cpa_1.html. 

43 For example, information about the Beijing MRAF Security Committee’s General Office was found at 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ac64c9ed010195dt.html; Information on the Fuzhou Command Post’s Security 

Committee was found at http://forum.home.news.cn/thread/97861055/1.html; Information on a Guangzhou MRAF 

air division’s Security Committee was found at www.chinamil.com.cn/big5/2009jbzsc/2011-

05/11/content_4434101.htm; and information on a Wuhan airfield station (regiment-grade organization) was found 

at www.yf-lp.com/ cnproduct2show.asp?id=27. 

44 See www.china.com.cn/news/2011-07/01/content_22903895.htm and www.stdaily.com/kjrb/content/2011-

12/20/content_402755.htm. 
353 

Department. Part of the new department’s responsibilities includes managing the headquarters 

staff’s directly subordinate organizations. 

Third, as early as October 2005, the Headquarters Department created a subordinate Technology 

Bureau as a result of the 2003-2004 downsizing by merging several units that were dispersed 

throughout the PLAAF. When it was created, the bureau confronted a situation where it did not 

have any regiment-level organizations to carry out the necessary work for the bureau staff. This 

bureau is responsible for unidentified units in Sichuan, Yunnan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Guangdong. 

Finally, prior to 2003, each Headquarters Department had a separate Operations Department (֌

ᡈ䜘) and Training Department (䇝㓳䜘) from PLAAF Headquarters down to the brigade level 

and then merged them into an Operations and Training Branch (֌ᡈ㛑) at the regiment level. 

As part of the 2003-2004 force reduction, however, at least some division and brigade 

headquarters began merging them into an Operations and Training Office (֌ᡈ、), which 

resulted in a smaller staff with greater responsibilities. 

MRAF Headquarters Department Second-Level Divisions 

A review of several sources identified the following second-level divisions in MRAF 

Headquarters Departments listed in alphabetical order: 

x Communications Division (䙊ؑ༴) 

x Directly Subordinate Work Division (ⴤᐕ༴/ⴤ኎ᐕ֌༴) 

x Management Division (㇑⨶༴) 

x Meteorology Division (≄䊑༴) 

x Military Affairs Division (࣑ߋ༴) 

x Military Training Division (ߋһ䇝㓳༴) 

x Navigation Division (亶㡚༴) 

x Operations Division (֌ᡈ༴) 

x Radar Troop Division (䴧䗮ޥ༴) 

Political Department 

According to PLAAF 2010 and PLAAF Structure, the Political Department (オ᭯/オߋ᭯⊲/䜘) 

is the highest-level leadership, functional, and administrative organization within PLAAF 

Headquarters for political work. The Political Department is responsible for keeping officer 

personnel records, propaganda, security, education, cultural activities, civil-military relations, 

Party discipline, and Party organizations within the PLAAF.45

The leadership of the PLAAF’s Political Department includes the director (ѫԫ) and several 

deputy directors (࢟ѫԫ). Each deputy director is responsible for guiding and monitoring 

activities in one or more second-level departments. The seven primary second-level departments, 

each of which has several subordinate third-level departments, are shown below.46 It is not clear 

what the protocol order for the departments is, but the list is based on a best estimate. 

 

45 Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 217. 46 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 
354 

x Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

x Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘) 

x Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘)

47

x Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘) 

x Security Department (؍ছ䜘)

48

x Discipline and Inspection Department (㓚Ự䜘) 

x Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘) 

PLAAF Headquarters and each MRAF Headquarters has a Procuratorate (オߋߋһỰሏ䲒), 

which oversee the arrest of offenders, the prosecution process throughout the court trial, and 

carrying out the sentences awarded by military courts.49 This is separate from overseeing Partyrelated discipline issues, which the Discipline and Inspection Department manages. 

Political Department Reforms 

No changes to the Political Department were noted since 2000. 

MRAF Political Department Second-Level Divisions 

A review of several sources identified the following second-level divisions and third-level 

offices in MRAF Political Departments listed in alphabetical order:50

x Cadre Division (ᒢ䜘༴) 

 Welfare Office (鬯࡙ (、

 Appointment and Removal Office (ԫݽ (、

 Deployment Office (䈳䝽、) 

 Transfer to Civilian Position General Office (䖜ъޜ࣎ᇔ) 

x Discipline Inspection Division (㓚Ự༴) 

x Judicial General Office (ਨ⌅ޜ࣎ᇔ) 

x Legal Consultant Division (⌅ᖻ亮䰞༴) 

x Organization Division (㓴㓷༴) 

 Youth Office (䶂ᒤ、) 

 

47 The Cadre Department has at least a subordinate Legal Consultant Division (⌅ᖻ亮䰞༴), Welfare Division (鬯

࡙༴), and Veteran Cadre Division (㘱ᒢ༴). 48 The Security Department is responsible for the PLAAF’s security police, except for key personnel guard units (䆖

ছ䜘䱏), which are directly subordinate to the Headquarters Department. Although no reference to a Security 

Department was found within the PLAAF Headquarters’ Political Department, several references were found to 

Security Divisions (؍ছ༴), Security Offices (؍ছ、), and Security Branches (؍ছ㛑) at lower level 

organizations from the MRAF Headquarters down to the regiment level, which implies there is a Security 

Department in PLAAF Headquarters. Since the 2003-2004 downsizing, the PLAAF has merged the Propaganda and 

Security branches at the regiment level so they are now called xuanbao gu (ᇓ؍㛑). 49 Zhu Haiwen, “CPLA Air Force Military Procuratorate,” and Xu Xuejun, “Air Force military procuratorial work,” 

in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 383. 50 The information on these second- and third-level departments is based on a review of multiple articles from East 

View Press’ Air Force News database for 2008 through mid-2012 and the Internet, such as an article about the 

PLAAF’s Defense Student Program found at http://gfszx.sdut.edu.cn/show.aspx?id=67&cid=4. 
355 

x Propaganda Division (ᇓՐ༴) 

 Propaganda Office (ᇓՐ、) 

x Secretariat Division (〈Җ༴) 

x Security Division (؍ছ༴) 

Logistics Department 

According to PLAAF 2010 and PLAAF Structure, the Logistics Department (オਾ/オߋਾऔ䜘) 

is the highest-level leadership, functional, and administrative organization within PLAAF 

Headquarters for logistics work, which includes overseeing transportation, finances, materials 

and supplies, POL, and medical care.51 

The leadership of the PLAAF’s Logistics Department includes the director (䜘䮯), political 

commissar (᭯င), deputy directors (࢟䜘䮯), deputy political commissar (࢟᭯င), chief of staff 

(৲䈻䮯) (i.e., director of the Headquarters Department), and director of the Political Department 

(᭯⋫䜘ѫԫ). The 12 primary second-level departments, each of which has several third-level 

departments, are shown below. Although each department has several subordinate divisions, only 

those identified are also listed below. It is not clear what the protocol order for the departments is, 

but the list is based on a best estimate.52 

x Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

 Veteran Cadre Services Division (㘱ᒢȢ࣑༴) 

 Retired Cadre Services Division (⿫䘰Ձᒢ䜘Ȣ࣑༴/⿫Ձᒢ䜘Ȣ࣑༴/⿫Ձᒢ䜘༴) 

 Propaganda and Security Division (ᇓ؍༴) 

x Finance Department (䍒࣑䜘) 

 Payroll and Insurance Division (ᐕ㯚؍䲙༴) 

 Budget Division (亴㇇༴) 

x Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Department (ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

 Subsistence Division (㔉ޫ༴) 

x Health Department (ছ⭏䜘) 

 Medical Division (५⯇༴) 

 Health Division (ছ⭏༴) 

 Duty Office (٬⨝ᇔ) 

x Military Transportation Department (ߋӔ䘀䗃䜘) 

 Transportation Division (䘀䗃༴) 

x Airfield and Barracks Department (χ൪㩕ᡯ䜘) 

 Airfield Service Support Division (ᑨ؍࣑䳌༴) 

 

51 Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 217. 52 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). The information on these second- and third-level departments 

is based on a review of multiple articles from East View Press’ Air Force News database for 2008 through mid-2012 

and the Internet. 
356 

x Directly Subordinate Supply Department (ⴤ኎׋ᓄ䜘/ⴤ׋䜘)

53

 Transportation Division (ߋӔ䘀䗃༴) 

 Quartermaster and POL Division (ߋ䴰⋩ᯉ༴) 

 Finance Division (䍒࣑༴) 

x Air Force National Defense Engineering Development Command Department (オߋഭ䱢

ᐕ〻ᔪ䇮ᤷᥕ䜘) 

x Audit Bureau (ᇑ䇑ተ) 

x Real Estate Management Bureau (ᡯൠӗ㇑⨶ተ/ᡯ㇑ተ)

54

 Several Regional/City Divisions, such as the Nanjing Real Estate Management 

Division (ইӜᡯ㇑༴) 

The Logistics Department also has an Air Force Engineering and Design Research Institute (オ

ߋᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウተ), which is responsible for the research and design of all PLAAF engineering 

and construction for airfield, barracks, and defense facilities. Up to 2000, it had constructed 23 

airfields, more than 30 defense facilities, and over 1,000 barracks.55 The PLAAF also has several 

Air Force Air Defense Engineering Divisions (オߋオ䱢ᐕ〻༴), and each MRAF has a 

Directly Subordinate Construction and Engineering Division (ⴤ኎ᔪᅌᐕ〻༴), which has 

several subordinate Air Force Engineering Command Headquarters (オߋᐕ〻ᤷᥕ䜘) to 

manage specific projects.56 

Logistics Department Reforms 

One of the most significant organizational changes since 2000 began in 2003, when the Materials 

Department (⢙䍴䜘) and Fuels Department (⋩ᯉ䜘) were merged.57 At some point later, 

probably January 2004, the Quartermaster Department (ߋ䴰䜘) was also merged into it. These 

 

53 Since the 2003-2004 downsizing went into effect, the Directly Subordinate Supply Department’s support missions 

expanded along with the number of people. 

54 The PLAAF’s Real Estate Management Bureau was formally created in 2004. It had its origin in 1985 as part of 

the 1 million person force reduction. In 1986, the GSD approved its creation to manage military housing and 

property. It has changed several times but was always outside the formal organizational structure and was managed 

by civil service personnel. When it was formally established in 2004, it switched to management by military officers. 

Its management system now has a 3-tiered structure: bureau (ተ), divisions (༴), and local offices (ൠ४࣎һ༴). 

The bureau’s primary mission is to receive the PLAAF’s real estate assets that had been empty and to oversee their 

maintenance so they can be used by units for multiple purposes, including storage of supplies during peacetime and 

wartime. 

55 Tian Jun, “Air Force Engineering Design Institute (オߋᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウተ), in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force 

Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p.1254. Zhu Rongchang, ed. Air Force Dictionary, p. 777. 56 Liu Zhixiong, “Air Force Engineering Division,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 242. The 

engineering divisions are responsible for air force national defense engineering projects and repairs. This appears to 

be a regiment-level organization. Each of the seven MRAF Logistics Departments also has a Directly Subordinate 

Construction and Engineering Division (ⴤ኎ᔪᅌᐕ〻༴) that is responsible for projects in their MRAF. The Air 

Force Engineering Design Institute assumed its current name in 1986 at the same time the Air Force Engineering 

Divisions were formed by combining engineering zongdui and regiments. For an example of an Engineering 

Headquarters in Jilin that is subordinate to the Shenyang MRAF’s Directly Subordinate Construction and 

Engineering Division ( ⊸䱣ߋ४オߋⴤ኎ᔪᅌᐕ〻༴ਹ᷇ᐕ〻ᤷᥕ䜘 ) see http://company.ch. 

gongchang.com/info/64852260_dd95/. 

57 The information in this paragraph comes from analysis of multiple articles in Air Force News, East View Press’ 

PLA Daily database, and the Internet. 
357 

changes corresponded with the phased merging of the same three departments in the GLD. 

However, the three components are separated into individual offices (、) and branches (㛑) at 

the division/brigade, and regiment levels, respectively. For example, each regiment has a 

Quartermaster Branch (ߋ䴰㛑), Materials Branch (⢙䍴㛑), and Fuels Branch (⋩ᯉ㛑). 

Prior to the creation of the General Armament Department in 1998, the PLAAF’s Logistics 

Department was responsible for maintenance of all non-aviation weapons and equipment, 

including SAMs, AAA, radar systems, and vehicles. Although the PLAAF Equipment 

Department took over the responsibility in 1998 for birth-to-death of the PLAAF’s weapons and 

equipment, including SAMs, AAA, and radar systems, the Logistics Department’s 

Transportation Department retained that responsibility for all transportation vehicles.58

MRAF Logistics Department Second-Level Divisions 

A review of several sources identified the following second-level divisions and third-level 

offices in MRAF Logistics Departments listed in alphabetical order:59

x Airfield and Barracks Division (χ൪㩕ᡯ༴/χ㩕༴) 

x Air Defense Engineering Division (オ䱢ᐕ〻༴) 

x Air Materiel Depot Functional Division (㡚ᶀԃᓃъ࣑༴) 

x Combat Services Plans Division (ᡈऔ䇑ࡂ༴) 

x Finance Division (䍒࣑༴) 

x Health Division (ছ⭏༴) 

x Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Division (ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ༴) 

 Bedding, Clothing, and Accoutrements Office (㻛㻵、) 

x Transportation Division (ߋһӔ䙊䘀䗃༴/ߋӔ䘀䗃༴/䘀䗃༴) 

Equipment Department 

When the PLAAF was founded in November 1949, it created an Air Force Engineering 

Department (オߋᐕ〻䜘) to manage aircraft maintenance; however, in September 1969, it was 

abolished, leaving the PLAAF with only three first-level departments. Because of significant 

aircraft maintenance problems during the Cultural Revolution, the PLAAF created the 

Aeronautical Engineering Department (オߋ㡚オᐕ〻䜘) in May 1976 as the fourth first-level 

department with the responsibility of managing aircraft maintenance and providing 

representatives at aviation-related factories. In 1992, the name was changed to the Air Force 

Equipment Technical Department (オߋ㻵༷ᢰδ䜘), but it still had the same responsibilities.60

 

58 The information in this paragraph is based on a review of Air Force News articles, the Internet, and interviews 

with PLA personnel over the past decade. 

59 The information in this paragraph comes from analysis of multiple articles in Air Force News, East View Press’ 

PLA Daily database, and the Internet. 60 Kenneth Allen, People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army Air Force, Washington, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, DIC-1300-445-91, May 1991, Section 8, p. 8-1. “Air Force Aviation Engineering Department,” 

Air Force Dictionary, 146. World Military Yearbook 1993-1994 (ц⭼ߋһᒤ䢤), Beijing, PLA Press, June 1994, 

81. Prior to 1998, the Logistics Department was responsible for maintenance for all non-aviation equipment and 

weapon systems. With the exception of vehicle maintenance, which remained under the Logistics Department, the 

Equipment Department took responsibility for maintenance for all equipment and weapon systems in 1998. 
358 

At the same time the CMC created the General Armament Department in 1998, the PLAAF 

changed the name to the Equipment Department (オ㻵/オߋ㻵༷䜘). At that time, the secondlevel Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘) and Scientific Research Department (、⹄䜘) from the 

Headquarters Department, along with the second-level Ordnance Department (ߋỠ䜘) from the 

Logistics Department were merged into the new Equipment Department. 

The Equipment Department is the highest-level leadership, functional, and administrative 

organization within PLAAF Headquarters for equipment work, which includes the birth-to-death 

life-cycle management, repair, and maintenance of all PLAAF weapon systems and equipment 

except for transportation vehicles.61

The leadership of the PLAAF’s Equipment Department includes the director (䜘䮯), political 

commissar (PC), at least five deputy directors (࢟䜘䮯), one deputy PC, and the director of the 

Political Department (᭯⋫䜘ѫԫ). 

The eight primary second-level departments, each of which has several third-level departments, 

are shown below. The subordinate divisions identified are also shown below. It is not clear what 

the protocol order for the departments is, but the list is based on a best estimate.62 

x Comprehensive Planning Department (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ䜘), which also serves the function of a 

Headquarters Department 

 Comprehensive Division (㔬ਸ༴) 

 Training Division (䇝㓳༴) 

 Equipment Management and Repair Division (㻵༷㇑⨶㔤؞༴) 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

x Field Maintenance Department (ཆ൪䜘)

63

 Organization and Planning Division (㓴㓷䇑ࡂ༴) 

x Scientific Research and Procurement Department (、⹄䇒䍗䜘)

64

x Air Materiel Department (㡚ᶀ䜘)

65

x Aviation Engineering Management Department (㡚オᐕ〻㇑⨶䜘)

66

 Personnel and Labor Division (Ӫһࣣࣘ༴) 

x Ordnance General-Use Equipment Department (ߋỠ䙊⭘㻵༷䜘) 

 Air Force Ordnance General-Use Equipment Military Representative Bureau (オߋߋ

Ỡ䙊⭘㻵༷ߋһԓ㺘ተ) 

 

61 Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 218. 62 The information in this paragraph comes from analysis of multiple articles in Air Force News, East View Press’ 

PLA Daily database, and the Internet. 63 The Field Maintenance Department is responsible for all first- and second-level maintenance at the aviation 

division and regiment level. This department also has directly subordinate repair and spare-part factories for secondlevel maintenance in each Military Region. 

64 Somewhere between 2003 and 2005, the PLAAF merged the Scientific Research Department (、⹄䜘) and the 

Equipment Procurement Department (㻵༷䇒䍗䜘) into a single department. 65 This department was previously under the Logistics Department. 

66 In this instance, given the historical context of the term, gongcheng (engineering) most likely refers to aircraft 

maintenance. 
359 

x Major Type/Model Department (䟽⛩රਧ䜘). 

Equipment Department Reforms 

The most significant changes to the Equipment Department since 2000 were the creation of the 

Ordnance General-Use Equipment Department and its subordinate Air Force Ordnance GeneralUse Equipment Military Representative Bureau, which first appeared in late 2004 and early 2005, 

respectively.67 

Only a few items for the department were found online, the latest of which appeared in late 2011. 

The department has a director (䜘䮯), whose rank is major general, deputy directors (࢟䜘䮯), 

and a Ground-based Weapons Division (ൠ䶒↖ಘ༴).68 It is not clear what grade is assigned to 

the department or bureau. 

The bureau has a director (ተ䮯) and a subordinate Political Department, a Cooperation Office 

( ॿ ࣎( , and a Management Division ( ㇑⨶༴ ). The Military Representative Bureau is 

responsible for guiding all of the PLAAF’s military representatives assigned to regional bureaus 

and offices and to individual non-military research institutes and factories to monitor the 

development and production of PLAAF systems. It is roughly equivalent to the USAF’s Air 

Force Plant Representative Office (AFPRO) system, except that the PLAAF’s military 

representatives spend most, if not all, of their career in the same office, while the USAF’s 

representatives rotate every two to three years. 

Although the PLAAF created its first military representative offices in factories in 1950, it did 

not begin creating regional bureaus (ൠ४ߋһԓ㺘ተ) until 1994. The PLAAF currently has a 

three-tiered military representative structure: Headquarters Air Force, regional bureaus and 

offices, and factory/research institute representative offices.69

Although not identified in PLAAF 2010, the Equipment Department apparently created a new 

subordinate department in 2010. The Chinese name is Zhongdian Xinghao Bu (䟽⛩රਧ䜘). 

The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database has only one article by anyone 

from the department, which was written in 2011. CNKI identified the English name as the Major 

Type Department, but that does not necessarily mean it is the correct name. Internet articles 

about the new department imply a close link between it and the Equipment Department’s 

Ordnance General-Use Equipment Department and the Air Force Equipment Research 

Academy’s General Demonstration Research Institute (㻵༷ᙫփ䇪䇱⹄ウᡰ), which indicates 

it focuses on the research and development aspects of new aircraft and engines. The department 

has a subordinate Test Flight and Navigation Office (䈅伎䈅㡚ᇔ) in Beijing, which was 

 

67 The first article in CNKI written by anyone from the Armament General-Use Equipment Department was 

published in November 2004, and the first time it appeared in Air Force News was 29 January 2005, p. 3. There are 

still articles the Internet referring to this department. The first time the Air Force Armament General-Use Equipment 

Military Representative Bureau appeared in Air Force News was 24 February 2005, p. 2. 68 Information accessed at www.zgjyzb.cn/news_show.asp?id=18 and www.chinahvacr.com/News/Class9/ 

201007/News_3036299.shtml on 1 April 2012. 

69 Niu Keli, “Air Force Bureaus of Military Representatives,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 1, p. 

245. 
360 

involved in writing an article on turbofan engines.70 A search of the Internet found that the term 

major type (䟽⛩ؑਧ) was first noted in an article about Beijing University of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics (BUAA) concerning unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).71 All other Internet articles 

that include this term concern appeared after 2005 and focus on aircraft, aircraft engines, and 

UAVs, which implies it is specific to these systems and the PLAAF created a new department to 

deal with them. 

MRAF Equipment Department Second-Level Divisions 

A review of several sources identified the following second-level divisions and third-level 

offices in MRAF Equipment Departments listed in alphabetical order: 

x Air Materiel Division (㡚ᶀ༴) 

 Equipment Command Center (㻵༷ᤷᥕѝᗳ) 

x Comprehensive Planning Division (㔬ਸ䇑ࡂ༴) 

x Equipment Division (㻵༷༴) 

x Field Maintenance Division (ཆ൪༴) 

x Ordnance Division (ߋỠ༴) 

x Ordnance General-Use Equipment Division (ߋỠ䙊⭘㻵༷༴) 

Branches and Specialty Units 

The PLAAF, which is one of three PLA services (ߋ(⿽, consists of the following five 

branches/arms (ޥ (⿽and five specialty units and subunits (уъ䜘(࠶(䱏), which are listed in 

protocol order.72 The PLA defines units as organizations at the corps, division, brigade, and 

regiment levels. For example, air divisions, brigades, and regiments, SAM brigades and 

regiments, and communications regiments are considered units. The PLA defines subunits (࠶

䱏), which are sometimes translated as elements or detachments, as organizations at the battalion, 

company, and platoon level. Some definitions include squads as subunits. Subunits can be either 

permanent, or they can be ad hoc organizations, such as communications, radar, vehicle, 

 

70 Information about the new department was accessed at www.chinahvacr.com/News/ 

Class9/201007/News_3036299.shtml, www.zhqsdz.com.cn/NewsView.asp?ID=102, www.cannews.com.cn/zghkb/ 

html/2010-08/03/content_8801.htm, and www.ztmw.com/index/news/news_detail.aspx?id=936 on 4 May 2012. The 

CNKI article was accessed at www.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?filename=HKFJ201104015&dbcode= 

CJFQ&dbname=CJFD2011 on 6 May 2012. 

71 Information accessed at www.nen.com.cn/72351167937511424/20060309/1866255_1.shtml on 4 May 2012. 

72 The three services are Army, Navy, and Air Force. Second Artillery is an independent branch, not a service. Since 

1985, the World Military Yearbook (ц⭼ߋһᒤ䢤), which is published annually or biennially by PLA Press (䀓᭮

ߋࠪ⡸矢), has listed the five branches in order as aviation, SAM, AAA, radar, and airborne. Until 2007, they did 

not identify the specialized units and subunits. Beginning with the 2007 edition, the yearbook has added the five 

specialty units and subunits in the order of communications, radar, ECM, chemical defense, and technical 

reconnaissance. As for the biennial China’s National Defense, only the 2002 and 2008 editions identify the branches. 

The 2002 edition confused the issue by identifying only four branches (aviation, SAM, AAA, and airborne) and 

listed the five specialty units and subunits as communications, radar, ECM, chemical defense, and special technical. 

The 2008 edition listed eight branches in the following order: aviation, air defense (SAM and AAA), airborne, 

communications, radar, ECM, technical reconnaissance, and chemical defense. It did not mention specialty units and 

subunits. Meanwhile, the Ministry of National Defense’s website states that the PLAAF has five branches (aviation, 

SAM, AAA, radar, and airborne) and other specialized units and subunits. 
361 

maintenance, or launch/firing subunits. Subunits are also identified as the “grassroots” (สቲ) 

level. Each of the branches and specialty units will be discussed in subsequent sections. 

x Five Branches 

 Aviation (㡚オޥ (

 Surface-to-air missiles (SAM/ൠオሬᕩޥ (

 Antiaircraft artillery (AAA/ 儈ሴ⛞ޥ (

 Radar (䴧䗮) 

 Airborne (オ䱽ޥ (

x Five Specialty Units 

 Communications (䙊ؑ), which was previously a branch 

 Radar (䴧䗮), which is also a branch 

 Electronic countermeasures (⭥ᆀሩᣇ) 

 Chemical defense (䱢ॆ) 

 Technical reconnaissance (ᢰδזሏ). 

Although the PLAAF has added new weapons and equipment throughout the force over the past 

decade, the only significant changes to the organizational structure identified have occurred in 

the aviation branch. Figure 1 shows the basic organizational structure of the five branches and 

the different types of highest-level unit headquarters down to the regiment level. Each type of 

headquarters is either directly subordinate to a command post (corps deputy leader grade or 

division leader grade), MRAF Headquarters (military region deputy leader grade), or PLAAF 

Headquarters (military region leader grade). Each type of headquarters has subordinate units or 

subunits. 

 
362 

Figure 2: PLAAF Branches and Subordinate Units 

In the PLAAF, divisions, brigades, and regiments can each serve as the highest level 

headquarters below the PLAAF Headquarters, MRAF headquarters, base, or command post 

levels. Divisions can have subordinate regiments, battalions (flight groups), and/or companies 

(flight squadrons). Brigades, which are never subordinate to a division and do not have 

subordinate regiments, can have subordinate battalions and/or companies. Whereas air divisions 

have subordinate regiments, flight groups (battalion), and flight squadrons (company), air 

brigades only have subordinate flight groups and squadrons. Meanwhile, the SAM branch can 

have division, brigade, or regiment headquarters with subordinate battalions and/or companies, 

and the AAA branch can have brigade or regiment headquarters with subordinate battalions 

and/or companies. The 15th Airborne Corps is organized into three airborne divisions with 

subordinate regiments, battalions, and companies. 

The PLAAF’s Force Restructuring 

According to China’s National Defense in 2004, the PLA conducted a force reduction of 200,000 

personnel beginning in late 2003. Of this total, 85 percent were officers. The primary purpose 

was to “reduce the number, aim at optimal force structures, and create smoother internal relations 

and better quality” The focus of these reforms was to:73 

x Rebalance the ratio between officers and enlisted personnel 

x Improve the system of leadership and command 

x Optimize the composition of the services and branches 

x Deepen the reform of joint logistics support 

x Realign the organizational structure of military academic institutions. 

 

73 China’s National Defense 2004. One must make a distinction between air defense forces, which include SAM and 

AAA, and air defense missions which include SAM, AAA, and aviation units. In some cases, the radar branch is 

included as an air defense force. 
363 

PLAAF C2 Reforms in 2003-2004 and 2012 

According to PLAAF 2010 and PLAAF Structure, historically, the PLAAF has had a five-tiered 

vertical command structure for its aviation and air defense (SAM and AAA) troops, but it 

reduced the number of tiers to four beginning in late 2003.74 The change occurred when the 

PLAAF abolished the air corps (オߋߋ (level, created several corps deputy leader-grade (ߋ࢟

㙼) and division leader-grade (↓ᐸ㙼) command posts (CPs/ᤷᥕᡰ), and consolidated the 

operational chain of command for aviation and air defense troops under the seven MRAF 

Headquarters. In conjunction with establishing new air brigades, which began in late 2011, the 

PLAAF has begun creating four bases ˄สൠ˅ as corps deputy leader-grade organizations 

from existing CPs. A comparison of the three periods is shown in Table 3. 

Table 3: Aviation and Air Defense Command Structure 

Pre-2003 2004-2011 2012-Current 

PLAAF HQ PLAAF HQ PLAAF HQ 

MRAF HQ MRAF HQ MRAF HQ 

Air Corps and bases Command Posts Bases and Command Posts 

Units Units Units 

Subunits Subunits Subunits 

According to PLAAF Structure, the last two tiers consist of units (䜘䱏) and subunits (࠶䱏). 

PLAAF Structure notes that, prior to the 2003-2004 force reduction, the PLAAF had 11 corps 

leader-grade (↓ߋ㙼) organizations, including the 15th Airborne Corps plus five air corps and 

five bases. Excluding the 15th Airborne Corps, the other air corps and bases were subordinate to 

their respective MRAF headquarters and were responsible for directly commanding the PLAAF 

combat units (aviation, air defense, radar, etc.) in their area of responsibility (AOR). The PLAAF 

also had two division-level CPs that served the same function. 

PLAAF Structure states that, from 2003 to 2012, the only corps leader-grade combat 

organization was the 15th Airborne Corps, which is directly subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters 

and has three subordinate airborne divisions in the Guangzhou and Jinan MRAFs. As a result of 

the 2003 force restructuring, the PLAAF reduced the grade of the remaining air corps and corpslevel bases to either corps deputy leader- or division leader-grade organizations, re-designated 

them as CPs, and consolidated leadership for all aviation and air defense organizations in each 

MRAF directly under the respective MRAF headquarters. Of note, every billet in the previous air 

corps and bases were downgraded accordingly to match the Table of Organization (㕆ࡦ (for the 

corps deputy leader- and division leader-grade CPs. In addition, while the Headquarters 

Department and Political Department remained, their Logistics Department and Equipment 

Department were abolished and those responsibilities were move up to the MRAF Headquarters. 

From 2004 to 2012, the PLAAF had 13 CPs, which acted on behalf of the MRAF Headquarters 

to command the organizations in their AOR. Based on the available information, Table 4 shows 

the 13 CPs and their identified grade: 

 

74 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 
364 

Table 4: PLAAF Command Posts as of 2004 

MRAF Corps Deputy Leader CPs Division Leader CPs 

Beijing Datong None 

Chengdu Kunming Lhasa 

Guangzhou Wuhan Nanning 

Jinan None None 

Lanzhou Wulumuqi, Xi’an Hetian 

Nanjing Fuzhou Shanghai, Zhangzhou 

Shenyang Dalian Changchun 

According to PLAAF 2010, although downgrading all of the air corps-level organizations was 

intended to simplify the command structure, it actually complicated the situation.75 The primary 

reason is that the PLA’s organizational structure, in general, does not allow for an organization 

of one grade to be subordinate to another organization of the same grade. In other words, an air 

or SAM division can be subordinate to a corps deputy leader-grade CP but not to a divisiongrade CP. To help solve this dilemma, PLAAF writings state that each MRAF now commands 

all operational organizations in its AOR, and that each command post acts on behalf of the 

MRAF to command combat organizations in its AOR. Furthermore, a second problem arose 

concerning coordination between the command posts and the ground forces. Whereas the air 

corps and group armies could work as equals to plan, organize, and implement joint training, the 

command posts no longer have the same equal relationship. 

PLAAF Creates New Bases in 2012 

In January 2012, the PLAAF began creating four corps deputy leader-grade bases from existing 

command posts in Nanning, Urumqi, Shanghai, and Dalian. Each base is responsible for C2 of 

the air brigades, SAM, AAA, and radar units in their AOR. They also coordinate with Army and 

Navy units in their AOR for joint training. 

Aviation Branch 

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF has 29 air divisions (㡚オޥᐸ).76 It also has several 

independent transport regiments that are not subordinate to an air division. An air division 

consists of a command staff, four administrative and functional departments, and two types of 

regiment-level subordinate units: air regiments (㡚オޥഒ) and field stations (൪ㄉ). The air 

division headquarters is considered a tenant unit at an airfield. 

Depending on its location and mission, an air division can be directly subordinate to PLAAF 

Headquarters or an MRAF Headquarters. As noted above, since the 2003-2004 force reduction, 

under certain circumstances, an air division can be subordinate to a command post. 

The command staff of an air division consists of a commander (ᐸ䮯), a political commissar (᭯

င ), at least two deputy commanders, and at least one deputy political commissar. The 

 

75 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 2 (Organizational Structure). 76 PLAAF 2010, Chapter 8 (Aviation Branch) 
365 

administrative and functional departments consist of a Headquarters Department headed by a 

chief of staff, a Political Department headed by a director, and a Logistics Department and 

Equipment Department, each of which have a director and a political commissar. Each 

department has several subordinate offices that equate to those in the PLAAF and MRAF 

Headquarters. 

Most of the air divisions today have two to three subordinate air regiments (㡚オޥഒ), each of 

which is usually located at a separate airfield. Depending on the type of aircraft, each regiment 

has 18 to 24 aircraft that are organized into two to three subordinate flight groups (伎㹼བྷ䱏), 

which are battalion leader-grade organizations. Each flight group, in turn, is divided into two to 

three flight squadrons (伎㹼ѝ䱏), which are company leader-grade organizations. Each flight 

group has an average of eight to ten aircraft, and each flight squadron has an average of two to 

four aircraft. 

Each air regiment also has a subordinate battalion-level maintenance group (χ࣑བྷ䱏), which, 

in turn, has subordinate company-level maintenance squadrons (χ࣑ѝ䱏), which are identified 

as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd maintenance squadrons and the periodic inspection squadron. Each 

squadron, in turn, has several subordinate platoon-level flights ( ࠶ 䱏 ), including radar, 

machinery, armament, special equipment, radio, and fire control system flights. Each flight has a 

commander. 

Each maintenance group also has a subordinate company-level aircraft repair shop (؞⨶ল), or 

backshop, for local repairs. The repair shop, in turn, has several subordinate platoon-level flights 

(࠶䱏) that work with their corresponding squadrons in a maintenance group. Each flight is 

organized into several squad-level sections (㓴). 

A field station is an independent regiment-level logistics support unit subordinate to the air 

division. Some field stations can also be directly subordinate to an MRAF Headquarters. The 

commander (ㄉ䮯) serves as the airbase commander with responsibility for all facilities and 

operations. He also organizes the supply of materials and equipment to each tenant air regiment 

and provides logistics support for flight operations and training. 

Aviation Branch Reforms 

In 2004, the PLAAF created the 4th Transport Air Division in Qionglai, Sichuan Province, 

Chengdu MRAF and assigned the first female commander, Colonel Cheng Xiaojian (〻ᲃڕ(. 

The division consists of three transport regiments equipped with Y-5s, Y-7s, and helicopters.77

In 2005, the 15th Airborne Corps began creating subordinate battalion-level helicopter dadui to 

its airborne divisions.78

In December 2011, the PLAAF revealed that it had begun creating air brigades (㡚オޥ (᯵in at 

least the Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Nanjing, and Shenyang MRAFs by upgrading existing air 

regiments. Each brigade has from three to five subordinate battalion-level leader-grade flight 

 

77 Information accessed at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/zt/2010jzjg/node_42768.htm on 1 April 2012. 

78 Various articles from Air Force News during 2005. 
366 

groups, which, in turn, have subordinate company-level flight squadrons. The goal is to have 

each flight group equipped with a different type of aircraft, including trainers, ground attack, and 

fighters, such that the brigade is multifunctional.79 

Beginning in 2012, the PLAAF has also merged six of its seven division leader-grade flight 

colleges (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th) into three corps deputy leader-grade flight colleges. The 

details are discussed in Section 13. 

Table 5 shows the number and location of operational and training air brigades that have been 

identified by MRAF. 

Table 5: PLAAF Air Brigades 

MRAF Operational 

Brigades 

Flight College 

Brigades 

Beijing 0 1 

Guangzhou 2 N/A 

Lanzhou 2 2 

Nanjing 2 N/A 

Shenyang 2 2 

Some reporting also indicates that the PLAAF has merged at least some, if not all, of its seven 

MRAF transition training bases (᭩㻵䇝㓳สൠ) that were created in 1986 into the new 

operational and training air brigades, such that newly graduated flight cadets are assigned 

directly to a training flight group in their new unit for transition training.80 

Shifting Commanders from the Tower to the Command Post 

Based on information from various PLAAF sources, including China Air Force (ѝഭオߋ (

magazine and Air Force News (オߋᣕ) besides adjusting the force structure discussed in this 

section, the most significant reform has been to begin providing pilots in all air units (divisions, 

brigades, regiments, and flight groups and squadrons) with the “autonomy” to create their own 

flight plans, taxi out and take off without strict guidance, to conduct “free air combat” while 

implementing the flight plan, and then land without strict guidance from a senior officer in the 

tower. The PLAAF has identified this overall control as the “nanny model.”81

In order for pilots to implement their new autonomy, the PLAAF began planning for reforms in 

2008 to move the flight commanders (伎㹼ᤷᥕઈ) from the control tower down to the 

command post in the bottom of the tower and replace them with ground officers identified as 

 

79 Accessed at www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2012-02/01/content_24523647.htm and http://club.mil.news.sohu. 

com/newclub/show.php?forumid=shilin&threadid=4114990 on 25 March 2012. 

80 Information accessed at http://paper.wenweipo.com/2012/01/21/PL1201210004.htm and http://paper.wenweipo. 

com/2011/12/31/PL1112310005.htm on 25 March 2012. 

81 Zhang Li and Cao Chuanbiao “Changes in an Aviation Division’s Training Model to Enhance Training 

Effectiveness,” PLA Daily online, 18 March 2012. Li Tianxia, Jia Yanbin, and Huang Chun, “Transitioning from 

the Tower Begins,” China Air Force, 2012/04, p. 26-28. 
367 

flight adjusters (伎㹼䈳䝽ઈ). The first group of flight adjusters was selected from grounded 

pilots and navigators, but the PLAAF is now beginning to train cadets to assume these positions. 

Each control tower also has a flight support room manned by logistics and maintenance 

personnel. 

In addition to selecting officers who are already at an airfield, the PLAAF has begun a new 

program to educate and train cadets to eventually become flight adjusters. The April 2012 issue 

of China Air Force magazine has a three-page article on a new program to train cadets to 

become flight adjusters.82 According to the article, the first class of 30 flight adjusters in the Air 

Force Engineering University’s (AFEU) Air Force Air Traffic Control Department (オߋ㡚㇑パーセント) 

began on 15 February 2012. 

Under the new reforms, which were implemented in 2012, the number of officers in the top of 

the control tower has been reduced from about 13 to five, and the number of officers in the 

command post has been increased accordingly. The new flight adjusters serve as air traffic 

controllers for skills training (e.g., takeoffs, navigation, and landings) out to between 30 and 50 

kilometers from the airfield, and the flight commanders, who now reside in the command post, 

command and control tactics training in the unit’s training and operational airspace. When the air 

unit conducts “red” and “blue” opposition-force training, each group has its own flight 

commander in the command post. Unlike previous training, where the two groups coordinated 

their tactics prior to taking off, the two groups do not exchange information ahead of time so as 

to train in a more realistic operational environment. The flight commanders apparently 

coordinate with the pilots once they are airborne through the use of data links, but little 

information is available about how this is accomplished. In some cases, pilots have also 

conducted training under complete radio silence. 

Surface-to-Air Missile Branch 

It is not clear how many SAM units, especially long-range SAMs, the PLAAF has, but the 

number is apparently growing and the units are being deployed in more MRAFs. Although the 

annual DoD report on the PLA provides numbers of air divisions, it does not provide numbers of 

SAM units. For example, the 2011 report states, “The PLA Air Force has continued expanding 

its inventory of long-range, advanced SAM systems and now possesses one of the largest such 

forces in the world.”83 Furthermore, no credible Internet source provides information on the 

number or true unit designators for the PLAAF’s SAM units. 

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF’s SAM branch was created in October 1958, when China 

received its first SA-2 missiles (5 launchers and 62 missiles) from the Soviet Union. At the same 

time, the Air Force established its missile school at Sanyuan, Shaanxi Province, and the first 

SAM battalion near Beijing. The first units borrowed people from the AAA, radar, aviation 

maintenance, and spotlight troops. For security purposes, the SAM department in the PLAAF 

Headquarters was called the Technical Department until 1966, when it was combined with the 

AAA Department and remains there today. 

 

82 Li Tianxia, Jia Yanbin, and Huang Chun, “Transitioning from the Tower Begins,” China Air Force, 2012/04, p. 

26-28. 

83 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China, 2011, p. 4. 
368 

The PLAAF also refers to its SAM forces as “second artillery” (Ҽ⛞) to distinguish it from its 

AAA troops or “first artillery” (а⛞). However, this often causes confusion because the term 

can be mistaken for the PLA’s ballistic missile force, which is also called Second Artillery and 

uses the same Chinese characters. Of note, the PLAAF often identifies the SAM and AAA 

branches together as air defense units (䱢オ䜘䱏). 

Today, the PLAAF’s SAM forces are organized into one of the following four command 

structures, where the highest-level headquarters can be a division, brigade, or regiment: 

x Air defense composite division (䱢オ␧ᡀᐸ) with separate SAM and AAA regiments, 

battalions, and launch/firing companies.84

x SAM division (ሬᕩᐸ) with subordinate regiments, battalions, and companies 

x SAM brigades ( ሬᕩ᯵ ) with subordinate battalions and, in some cases, launch 

companies 

x SAM regiments with subordinate battalions and, in some cases, launch companies. 

There are no identified situations in the PLAAF where a brigade is subordinate to a division. 

Furthermore, no SAM regiments are subordinate to SAM brigades. Depending on their location, 

SAM units can either be directly subordinate to an MRAF Headquarters or subordinate to a 

PLAAF command post, which is, in turn, subordinate to an MRAF Headquarters. 

The administrative and functional departments in SAM divisions and brigades consist of a 

Headquarters Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political Department headed by a director, 

and a Logistics Department and Equipment Department. Each department has several 

subordinate offices (、) that equate to those in the PLAAF and MRAF Headquarters. 

The administrative and functional departments in SAM regiments consist of a Headquarters 

Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political Division headed by a director, and a Logistics 

Division and Equipment Division. Each organization has several subordinate branches (㛑). 

Surface-to-Air Missile Branch Reforms 

Other than an increase in the number and types of SAMs in the order-of-battle, no changes to the 

organizational structure were noted. 

Antiaircraft Artillery Branch 

It is not clear how many AAA units the PLAAF has. The annual DoD report does not even 

mention AAA anywhere in the report. Furthermore, no credible Internet source provides 

information on the number or true unit designators for the PLAAF’s AAA units. 

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF’s AAA branch was originally established in 1946 as part 

of the ground forces. In August 1955, the CMC formally established the PLA Air Defense Force 

(ADF/䀓᭮ߋ䱢オߋ (as one of the PLA’s four services. The new force was created by merging 

 

84 The characters huncheng (␧ᡀ) can be translated as “combined,” “composite,” or “mixed.” 
369 

the ground forces’ AAA, searchlight, observation, and radar units. In May 1957, the CMC 

merged the ADF into the Air Force, into a single service with aviation and air defense units. 

When the PLAAF and ADF merged, there were 11 AAA divisions. Today, the PLAAF has no 

remaining AAA divisions, as they have all been downgraded to brigades or regiments. 

The PLAAF’s AAA troops are organized into one of two command structures as follows, where 

the highest-level AAA headquarters is a brigade or regiment, each of which has subordinate 

battalions: 

x AAA brigades ( ᯵ ) with subordinate battalions, which are composed of firing 

companies.85

x AAA regiments ( ഒ ) with subordinate battalions, which are composed of firing 

companies. 

The PLAAF also has a single air defense composite division that has separate SAM and AAA 

regiments, each of which have subordinate battalions and launch/firing (ਁሴ) companies.86

Depending on their location, AAA units may be directly subordinate to an MRAF headquarters 

or they may be subordinate to a command post, which, in turn, is subordinate to an MRAF 

headquarters. 

The administrative and functional departments in AAA and brigades consist of a Headquarters 

Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political Department headed by a director, and a 

Logistics Department and Equipment Department. Each department has several subordinate 

offices (、) that equate to those in the PLAAF and MRAF Headquarters. 

The administrative and functional departments in AAA regiments consist of a Headquarters 

Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political Division headed by a director, and a Logistics 

Division and Equipment Division. Each organization has several subordinate branches (㛑). 

Antiaircraft Artillery Branch Reforms 

Other than changes to the order-of-battle, no changes to the organizational structure were noted. 

Radar Branch 

Radar Troops 

PLAAF 2010 states that the first independent radar troop (䴧䗮ޥ (units were established in 1949. 

Once the PLA ADF was established in December 1950, radar units were divided into two types. 

Those subordinate to the ADF were responsible for early warning, and those subordinate to the 

PLAAF were responsible for directly supporting aviation units. In 1957, the PLAAF and ADF 

merged and the radar troops became a formal branch of the PLAAF. 

 

85 In the case of firing companies, the PLAAF often translates “companies” as “batteries.” Cui Changqi, A New 

English-Chinese Chinese-English Dictionary of Military Terms, Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, October 

1999, p. 38. 

86 In April 1989, the author had a discussion with the PLAAF commander, General Wang Hai, who said that the 

PLAAF’s goal was to consolidate all SAM and AAA units into composite divisions. Obviously, this did not occur. 
370 

In 1959, company-level radar stations (䴧䗮ㄉ) were established as the basic radar unit. In the 

early 1960s, the PLAAF created a 3-level structure consisting of regiments, battalions, and 

company-level stations. As the number of radar stations grew in the late 1990s, the PLAAF 

established some radar brigades as the highest-level headquarters. These brigades have 

subordinate battalions and stations. 

Today, the PLAAF has two basic types of radar sites. The first type is located at airfields and is 

used primarily for air traffic control (ATC) and some ground-controlled intercept (GCI). The 

second type consists of early warning and GCI radars located throughout China. 

Normally, PLAAF radar units are organized into one of two 3-tiered structures: brigades with 

subordinate battalions and stations, or regiments with subordinate battalions and stations. The 

brigade and regiment headquarters, which are also identified as intelligence stations (ᛵᣕㄉ), 

are responsible for collecting, managing, and disseminating radar intelligence. They also 

command subordinate radar battalions and stations. 

The PLAAF and MRAF command structure collects and manages radar intelligence and 

organizes the structure for radar unit combat activities. The command structure above the brigade 

and regiment level is organized as follows: 

x A radar intelligence central station (䴧䗮ᛵᣕᙫㄉ) at PLAAF Headquarters 

x A radar intelligence central branch station ( 䴧䗮ᛵᣕᙫ࠶ㄉ ) at each MRAF 

Headquarters 

x Radar intelligence branch stations (䴧䗮ᛵᣕ࠶ㄉ) at each command post. 

Radar Branch Reforms 

Although the PLAAF began creating radar brigades in the 1990s, it created new brigades in the 

Jinan, Lanzhou, and Shenyang MRAFs following the 2003-2004 force reduction by upgrading 

and consolidating regiments into brigades. In some cases, individual radar regiments have been 

either upgraded to brigades, or two regiments have been merged into a single brigade structure. 

As a result of these changes, these brigades now have control over a larger number of radar 

stations covering a wider geographical area. 

In addition, reporting indicated the PLAAF established a “central radar station” (ѝᗳ䴧䗮ㄉ) in 

each of the Chengdu, Jinan, and Nanjing MRAFs. No references to central radar stations were 

noted in the four other MRAFs. These central radar stations appear to be either company- or 

battalion-level organizations, some of which have a mobile mission.87

Airborne Branch 

 

87 Multiple sources, including Air Force News and the Internet. 
371 

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLA’s airborne forces have always been subordinate to the Air 

Force rather than the Army.88 In July 1950, the CMC established an Air Force Marine (オߋ䱶ᡈ) 

brigade in Shanghai, but the headquarters was moved to Kaifeng, Henan Province, the following 

month. Thereafter, the unit’s designation changed several times, becoming the Air Force Marine 

First Division, the Paratroops Division, and the Airborne Division. In 1961, the name was finally 

changed to the 15th Airborne Corps and had its headquarters in Xiaogan, Hubei Province. By the 

mid 1970s, the airborne corps had three airborne divisions. In the mid 1980s, the three divisions 

were reduced to brigades, but were again upgraded to divisions in 1993, each with about 10,000 

troops. 

Today, the 15th Airborne Corps (オ 15 ߋ (is directly subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters. With 

its headquarters in Xiaogan, Hubei Province, the corps consists of the following three 

subordinate divisions, each of which is organized into regiments, battalions, and companies: 

x 43rd Airborne Division located in Kaifeng, Henan Province 

x 44th Airborne Division located in Guangshui, Hubei Province 

x 45th Airborne Division located in Wuhan, Hubei Province. 

The three divisions are composed of several types of subordinate troops: infantry, motorized 

infantry equipped with light vehicles, mechanized infantry, artillery, air defense (AAA and 

SAM), special operations, communications, special forces, reconnaissance, engineering, 

helicopter, training, and logistics support. 

The administrative and functional departments in the 15th Airborne Corps and division 

headquarters consist of a Headquarters Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political 

Department headed by a director, and a Logistics Department and Equipment Department. Each 

department for the corps and division headquarters has several subordinate divisions (༴) or 

offices (、), respectively, that equate to those in the PLAAF and MRAF Headquarters. 

The administrative and functional departments in subordinate regiments consist of a 

Headquarters Department headed by a chief of staff, a Political Division headed by a director, 

and a Logistics Division and Equipment Division. Each organization has several subordinate 

branches (㛑). 

Airborne Branch Reforms 

Other than changes to the order-of-battle, the 15th Airborne Corps began creating subordinate 

battalion-level helicopter dadui to its divisions in 2005.89

Specialty Units 

According to the 2010 edition of World Military Yearbook, the PLAAF has five types of 

specialty units and subunits (уъ䜘(࠶(䱏)—communications, radar electronic countermeasures 

 

88 The airborne forces did not become an official branch until around 1992. Prior to that, the PLAAF’s five branches 

were aviation, SAM, AAA, communications, and radar. The airborne troops were sometimes mentioned as a sixth 

branch. 

89 Various articles from Air Force News during 2005. 
372 

(ECM), chemical defense, and technical reconnaissance. It is not clear why radar troops are 

identified as both a branch and specialty units/subunits, but they are covered above. 

Communications Troops

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF’s communications troops (䙊ؑޥ (were originally part 

of the ground forces’ signal corps in the late 1940s. Today, they are responsible for providing 

communications, navigation, and automated command support to the entire PLAAF. 

The PLAAF’s Headquarters Department has a subordinate Informatization Department (ؑ᚟ॆ

䜘), which prior to 2011 was known as the Communications Department (䙊ؑ䜘), that is 

responsible for providing guidance to all PLAAF communications units. 

Communications troops are assigned to communications organizations at the regiment level 

down to squads. For example, PLAAF Headquarters and each MRAF Headquarters have a 

regiment-level main communications station (䙊ؑᙫㄉ). Each main communications station has 

subordinate battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In addition, communications regiments 

(䙊ؑഒ) are assigned to various organizations, such as the PLAAF Headquarters Department 

and the 15th Airborne Corps. 

Concerning the personnel composition of these organizations, general communications stations 

and communications regiments are organized like all PLA and PLAAF regiment-level 

organizations, with a commander, political commissar, and four administrative and functional 

departments or divisions. Battalion- and company-level communications units have commanders, 

deputy commanders, and political officers, but they do not have any functional or administrative 

organizations. 

Of note, a high percentage of communications personnel are females. Even though there are male 

communications personnel, the PLAAF does not appear to have mixed-gender communications 

companies, platoons, or squads. 

Communications Troop Reforms 

Other than new equipment, no changes to the Communications Troop organizational structure 

were noted. 

Electronic Countermeasures Troops

PLAAF 2010 states that the PLAAF provides little public information about its electronic 

countermeasures specialty troops (⭥ᆀሩᣇуъޥ(. According to China’s National Defense for 

2008, they are organized into brigades or regiments, each of which has subordinate battalions. 

The PLAAF formed its first ground-based ECM units in the early 1970s and aviation ECM units 

in the 1980s. These units were re-designated as specialty technical units in the 1990s. 

The PLAAF’s Headquarters Department has a subordinate Electronic Countermeasures and 

Radar Department (⭥ᆀሩᣇ䴧䗮䜘) that is responsible for providing guidance to all PLAAF 

radar and ECM units. 
373 

Electronic Countermeasures Troop Reforms 

Other than new equipment, little information on the Electronic Countermeasures Troop 

organizational structure was noted. 

Chemical Defense Troops

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF’s chemical defense troops (䱢ॆ䜘䱏), which actually 

include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) responsibilities, are primarily responsible for 

decontaminating areas struck by chemical weapons, but also deal with radiological 

decontamination. 

The PLAAF’s chemical defense troops were created in 1951 as part of a field station. Since 1955, 

PLAAF Headquarters and each MRAF Headquarters have had a chemical defense administrative 

organization. Each MRAF Headquarters and most air corps-level organizations have a 

subordinate chemical defense subunit. During the 1960s and 1970s, the PLAAF also created a 

chemical defense research institute, training organizations, and equipment repair facilities. 

Today, the highest-level PLAAF administrative and functional organization responsible for 

chemical defense troops is the Chemical Defense Division (䱢ॆ༴), which is subordinate to the 

Headquarters Department’s Training Department. The Air Force Equipment Research Academy 

also has a subordinate Air Force Meteorology and Chemical Defense Research Institute (オߋ≄

䊑䱢ॆ⹄ウᡰ). 

At PLAAF Headquarters and the MRAF Headquarters, chemical defense troops are organized 

into regiment-level groups (䱢ॆབྷ䱏) or battalion-level teams (䱢ॆ䱏). These organizations 

have subordinate chemical defense subunits and/or companies. The regiment-level groups also 

have their own command post. 

Operational units, including ground air defense and field stations, have embedded chemical 

defense teams that can be battalion, company, or platoon size and that range from a few people 

to more than 30. These organizations have a wide variety of support vehicles. 

Each subunit, company, and team has subordinate squads, including observation, reconnaissance, 

and decontamination squads. Their primary missions include detecting and destroying nuclear, 

biological, and chemical agents. 

Chemical Defense Troop Reforms 

Little information on the Chemical Defense Troop organizational structure was noted. 

Technical Reconnaissance Troops 

According to PLAAF 2010, little information is available on the PLAAF’s technical 

reconnaissance troops (ᢰδזሏޥ(. From the limited writings, however, it is clear that the 

PLAAF’s technical reconnaissance troops are responsible for intercepting, processing, and 

analyzing foreign communication signals and non-communication signals. In Western military 

terms, these troops carry out signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and 

measures and signals intelligence (MASINT). Their work includes electronic direction finding 

based on these various signal types. 
374 

Although the organization is unclear, PLA sources state that technical reconnaissance 

organizations exist at the levels of regiment and below, with technical reconnaissance companylevel stations serving as the basic reconnaissance organization. Technical reconnaissance troops 

are also dispersed throughout other types of units, to include aviation, airborne, and radar units. 

Technical Reconnaissance Troop Reforms 

Little information on the Technical Reconnaissance Troop organizational structure was noted. 

Equipment Research Academy 

According to the Air Force Encyclopedia, in February 2004, PLAAF Headquarters formally 

established the Air Force Equipment Research Academy (オߋ㻵༷⹄ウ䲒), which consolidated 

the administration of more than 20 PLAAF scientific research organizations.90 The academy is a 

corps deputy leader-grade organization.91 The academy’s administrative departments include a 

Science and Technology (S&T) Department (、ᢰ䜘), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), and an 

Academy Affairs Department (䲒࣑䜘).92 The S&T Department serves as the Headquarters 

Department and the Academy Affairs Department most likely manages the facilities. The 

academy has about 1,500 S&T officers and 490 senior technical billets. 

A review of the academy’s activities since 2004 indicates that there are at least two primary 

reasons the PLAAF, along with the Navy and Second Artillery, created an equipment research 

academy. The first reason was to consolidate the management of all RDA under a single 

organization. The second reason was to be able to deal with the GAD and government RDA 

organizations on a more equal basis. 

The History of China’s Aviation states that the academy has 12 primary functions and 

responsibilities for equipment and weapon systems research and development (R&D/⹄ࡦ(, 

which can be summarized as: (1) tracking foreign development of new military technology, 

equipment, and weapon systems; (2) serving as the PLAAF’s top level organization for 

equipment and weapon system design, system development, regulations, and planning for new 

systems, modifying older systems, and special-use equipment; and (3) conducting research for 

 

90 Wang Kang, “Equipment Academy of Air Force,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1252. The 

Logistics Department still has its own set of research institutes, including the Fuel Research Institute (⋩ᯉ⹄ウᡰ) 

and the Air Force Aviation Medicine Research Institute (オߋ㡚オ५ᆖ⹄ウᡰ or 㡚५ᆖ⹄ウᡰ). 91 During 2009 and 2010, the PLA had a ceremony for corps deputy leader-grade officers who received their first 

star. The leaders of the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery Equipment Research Academies were among those 

who received their stars. This clearly indicates that each of those organizations is a corps deputy leader-grade 

organization. Information accessed at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache: 402M94YcDS0J: 

www.ourzg.com/bbs/read.php%3Ftid%3D87791+%222009%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%99%8B%E5% 

8D%87%22+%22%E6%8E%88%E4%BA%88%E5%B0%91%E5%B0%86%E5%86%9B%E8%A1%94%22&cd= 

6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us for the 2009 ceremony and www.ourzg.com/bbs/simple/?t149938.html for the 2010 

ceremony. 

92 Wang Kang, “Equipment Academy of Air Force,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1252. In 

early 2004, Second Artillery also created a Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy. In late 2003, the PLA 

Navy replaced the Naval Research Center (NRC) with its own Naval Equipment Research Academy. 
375 

the operational use, maintenance, and technical support for new and modified equipment.93 Some 

of the subordinate institutes are shown below.94 The research institutes are either division- or 

regiment-level organizations.95

x Air Force Equipment General Demonstration (Development and Evaluation) Research 

Institute (オߋ㻵༷ᙫփ䇪䇱⹄ウᡰ) is a regiment-grade organization, which has an 

Organization and Plans Division (㓴㓷䇑ࡂ༴), Political Division (᭯⋫༴), and 

Management Division (㇑⨶༴), as well as nine research labs (⹄ウᇔ)

96

x Air Force Aviation Equipment Research Institute (オߋ㡚オ㻵༷⹄ウᡰ) is a divisiongrade organization, which has an S&T Division (、ᢰ༴), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), 

and Management Division, as well as several subordinate research institutes and labs97 

x Air Force Ground Air Defense Equipment Research Institute (オߋൠ䶒䱢オ㻵༷⹄ウᡰ) 

is a regiment-grade organization, which has an S&T Division, Political Division, and 

Management Division, as well as six research labs and one testing workshop (䈅ࡦ䖖

䰤)

98

x Air Force Radar and Electronic Countermeasures Research Institute (オߋ䴧䗮о⭥ᆀሩ

ᣇ⹄ウᡰ) is a division-grade organization, which has an S&T Division, Political 

Department, and Management Division, as well as several research labs99

x Air Force Communications, Navigation, and Command Automation Research Institute 

(オߋ䙊ؑሬ㡚оᤷᥕ㠚ࣘॆ⹄ウᡰ), which has a General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), several 

research labs, and a services subunit (औ࠶࣑䱏)

100

x Air Force Reconnaissance and Intelligence Equipment Research Institute (オזߋሏᛵᣕ

㻵༷⹄ウᡰ), which has three research labs and a testing workshop101

 

93 Liu Yazhou and Yao Jun, eds., A History of China’s Aviation: Second Edition (ѝഭ㡚オਢ [ᅮҼ⡸]), (Hunan: 

Hunan Science and Technology Press, August 2007), p. 608-609. 

94 Wang Kang, “Equipment Academy of Air Force,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1252. 95 Although Air Force Encyclopedia entries noted in the next few endnotes do not state which grade the research 

institutes have, regiment-level organizations in the PLA have a Political Division (᭯⋫༴), while division and 

above had a Political Department (᭯⋫䜘). The S&T Division apparently serves the same function as a 

Headquarters Department and works directly with the Equipment Research Academy’s S&T Department. The 

Management Division apparently works with the Research Academy’s Academy Affairs Department. 

96 Wang Kang, “Air Force Institute of Equipment General Development and Evaluation,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force 

Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1252. The Organization and Plans Division apparently serves the same functions as a 

Headquarters Department. 

97 Zhang Hongyuan, “Air Force Aeronautic Equipment Institute,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 

1252. 

98 Wang Yuzhu, “Air Force Institute of Land-Based Air Defense Equipment,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force 

Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1252-1253. 99 Zhu Heping, “Air Force Radar and ECM Institute,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1253. 100Zhu Lin, “Air Force Institute of Communication, Navigation and Command Automation,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air 

Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1253. Other than a General Office, no other administrative organizations were 

identified, so it is not clear whether this is a regiment- or division-grade organization; however, it probably has an 

S&T Division, Political Division/Department, and a Management Division. 

101 Gu Zhiming, “Air Force Institute of Reconnaissance Intelligence Equipment,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air Force 

Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1253. No administrative organizations were identified, so it is not clear whether this is a 

regiment- or division-grade organization; however, it probably has an S&T Division, Political Division/Department, 

and a Management Division. 
376 

x Air Force Weather and Chemical Defense Research Institute (オߋ≄䊑䱢ॆ⹄ウᡰ), 

which has an S&T Division, Political Department, and Management Division, as well as 

four research labs102

x SAM Technical/Technology Services Research Institute (ሬᕩᢰδऔ࣑⹄ウᡰ)

103

x Air Force Equipment Software Testing and Evaluation Center (オߋ㻵༷䖟Ԧ⍻䇴ѝ

ᗳ).104

Academic Institution Reforms 

According to PLAAF Structure, starting in the late 1990s, the PLAAF began to restructure its 

academic institutions (䲒ṑ). To help provide better education to its cadets and meet operational 

support requirements, the PLAAF consolidated several colleges into two universities—Air Force 

Engineering University (オߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ) in 1999 and Air Force Aviation University (オߋ㡚オ

བྷᆖ) in 2004—and restructured some of its other colleges—Xuzhou [Logistics] Air Force 

College, Guilin [AAA and Airborne] Air Force College, and flight colleges. At the same time, 

however, the PLAAF increased the number of new officers who have graduated from the 

Defense Student (ഭ䱢⭏) program at 19 civilian universities. This program is also called the 

Reserve Officer (ਾ༷ߋᇈ) program and is discussed later in the chapter.105 

Administrative and Functional Departments 

According to PLAAF Structure, the PLAAF’s non-flight college academic institutions plus the 

Air Force Aviation University through the end of 2010 are shown in Table 6 below. PLAAF 

academic institutions have at least the following three administrative and functional departments, 

which are always listed in protocol order: 

x Training Department (䇝㓳䜘): The Training Department serves the same purpose as a 

Headquarters Department in other organizations. It is also responsible for all policy 

issues as well as managing all training matters. Every university has a Training 

Department, and most, but not all, of its subordinate xueyuan have their own Training 

Department. Each Training Departments has various subordinate organizations, such as: 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘): The Political Department is organized the same as all 

other PLA Political Departments and serves the same functions. Every university has a 

Political Department, and most, but not all, of its subordinate xueyuan have their own 

Political Department. 

x Xueyuan/School Affairs (䲒࣑䜘 or ṑ࣑䜘): It is not clear what the Xueyuan/School 

Affairs Department is responsible for, but it is most likely in charge of managing the 

facilities and logistics issues. Every university has this department, and some, but not all, 

of its subordinate xueyuan have their own department as well. 

 

102 Yu Chenglang, “Air Force Institute of Aeronautic Meteorology and Chemical Defense,” in Yao Wei, ed., Air 

Force Encyclopedia, Vol 2, p. 1253. 103 Air Force Encyclopedia did not have a separate entry for this institute. 104 Air Force Encyclopedia did not have a separate entry for this institute. 105 See Kenneth Allen, “Chinese Air Force Officer Recruitment, Education and Training,” Washington DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation China Brief, November 30, 2011, and Kenneth Allen, “PLA Air Force Male Aviation Cadet 

Recruitment, Education and Training,” Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, March 2, 2012. 
377 

Depending on the institution’s mission and curriculum, it may have a Scientific Research 

Department (、⹄䜘), which is responsible for overseeing all of the institution’s technical 

training curricula and systems research work. The Scientific Research Department also has 

subordinate classrooms and laboratories, where personnel from the department provide training 

to the cadets. For example, the National University of Defense Technology’s Scientific Research 

Department has a Weapons and Equipment Development Research Center (↖ಘ㻵༷ਁኅ⹄ウ

ѝᗳ). 

The Graduate School ( ⹄ウ⭏䲒 ) is also considered an administrative and functional 

organization but not a department. It provides overall guidance for the graduate programs in each 

subordinate college. It does not have any students assigned to it. It is a corps deputy-leader grade 

organization. 

 
378 

Table 6: Academic Institution Departments and Grades 

Academic Institution 

(grade) 

Training Political Affairs Basic Scientific 

Research 

City, Province Missions 

Command College 

(corps leader) 

x x x x Beijing Command 

officers 

Engineering University 

(corps leader) 

x x x x x Xian, Shaanxi Aircraft 

maintenance, 

SAMs, and 

Comms 

Natural Science 

College (division 

leader) 

x x Xian, Shaanxi Basic 

education 

Engineering College 

(division leader) 

x x x x x Xian, Shaanxi Aircraft 

Maintenance 

Air Defense Missile 

College (division 

leader) 

x x x x Xian, Shaanxi SAMs 

Telecommunications 

Engineering College 

(division leader) 

x x x x Xian, Shaanxi Comms 

Air Force Aviation 

University106

x x x x Changchun, 

Jilin 

Basic aviator 

education 

Air Force Airborne 

Troop College (corps 

deputy leader) 

x x x Guilin, 

Guangxi 

AAA and 

airborne 

Air Force Early Warning 

College (corps deputy) 

x x x x x Wuhan, Hubei Radar 

Air Force Logistics 

College (corps deputy 

leader) 

x x x x x Xuzhou, 

Jiangsu 

Logistics 

1st Aviation College 

(division leader) 

x x x x x Xinyang, 

Henan 

Aircraft 

maintenance 

Dalian NCO 

Communications School 

(division leader) 

x x x Dalian, 

Liaoning 

Comms 

PLAAF Academic Institution Reforms in 2011-2012 

According to Hong Kong Wen Wei Po press reports, the PLAAF began renaming some of its 

colleges in the summer of 2011 as shown below.107 Although these reports were published in 

 

106 The Air Force Aviation University also has a subordinate Flight Basic Training Base and a Flight Training Base. 

Cadets who come from high school graduates receive 30 months of basic education and aviation theory at the Air 

Force Aviation University’s Flight Basic Training Base. Some cadets also receive six months of follow-on training 

in a basic trainer at the University’s Flight Training Base. Kenneth Allen, “PLA Air Force Male Aviation Cadet 

Recruitment, Education and Training,” Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, March 2, 2012. 

107 Information accessed at http://paper.wenweipo.com/2011/12/31/PL1112310005.htm and http://club.xilu.com/ 

zgjsyj/replyview-819697-75949.html on 25 March 2012. 
379 

December 2011, the PLAAF’s newspaper, Air Force News, continued to use the old names until 

late May 2012. 

x The Air Force Radar College (オߋ䴧䗮ᆖ䲒) in Wuhan, Hubei Province, was renamed 

the Air Force Early Warning College (オߋ亴䆖ᆖ䲒) to reflect an expanded scope of 

education and training. 

x The Xuzhou Air Force College (ᗀᐎオߋᆖ䲒) in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, was 

renamed the Air Force Logistics College (オߋऔ࣑ᆖ䲒). Although the English name 

(Logistics College) is now the same as it was from 1993 to 2004, the Chinese term for 

logistics was changed from houqin (ਾऔ) to qinwu (औ࣑(, which is usually translated as 

“service.” According to the PLA’s Military Dictionary, qinwu refers to units and subunits 

that carry out specialized support missions. 108 The dictionary does not have an entry for 

houqin. 

x The Guilin Air Force College (Ṳ᷇オߋᆖ䲒) in Guilin, Guangxi Autonomous Region, 

was renamed the Air Force Airborne Troop College (オߋオ䱽ޥᆖ䲒). The Guilin Air 

Force College was created in the early 1950s as the Antiaircraft Artillery School under 

the PLA Air Defense Force. The school was closed at the beginning of the Cultural 

Revolution in 1966 and reopened in 1978. It was upgraded to a college in 1986. Prior to 

1999, the PLAAF’s airborne command officers received training in various Army 

colleges. In 1999, the Guilin Air Force College expanded its scope to include training the 

PLAAF’s airborne command officers. In 1999, the college added courses for the 

PLAAF’s airborne forces and security police. As a result of adding these responsibilities, 

“AAA” was dropped from the name, and the school was renamed the Guilin Air Force 

College. Given that the college’s name now includes only airborne troops, it is not clear 

where the PLAAF’s AAA cadets will receive their undergraduate education and training. 

x The Air Force Engineering University’s (オߋᐕ〻བྷᆖ) Missile College (ሬᕩᆖ䲒) 

was renamed the Air Defense Missile College (䱢オሬᕩᆖ䲒).109

x On 28 April 2012, a ceremony was held in Bengbu, Anhui Province, to celebrate the 

creation of the Air Force Aviation University’s subordinate Flight Instructor Training 

Base, which is located in Bengbu. The base was created from the former 13th Flight 

College. The base is now considered the Bengbu Campus of the Aviation University, 

which is located in Changchun, Jilin Province. The base is responsible for providing 

combined training for new flight controllers (伎㹼ᤷᥕઈ) in the tower, new flight 

instructors (伎㹼ᮉઈ), and teaching management cadre (ᮉᆖ㇑⨶ᒢ䜘) for all of the 

PLAAF’s flight colleges. It is also responsible for teaching various courses to operational 

aviation unit flight instructors.110

PLAAF Command College

As a mid-level command college, the Air Force Command College (オߋᤷᥕᆖ䲒) provides 

one-year professional military education (PME) for officers who hold or will be assuming 

 

108 Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋ䈝), Beijing: Academy of 

Military Science Press, September 2011, p. 67. 

109 Air Force News, 22 May 2012, p. 3. 110 Information accessed at www.bblft.com/news.php?id=8868 and www.bengbu.gov.cn/bbxw/article.jsp? 

articleId=21005573 on 9 June 2012. 
380 

“commanding” officer billets at the regiment (colonel), brigade (colonel), and division (senior 

colonel) levels, which include commanders, deputy commanders, political officers, and logistics 

and equipment officers. The one-year program also includes staff officers (majors, lieutenant 

colonels, and colonels) who will serve in regiment and above headquarters. In addition, the 

college has an advanced-level course known as the Campaign Command Course for divisionand corps-level (major general) officers, who have the opportunity to travel abroad each year. 

The college also provides master’s, doctorate, and post-graduate programs for certain 

commanding officer specialties plus short-term (2-4 week) PLAAF and joint courses. Finally, it 

also holds various courses for foreign officers, some of which only recently began to include 

PLAAF officers. 

The Air Force Command College should not be compared to the U.S. Air Force’s Air University 

(AU), Air War College (AWC), Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), and Squadron Officer 

College (SOC), because they are not structured the same nor do they have the same missions. For 

example, whereas the AWC offers master’s degrees and about half of each class includes officers 

from other services and the Air National Guard, as well as government civilians, students in the 

Air Force Command College’s year-long intermediate course receive only a certificate and the 

course does not appear to include officers from the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery. The only 

courses that include officers from the other services and branches are short-term courses on 

specialized topics. 

Command College Reforms since 2000 

Since 2000, the Command College has implemented several new programs aimed at increasing 

the command level of its officers in single branch, combined arms, and joint environments. It 

also created a Foreign Officer Training Program. The details are discussed below. 

In April 2003, the college initiated its first 12-day advanced- and mid-level theory training 

rotation class. The class had 80 leaders from division and above headquarters. The class focused 

on political theory, including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, and guidance 

from the 16th Party Congress.111 

In September 2004, the college created the Air Force Talented Personnel Research Center (オߋ

Ӫ᡽⹄ウѝᗳ) to help develop programs to recruit, train, and retain the proper personnel for the 

PLAAF’s new weapons and equipment.112

In 2006, the college built a new exercise command post for its students. The officers in the 

photos are majors and lieutenant colonels, which indicates they are battalion leader- and 

regiment deputy leader grade officers who are probably serving as staff officers in regiment- or 

division-level headquarters. The article highlighted the fact with exclamation marks that a single 

PLA Navy officer participated, which implied this was a new situation.113

In addition to conducting a joint operations exercise in the new command post, the college held a 

10-day field exercise in October 2009 to celebrate the PLAAF’s 60th anniversary. According to 

 

111 Air Force News, 15 April 2003, p. 1. 112 Information accessed at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2004-09-24/2152230231.html on 19 February 2012. 113 Wei Weifeng, “I am a “Red Force Chief of Staff,” (ᡁᱟ”㓒ߋ৲䈻䮯”), China Air Force, 2007-3, p. 42-44. 
381 

an Air Force News article, 500 students, faculty, and researchers participated in the exercise that 

covered about 1,000 kilometers, including 232 by marching for six days.114 A similar exercise 

took place in April 2010.115

In 2006, the college built a new Campaign Training Center that allowed the students to 

incorporate a 15-day joint training exercise at the end of the year-long course for regiment- and 

division-level officers.116 However, the 300-member class did not include officers from the other 

services.117 Furthermore, because the college separates the students by specialty for most of the 

course, they still had little daily interaction with officers from the other specialties. 

In January 2010, the graduating class conducted its 15-day joint operations graduation exercise. 

A total of 40 students were selected to rotate among various commanding positions. An Air 

Force News article stated that not all of them had self-confidence. Their problems included 

failure to use standard military terminology, ineptitude in command procedures, and 

unsatisfactory verbal expression and psychological qualities.118 

In May 2011, the college implemented two one-month courses per year for 30 students each that 

focused on strategic planning. The students included second- and third-level department, bureau, 

and division directors from Air Force Headquarters.119

Finally, in March 2001, the college established a Foreign Student Training Program.120 From 

then until March 2010, it held 35 courses. During this period, the college trained 511 officers 

from 62 countries, most of which are Third World countries, but some developed countries 

participated. The limit for attendance in any single course has been just over 20 countries. 

According to statistics, 22 of the 511 officers who attended the course achieved flag rank, 

serving as deputy commanders, unit chiefs of staff, and base commanders. 

Flight College Reforms 

Table 7 provides information about the PLAAF’s seven flight colleges prior to mid-2011, when 

the PLAAF began to merge them together. Each flight college, which was a division-leader 

grade organization, was organized in the same way as an operational air division with a 

command staff plus four administrative and functional departments—Headquarters Department 

 

114 Air Force News, 29 October 2009, p. 2. 115 Information accessed at http://news.sohu.com/20100425/n271736358.shtml on 20 February 2012. 116 Ma Dezu and Yang Chunyuan, “Joint Operations Exercise by Students Graduating from Air Force Command 

Academy,” KJB, 10 March 2007, p. 4. Tan Ji and Hu Jun, “Air Force Command College Increases Education 

Quality of Command Personnel,” PLA Daily, 14 July 2009. 117 By comparison, the USAF’s Air War College (AWC) has about 240-250 students per class, but only one-half are 

Air Force officers. The remaining AWC students are Army, Navy, Marine, and foreign military officers, as well as 

civilians. See “AWC Student Demographics: Class of 2009,” www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/students.htm (accessed 3 

December 2009). 

118 Air Force News, 25 January 2010, p. 2. 119 Air Force News, 11 May 2011, p. 1. 120 Guo Kai and Hu Yun, “Air Force Command College Foreign Training Work 10 Years Bears Fruit,” Air Force 

News, 5 April 2010, p. 1. Hu Yun and Xue Haixiang, “Air Force Command College Chinese and Foreign Officer 

Same Course Combined Training Revelation,” Air Force News, 15 March 2010, p. 3. Zhang Xuefeng and Hu Yun, 

“Air Force Command College Chinese and Foreign Student Combined Training Documentary,” China Air Force, 

March 2010, p. 30-33. 
382 

(ਨԔ䜘), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘), and Equipment 

Department ( 㻵༷䜘). Rather than academic departments, each college had at least one 

subordinate basic trainer (ࡍ㓗ᮉ㓳χ) regiment, where cadets train for six months, and one or 

more advanced trainer (儈㓗ᮉ㓳χ) regiments, where cadets train for twelve months before 

graduating. As with the PLAAF’s operational units, the training regiments are organized into at 

least two flight groups (伎㹼བྷ䱏), which, in turn, have subordinate flight squadrons (伎㹼ѝ䱏). 

Table 7: Pre-2012 PLAAF Flight Colleges 

Academic 

Institution 

Headquarters Political Logistics Equipment City, Province Mission 

1st Flight College X X X X Harbin, 

Heilongjiang 

Transport, 

bomber, and 

tanker crew 

2nd Flight College X X X X Huxian, Shaanxi 

3rd Flight College X X X X Jinzhou, Liaoning Fighter and/or 

ground attack 

pilots 4th Flight College X X X X Shijiazhuang, 

Hebei 

5th Flight College X X X X Wuwei, Gansu 

6th Flight College X X X X Zhuozhou, Hebei 

13th Flight College X X X X Bengbu, Anhui 

According to two articles in late December 2011 from Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po Online, the 

PLAAF had consolidated its seven flight colleges shown in Table 7, in which resources were 

relatively decentralized and there was an overlap of their functions and designs, with four of its 

original seven MRAF flight transition training bases. 121 Additional articles since then have 

provided further information stating that the PLAAF had consolidated six of the existing flight 

colleges into three newly formed flight colleges in Harbin, Shijiazhuang, and Xi’an. Each of 

these new flight colleges are corps deputy leader-grade (ߋ࢟㙼) organizations.122 In addition, 

the former 13th Flight College has been transformed into a Flight Instructor Training Base 

subordinate to the Air Force Aviation University. 

The articles have not, however, discussed how they are organized other than that they now have 

at least some subordinate training brigades. It appears that each new flight college was created by 

merging the headquarters from two previous flight colleges, but the airfields and their training 

units still exist. 

 

121 Ni Eryan, “PLA Quietly Advances Reforms in Organizations and Structures,” Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Online in 

Chinese, 31 December 2011. The Chinese version of the article used the grade of “corps level” (ߋ㓗), which refers 

to both corps leader and corps deputy leader. Ni Eryan, “Adequate Preparations Against War Is the Best Means of 

Preventing It: Trend of Development of the PLA Air Force’s Transformation,” Hong Kong Wen Wei Po in Chinese, 

21 January 2012. 

122 Ni Eryan, “Adequate Preparations against War Is the Best Means of Preventing It: Trend of Development of the 

PLA Air Force’s Transformation.” 
383 

Each new flight college obviously has a commander, political commissar, deputy commanders 

and deputy political commissars, as well as a Headquarters Department, Political Department, 

Logistics Department, and Equipment Department. In addition, because each new flight college 

has a higher grade, every billet has been upgraded as well. 

The following bullets provide a summary of the information available from Wikipedia websites 

in Chinese about how each of the new flight college was formed: 

x Air Force Xi’an Flight College (オߋ㾯ᆹ伎㹼ᆖ䲒)

123

 Established in late 2011 

 The subordination is not clear, but it is most likely subordinate to PLAAF 

Headquarters 

 The headquarters is most likely located at the previous 2nd Flight College’s campus in 

Huxian, Shaanxi Province, which is located just west of Xi’an 

 Headquarters of the former 2nd Flight College, which was divided into Huxian, 

Shaanxi (Lanzhou MRAF) and Jiajiang, Sichuan (Chengdu MRAF), was abolished 

and all subordinate units were merged under the Xi’an Flight College 

 Headquarters of the 5th Flight College in Wuwei, Gansu Province, was abolished and 

all subordinate units were merged under the Xi’an Flight College 

 Served as the model for new training brigades 

 At least 2, and probably 4, subordinate regiments have been upgraded to training 

brigades124

x Air Force Harbin Flight College (オߋ૸ቄ┘伎㹼ᆖ䲒)

125

 Established in early 2012 

 Subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters 

 Headquartered at the former 1st Flight College in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province 

 Headquarters of the former 1st Flight College in Harbin was abolished and all 

subordinate units were merged under the Harbin Flight College 

 Headquarters of the former 3rd Flight College in Jinzhou, Liaoning Province, was 

abolished and all of its subordinate units were merged under the Harbin Flight 

College 

 2 subordinate regiments upgraded to training brigades126

x Air Force Shijiazhuang Flight College (オߋ⸢ᇦᒴ伎㹼ᆖ䲒)

127

 

123 Information accessed at http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0% 

91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E7%A9%BA%E5%86%9B%E7%AC%AC%E4%BA%8C%E9%A

3%9E%E8%A1%8C%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2 on 10 July 2012. 

124 The 2nd Training Brigade was identified in Li Qiang, “A Careful New Opening,” Air Force News, 10 May 2012, 

p. 3, which has a photo of K-8s and an accompanying caption. The 4th Training Brigade was identified in Fan Jun 

and LI Guan, “Lanzhou MRAF Flight College 4th Training Brigade Safety Inspectors Strictly Adhere to Quality and 

Safety,” Air Force News, 7 May 2012, p. 2. 125 Information accessed at http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0% 

91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E7%A9%BA%E5%86%9B%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E9%A

3%9E%E8%A1%8C%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2 on 10 July 2012. 

126 Wang Zhijia and Zhao Bing, “Shenyang MRAF Flight College 1st Brigade,” Air Force News, 28 May 2012, p. 2. 

Wang Zhijia and Ma Yaowu, “Shenyang MRAF Flight College 2nd Training Brigade,” Air Force News, 22 May 

2012, p. 3. 
384 

 Established in early 2012 

 The subordination is not clear, but it is most likely subordinate to PLAAF 

Headquarters 

 Headquartered at the former 4th Flight College in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province 

 Headquarters of the former 4th Flight College in Shijiazhuang was abolished and all 

subordinate units were merged under the Shijiazhuang Flight College 

 At least one, and probably more, former regiments have been upgraded to training 

brigades 

 Headquarters of the former 6th Flight College in Zhuozhou, Hebei Province, was 

abolished and all subordinate units were merged under the Shijiazhuang Flight 

College 

 It is not clear if any former regiments have been upgraded to training brigades 

Pilot PME and Graduate Degrees 

It does not appear that pilots receive any basic-level PME after they are assigned to their 

permanent unit. Furthermore, unless a pilot is a staff officer or commanding officer in a regiment, 

brigade, or division headquarters, it does not appear that they receive any mid-level PME. 

During the 2000s, however, the PLAAF began providing the opportunity for some pilots to 

receive a master’s degree. As a result, only a small number of PLAAF pilots receive a graduate 

degree. For example, in October 2009, eight test pilots at the PLAAF’s Xi’an Yanliang Flight 

Test and Training Group were the first pilots in the unit to receive their two-year’s master’s 

degree at Northwestern Polytechnical University.128 In January 2003, Jin Wenya (ं᮷䳵), who 

was a member of the 6th female pilot class, became the first female in the PLAAF to receive a 

master’s degree, which she began in 2000.129

Air Force Military Professional University 

In June 2008, the PLAAF created the distance learning, online Air Force Military Professional 

University (オߋߋһ㙼ъབྷᆖ), and its first classes began in September of that year. PLAAF 

Commander General Xu Qiliang became the university’s commandant, and PLAAF Political 

Commissar General Deng Changyou became the political commissar. The university has branch 

campuses in each of the PLAAF’s four departments, each MRAF Headquarters, and the 

Airborne Corps headquarters. Every independent unit at the regiment level and above also has its 

 127 Information accessed at http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0% 

91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E7%A9%BA%E5%86%9B%E7%AC%AC%E5%9B%9B%E9%A

3%9E%E8%A1%8C%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2 on 10 July 2012. 

128 Information accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dacb4240100g2is.html on 19 February 2012. 129 Air Force News, 28 January 2003, p. 1. 
385 

own study center.130 Officer corps and enlisted force students receive courses on CDs and can 

study via online individually or in groups.131

Another significant change in the PLAAF’s academic institution structure was the PLA’s 

creation in 1998 of a Defense Student (ഭ䱢⭏) Program, which is also called the Reserve 

Officer (ਾ༷ߋᇈ) Program, in a few civilian universities.132 In May 2000, the State Council 

and CMC issued the “Decision Concerning Establishing a System for Civilian Colleges to 

Educate and Train Military Officers.” To date, the PLA has created programs in 117 civilian 

universities, including 19 PLAAF programs each of which has its own website. 133 The 19 

universities with PLAAF programs are shown in Table 8 below: 

 

 

130 Wei Yinhai and Zhang Jinyu, “Air Force Military Professional University Established,” 

english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2008-07/04/content_1348728.htm, 4 July 2008. “The PLA’s First 

Military Professional University is Established in the Air Force” (ߋޘᅮаᇦߋһ㙼ъབྷᆖ൘オߋᤲ⡼ᡀ・), 

www..go81.net/news/shownews_12454.html, 3 July 2008. In early 2009, the PLAAF created the Military 

Professional Education Department to manage the university and to link up with the China Central Radio and TV 

University. The department director is Zhang Liqun ( ᕐ࣋㗔 ). Information accessed at 

www.infzm.com/content/29139 and www.crtvu.edu.cn/DDSX/file.php?id=8868 on 7 November 2010. 

131 www.eol.cn/dong_tai_2866/20111012/t20111012_692694.shtml and http://gaokao.eol.cn/dong_tai_2866/ 

20111012/t20111012_692301_1.shtml. 

132 http://military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58520/15764191.html. 133 www.dx513.com/Article/teee/19816.html and http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52966/15699452. html. 
386 

Table 8: 19 Universities with PLAAF Defense Student Programs 

Name Location

Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (ेӜ㡚オ㡚ཙབྷᆖ) Beijing 

Changchun University of S&T (䮯᱕⨶ᐕབྷᆖഭ䱢、ᆖᢰδᆖ䲒) Changchun, Jilin 

Changchun University of Technology (䮯᱕ᐕъབྷᆖ) Changchun, Jilin 

Changsha University of S&T (䮯⋉⨶ᐕབྷᆖ) Changsha, Hunan 

Hebei University of Technology (⋣ेᐕъབྷᆖ) Tianjin, Hebei 

Hunan University ((19)ইབྷᆖ) Changsha, Hunan 

Lanzhou Jiaotong University (ޠᐎӔ䙊བྷᆖ) Lanzhou, Gansu 

Lanzhou University (ޠᐎབྷᆖ) Lanzhou, Gansu 

Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (ইӜ㡚オ㡚ཙབྷᆖ) Nanjing, Jiangsu 

Nanjing University of Information S&T (ইӜؑ᚟ᐕ〻བྷᆖ) Nanjing, Jiangsu 

Shandong University of Technology (ኡь⨶ᐕབྷᆖ) Zibo, Shandong 

Shenyang Institute of Aeronautical Engineering (⊸䱣㡚オᐕъᆖ䲒オߋਾ༷ߋᇈᆖ䲒) Shenyang, 

Liaoning 

Shenyang University of Technology (⊸䱣ᐕъབྷᆖഭ䱢⭏ᮉ㛢ᆖ䲒) Shenyang, 

Liaoning 

Southeast University (ьইབྷᆖ) Nanjing, Jiangsu 

Tsinghua University (␵ॾབྷᆖ) Beijing 

University of Electronics S&T (⭥ᆀ、ᢰབྷᆖ) Chengdu, Sichuan 

Wuhan University of Technology (↖≹⨶ᐕབྷᆖ) Wuhan, Hubei 

Xidian University [Xian Electronics S&T University] (㾯ᆹ⭥ᆀ、ᢰབྷᆖ) Xian, Shaanxi 

Xihua University (㾯ॾབྷᆖਾ༷ߋᇈᆖ䲒) Chengdu, Sichuan 

Based on analysis of multiple sources, the PLA and PLAAF academic institutions are managed 

by the General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) Military Training Department and the PLAAF 

Headquarters Department’s Military Training Department, respectively, but the Defense Student 

Program is managed by the General Political Department’s (GPD’s) Cadre Department and the 

PLAAF Political Department’s Cadre Department. As a result, there is virtually no oversight of 

the Defense Student Program by the training organizations.134

 

134 www.ylhxjx.com/ebook/jxyj/jayy2008/jayy20080307-1.html. See Kenneth Allen, “Chinese Air Force Officer 

Recruitment, Education and Training,” Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Volume 11, Issue 22, 

November 30, 2011, for further information on this program. 
387 

Conclusion 

Besides upgrading its weapon systems and equipment over the past decade, the PLAAF has also 

made some significant reforms to its organizational structure. Four of the most significant 

changes were the addition of the brigade level to the aviation branch, the merger of additional 

radar regiments into brigades, the downgrading of air corps and bases to command posts 

followed by reinstituting four bases, and the beginning of transitioning the flight commanders 

from the top of the control tower into the command post and replacing them with flight adjusters. 

While a few changes occurred in the Headquarters Department, such as renaming the 

Communications Department the Informatization Department, the most significant changes 

occurred in the Equipment Department with respect to the military representative system and the 

creation of the Equipment Research Academy. In addition, the PLAAF has made major reforms 

to its officer cadet education and training system. Besides creating the Air Force Aviation 

University and merging its flight colleges, it changed the name of some of its specialty colleges 

and created Defense Student Programs in 19 civilian universities. It also created an online 

university for correspondence courses. 

None of these reforms occurred over night, and some of them are still being implemented. As 

such, more reforms will most likely occur over the next decade as the PLAAF tries to match its 

organizational structure and personnel to its growing technological capabilities. 
388 

Chapter Eleven: The People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force 

(PLASAF) as an Organization 

Michael S. Chase, Daniel Yoon, and Mark Stokes1

Introduction 

As part of the ongoing modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) has clearly prioritized the improvement of its ballistic and cruise 

missile capabilities. Indeed, the transformation of the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF/ᅮ

Ҽ⛞ޥ / Ҽ ⛞ ), which as China’s strategic missile force is responsible for most of its 

conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) — has 

emerged as one of the centerpieces of Chinese military modernization.2

 In less than two decades, 

China has progressed from a limited and vulnerable, non-mobile nuclear ballistic missile 

capability to one of the world’s most impressive nuclear and conventional ballistic missile, as 

well as cruise missile, programs. The transformation of Second Artillery is underscored by an 

April 2009 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report, which concludes 

that China now has “the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the 

world.”3

 In addition, China is “developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional 

missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter 

ballistic missile defenses.”4 

The past decade has witnessed significant changes in PLASAF’s organizational structure. The 

number of missile bases has remained constant, but as the NASIC report indicates, there has 

been an increase in the number of brigades as Second Artillery has formed new missile units. 

Other important organizational changes include the implementation of a new military cover unit 

designator (MUCD) system in 2000 that addressed the current and future PLASAF structure; the 

establishment of the Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy in 2004 to better organize 

and manage equipment research for PLASAF; and the addition of the commander of PLASAF to 

the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004, along with the commanders of the PLA Navy 

(PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF), as part of China’s attempt to promote “jointness” in a 

military traditionally dominated by ground force officers. 

Along with these important organizational changes, Second Artillery has thus become one of the 

most dynamic parts of the PLA, particularly in terms of force modernization, since the 

publication of the PLA as Organization V1.0 conference volume in 2002. When that publication 

was released, Second Artillery was already well on its way to becoming a credible nuclear 

deterrent and conventional strike force, but its capabilities in these areas were still somewhat 

limited. In 2002, China was in the process of replacing its DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1) silo-based 

 

1

 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone. 

2

 We use the terms Second Artillery Force and PLASAF even though the original version of this conference volume 

used the term Second Artillery Corps. China has used the term Second Artillery Force since the publication of its 

first biennial defense white paper in 1998, and China began using the acronym PLASAF to refer to Second Artillery 

Force in China’s National Defense 2010. 3

 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-09, April 2009, 

p. 3. 

4

 Ibid. 
389 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with the longer-range DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBMs, 

but it had not yet deployed any road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) or DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) 

ICBMs, which remained under development at the time, according to the 2002 Department of 

Defense report on Chinese military power.5 As for the PLASAF developing its conventional 

missile force, in 2002, the Department of Defense reported that China had deployed about 350 

conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan, a number that analysts 

projected would “increase substantially over the next several years.”6

 Indeed, by the end of 2010, 

China had not only enhanced the survivability and striking power of its nuclear force by 

deploying the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs, but also roughly tripled the size of its 

conventional SRBM force to about 1,000-1,200 missiles. 7 The number of SRBM brigades 

increased along with the expansion of China’s conventional ballistic missile force, from three 

identified in the first PLA as Organization conference volume to at least seven identified in this 

edition, a number that includes the two SRBM brigades previously subordinate to the Nanjing 

and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs). The brigades previously subordinate to Nanjing and 

Guangzhou MRs were transferred to Second Artillery in 2010, making PLASAF responsible for 

all of China’s land-based ballistic missiles. 

Furthermore, the diversification of China’s conventional missile force to include DF-21C 

conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and the DF-21D, the world’s first antiship ballistic missile (ASBM), is strengthening its deterrence and warfighting capabilities. China 

is also refining its doctrine for missile force operations and increasing the realism and 

sophistication of missile force training.8 As a result of these developments, in less than a decade 

since publication of the inaugural PLA as organization conference volume, the PLASAF has 

clearly emerged as the cornerstone of the Chinese military’s growing strategic deterrence, 

coercive diplomacy, and precision-strike capabilities. 

This assessment underscores the PLASAF’s growing ability to fulfill its assigned nuclear and 

conventional missions. Beijing’s own description of Second Artillery’s key missions, as outlined 

in China’s National Defense 2008, indicated that the PLASAF “is mainly responsible for 

deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and for conducting nuclear 

counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles.”9

 Furthermore, according to the 

same report: 

The Second Artillery Force sticks to China’s policy of no first use of nuclear 

weapons, implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy, strictly follows the orders 

of the CMC, and takes as its fundamental mission the protection of China from 

any nuclear attack. In peacetime, Second Artillery’s nuclear missile weapons are 

 

5

 Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2002, p. 2-3. 6

 Ibid. 

7

 Department of Defense, Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China, 2011, p. 30. 8

 See Department of Defense, Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China, 2011, p. 34, and Ron Christman, “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps: 

Doctrine, Training, and Escalation Control Issues,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., Chinese 

Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011, p. 307-327. 9 China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing: State Council Information Office, January 2009, 

www.english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm. 
390 

not aimed at any country. But if China comes under a nuclear threat, Second 

Artillery’s nuclear missile force will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a 

nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against 

China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, Second Artillery’s nuclear missile 

force will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the 

enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services. 

Second Artillery’s conventional missile force is charged mainly with the task of 

conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against the enemy’s key 

strategic and operational targets.10

Although Chinese writers discuss these policy and strategic-level issues with some regularity, 

they rarely offer detailed descriptions of China’s deployed or developmental missile systems. 

Nonetheless, senior military leaders appear to be increasingly confident about the PLASAF’s 

nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. In 2008, then-Second Artillery Commander 

General Jing Zhiyuan (2003-2012) and then-Second Artillery Political Commissar General Peng 

Xiaofeng (2003-2009) provided an authoritative review of Second Artillery’s development in the 

reform and opening era since 1978. They underscored the strengthening of the combat capability 

of the missile force, writing that the “integrated combat capability of the troops has been elevated 

significantly.” They also highlighted improvements in the realism and overall quality of missile 

force training. Jing and Peng also emphasized the importance of the “major breakthroughs” that 

have been made in the development of Second Artillery’s weapons and equipment. They also 

stressed that Second Artillery has made advances in a number of other areas, such as political 

and ideological work, international exchanges, logistics and support capabilities, management, 

and personnel development.11

Second Artillery’s central focus remains on strengthening its deterrence and combat operations 

capabilities, but it is also responsible for improving its ability to participate in “non-war military 

operations” such as domestic disaster relief efforts.12 As Jing and Peng pointed out, Second 

Artillery engineering and medical units participated in disaster relief operations following the 

rain and ice storm in South China in early 2008 and the devastating earthquake in Wenchuan, 

Sichuan Province in May of the same year.13 Overall, Jing and Peng concluded that China’s 

leadership requires the military to enhance its “ability to cope with various security threats and to 

fulfill diversified military tasks.” As a result, “the new situation and new tasks have put forth 

new and higher requirements for the development of the Second Artillery.”14 These changes, in 

 

10 China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing: State Council Information Office, January 2009, 

www.english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm. 11 Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, “Riding the Tide, Sharpening the Sword, and Creating Glory: Recalling the 

Glorious History of the Accelerated Construction and Development of the Second Artillery in the Reform and 

Opening Era,” in Second Artillery Political Department, ed., Glorious Era: Looking Back on Development and 

Advances of the Second Artillery in the Period of Reform and Opening, (䖹❼ᒤԓ˖ എ亮൘᭩䶙ᔰ᭮ѝਁኅࡽ䘋

ⲴᅮҼ⛞ޥ(, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Publishing, 2008, p. 1-22. 12 Ibid. 

13 Ibid. According to Jing and Peng, “engineer units opened up roads through the mountains and built bridges over 

rivers, going all out to save people’s lives and properties and to restore production and daily life following the 

disaster. The logistics detachments went to villages and households to rescue the injured and treat the sick.” Jing and 

Peng laud Second Artillery units for having “made prominent contributions to winning a victory in the struggle to 

fight rain and ice storm and the earthquake and in the disaster relief operations.” 14 Ibid. 
391 

turn, have had important implications for Second Artillery’s organizational structure, which has 

evolved considerably since the publication of the first PLA as Organization conference volume. 

Key Findings 

Against this backdrop, we reach several key findings about the evolving capabilities and 

institutional development of the PLA’s Second Artillery Force: 

x Second Artillery’s growing nuclear strike capabilities make it China’s “core force...for 

strategic deterrence.”15 It is also emerging as one of the cornerstones of Chinese military 

power more broadly because of its growing conventional capabilities, which could be 

employed for deterrence and intimidation as well as to conduct conventional precision 

strikes against regional targets. 

x According to Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, in future combat operations, 

Second Artillery’s “main mission” (สᴥԫ࣑ (will be “dual deterrence, dual operations” 

(ৼ䟽ေខˈৼ䟽֌ᡈ). With its powerful nuclear and conventional missile force 

capabilities, official Chinese missile force publications characterize Second Artillery as 

the “trump card” for winning local wars under “informatized” conditions, the 

information-dependent type of conflict Chinese scholars assess the PLA must be prepared 

to face in the future.16

x The most important development with respect to the nuclear missile force is the transition 

to a more survivable and thus more credible nuclear force posture. After decades of 

vulnerability, the PLASAF’s deployment of road-mobile ICBMs over the past several 

years is increasingly enabling it to support “effective” nuclear deterrence in line with 

China’s longstanding quest for an assured retaliation capability. 

x At the same time, China’s conventional missile force is emerging as a central element of 

the PLA’s capability to execute a variety of types of joint military campaigns. The 

conventional missile force is especially critical as the conventional precision strike 

component of the “counter-intervention” aspects of such campaigns (Western observers 

typically refer to China’s “counter-intervention” capabilities by using the terms “antiaccess” and “area denial.” It should be noted, however, that this is U.S. terminology, and 

it is not actually used in authoritative Chinese sources, which refer instead to “counterintervention” actions). 

x China’s development of the world’s premier conventional ballistic missile force not only 

gives China options for conventional precision strikes against regional targets as part of 

joint campaigns, but also provides Beijing with a powerful instrument of conventional 

deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and intimidation. 

x Chinese publications underscore the view that conventional missile force operations in a 

conflict involving a nuclear-armed adversary would inevitably take place under “nuclear 

deterrence conditions.” This requires the nuclear force to serve as a deterrent “backstop” 

to support conventional missile force operations.17 

 

15 “The Second Artillery Force of the PLA,” Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, 

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/second.htm. 

16 People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᡈᖩᆖ), 

Beijing: PLA Press, 2004, p. 138. 

17 See Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and Zhao Xijun, Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion 

of Missile Deterrence (ខᡈ--ሬᕩေខ㓥⁚䈸) Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2005. 
392 

x The key driver of changes in nuclear force structure is China’s concern about the 

credibility of its traditional nuclear deterrent posture in the face of improvements in 

adversary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), conventional precision 

strike, and missile defense capabilities. 

x Development of China’s conventional missile force has been driven by several factors, 

including desire to influence politics in Taiwan and deter U.S. intervention in a Taiwan 

Strait crisis or conflict and relative advantages offered by emphasizing missile force 

modernization as opposed to relying more heavily on capabilities such as stealth aircraft 

as means of conducting precision strikes. 

x Since the publication of PLA as Organization v1.0, some aspects of PLASAF 

organization have remained relatively constant: the basic organizational structure of 

PLASAF still consists of PLASAF Headquarters, missile bases, missile brigades, launch 

battalions, launch companies and platoons, and various types of support regiments. 

x But there have been important changes, as evolving strategy, missions, and capabilities 

have affected Second Artillery’s organizational structure. The increase in the number of 

missile brigades is particularly striking—Second Artillery now has at least 28 missile 

brigades, almost double the number identified in the first PLA as Organization volume. 

This expansion was clearly required to accommodate the expansion of the missile force 

since publication of the first volume. Because the number of missile bases has stayed the 

same, this means PLASAF has adjusted the original “3-3” organizational structure that 

was created for command and control (C2) and span of control purposes. 

x Another important change was the elevation of the Commander of Second Artillery to 

membership in the CMC along with the PLAN and PLAAF Commanders in 2004, which 

reflected the growing importance and institutional standing of Second Artillery (and the 

PLAN and PLAAF) as well as broader PLA efforts to promote improved “jointness.” 

x Still another important organizational development since the publication of the first PLA 

as Organization volume was the establishment of Second Artillery’s Equipment Research 

Academy (㻵༷⹄ウ䲒) in 2004, which was presumably intended to better organize and 

manage equipment research and related activities in support of PLASAF. 

x The growing availability of open source information has also shed some light on 

previously highly opaque aspects of Second Artillery organization, including nuclear 

warhead storage and transportation and PLASAF wartime organization. 

x Looking ahead, future developments will likely result in further organizational changes. 

These developments could include the establishment of additional nuclear and 

conventional missile force brigades. Specifically, as for future nuclear missile force 

developments, China is highly likely to deploy the forces it perceives as required to 

ensure it will have an assured retaliation capability, perhaps including road-mobile 

ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), but China is 

not likely to “rush to parity” with the United States and Russia. With regard to the 

continued modernization of the conventional missile force, the PLASAF is likely to 

continue extending the power and reach of its conventional precision strike capabilities. 

x These developments will have important implications in a number of areas, including 

future arms control negotiations beyond the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 

START). Technological and doctrinal developments together are also likely to create 

potentially serious escalation management challenges in the event of a regional crisis or 

conflict. 
393 

x They will also shape the future organization of Second Artillery, as will the growing 

importance of space-based ISR and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the possibility 

that Second Artillery may become responsible for new missions, such as computer 

network attack and counter-space operations. 

Organization of the Study 

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two offers an overview of key 

research sources. Part three presents a brief overview of China’s nuclear policy and strategy and 

Second Artillery’s current missile force structure in order to provide broader context for 

understanding the PLASAF as an organization. Part four addresses Second Artillery’s 

organizational structure. Part five explores possible future developments in the organization of 

the PLASAF. 

Research Sources 

This section offers an overview of some of the Chinese-language primary sources that offer 

insight into Second Artillery strategy, doctrine, and organization. The development of China’s 

missile force is among the more secretive aspects of a military modernization program that 

outside observers have criticized for its lack of transparency, but a growing array of Chinese 

military publications are shedding new light on topics such as missile force modernization, 

strategy and doctrine, and operations. Some of these are broader studies on strategy or campaigns 

that include sections on the Second Artillery or related missile force topics, such as Science of 

Strategy (there are three different versions—a 1987 version by the PLA’s National Defense 

University (NDU), a 1999 version by PLA NDU,18 and a 2001 version by the PLA’s Academy of 

Military Science (AMS)19), Science of Campaigns (there are two editions—one published in 

200020 and another in 200621), and Campaign Theory Study Guide (published in 2001).22 

Additionally, in recent years, a growing variety of Chinese primary source materials that focus 

on missile force issues have become available to Western scholars. Indeed, this study draws on a 

wide variety of Chinese-language sources, including several books that focus on missile force 

operations and deterrence issues and offer new insights into Chinese nuclear and conventional 

missile force strategy. The most noteworthy of these books is Science of Second Artillery 

Campaigns (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᡈᖩᆖ), an authoritative book on missile force strategy and operations 

published by the Second Artillery Force.23 Another valuable source that addresses missile force 

issues is Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion of Missile Deterrence, written by 

 

18 Wang Wenrong, ed., Science of Strategy (ᡈ⮕ᆖ), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999. 19 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. Science of Strategy (ᡈ⮕ᆖ), Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 2001. 20 Wang Hongqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Science of Campaigns (ᡈᖩᆖ), Beijing: National Defense University 

Press, May 2000 

21 Zhang Yuliang, ed., Science of Campaigns (ᡈᖩᆖ), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006. 22 Xue Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide (ᡈᖩ⨶䇪ᆖҐᤷই), Beijing: National Defense University 

Press, 2001. 

23 People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᡈᖩᆖ), 

Beijing: PLA Press, 2004. 
394 

Zhao Xijun, a former deputy commander of the Second Artillery Force. 24 Still another is 

Glorious Era: Looking Back on Development and Advances of the Second Artillery in the Period 

of Reform and Opening, a volume edited by the Second Artillery’s Political Department that 

chronicles the development of the missile force over the past three decades and features chapters 

written by a number of Second Artillery officers.25 These three books in particular offer a 

considerable amount of insight into organizational issues. 

The chapter also draws on articles from Chinese military journals like China Military Science 

(ѝഭߋһ、ᆖ) and Military Art (ߋһᆖδ), and official military newspapers like PLA Daily

(䀓᭮ߋᣕ) and the Second Artillery’s newspaper, the title of which is usually translated as 

Rocket Force News (⚛㇝ޥᣕ).26 In addition to these Chinese language publications, the chapter 

draws on unclassified U.S. government reports on the Chinese military and declassified U.S. 

government documents on Chinese nuclear and missile developments, as well as open source 

analysis of organizational issues based on a wide variety of Chinese sources and publicly 

available commercial satellite imagery. 

Policy, Strategy, and Force Structure 

Before turning to the organization and force structure of the PLASAF, it is necessary to consider 

China’s nuclear policy and strategy and nuclear and conventional missile force structure, which 

have shaped the evolution of the PLASAF as an organization since its establishment in 1966. 

China’s approach to nuclear policy and strategy has been relatively consistent since its first 

nuclear test in 1964, though it was not clearly articulated for many years, even as China worked 

toward the development of the assured retaliation capability it desired to deter potential 

adversaries, principally the Soviet Union and the United States, from using nuclear weapons 

against China or coercing China with nuclear threats. 

China’s National Defense 2006 provided the first official explanation of China’s nuclear policy 

and strategy. The document summarized the key elements of China’s approach to nuclear 

weapons as follows: 

China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military 

strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening 

to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the 

policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. 

It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for 

the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

 

24 Zhao Xijun, Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion of Missile Deterrence (ខᡈ--ሬᕩေខ㓥⁚䈸) 

Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2005. Among other topics, Zhao provides extensive discussions of 

a number of issues related to deterrence and escalation control. 

25 Second Artillery Political Department, ed., “Glorious Era: Looking Back on Development and Advances of the 

Second Artillery in the Period of Reform and Opening,” (䖹❼ᒤԓ˖ എ亮൘᭩䶙ᔰ᭮ѝਁኅࡽ䘋ⲴᅮҼ⛞ޥ(, 

Zhongyang Wenxian Publishing, 2008. 

26 PLASAF’s newspaper, which is published four times a week, does not have an English title, even though the 

PLAAF’s newspaper now has Air Force News (オߋᣕ) in English on the cover. Furthermore, since around 2008, 

Rocket Force News is no longer for internal use only. It is available for subscription through China’s postal system. 
395 

China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited 

development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective 

nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure 

the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear 

deterrent force. China’s nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central 

Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its 

nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms 

race with any other country. 

Although it represented the first official articulation of China’s nuclear policy and strategy, the 

content reflected a longstanding approach to these issues. Indeed, many of the main aspects of 

the nuclear policy and strategy outlined in the China’s National Defense 2006—including its 

emphasis on deterrence of nuclear attack, no first use of nuclear weapons, highly centralized 

command and control, and a nuclear force that is lean and effective—can be traced to earlier 

Chinese military publications. 

One of the most important of these is the 1987 edition of Science of Strategy, which states, 

“China’s nuclear strategy is defensive in nature, but if an enemy is first to use nuclear weapons, 

China will resolutely implement a nuclear counter-strike and carry out nuclear retaliation.”27

Furthermore, the 1987 edition of Science of Strategy outlines the mission of the nuclear missile 

force as follows: 

In peacetime, the mission of the Second Artillery is to bring nuclear deterrence 

into play, so as to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war against China, and 

to support China’s peaceful foreign policy....in wartime, the strategic mission is 

to prevent conventional war from escalating into nuclear war, and to contain the 

escalation of nuclear war; and—if China suffers the enemy’s nuclear attack—to 

conduct a nuclear counter-attack, striking the enemy’s strategic targets and 

weakening its war potential and strategic attack forces.28 

Accordingly, the “basic guiding thought” of the Second Artillery includes principles such as 

“centralized command,” “striking after the enemy has struck,” “close protection,” and “key-point 

counterstrikes.”29

Perhaps most importantly, according to the 1987 edition of Science of Strategy, “China’s nuclear 

counterstrike must take effectiveness (M᭸ᙗ) as the foundation.” Furthermore, “In order to 

continuously increase the effectiveness of nuclear counterattack capability, it is necessary to 

continuously move toward mobile launch and miniaturization developments, further increase the 

survivability of the strategic missiles, improve their ability to penetrate and their accuracy, and 

appropriately increase the number of missiles and launch units, and improve operational 

command and support systems.”30

 

27 The Science of Strategy, 1987, p. 237. 28 Ibid., p. 115.

29 Ibid., p. 115. 

30 Ibid, p. 116. 
396 

Subsequently, a variety of authoritative publications on missile-force campaigns and nuclear 

deterrence have shed further light on China’s nuclear strategy.31 For example, Peng Guangqian 

and Yao Youzhi, the editors of the 2001 Science of Strategy, published by the AMS, divide 

nuclear deterrence strategies and postures into three categories: “maximum nuclear deterrence,”

“minimum nuclear deterrence,” and “medium strength nuclear deterrence” (ѝᄬᕪᓖṨေខ). 

Editors Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi indicate that “medium strength nuclear deterrence” 

requires “‘sufficient and effective’ nuclear strike force to threaten an opponent by imposing on 

him unbearable destruction, to a certain extent, so as to attain one’s deterrent objective.”32

China’s pursuit of “lean and effective” nuclear forces, which is intended to support an assured 

retaliation capability that must evolve in response to changes in the offensive and defensive 

capabilities of potential adversaries, appears most similar to the concept of “medium strength 

nuclear deterrence.”33

These newly available sources also address the types of enemy actions China believes its nuclear 

capability can help deter. First and foremost, official publications make it clear that the main role 

for China’s nuclear weapons is to deter an enemy from launching a nuclear attack or attempting 

to coerce or intimidate China with nuclear threats. Former Second Artillery Deputy Commander 

Zhao Xijun (1996-2004) states that the strategic missile force in particular is a “strong shield” for 

maintaining national security. It deters other nuclear powers from threatening to strike China 

with nuclear weapons. According to Zhao, “Anyone who wants to conduct a nuclear strike on 

China must also sustain a nuclear strike. China has limited strategic missiles, but the 

consequences of nuclear retaliation are still strong enough to ensure that the enemy would lose 

more than it would gain.”34 The strategic missile force is also an effective means to prevent wars 

from breaking out. The major powers often try to threaten or coerce other countries, but they are 

very cautious about threatening countries that are armed with nuclear weapons. The strategic 

missile force is also “an important weight in containing the escalation of war.”35 

It is important to note that Chinese doctrinal publications like Science of Second Artillery 

Campaigns continue to reflect the official No First Use (NFU) policy, as outlined in other books, 

articles, and official documents like the biennial China’s National Defense, in that they assume 

the Second Artillery nuclear forces would launch their weapons only after an enemy first strike. 

For example, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns indicates that Chinese missile forces would 

have to conduct nuclear counterstrikes after suffering heavy damage from an enemy nuclear 

attack.36 Yet these sources suggest that Chinese strategists expect nuclear deterrence not only to 

prevent an enemy from using nuclear weapons against China, but also to deter certain types of 

strategic conventional attacks. For example, Zhao suggests that China’s nuclear retaliation 

 

31 These include Wang and Zhang, The Science of Campaigns; Xue, Campaign Theory Study Guide; and Zhang, 

Science of Campaigns. 32 Peng and Yao, The Science of Strategy, p. 235. 33 Indeed, Fravel and Medeiros note that “This definition—especially the explicit reference to the concepts of 

sufficiency and effectiveness—strongly resembles PLA descriptions of China’s own nuclear strategy and is 

consistent with the concept of deterrence through assured retaliation.” See Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for 

Assured Retaliation,” p. 78. 

34 Zhao, Intimidation Warfare, p. 30-31. 35 Zhao, Intimidation Warfare, p. 31. 36 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 59. 
397 

capability may also deter the enemy from carrying out conventional strikes that could raise the 

risks of nuclear escalation.37 

The PLA’s Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and other sources indicate that in a PLA joint 

campaign against a nuclear-armed adversary, the Second Artillery’s nuclear missile force would 

likely be expected to conduct nuclear deterrence operations as a backstop to support 

conventional missile strikes. In such a conflict, China expects that missile force operations would 

take place under conditions that may involve adversary nuclear threats against missile units. As 

Science of Second Artillery Campaigns puts it, one of the key characteristics of Second Artillery 

campaigns is that in future informatized wars, the Second Artillery will “conduct operations 

under nuclear or nuclear deterrence conditions.”38 As a result, according to Intimidation Warfare, 

because future wars will involve conventional operations under nuclear deterrence conditions, 

nuclear missile force deterrence actions will have a major influence on actual combat 

operations.39 

Furthermore, according to the authors of Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, because future 

joint campaigns will be part of conventional local wars that take place under nuclear deterrence 

conditions, they “will necessarily involve the deterrence activities of the Second Artillery’s 

nuclear missile units.”40 Under such circumstances, the Second Artillery’s nuclear missile force 

will serve as a “powerful backup supporting conventional strength” (᭟ᤱᑨ㿴࣋䟿Ⲵඊᕪਾ

⴮). 41 Of course, this does not necessarily mean China would seriously consider nuclear 

escalation in response to conventional threats, but it does suggest that Beijing would rely on its 

nuclear retaliatory capability to constrain an adversary’s options. Specifically, according to the 

authors of Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, “In local wars under informatized conditions, 

simply by moderately revealing nuclear strength, it is possible to flexibly use many types of 

deterrence methods; when the enemy uses informatized conventional air raids to attack us, they 

cannot help but to prudently consider the possibility that they might pay a price that would be 

very difficult to bear, thus achieving the objective of supporting conventional operations.”42 This 

illustrates one of the ways in which the editors of the volume view nuclear weapons as a 

“backstop to support conventional operations.”43

The force structure of Second Artillery is another key factor that shapes its organization. Second 

Artillery brigades are equipped with either nuclear or conventional missiles. China classifies 

Second Artillery’s ballistic missiles according to their ranges. The categories, which differ 

somewhat from the typical U.S. classifications of short, medium, intermediate, and 

intercontinental, are as follows: 

x Short-range (䘁〻; less than 1,000km) 

 

37 Zhao, Intimidation Warfare, p. 31. See also Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 273-274. 38 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 59. 39 Zhao, Intimidation Warfare, p. 93. 40 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 160. 41 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 122. At the same time, they must ensure their survival so that they can 

prepare to carry out nuclear counterstrikes if ordered to do so. 

42 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 274. 43 Ibid, p. 273. 
398 

x Medium/intermediate range (ѝ〻; 1,000-3,000km) 

x Long-range (䘌〻; 3,000-8,000km) 

x Intercontinental (⍢䱵; more than 8,000km).44

The “basic firepower unit” (สᴥ⚛࣋অս) for the nuclear force appears to be the launch 

battalion. For the conventional missile force, it appears to be the launch company, though 

occasional mention of the launch platoon in Chinese military periodicals compels at least a 

consideration of the latter as well.45 

Second Artillery’s conventional missile force has grown rapidly since its inception to enable 

China to implement its concepts for employing it for deterrence, intimidation, and conventional 

firepower strike operations. Today, China’s rapidly expanding conventional ballistic missile 

force includes DF-15 (CSS-6) and DF-11 (CSS-7) SRBMs and DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBMs. China 

has deployed the DH-10 LACM to enhance the PLA’s regional precision strike capabilities. 

China is also developing and deploying an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant 

of the DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBM. Beyond these capabilities, Taiwan officials have stated publicly 

that China is deploying the new DF-16 ballistic missile, with a range of about 1,000-1,500km.46

In addition, PRC media reports indicate that China is developing another conventional missile 

with a range of 4,000km, which would enable Second Artillery to strike Guam with conventional 

weapons.47

Backstopping the PLA’s growing arsenal of short-range and theater conventional missiles are its 

theater and strategic nuclear missile forces, which provide the ultimate escalatory or counterescalatory threat. Beijing is modernizing these forces to enhance their survivability, increase 

their striking power, and counter missile defense developments. China currently maintains the 

DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM and DF-21 and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 1 and CSS-5 Mod 2) MRBMs for 

theater nuclear deterrence missions. The PRC’s intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile force 

consists of limited-range DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBMs, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBMs, and the 

recently deployed road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) and DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) ICBMs. 

Some reports indicate that a new mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying multiple 

independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), may also be under development.48

Organization of Second Artillery Force 

Drawing on a variety of open sources, including previously published work by Western scholars 

and Chinese language media reports, this section presents an overview of the organizational 

structure of the Second Artillery Force, including its headquarters, bases, brigades, and other 

subordinate units, and academic and research institutions. 

 

44 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 170-171. 

45 Ibid, p. 172. 

46 For an overview of legislative testimony about the new missile and coverage of the statement in Taiwan’s news 

media, see Russell Hsiao, “Taiwan’s Intelligence Chief Warns about the PLA’s Growing Strategic Weapon Systems,” 

China Brief Vol. 11, No. 5 (March 25, 2011). 47 Zhang Han and Huang Jingjing, “New Missile ‘Ready by 2015,’” Global Times, February 18, 2011. 48 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, p. 2. 
399 

Before considering each of these parts of the Second Artillery, however, it is necessary to briefly 

consider the Second Artillery in relation to the rest of the PLA. As Ken Allen and Maryanne 

Kivlehan have pointed out, Second Artillery is not a service, but “an independent branch that is 

considered equal to the three services [i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force]” (⴨ᖃоߋ⿽Ⲵ⤜・ޥ

⿽).49 Further underscoring Second Artillery’s equivalent status, the Commander of Second 

Artillery is now a member of the CMC, having been added along with the PLAN and PLAAF 

Commanders in 2004 (see below for a brief biography of Second Artillery’s current commander, 

General Wei Fenghe). However, according to Allen and Kivlehan, although Second Artillery is 

equal to the three services, its command structure is somewhat different than that of the PLAN 

and PLAAF. As they observe, PLAN and PLAAF units are under the dual leadership of their 

respective service headquarters and the MR in which they are stationed. In contrast, Second 

Artillery “implements what has been referred to as vertical command” (඲ⴤᤷᥕ), which 

appears to indicate that in comparison with the PLAN and PLAAF, Second Artillery forces are 

more strictly under the leadership of the General Staff Department (GSD) and CMC as opposed 

to the MR authorities in the areas in which they are located.50

Leadership of PLASAF 

Second Artillery’s most important leaders are its commander and political commissar. The 

current commander of Second Artillery Force is General Wei Fenghe (兿ࠔ઼ (and its political 

commissar is General Zhang Haiyang (ᕐ⎧䱣). A brief biographical profile of each is provided 

below: 

Wei Fenghe, PLASAF Commander 

Wei Fenghe was appointed Second Artillery’s 9th commander in October 2012 just before the 

18th Party Congress began in November. Like his predecessor, outgoing PLASAF commander 

General Jing Zhiyuan, Wei hails from Shandong Province (specifically, from Chiping County of 

Liaocheng City). He joined the PLA as an enlisted member in 1970 at 16 years of age, joined the 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in January 1972, and has served in Second Artillery for his 

entire 40-year military career. Shortly after Wei’s October 2012 appointment to the CMC, he 

was promoted from lieutenant general to general in a special ceremony presided over by newly 

appointed CMC Chairman Xi Jinping.51 Wei had received his second star in late December 2010, 

upon his appointment as one of the five Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (DCOGS). He was 

the first Second Artillery officer to serve as a deputy in any of the four General Departments, in 

this case Deputy Chief of the General Staff (࢟ᙫ৲䈻䮯; military region leader grade) and 

member (ငઈ) of the GSD Party Committee (ᙫ৲䈻䜘ފင), and was likely placed there at 

 

49 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 167. Allen and Kivlehan cite 

Qian Haihao, ed., Course Material For The Study Of Military Organizational Structures (ߋ䱏㓴㓷㕆ࡦᆖᮉ〻), 

Beijing, Academy of Military Science Press, March 2001, p. 75, and Chinese Military Encyclopedia (ѝഭߋһⲮ、

ޘҖ), Beijing, Academy of Military Science Publishers, July 1997, Volume 2, p. 348. 50 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 168. 51 See “Xi Jinping Promotes PLA General,” Xinhua, November 23, 2012, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/23/c_131994985.htm. This action brought all CMC members up 

to the rank of full general. The timing and process—promotion of the lone LTG to full general about one week after 

the Party Congress by the newly appointed Chairman (or re-appointed Chairman in 2007)—mirrors the 2007 

promotion of Chang Wanquan to full general after he was elevated to the CMC as General Armament Department 

Director. 
400 

least in part so he could have the grade of military region leader in order to be able to move up to 

the CMC member grade once he became commander of PLASAF. Of note, no Second Artillery 

officer replaced Wei as a DCOGS.52

Zhang Haiyang, PLASAF Political Commissar 

Zhang Haiyang was appointed political commissar of PLASAF in December 2009. He was born 

in July 1949 in Pingjiang County, in Hunan Province’s Yueyang (Prefecture-level) City. He 

joined the PLA in February 1969 (CCP in November 1969). Zhang will continue to serve as 

political commissar of PLASAF under newly appointed commander Wei Fenghe.53

Organizational Structure of PLASAF 

Second Artillery has six launch-related organizational levels, as well as support regiments, 

battalions, companies, and platoons: 

x Second Artillery Headquarters (Ҽ⛞) 

x Missile bases (ሬᕩสൠ) 

x Missile brigades (ሬᕩ᯵) 

x Launch battalions (ਁሴ㩕) 

x Launch companies (ਁሴ䘎) 

x Launch platoons (ਁሴᧂ) 

It should be noted that company- and platoon-level entities are sometimes referred to as launch 

fendui ( ਁሴ࠶䱏 ). 54 The following table offers a layout of the aforementioned six 

organizational levels along with their grades: 

 

52 Sources for this biography include the following: http://baike.baidu.com/view/1551471.htm accessed on 16 

November 2012; http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_628e37ab0100nw7u.html, accessed 15 November 2012; 

http://news.qq.com/a/20110115/001044.htm, accessed 15 November 2012; http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2011-01-

09/050321784137.shtml, accessed 15 November 2012. 53 Sources for this biography include the following: http://news.iqilu.com/china/gedi/2009/1230/152934.shtml, 

accessed 20 July 2012; http://gzcx020.blog.163.com/blog/static/105834761201011152440233/, accessed 15 

November 2012; and http://baike.baidu.com/view/467652.htm, accessed 15 November 2012. 54 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 171. See Introduction for a 

more detailed discussion of “࠶䱏”. 
401 

Table 1: The Organizational Levels and Grades of Second Artillery 

Grade Primary Rank Secondary Rank Unit Unit (Chinese) 

CMC Chairman Not Applicable 

CMC Vice 

Chairman GEN/ADM 

CMC Member GEN/ADM Commander 

Military Region 

Leader GEN/ADM LTG/VADM Political Commander 

ޥ⛞ᅮҼ

Military Region 

Deputy Leader LTG/VADM MG/RADM 

Corp Leader MG/RADM LTG/VADM Missile Base ሬᕩสൠ

Corps Deputy 

Leader MG/RADM SCOL/SCAPT 

Division Leader SCOL/SCAPT MG/RADM 

Division Deputy 

Leader COL/CAPT SCOL/SCAPT 

Brigade Leader Missile Brigade ሬᕩ᯵

Regiment Leader COL/CAPT LTC/CDR 

Brigade Deputy 

Leader 

Regiment Deputy 

Leader LTC/CDR MAJ/LCDR 

Battalion Leader MAJ/LCDR LTC/CDR Launch Battalion ਁሴ㩕

Battalion Deputy 

Leader CAPT/LT MAJ/LCDR 

Company Leader CPT/LT 1LT/LTJG Launch Company ਁሴ䘎

Company Deputy 

Leader 1LT/LTJG CPT/LT 

Platoon Leader 2LT/ENS 1LT/LTJG Launch Platoon ਁሴᧂ

The following sections provide a more detailed discussion of Second Artillery’s organization at 

various levels, from Second Artillery Headquarters down to lower-level units. 

Second Artillery Headquarters 

The Second Artillery Headquarters Department oversees operational planning, operational 

support, and the force’s command and control system. The Headquarters Department is overseen 

by the Second Artillery Chief of Staff and from three to five Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Between 

2010 and 2012, Wei Fenghe, a former Second Artillery Chief of Staff who was appointed as 

PLASAF’s new commander, served as one of five GSD Deputy Chiefs of Staff.55 Specific 

 

55 The current Second Artillery Chief of Staff is the first to have emerged from the force’s conventional missile 

corps. 
402 

Headquarters Department responsibilities include long range planning, intelligence and 

surveillance, training, nuclear safety and control, engineering, electronic warfare, 

communications, weather, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, and possibly 

computer network operations in the future. 

Second Artillery Headquarters is located in Qinghe, north of Beijing, on the way to the Badaling 

section of the Great Wall.56 According to Allen and Kivlehan, it is a military region leader-grade 

organization ( ↓བྷߋ४㙼 ). Although the political commissar is the same grade as the 

headquarters, as noted above, the commander has been a CMC member-grade officer since 

2004. 57 Second Artillery Headquarters has four first-level departments, the Headquarters 

Department (ਨԔ䜘), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘), Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘), and 

Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘). 

In addition, PLASAF Security Committee (Ҽ⛞؍ᇶငઈՊ) and PLASAF Security Committee 

General Office (Ҽ⛞؍ᇶ࣎ (appear to be directly subordinate to PLASAF Headquarters. (See 

the Introduction chapter for further information on PLA Security Committees.) Second 

Artillery’s Security Committee appears to be directed by a Deputy Commander, with the 

Political Department Director serving concurrently as the Security Committee’s deputy 

director.58 PLASAF also has Security Committees and Security Committee General Offices at 

lower levels, including Second Artillery Bases.59 This is in keeping with PLA-wide practice. 

Accordingly, although available information about Second Artillery’s Security Committees and 

General Offices is limited, it can be presumed that the functions of these organizations within 

PLASAF mirror those of other such organizations throughout the PLA. 60 Within the PLA, 

security or secrecy work (ߋ䱏؍ᇶᐕ֌) includes promulgation of policies, laws, and 

regulations, management of security education, and other duties related to ensuring the 

protection of classified materials. Security committees at every level have general offices (ޜ࣎

ᇔ) charged with managing the committee’s daily affairs. 

Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘) 

The Headquarters Department is a military region deputy leader-grade ( ࢟བྷߋ४㙼 ) 

organization; its director – the chief of staff – is a military region deputy leader-grade officer. 

The chief of staff can therefore be a lieutenant general (primary) or major general (secondary). 

The Headquarters Department hosts at least the following second-level (Ҽ৺䜘) departments: 

 

56 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 93-94, 107. 57 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 205. 58 See, for example, Kuang Bin, “Second Artillery Security Committee Convenes Meeting to Implement Spirit of 

PLA Security Committee Meeting (Ҽ⛞ਜᔰ؍ᇶငઈՊՊ䇞䍟ᖫ؍ߋငՊ䇞マ血),” Security Work (؍ᇶᐕ֌, 

2006, No. 1, p. 15, http://lib.cqvip.com/qk/80914X/200601/21074170.html. 

59 For a reference to an unidentified PLASAF Base’s Security Committee, see “A Certain Second Artillery Base’s 

27 Rules Spawn ‘Network Security Guardians (ᅮҼ⛞ޥḀสൠ 27 ᶑ㓶ࡉۜ“⭏㖁㔌ᆹޘছ༛),” PLA Daily (䀓

᭮ߋᣕ), March 31, 2007, www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2007-03/31/content_778423.htm. 60 As Ken Allen points out in the introduction to this volume, “Every PLA organization at the regiment and above 

level has a Security Committee (؍ᇶငઈՊ), which is responsible to that level’s Party Committee and the next 

higher level’s Security Committee.” As Allen notes, this is sometimes translated as Secrecy Committee. 
403 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

x Operations Department (֌ᡈ䜘) 

x Communications Department (䙊ؑ䜘)

61

x Engineering Department (ᐕ〻䜘) 

x Training Department (ߋ䇝䜘) 

x Military Affairs Department (࣑ߋ䜘) 

x Directly Subordinate Work Department (ⴤᐕ䜘). 

Gill, et. al. note that an Intelligence Department (ᛵᣕ䜘) is also likely a second-level 

department under Second Artillery’s Headquarters Department; other directly subordinate units 

under the Headquarters Department reportedly include a surveying and mapping group, 

computer center, weather center, and Scientific Research Division (、⹄༴).62 The Political 

Department under the Headquarters Department is a second-level department (e.g., division 

leader-grade) and the director is a division leader-grade officer with the rank of senior colonel 

(primary) or major general (secondary). 

The Headquarters Department also includes a second-level Nuclear Security and Control Bureau 

(Ṩᆹޘ᧗ࡦተ) that likely coordinates with civilian nuclear regulatory agencies within China.63 

The Headquarters Department’s second-level Technical Reconnaissance Bureau most likely 

provides signals intelligence support to the force’s operational leadership and oversees a number 

of subordinate elements located throughout China.64

Second Artillery Headquarters Department also oversees two engineering organizations 

responsible for tunneling of underground facilities and civil engineering: the 308 Engineering 

Command (ᐕ〻ᤷᥕ䜘) and the Engineering Technology Zongdui (ᐕ〻ᢰδᙫ䱏). 65

Headquartered in Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province, the 308 Engineering Command is responsible for 

tunneling and launch site construction.66 A GSD engineering brigade appears to also have been 

 

61 PLASAF Communications Department has probably been renamed PLASAF Informatization Department, in line 

with the renaming of the equivalent departments in GSD and PLAAF. 

62 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible 

Deterrence,” in James C. © and Andrew N.D. Yang, The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, p. 510-586. 

63 For reference to the Nuclear Security and Control Bureau, see “Second Artillery NBC Units Offer Vaccinations to 

Prevent Epidemic After Disaster (Ҽ⛞䱢ॆ䱢⯛࠶䱏⺞؍བྷ⚮ѻਾᰐབྷ⯛), China Military Online, May 30, 2008, 

at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2008-05/30/content_1289669.htm. 

64 The Technical Reconnaissance Bureau is assigned the military cover designator of the 96669 Unit. Among 

various sources, see ““Practice the Core Values of the Contemporary Revolutionary Soldier’s Life ⭘⭏ભ䐥㹼ᖃԓ

䶙ભߋӪṨᗳԧ٬㿲,” Renmin Ribao, 31 October 2009. Accessed at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-

10/31/content_372115.htm on 27 November 2012. 65 Infrastructure work on the six missile bases and warhead storage complex began in the late 1960s and was 

completed by the end of the 1970s. In the early days of the Second Artillery, the engineering regiments were 

subordinate to the individual missile bases, with many of the original regiments incorporated into other units, 

transformed into PLA construction companies, or converted to operational launch brigades. Others were 

subordinated to a centralized 308 Engineering Command and Engineering Technology Zongdui. In the mid-1990s, 

the CMC approved the Second Artillery’s plan for an expanded network of underground facilities. 66 The command oversees four operational engineering regiments responsible for tunneling and other civil 

engineering functions, along with a training regiment. 
404 

re-subordinated to the 308 Engineering Group. Headquartered in the Luoyang suburb of 

Xujiaying, the Engineering Technology Zongdui is responsible for installation engineering, 

including ventilation for underground facilities and fixed communications. In addition to three 

installation regiments, the Engineering Technology Zongdui commands a communications 

engineering regiment responsible for installing fiber optic cable in support of a dedicated internal 

Second Artillery communications network.67

Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

The Political Department ensures the CCP remains firmly in control of the Second Artillery 

Force. In addition to overseeing the political commissar system, the Political Department 

oversees officer personnel issues,68 distributes propaganda, and ensures discipline in accordance 

with party edicts. The Political Department is – like the Headquarters Department – a military 

region deputy leader-grade (࢟བྷߋ४㙼) organization – and its director (ѫԫ) is a military 

region deputy leader-grade officer. The director, like the chief of staff, can therefore be a 

lieutenant general (primary) or major general (secondary). The Political Department hosts at 

least the following second-level (Ҽ৺䜘) departments: 

x General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ); 

x Cadre Department (ᒢ䜘䜘) 

x Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘); 

x Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘); 

x Security Department (؍ছ䜘); 

x Culture Department (᮷ॆ䜘) 

x Discipline Inspection Committee (㓚ᖻငઈՊ). 

Gill, et. al. note that the Political Department also contains a “procurate” (Ựሏ䲒) and a court 

(⌅䲒) that at least, in part, oversee and investigate disciplinary matters throughout Second 

Artillery. 69

Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘) 

The Logistics Department oversees a number of support functions, including budget and finance, 

material, medical, and transportation. A central depot north of Beijing stores non-mission 

essential supplies for the entire force.70 The Logistics Department is a corps leader-grade (↓ߋ

㙼) organization – one grade lower than the Headquarters and Political Departments. The 

director of the Logistics Department and the political commissar are both corps leader-grade 

 

67 Additional regiments are responsible for training and vehicle repair. All are located in Henan Province. 68 Enlisted personnel issues are managed by the Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department. 69 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible 

Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, p. 510-586. 

70 The 96628 Unit is the Second Artillery Logistics Department’s primary depot (Ḁ㔬ਸԃᓃ). Located in the 

Western Hills, opposite side of the range from GSD Ops Center, the depot headquarters are in Sujiatuo Village (㣿

ᇦ඘䭷). See “Experience in Personnel Education in the Second Artillery Logistics Department Integrated Depot 

(ᅮҼ⛞ޥਾऔ䜘Ḁ㔬ਸԃᓃ㛢Ӫ㓿傼䈸),” China Youth Daily (ѝഭ䶂ᒤᣕ), 30 November 2000, accessed at 

www.chinayouthdaily.com.cn/gb/djysd/2000-11/30/content_120940.htm on 27 November 2012. 
405 

officers and can be either a major general (primary) or lieutenant general (secondary). The 

Logistics Department hosts at least the following second-level (Ҽ৺䜘) and third-level (й㓗䜘) 

departments: 

x Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘); 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘); 

x Finance Department, which includes the Finance Division (䍒࣑༴) and Payroll 

Division (ᐕ㯚༴) 

x Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuels Department (ߋ䴰⢙䍴⋩ᯉ䜘) 

x Health Department (ছ⭏䜘) 

x Transportation Department (ߋӔ䘀䗃䜘) 

x Barracks Department (㩕ᡯ䜘) 

x Audit Bureau (ᇑ䇑ተ). 

The Second Artillery General Hospital (Ҽ⛞ᙫ५䲒) is also directly subordinate to the Health 

Department of PLASAF Logistics Department. 71

Equipment Department (㻵༷䜘) 

The Second Artillery Equipment Department oversees force structure planning and acquisition of 

warheads, delivery vehicles, critical components, and associated ground equipment. The 

Equipment Department appears to conduct nuclear force structure planning, with the CMC and 

CCP Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) having approval authority. The Equipment 

Department also oversees operational test and evaluation of new weapon systems. Nuclear 

warhead inventory requirements may be developed by the Equipment Department’s General 

Planning Department, with the acquisition carried out by the Special Equipment Management 

Department. The Equipment Department is a corps-leader grade (↓ߋ㙼) organization like the 

Logistics Department and its director and political commissar are corps-leader grade officers 

with the rank of major general (primary) or lieutenant general (secondary). The Equipment 

Department hosts the following second- and third-level departments: 

x Headquarters Department (ਨԔ䜘); 

x Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) 

x Management Department (㇑⨶䜘); 

x Scientific Research Department (、⹄䜘); 

x Procurement Department (䇒䍗䜘); 

x Special Equipment Management Department (⢩㻵㇑⨶䜘); 

x Site Management and Communications Department (which includes the Launch 

Site Management Division; 䱥䙊䜘 and 䱥ൠ㇑⨶༴, respectively); 

x High Technology Office (儈ᯠᢰδޜ࣎ᇔ); and 

x Metrology Station (䇑䟿ᙫㄉ). 72

 

71 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible 

Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, p. 510-586. 
406 

Another important organization affiliated with the Second Artillery Equipment Department is the 

Second Artillery Science and Technology Committee (Ҽ⛞、ᢰင). The role of the Second 

Artillery S&T Committee presumably mirrors that of the GAD’s S&T Committee, but with a 

focus on the requirements of the missile force. Like its counterparts, the Second Artillery S&T 

Committee appears to have a number of expert groups, such as the “Second Artillery S&T 

Committee Expert Group on Penetration” (Ҽ⛞、ᢰငケ䱢уᇦ㓴), which presumably focuses 

on topics related to penetrating the missile defense systems of potential adversaries. In addition, 

PLASAF Equipment Department oversees the Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy 

and the Military Representative Bureau (ߋһԓ㺘ተ) that oversees Second Artillery Military 

Representative Offices (ߋһԓ㺘ᇔ) throughout the defense industry.73

The following table offers a leadership structure for each of the four first-level departments in 

Second Artillery that constitute Second Artillery Headquarters: 

 

 72 Ibid, , p. 510-586. 

73 Accessed at http://junshi.xilu.com/2010/0908/news_44_106709_3.html on 27 November 2012. 
407 

Table 2: Leadership Structure of PLASAF Headquarters 

Grade Primary 

Rank 

Secondary 

Rank Leaders 

Headquarter

s 

Department 

Political 

Department 

Logistics 

Department 

Equipment 

Department Unit Grade 

CMC 

Chairman 

Not 

Applicable CMC Chairman 

CMC Vice 

Chairman GEN/ADM CMC Vice Chairman 

CMC Member GEN/ADM Commander CMC Member 

Military 

Region Leader GEN/ADM LTG/VADM Political Commissar Military Region Leader 

Military 

Region Deputy 

Leader 

LTG/VAD

M MG/RADM Chief of Staff Director 

Military 

Region Deputy 

Leader 

Corp Leader MG/RADM LTG/VADM 

Deputy 

Chiefs of 

Staff 

Deputy 

Directors Director Director 

BASE: 

Commander 

& POL COM 

Corp Leader 

Corps Deputy 

Leader MG/RADM SCOL/SCAPT Deputy Directors 

Deputy 

Directors 

Corps Deputy 

Leader 

Division 

Leader 

SCOL/SCA

PT MG/RADM 

SecondLevel 

Departments 

SecondLevel 

Department

s 

SecondLevel 

Departments 

SecondLevel 

Departments 

Division 

Leader 

Division 

Deputy 

Leader/Brigade 

Leader 

COL/CAPT SCOL/SCAP

T 

BRIGADE: 

Commander 

& POL COM 

Division 

Deputy 

Leader/Brigade 

Leader 

Regiment 

Leader/Brigade 

Deputy Leader 

COL/CAPT LTC/CDR 

Regiment 

Leader/Brigade 

Deputy Leader 

Regiment 

Deputy Leader LTC/CDR MAJ/LCDR Regiment Deputy Leader 

Battalion 

Leader MAJ/LCDR LTC/CDR 

LAUNCH 

BATTALION

: Commander 

& POLCOM 

Battalion 

Leader 

Battalion 

Deputy Leader CAPT/LT MAJ/LCDR Battalion Deputy Leader 

Company 

Leader CPT/LT 1LT/LTJG 

LAUNCH 

COMPANY: 

Commander 

& POL COL 

Company 

Leader 

Company 

Deputy Leader 1LT/LTJG CPT/LT Company Deputy Leader 

Platoon Leader 2LT/ENS 1LT/LTJG 

LAUNCH 

PLATOON: 

Commander 

& POL COM 

Platoon Leader 

Second Artillery’s four departments oversee a number of direct reporting units that would 

provide support to an operational campaign. For example, a regiment-sized unit north of Beijing 

specializes in imagery and all-source intelligence, and would likely be deployed to a theater 

command center as the intelligence cell. 74 At least one and probably two electronic 

countermeasures (ECM) regiments would support the Second Artillery corps-level component 

commander within a Joint Theater Command. 75 The Second Artillery Technical Reconnaissance 

 

74 According to a former engineer, the 96637 Unit is located in Kangzhuang. Formerly known as the 80809 Imagery 

Group, the unit shifted its mission toward operations support in 2002. In addition to providing imagery for land 

attack cruise missile brigades, the unit is also is said to carry out electronic reconnaissance, translation, and, in a 

crisis, battle damage assessment in direct support of strike operations. See, for example, Liu Feng and Wang 

Bingjun, “Second Artillery 96637 Unit Establishes ‘Warrior Culture’ (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ 96637 䜘䱏㩕䙐 ‘ቊ↖’ ᮷ॆ), 

Worker’s Daily (ᐕӪᰕ๡), 3 August 2006, accessed at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-08-03/01009640261s.shtml 

on 27 November 2012. 

75 The primary Second Artillery ECM Regiment is the 96620 Unit, home-based in Dingxing and commanded by Col 

Li Changwei (ᵾ䮯Տ). A newer regiment (96634 Unit) appears to have been formed in Nanchang. 
408 

Bureau is likely the service-level cryptologic authority and may engage in computer network 

operations.76 

Second Artillery Bases, Brigades, and Other Subordinate Units 

Second Artillery has six operational missile bases, a warhead storage base, and a training base, 

which are corps leader-grade organizations. A Second Artillery missile base is a regionally 

focused corps-level organization that integrates the capabilities of launch brigades and support 

regiments under its purview. In a crisis, a missile base likely would form the core of the Second 

Artillery component for a Joint Theater Command. The commander and political commissar are 

corps leader-grade officers with the primary grade of major general and secondary rank of 

lieutenant general. The organizational structure at this level mirrors that of Second Artillery 

Headquarters in that each missile base has four first-level departments, including a Headquarters 

Department, Political Department, Logistics Department, and Equipment Department.77 Each 

base has a varying number of subordinate missile brigades. 

 

The commander and political commissar of a missile brigade are division deputy leader-grade 

officers. The internal organizational structure of a brigade is similar to that of Second Artillery 

Headquarters and the six missile bases in that each brigade has a Headquarters Department, 

Political Department, Logistics Department, and Equipment Department . Subordinate 

organizations include launch battalions (ਁሴ㩕), a communications subunit (䙊ؑ࠶䱏), and a 

launch position management subunit (䱥ൠ㇑⨶࠶䱏).78

Beyond this information on the internal organizational structure of brigades, there is also a 

considerable amount of open source data on the facilities that are typically associated with 

missile force brigades. In particular, Sean O’Connor’s “IMINT & Analysis” blog offered a 

detailed description of Second Artillery brigade-level facilities in a 2010 posting. According to 

O’Connor, Second Artillery brigades maintain garrison facilities, underground facilities (UGFs), 

rail transfer points, and launch positions. Specifically, O’Connor’s analysis of Google Earth 

imagery indicates that garrisons “typically contain administrative and support infrastructure for 

assigned personnel, and various garages for housing missile transporter erector launchers (TELs) 

and support equipment.”79 In addition, garrisons supporting road-mobile missile systems also 

feature “high-bay garages or other similar structures used for checkout of system components.”80

Second Artillery UGFs, which are located in close proximity to missile brigades, can perform 

several functions, such as serving as “staging areas for missile systems which have left garrison” 

or providing “storage for missiles and/or warheads.”81 Rail transfer points likely associated with 

Second Artillery are located in close proximity to missile force garrisons “via roadway or 

connecting railspur,” while launch sites may “contain a hardened concrete pad where the 

associated missile will be erected for launch.”82 

 

76 “Practice the Core Values of the Contemporary Revolutionary Soldier’s Life.” 

77 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 170. 78 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 207. 79 Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” IMINT & Analysis, 26 June 2010, accessed 

at http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/04/dragons-fire-plas-2nd-artillery-corps.html on 27 November 2012. 80 Ibid. 

81 Ibid. 

82 Ibid. 
409 

Chinese military publications that discuss positions associated with missile force units provide 

data that elaborates on O’Connor’s analysis. For example, Campaign Theory Study Guide (2002) 

indicates that conventional missile brigade operational positions (֌ᡈ䱥ൠ) can be divided into 

basic (สᴥ֌ᡈ䱥ൠ) and emergency operational positions (ᓄᙕ֌ᡈ䱥ൠ). For conventional 

missile brigades, operational positions typically include brigade command posts (᯵ᤷᥕᡰ), 

technical positions (i.e., central depots; “ᢰδ䱥ൠ” or “ѝᗳᓃ”), readiness positions, transport 

sites, launch positions, and support element deployment zones. 83 Additionally, the brigade 

command post and the support element deployment zones are normally situated in locations that 

are convenient to transportation within the guided missile brigade operational area (ሬᕩ᯵֌ᡈ

४ฏ). Further, according to the same source, “the combat formation of the technical positions, 

readiness positions, and launch positions can be deployed to form different formations. Normally, 

technical positions (ᢰδ䱥ൠ) are in the rear, and launch positions (ਁሴ䱥ൠ) are in the front, 

with step-by-step extension (䙀㓗ࡽը), and fan-shaped deployment (ᡷᖒኅᔰ).” 84

In addition to launch brigades, each base oversees five support regiments responsible for training, 

transportation, warhead and missile storage, vehicle repair and maintenance, and 

communications. The base training regiment is responsible for standardized training of new 

personnel, as well as coordinating deployment and live fire exercises, and other training 

activities. A technical service regiment responsible for secure transport of warheads, missiles, 

fuel, and components from base-level storage sites to launch brigade operating facilities. 85

Depots under each missile base, referred to as equipment inspection regiments, are responsible 

for storage and handling of nuclear and conventional warheads, missiles, associated sub-systems, 

and fuel.86 Base-level repair and maintenance regiments, also referred to as repair factories (؞䝽

ল), ensure the readiness of launchers and other support vehicles. In this capacity, the regiment 

maintains a close relationship with original equipment manufacturers. Communications 

regiments link base headquarters elements, support regiments, and launch brigades.87

Base 52 is unique in that it assigned a sixth support regiment responsible for conventional 

missile storage and handling. Since at least 1994, a specialized regiment reporting to Base 52 

headquarters appears to store most SRBMs, related assemblies, and components at a hardened 

 

83 Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide (ᡈᖩ⨶䇪ᆖҐᤷই), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 

2002, p. 152. 

84 Ibid. 

85 Transportation regiments often are headquartered within easy reach of the equipment inspection regiment 

headquarters. Means of transportation include both rail and vehicular, as well as airlift in cases of extreme 

emergency. Transportation regiments oversee rail transfer facilities, which appear to be managed by a rail transport 

battalion. The regiments also appear to have dedicated communications and security surveillance networks. 86 With most nuclear warheads centrally stored in the Taibai mountain area, equipment inspection regiments possess 

a minimal number of nuclear warheads at any one time. Battalions under the regiment manage at least three weapons 

storage and handling sites, with each having as many as seven subordinate facilities. A battalion oversees a security 

company, missile management company, and one or more site management companies. Missiles appear to be stored 

and handled separately from warheads. True unit designations of depot regiments are 901 Regiment (901 ഒ] for 51 

Base, 902 for 52 Base, and so on through the 906 Regiment (56 Base). See Mark Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead 

Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, March 2010, p. 3. 87 S&T Daily reporting indicates regiments have a three hour rapid response requirement for emergency 

deployments. In addition to a dedicated Second Artillery fiber optic network, communications regiments also likely 

rely on satellite communications, including commercial systems such as Iridium and INMARSAT. 
410 

facility in Shangrao County, with annexes in the Qimen and Leping areas.88 A specialized test 

and measurement unit subordinate to Second Artillery Equipment Department oversees elements 

that are collocated with Base 52 component depot facilities. 89 Other elements directly 

subordinate to a base headquarters include a vehicle battalion (⊭䖖㩕), hospital (५䲒), 

command office (ᤷᥕᇔ), weather office (≄䊑ᇔ), chemical defense subunit (䱢ॆ࠶䱏), 

engineering subunit (ᐕ〻࠶䱏), survey and mapping subunit (⍻㔈࠶䱏), computer subunit (䈨

ݳ䇑㇇࠶䱏), control subunit (᧗࠶ࡦ䱏), camouflage subunit (՚㻵࠶䱏), reconnaissance 

subunit (זሏ࠶䱏), technical testing subunit (ᢰδ⍻䈅࠶䱏), and electronic countermeasures 

subunit (⭥ᆀሩᣇ࠶䱏).90

Mark Stokes, Sean O’Connor, and other analysts have identified the missile bases and a number 

of their subordinate missile brigades through thorough analysis of open source materials such as 

Chinese military newspapers, national and local Chinese media, postings on Chinese websites, 

and Google Earth imagery.91 The following is a list of the six missile bases and subordinate 

brigades and support regiments, based on the most recently published open source research. It 

should be noted that the relevant studies are at least a year or two old in most cases, meaning 

some of the information may be dated or may fail to account for more recent developments, as 

PLASAF units sometimes move to new locations and/or replace older missiles with newer and 

more capable models.92

 

88 The regiment, referred to as a “Missile Component Depot” (ሬᕩಘᶀԃᓃ), is designated as the 96176 Unit. See 

Mark Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, March 

2010; and Su Haibin, “Focus on High Safety Standards for Subordinate Fuel Storage Support Units,” Studies on 

Basic Political Work, December 2008, p. 65, accessed at www.cqvip.com/qk/81771X/200812/28752572.html on 

January 20, 2010. Su is from the 96176 Unit. Also see “Civil-Military Team Building Units Pays a Visit (ߋ≁ޡᔪ

অսᶕᡁተ䎠䇯ហ䰞),”, 9 February 9 2010, accessed at www.jx-n-tax.gov.cn on 20 February 2010. According to a 

retired soldier previously assigned to the regiment, the Missile Component Depot has automated depot functions 

over the last few including installation of an enterprise resource management planning (ERP) system. 

89 Among various sources, see “Second Artillery Metrology Post Repairs 140 Missile Precision Devices Over Two 

Years (Ҽ⛞䇑䟿ㄉ 2 ᒤ㔤؞ 140 ։ਠ⧠ᖩሬᕩⶴ߶䇮༷),” PLA Daily (ѝഭߋ㖁), 7 March 2010, accessed at 

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2010-03-07/1240586122.html on 16 May 2010. 

90 Allen and Kivlehan, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” p. 206-207. 

91 The relevant studies include: Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National 

Security, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p. 93-95; Bates Gill, James 

Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in 

Mulvenon and Yang, The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v1.p. 510-586; Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, 

“Implementing Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,”, p. 159-220; O’Connor, “PLA Second Artillery Corps,” ; Mark 

Stokes and Ian Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the 

Taiwan Strait and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, 27 May 2010, accessed at www.project2049.net on 27 November 

2012; O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” ; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s 

Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, 18 April 2011, accessed at 

http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html on 27 November 2012; Mark Stokes 

and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “Spotlight on New Second Artillery ICBM Base Leadership,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 

Institute, 2 August 2011, accessed at http://blog.project2049.net/2011/08/spotlight-on-new-second-artilleryicbm.html on 27 November 2012; and Mark Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “New DF-31A ICBM Brigade in 

Hunan?” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, 9 September 2011, accessed at http://blog.project2049.net/2011/09/newdf-31a-icbm-brigade-in-hunan.html on 27 November 2012. 

92 Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 21 

February 21 2012. 
411 

Figure 1: Second Artillery Headquarters and Six Operational Missile Bases 

Base 51 

Base 51 was formally established in September 1964 in the area of Tonghua, Jilin Province. 

With headquarters moving to Shenyang in the early 1990s, Base 51 today consists of four 

confirmed brigades in northeastern China capable of delivering nuclear and conventional 

payloads against targets in Japan and South Korea. The commander is said to have a grade 

equivalent of a Deputy Corps leader, a half grade below commanders of 52, 54, 55, and 22 

Bases.93 Missile brigades subordinate to Base 51 are shown below in Table 3: 

 

 

93 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 94. 
412 

Table 3: Missile Brigades Subordinate to Base 5194

TUD MUCD Location Missile System Additional Informatiton 

806 Brigade 96111 Hancheng, Shaanxi 

Province (丙෾ᐲ) 

Nuclear MRBMs 

[126] 

810 Brigade 96113 Dengshahe, Dalian, 

Liaoning Province 

(བྷ䘎ᐲ, ⲫ⋉⋣䭷) 

Nuclear IRBMs 

[127] 

The brigade least covered 

by government-related 

media outlets; reportedly 

also the only remaining 

brigade outfitted with DF3 nuclear IRBMs 

816 Brigade 96115 Tonghua, Jilin Province 

(ਹ᷇ⴱ, ਼ॆᐲ) 

Nuclear MRBMs 

[128] 

Formerly, an experimental 

regiment established in 

1984 to “facilitate the 

introduction of the DF-21. 

822 Brigade 96117 Laiwu, Shandong 

Province (㧡㣌ᐲ) 

Conventional 

MRBMs [129] 

Reportedly equipped with 

conventional MRBMs. 

Sources: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, 

Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011; and Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” 

IMINT & Analysis, June 26, 2010. 95 96 97 98

Support regiments reportedly under the Base 51 are shown in Table 4: 

 

 

94 “TUD” stands for “True Unit Designator”; “MUCD” stands for “Military Unit Cover Designator”. Refer to the 

Introduction for a discussion on the meaning of and differences between the two. 

95 Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan.” 96 O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps.” 

97 Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan.” 98 Ibid. 
413 

Table 4: Support Regiments Subordinate to Base 51 

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION 

96121 Dawa County, Panjin, 

Liaoning Province (བྷ⍬

৯, ⴈ䭖ᐲ) 

Training Provides instruction on 

equipment maintenance; 

hosts simulation facilities 

96122 Tonghua, Jilin Province 

(䙊ॆᐲ) 

Transport 

96123 Guosong District, 

Tonghua, Jilin Province 

(᷌ɲ䭷) 

Warhead Also known as the 901 

Regiment; hosts a 

technical service battalion 

with site management and 

missile management 

companies. 

96124 Tonghua, Jilin Province 

(䙊ॆᐲ) 

Repair 

96125 Shenyang, Liaoning 

Province (⊸䱣ᐲ) 

Communications 

Source: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012. 

Base 52 

With an operational planning focus on Taiwan, Base 52 is the largest and most powerful missile 

corps in the Second Artillery. Base 52 general headquarters oversees staff offices, at least two 

nuclear-capable MRBM brigades, at least five SRBM brigades, and six support regiments. A 

relatively new brigade possibly equipped with a new conventionally-capable MRBM variant has 

been established in northern Guangdong’s Shaoguan City. Indications exist that a missile brigade 

formerly subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and possibly equipped with UAVs has also 

been incorporated into Base 52.99 Specifically, missile brigades reportedly subordinate to this 

base are listed below in Table 5: 

 

 

99 The 96180 Unit appears to be the designation of the Nanjing Military Region 1st Missile Brigade (73661 Unit), 

which was transferred to the Second Artillery in late 2010. 
414 

Table 5: Missile Brigades Subordinate to Base 52 

TUD MUCD LOCATION MISSILE SYSTEM

ADDITIONAL 

INFORMATION

807 Brigade 96161 Chizhou, Anhui Province 

(⊐ᐎᐲ) 

Nuclear MRBMs 

811 Brigade 96163 Qimen, Anhui Province (哴

ኡᐲ, 禸䰘৯) 

Nuclear MRBMs 

815 Brigade 96165 Shangrao, Jiangxi Province 

(к侦ᐲ) 

Conventional SRBMs China’s first 

conventional SRBM unit. 

817 Brigade 96167 Yong’an, Fujian Province 

(≨ᆹᐲ) 

Conventional SRBMs 

818 Brigade 96169 Meizhou, Guangdong 

Province (ẵᐎᐲ) 

Conventional SRBMs 

819 Brigade 96162 Gangzhou (ᒯᐎᐲ) Conventional SRBMs 

820 Brigade 96164 Jinhua, Zhejiang Province 

(䠁ॾᐲ) 

Conventional SRBMs 

Sources: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, 

Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011; and Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” 

IMINT & Analysis, June 26, 2010. 

For support regiments reportedly under Base 52, see Table 6 below: 

 
415 

Table 6: Support Regiments Subordinate to PLASAF Base 52

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION

96171 Jiangshan, Zhejiang Province 

(⊏ኡᐲ) 

Training Primarily responsible for the 

training of new recruits in missile 

launch operations; unit depends 

heavily on simulation technology. 

96172 Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province 

(Ჟᗧ䭷ᐲ) 

Transport The regiment’s rail battalion 

supported a ten-day deployment of 

a brigade during live-fire training 

in northwestern China in 2010. 

96173 Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province 

(Ჟᗧ䭷ᐲ) 

Warhead Also known as the 902 Regiment. 

96174 Xiuning, Anhui Province 

(Ձᆱ৯) 

Repair The regiment has been undergoing 

a transition in which its repair and 

maintenance capabilities are 

automated. 

96175 Huizhou District, Huangshan, 

Anhui Province (哴ኡᐲ, 

ᗭᐎ४) 

Communications The third battalion of the 96176 

Regiment may be dedicated toward 

mobile satellite communications. 

96176 Shangrao, Jiangxi Province 

(к侦ᐲ) 

Component A Second Artillery missile depot 

with a large inventory of SRBMs. 

96180 Xianyou County, Putian, 

Fujian Province (㦶⭠ᐲ, 

ԉ9৯) 

 

Source: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012. 

Base 53 

Headquartered in southwestern city of Kunming and equipped with the most diverse range of 

missile systems, Base 53 oversees at least three MRBM brigades and one LACM brigade. The 

commander of Base 53 has a grade equivalent to a Deputy Corps leader, although its status may 

have elevated to full corps leader equivalent. The LACM brigade, garrisoned in the area of 

Luzhai, Guizhou Province, may be preparing for a new variant.100 Brigades equipped with DF21/31 variants are centered in Yunnan province in the areas of Jianshui and Yuxi. A relatively 

new brigade in Guangdong Province appears to be equipped with the DF-21D ASBM.101 Base 53 

may also support a Second Artillery force-wide training facility near Guiyang. Indications exist 

that a missile brigade formerly subordinate to the Guangzhou Military Region and possibly 

equipped with UAVs has also been incorporated into Base 53.102 Located in Kunming, Yunnan 

 

100 Accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-12/07/content_45198.htm on 27 November 2012. 101 Available reporting indicates that a limited number of missiles, between 10 and 12, are available to the brigade 

and its subordinate battalions for training and familiarization. 

102 The 808 Brigade had been based in the area of Chuxiong, and has relocated to Yuxi within the last two years. The 

brigade, previously equipped with the DF-21A, most likely is transitioning to a new missile variant, such as the DF21C. Relocation of brigade often is linked with integration of new missile variant. New underground facilities 

appear to be constructed north of Yuxi.
416 

Province, Base 53 could cover a variety of potential targets, including locations in India and 

Southeast Asia.103

Missile brigades reportedly subordinate to Base 53 are listed below in Table 7: 

Table 7: Missile Brigades Subordinate to Base 53 

TUD MUCD LOCATION MISSILE SYSTEM

ADDITIONAL 

INFORMATION

802 Brigade 96211 Jianshui County, Honghe 

Hani and Yi, Autonomous 

Prefecture, Yunnan Province 

(㓒⋣૸ቬ᯿ᖍ᯿㠚⋫ᐎ, ᔪ

≤৯) 

Nuclear MRBMs 

808 Brigade 96213 Chuxiong Autonomous 

Prefecture, Yunnan Province 

(ᾊ䳴ᖍ᯿㠚⋫ᐎ) 

Appears to be relocating to 

Yuxi and transitioning to a 

new missile variant, 

according to Mark Stokes 

821 Brigade 96215 Luzhai County, Liuzhou, 

Guangxi Province (ḣᐎᐲ, 

咯መ৯) 

Conventional LACMs 

Sources: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, 

Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011; and Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” 

IMINT & Analysis, June 26, 2010. 

Support regiments reportedly subordinate to Base 53 are listed below in Table 8: 

 

 

103 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 95. 
417 

Table 8: Support Regiments Subordinate to Base 53

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION

96221 Chenggong County, Kunming, 

Yunnan Province (ᰶ᰾ᐲ, ੸䍑৯) 

Training 

96222 Chenggong County, Kunming, 

Yunnan Province (ᰶ᰾ᐲ, ੸䍑৯) 

Transport 

96223 Mi’le County, Honghe Hani and Yi 

Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan 

Province (㓒⋣૸ቬ᯿ᖍ᯿㠚⋫ᐎ, 

ᕕं৯) 

Warhead 

96224 Kunming, Yunnan Province 

(ᰶ᰾ᐲ) 

Repair 

96225 Dabanqiao, Kunming, Yunnan 

Province (ᰶ᰾ᐲ, བྷɳẕ䭷) 

Communications 

96217 Guiyang, Guizhou Province 

(䍥䱣ᐲ); Qingzhen, Guiyang, 

Guizhou Province (䍥䱣ᐲ, ␵䭷ᐲ) 

Southwest Training 

Base 

May be related to land-attack 

cruise missile operations; a “major 

element” of the unit appears also to 

be based in Hainan Island. 

Source: Sources: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 

Institute, February 21, 2012. 

Base 54 

Located in Luoyang, Henan Province, Second Artillery’s Base 54 is an important nuclear ICBM 

command.104 Concentrated in western Henan Province, Base 54 oversees three ICBM brigades. 

At least one of these brigades is equipped with the silo-based DF-5 and is capable of reaching 

CONUS targets. The base also hosts the Second Artillery’s first DF-31 brigade, headquartered in 

Nanyang. Tentative indications exist of a potential new brigade being formed in the area of 

Xinyang. Likely an operational test and evaluation regiment at the current time, a highly 

speculative hypothesis is that the unit could emerge as a road mobile MIRVed ICBM brigade. 

Missile brigades subordinate to Base 54 are shown in Table 9. 

 

 

104 Stokes and Hsiao, “Spotlight on New Second Artillery ICBM Base Leadership.” 
418 

Table 9: Missile Brigades Subordinate to PLASAF Base 54 

TUD MUCD LOCATION

MISSILE 

SYSTEM ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

801 Brigade 96261 Lushi County, Sanmenxia, 

Henan Province (й䰘጑

ᐲ, ঒∿৯) 

Nuclear ICBMs Established 1959; upgraded to 

regiment in 1966 with the formal 

establishment of Second Artillery 

and to brigade in 1985 when 

strategic ICBMs entered its 

operational inventory; known as 

the “First East Wind Brigade.” 

804 Brigade 96263 Luoning County, Luoyang, 

Henan Province (⍋䱣ᐲ, 

⍋ᆱ৯) 

Nuclear ICBMs 

813 Brigade 96265 Nanyang, Henan Province 

(ই䱣ᐲ) 

Road-mobile 

nuclear ICBMs 

The first unit in Second Artillery 

to be outfitted with the DF-31 

road-mobile ICBM 

Sources: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, 

Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011; and Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” 

IMINT & Analysis, June 26, 2010.

Support regiments under Base 54 are shown below in Table 10. 

Table 10: Support Regiments Subordinate to Base 54

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION

96271 Yiyang County, Luoyang, Henan 

Province (⍋䱣ᐲ, ᇌ䱣৯) 

Training 

96272 Transport 

96273 Lushi County, Sanmenxia, Henan 

Province (й䰘጑ᐲ, ঒∿৯) 

Warhead 

96274 Luoyang, Henan Province (⍋䱣ᐲ) Repair 

96275 Luoyang, Henan Province (⍋䱣ᐲ) Communications 

Source: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012. 

Base 55 

Headquartered in the western Hunan city of Huaihua, Base 55 consists of three ICBM brigades 

concentrated in Hunan and one LACM brigade in neighboring Jiangxi province. Missile brigades 

subordinate to Base 55 are shown in Table 11 below: 

 
419 

Table 11: Missile Brigades Subordinate to Base 55 

TUD MUCD LOCATION

MISSILE 

SYSTEM

ADDITIONAL 

INFORMATION

803 Brigade 96311 Jingzhou Miao and Dong 

Autonomous County, Huaihua, 

Hunan Province (ᘰॆᐲ, 䶆ᐎ㤇

᯿ׇ᯿㠚⋫৯) 

Nuclear ICBMs 

805 Brigade 96313 Shaoyang, Hunan Province (䛥䱣

ᐲ) 

Road-mobile 

nuclear ICBMs 

Relocated from Tongdao to 

Shaoyang and converted 

from its inventory of older 

missiles to more modern, 

road-mobile ICBMs 

814 Brigade 96315 Huitong County, Huaihua, Hunan 

Province (ᘰॆᐲ, Պ਼৯) 

Nuclear ICBMs 

824 Brigade 96317 Yichun, Jiangxi Province (ᇌ᱕

ᐲ) 

Conventional 

LACMs 

Sources: Mark Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “Spotlight on New Second Artillery ICBM Base Leadership,” Asia 

Eye, Project 2049 Institute, August 2, 2011; and Mark Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “New DF-31A ICBM Brigade 

in Hunan?” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, September 9, 2011. 

Support regiments under Base 55 are shown below in Table 12: 

Table 12: Support Regiments Subordinate to Base 55

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION

96321 Dongkou County, Shaoyang, 

Hunan Province (䛥䱣ᐲ, ⍎ਓ৯) 

Training 

96322 Jingzhou Miao and Dong 

Autonomous County, Huaihua, 

Hunan Province (ᘰॆᐲ, 

䶆ᐎ㤇᯿ׇ᯿㠚⋫৯) 

Transport Appears to have attempted an 

emergency delivery mission in 

2011 that experienced a 

serious delay. 

96323 Huaihua, Hunan Province 

(ᘰॆᐲ) 

Warhead 

96324 Hecheng District, Huaihua, Hunan 

Province (ᘰॆᐲ, 咔෾४) 

Repair 

96325 Huaihua, Hunan Province 

(ᘰॆᐲ) 

Communications 

Source: Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012. 

Base 56 

Headquartered in Yuzhong County within the municipality of Lanzhou City, Base 56 oversees as 

many as two brigades equipped with variants of the DF-21 and at least one equipped with the 
420 

DF-31A ICBM.105 Base 56 may also administer the Second Artillery’s Northwest Test and 

Training base. Missile brigades subordinate to Base 56 are listed in Table 13 below: 

Table 13: Missile Brigades Subordinate to Base 56

TUD MUCD LOCATION MISSILE SYSTEM

ADDITIONAL 

INFORMATION

809 Brigade 96361 Datong Hui and Tu Autonomous 

County, Xining, Qinghai Province 

(㾯ᆱᐲ, བྷ䙊എ᯿൏᯿㠚⋫৯) 

Appears to be converting 

from nuclear MRBMs to 

road-mobile nuclear 

ICBMs, according to 

Hans Kristensen [135] 

812 Brigade 96363 Tianshui, Gansu Province (ཙ≤

ᐲ) 

Road-mobile nuclear 

ICBMs 

Second Artillery’s 

first DF-31A mobile 

ICBM unit. 

823 Brigade 96365 Korla (Ku’erle), Bayin’guoleng 

Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, 

Xinjiang Province (ᓃቄंᐲ, ᐤ

ഐ䜝ߧ㫉᯿㠚⋫ᐎ) 

Conventional MRBMs Known as the 

“Dagger Brigade”. 

Sources: Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Mobile ICBMs Seen in Central China,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 1, 

2012; Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 

February 21, 2012; Mark Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “New DF-31A ICBM Brigade in Hunan?” Asia Eye, 

Project 2049 Institute, September 9, 2011; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure 

Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011; and Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The 

PLA’s Second Artillery Corps,” IMINT & Analysis, June 26, 2010. 106 107 108

Support regiments under Base 56 are shown below in Table 14: 

 

 

105 Base general headquarters was formerly located in Xining until its move to Lanzhou City in 2010-2011. 106 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Mobile ICBMs Seen in Central China,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 1 March 2012. 107 Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, 21 

February 2012. 

108 Ibid. 
421 

Table 14: Support Regiments Subordinate to Base 56 

MUCD LOCATION CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION

96371 Shangwuzhuang Township, 

Huangzhong County, Xining, Qinghai 

Province (㾯ᆱᐲ, 8.ѝ৯, кӄᒴ䭷) 

Training 

96372 Huangzhong County, Xining, Qinghai 

Province (㾯ᆱᐲ, 8.ѝ৯) 

Transport 

96373 Shangwuzhuang Township, 

Huangzhong County, Xining, Qinghai 

Province (㾯ᆱᐲ, 8.ѝ৯, кӄᒴ䭷) 

Warhead Reporting on this unit can often 

be confused with the 22 Base, 

96241 Unit. 

96374 Sanqi Village, Chengbei District, 

Xining, Qinghai Province (㾯ᆱᐲ, 

෾े४, йަᶁ) 

Repair 

96375 Communications The S&T Daily indicates that it 

has a “three-hour rapid response 

requirement for emergency 

deployments; equipped with 

Iridium satellite phone systems 

and maritime satellite 

communications. 

96367 Delingha, Haixi Mongol and Tibetan 

Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai 

Province (⎧㾯㫉ਔ᯿㯿᯿㠚⋫ᐎ, 

ᗧԔ૸ᐲ) 

Northwest Test and 

Training Base 

Serves as the Second Artillery’s 

test and training base. 

Second Artillery Brigades: Roles, Organization, and Recent Developments 

Working closely with support regiments, Second Artillery operations centered upon launch 

brigades and subordinate launch battalions. Roughly equal in status to a U.S. Air Force (USAF) 

wing, a launch brigade is typically commanded by a senior colonel (roughly equivalent to a U.S. 

brigadier general). Brigade headquarters are structured along similar lines as general 

headquarters and missile bases, with staff functions carried out by a headquarters department, 

political department, logistics department, and equipment department. 

A chief of staff oversees the brigade Headquarters Department, with deputy chiefs of staff likely 

manning a 24-hour command center managed by the brigade operations and training office. 

Other Headquarters Department offices are responsible for weather, engineering, target 

intelligence, and other operational support functions. The Logistics Department likely oversees 

the brigade’s budget and finance and fuel depot and a material depot.109 A military transportation 

section would be responsible for coordinating with the base-level transportation regiment and 

with local civilian highway and rail authorities.110 The Equipment Department oversees sections 

responsible for equipment management and oversight of technical operations, including 

 

109 Accessed at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-02-16/1114633129.html on 27 November 2012. 110 For an overview of a brigade special vehicle mission, see www.stdaily.com/kjrb/content/2011-

06/21/content_316977.htm. Accessed 27 November 2012. 
422 

development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for missile preparation, underground facility, 

transfer point, and launch site management, as well as coordination with support regiments.111

A launch brigade consists of six subordinate launch battalions consisting of two companies each. 

Commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel, a launch battalion is the core of missile operations. 

The table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a nuclear-capable launch brigade appears 

to assign 12 launchers (one per company). Conventional brigades subordinate to Base 52 appear 

to be assigned 36 transport-erector-launchers (TELs), or 6 launchers per battalion (three 

launchers per company). 

It is unclear whether brigades have warheads or missiles assigned to their TO&E on a permanent 

basis. Base 22 stores and handles most nuclear warheads, with base-level Equipment Inspection 

regiments having relatively few warheads under control at any given time. Equipment Inspection 

regiments, and a specialized additional regiment under Base 52, may also perform storage and 

depot functions for missiles. The base-level transportation regiment is responsible for delivery of 

warheads and missiles to a brigade’s technical positions for assembly, mating, and other prelaunch missions. 

Adopting the Soviet model for missile operations, a technical battalion is responsible to the 

brigade commander for preparing a missile round for launch, including inspection and testing of 

components, missile assembly and warhead mating, targeting, and other tasks.112 Individual 

components of a nuclear warhead and missile delivery vehicle sub-assemblies and components, 

including the inertial measurement unit (IMU), such gyroscope or GPS receiver, must be tested 

to ensure readiness. Much of the work is carried out in an underground facility, referred to as the 

Central Depot. According to one report, a technical battalion commander spent 270 days in one 

year in a Central Depot for testing, maintenance, and assembly.113

Mobile missile brigades oversee a site management battalion. As many as six subordinate 

companies manage missile-related launch sites, storage, and handling facilities. Their 

responsibilities include underground facility management, including power and electricity, water, 

air-conditioning, and ventilation. Facilities have upgraded to site management information 

system, including automated security and perimeter monitoring systems. At least one unit, based 

in the Qimen area, ran into difficulties with local villagers stripping away forest cover 

camouflaging launch positions. At least one site management battalion manages a central fuel 

management depot. A subordinate platoon is responsible for site management battalion 

communications. 

 

111 Accessed at http://mil.anhuinews.com/system/2004/04/30/000634878.shtml on 27 November 2012 and 

http://junshi.xilu.com/2009/0521/news_1375_325555.htm on 27 November 2012. 112 B.P. Voronin, and N.A. Stolyarov, Launch Preparation and Rocket Launching, 1972, translated by U.S. Foreign 

Technology Division (FTD-ID(RS)T-0327-91), at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a238929.pdf. 113 The technical battalion often will include a measurement and transport company (⍻䈅䖜䘀䘎) and a site 

equipment company (䱥䙊䘎). A technical battalion also can include a site management company (䱥㇑䘎), which 

appears to manage facilities at operational sites, including technical sites or fixed/mobile launch sites. It may also 

have a rail transport company (䫱䘀䘎) and loading company (㻵ປ䘎). Missile launch operation appears to be 

under the purview of the measurement and transport company’s control platoon (᧗ࡦᧂ) commander. 
423 

Other brigade elements include a security company, technical service battalion, communication 

battalion, and an electronic countermeasures battalion. A brigade’s technical service battalion 

provides warning, camouflage, and weather support.114 Over the last decade, newly formed 

Second Artillery brigades have formed ECM battalions for self-protection against air attack. 

Battalions have been noted participating in training during deployments to Northwest China.115 

A launch brigade’s communications battalion is the glue that binds together elements within the 

brigade. Leveraging static fiber optic networks and satellite terminals for brigade liaison with 

upper echelons, the communications battalion most likely relies upon tactical line of sight 

communications for intra-brigade communications. A brigade may have its own fiber optic 

network anchoring a brigade to selected pre-survey launch sites and technical positions. 

However, reliance on wireless line of sight communications would indicate that launch battalions 

operate within a 100-kilometer radius of a brigade’s command center. 

Open source analysis highlights at least three relatively recent organizational developments: 

x Second Artillery has established a new missile brigade in the area of Shaoguan, 

Guangdong Province, under Base 52. This brigade “could be a candidate for a new 

MRBM system, such as the DF-16.”116 

x Another missile brigade was recently formed in the area of Qingyuan City, Guangdong 

Province, under Second Artillery’s Base 53. This unit could be a candidate to receive the 

DF-21D ASBM.117

x Finally, there are indications that the two tactical missile brigades under the PLA Army 

(one in the Nanjing MR and one in the Guangzhou MR) have transferred to Second 

Artillery.118

Base 22 

The Second Artillery maintains separate systems for missile and nuclear warhead management. 

China maintains a highly centralized nuclear warhead storage and handling system to maximize 

security, maintain strict control, and minimize the possibility of any nuclear accidents or 

 

114 Service Battalions include a warning and camouflage company (䆖՚䘎). Brigades with Service Battalions 

include the 96211, 96163, and 96317 Units. Accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2007ztpdc/2007-

09/07/content_943213.htm on 27 November 2012; www.stdaily.com/kjrb/content/2011-02/22/content_276929.htm 

on 27 November 2012; and www.chinamil.com.cn/site18/news/2008-08/31/content_1454482.htm on 27 November 

2012. 

115 For example, media highlighted ECM battalion training in Northwest China on October 19, 2010. Accessed at 

http://tp.chinamil.com.cn/2010-10/25/content_4320362.htm on 27 November 2012. Confirmed brigades with ECM 

battalions include the 96164 Unit (820 Brigade in Jinhua), 96215 Unit, and 96363 Unit in Tianshui. Accessed at 

http://news.sohu.com/20100823/n274392447.shtml on 27 November 2012; www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/jbzsc/2009-

05/19/content_1768818.htm on 27 November 2012; and http://military.people.com.cn/GB/42967/8140815.html on 

27 November 2012. 

116 Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 

Institute, 18 April 2011, accessed at http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html 

on 27 November 2012; and J. Michael Cole, “NSB Director Confirms PRC Deployment of ‘New’ Missile Unit in 

Guangdong Province,” Taipei Times, 27 May 2011, accessed at 

www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/05/27/2003504271 on 27 November 2012. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 
424 

unauthorized access to or use of nuclear weapons. As primary custodians of China’s nuclear 

warhead stockpile, Base 22 inspects warheads for reliability and safety, stores and transports 

warhead components, trains missile base personnel in warhead storage, maintenance, assembly, 

and mating, maintains a support infrastructure for warhead management, and operates a 

communications system that supports its mission. 119 The force centrally stores most of the 

country’s nuclear warheads in Taibai County, deep in the Qinling Mountains of Shaanxi 

Province. Base 22 was established under COSTIND in the mid-1960s, and re-subordinated to the 

Second Artillery in the 1970s. Base 22 includes two inspection units for warhead maintenance 

and inspection. At least one works within the nuclear warhead storage depot in Taibai County. 

The Base 22 transportation regiment handles the movement of warheads between the central 

storage complex in Taibai and smaller storage facilities that are subordinate to each of Second 

Artillery’s missile bases. The transportation regiment consists of at least two battalions, one for 

road and one for rail, and works closely with PLA rail representative offices. 120 The 

transportation regiment employs specialized container vehicles to transport warheads by 

specially designated roads linking Taibai with transfer points along the Baoji-Chengdu rail 

line.121 A separate Base 22 regiment is responsible for training Second Artillery personnel in 

warhead maintenance and handling. A communications regiment is responsible for nuclear 

warhead command and control-related communications within Base 22, and between Base 22 

and other Second Artillery units. Base 22 also oversees a contingency response group for nuclear 

and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related accidents. 

Base 28 

Second Artillery also maintains a base that is responsible for training, and reportedly supervises 

a “blue force” unit that acts as the opposing force in training and exercises. The incorporation of 

a realistic opposing force is intended to help sharpen the skills of other PLASAF units. 

According to Ron Christman, “One of the most significant advances Second Artillery has made 

in preparing its conventional units to deal with a severe threat environment has been establishing 

an “opposing force” unit that tests operational units in a wide range of battlefield environments. 

This so-called “Blue Army” opposing force regiment is probably subordinate to Second 

Artillery’s Base 28, which is located in Jilin Province in northeastern China.”122 Chinese military 

media reports indicate that this “Blue Force” unit replicates potential enemy operations against 

the PLASAF by simulating electronic warfare, computer network attacks, air strikes, and special 

operations force raids in online and field training exercises involving PLASAF missile units.123

Second Artillery Force Academic and Research Organizations 

Second Artillery also maintains several academic and research organizations. The academic 

 

119 Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, 12 March 

2010, p. 3, accessed at http://project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system. 

pdf on 27 November 2012. 

120 Accessed at http://club.xilu.com/emas/msgview-821955-

64344.html?PHPSESSID=04845836d7cd9ef5131e8edbfbb462ff on 27 November 2012 

121 Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” p. 8. 122 Christman, “Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps,” p. 211. 123 See, for example, Feng Chunmei, Chen Shoufu, and Zhang Rong, “The Long Sword of a Great Power Must be 

Mighty (Voice of 8-1 Highlighting the Building of the Core Military Capabilities of the Second Artillery (བྷഭ䮯ࢁ

ަ࣯ᗵေ(ޛаѻ༠))ᅮҼ⛞ޥṨᗳߋһ㜭࣋ᔪ䇮Ӟ⛩䘿㿶”), Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ (People’s Daily), December 16, 2011, p. 

20. 
425 

institutions include the Second Artillery Command Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒), the Second 

Artillery Engineering Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᐕ〻ᆖ䲒), and the Second Artillery Qingzhou 

Noncommissioned Office (NCO) School (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ䶂ᐎ༛ᇈᆖṑ). The research organizations 

include the Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ㻵༷⹄ウ䲒), as well as 

several other research institutes, such as the Second Artillery Engineering Design Research 

Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウ䲒) and the Assembly and Inspection Research Institute.124 

Second Artillery Command Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒) 

The Second Artillery Command Academy is a corps-leader grade (↓ߋ㙼) organization located 

in Wuhan, Hubei Province.125 It was established in 1977 and provides intermediate-level training 

and development for PLASAF officers and technical personnel. 126 It offers courses at the 

doctoral, masters, and undergraduate levels, as well as specialized technical courses in a number 

of fields. It received the right to confer masters-level degrees in 1990 and doctoral degrees in 

1998. It offers masters degrees in a number of fields, including: 

x Service campaign studies (ߋ⿽ᡈᖩᆖ) 

x Military logistics studies (ߋһਾऔᆖ) 

x Military political work studies (ߋ䱏᭯⋫ᐕ֌ᆖ) 

x Military armament studies (ߋһ㻵༷ᆖ) 

x Military communications studies (ߋһ䙊ؑᆖ) 

Masters degrees are also available in eight other fields that are not listed, and it offers a doctoral 

degree in service campaign studies (ߋ⿽ᡈᖩᆖ). The main fields of study offered at the 

undergraduate (ᴥ、) level include the following: 

x Communications command (䙊ؑᤷᥕ) 

x Electrical power engineering and automation (⭥࣋ᐕ〻৺ަ㠚ࣘॆ (

x National defense engineering command (ഭ䱢ᐕ〻ᤷᥕ) 

x Machinery engineering and automation (χỠᐕ〻৺ަ㠚ࣘॆ (

x Construction engineering (൏uᐕ〻) 

x Water supply and drainage, heating, and ventilation engineering (㔉ᧂ≤о䟷᳆䙊仾ᐕ

〻) 

The three-year senior technical degrees (བྷу) offered for non-commissioned officers at the 

academy include: 

x Wired communications command (M㓯䙊ؑᤷᥕ) 

 

124 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” p. 529-

530. 

125 Accessed at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/48c2487931b765ce050814d6.html on 30 August 302012. 126 This description is taken from Second Artillery Command Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᤷᥕᆖ䲒), 9 July 2007, accessed 

at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/milschools/2007-07/09/content_871228.htm on 27 November 2012. 
426 

x Wireless communications command (ᰐ㓯䙊ؑᤷᥕ) 

x Mobile communications (〫ࣘ䙊ؑ) 

x Engineering construction management (ᐕ〻ᔪᅌ㇑⨶) 

x Engineering facilities installation (ᐕ〻䇮༷ᆹ㻵) 

x Engineering machinery command (ᐕ〻χỠᤷᥕ) 

In addition, the Second Artillery Command Academy serves as an important center of research 

on military affairs and theory for the PLASAF. Faculty members and researchers have won a 

number of awards for their research and authored a substantial number of articles and other 

publications on related subjects. 

Second Artillery Engineering Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᐕ〻ᆖ䲒) 

The Second Artillery Engineering Academy is also a corps-leader grade (↓ߋ㙼) organization 

and is located in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province.127 It was established in September 1959. It serves as 

Second Artillery’s basic training academy. According to its website, it is the “cradle (᩷(오후)) of 

the officers of the PLA’s strategic missile force.” The academy has produced more than 30,000 

graduates, of whom 96 have become general officers, and its website states that 90 percent of 

current missile brigade commanders and chiefs of staff are graduates of the academy.128 The 

Second Artillery Engineering Academy’s website indicates that the school offers the following 

specialties (уъ䇮㖞): 

x Electronic engineering (⭥ᆀᐕ〻) 

x Engineering Physics (ᐕ〻⢙⨶) 

x Weapon systems and launch engineering (↖ಘパーセント㔏оਁሴᐕ〻) 

x Air vehicle propulsion engineering (伎㹼ಘ࣋ࣘᐕ〻) 

x Measurement and control engineering (⍻᧗ᐕ〻) 

x Computer science and technology (䇑㇇χ、ᆖоᢰδ) 

x Command automation engineering (ᤷᥕ㠚ࣘॆᐕ〻) 

x Information research and security (ؑ᚟⹄ウоᆹޘ (

x Mechanical engineering and automation (χỠᐕ〻৺ަ㠚ࣘॆ (

x Power engineering and automation (⭥࣋ᐕ〻৺ަ㠚ࣘॆ (

x Environmental engineering (⧟ໍາᐕ〻) 

x Management engineering (㇑⨶ᐕ〻) 

x Information engineering (ؑ᚟ᐕ〻) 

x Sensing engineering (ז⍻ᐕ〻) 

x Firepower command and control engineering (⚛࣋ᤷᥕо᧗ࡦᐕ〻).129

 

127 Accessed at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/48c2487931b765ce050814d6.html on 30 August 302012. 128 Second Artillery Engineering Academy, “Overview of the Academy ( ᆖ䲒ᾲߥ“( , accessed at 

www.epgc.net/xygk/ on 7 December 2011. 

129 See Second Artillery Engineering Academy, “Specialties” ( уъ䇮㖞), www.epgc.net/zysz/249524.shtml, 

accessed December 7, 2011. 
427 

Second Artillery Qingzhou Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) School 

(ᅮҼ⛞ޥ䶂ᐎ༛ᇈᆖṑ) 

The Second Artillery Qingzhou NCO School is a division-leader grade (↓ᐸ㙼) organization 

located in Qingzhou, Shandong Province.130 It was first established as the 814 Regiment of the 

Second Artillery in September 1970 in Yunnan Province and was relocated just over a year 

afterward in November 1971 to Xi’an (presumably near the premises of the Second Artillery 

Engineering Academy, which assumed teaching responsibilities for the 814 Regiment). The 814 

regiment became the Second Artillery Training Regiment (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ䇝㓳ഒ) in April 1976; 

relocated to the premises of the Second Artillery Command Academy in Wuhan in August 1976; 

and finally to Qingzhou in Shandong Province in January 1978, where it assumed training of 

NCOs (in addition to various other training programs it had undertaken, including officer 

training). In March 1993, the Training Regiment was rechristened the Qingzhou Branch of the 

Second Artillery Command Academy, and in July 1999 as the NCO School. The school today 

offers 19 tertiary-level (i.e., university-level) majors, 16 vocational programs, and nine shortterm training programs. It publishes five journals, including “NCO Education Survey” (༛ᇈᮉ

㛢ᾲ䇪) and “NCO Psychological Education” (༛ᇈᗳ⨶ᮉ㛢), and its students and faculty have 

published 700 papers in recent years in both military-related and non-military-related journals. 

The Qingzhou campus hosts one weapons testing center, 60 laboratories, and 15 training fields, 

and is reportedly equipped with four types of ground-to-ground missile systems.131

Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ㻵༷⹄ウ䲒) 

The Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy was formed in December 2003 in order to 

better leverage available technologies for the purpose of force modernization and to integrate 

activities of stove-piped research institutes. Located in Beijing’s Qinghe suburb, the Second 

Artillery Equipment Research Academy is a corps-leader grade (↓ߋ㙼) organization.132At least 

five and as many as seven subordinate research institutes conduct feasibility studies and develop 

concepts for new missile systems, and oversee industrial R&D and testing. The first known 

competitive tender for an R&D contract appears to have been in 2002. Program management of 

larger, more complex systems is handled at the Equipment Research Academy headquarters level, 

while sub-systems are managed within the Academy’s research institutes. 133 The research 

institutes within the Second Artillery’s Equipment Research Academy and multiple research 

 

130 Accessed at 

http://wk.baidu.com/view/40c3924cfe4733687e21aae5?from=&ssid=&bd_page_type=1&uid=bk_1342510523_703

&pu=sl%401%2Cpw%403000%2Csz%40224_220%2Cpd%401%2Cfz%402%2Clp%401%2Ctpl%40color&pn=1&

st=1&set=num on 30 August 2012. 

131 “Qingzhou Second Artillery Noncommissioned Officer School of the CPLA (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋᅮҼ⛞ޥ䶂ᐎ༛

ᇈᆖṑ),” Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Edition II, Discipline Volume III: The History of the People’s Liberation 

Army (ѝഭߋһⲮ、ޘҖᆖ、޼࠶ III: ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋਢ), Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House 

(ѝഭབྷⲮ、ޘҖࠪ⡸矢), p. 768. 132 Xia Hongming, Wang Yongxiao, and Zhou Ming, “Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy Investigates 

Indigenous Innovation (ᅮҼ⛞ޥ㻵༷⹄ウ䲒᧒䇘㠚ѫࡋ(ᯠ, “PLA Daily (䀓᭮ߋᣕ), 18 December 2007, 

accessed at www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2007-12/18/content_1059412.htm on 27 November 2012. 133 For general background on the Academy, see “How Did the Second Artillery Corps Create More than 6,000 S&T 

Results? (Ҽ⛞ 6000 ։亩、⹄ᡀ᷌ᱟྲօࡋ䙐Ⲵ ̨),” PLA Daily (ѝഭߋ㖁), 11 February 2009, accessed at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-02/11/content_10798697.htm on May 30, 2010. 
428 

offices within the Second Artillery’s Engineering Academy support Second Artillery 

headquarters staff in the development of technical requirements documentation.134

A bibliometric analysis of the academy’s publications available on the Chinese National 

Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database reveals that the academy published 742 papers on 

CNKI since 2004 on the open source. There appear to be at least seven research institutes (⹄ウ

ᡰ) subordinate to the academy – and an as yet undetermined number of laboratories under each 

research institute. The following table shows how many papers each of the seven research 

institutes published, which shows that the third research institute is the most prolific on CNKI: 

Table 15: Publications from PLASAF Equipment Research Academy by Research Institute

Research Institute Publications Count 

First Research Institute 8 

Second Research Institute 44 

Third Research Institute 76 

Fourth Research Institute 36 

Fifth Research Institute 23 

Sixth Research Institute 4 

Seventh Research Institute 3 

Source: China National Knowledge Infrastructure 

An analysis of the content of the publications produced by each of the research institutes reveals, 

to varying degrees of confidence, a general idea of the fields in which each unit specializes. For 

example, the first research institute appears to focus primarily on operations research (OR), 

having published literature on such matters as missile readiness, airborne laser-based missile 

defense, mobile maintenance equipment, preventive maintenance measures, and weapons 

targeting. A chart detailing these findings for each of the research institutes is presented below in 

Figure 6.135

 

 

134 For example, the Academy’s Operations Support Department has produced a number of studies on anti-ship 

ballistic and anti-satellite technologies. Authors of articles on ASBM and ASAT requirements include Tan Shoulin 

(䉝ᆸ᷇), Wang Minghai (⦻᰾⎧), Li Xinqi (ᵾᯠަ), Zhang Daqiao (ᕐབྷᐗ), and Tang Baoguo (ୀ؍ഭ). Most 

are affiliated with the Engineering Academy’s 603th Instruction and Research Lab (603 ᮉ⹄ᇔ). The Department 

of Automated Control’s 303 Lab (Ҽ⛞ᐕ〻ᆖ䲒 303 ᮉ⹄ᇔ) has performed technical analysis on near space flight 

vehicles. 

135 Accessed at http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/post_read.asp?BlogID=3119820&PostID=36743031 on 31 August 

2012. 
429 

Figure 2: Organization of the Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy with 

Possible Functions of the Subordinate Research Institutes 

Second Artillery Engineering Design Research Academy (ᅮҼ⛞ޥᐕ〻䇮䇑⹄ウ䲒) 

The Second Artillery Engineering Design Research Academy is a corps deputy-leader grade (࢟

ߋ㙼) organization, a whole grade lower than Second Artillery Command Academy, Second 

Artillery Engineering Academy, and Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy, and two 

whole grades lower than the Second Artillery NCO School. It is based in Beijing’s Dongcheng 

District. Established in 1976, it is a research organization that specializes primarily in 

engineering survey and design and civil air defense. It has designed, among other projects, air 

defense systems for major Chinese city subway systems; commercial buildings (e.g., offices, 

hotels, and residential apartments); telecommunications facilities; roads and bridges; and urban 

planning modules.136

 

 

136 Accessed at www.360doc.com/content/12/1004/16/8021685_239448474.shtml on 27 November 2012; 

www.urt.cn/4lishi/disp2.asp?recno=520 on 27 November 2012; and 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4c44e3f40100ibh9.html on 27 November 2012. 
430 

Figure 3: Academic and Research Organizations of Second Artillery 

Second Artillery Engineering Units 

Second Artillery’s engineering community consists of two division leader-grade units: the 308 

Engineering Command (MUCD: 96501 Unit) and the Engineering Technology Zongdui (MUCD: 

96531 Unit). 137 The former appears to consist of four “operational engineering regiments 

responsible for tunneling and other civil engineering functions” along with one regiment 

dedicated to training and another whose function has yet to be determined; the latter consists of 

three “installation regiments” (ᆹ㻵ഒ) responsible for “Second Artillery-related installation 

engineering – including ventilation for underground facilities and fixed communications” along 

with three other support regiments.138 The 308 Engineering Command is based out of Hanzhong, 

Shaanxi Province; of its three operational engineering regiments, its 107 Regiment (MUCD: 

96512 Unit) apparently serves as the “lead” unit responsible for tunneling: 

The [107] regiment has at least five battalions that are likely based near regiment 

headquarters [in Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province] but on long-term tours of duty 

[throughout] China...The unit also played a key role in the construction of 

Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.139

 

137 Mark Stokes, “Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: First Quarter 2012,” Project 2049 Institute, p.19. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid p. 19-20. 
431 

The Engineering Technology Zongdui is based out of Luoyang, Henan Province; of its three 

installation regiments and three support regiments, the First Installation Regiment (MUCD: 

96542 Unit) appears to be the most prominent – the regiment won a major award (presumably 

military-based) in May 2009 for its work in restoring power and water services in the wake of 

the Sichuan earthquake earlier that year.140 The First Installation Regiment plays a prominent 

role preparing nuclear test facilities – again involved in such activities as installing air 

conditioning, water, and electrical systems in those and other facilities.141 Of the three support 

regiments attached to the Engineering Technology Zongdui, the Communications Engineering 

Regiment (MUCD: 96548 Unit) appears to be responsible for communications projects such as 

laying fiber optics communications lines for Second Artillery (which suggests the unit is likely 

involved with China’s nuclear command and control system).142 The Group also has a training 

regiment as well as a “vehicle repair factory” attached to it. 

PLASAF Wartime Organization 

The Second Artillery peacetime organizational structure likely would be adjusted in wartime. In 

the event of a crisis, selected brigades, support regiments, and staff elements under Second 

Artillery general headquarters and one or more missile bases would comprise a corps-level 

Second Artillery conventional missile component under a Joint Theater Command (JTC). For 

example, in a notional Taiwan scenario, the CMC could direct formation of a JTC in the Nanjing 

area that would consist of a subordinate corps-level Second Artillery component. Under 

command of the Second Artillery Force Chief of Staff, key Headquarters Department staff, 

selected support regiments, Base 52 staff, and Base 52 support regiments would be assigned to 

form the Second Artillery corps. Five conventional SRBM brigades under Base52, one Base 53 

ASBM brigade, and one Base 55 LACM brigade could notionally also be assigned to the Second 

Artillery component. A separate nuclear corps-level group, reporting directly to the CMC, could 

be comprised of Base 22 and ICBM brigades subordinate to Bases 54, 55, and 56. 

The PLA’s Science of Second Artillery Campaigns indicates that the composition of campaign 

forces would be based on PLASAF peacetime organization. According to Science of Second 

Artillery Campaigns, “using the peacetime system of organization as the foundation and 

scientifically constructing the wartime system fulfills the requirements of integrating peacetime 

and wartime and the requirements of rapidly transform in wartime.” 143 Further, Science of 

Second Artillery Campaigns states that the composition of campaign forces must be able to 

satisfy operational requirements and facilitate coordination with the rest of the armed forces. In 

addition, PLASAF wartime organization must be unified with the joint campaign command 

system. 

Selected conventional missile units would be assigned under the JTF command headquarters. 

Nuclear-capable brigades likely would fall under the direct control of the Supreme Command. 

 

 

140 Ibid p. 20. 141 Ibid p. 20-21. 142 Ibid p. 21. 143 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 146. 
432 

PLASAF campaign forces are divided into three groups: basic assault group, reserve assault 

group, and support group. The basic assault group is the “main operational force.” The reserve 

assault group is held in reserve for subsequent campaign operations. The support group handles 

all support requirements for the campaign. 

In a conventional campaign, the conventional guided missile assault campaign juntuan consists 

of a basic assault group, reserve assault group, and support group. The basic assault group is 

composed of several guided missile brigades, an electronic warfare unit, defensive operations 

unit, and other units. The strength of the reserve assault group is determined by the campaign 

commander in accordance with his expectations about the development of the campaign. They 

are generally about one-third the size of the basic assault group forces. The support group 

includes combat support units, logistics support units, and equipment support units.144

In a nuclear counterstrike campaign, the nuclear counterstrike campaign juntuan consists of a 

basic assault group, reserve assault group, and support group. The basic assault group is 

composed of several nuclear missile brigades, equipment inspection regiment, electronic warfare 

unit, and defensive operations forces. The composition of the reserve assault group is the same as 

that of the basic assault group, but it is smaller. Nonetheless, it must consist of forces that are 

sufficient to “meet the needs of a counter-punch against the enemy.” 145 The support group 

includes combat support units, logistical support units, and equipment support units. 

Possible Future Developments 

What do these developments suggest about the future of Second Artillery as an organization? 

This section considers the future of Second Artillery’s nuclear and conventional missile forces 

and some of the potential organizational implications of developments in these areas. 

The Future of Second Artillery’s Nuclear and Conventional Missile Forces 

The modernization and expansion of China’s nuclear missile force capabilities has led some 

analysts to ponder the question of “how much is enough” for China. The answer to this question 

will influence the size and composition of the PLASAF as an organization. Some observers have 

speculated that China may take advantage of the declining numbers of nuclear weapons in the 

U.S. and Russian arsenals to “rush to parity” with the nuclear superpowers.146 

However, the writings of Chinese strategists suggest quite strongly that China would see little 

benefit to be gained by amassing thousands of nuclear weapons. With respect to its nuclear 

missile force, China has shown it is determined to maintain the secure, second-strike capability 

that is required to ensure that it will have a credible strategic deterrence force even in the face of 

advances in adversary ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities. Yet the writings of 

Chinese strategists strongly suggest that going much beyond what is required for an 

unquestionably credible assured retaliation capability would lead to diminishing returns at best 

and strategic instability at worst. 

 

144 Ibid, p. 148-150. 145 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 150-151. 146 For an example of the argument that China could try to take advantage of U.S. and Russian reductions, see Peter 

Brookes, “Beijing’s Build-Up and New START,” National Review Online, 9 December 2010, accessed at 

www.nationalreview.com/articles/254731/beijing-s-build-and-new-start-peter-brookes?pg=1 on 27 November 2012. 
433 

For example, Yao Yunzhu argues that China continues to adhere to the views of Mao Zedong 

and Deng Xiaoping, who clearly believed that “deterrent effectiveness does not increase in 

proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons,” but rather that “a survivable and invulnerable 

small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence.”147

Along similar lines, Sun Xiangli, Deputy Director of the Arms Control Research Division at the 

Beijing Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), argues that the 

experience of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War shows that the pursuit of a “warfighting” strategy “does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.” 

Moreover, because it requires a very large nuclear arsenal, it consumes “substantial economic 

and technological resources.” Worse still, large arsenals and “war-fighting” strategies lead to 

strategic instability and increase the risk of nuclear war.148

As Fravel and Medeiros point out, “Chinese leaders have believed that nuclear weapons were 

basically unusable on the battlefield and that once mutual deterrence was achieved, a larger 

arsenal or arms racing would be costly, counterproductive, and ultimately self-defeating.”149

China is thus extremely unlikely to attempt to match or exceed the United States or Russia in 

terms of the number of nuclear weapons it deploys. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe 

Beijing will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal as needed to ensure that it maintains an 

assured retaliation capability in response to perceived security challenges. This could result in 

quite substantial increases to the quantity and quality of China’s nuclear arsenal, which in turn 

could have important implications for the organization of the PLASAF. 

Indeed, many observers expect China to field a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force over 

the next 10-15 years. According to unclassified March 2011 congressional testimony by DIA 

Director Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., for example, “The PRC currently has fewer than 50 

ICBMs that can strike the continental United States, but probably will more than double that 

number by 2025.”150 The key factors that are likely to influence Chinese decision-making about 

what exactly it requires in terms of nuclear force structure include China’s perception of external 

security environment and its relationships with major powers, principally the United States, India, 

Russia, and Japan; China’s perception of potential nuclear and conventional threats to its silobased, road-mobile, and sea-based nuclear forces; and China’s concerns about future missile 

defense developments that could undermine its ability to maintain an assured retaliation posture 

capable of deterring potential adversaries. 

Chinese scholars suggest that missile defense is the most important factor in determining China’s 

future requirements. According to Yao Yunzhu, for example, U.S. missile defense deployments 

will be “the most significant factor that will influence China’s nuclear calculus.” 151 Furthermore, 

according to Chu Shulong and Rong Yu of Tsinghua University, “Trying to retain the credibility 

 

147 Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” 148 Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” p. 27. 149 Fravel and Medeiros, p. 87. 150 Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess Jr., U.S. Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency “World Wide 

Threat Assessment,” Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 10 March 2011, p. 

17, accessed at www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2011-03-10.html on 27 November 2012. 151 Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” 
434 

of its nuclear deterrent in the face of a BMD system, China may increase its nuclear arsenal until 

it is beyond doubt that it is large enough.”152 Chinese writers rarely provide specific numbers, 

but Chu and Rong suggest that perhaps 200 nuclear warheads could be needed today, with that 

number perhaps increasing to 300 or 400 in the future. 

As for Second Artillery’s conventional missile force, it appears likely to remain the most 

dynamic component of the PLASAF, with a variety of potential new developments on the 

horizon, which could influence its organizational structure in important ways. In particular, some 

analysts have highlighted the possibility that Beijing might choose to pursue new longer-range 

conventional strike missions and capabilities for Second Artillery. 153 Specifically, future 

developments may include further expansion of its conventional MRBM force and possibly 

conventional IRBMs. According to the 2011 Department of Defense (DoD) report on Chinese 

military developments, “China’s ballistic missile force is acquiring conventional medium-range 

and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that extend the distance at which it can threaten other 

countries with conventional precision or near-precision strikes.”154 

Finally, this paper suggests some research questions that future observers may want to explore as 

part of the update to the Second Artillery chapter when the third edition of this volume is 

produced. 155 First, Chinese military publications indicate that Second Artillery’s nuclear 

counterattack campaign can be conducted as an “independent nuclear counterattack campaign” 

(⤜・Ṩ৽ࠫᡈᖩ) or as a major part of a “joint nuclear counterattack campaign” (㚄ਸṨ৽ࠫ

ᡈᖩ).156 Will Second Artillery engage in true joint planning with the PLAN for nuclear counterattack campaigns, or will the General Staff Department (GSD) coordinate and de-conflict 

PLASAF and PLAN nuclear operations? Either way, what will be the organizational 

implications for Second Artillery? 

Second, a growing missile force will likely mean more organizational changes to accommodate a 

larger number of missiles. Will this result in a further increase in the number of missile brigades? 

Will there be an increase in the number of missiles available for reloads? What other 

organizational changes might result? 

Third, ISR developments will be important to support targeting and battle damage assessment 

(BDA) for long-range strikes, increasing reliance on space and UAVs. For example, Chinese 

military publications indicate that as the technological sophistication of the missile force 

 

152 Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long 

Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford: Stanford University, 2008, p. 171. 153 James C. Mulvenon, Murray Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David Frelinger, David C. Gompert, Martin C. 

Libicki, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the 

Department of Defense, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006, p. 95. See also Mark Stokes, China Evolving 

Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in 

the Western Pacific and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, 14 September 2009, accessed at www.project2049.net on 27 

November 2012. 

154 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011, p. 33. 155 We are grateful to the commentator and to the other conference participants who raised these questions following 

our presentation. 

156 Science of Campaigns, 2006, p. 616-628. 
435 

increases, Second Artillery is becoming increasingly reliant on space systems. 157 What are the 

organizational implications of Second Artillery’s growing reliance on space-based ISR 

capabilities and UAVs? 

Another issue analysts will likely need to explore for the third edition of this volume centers on 

the possibility that Second Artillery will acquire new missions in the coming years. What will 

role will Second Artillery play in offensive counter-space operations, electronic attack, and cyber 

warfare? What organizational changes would be required to accommodate such responsibilities? 

Finally, with the Chinese Communist Party undergoing a sweeping leadership transition in 2012, 

will new leaders seek to make any major changes in the organization of the PLASAF?

 

157 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, p. 75-76. 
436 

Chapter Twelve: China’s People’s Armed Police Force Leadership, Command, 

and Organization in the Wake of the 2009 PAP Law 

Murray Scot Tanner1

Important as the development of the regular PLA has been to China’s emergence as a global 

power, China’s ability to develop effective, professional paramilitary internal security and 

emergency response forces will almost certainly have a greater impact on China’s day-to-day 

national security than any other effort to strengthen China’s military and security forces. The 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to face increasing social unrest, violent crime, crossborder drug trafficking, and other threats to internal stability. Moreover, it has been made clear 

by recent major social uprisings and natural disasters, such as the 2008 and 2009 riots in Lhasa 

and Urumqi, and the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, that when China’s paramilitary and emergency 

response forces are unable to handle these crises, Beijing has little choice but to call upon the 

regular PLA to help support these disaster relief and domestic security operations. China’s 

capacity to develop emergency response and paramilitary forces, therefore, will continue to have 

a major impact on the regular PLA’s ability to free itself to focus on its new emerging missions. 

This chapter examines recent efforts to reorganize People’s Armed Police Force (PAP/↖㻵䆖ሏ

䜘䱏/↖䆖䜘䱏)

2

 leadership and management to help it better meet the leadership’s expectations 

of this force. It focuses in particular on the most important effort to reorganize PAP leadership 

and command in the past decade—the passage in 2009 of the Law of the People’s Republic of 

China on the People’s Armed Police (hereafter the PAP Law)—which raised serious issues of the 

ability of local officials to mobilize the PAP for security missions in their area. The final draft of 

the law removed language that reaffirmed the authority of local officials to mobilize local PAP 

forces. This paper, drawing on debates over the draft law and local emergency response plans, 

attempts to clarify why the draft PAP law was revised, and what the current state of local 

authority to mobilize and command PAP forces is. This chapter also provides an overview of the 

basic structure and organization of the PAP.3

Historical Background 

Although the modern People’s Armed Police Force was formed in the early-mid 1980s, the 

CCP’s military, police, intelligence, and militia forces have experimented with a wide variety of 

paramilitary security and emergency response forces since well before 1949. The forces that 

comprise the PAP and its institutional precursors have combined a broad and somewhat 

disjointed set of security missions and functions, including internal security and social order, 

border defense, leadership bodyguards, prison guarding, fire-fighting, and providing security for 

 

1

 The views in this paper are entirely those of the author, and should not in any way be interpreted as representing 

the views of C.N.A., its corporate officers, or its sponsors. 2

 China’s National Defense White Paper and other Chinese English-language media often abbreviate People’s 

Armed Police Force as “PAPF.” This chapter uses the abbreviation “PAP.” 3

 According to the 2002 China’s National Defense, China’s Armed Forces (↖㻵࣋䟿) consists of three components: 

the People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋ(, which is composed of active duty Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Second Artillery personnel; the People’s Armed Police (Ӫ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏); and the Reserves (亴༷ᖩ䜘䱏) and 

 .(ޥ≁) Militia
437 

a collection of economic activities (guarding gold-mining, hydropower, transportation, and 

forestry activities). 

These forces have been reorganized, divided, and recombined repeatedly, with the balance of 

leadership control moving back and forth among Central and local Party and government 

officials, and between the PLA and Public Security systems. In the case of the PAP’s specialized 

economic units, an additional challenge has been the leadership role and fiscal contributions of 

the State Council economic ministries whose activities the PAP units secure. The current PAP 

organizational structure is the PRC’s longest-lived paramilitary system, and has finally given 

PAP forces at least the opportunity to develop a persistent institutional identity and a predictable 

set of career patterns for its officers. 

The process of inaugurating and amalgamating the units that form the modern PAP began with a 

19 June 1982 CCP Central Directive entitled “Report Requesting Instructions on the 

Management Structure of the People’s Armed Police.” The formal establishment of the PAP 

Headquarters (ѝഭӪ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏ᙫ䜘) was announced on 5 April 1983. The initial force 

merged the PLA’s Internal Security Duty Forces (neiwei zhiqin budui), with public security 

Armed Forces, Border Defense, Fire-fighting, and other forces subordinate to the Ministry of 

Public Security (MPS) and other public security departments.4

The PAP’s border security, fire-fighting, and specialized economic security units continued to 

expand and reorganize over the next five years as several more paramilitary and security units 

were added, and leadership over some of these units shifted. The Hydropower ( ≤ ⭥ ), 

Transportation (Ӕ䙊), and Gold (哴䠁) protection units that were originally subordinate to the 

PLA’s Capital Construction Corps were added to the PAP order of battle on 1 January1985. 

Three years later, in February 1988 the forestry (἞᷇) protection armed police forces in 

Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia were also added to the PAP. Originally, most of these 

units were primarily under the leadership of their respective State Council ministries and 

commissions. In 1999 the Hydropower, Gold, Transportation, and Forestry units were “clearly 

placed under the responsibility of the PAP Main Corps,” although this wording still leaves many 

questions regarding their leadership unanswered. In August 1985 the MPS issued a “Notice on 

Improving and Adjusting the Structure of Border Defense” and a “Notice on Several Directives 

for Improving and Strengthening the Leadership and Management of the Fire-Fighting Corps.” 

These directives removed the Border Defense Armed Police and the Fire-Fighting Armed Police 

from the PAP Headquarters, and placed them under the leadership of local Public Security units 

at their respective administrative levels. 5

 

4

 Much of this history is also reviewed in Murray Scot Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster: Reorganizing 

the People’s Armed Police After Tiananmen,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s 

Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume v1.0 (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2002); See also Dennis 

Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (Routledge, 2012); For recent 

Chinese reviews of this history, see An Zheng, Zhongguo Jingcha Zhidu Yanjiu (Research on China’s Police 

System), (2009, Beijing, Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe), pp. 92-94; also Gao Wenying, Renmin Jingcha Zhuzhi 

Guanli Guifan (Standards and Norms of People’s Police Organization and Management) (2001, Beijing, Zhongguo 

Renmin Gongan Daxue Chubanshe), p. 12-14. 

5

 An Zheng, Zhongguo Jingcha Zhidu Yanjiu, pg. 92. 
438 

The PAP Leadership System 

The PAP’s most important and persistent organizational questions have always concerned the 

allocation of leadership and command over the PAP among the variety of Central and local, 

police and military stakeholders who oversee these forces. This issue has been at the root of 

numerous PAP reorganizations since 1949, including in 1983, 1995, and most recently again in 

the debate over drafting of the 2009 PAP Law. 

From its establishment in 1983 until the post-Tiananmen years, the PAP employed a leadership 

and cadre management system that officially gave government and military leaders “dual 

leadership” over the PAP, but in reality was largely dominated by local Communist Party 

officials and their local Public Security departments. Officially called the system of “One 

Unified and Two Divisions,” China’s State Council and the CCP’s Central Military Commission 

(CMC) jointly exercised unified leadership (㔏а亶ሬ) over the PAP at the Central level. Local 

Public Security units at each administrative level carried out management (㇑⨶) and command 

(ᤷᥕ) of the PAP, including management over the hiring and promotion of PAP cadres (e.g. 

management and command “divided” by levels). While superficially a system that combined 

Central and local leadership, it was local Party leaders and local public security units that 

exercised the dominant leadership. As one police analyst describes the system at this time, “the 

People’s Armed Police accepted dual leadership (ৼ䟽亶ሬ), but with the ‘two divisions’ (e.g. 

local leadership) as the main element.”6

In the wake of the 1989 protests, when the PAP was perhaps unfairly accused of ineffective 

performance, leadership, and management over the PAP were reorganized. Through the early 

1990s, PLA leaders assumed the leading role in the PAP’s political work, even though China’s 

successive Ministers of Public Security continued to hold the concurrent post of First Political 

Commissar of the PAP. 

The major reorganization of PAP leadership and management was set forth in a March 1995 

joint directive by the State Council and the CMC. The directive “further strengthened the CMC’s 

leadership over the Armed Police forces.”7

 The Directive transformed the former leadership and 

management system of “One Unified and Two Divisions” into a new system labeled “Two 

Unifieds and One Division.” Thereafter, the State Council and CMC carried out unified 

leadership over the PAP as well as unified management. Public Security departments at all levels 

of society no longer managed PAP personnel, but did continue to carry out command (ᤷᥕ) of 

the PAP at each level. 

Activation of PAP Units: Central versus Local Control 

The 1995 State Council-CMC Directive preserved the authority of local Party and government 

officials to activate the PAP forces in their region in the event of emergencies. Local authorities 

were also granted the authority to place these units under the command of local Public Security 

forces for carrying out social stability operations. This is the main system of PAP leadership that 

survived until the passage of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed 

 

6

 Tanner, Institutional Lessons of Disaster; also An Zheng, Zhongguo Jingcha Zhidu Yanjiu, pg. 92. 7

 Ibid. 
439 

Police (the “PAP Law”) in 2009. The power of central-level leaders over the PAP was further 

strengthened in 1996, when, as part of the PLA’s overall decrease in forces, a group of PLA 

“Yi”-type (e.g. level two/҉㓗) mobile divisions were transferred and subordinated to the PAP to 

serve as mobilized divisions (χࣘᐸ) for rapid response to “suddenly occurring incidents” (ケਁ

һԦ), in particular as a check against major incidents of unrest. These units, although they were 

distributed to numerous locations around China, remained directly subordinated to the PAP 

Headquarters.8 

Table 1: Units Directly Subordinate to the PAP 

PAP Unit Location 

8610 Jinzhou, Liaoning 

8620 Xingcheng, Huludao, Liaoning 

8630 Tianjin 

8640 Dingzhou, Baoding, Hebei 

8650 Jinzhong, Shanxi 

8660 Yining, Xinjiang 

8670 Pingliang, Gansu 

8680 Kashi, Xinjiang 

8690 Yixing, Jiangsu 

8710 Putian, Fujian 

8720 Wuxi, Jiangsu 

8730 Leiyang, Hunan 

8740 Nanchong, Sichuan 

8750 Mengzi, Yunnan 

Basic Organization of the PAP Leadership Today 

The formal organizational structure of the PAP forces still reflects their continued internal 

division and the inherently amalgamated nature of the force. China’s National Defense 2006

provided a broad analysis of the nature of the government, public security, and military 

leadership over the PAP today.9

The PAP is described as one component of China’s “armed forces,” and is subordinate to 

China’s State Council. The State Council and the CMC exercise dual leadership over the PAP. 

Organizationally, the State Council’s leadership is carried out through the Ministry of Public 

 

8

 An Zheng, Zhongguo Jingcha Zhidu Yanjiu, pg. 93. The unit locations listed in this table are based on the October 

2011 edition of the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, pp. 91-94. Blasko (2012, pp. 111 & 254, fns. 42, 43), 

citing the 2010 Directory of PRC Military Personalities and reports from Hong Kong’s Information Center for 

Human Rights and Democratic Movement, notes that at least a portion of the 8680 unit, originally based in Gongyi, 

Henan, was moved to Kashi in Xinjiang to assist in handling the July 5, 2009 Urumqi riots, but that April 2011 

reports indicate the unit was returning to Henan. 

9

 State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006. 
440 

Security and other “functional departments,” in particular the ministries and bureaus that direct 

policy for the economic areas relevant to the PAP’s specialized economic units (e.g. Forestry, 

Transport, Gold, and Hydropower). The State Council is also responsible for the PAP’s budget 

and its size and number of internal units. The CMC, in turn, is responsible for PAP personnel 

issues, including the “management of officers, command, training and political work.” As noted 

above, this leadership is exercised largely through the PLA’s four general departments. The 

Ministry of Public Security, according to the White Paper, exercises “leadership and command” 

over the PAP General Headquarters with regard to carrying out public security operations and in 

terms of developing the PAP’s “relevant capabilities” in this area. The White Paper indicates that 

the PAP’s provincial and local-level units (e.g. contingents, detachments, and below) are 

likewise under the “leadership and command” of public security departments at the same 

administrative level, although this source makes no effort to clarify how local public security 

leadership and command relate to the forms of military management, command, training and 

political work noted above.10

Broadly, the PAP is composed of three main categories of units, each with a distinctive 

leadership structure. These are: (1) the Internal Guards (޵ছ) units; (2) four specialized 

economic security units, including transportation (Ӕ䙊), forestry (἞᷇), hydropower (≤⭥), 

and gold (哴䠁) units, and (3) three types of security units that fall under the leadership of the 

public security system, including border security (䗩䱢), firefighting (⎸䱢), and guard or 

bodyguard (䆖ছ) units. 

Although PAP units have ranks equivalent to various PLA units, their organizational structure 

has continued to follow the PRC’s state administrative structure. At the Central level is the PAP 

Headquarters (zongbu; ᙫ䜘). Each of China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and provinciallevel directly-administered municipalities has a PAP contingent ( ᙫ䱏). Each of China’s 

prefectural or municipal-level units have PAP detachments (᭟䱏) and each of China’s county 

level administrative units have either PAP battalions (བྷ䱏) or companies (ѝ䱏).11

 

 

10 Ibid. 

11 A 2001 public security source notes that in addition to this administrative structure, when work responsibilities 

require, the PAP can also establish directly subordinate PAP Detachments that are under PAP contingents and 

accept their direct leadership. These Detachments, in turn, are permitted to establish their own battalions, companies, 

platoons (pai) and squadrons (ban). Gao Wenying, pg. 13. 
441 

Table 2: PAP Organization 

Administrative Level Corresponding PAP Unit 

Central Level Headquarters (ᙫ䜘) 

Provincial Level (inc. Autonomous Regions and 

Directly Administered Municipalities) 

Contingent (ᙫ䱏) 

Municipal/Prefectural Level (inc. Autonomous 

Zhou and Meng) 

Detachment (᭟䱏) 

Country Level (inc. County-Level Cities, Districts, 

and Qi) 

Battalion (བྷ䱏) or Company (ѝ䱏) 

Township Police Station ( ⍮ࠪᡰ ), only in PAP Border 

Defense units. 

PAP General Headquarters (wujing zongbu) 

The formal organizational structure of the PAP Headquarters appears to have remained relatively 

stable over the past decade. 12 The PAP General Headquarters is the PAP’s leadership and 

command organ, and, in turn, operates under the leadership of China’s State Council and the 

Central Military Commission. Its primary responsibility, according to public security sources, is 

to lead and manage the military, political, and logistical work of the PAP Internal Guards Forces, 

and provide guidance rather than leadership, of the military, political, and logistical work of 

other forces in the PAP order of battle.13 PAP General Headquarters is divided into three main 

departments—the Command Department (ਨԔ䜘), Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) and the 

Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘). This report found no authoritative evidence that the PAP ever 

emulated the top levels of the PLA leadership and established an Armaments Department (㻵༷

䜘) at a rank equivalent to its command, political, and logistics departments, nor did it uncover 

any explanation as to why this is the case.14 Some sources indicate, however, that the PAP 

Command Department has a subdepartment called the armaments department (㻵༷䜘), but this 

does not appear to hold the rank equivalent to the other three main departments. The PAP 

General Headquarters itself holds rank equivalent to deputy military region (ߋ࢟४㓗).15

 

12 Compare the discussion of the organization in this section with the table in Murray Scot Tanner, “The Institutional 

Lessons of Disaster: Reorganizing the People’s Armed Police after Tiananmen,” in Mulvenon and Yang, eds. The 

People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume v1.0, pg. 634. 13 Gao Wenying, pg. 13. 

14 The reasons for the non-establishment of an armaments department are of some interest, because available source 

material indicates that since Tiananmen and the 1995 reorganization, the PLA’s three (now four) general 

departments have been one of the major leadership vehicles through which the PLA has maintained its influence 

over the development of the PAP. 

15 The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (Zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingcha), June 13, 2011, 

www.360doc.com/content/11/0613/02/5257523 126539508.shtml. (Hereafter “Chinese People’s Armed Police 

Force (2011).” The author is indebted to Ken Allen of DGI for introducing him to this source; Chinese People’s 

Armed Police Force History Department, ed., Yearbook of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, 1999, 

(zhongguo wujing nianjian 1999 nian), (Beijing, Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1999) (Hereafter “PAP Yearbook 1999”). 
442 

Command Department 

The PAP General Headquarters Command Department (ਨԔ䜘)

16 holds the rank of a deputy 

military region. It is comprised of at least 11 identified departments, bureaus, or offices (most of 

which, like the Headquarters itself, are also referred to by the bureaucratic rank of “bu”): the 

General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ ), Operations Department (֌ᡈ䜘), Intelligence Department (ᛵᣕ䜘), 

Confidential Work Department (χ㾱䜘), Management Bureau (㇑⨶ተ ), Police Affairs 

Department (䆖࣑䜘 ), Training Department (䇝㓳䜘), Police Branches Department (䆖⿽䜘 ),17

Communications Department (䙊ؑ䜘 ), Armaments Department or Technology and Equipment 

Department (㻵༷䜘 or ᢰδ㻵༷䜘 ),18 Policy Research Office (᭯ᅙ⹄ウᇔ), and other 

directly subordinate work departments (ⴤ኎ᐕ֌䜘).19

While the PAP Headquarters (HQ) has direct command over its internal guards units, it has also 

established command departments for each of the four PAP specialized economic forces 

(transport, hydropower, forestry, and gold). The PAP HQ shares “dual leadership” over these 

forces with their corresponding state ministries—respectively, the Ministries of Transport and 

Hydropower, and the State Bureaus for Forestry and Gold Industry Management. These 

command departments are the PAP Transportation Command Department (↖䆖䙊ᤷᥕ䜘), the 

PAP Hydropower Command Department (↖䆖≤⭥ᤷᥕ䜘), the PAP Forestry Command 

Department (↖䆖἞᷇ᤷᥕ䜘), and the PAP Gold Command Department (↖䆖哴䠁ᤷᥕ䜘).20

Each of these commands, in turn, oversees either numbered or provincially-based specialized 

PAP corps (ᙫ䱏).21

Political Department 

General Headquarters Political Department (᭯⋫䜘) like the Command Department holds the 

rank of a deputy military region. Chinese sources identify at least 13 departments and organs 

 

16 Some scholars of the PAP writing in English translate the name of this department as the “PAP HQ Headquarters 

Department.” Solely for stylistic reasons, to avoid repetition of the word “headquarters,” this paper translates siling

bu as “command department.” 

17 The Police Branches Department and the PAP Forestry Command Department are noted in “State Forestry Bureau 

and People’s Armed Police Headquarters Hold New Years Symposium”˄ഭᇦ᷇ъተо↖䆖ᙫ䜘Ѯ㹼ᯠ᱕ᓗ

䈸˅, January 20, 2009, www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/344/content-6051.html. 18 An older, more clearly authoritative source (PAP Yearbook 1999, pg. 452) identifies a Technology and 

Equipment Department (jishu zhuangbei bu), while the more recent source (Chinese People’s Armed Police Force 

[2011]) identifies an “equipment department” (junshi jiaotong bu). It is possible these may be two separate 

departments, but it is also possible that these may be the same department referred to by two different names at 

different times. 

19 Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (2011); PAP Yearbook, 1999, p. 452. 

20 “Ministry of Land Resources and PAP Headquarters Jointly Develop Master Plan for Transformation and 

Development of PAP Gold Corps,” ഭ൏䍴K䜘о↖䆖ᙫ䜘ޡ䈻↖䆖哴䠁䜘䱏䖜රਁኅབྷ䇑, June 13, 2012, 

www.mlr.gov.cn /xwdt/jrxw/201206/t20120613_1109596.htm; “Introduction to the People’s Liberation Army 

Types of Military Forces” (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋ⿽ӻ㓽) Dongnan University Air Force Reserve website, November 

5, 2012, http://gfs.seu.edu.cn/s/269/t/2037/0d/73/i/2/info68979.htm 

21 On these ministries and dual leadership, see Changsha City Public Security Bureau website, “Enforcing the Law: 

China’s Police Types” ( ᢗ⌅˖ѝഭⲴ䆖⿽ , 䮯⋉ᐲޜᆹተ䰘ᡧ㖁ㄉ ), July 30, 2012, 

www.hncsga.gov.cn/hdjl/jsch/201207/t20120730_349550.htm; also Liaoning Huludao Public Security Bureau 

website, “China’s Police Types,”( ѝഭ䆖ሏⲴ⿽学 ) December 30, 2011, 

www.lg.hldgaj.gov.cn/E_ReadNews.asp?NewsID=905. 
443 

under the Political Department: the General Office (ޜ࣎ᇔ), Organization Department (㓴㓷䜘), 

Cadres Department (ᒢ䜘䜘), Propaganda Department (ᇓՐ䜘), Security Department (؍ছ䜘), 

Liaison Department (㚄㔌䜘), Retired Cadres Department (㘱ᒢ䜘䜘), Discipline Inspection 

Department and Supervision Department (㓚ỰỰḕ䜘), Culture Department (᮷ॆ䜘), Mass 

Work Department (㗔ᐕ䜘), PAP Military Courts (↖䆖ߋһ⌅䲒), PAP Procuratorate (↖䆖ߋ

һỰሏ䲒), and the People’s Armed Police Publishing House (Ӫ≁↖䆖ࠪ⡸矢).22 

A 2009 PAP volume on political work stresses that the PAP’s Political work and its Political 

Departments are led by the PLA General Political Department, the PAP Party Committee(s), and 

its Commissars.23 The CCP’s “work organs” within the armed police are the PAP political 

organs. These are responsible for guiding Party activities within the PAP, including leading Party 

building, the construction of Party branches, the education and development of Party members, 

Party discipline inspection and work-style education, and carrying out the Party line. 

PAP units at and above the level of the zhidui (tuan) establish political organs that manage the 

Party’s work within the unit. They are also responsible for leading the political work of the PAP 

units subordinate to them. Most PAP political organs set up at least six professional departments, 

which parallel the key offices in the PAP HQ’s Political Department: 

x Organization department 

x Cadres 

x Propaganda 

x Security 

x Discipline Inspection 

x Secretariat and Mass Relations 

One example of the strengthening of military-style political organization that was specific to the 

PAP that occurred following Tiananmen and the 1995 reorganization was the establishment in 

1997 of a system of PAP military courts and PAP military procuratorates, as distinct from either 

China’s civilian or military judicial institutions. The PAP Party Committee and PAP 

Headquarters Political Department lead the work of these PAP military legal investigatory and 

judicial organs—the People’s PAP Corps Military Procuratorate the People’s PAP Corps 

Military Court. The PAP Procuratorate accepts professional guidance—but apparently not actual 

leadership—from the PLA Military Procuratorate, while the PAP Court likewise receives 

professional guidance from the PLA Military Court.24 

 

22 Qin Huaibao, et al, Concepts of Political Work in the Chinese People’s Armed Police (Zhongguo Wujing 

Zhengzhi Gongzuo Gailun; ), (Beijing, Renmin Wujing Chubanshe, 2009), pp. 376-377; Zhongguo Junshi Baike 

Quanshu (Di Er Ban), Xueke Fence, Jundui Zhengfa Gongzuo (China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition) 

Curriculum Set, Military Political-Legal Work), (Beijing, Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshe, 2006),pp. 44-45, 

92-93; Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (2011); PAP Yearbook, 1999, pg. 453. 23 Qin Huaibao (2009), pp. 376-377. 

24 Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu (Di Er Ban), Xueke Fence, Jundui Zhengfa Gongzuo (China Military 

Encyclopedia (Second Edition) Curriculum Set, Military Political-Legal Work), (Beijing, Zhongguo Dabaike 

Quanshu Chubanshe, 2006),pp. 44-45, 92-93. This source appears to indicate that the jurisdiction of these courts in 

limited to the non-public security portions of the PAP force—the internal guards forces, the gold, forestry, 

hydropower, and transport forces. 
444 

Logistics Department 

The PAP General Headquarters Logistics Department (ਾऔ䜘) holds a lower rank than that of 

the Command and Political Departments, that of a corps leader grade unit (↓ߋ㓗). Within it, at 

least ten departments have been identified: the Ordnance Department ( ߋỠ䜘), 25 Finance 

Department (䍒࣑䜘), Transport Department (䘀䗃䜘 or ߋһӔ䙊䜘),26 Barracks Department 

(㩕ᡯ䜘), Petroleum and Lubricants Department (⋩ᯉ䜘), Medical/Sanitation Department (ছ

⭏䜘), Uniforms and Clothing Department (㺕㻵䜘), Supply Department (㔉ޫ䜘), Materials 

Department (⢙䍴䜘), and an Auditing Department (ᇑ䇑䜘). 

At lower administrative levels of the system, the PAP border defense, fire-fighting, and 

guards/bodyguards PAP units under public security leadership have financial supervision, 

oversight and auditing structures essentially akin to public security units—again suggesting a 

good deal of local Party and government control over at least these aspects of their logical work. 

According to public security materials, in 1994, “based on the public security border defense, 

fire-fighting, and guards corps having been withdrawn from (㝡⿫) the leadership of the People’s 

Armed Police forces,” and placed under separate financial listing of the state financial system, 

the MPS Auditing Office established a separate auditing branch for these “active duty” public 

security forces. The MPS has continued issuing auditing directives for these three units since.27

 

Command and Leadership in the PAP Law Debate 

In 2009 the PAP’s longstanding issues of institutional leadership and control again came to the 

fore during the debate over the passage of the PAP Law, and prompted a major revision in the 

draft law that ultimately kicked the issue down the road for the State Council and CMC to deal 

with at a later date. Available data on local emergency regulations, however, indicate that 

Chinese authorities have handled this issue since 2009 by reverting, at least formally and 

temporarily, to a relatively strict version of mid to late 1990s State Council and Central Military 

Commission joint directives governing how and when local governments and Party committees 

can mobilize and activate PAP units in the event of social unrest or other emergencies. 

The formal drafting process for the PAP Law began in 1995, when the first proposal for drafting 

such a law was submitted before the National People’s Congress, and many legislators indicate 

that the drafting process took more than a decade. In November 2002, the PAP Party Committee 

put forward a legislative proposal to the Central Military Commission. 28 The drafting committee, 

 

25 One source gives the name of this department as the jun xu bu (possibly military requirements department). 

Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (2011). 26 An older, more clearly authoritative source (PAP Yearbook, 1999, pg. 454) identifies a transport department 

referred to as the yunshu bu. A more recent source (Chinese People’s Armed Police Force [2011]) identified a 

“military transportation department” (junshi jiaotong bu). These may refer to the same department under different 

names at different times. 

27 Guo Ying, Public Security Auditing (Gongan Shenji; ޜᆹᇑ䇑), (2004 Beijing, People’s Public Security 

University Press), pp. 8-9. According to this same source, the MPS issued further directives for these units in 

September 2003. 

28 “Wujing Budui Silingyuan jiu ‘Wujing Fa’ Zhiding deng Wenti Da Jizhe Wen,” (The Commander of the People’s 

Armed Police Answers Reporters Questions on the Law’s Drafting and Other Topics), April 27, 2009, at 

www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-08/28/content_1403586.htm; on the length of the drafting process and the involvement of all 
445 

which was formed by the PAP Headquarters, apparently included officials from the CCP Central 

Political-Legal Committee, the CMC’s Legal Affairs Bureau (⌅ࡦተ), the National People’s 

Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (NPC/SC) Legal Committee and the NPC/SC Legislative 

Affairs Commission, the State Council Legal Affairs Bureau, and the Legal System Bureau of 

the Ministry of Public Security. At the outset of 2003, the PAP Law was placed on the legislative 

plan of the CMC. The proposal began being included in the State Council’s legislative plan in 

2007, and in 2008 it was first added to the legislative plan of the National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee. The Eighth meeting of the Eleventh NPC Standing Committee gave the 

law its first reading and review in April 2009, and it was passed by the Standing Committee on 

August 27 of that year. 29

According to then-Commander of the PAP General Wu Shuangzhan, China needed to draft the 

PAP Law to provide a clear, unified, and legal basis for the PAP’s organization and activities. 

Wu noted that in the years since the modern PAP was established in 1983, its command structure 

and responsibilities had only rested upon “Party Central documents, PLA- and PAP-related 

regulations, and some relevant regulations within a few State-promulgated laws.” Many of these 

regulations, Wu noted, are of a relatively high level of secrecy, in particular directives such as 

those regarding PAP use of firearms during mass protests and riots. So it was important to 

transform those regulations and clauses that could be openly published into a public law.30

Debates over leadership and control over the PAP became more public when the April 2009 draft 

was reviewed and discussed by the NPC/SC. The April draft, in contrast to the 1995 State 

Council-CMC directive, contained only a few relatively brief clauses concerning which units of 

government had the authority to mobilize PAP units in response to a crisis. As the debate among 

the NPC/SC delegates made clear, the law was never intended to fully replace CMC and State 

Council regulations as a guide for mobilizing the PAP. But in keeping with the 1995 CMC-State 

Council regulations, the draft did preserve the authority of local governments to activate PAP 

forces when they were needed, and specified that governments down to the county level could 

mobilize the PAP.31 In doing so, however, the draft used language that was less explicit than the 

1995 or 1980s regulations. The April 2009 language simply noted implicitly that there would be 

 these Central organizations, see the comments of NPC Standing Committee members discussing the draft in April 

2009, at www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500332.htm. 

29 “Wujing Budui Silingyuan jiu ‘Wujing Fa’ Zhiding deng Wenti Da Jizhe Wen,” (The Commander of the People’s 

Armed Police Answers Reporters Questions on the Law’s Drafting and Other Topics), April 27, 2009, at 

www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-08/28/content_1403586.htm. 

30 “Wujing Budui Silingyuan jiu ‘Wujing Fa’ Zhiding deng Wenti Da Jizhe Wen,” (The Commander of the People’s 

Armed Police Answers Reporters Questions on the Law’s Drafting and Other Topics), April 27, 2009, at 

www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-08/28/content_1403586.htm. 

31 National People’s Congress Standing Committee “Full Text and Legislative Explanation of the People’s Armed 

Police Law (Draft),” [Renmin Wuzhuang Jingcha Fa (Cao’an) Quanwen ji Shuoming, Ӫ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ⌅˄㥹Ṹ˅ޘ

᮷৺䈤᰾ ]. Hereafter in this paper this draft is referred to here as the “April 2009 PAP Law Draft.” No English 

translation of this draft was apparently issued, and all translations in this paper are by the authors. The original 

source is reportedly the NPC/SC as issued through the NPC’s China People’s Congress Net (ѝഭӪབྷ㖁 ), and the 

original date of publication (ਁᐳᰕk) is listed as April 28, 2009. Directions issued along with the draft indicate 

that this draft was debated by the Eleventh NPC Standing Committee at its Eighth Meeting, and that comments on 

this draft are to be returned to the NPC Standing Committee or its Legal Committee in Beijing no later than May 31, 

2009. This draft was re-posted in 2009 on the website of the Qingdao City People’s Congress Standing Committee, 

at http://rdcwh.qingdao.gov.cn/n8146584/n8152591/n8153590/8381107.html. 
446 

times when county-level and higher government and police authorities would need to activate the 

PAP. The April 2009 draft language, however, made clear that other presumably unpublished 

directives from the State Council and CMC existed or would be issued in the future, and that 

these would more clearly define the circumstances and authority relationships required for 

activating the PAP than the text of the PAP law would. Article 7 of the April Draft made clear 

that when local authorities did activate the PAP, they were required to do so in compliance with 

these other State Council-CMC Directives. Moreover, the April 2009 draft echoed recent trends 

in civilian police regulations that recognized the tendency of some authorities to abuse their 

power and issue illegal orders to police, and strengthened police powers to resist such orders. 

The April 2009 draft authorized PAP forces to refuse any such illegal orders, and report them up 

their chains of command. Article Seven of the April draft read as follows: 

At times when county-level or higher People’s Governments and their Public 

Security organs must activate and employ People’s Armed Police Forces to carry 

out security protection duties, they must act strictly in accordance with the limits 

of authority for approval and procedures as regulated by the State Council and 

the Central Military Commission. 

No organization or individual is permitted to activate or employ People’s Armed 

Police forces in violation of regulations. In the event that any [organization or 

individual] illegally activates or employs the People’s Armed Police forces, the 

People’s Armed Police forces should refuse to carry out [these orders], and 

should immediate report this to superior levels. 

Article 7 sparked significant debate and several calls for revision among the NPC/SC delegates, 

according to online NPC records of the April 2009 meeting.32 Some delegates supported the 

wording as is. But several clearly objected to this authority being granted to officials at the 

county level. Some argued that China presently faced enormous numbers of mass protests, most 

of which were motivated by legitimate popular grievances (“contradictions among the people”), 

and they feared that county officials might be tempted to misuse the PAP to suppress these 

protests in ways that would only exacerbate these protests and make local tensions even worse. 

These delegates cited longstanding official Central policy on the handling of “mass incidents” to 

the effect that, while the state needed the capability to respond to dangerous riots and protests 

with force when necessary, the preferred way of dealing with such incidents was by encouraging 

local officials to consult with protestors, deal with real problems, and engage in patient, nonviolent, educational and propaganda work. If it were too easy for county level officials to 

 

32 These NPC Standing Committee discussions were originally posted on the China People’s Congress Network 

(Zhongguo Renda Wang) in Fall 2008 and Spring 2009. These Chinese language summaries include short, 

paragraph length statements by participants in the subgroup discussion. The summaries consulted for this paper 

were obtained at the following sites: www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500332.htm; 

www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500329.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-

04/29/content_1500328.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500325.htm; 

www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500323.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-

04/29/content_1500320.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/fzjzf/2008-11/18/content_1458795.htm; 

www.npc.cn/huiyi/lfzt/rmwzjcf/node_9948.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/rmwzjcf/2009-

04/16/content_1497940.htm; www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500327.htm; 
447 

mobilize PAP forces, these delegates insinuated, local officials would be too likely to rely on 

force as their first option. 

One delegate, Bai Keming, captured a number of these themes in his comment on the draft: 

Regarding this question of whether or not it is necessary to mobilize the police 

forces, we must certainly be careful. Because right now a large number of 

[incidents] are contradictions among the people; concerning mass incidents, the 

overwhelming majority are also contradictions among the people. Regarding 

these contradictions among the people, when we handle them, we must to a 

greater degree do ideological work and educational work; but at times when it is 

necessary, we must also decisively use police force, and prevent these situations 

from turning more evil. From the standpoint of our work practice, we must 

decide with great care whether or not to deploy the police force. I believe it is not 

good to take such an authority and devolve it to the level of the county 

[authorities]; the authority for mobilizing police force should be retained at the 

two levels of the province and the municipality [district]. These days, 

communications and information [flows] are extremely developed, and the two 

levels of the province and the municipality [district] can get a grasp on what is 

going on with a suddenly-occurring incident very quickly. So entrusting the 

decision on whether or not to mobilize police forces to a somewhat higher 

[administrative] level is a little more stable and appropriate.33

Some NPC/SC officials cited more narrowly administrative and organizational objections to the 

draft language in Article 7. They noted that the State Council, Central Military Commission, and 

PAP Headquarters had, over the years, already adopted a number of relatively detailed 

regulations governing the deployment and mobilization of the PAP. At least one delegate noted 

that the draft law was not specific enough about which local government units would actually 

have the authority to deploy PAP units—the local government collective leadership, the county 

government head, the county public security chief, etc. Broadly, the largest number of delegates 

whose comments were reported favored drafting the authority to mobilize the PAP much more 

narrowly and strictly, and granting it only to government officials at the provincial and perhaps 

the municipal/district level, but not to county level officials.34

When the NPC approved the final draft of the PAP Law in August, these arguments were taken 

on board, and the version of Article Seven contained in the April Draft had been dropped.35 In its 

 

33 See www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-04/29/content_1500327.htm. 

34 This point was particularly prominent in the April 29 NPC/SC subgroup session on the PAP’s duties and 

institutional authorities and responsibilities (ޣҾӪ≁↖㻵䆖ሏⲴԫ઼࣑㙼䍓——࠶㓴ᇑ䇞Ӫ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ⌅㥹

Ṹਁ䀰᪈ⲫ [ ഋ ]). See People’s Congress Network at www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-

04/29/content_1500327.htm. 

35 Apparent Text of PRC Armed Police Law Adopted at NPC Session 27 Aug. CPP20090827172011 Beijing 

Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese 1317 GMT 27 Aug 09. [Apparent text of the Law of the People’s Republic of 

China on the People’s Armed Police, approved at the 10th Session of the 11th National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee on 27 August 2009]. Beijing, 27 Aug (Xinhua) -- Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 

People’s Armed Police [PAP] (Approved at the 10th Session of the 11th National People’s Congress [NPC] 

Standing Committee on 27 August 2009) 
448 

place was an Article Eight that omitted the wording that had made clear that county-level 

governments and public security departments had the authority to activate and employ PAP units, 

as had been the case in the 1980s and the 1995 State Council-CMC directive. In its place, the 

PAP Law asserted that any deployment or employment of PAP forces had to be carried out in 

accordance with “the principles of strict review and approval and law governed policing.” But 

the law did not indicate the legal documents or Party-state directives in which these “principles” 

were defined. And most importantly, in lieu of a clear or even implicit grant of authority to local 

government officials to activate and employ PAP, the Law issued a vague promise that the State 

Council and CMC would issue “specific approval powers and procedures”: 

 

Article 8 The principles of strict review and approval and law-governed policing 

shall be adhered to in deploying and using PAP units to carry out security tasks. 

Specific approval powers and procedures shall be prescribed by the State 

Council and the CMC. 

No units or individuals may deploy or use PAP units in violation of rules and 

regulations. In the event they are deployed and put to use in violation of rules 

and regulations, PAP units shall refuse to carry out tasks and immediately report 

the situation to higher levels. 

Although the final PAP Law did not endorse the authority of local governments and public 

security forces to mobilize PAP units on their own, other sections of the law did reaffirm 

previous grants of authority for these local officials at the county level and above to deploy and 

command PAP units supporting Public Security, State Security, and other operations within their 

region. For example Article 10 of the final law, like Article Nine of the April 2009 Draft, 

enumerated several types of actions that PAP units would be permitted to carry out when they 

were acting as part of “deployments” planned by county-level and higher local governments and 

public security units—thereby recognizing that PAP units would act under the guidance and 

arrangements of these local authorities. In revising the law from the April to the final draft, this 

list of actions remained virtually unchanged and was not narrowed in any way. Most importantly, 

these tasks, listed below, included dispersing crowds that threatened social order: 

Article 10: PAP units may take the following measures when carrying out 

security tasks according to plans made by the public security agencies of 

people’s governments at or above the county level: 

1. Inspecting personnel, articles, and conveyances in security areas and 

stopping those that are not permitted to enter or exit pursuant to rules and 

regulations and taking necessary measures to stop those that forcibly enter or 

leave the areas; 

2. Questioning on the spot or checking the documents of people suspected 

of breaking the law or committing crimes and inspecting suspicious articles and 

conveyances during armed patrols with the consent of their commanders on the 

scene; 

3. Assisting in enforcing road traffic control or control on the scene; 

4. Taking necessary measures to stop or disperse crowds that gather to 

endanger social order or the security of targets of protection services; and 
449 

5. Learning related information from relevant units and personnel or 

conducting necessary surveillance on the scene as required for the performance 

of duties. 

The final draft of the law also retained the authority for PAP units to decline to carry out illegal 

orders and to report these to higher levels. 

Some Chinese legal officials contend that the State Council-CMC dual leadership system 

endorsed by the PAP Law did not represent a major departure from past practice. Speaking right 

after the law’s passage, NPC/SC official Wang Shangxin described the dual leadership system as 

the one that the PAP had been practicing for many years, and said it had been proven appropriate 

for the PAP’s role through years of practice.36

Tuo Chengxiang, Director of the General Office in the PAP Headquarters, speaking in a 2009 

interview, described the division of leadership responsibilities between the State Council and the 

CMC this way. The State Council takes primary responsibility for assigning the PAP’s regular 

responsibilities, its scale, the number of PAP personnel, command, professional construction, its 

financial and material guarantees, and organizing and carrying out leadership of the PAP corps 

through the concerned professional departments. The CMC takes primary responsibility for the 

organizational structure of the PAP, management of its cadres, command training, political work, 

and carries out leadership over the PAP via the four general departments of the PLA.37

“Command divided by levels” means that local governments carry out command over the PAP 

forces at the corresponding level during security operations, but do so according to specific 

authorization and concrete procedures as directed by the State Council and CMC.38 The law 

itself does not further specify these Central-local command relationships. Then-PAP 

Commander Wu Shuangzhan, in an interview, stressed that the relationship permitted local 

governments and their public security forces to “reasonably” make use of PAP forces when 

needed. 39 A CCP Central Party School specialist cited in a Xinhua report argued that in an era of 

many mass protests, the law’s command relationships would help prevent local governments 

from capriciously or wantonly making use of the PAP.40

According to Chinese legislative practice, the detailed rules for enacting and enforcing a major 

law like the PAP Law would typically be embodied in a set of implementing regulations or 

 

36 This is according to NPC/SC Legislative Affairs Commission Criminal Law Office Director Wang Shangxin. Xin 

Jing Bao, August 28, 2009, at http://news.qq.com/a/20090828/000493.htm. 

37 “Expert Carefully Explains the Leadership Structure of the People’s Armed Police.” (zhuanjia xiangjie Wujing 

lingdao tizhi: Guowuyuan he Zhongyang shuangchong lingdao), August 27, 2009, 

http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/14957/53050/9941814. 

38 Tuo Chengxiang, PAP Gen. HQ General Office. “Expert Carefully Explains the Leadership Structure of the 

People’s Armed Police.” (zhuanjia xiangjie Wujing lingdao tizhi: Guowuyuan he Zhongyang shuangchong lingdao), 

August 27, 2009, http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/14957/53050/9941814. 

39 “The PAP Law, After Second Reading, is Passed. The Legislation Prevents Local Governments Capriciously 

Using the PAP,” (Wujing Fa Er Shen Ji Tongguo, Lifa Fang Difang Lanyong Wujing) Xinhua report, August 29, 

2009, reprinted in http://bzrb.newssc.org/html/2009-08-29/content_667711.htm. 40 “The PAP Law, After Second Reading, is Passed. The Legislation Prevents Local Governments Capriciously 

Using the PAP,” (Wujing Fa Er Shen Ji Tongguo, Lifa Fang Difang Lanyong Wujing) Xinhua report, August 29, 

2009, reprinted in http://bzrb.newssc.org/html/2009-08-29/content_667711.htm. 
450 

directives drafted by the key responsible bureaucracies—in this case the State Council and the 

Central Military Commission—in the months or years following the promulgation of the law. 

And following the PAP Law’s passage, some legal specialists called for precisely these sorts of 

detailed regulations to clarify the issues of which levels of government had the authority to 

mobilize the PAP and under what circumstances. Because major Chinese laws are typically very 

broadly written and vague, and critical issues of enforcement are often “kicked down the road,” 

the drafting process for these implementing regulations and directives can often take nearly as 

long as the process for drafting the original law. The research for this paper has not yet 

uncovered any evidence that new State Council-CMC directives have been issued since the PAP 

Law’s passage that define local Party and government authority for activating the PAP. This 

could be due to the secrecy of any such regulations, and it could just as easily be due to the 

difficulty of reaching agreement on any such regulations. 

But a review of several local government plans and directives on handling mass protests, riots, 

fires, and other crises that have been issued since the PAP Law’s passage reveals some of the 

rules and procedures by which some local authorities are permitted to activate the PAP, or obtain 

permission from higher levels for doing so. These plans and directives indicate that instead of 

drafting new regulations governing local authorities’ activation of the PAP, these localities are 

being asked to strictly comply with existing regulations that date back more than ten years. 

Municipal and county government emergency response plans issued in 2010-2012 include 

directions for employing both local public security and armed police forces. In the event local 

Party Committees and governments need to activate PAP forces, their plans require them to 

strictly comply with a pair of directives jointly in 1997. These directives are entitled “Notice of 

the CCP Central Committee General Office and the State Council General Office on Circulating 

‘Regulations Regarding Permission Authority for Deployments of People Armed Police Forces 

and Activation and Use of Forces’ and ‘Regulations Regarding Permission Authority for 

Deployments of People’s Armed Police Forces and Activation and Use of Forces in the Beijing 

Area’” (ѝޡѝཞޜ࣎঵ǃഭ࣑䲒ޜ࣎঵ޣҾঠਁ “ޣҾѝഭӪ≁ ↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏䜘㖢઼ޥ

࣋䈳ࣘ֯⭘ᢩ߶ᵳ䲀Ⲵ㿴ᇊ”઼ “ޣҾेӜൠ४ѝഭ Ӫ≁ ↖㻵䆖ሏ䜘䱏 䜘㖢઼࣋ޥ䈳ࣘ֯

⭘ᢩ߶ᵳ䲀Ⲵ㿴ᇊ”Ⲵ䙊⸕). The Document is numbered CCP Central Committee General 

Office Document No. 2 [1997].41

 

41 These 1997 Central Documents are referenced for activating PAP forces in the following local directives: ᖴਓ䭷

㗔փᙗ⋫ᆹһԦᓄᙕ༴㖞亴Ṹ (Jingkou Zhen Emergency Response Plan for Mass Public Security Incidents), 

dated October 9, 2011, at 

www.bobai.gov.cn/(S(yrmiqs45xqizlum2pprtgg55))/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?Id=3527; े豸ᐲ༴㖞བྷ㿴

⁑㗔փᙗһԦᓄᙕ亴Ṹ (Beipiao Municipality Emergency Response Plan for Containing Large Scale Mass 

Incidents), Published August 25, 2011, at www.bp.gov.cn/news/?id=9443; ⁚ኡ৯༴㖞ケਁޡޜһԦᓄᙕ亴Ṹ

(Hengshan County Response Plan for Handling Sudden Public Emergency Incidents) Issued August 28, 2010, 

available at Hengshan County Government website, 

http://hengshan.678114.com/Html/zhengfu/zhengwu/20100828CE3B1FFF.htm.; ᆹᓧᐲޜᆹχޣ༴㖞㗔փᙗ⋫

ᆹһԦᐕ֌亴Ṹ (Ankang Municipality Public Security Organs’ Work Plan for Controlling Mass Social Order 

Incidents), Issued July 8, 2010, at http://yjb.ankang.gov.cn/Article/class4/class20/201007/55.html. The 1997 

Central Directives are also referenced in the following emergency response plans, which either have unclear 

issuance dates, or were issued before the passage of the PAP Law. ⌠ᆹᐲབྷѝර≤ᓃ〫≁ਾkᢦᤱᐕ֌㗔փᙗ

һԦᓄᙕ༴㖞亴Ṹ (Taian Municipality Emergency Response Plan for Coping with Mass Incidents following 
451 

The research for this chapter has been unable to locate the full text of Central General Office 

Document No. 2 (1997). But the texts of these various local directives indicate that Document 

No. 2 (1997) contains a system for activating PAP forces that distinguishes different size and 

rank PAP forces, and prescribes different administrative levels of the Chinese system that are 

authorized to approve the activation of these units. 

The Hengshan directives note, for example, that 

In activating People’s Armed Police forces to take part in containing sudden 

social order incidents, strictly adhere to the directives in CCP Central General 

Office Document 2 (1997). If activating a squadron (ѝ䱏) or fewer than 100 

police, the City Party Committee and City Government must approve, and the 

case must be reported to the Shaanxi Provincial Public Security Bureau and the 

Shaanxi PAP General Corps. 

The Ankang Municipality directives prescribe a similar system, and notes criteria under which 

Central Public Security and PAP forces must be notified in the event of very large PAP 

deployments. 

In activating People’s Armed Police forces to take part in containing sudden 

social order incidents, strictly adhere to the directives in CCP Central General 

Office Document 2 (1997). If activating a squadron (ѝ䱏) or fewer than 100 

police, the City Party Committee and City Government must approve, and the 

case must be reported to the Shaanxi Provincial Public Security Bureau and the 

Shaanxi PAP General Corps. If activating a group (བྷ䱏) or more than 300 

police, the Provincial Public Security Bureau must approve, and the case must be 

reported to the Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial Government, and the 

Shaanxi PAP General Corps. If mobilizing a detachment (᭟䱏) or fewer than 

1,000 police, the Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government must 

approve, and the activation must be reported to the Ministry of Public Security 

and the PAP Headquarters. 

An examination of local government directives indicates that the State Council and Central 

Military Commission have issued different regulations governing the authority and procedures 

for local governments to mobilize PAP Gold, Forestry, Hydropower, and Transportation units. In 

2003 the Party Central Committee, the State Council and CMC issued “Directive of the CCP 

Central Committee General Office, the State Council General Office, and the Central Military 

Commission General Office Regarding Regulations on Permission Authority for Deployments, 

Activation, and Use of People Armed Police Forces Gold, Forestry, Hydropower, and 

Transportation Forces (Central General Office Document No. 14 [2003])” (ѝޡѝཞޜ࣎঵ǃ

ഭ࣑䲒ޜ࣎঵ǃѝཞߋငޜ࣎঵ޣҾѝഭӪ≁↖㻵䆖ሏ哴䠁ǃ἞᷇ǃ≤⭥ǃӔ䙊䜘䱏䜘㖢

઼࣋ޥ֯⭘ᢩ߶ᵳ䲀Ⲵ㿴ᇊ),NJ˄ѝ࣎ਁǒ2003Ǔ14 ਧ˅. The full text of this document is 

also, apparently, unavailable. But the available excerpts indicate that this document requires 

 Relocation of Persons Resulting from Large and Medium Scale Dam Construction), published at 

www.esafety.cn/Common/ShowDownloadUrl.aspx?urlid=0&id=59121. 
452 

local governments to first seek permission for emergency deployments from higher levels before 

sending these units to accompany public security forces (it does not indicate to which levels of 

local government this directive applies). In the event of extreme emergencies, and if the number 

of forces does not exceed a group (བྷ䱏) in size, localities may first deploy the units while 

simultaneously informing higher levels.42 It is unclear whether this directive is still being used 

for guidance by local authorities to clarify the uncertainties left by the 2009 PAP Law. 

Conclusion 

The process for drafting the 2009 People’s Armed Police Law reinvigorated longstanding 

debates over the optimal balance of Central and local leadership and command authority over the 

PAP. In particular, some officials were clearly concerned that lower level local officials—

especially county leaders—would abuse their authority to mobilize PAP forces to suppress 

demonstrators. It appears that in response, the PAP Law was revised so that it did not provide 

explicit legal authority for county and other local officials to mobilize the PAP. We have not yet 

found evidence that the State Council and Central Military Commission have—as the PAP Law 

suggests—issued any new directives on local mobilization of the PAP. Instead, a review of local 

emergency plans adopted since the PAP Law’s passage suggests higher level authorities may 

have settled, for now, for stricter enforcement of a mobilization system passed in 1997, under 

which county and municipal authorities have to seek approval from higher level Party and Public 

Security authorities before mobilizing relatively small PAP units. The number and rank of higher 

level authorities who must be consulted and/or notified if the PAP are to be notified appear to 

increase as the number of PAP forces to be mobilized increases. But Central authorities do not 

appear to have attempted to take authority all the way to Beijing, and for now appear to be 

comfortable with authority to mobilize small and medium size PAP forces nested at the 

provincial and municipal levels. 

 

42 ᬰ᷍㣡ᐲӪ≁᭯ᓌޜ࣎ᇔޣҾਁᥕ↖䆖἞᷇䜘䱏㙼㜭֌⭘Ⲵ᜿㿱˄ᬰ࣎ਁǒ2005Ǔ54 ਧ˅; posted at 

www.67863.cn/news/show.php?itemid=7766. 
453 

Chapter Thirteen: The PLA’s Wartime Structure 

Dean Cheng 

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a war since the 1979 war” with 

Vietnam. In the intervening 30 years, however, it recognizes that the nature of warfare has 

fundamentally changed, from conducting “Local Wars Under Modern Conditions,” to “Winning 

Local Wars Under Modern, High-Technology Conditions” to “Local Wars Under 

Informationized Conditions.” This evolution in how it conceives of future wars is a reflection of 

the broader array of changes in the nature of the global economy, technology, and society. As the 

latter aspects have evolved, so has the nature of warfare. 

Consequently, how the PLA prepares for future wars, including its command and control 

functions, has also had to evolve, in order to accommodate and adapt to the shifting nature of 

warfare. In this regard, the PLA has demonstrated that it is a learning organization. As it has 

observed and analyzed foreign wars of the past three decades, it has sought to incorporate lessons 

into its military theory (ߋһ⨶䇪), and from there to its organization (as well as its training and 

equipment). 

By examining how the PLA has written about the evolution in future wars, and as important how 

they conceive of command and control of future conflicts, it is possible to derive a sense of how 

the PLA would organize itself in the event of future conflict. This chapter will therefore examine 

changes in PLA doctrine, with particular attention on the growing importance of jointness, itself 

an evolving concept, and how that, in turn, has affected Chinese discussions of their wartime 

command and control structure. 

Evolving Concepts of Modern Warfare 

Since the early 1990s and the Gulf War, the PLA has been reforming its conception of how 

modern wars will be fought. In the wake of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, PLA theorists 

concluded that modern high technology had effected a fundamental shift in modern warfare. To 

accommodate these changes, the PLA in 1999 issued a new series of manuals and regulations to 

prepare itself to fight “local wars under modern, high-technology conditions (儈ᢰδᶑԦлተ

䜘ᡈҹ).” 

These “New Generation Operations Regulations (ᯠаԓ֌ᡈᶑԔ)”, which is the generic term 

for documents that include “essentials” (㓢㾱) and “regulations” (ᶑԔ), constituted a wholesale 

revision of operational doctrine, affecting every aspect of the PLA, from its conception of future 

wars to its training and organization. This new guidance on joint operations apparently was 

issued in at least two parts. 

The first is The Essentials of Joint Campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ѝഭӪ

≁䀓᭮ߋ㚄ਸᡈᖩ㓢㾱). These probably provide overall guidance as to the importance and 

method of undertaking joint operations.1 In addition, there are the “Joint Campaign Regulations” 

 

1

 Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, August 2001), p. 12. 
454 

(㚄ਸ֌ᡈᶑԔ). These Regulations likely provide not only more specific guidance on the 

conduct of joint campaigns, but also for training, logistics and maintenance support, and various 

aspects of “high-tech” combat, such as air defense. Together, these two sets of documents 

provide a common foundation for operational thinking by all arms of the PLA. As important, the 

service campaign regulations, as well as regulations for the Second Artillery and for support and 

logistics, were explicitly made subordinate to the joint campaign regulations. 2 Joint operations 

inform service-led, combined-arms operations, indicating that, to the PLA, joint operations are 

more important, and more decisive, than combined-arms operations. 3 

The issuance of these new Regulations occurred in the context of what the PLA perceived as a 

fundamental, global military transformation, characterized by the shift from “local war under 

modern conditions,” i.e., industrial-era warfare, towards “local war under modern, hightechnology conditions.” The new type of wars is marked by several key characteristics: 

x The quality as well as the quantity of weapons matters. The side with more 

technologically sophisticated weapons will be able to determine the parameters of the war 

and effectively control its scale and extent. 

x The battlefields associated with such wars are three-dimensional, and extend farther and 

deeper into the strategic rear areas of the conflicting sides. Consequently, military 

operations will occur over an ever broader physical space (including outer space), with 

fewer areas out of an opponent’s potential reach. 

x The war is typically marked by high operational tempos conducted around the clock, 

under all-weather conditions. 

x The fundamental approach to warfare is more complex. Local wars under modern, hightech conditions not only incorporate operations typical of local wars under modern 

conditions, but also place much greater emphasis on joint operations, while also 

incorporating more aerial combat, long-distance strike, and mobile operations. 

x Finally, the role of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) is 

paramount. C3I functions are essential to successful implementation of such wars; 

consequently, the ability to interfere with an opponent’s C3I functions also is much more 

important.4

 

In order to successfully engage in local wars under modern, high-tech conditions, the PLA 

promulgated the campaign basic guiding concept of “integrated operations, key point strikes.” 

The campaign basic guiding concept provides the fundamental theoretical basis for the planning 

 

2

 The term “؍䳌” does not seem to have a direct counterpart term in English. It encompasses a range of combat 

support and combat service support activities, such as camouflage, meteorological and hydrographic support, 

battlefield management, as well as some aspects of reconnaissance and intelligence. It is commonly linked to 

logistics (ਾऔ), as in “ਾऔо؍䳌,” but also touches on aspects of political work, equipment maintenance and 

security, financing, etc. Comprehensive Dictionary Editorial Committee, Comprehensive Dictionary, Military 

Volume (Shanghai, PRC: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 2003), pp. 27, 90. 3

 AMS Strategies and Campaigns Department, “New Developments in Campaign Theory,” Military Art (#4, 1999), 

p. 17. 

4

 Chinese Military Encyclopedia Committee, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. II, (Beijing, PRC: Academy of 

Military Science Publishing House, July 1997), pp. 126-127. Note that subsequent PLA writings have adopted the 

concept of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or C4ISR. 
455 

and organization of military campaigns, directing campaign training, planning weapon system 

and equipment research and production, and enunciating modern campaign practices.5

“Integrated Operations, Key Point Strikes”6

The campaign basic guiding concept as enunciated in the 2000 edition of The Science of 

Campaigns comprised two elements. 

“Integrated operations (ᮤփ֌ᡈ)” refers to the idea of integrating forces, domains, and 

activities. Ideally, the planning and conduct of campaigns should be undertaken as a holistic, 

integrated effort, with the participating forces, areas of operation, and types of activities all 

contributing towards a common objective, leading to victory. 

x Integrating forces entails not only employing land, sea, air, and Second Artillery forces, 

but all the elements of the armed forces, including the People’s Armed Police (PAP), 

reserve forces, and militia. It also entails integrating not only the armed forces, but also 

mobilizing such civilian and commercial resources as might be necessary. 

x Integrating domains or battlespaces involves, first, taking a holistic view of the land, sea, 

and air battlefields; but it also requires paying attention to both the front-line and rear 

areas. This is especially important in light of the greater reach of modern weapons, so 

that what was once the strategic depth is now vulnerable to aerial attack. It also means 

incorporating both outer space and the information realm (both the electromagnetic 

spectrum and computer networks) into a single concept of the battlespace. 

x Integrating campaign phases and activities allows PLA commanders to engage in the full 

range of offensive and defensive operations by all forces, in order to maximize the 

chances of defeating the enemy. This includes positional warfare, mobile warfare, and 

guerrilla warfare, as well as the full range of combat activities, such as air defense 

operations, air strikes, artillery and missile strikes, and electronic warfare. It also entails 

integrating combat and combat support and combat service support functions, including 

logistics support. 

With the integrated forces, the commander is expected to undertake “key point strikes (䟽⛩ᢃ

ࠫ).” That is, the commander is expected to strike at the most important vulnerabilities, at key 

moments, with a concentration of his best available forces. Key points are those parts of the 

enemy’s forces and infrastructure that bind together the “system of systems” that comprise 

modern militaries, effectively preventing them from effective interoperation. Typical “key points” 

include an opponent’s C4ISR infrastructure. Specific weapons are often a lower priority than the 

systems that target and allocate them. 

The objective is to paralyze an opponent, rather than necessarily to annihilate them. Indeed, a 

hallmark of local wars under modern, high-tech conditions is the prevalence of wars of paralysis, 

 

5

 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, Chief Editors, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense 

University Publishing House, 2000), p. 88. 

6

 This section draws upon Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National 

Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 88-101. 
456 

eclipsing wars of annihilation. What will keep an opponent paralyzed over the course of a 

campaign may evolve, however, and therefore, while “key point strikes” will be conducted 

throughout a campaign, the specific targets are likely to shift over its course. 

 

Joint Campaigns and Their Command Structure 

The ability to implement “integrated operations, key point strikes” relies on the conduct of joint 

operations (㚄ਸ֌ᡈ). The need for the PLA to be able to conduct joint operations was made 

apparent from Chinese observations of the first Gulf War, where American forces, in particular, 

implemented the doctrine of “AirLand Battle.” This entailed the close cooperation of air and 

ground forces, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

For the United States, the doctrine of AirLand Battle built upon a history of joint operations that 

dated back at least to the Second World War, when air-ground, air-naval, and ground-naval 

operations occurred regularly in all the theaters of war. This had been further encouraged, and 

even mandated, by the results of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which had made joint experience a 

prerequisite for promotion. 

For the PLA, however, joint operations were much more alien. PLA military experiences from 

the Chinese Civil War and the war against Japan, through the various conflicts in Korea, India, 

and Vietnam, had all been primarily land combat, with no naval and minimal air force 

participation. Much of the PLA’s training efforts in the 1980s had been focused on combined 

arms operations (ਸ਼֌ᡈ), involving greater cooperation between branches (ޥ(⿽, rather than 

across services (ߋ(⿽. Thus, the need for the PLA to shift to a more joint approach to warfare 

constituted a fundamental shift in its approach to warfare. 

Yet, the synergies exhibited by western forces through the conduct of joint operations were such 

as to make adopting a more joint approach to warfare imperative. Only by having the various 

services work together could the PLA hope to match potential opponents across the range of 

potential battlespaces, including not only the traditional land, sea, and air domains, but 

increasingly outer space and the electromagnetic sphere. Moreover, “local wars under modern, 

high-tech conditions” required a range of more specialized capabilities—not just armor units, 

fighter squadrons, and destroyer flotillas, but also special operations forces, psychological 

warfare units, etc.7

Consequently, the new regulations governing joint operations were apparently the capstone of 

the “New Generation Operations Regulations,” taking precedence over individual services’ 

campaigns.8 This reflected the much greater importance accorded joint operations over single 

service operations. 

For the PLA, “joint campaigns” are defined by four criteria: 

 

7

 Gao Hongchun, editor, National Defense Knowledge, National Defense Teaching Materials, Vol. III (Beijing, PRC: 

AMS Publishing, January 2003), pp. 127-130. 

8

 The PLA is comprised of the ground forces, navy, and air force as services ˄ߋ ˅⿽and the Second Artillery as 

an independent branch (ޥ(⿽. However, for the purposes this chapter, the use of the term “services” refers to all 

four elements. 
457 

x The campaign involves two or more services 

x Each service contributes a campaign juntuan (ᡈᖩߋഒ)-level of force, i.e., a group 

army, a military region air force, a fleet, a Second Artillery base 

x The campaign has a single, unified command structure 

x The command structure develops a single, unified campaign plan, which all the 

participating forces are obliged to follow.9

Contemporary Chinese writings suggest that there are various ways of categorizing joint 

campaigns. One is by offensive versus defensive joint campaigns. Another is by the types of 

forces involved. Still another is by the type of operations envisaged, such as island blockade 

campaigns, frontier counter-attack campaigns, etc.10 They can also be categorized by scale, 

which are described as: 

x Large-scale, or war zone, joint campaigns (བྷර˄ᡈ४˅㚄ਸᡈᖩ). These may be 

comprised of one or more war zones, and would involve large numbers of campaign 

juntuan and other forces.11 An island offensive campaign is likely to entail a large-scale, 

war zone joint campaign.12 

x Mid-scale, or war zone direction, joint campaigns (ѝර˄ᡈ४ᯩੁ˅㚄ਸᡈᖩ). These 

will be focused on a particular operational direction (֌ᡈᯩੁ) of a war zone. These 

may be part of a large-scale (war zone) joint campaign, or they may be conducted 

independently. A frontier area counter-attack campaign is cited as an example of a midscale, war zone direction joint campaign.13 

x Small-scale, or group army level, joint campaign (ሿර˄䳶ഒߋ㓗˅㚄ਸᡈᖩ). These 

would be on a particular strategic or campaign direction, and might involve smaller 

forces drawn from the various services. The Yijiangshan campaign in 1954-1955, which 

involved smaller forces than juntuan-level, is considered a small-scale, group army-level 

joint campaign.14 

 

 

9

 Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, 2001), p. 27, and Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, Chief Editors, The Science of Campaigns

(Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2000), pp. 385-386 . 

10 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 

2000), pp. 387-389, and Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of 

Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 28-29. 

11 “ᡈ४” can be translated as “war zone” or as “theater.” 12 Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, 2001), p. 102. 

13 Ibid., p. 103. 

14 Ibid., p. 29. 
458 

Military Regions and War Zones 

A military region (ߋ४) is a first-level military organization (ߋ䱏а㓗㓴㓷), generally 

established on a nation’s own territory, delineating a strategic area. Currently, China has seven 

military regions (MRs), which are directly subordinated to the Central Military Commission. 

Each MR has its own leadership and command organs (亶ሬᤷᥕχޣ(, subordinating a number 

of combat and support units. It will also have subordinate provincial military districts, military 

academies, and other military administrative entities. The MR’s leadership will be responsible 

for military affairs, military political work, military logistics and support work, and equipment 

support work within the MR. It will also be responsible for leading military-civilian relations, 

mobilization work, People’s Air Defense work, and battlefield construction. 

A war zone (ᡈ४) is an operational area, established either prior to a conflict or after its onset, 

and determined by national strategic intentions and military, political, economic, and geographic 

considerations, and which establishes boundaries for strategic planning, and within which one 

undertakes strategic missions (ᡈ⮕ԫ࣑(. It is also referred to as a strategic region (ᡈ⮕४), 

and is sometimes translated as “theater.” 15 

In essence, military regions appear to be peacetime administrative areas (e.g., provincial and 

autonomous region boundaries), responsible for the training of forces assigned to it, as well as a 

variety of supporting functions such as mobilization preparation, military-civilian relations, etc. 

War zones, on the other hand, appear to be more ad hoc, established in time of war or possibly 

crisis, and reflecting expected wartime conditions. War zones draw upon MRs’ resources (e.g., 

the forces within them, the command structures, and local, civilian assets that might be 

mobilized), but need not have the same boundaries as an MR. Moreover, a war zone will likely 

encompass extended air and seaspace beyond the peacetime boundaries of the People’s Republic 

of China, whereas MRs seem to be limited by peacetime boundaries. 

A headquarters structure will be established to direct operations within a war zone. That entity 

may be based upon the MR’s headquarters, but need not be. 

Directing any joint campaign will be a unified command structure. In 1999, and again in 2006, 

The Science of Campaigns distinguishes between joint campaigns (㚄ਸᡈᖩ) and service 

specific campaigns. For service-specific campaigns, such as mobile land campaigns, naval 

blockade campaigns, and air defense campaigns, the command structure can be based upon the 

existing service headquarters. But for joint campaigns, such as landing and anti-landing 

campaigns, it is necessary to have a truly joint command system, (㚄ਸᤷᥕփࡦ (to formulate 

and implement the unified campaign plan, because no individual service takes precedence. Such 

systems will usually have a joint campaign command headquarters (JCCH/㚄ਸᡈᖩᤷᥕ䜘) as 

the top tier of the overall joint campaign command system. To this end, PLA writings suggest 

that these joint campaign command systems will vary in size, corresponding to the expected 

scale of the joint campaign.16 

 

15 Comprehensive Dictionary Editorial Committee, Comprehensive Dictionary, Military Volume (Shanghai, PRC: 

Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 2003), p. 67. 

16 Gao Yubiao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, 2001), p. 29. 
459 

The largest joint campaign command structure, consistent with a large-scale, or war zone joint 

campaign, will be comprised of three tiers. At the top will be the JCCH. In some cases of such 

large-scale joint campaign headquarters, it may be manned by personnel drawn from the 

Supreme Command (㔏ᐵ䜘), i.e., from the General Departments themselves, primarily the 

General Staff Department, as well as the service headquarters, i.e., PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, 

and Second Artillery headquarters.17 This form would appear to be associated with situations 

involving more than one war zone. 18 

Alternatively, a three tier, large-scale JCCH may start with personnel drawn from the constituent 

MR headquarters, including the MR’s Operations Department staff, MR’s constituent service 

component headquarters staff, as well as other MR organs (e.g., political work, logistics work). 

They may then be augmented by personnel dispatched from the Supreme Command (both 

General Department and service headquarters personnel. This form would seem to arise if only 

one war zone is involved.19 

Beneath the JCCH, the second command tier in a large-scale joint campaign command system 

may be either a war zone direction (ᡈ४ᯩੁ) command structure (ᤷᥕχʃ), or a command 

structure drawn from a service’s staff.20 Finally, the lowest tier of the three-tier joint command 

structure will be the campaign-level juntuan command section. This will be drawn from the 

command staff of the most involved service. 

A two-tier campaign command structure would be created for a war zone direction joint 

campaign (ᡈ४ᯩੁ㚄ਸᡈᖩ) will typically be led by a two-tier campaign command structure. 

The top JCCH tier is typically comprised of staff drawn from the war zone command staff, and 

participating services’ command staffs. If necessary, this structure can directly command the 

services’ juntuan. The second tier is the campaign-level juntuan command section, responsible 

for developing their respective service forces’ plans, while also helping implement the overall 

joint campaign plan. 

A group army-scale joint campaign (䳶ഒߋ㓗㚄ਸᡈᖩ) will have a single-tier command 

structure. This will often be comprised primarily of the staff of the service that is providing the 

bulk of the forces for the campaign, supplemented by relevant personnel drawn from other 

participating services. Such a campaign would be a very small scale joint campaign. 

Joint Campaign Command Headquarters 

In each type of joint campaign, the JCCH, constituting the top tier in the two- and three-tier 

campaign command structures, is responsible for mission planning, organization, and direction 

 

17 㔏ᐵ䜘 is usually translated as “Supreme Command,” and refers to the highest leadership and command structure 

of the nation’s armed forces in wartime, responsible for planning and directing the overall war effort, and effecting 

strategic command. 2011 Junyu, p. 172. 18 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Discussions on Headquarters Work (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University 

Press, 2001), p. 377. 

19 Ibid., p. 377. 

20 It should be noted that, according to Chinese writings, the second tier, if a war zone direction command section, is 

not simply a war zone direction joint campaign command headquarters. 
460 

for the overall force. These tasks include setting campaign objectives in light of overall goals of 

the conflict, determining campaign methods, and establishing key tasks and missions for 

subordinate forces. It also includes creating the coordination plans, determining phasing, 

ensuring logistical and safeguarding support, and the various other tasks required to maximize 

the effectiveness of all the participating forces. 

To support the joint campaign commander, the JCCH is divided into several centers. In volumes 

published prior to 2005, these typically include: 

x Command center (ᤷᥕѝᗳ). This is the core of the JCCH, and includes the chief of 

staff, the political officer, and other key senior leaders. It is responsible for establishing 

the campaign determination (ᡈᖩߣᗳ), planning and implementing the campaign’s 

activities, and exercising command over all campaign activities. 

x Intelligence center (ᛵᣕѝᗳ). The intelligence center oversees reconnaissance (זሏ) 

and intelligence (ᛵᣕ) activities undertaken in the course of the joint campaign, as well 

as countering enemy activities in these areas. This center’s responsibilities include 

organizing and managing associated networks and systems, issuing taskings for assets, 

and assessing the resulting collected information. Furthermore, the intelligence center is 

expected to provide intelligence assessments and updates for the joint campaign 

commander and his staff, as well as other centers (e.g., the air defense operations center). 

x Communications center (䙊ؑѝᗳ). The communications center manages information 

flows within the joint campaign area, linking commanders and the command center to 

subordinate forces. 

x Air defense operations center (䱢オ֌ᡈѝᗳ). The air defense operations center plans 

and organizes air defense combat activities within the joint campaign area, drawing upon 

PLA Air Force, ground force, and local air defense assets.21 Although not stated, PLA 

Navy air defense assets are most likely included. 

Some descriptions also included an electronic warfare center (⭥ᆀሩᣇѝᗳ) and a special 

operations center (⢩⿽֌ᡈѝᗳ) as part of the JCCH.22 

It should be noted that, while the four departments are a key part of peacetime organization of 

the MR headquarters, Chinese writings indicate that wartime JCCHs must make adjustments to 

their organization, and should not simply adhere to the peacetime organization, specifically with 

regards to political work, logistics and safeguarding work, and equipment (armaments) 

work.23This would almost seem to imply that war zones have a primarily operational function, 

 

21 Zhang Peigao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Command Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military 

Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 36-43. 

22 Wang Guangzhou, Chief Editor Science of Operations Command (Beijing, PRC: Liberation Army Press, 2000), p. 

136, Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Discussions on Headquarters Work (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University 

Press, 2001), p. 384. 

23 Zhang Peigao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Command Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military 

Science Publishing House, 2001), pp.48-49 
461 

whereas military regions have more of a training and administrative function, as well as a role in 

mobilizing available assets and resources in transitioning from peacetime to wartime.24 

Evolving PLA Views of Future Wars 

Even as the PLA was promulgating its news regulations, it was also recognizing that warfare was 

still evolving. PLA analysts spent significant time examining NATO operations in the Balkans, 

as well as the war in Afghanistan, and the coalition war against Iraq in 2003. It is not clear 

whether these analyses have led to changes in the “New Generation Operations Regulations,” but 

they appear to have affected other aspects of PLA thinking about future wars. 

For PLA analyses, the hallmark of the intervening two decades since the first Gulf War has been 

the growth of information and associated technologies. The current Information Era, in contrast 

with the Industrial Era of the 20th Century, has therefore seen not only industrial and social 

reorganizations to accommodate the growing importance of information, but also affected the 

conduct of warfare. Just as economic strength is now heavily influenced by the ability to acquire, 

manipulate, and exploit information, the transformation in global military affairs (ц⭼ߋһ᭩䶙) 

is seen as a consequence of the introduction of information technology into various areas of 

military operations. In short, the key high technologies in both war and peace are those relating 

to information. 

This shift is prominently noted in the evolving PLA descriptions of the nature of future wars. 

The 1990s formulation of preparing to fight “local wars under modern, high-technology 

conditions” was replaced with concern over fighting and winning “local wars under 

informationized conditions.” This change was incorporated in the 2004 Chinese white paper on 

national defense, but was apparently already being discussed in 1999 PLA professional military 

literature, and was “officially incorporated into the lexicon of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines 

for the New Period’” in 2002.25 Subsequently, PLA writings also evolved into fighting and being 

able to win such wars, to the current formulation of “fighting and winning ‘local wars under 

informationized conditions.’” 

According to the PLA, “local wars under informationized conditions” are comparable to 

“mechanized warfare,” as a description of the nature of current wars. 26 Informationized 

conditions are marked, in part, by the introduction of information technology into various 

weapons, making them ever more precise and lethal. The networking of weapons with each other, 

and with sensors, allows for higher operational tempos, as night and weather conditions no 

longer constrain military forces as much as in the past. But informationized warfare goes beyond 

the incorporation of information technology into individual weapons, or even into broader 

systems. 

 

24 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Discussions on Headquarters Work (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University 

Press, 2001), pp. 232-236. 

25 David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in 

Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. by Roy Kamphausen 

and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 96. 26 AMS Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationized Operations Theory Research 

Office, Study Guide for Informationized Operations Theory—400 Questions on Informationized Operations (Beijing, 

PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2005), p. 72. 
462 

As one PLA volume states, “informationized operations (ؑ᚟ॆ֌ᡈ)” may be defined as: 

Systems versus systems conflict activities (փパーセントሩᣇ㹼ࣘ (that entail a heavy 

reliance by both sides on information, information systems, informationized 

weapons and equipment, with a focus on information flow, involving operations 

on land, sea, air, in space, within the electromagnetic spectrum, information (ؑ

᚟), and cognitive (䇔⸕) domains.27 

As this definition suggests, with the steady proliferation of information technologies, conflicts 

are no longer determined by platform-versus-platform performance, not even system against 

system. Rather, conflicts are now clashes between systems-of-systems (փパーセント). Systems-ofsystems are created through the integration of information flows that themselves are generated 

by the incorporation of information technology into every facet of military activities, e.g., 

logistics, intelligence collection and exploitation, transportation, etc.28 

Key to the struggle between systems-of-systems is the ability to affect that information flow, i.e., 

the ability to secure information dominance (ࡦؑ᚟ᵳ). This entails “an emphasis on the use of 

command decision-making to form and shape the entire whole.” 29 Informationized warfare 

correspondingly emphasizes the incorporation of advanced information technology into 

command and control capacity, as an integral part of generating additional combat power. 

These systems-of-systems, moreover, apply not only to combat forces, but also the linkage and 

melding of combat and combat support and combat service support functions. The PLA sees a 

blurring in the distinction between forward and rear areas, as well as the lines separating 

offensive and defensive operations, or the applicability of positional, mobile, and guerrilla 

warfare. In short, informationized warfare appears to have accelerated an evolution of joint 

operations, from coordinated joint operations to fully integrated joint operations (аփॆ㚄ਸ֌

ᡈ).30 

Fully integrated joint operations involve highly melded joint units (儈ᓖ㶽ਸⲴ㚄ਸ䜘䱏) 

drawn from the various services and branches, with a seamless networked information system 

(ᰐ㕍䬮᧕Ⲵ㖁㔌ॆؑ᚟パーセント㔏), capable of integrated operations (ᮤփ֌ᡈ) across all five 

battlespaces of land, sea, air, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum.31 Such operations are 

marked by networked information system; highly melded joint units; integrated, multi-aspect 

 

27 AMS Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationized Operations Theory Research 

Office, Study Guide for Informationized Operations Theory—400 Questions on Informationized Operations (Beijing, 

PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2005), p. 72 

28 Bai Bangxi, Jiang Lijun, “Systems of Systems Conflict Is Not the Same as Systems Conflict,” National Defense 

Newspaper (January 10, 2008). 29 Ibid. 

30 To distinguish between the various Chinese forms of “integrated” such as “zhengti” and “yitihua,” the phrase 

“fully integrated” is used in reference to “yitihua.” 

31 AMS Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationized Operations Theory Research 

Office, Study Guide for Informationized Operations Theory—400 Questions on Informationized Operations (Beijing, 

PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2005), p. 380. 
463 

battlespaces (ཊ㔤аփⲴᡈ൪オ䰤); and integrated joint activities in operational maneuvers (ᮤ

փ㚄ࣘⲴ֌ᡈ㹼ࣘ(. 

Fully integrated joint operations are the expression of the characteristics associated with 

informationalized warfare; they are the basic operational form (֌ᡈᖒᔿ) of conflict in the 

Information Age.32According to one PLA analysis, the further integration (аփॆ) of PLA joint 

operations has involved four aspects:33 

x The creation of a “fully integrated operational theory (֌ᡈ⨶䇪аփॆ),” in which a 

common operational theory was created to allow different services to share common 

operational concepts. Without a unified, or consolidated set of regulations (㔏аⲴᶑԔ), 

then it would not be possible to have different services’ formations act in a unified, or 

consolidated, manner (㔏а㹼ࣘ(. 

x An integrated operational theory, in turn, required “fully integrated command (ᤷᥕаփ

ॆ)” in order to be implemented. This required establishing an appropriate command 

system (ᤷᥕփࡦ (for the various forces, capable of executing planning across service 

lines. 

x The integrated command system can only manage joint operations through the creation of 

a “further integrated C3I system.” This C3I system (which is probably now expanded to 

C4I) is necessary, so that all participating forces can be linked together. 

x The integrated command structure and C3I system will facilitate the “further integration 

of knowledge (⸕䇶аփॆ),” so that there is common situational awareness of the 

situation, but also mutual understanding of each service’s perspectives and approaches to 

warfare. 

Modifying the Campaign Basic Guiding Concept 

The emphasis on informationization, as well as integrated operations, is reflected in a 

modification of the campaign basic guiding concept. In the 2000 edition of The Science of 

Campaigns the contemporary campaign basic guiding concept is characterized as “integrated 

operations, key point strikes (ᮤփ֌ᡈ, 䟽⛩ᢃࠫ).” In the 2006 edition, however, this had been 

modified to “integrated operations, constrain the enemy with precision strikes (ᮤփ֌ᡈ, マᢃ

 “.(᭼ࡦ

“Integrated Operations” 

In this new formulation, “integrated operations” builds upon the previous concept of integrated 

forces, domains, and activities, incorporating information technology to various aspects to 

improve integration, while also adding additional aspects. However, the various elements are 

now to be “fully integrated” (аփॆ). 

 

32 Kou Shiqiang, “A Clarification of Integrated Joint Operations,” People’s Liberation Army Daily (August 11, 

2004). www.china.com.cn/military/zhuanti/sjxjsbg/txt/2004-08/11/content_5632264.htm 

33 Cui Shizeng, Wang Junyi, “Advancing Military Transformation with Chinese Characteristics, Strengthening 

‘Integrated-Style Joint Operations,” People’s Liberation Army Daily (July 7, 2004) 
464 

From “integrating forces,” it is now said that all participating forces should be unified. In this 

new formulation, joint operations are still emphasized, incorporating land, sea, air, and Second 

Artillery forces, as well as the other elements of the Chinese armed forces (i.e., PAP, militia). 

But the new approach must also integrate both “hard kill and “soft kill” capabilities, and link 

firepower attacks to special operations missions as well as psychological strikes.34 Moreover, 

integrated operations must also concentrate battlefield sensors, information transmission systems, 

as well as rapid mobility and precision strike capacity, with the objective of creating a system 

that generates fully integrated operational strength (аփॆⲴ֌ᡈ࣋䟿).35 

From “integrating domains or battlespaces,” there is now the view that the various aspects of the 

battlespace must be fully integrated. In this new formulation, the land, sea, air, electromagnetic, 

and outer space battlefields are now joined by the psychological battlefield. Moreover, specific 

attention is drawn to the importance of the space and psychological battlefields. The former is 

described as the new strategic high ground (ᡈ⮕ࡦ儈⛩). The latter reflects the human factor in 

warfare and requires careful planning so as to attrit the enemy’s will.36 

From “integrating campaign phases and activities,” there is now the view that commanders must 

strive to further integrate the operational activities and styles. Through informationization, 

operational activities and styles have undergone a profound transformation, with wholly new 

styles and concepts of operations now possible. At the same time, only through a comprehensive 

application of all the available styles and activities is victory possible; no single approach or 

activity can hope to defeat an opponent. Commanders are therefore admonished to combine all 

the various types of wartime operations, including information warfare, firepower warfare, 

mobile warfare, positional warfare, psychological warfare, special operations, network warfare in 

future operations. They must also combine conventional and irregular warfare, offense and 

defense, hard- and soft-kill, and physical strikes with psychological attacks. The command and 

control systems play an essential role in the process of unifying operational activities and styles. 

In addition to expanding the previous concepts of integrating forces, battlespaces, and campaign 

activities, the revisions to the campaign basic guiding concept also calls for “further integrating 

the various aspects of safeguarding.” Safeguarding, in the Chinese conception, is linked to the 

provision of protection or sustainment in support of operations. It therefore contains aspects of 

logistics, but also refers to maintaining security and secrecy. 

In the revised 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns, it is noted that there are many aspects 

of safeguarding, including the safeguarding of forces, capabilities, and types of capabilities (e.g., 

operational safeguarding, logistics safeguarding, and equipment safeguarding). 37 In order to 

support integrated operations, it is therefore necessary to have a consolidated command and 

support structure (ᤷᥕ؍䳌փࡦ(, to oversee the overall support mission throughout the course 

of the campaign, across all battlespaces. Only through such an integrated overall support system 

(བྷパーセント㔏ᮤփ؍䳌) can there be a fully integrated civil-military effort (ߋ≁аփ˅, a fully 

 

34 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), p. 87. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Ibid. pp. 87-88. 

37 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
465 

integrated multi-service effort (䈨ޥߋ⿽аփ˅, and a fully integrated logistics and equipment 

preparation effort (ਾऔо㻵༷аփ).38 

Finally, emphasis is placed upon preventing the enemy from creating an integrated structure (ᮤ

փ㔃ʃ) for their operational systems (֌ᡈփパーセント). Commanders are advised to create disruptions 

in the enemy’s systems architecture, so as to weaken their ability to conduct integrated 

operations (ᮤփ֌ᡈ㜭࣋(. There must be a focused effort on identifying the enemy’s key 

nodes and attacking them, thereby generating a cascading set of failures that will paralyze their 

entire system. Examples include attacking the enemy’s command and control systems, 

information systems, weapons systems, and vital support systems.39 

“Constrain the Enemy with Precision Strikes”40

The other half of the revised campaign basic guiding concept calls for constraining or limiting 

the enemy through precision attacks (マᢃࡦ᭼). This is not solely focused on the application of 

precision firepower, but instead refers to “precision operations (マ⺞֌ᡈ).” Such operations, it 

is noted, involve precision selection of operational targets, of types of forces, of tactics and 

techniques, and precise control of the intensity and progress of the conflict. The key to successful 

precision operations is a suitable joint campaign command structure, in order to effect that 

precision application of forces and capabilities.41 

The “precise selection of targets (マ⺞䘹ᤙᢃࠫⴞḷ)” involves applying available forces 

against “key enemy targets (᭼㾱ᇣⴞḷ).” These are defined as those targets whose destruction 

or damage will influence the campaign, and may even have strategic impact. The focus should be 

on disrupting or paralyzing the enemy’s combat systems structure (֌ᡈփパーセント㔃ʃ). Therefore, 

targets should be selected whose destruction will not only disrupt operations, but also shake 

enemy morale. Consequently, the campaign command should strive to destroy or disrupt not 

only political and economic targets, but also vital military facilities, and those facilities that help 

support operations systems (᭼֌ᡈփࡦ䎧㔤パーセント֌⭘). 

Precision selection of targets, however, involves not only identifying which enemy systems are 

most vulnerable, but also “weaponeering.” That is, in the PLA view, one must also take into 

account the capabilities at one’s own disposal, ensuring that every target is not only serviced, but 

serviced efficiently. This is especially important for those targets that will be struck at the onset 

of the campaign. As the campaign progresses, the campaign command must be prepared to adjust 

their targeting, maintaining a flexible, responsive approach to situational changes while 

remaining focused on the ultimate campaign objectives. 

Not only is the campaign command expected to precisely apply weapons, but also to “precisely 

apply forces against key points (マ⺞䟽⛩⭘ޥ(. “The intent is to forge an overwhelming 

advantage against key enemy points, but through precise application of high quality forces, 

 

38 Ibid., p. 89. 

39 Ibid. 

40 The following section is drawn mainly from Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, 

PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2006), pp. 90-93. 

41 Ibid, pp. 89-90. 
466 

rather than simply massing numbers (although quantity remains part of the calculus). Indeed, The

Science of Campaigns notes that the proper perspective is to emphasize quality when calculating 

the amount of force required. 42 These same calculations should also take into account 

assessments of the relative virtues and advantages of various types of forces against each target 

set, in order to create mutually reinforcing effects. Thus, in some instances, the campaign 

command should rely upon “soft-kill” capabilities, e.g., against the enemy’s information and 

command systems. Soft-kill refers to the use of non-kinetic attack methods, such as computer 

network attacks, electronic warfare, jamming of communications links, and other such means. 

By contrast, facilities should be targeted with “hard-kill” capabilities, referring to more 

destructive, kinetic methods, such as cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, laser-guided bombs, 

etc. 43 

Commanders are also advised to concentrate their best forces, to maximize effect. In this manner, 

even though a force may be generally qualitatively inferior to an opponent, it may nonetheless be 

able to forge local superiority in advanced weapons and elite troops. For this reason, one’s best 

forces should be applied specifically along the main direction (ѫ㾱ᯩੁ), at key areas (䟽⛩ൠ

४), and at key times (ޣ䭞ᰦ㢲), in order to create this local superiority at decisive times and 

places.44 

In precisely applying weapons and troops, commanders must also “precisely apply tactics and 

techniques (マ⺞䘀⭘਴⿽֌ᡈᯩ⌅઼᡻⇥).” Of particular importance is precise application of 

tactics and techniques that will facilitate securing the “three dominates (or superiorities) (йᵳ),” 

that is information dominance, air dominance, and maritime dominance. Control of these 

domains is seen as essential prerequisites for winning any campaign. 

Precise application of tactics and techniques requires the campaign command to be familiar with 

one’s own forces and enemy forces, with the ability to fight the close-in as well as distant battles, 

to apply both hard- and soft-kill techniques. To this end, like the precise application of weapons 

and troops, the campaign command must be able to flexibly and innovatively adjust one’s 

actions, engaging in both simultaneous and sequential operations while responding to 

contingencies as they arise. 

Finally, constraining the enemy through precision strikes requires the “precise control of 

operations (マ⺞᧗ࡦ֌ᡈ䘋〻).” This refers to precise planning of each phase of an operation, 

including subordinate missions and associated tactics, as well as precisely managing the 

transition from phase to phase. The campaign command must, based on both the overall 

operational intent and the actual battlefield situation, create phases that mutually support each 

other and all contribute towards achieving the ultimate, overall campaign goal. Thus, for each 

phase, they must determine the proper operational style (֌ᡈṧᔿ) and when to implement them. 

This must be done for the forces of each participating service and branch, with crosscoordination of all these activities. In addition, the campaign command must also effect a smooth 

 

42 Ibid, p. 91. 

43 Yuan Wenxian, Joint Campaign Information Operations Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: National Defense 

University Press, 2009), pp. 19-20. 

44 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), p. 91 
467 

transition from phase to phase, adjusting timing to suit circumstances. Finally, as the campaign 

progresses, “the intensity and phase of the operation may have to change, which will affect the 

progress of the operation and the result.”45 

As with the precision application of weapons, The Science of Campaigns emphasizes the 

importance of the initial battle of any campaign in precisely planning operations and tactics, as 

the outcome of that first battle will greatly affect the course of the overall campaign. But the 

Chinese authors also note the importance of focusing on campaign goals, and note that this, 

rather than whether battles are being won, should be the essential metric of success. The 

command structure must maintain emphasis on whether the entire operations’ goals can be 

realized or not, and maintain tight control over the course of the operation so as to keep those 

goals in mind. In this regard, it would seem that the Chinese concern is that one might win 

battles that are irrelevant, or at best tangential, to achieving campaign goals. 

Command of Fully Integrated Joint Operations 

With these campaign basic guiding principles in mind, the PLA emphasizes the importance of 

campaign command (ᡈᖩᤷᥕ). The ability to command effectively is an essential part of 

combat power generation, and is a key role of the campaign commander and his staff.46 The 

concept of campaign command includes both the campaign tasks (ᤷᥕԫ࣑(, and the command 

structure (ᤷᥕχʃ) which will try to implement campaign command tasks. The command 

headquarters includes the campaign commander (ᡈᖩᤷᥕઈ) and the command organs (ᤷᥕ

χޣ(. These organs seem to replicate the four General Departments (i.e., the Political, Logistics, 

and Armaments or Equipment Departments), as well as certain key functions (e.g., air defense, 

intelligence, communications).47 

The basic mission of the campaign command is to implement command of campaign forces, 

consistent with higher level intentions, through the organization and planning of the campaign, 

flexible application of campaign strength and campaign tactics and methods. Ideally, campaign 

command will be able to create unity of effort and intent. For informationalized operations, this 

means the effective collection, transmission, management, application, and sharing of 

information among various participating forces.48

Command Tasks for Integrated Joint Operations49

The joint operations command headquarters, including the commander, the chief of staff (e.g., 

the director of the Headquarters Department), and the joint operations command structure will all 

be engaged in informationized operations, because command is seen, at base, as an information 

 

45 Ibid, p. 92. 

46 He Qingcheng, “Combat Command Capability: The Core of Military Capability’s ‘Core,’” Liberation Army Daily

(September 10, 2009) 

47 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: 

National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), p. 42. 48 HE Qingcheng, “Combat Command Capability: The Core of Military Capability’s ‘Core,’” Liberation Army Daily

(September 10, 2009) 

49 Drawn from Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, 

PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 11-13, 16-20. 
468 

activity.50 Based on the reviewed literature, there appears to be broad agreement on what tasks 

will confront joint operations command structures as they implement integrated joint operations. 

These include: 

x Grasping the situation (ᦼᨑᛵߥ(. This is the first, most basic task for the joint 

operation command organs (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχޣ(, and supports all the other tasks of the 

headquarters. The requirement for grasping the situation is seen as much greater for joint 

operations among services than for combined operations within a single service, as it 

affects all aspects of planning and all subsequent command activities. 

o This entails the collection, management, processing, and distribution of 

information. This applies not only to the gathering of current intelligence, 

however, but also collection of background material and undertaking longer term 

assessments. The ability to gather sufficient information to fully understand a 

situation is a “force multiplier” for combat power, and a key means of seizing and 

retaining battlefield initiative.51 

o To this end, it is the task of the joint operations command structure to oversee 

reconnaissance and surveillance activities, as well as analysis of the collected 

information, exploiting a wide range of sources for comprehensive coverage. The 

command structure must therefore incorporate not only up-to-date battlefield 

information in its assessments, but also relevant political, economic, diplomatic, 

cultural, and social conditions. 

o It is notable that this task is not included in the brief list of command activities (ᤷ

ᥕ⍫ࣘ (associated with joint campaigns in the new edition of the Science of 

Campaigns, although aspects of the following three are.52 

x Assist in decision-making (䖵ߣࣙᅙ). As military operations have become ever more 

complex, so has command and control. As Chinese analysts have observed, military 

command is no longer the activity of a single individual, nor of several staffers, assisting 

the commander. Instead, it is the activities of staff personnel, engaging in specified 

activities in prescribed manners, creating a command structure. 53 These personnel 

supplement and assist the commander in decision-making. 

o In this regard, the central role of the commander (ᤷᥕઈ) is to lay down accurate 

determinations (ߣᗳ), based on decisions (ߣᇊ) rooted in the operational goals 

and higher level directives. The commander also outlines how he expects that 

determination to be implemented, in broad terms. 

o The task of the command organs (ᤷᥕχޣ (is to then take those determinations, 

and incorporate their understanding of the overall situation, based on their earlier 

grasping. With that information in mind, they are expected to undertake 

comprehensive analysis and research, and from their assessments, provide the 

 

50 He Qingcheng, “Combat Command Capability: The Core of Military Capability’s ‘Core,’” Liberation Army Daily

(September 10, 2009). 

51 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, in Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: 

National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 16-17. 

52 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), pp. 283-284. 

53 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, in Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: 

National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 13-14. 
469 

commander with proposed approaches (ᯩṸ). It should be noted that these 

approaches are, apparently, more akin to outlines, as they are distinct from actual 

operational plans and organization, which is a separate task. 

x Planning and organizing (䇑ࡂ㓴㓷). Based on the commander’s determinations, 

directives, and guidance, supplemented by their proposed approaches, the joint campaign 

command organs are expected to undertake planning and preparations of operational 

activities (֌ᡈ㹼ࣘ(, various support activities (؍䳌㹼ࣘ(, and command activities (ᤷ

ᥕ㹼ࣘ(. As multiple services will be participating in any joint operations, one key task 

for the command organs is precise organizing and tight planning that exploits 

participating services’ virtues, compensates for respective weaknesses, and generates 

maximum integrated strength. 

o To do this, the joint operations command offices must keep in mind not only the 

commander’s intentions, but also the joint operation missions (㚄ਸ֌ᡈԫ࣑(, 

and allocated forces’ capabilities. They must take into account not only combat 

missions, but also incorporate support work, political work, logistical work into 

their plans, deconflicting requirements and coordinating activities. Once the plans 

are created and approved, they must then oversee their implementation, inspect 

units to ensure compliance, and provide guidance where necessary, always 

ensuring that the plans and activities are consistent with higher level directives.54

Thus, commanders provide the direction for joint operations command offices’ 

activities; while the joint operations command offices are the foundation and 

support for realizing the commander’s orders. 

o Planning and organizing applies not only to pre-war preparations, however, but 

also extends into the course of operations. When the battlefield situation changes, 

especially due to enemy actions, then the joint operations command offices must 

promptly propose adjustments to the commander’s determinations, and adjust 

plans, transmit orders, and organize the redeployment of forces.55 

x Controlling and coordinating (᧗ࡦॿ䈳). This task would seem to heavily overlap with 

the planning and organizing function noted previously. PLA writings suggest that 

controlling and coordinating mainly entails coordination of the various forces in response 

to battlefield situations. It may therefore refer to the implementation of the planning and 

organizing aspect, once the conflict has begun. 

o Given that conflicts under informationized conditions are much more complex, 

involving more participating services, larger physical scale, and more varied 

operational styles (֌ᡈॿ਼), the coordination and control of participating forces 

requires much more active effort on the part of the joint campaign command 

structure. There are three possible approaches to coordination: planned 

coordination (䇑ࡂॿ਼), ad hoc coordination (Ѥχॿ਼), and entrusted or 

delegated coordination (ငᢈॿ਼).56 

o Planned coordination is based upon previously established arrangements, 

specifying coordination missions and the sequencing of activities. Ad hoc 

coordination is undertaken in the midst of joint operations, in response to 

 

54 Ibid., p. 14. 

55 Ibid., p. 19. 

56 Ibid., pp. 141-142. 
470 

battlefield developments. It is seen as a supplement to planned coordination, but 

planned coordination is seen as the primary form. 57 Entrusted coordination 

involves delegating some aspect of coordination to a separate operational 

organization’s command structure. It may be based on a particular combat style or 

activity, an operational direction or space, or a specific operational phase or time 

period. This is especially important for situations where communications are 

disrupted or broken. 

o Coordination may be implemented based on electromagnetic spectrum, 

operational timing, physical space, or specific target. Electromagnetic 

coordination is a new type of coordination, involving the coordination of friendly 

electronic warfare activities with other friendly activities. Based on physical area 

of operations, timing of operations, or affected spectra, one may engage in 

electronic warfare (or suspend such operations) or other military activities.58 

It is interesting to note here that three of these tasks (grasping the situation; planning and 

organizing; controlling and coordinating) are largely unchanged from those outlined a decade 

ago.59 However, these tasks are now specifically enumerated for the joint operations command 

offices, i.e., as a staff support function, rather than simply a command task. Similarly, recent 

writings specify the role of command offices as assisting in decision-making (䖵ߣࣙᅙ), where 

earlier PLA writings had simply stated that engaging in decision-making (䘀ㆩߣᅙ) was a core 

responsibility.60 

Campaign Command Structures 

To fulfill the various tasks, campaigns operate under the direction of campaign command 

headquarters (ᡈᖩᤷᥕχʃ). As in the earlier edition of The Science of Campaigns, the new 

edition indicates that there are still three types of campaign command structures, which are based 

on the scale of the campaign. However, there are distinctions between the joint campaign 

command structure and the more generic campaign command structure. 

For campaigns in general, there are the war zone campaign command structure; the group of 

group armies campaign command structure or the war zone direction campaign command 

structure; and the group army [level] command structure. For the joint campaign, there are the 

three tier command system, the two tier command system, and the one tier command system. 

Generic Campaign Command Headquarters 

For campaigns in general, the largest scale campaign is commanded by a war zone campaign 

command structure (ᡈ४ᡈᖩᤷᥕχʃ), which is comprised of the war zone’s land, sea, and 

air commanders, along with command personnel drawn from operational and tactical missile 

units, as well as associated staff officers and structures. It is noted that, under modern conditions, 

 

57 Ibid., pp. 142. 

58 Ibid., p. 143. 

59 Zhang Peigao, Chief Editor, Joint Campaign Command Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military 

Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 71-161. 

60 Ibid., pp. 93-112, and Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials

(Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 16-20, 84-107. 
471 

these frequently are joint campaign command headquarters, but the implication is that this may 

not always be the case.61 

The officers leading the war zone campaign command headquarters may be drawn from the war 

zone’s commanders, but may instead be drawn from the Supreme Command (㔏ᐵ䜘); in any 

case, the Supreme Command will express guidance, while the main task of the war zone 

campaign command headquarters will be conducting war zone campaign operations. 

The next tier beneath the war zone campaign command headquarters will be either a group of 

group army [level] campaign command structure (䳶ഒߋ㗔ᡈᖩᤷᥕχʃ) or a war zone 

direction command headquarters (ᡈ४ᯩੁᤷᥕχʃ). Additional group army-level forces, as 

well as special operations groups command structure (⢩⿽֌ᡈ䳶ഒᤷᥕχʃ) may also be 

assigned to a war zone campaign command headquarters. Subordinate to either of these 

headquarters would be group army (corps) campaign command structure (䳶ഒߋ]ߋ[ᡈᖩᤷᥕ

χʃ). 

Mid-scale campaigns will be led by either the group of group army [level] campaign command 

headquarters or a war zone direction command headquarters. The forces associated with this 

scale campaign will either be formed from a group of group armies along a strategic direction, or 

be implemented by several campaign directions. Command staffs will be drawn either from war 

zone commanders and their staffs, or from a single service, with the war zone command 

providing representatives, presumably to oversee operations. It is noted that mid-scale campaigns 

will be either subordinate to the war zone command headquarters, or else to the senior national 

leadership. 

Small scale independent campaigns, or ancillary campaigns in support of large and mid-scale 

campaigns, will be led by group army-level campaign command structure (䳶ഒߋᡈᖩᤷᥕχ

ʃ). The command structure may be comprised from elements of the participating forces’ 

command staffs, or may be composed of officers dispatched from higher levels (presumably the 

group of group army campaign command headquarters or war zone direction command 

headquarters), or may be built from a single participating service’s command structure. 

Joint Campaign Command Structure 

For joint campaigns, the joint operations command structure (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ) is comprised 

of the joint operations commander (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕઈ) and the joint operations command 

structure (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ).62 There are three types of campaign command headquarters, 

which appear to be at least partially derived from those of the more generic campaign command 

headquarters described above.63 

 

61 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), p. 127. 

62 Yuan Wenxian, Chief Editor, “Foreword,” in Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials

(Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), p. 1. 

63 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), pp. 281-282. 
472 

For large-scale joint campaigns, command will be exercised from the three-tier command system

(й㓗ᤷᥕփࡦ(. These apparently come in two forms: 

x Joint campaign command headquarters (㚄ਸᡈᖩᤷᥕ䜘)—service-based campaign 

command headquarters (ߋ⿽ᡈᖩᤷᥕ䜘)—campaign juntuan command headquarters 

(ᡈᖩߋഒᤷᥕ䜘) 

x Multiple-war zone joint campaign command headquarters (ཊᡈ४㚄ਸᡈᖩᤷᥕ䜘)—

war zone direction command headquarters (ᡈ४ᯩੁᤷᥕ䜘)—campaign juntuan

command headquarters (ᡈᖩߋഒᤷᥕ䜘) 

In the first version, the joint campaign command section will represent the highest level of 

command authority, operating under guidance from the Supreme Command but responsible for 

planning and implementing the campaign. In the second version, the joint campaign command 

headquarters is typically made up of command personnel from both the involved war zones and 

participating services, supplemented by relevant personnel and organizations as may be 

necessary. It may, if appropriate, also incorporate officers dispatched from the Supreme 

Command (㔏ᐵ䜘). Which three-tier command system is employed will likely depend on 

whether the projected campaign will involve one or multiple war zones. 

In both cases, the second layer will be directed by the top layer, and will, in turn, command a 

lower layer of campaign juntuan command sections. This lowest layer will be drawn from the 

service forces’ command staffs, and will be responsible for organizing and implementing the 

campaigns. It is noted that in a very large scale joint campaign, there may be many different 

service campaign juntuan command sections.64 

For middle-scale joint campaigns, command will be exercised from a two-tier command system 

(Ҽ㓗ᤷᥕփࡦ(, comprised of: the joint campaign command organs—service campaign juntuan

command organs. The joint campaign command organs will be drawn from war zone and service 

command personnel and their command offices. It may directly command the service campaign 

forces, or it may rely upon the service campaign juntuan command organs, which are expected to 

obey the joint campaign command organs’ directives. 

Finally, for small-scale joint campaigns, the group army-level joint campaign, command will be 

exercised through a single layer command system—a single layer joint campaign command 

headquarters (অ㓗㚄ਸᡈᖩᤷᥕ䜘). This is frequently built around a particular service’s 

campaign group army command headquarters, absorbing additional command elements and 

staffs drawn from other participating services. This appears to be identical to the smallest scale 

joint campaign command headquarters set forth in the earlier edition of The Science of 

Campaigns. 

It should be noted that some other Chinese writings would seem to differ from The Science of 

Campaigns on the scales of command headquarters for joint operations, although they agree that 

the choice of specific command structure should be based on operational missions (֌ᡈԫ࣑(, 

 

64 Ibid, p. 282. 
473 

operational scale (֌ᡈ㿴⁑), operational timing and area (֌ᡈᰦ䰤઼ൠฏ). One volume 

suggests that there may be four joint operational command headquarters: general joint operations 

command structure (ᙫ䜘㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ), war zone joint operations command structure (ᡈ

४㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ), war zone direction joint operations command structure (ᡈ४ᯩੁ㚄ਸ

֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ) and joint unit command structure (㚄ਸ䜘䱏ᤷᥕχʃ).65 

In general, however, while there may be different scales of joint campaign command structures, 

none seem to entail simply adding an additional command tier to a smaller-scale joint campaign. 

This is distinctly different from the more generic campaign command headquarters, where the 

command headquarters for large-scale campaigns seems to append an additional tier of command 

atop that for a mid-scale campaign. 

Joint Campaign Command Headquarters

There seem to be a number of different views of how joint campaign command headquarters can 

be organized for “local wars under informationized conditions.” The composition of the joint 

operations command headquarters, i.e., what specific departments are necessary for a joint 

campaign command headquarters to conduct integrated operations, varies in Chinese writings. 

This may reflect an ongoing evolution in PLA thinking. Alternatively, given the limitations of 

accessible Chinese writings, it may be that this situation was true but has since been resolved. 

This is complicated by comments suggesting that the PLA may not have established permanent 

joint campaign command headquarters. One publication from 2006 observes that “our military 

currently has not built day-to-day joint operations command structures (ᡁߋⴞࡽ䘈⋑Mᔪ・ᑨ

䇮Ⲵ㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃ).”66 Another PLA publication notes that 

Our military’s joint operations command systems have not yet been fully 

completed, and joint operations command offices’ organization and missions still 

lack formal authority as laid out in regulations (ᡁߋ㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕփࡦ䘈⋑M

ᆼޘᔪ・ޘڕˈ㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχʃⲴ㙼㜭઼ԫ࣑䘈㕪ѿᵳေⲴ⌅㿴׍ᦞ).67

As a result, available PLA writings may reflect different, possibly competing, ideas for how the 

joint campaign command headquarters should be organized, rather than describing how they are 

or will be organized. 

One possible organization proposed in the 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns is similar 

to that laid out in the 2000 edition. It is comprised of four command centers: 

x Operations center (֌ᡈѝᗳ). This will contain the Headquarters Department and senior 

leaders (ਨԔ䜘俆䮯), and the command staff from relevant operations departments (֌

ᡈ䜘䰘). This center would organize and plan the joint campaign, help coordinate 

commanders’ decision-making, engage in command and control. 

 

65 Dang p. 15. 

66 Ibid., p. 15. 

67 Yuan Wenxian, “Foreword,” in Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: 

National Defense University Publishing House, 2008), p. 1 
474 

x Intelligence center (ᛵᣕѝᗳ). This would contain the Headquarters Department and 

senior leaders and intelligence department personnel. 

x Communications center (䙊ؑѝᗳ). 

x Support center (؍䳌ѝᗳ). This would be organized from command and support 

personnel, and would undertake all operations command support missions (֌ᡈᤷᥕⲴ

 .(࣑ԫ䳌؍

This could then be supplemented as necessary, such as with a comprehensive firepower 

coordination center (㔬ਸ⚛࣋ॿ䈳ѝᗳ) or an information operations center (ؑ᚟֌ᡈѝᗳ), 

depending on the requirements of the campaign.68 

A variation on this structure would have six centers, including a command and control center, 

intelligence center, communications center, an information operations center, as well as an air 

defense center (䱢オѝᗳ) and a special operations center (⢩⿽֌ᡈѝᗳ). The special 

operations center would provide a single planning center for special operations, choosing 

specific targets and coordinating special operations. 

More recent writings suggest a somewhat different structure. One volume that discusses joint 

operations command organ work (㚄ਸ֌ᡈᤷᥕχޣᐕ֌) suggests that the joint operations 

basic command post (㚄ਸ֌ᡈสᴥᤷᥕᡰ) should be comprised of a command and control 

center, with intelligence, communications, military mobilization, political work, logistics support, 

and equipment support centers or departments (䜘䰘) apparently subordinate or subsumed within 

it.69 

x Command and control center (ᤷᥕ᧗ࡦѝᗳ). This center is responsible for supporting 

the joint operations commander’s planning and command and control activities, and 

would provide coordination and guidance to other departments. It engages in 

comprehensive planning, firepower coordination, information operations, special 

operations. Most of the tasks enumerated earlier (e.g., grasping the situation, providing 

planning) are this center’s responsibility. 

x Intelligence department (ᛵᣕ䜘䰘). This is responsible for joint operations intelligence 

support. It coordinates intelligence activities, oversee intelligence collection and data 

management, and distribute any findings. In conjunction with the command and control 

center, it also organizes counter-recon activities and battle damage assessments. 

x Communications department (䙊ؑ䜘䰘). This department is responsible for supporting 

all communications associated with the joint operation, and helps formulate the plans and 

directives associated with communications support. It will also help guide and coordinate 

other communications activities of subordinate forces, including frequency and spectrum 

management. It will also coordinate with local officials and managers for employing 

civilian communications assets. 

 

68 Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2006), pp. 282-283. 

69 Yuan Wenxian, Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: National Defense 

University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 208-211. 
475 

x Military affairs mobilization department (࣑ࣘߋઈ䜘䰘). This department is responsible 

for organizing military affairs, mobilization, and ground warfare management work. It 

will coordinate those offices associated with personnel, mobilization, and ground warfare. 

It is also responsible for providing supplementary military personnel, and will also 

coordinate with local governments for coordinating military transportation, material 

support, science and technology mobilization, and other interactions with local assets. 

x Political work department ( ᭯⋫ᐕ֌䜘䰘 ). This department is responsible for 

propaganda, legal affairs, mass work, and other political work matters. This includes 

planning, directing, and managing political work for the campaign, and overseeing 

political work in subordinate units. It also includes undertaking political warfare tasks, 

including psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare, as well as 

managing media outreach generally, and political mobilization. 

x Logistics support department (ਾ䈧؍䳌䜘䰘). This department is responsible for 

coordinating operational logistics and support. This includes keeping the command and 

control center appraised of the status of logistics, managing the flow of information 

between the main command post and rear area command posts, as well as logistical 

planning for the campaign. 

x Equipment support department (㻵༷؍䳌䜘䰘). This department is responsible for 

ensuring that equipment support, which includes equipment maintenance as well as 

preserving equipment security, is coordinated across all participating forces. 

Common across all these possible structures are a command or command and control center 

responsible for operational planning, coordination, and oversight of participating forces; a 

communications center or department; and an intelligence center or department. Several also 

have one or two departments responsible for aspects of support (؍䳌). 

Less consistent is the creation of an information operations center. Despite the emphasis on 

securing information dominance, it would appear from the available literature that there is not 

necessarily a dedicated center or department for information operations, or at least one that is 

separately enumerated. This is especially striking, given the extensive nature of the tasks 

associated with information operations. 

In addition to the basic command post, there are also reserve command posts, rear area command 

posts, and, if necessary, forward or directional command posts.70 

x The reserve command post (亴༷ᤷᥕᡰ) is generally established at the same time as the 

basic command post, in preparation of taking over, should the basic command post suffer 

attacks or otherwise be incapacitated. It is generally staffed by a deputy commander (࢟

㙼ᤷᥕઈ), augmented by headquarters staff, and political, logistics, and equipment 

command organ personnel, although on a reduced scale. The reserve command post must 

have ready access to the campaign command and information systems, so as to maintain 

situational awareness and be able to step into the breach promptly, if necessary. 

 

70 Yuan Wenxian, Joint Operations Command Organ Work Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: National Defense 

University Publishing House, 2008), pp. 41, 207-213. 
476 

x A rear area command post (ਾᯩᤷᥕᡰ) is established to exercise consolidated 

command (㔏аᤷᥕ) over logistics and support activities. Its responsibilities include 

providing equipment support and security (㻵༷؍䳌), and coordinating rear area defense. 

It may be led by a deputy commander, or by the head of the logistics or equipment 

(armament) command organs. It may be supplemented by local support staff, which may 

include civilian government personnel. The rear area command post is likely to have 

several distinct centers and departments: a rear area command center, a logistics support 

department, an equipment support department, and a mobilization and support 

department. 

x A forward, or directional, command post (ࡽ䘋˄ᯩੁ˅ᤷᥕᡰ) is established in order 

to supplement or improve command capacity along a likely line of enemy approach, or in 

advance of the main area of resistance. These are most likely to be created when largescale, fully integrated joint campaigns (བྷ㿴⁑аփॆ㚄ਸᡈᖩ) are being undertaken, 

due to the complexities of both operations and command and control relationships. It is 

generally staffed by a deputy commander, and essential staff personnel.
477 

Appendix 1: Key Leadership Terms1

Leaders (亶ሬ), principal officers (ѫᇈ), and command staff/leading cadre (俆䮯): Various 

Chinese dictionaries translate these three terms as follows: lingdao is translated as leader(s), 

leadership, or leading; shouzhang is translated as leading cadre or leading officer; and zhuguan is 

translated as principal officer. For all practical purposes these three terms are synonymous, 

which can generically be called the command staff. Based on interviews with PLA officers, the 

PLA’s command staff includes the commander, political commissar (PC), deputy commanders, 

deputy PCs, and directors of the Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment/Armament 

Departments. Furthermore, based on the interviews, the only real difference among lingdao, 

shouzhang, and zhuguan, is that zhuguan do not include the deputy commanders and deputy 

political commissars. 

Commander (ᤷᥕઈ): Zhihuiyuan appears to be the generic term for commander compared to 

specific terms such as silingyuan (ਨԔઈ) or zhang (䮯), as in division commander (ᐸ䮯). 

Based on how zhihuiyuan is used, it sometimes refers to a single person and other times it refers 

to the leaders (亶ሬ) and principal officers (ѫᇈ) as a group, to include the commander, 

political commissar, deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, and directors of the four 

first-level departments (Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment). The Air Force 

Dictionary translates zhihuiyuan as commander and defines it as the leading cadre (亶ሬᒢ䜘) at 

each level who are responsible for combat/operations command (֌ᡈᤷᥕ). The commander’s 

primary combat/operations responsibilities are organize intelligence and reconnaissance (ᛵᣕז

ሏ), issue decisions (ᇊлߣᗳ), clarify missions/tasks (᰾⺞ԫ࣑(, formulate combat plans (ࡦ

ᇊ֌ᡈ䇑ࡂ(, organize coordinated actions and support (㓴㓷ॿ਼ࣘ֌઼⿽਴؍䳌) [within the 

PLAAF and with other services and branches], inspect combat preparations situation (Ựḕ֌ᡈ

߶༷ᛵߥ(, and implement battlefield coordination and control (ᇎᯭᡈ൪ॿ䈳о᧗ࡦ(

2

According to the PLA Military Dictionary, which does not translate each term into English, 

zhihuiyuan is 1) The principal military [track] officer(s) (ߋһѫᇈ) at every level in the military; 

2) The leading cadre (亶ሬᒢ䜘) at each level who is/are responsible for combat/operations 

command (֌ᡈᤷᥕ) or military functional work (ߋһ㹼᭯ᐕ֌); 3) The general term (⌋〠) 

for military cadre. 3 It is also defined as the officer(s) who is/are responsible for all command of 

combat/operations at a particular level (ሩᴥ㓗֌ᡈ䍏䍓ޘ䜘ᤷᥕ䍏䍓Ⲵߋᇈ).4 

Commanding Officer(s)/Cadre (ᤷᥕߋᇈ/ᤷᥕᒢ䜘): According to various PLA publications, 

such as the Military Cadre Work volume of the China Military Encyclopedia, zhihui junguan is 

translated as commanding officer and is defined as officers who have the grade of platoon leader 

 

1

 The author would like to express his appreciation to Ken Allen who provided this appendix regarding the specific 

terminologies for commanders and command functions. 

2

 Zhu Rongchang, ed. Air Force Dictionary (オߋབྷ䗎ި), (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, September 1996), 

71. 

3 Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Complete Volume) (ѝഭӪ≁䀓᭮ߋߋ䈝 (ޘᴥ), 

(Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September 1997), 132.. 

4

 Sun Ruling, Basic Introduction to Combat/Operations Command (֌ᡈᤷᥕส⹰ᾲ䇪), (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press, May 2011), 101. 
478 

and above and are in one of the four PLA officer career tracks—military, political, logistics, and 

equipment—and are identified as military commanding officers (ߋһᤷᥕߋᇈ), political 

commanding officers (᭯⋫Ცភߋᇈ), logistics commanding officers (ਾऔᤷᥕߋᇈ), and 

equipment commanding officers (㻵༷ᤷᥕߋᇈ). These tracks are discussed later in Part 1. 

Commanding officers are categorized by their career track, grade, missions/tasks, and by their 

service and branch.5

 

5

 “Commanding Officer” (ᤷᥕߋᇈ) in Xu Yaoyuan, ed., Military Cadre Work (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌), 84, in China 

Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, November 2006). Su Shubo, Yang Qi, 

Yu Zhiyong, and Lin Cheng, eds., Military Cadre Work Handbook (ߋ䱏ᒢ䜘ᐕ֌᡻޼(,) Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, May 2011), 35-36.