### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 44 -C R

______________________________ AL DARI AN TYRONE DAVI S, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 124th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 35117-B

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r a n d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte rAllen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 1 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Whil e the jur

y wa s d e lib e ratin g the fate of Al da ri a n T y ro ne Da vis in o ne c a se , h e a g re e d to plead guilty

to s ev era l indictments. He now appe als his convictions resulting from those plea s of g uilty for the of

fense s of ag g ravated assault with a de adly wea po n , p o s s es s i on of a c ontrolled substance w ith intent to deliver, and unlawf ul possession of a firea

rm by a felon. Davis presents two points of error : ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and disproportionate sentenc ing. We ove rrule the po int s and

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound Th e State a lle g e d D a vis c omm itt e d a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult on or a bo ut Aug us t 16 , 2 00 6, wh ile attempting to c ollect a de bt i n cu rr ed d u ri ng a coc aine tra nsaction. Davis was also indicted on alleg ations that, on Fe bruar y 5, 2007, he possessed a controlled substance w ith intent to deliver and possessed a f

irea rm afte r beingpreviously convicted of

a fe lony
. The a g g ravated assault cha rg e proc eede d to trial. Davis orig inally enter ed a not guilty

plea
a nd the a lle g a tio ns we re tr ie d be fo re a jur y in the 18 8th Judic ia l Distri c t Cour t of Gr e g g Cou

nty wi th Judg e Da vid B ra bh a m pr e sid ing . A t tr ia l, D a vis de nie d the a ssa ult a nd te sti fi e d his dif

fe re nc e s w ith the victim orig inated fr om the sale of a DVD play er. During deliberations, the jury sent sever al notes to the trial court. When the jury indicated that it wa s deadloc ked six to six, the trial court deliver ed
an Allen c h a r g e to th e ju r y . A t th e e n d o f th e d a y , th e ju r y r e tu r n e d a n o te to th e trial court 1When asked, " What about the manner in wh i ch it would be ser ved? " the State informed 2 J udg e Khour

y that it would "de fer to the Court." De fense counsel stated, in his talks with the State, t h at t h e S t a t e " d i d

n o to p p o s e c o n cu rr en tt i m e a s p ar to f t h e r ec o m m en d at i o n " an d as k edJ u d ge Kho ury to "fol lo w t he S tat e's reco mm end ati on andto do con curr ent ti me. " 3 indicating a " hung jury ," w ith ten jurors voting "not g uilty " and two jurors voting "guilty ." T he trial
c o u rti n f o r m e d t h e a t t o r n e ys , w i t h D a v i s p r e s e n t , t h a t t h e j u r y h a d r e tu r

n e d a n o t e s a yi n g " h u n g j u r

y" and that the note " does have a breakdown." The trial court stated, " Not to give an adva ntag e to either sid e , I ' m g oin g to t e ll y ou the nume ri c a l bre a kd ow n but not wh a t it is. Th e nu me ri c a l br e a kd ow n is
no w t en t o t wo. " Meanw hile, the State and Da vis init iated discussions reg arding a final resolution of all t he char g es pendingag ainst Davis. Without objection, the jury was a llowed to rec ess for the day and
wa s tol d to re tur

n a t 9:3 0 the ne xt m or

nin g . Th e State a nd Da

vis re a c he d a n a g re e me nt that D a vis
wo u l d en t er an o p en p l ea b ef

o re J u d ge Al v i n Kh o u ry

i n t h e 1 2 4 t h J u d i ci al Di s t ri ct C o u rt o f G re gg County and the State would rec ommend a sentence of five y ear s for the ag g ravated assault cha rg e, a sente nce of twenty y ear s for the posse ssion of a controlled substanc e cha rg e, and a sentenc e of te n y ear s for the unla

wful possession of a f

irea rm by a fe lon char g e. Th e fo llo wi ngmor

nin g , Davis ple d g uil ty in the 12 4th Judic ia l D istri c t Co ur

t, a nd the State
rec ommended sente nces c onsistent with the above- mentioned ag ree ment. J udg e Khoury sentenc ed 2 Davis to ten y ear s for the a gg ravated assault, twenty y ear s for the posse ssion of a controlled substance, a

nd ten y ear s for the unlawful possession of a firea rm. J udg e Khour

y order ed the ten- y earSe e Da v is v . S tat e , c a us e numbe rs 06 -0 7- 00 14 5- CR and 06 -0 7- 00 14 6- CR. 3 4 sentenc e for

unlawful possession of a firea rm by a fe lon be serve d conse cu tively to the ten-y ear sentenc e for

ag g ravated assault. Three appea ls are pr esently pending befor e this Court
. Da v i s raises ide ntical issues and makes identica l arguments in all three of the appea ls. This a

ppeal conce rns Davis' conviction for 3 ag g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon. Davis ar g ues that he r ece ived ineff ective a ssistance of counsel a nd that his sentence s constitute gr ossly disproportionate pu n i s h m ent in violation of the Ei g hth Am e ndme nt. II. Ineff

ect ive Assistance of Counsel Da vis c la ims , in

his first po int

of e rr or , th a t he re c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. The standa

rd of testing claims o f i neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel is set out in Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U
. S
. 6 6 8 ( 1 9 8 4 )
. T o p r e v a i l o n t h i s c l a i m , an a p p e l l a n tm u s tp r o v e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e (1) that his or her c ounsel' s repr esentation fell b el o w an objective standard of rea sonablene ss a nd (2) that the de ficient pe rfor mance prejudice d the def

ense. Id. at 689; Ro sa le s v . S tat e , 4 S.W
. 3 d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To meet this burden, the a ppellant
mus t pr ov e that th e a tto rn e y ' s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll b e low the sta

nd a rd of pr e va ili ngpr of

e ssi on a l no rm s and that ther e is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney ' s deficie ncy , the re sult of the trial would have be en diffe rent. Ton g v . S tat e , 25 S.W. 3d 70 7, 71 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Un de r t his standard, a

claimant must prove that counsel' s repr esentation so undermined the proper functioning5

of t h e a d v e r s a r i a l p r o c e s s t h a tt h e t r i a l c a n n o tb e r e l i e d o n a s h a v i n g p r o d

u c e d a j u s tr e su lt. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 686. Davis complains that counsel was ineffe ctive by failing to adequately inform Davis that the Sta te ' s r e c omm e nd a tio ns wo uld no t be bin din g on

Judge Kho ury and

that Judg e Kh oury

ha s a reputation for not following the State' s rec ommendations. I n addition, Davis claims t r ia l c o u n sel was ineffe ctive for

not inquiring into the actua l nume rica l split of the jurors who be lieved Da vis was not g uilty
. A. P roce edings i n Jud ge K houry's Cou rt Da v i s cl ai m s h e w o u l d

n o th av e p l edgu i l t y i f h e h a d " b ee n p ro p er l y i n fo rm edt h at J u d ge Khoury does not take ple a ag ree ment s an d t h at he has a history of not following the
rec ommendations of the District Attorney ' s Offic e." The rec ord demonstra tes that Davis had be en informed that Judge Khoury does not acc ept neg otiated plea a g ree ments and that his plea would be an open ple a bef

ore the court. Be fore leaving J udg e B rabha m's c ourt, J udg e B rabha

m admonished Da vis a s f oll ow s: [Judg e B ra

bh a m]: A nd , M r. Da vis , y ou un de rs tand

tho se are jus t re c omm e nd a tio ns be fo re the 12 4th Di str ic t Co ur

t? [Davis] : Uh-huh. [J udg e B rabha

m] : You need to a

nswer out loud. [Davis] : Yes, sir.6 [J udg e B rabha

m] : Imean, ther e' s no plea a g ree ments or plea barg ains in the 124th District Court. I just want to be sure you understand. [Davis] : Yes, I

understand. I n addition, the proce eding s in the 124th J udicial District C ourt make it abunda ntly clea r Davis was informed ther e wa s no p l ea agre ement. Judge K houry eng ag ed Davis and the attorne y s in the f o l l o w i n g c o l l o qu y:

[J udg e Khoury ]:
. . . . Now, in a ny of these case s, is the re any ty pe of a ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt? [S tate]: No, y our Honor. [Defense Counsel] : No, y our Honor. [J ud ge Kh oury ]: I n any

of these c ases, is there any ty pe of a g ree ment or understandingby

and betwe en counsel for the State, counse l for the a ccuse d and the a c c us e d h ims e lf

tha t in a ny wa y c a n b e c on sid e re d a s a

ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt? [S tate]: No, y our Honor. [Defense Counsel] : No, y our Honor. [Judg e Kh oury ]: Ar e the se a ll o pe n p le a s o f guil ty to t his Court ? [S tate]: They

are , y our Honor. [Defense Counsel] : That' s corr ect, your Honor. [Judg e Kh oury ]: No w, wh a t th a t me a ns , M r. Da vis , is thi s: T he lawy e rs wi ll make re c omm e nd a tio ns to m e on wh a t th e y thi nk Ish ou ld d o. I ' ll l ist e n to the m, I ' ll listen to them equally
. But y ou need to be aware of t he fact t hat I don' t alway s follow lawy ers' rec ommendations. I sometimes do, I sometimes don' t. And beca use there is n o p le a

ba rg a in i n a

ny of the se c a se s, sh ou ld I

cho os e no t to fo llo w t he ir7

rec ommendations, y ou don' t ge t to withdraw y our g uilty pleas; do y ou understand that? [Davis] : Yes, sir. [J udg e Khoury ]: Under standing there is no plea bar g ain ag ree ment in any of the se thr e e c a se s, do y ou

wi shto c on tin

ue wi th your guil ty

ple a or no t? [Davis ]: Ye s. [Judg e Kh oury ]: Yo ur

g uil ty ple a s. [Davis] : Yes, sir. As de mon str a te d b y

the a bo ve qu o ta tio ns , D a vis wa s w e ll i nf or me d th a t th e re c omm e nd a tio ns wo uld not be binding on Judge Khoury . Fur ther, the r ecor d is silent concer ning w hether

J udg e Khour

y has
a re pu ta tio n f

or no t f oll ow ingthe State ' s r e c omm e nd a tio ns . T he ine ff e c tiv e ne ss o f cou nsel is a matter that must be firmly founded in the r ecor d, and the rec ord must a ffirmatively demonstrate the alleg ed inef

fec tiveness. Sm ith v . S

tat e , 51 S.W .3d 806, 813 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.). B. Num eric al Sp lit of Ju ry Davis also argu es h i s t ri al counse l was ineff ective f or fa iling to inquire into the ac tual numerica l split of t he jurors who believed Davis was not g uilty
. J udg e Brabha m informed Da

vis and trial counsel the note indicated that the j ury was deadlocke d and of the exact numerica l split of the j u r o r s ' v o t e s . J u d g e B r a

b h a m m e r e l y w i t h h e l d w h e t h e r m o r e j u r o r s b e l i e v e d D a v i s w a s n o tg u i l t y. Davis has f

ailed to pre sent this Court with any authority that the t rial cour

t was re quired to show
c ouns e l th e a c tua l no te or to inf or m hi m of the nu mbe r o f j ur or s v oti ngto a c qu it. Whe n, a s in thi s8

case , a trial c ourt inadver tently lear ns of the numer ical split in a dea d l o ck ed jury , we a re not convince d the cour

t is required to inform a defe ndant or the State of the nume rica l breakdown of jury deliberations. Se e Ex

pa rtePr e witt , N o . 0 4

- 9 5
- 0 0 7 3 7
- CR , 1 9 9 6 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 7 8 0 , a t * 6 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio Fe b. 28, 1996, pet. re f' d) (not desig nated for publication). Davis has not shown that hi s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r n ot a sk ingthe tr ial cou rt to r e c on sid e r i ts d e c isi on no t to
reve al the votes of the jurors. W e n o t e t h e r ec o rd i s s i l en tco n ce rn i n g co u n s el 's m o t i v at i o n s . Ou r r ev i ew o f c o u n s el 's
re pr e se ntatio n is hig hly

de fe re nti a l, a

nd we ind ulg e a str on g pr e su mpt ion that c ouns e l' s c on du c t f a lls within a wide ra

ng e of r easona

ble represe ntation. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9; Tong , 25 S.W .3d at 712. That another attorney , including appellant' s counsel on appea l, mig ht ha ve pursued a diffe rent
course of action does not nece ssarily indicate inef

fec tive assistance
. Ha rn e r v . S tat e , 997 S.W .2d 695, 7 0 4 ( T e x. A p p . — T e xa r k a n a 1 9 9 9 , n o p e t. )
. We w il l n o t c o n c lu d e th e c h a ll e n g ed conduc t constitutes deficie nt perf

ormanc e unless the conduct was so outrag eous t hat no competent attorney would have e ng ag ed in it. Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 5 7 S. W.3 d 4 36 , 4 41 (T e x Crim. Ap p. 20 01 ); see Tho mp so n v . S

tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We are u n ab le to conclude no
c o mp e t e n ta t t o r

n e y w o u l d

h a v e p e r m i t t e d h i s c l i e n tt o e n t e r

an o p e n p l e a

b e f o r e J u d g e K

h o u r y. Davis' first point of err or is overr uled.9

III. Disproportionate Sentence Davis f il e d a mo ti o n f

o r n e w tr ia l a ll e g in g th a t h is s e n te n c e w a s d is p r o p o rti o n a te to the offe nse. This Court has held that a mot ion for new trial is an appr opriate w ay to preser ve this issue. Mu lli ns v . S

tat e , 2 08 S.W. 3d 469 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; De lac ru

z v . S tat e , 167 S.W .3d 904 (Tex. A p p . — T ex ar k ana 2005, no pet.). Davis contends the sente nce imposed by the t ri al co u rt wa s d i s p ro p o rt i o n at e t o t h e o ff en s e, ci t i n g So le m v . H

e lm , 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Te x as courts have traditionally

held that, as long as the punishment assesse d is within t he ra ng e pre scribed by the L eg islature in a va lid statute, the punishment is not excessive, cr uel, or unusual. See, e .g. , J or da n v . S tat e , 4 95 S.W. 2d

94 9, 95 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ). He re , Da vis ' se nte nc e s f a ll w ith in the applica

ble ra ng es of punishment. That does not e nd the inquiry
. A prohibition a g ainst g rossly disproport i o n at e p u n ishment
su rv i v es u n d er

t h e E i gh t h Am en d m en tt o t h e U n i t edS t at es C o n s t i tu t i o n ap ar tfr o m any considera tion of wh e the r the punis hme nt a sse sse d is wi thi n th e ra ng e e sta bli sh e d b y

the L e g isl a tur e . U .S. C O N ST . a me nd . V I I I ; see Sole m , 4 63 U.S . at 29 0; Harmelin v. M ichigan , 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Sca lia, J ., plu ra lity op .) ; J ac k so n v . S tat e , 9 89 S.W. 2d

84 2, 84 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 99 , n o p e t.) ; Lackey

v . S tat e , 8 81 S.W. 2d

41 8, 42 0– 21 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 4, pe t. r e f' d) ; see also Ex parte Chavez , 213 S.W .3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (desc ribing this principle as involving a "ve ry limit ed,

' exceeding ly

rar e,' and somewhat amorphous" revie w).10

Solem had sug g ested, a s a three -par t test, that a

n appellate court consider: (1) the g ravity of the offe nse compar ed with the harshne ss of the penalty ; ( 2) the sente nces imposed f or similar crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentenc es imposed for c ommissi on of t he same crime in other jurisdictions. See Sole m , 463 U.S. at 292. Harmelin at least ra ised questions about the viability of the Solem three -par

t test. I n fac t, it was subsequently held that proportionality survived Ha rm e lin , but that the Solem three -par t test did not. Se e Mc Gr ud e r v . P uc k

e tt , 9 5 4 F.2d 313, 316 ( 5th Cir. 19 92 ); Lackey , 8 8 1 S. W. 2 d a t 4 2 0

– 2 1
. I n li g h t of Ha rm e lin , the test has bee n ref ormulated a s an initial threshold comparison of the g ravity of the off ense w ith the se verity

of the sente nce, a

nd then,
on ly if that ini tia l c omp a ri so n c re a te d an inf e re nc e that th e se nte nc e wa s g ro ssl y dis pr op or

tio nate to the offe nse should the re be a considera tion of the other two Solem fac tors—(1) sentence s for similar
c ri me s in the same jur isd ic tio n a nd (2 ) s e nte nc e s f

or the same c ri me in o the r j ur isd ic tio ns . McG ruder , 9 54 F .2 d at 31 6; Mullins , 2 08 S.W. 3d a t 47 0; Lackey , 881 S.W .2d at 420–21. Da vis a rgue s th e se nte nc e s, whi le wi th in the statut or y ra ng e of punis hme nt, a re g ro ssl y disproportionate to the off ense. D avis was se ntence d to ten y ear s for ag g ravated assault. Ag g ravated
a ssa ult is a se c on d- de g re e fe lony

wi th a punis hme nt r a ng e of

tw o to tw ent y

y e a rs ' imp ri so nme nt. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1 2. 33 (V e rn on 20 03 ), § 2 2. 02 (b ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 07 ). I n the c ours e of committing this off

ense, Davis place d the victim at the risk of ser ious injury or death. Given the g ra vit y of thi s o ff e ns e , a te n- y e a r s e nte nc e —in

the mid dle of the statut or y ra ng e of punis hme nt— is not gr ossly

disproportionate. The trial court se ntence d Davis to twenty y ear s for possession of a11

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi th i nte nt t o d e liv e r. Un de r the fa c ts s tip ulate d b y Da vis , th is o ff

e ns e wa s a first-deg ree felony

with a ra ng e of punish m en t o f fi v e y ear s to life. See T EX . H EA L TH & S AF E TY C ODE ANN . § 4 81 .1 12(d ) ( Ve rn on 20 03 ); T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1 2. 32 (V e rn on 20 03 ). Th is offe nse plac es the entire community in da ng er, and the sentenc e assessed is at the lower e nd of the statutory rang e. D a v i s a l s o c h a l l e n g e s t h e s e n t e n c e o f t e n ye a r s f

o r u n l a w f u l p o s s e s s i o n o f

a f i r e a r m b y a felon. As a t h i rd -d egree fe lony , the trial cour t assessed the ma x imum sentence pe rmissible. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1 2. 34 (Vern on 2003 ), § 4 6. 04 (e ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 07 ). Da

vis ' ma in complaint conce rns the trial court' s decision to or der the ten-y ear sentenc e for possession of a fire arm by a fe lon to be serve d consec utive to the ten-y ear sentenc e for

ag g ravated assault. Davis does not argue that the tria l court lac ked author ity to stack the sente nce. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.08 (Ve rnon 2006). The cumulation of sentenc es does not c onstitut e cr u el an d u n usual punishment. Ste v e ns v . S tat e , 6 67 S.W. 2d

53 4, 53 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ); Ba ird v . S tat e , 455 S.W. 2d 25 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 70 ); Qu int an a v . S tat e , 777 S.W .2d 474, 480 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref' d). Davis has not shown the trial court' s decision to or der the sentenc e to be
serve d consec utively , or stacke d, cause d the sentenc e to be g rossly disproportionate. Fur ther, e vidence wa s p resented that Davis ha d been pr eviously convicted in 1998 of

the offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry and sente nced to ten y ear s' confine ment. The seve rity of the sente nces imposed are not gr ossly

disproportionate to the g ravity of the off enses.12

Finally , there is no evidence in the rec ord compa ring Davis' sentenc e with other se ntence s for simil ar crimes in T exas or compar ing the sentenc es imposed on persons in Texas with sentence s in other jurisdictions. Mullins , 2 0 8 S.W. 3d46 9; se e Fl ue lle n v . S tat e , 7 1 S. W. 3 d

8 7 0 , 8 7 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 02 , p e t. r e f' d) ; Lat

ha m v . S tate , 20 S.W .3d 63, 6 9 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. re f' d). Davis' se cond point of er ror is over

ruled. F or the re a so ns state d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: J une 13, 2008 Date D ecide d: J une 18, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh