DA 10-0492

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2011 MT 72N

MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

ANGELA B. WETZSTEON and GEORGE H. CORN,

 Defendants and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV-10-222/3

Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Michael E. Spreadbury (Self-Represented), Hamilton, Montana

For Appellee:

Michael R. King, Department of Administration, Risk Management &

Tort Defense Division, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 16, 2011

 Decided: April 12, 2011

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

April 12 2011
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Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports.

¶2 Michael Spreadbury appeals the Twenty-First Judicial District Court’s order 

granting summary judgment to Angela Wetzsteon and George Corn. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 In October 2006, Spreadbury was charged with assault. The case was assigned to 

the Ravalli County Justice Court. Wetzsteon was a third-year law student at the time and 

was interning for the Ravalli County Attorney’s Office under the Montana Supreme 

Court’s Student Practice Rule (the Rule). George Corn was the Ravalli County Attorney 

who authorized Wetzsteon to handle cases. Wetzsteon was approved to represent Ravalli 

County in the prosecution of Spreadbury. 

¶4 On January 5, 2007, Spreadbury entered a not guilty plea in Justice Court. He was 

released on his own recognizance but was expressly required to appear in court for 

subsequent proceedings. Spreadbury’s trial was scheduled for July 31, 2007. On July 30, 

the Ravalli County deputy county attorney moved for a continuance on the ground the 

victim was unable to appear at the July 31 trial. Spreadbury’s counsel was invited to 

respond to the motion but declined. The Justice Court first denied the motion but after 

reviewing the county attorney’s motion to reconsider, granted it. Trial was set for August 
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8, 2007. Spreadbury’s counsel was again contacted and notified of the August 8 trial date 

and said that “will work.”

¶5 On August 6, 2007, Spreadbury’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charge on 

the grounds that Spreadbury had not received a speedy trial and on discovery issues. The 

judge denied the motion. Spreadbury’s counsel appeared at the August 8 trial but 

Spreadbury did not. He was found guilty in absentia. The judge issued a bench warrant 

for his arrest. On August 16, he was arrested and taken into custody. Spreadbury was 

sentenced to 30 days in jail and fines and costs totaling approximately $1,100. 

¶6 On August 22, Spreadbury appealed his conviction to the Twenty-First Judicial 

District Court. On November 26, 2007, Spreadbury moved to dismiss his assault charge 

on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial. The District Court granted the 

motion on January 22, 2008. On April 26, 2010, Spreadbury filed this civil action against 

Wetzsteon and her supervisor, Corn, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. On 

May 24, 2010, Wetzsteon and Corn moved for summary judgment. On August 25, 2010, 

the District Court granted Wetzsteon and Corn’s motion. 

ISSUE

¶7 A restatement of the issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting 

Wetzsteon and Corn’s motion for summary judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 On appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment, our standard of 

review is de novo, and we apply the criteria set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56. “Summary 

judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ehrman v. Kaufman, 2010 MT 

284, ¶ 10, 358 Mont. 519, 246 P.3d 1048 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Spreadbury asserts on appeal that summary judgment was inappropriate because 

(1) an unlicensed law student may not act as a lawyer in a criminal proceeding; (2)

prosecutorial immunity is not available to the law student and her supervisor; (3) the 

District Court erred in ignoring his claim of criminal contempt based on Wetzsteon’s 

violation of the Student Practice Rule; and (4) Corn, as Wetzsteon’s supervisor, was 

personally liable under the Student Practice Rule in the event Wetzsteon is found to be in 

violation of the Rule.

¶10 In granting Wetzsteon and Corn’s motion for summary judgment, the District 

Court, without analysis, concluded Wetzsteon and Corn had prosecutorial immunity from 

all of the claims raised by Spreadbury. The court further concluded that Spreadbury 

presented no facts creating a material question; rather, he merely set forth speculative and 

conclusory statements. As such, the District Court ruled Wetzsteon and Corn were 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The court dismissed Spreadbury’s 

complaint with prejudice. 

¶11 Reviewing the record in this case and the relevant provisions of the Student 

Practice Rule, we conclude neither Wetzsteon nor Corn violated the Rule. Additionally, 

had Wetzsteon or Corn failed to strictly comply with the Rule, Spreadbury has presented 

no legal authority to support his argument that such lack of compliance deprives a student 

prosecutor or the supervising prosecutor of prosecutorial immunity. Lastly, and again 
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assuming arguendo that Wetzsteon and Corn were not in strict compliance with the Rule, 

Spreadbury has failed to demonstrate how such lack of compliance could have 

proximately caused any of the injuries and damages he claims.

¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of 

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The 

issues in this case are legal and are controlled by settled Montana law, which the District 

Court correctly interpreted. 

¶13 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT