### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT S eptember 14 , 2 005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Ti mothy J
. Corrig an, United States District J udg e for the Middle District of F lorida, * sitti ngby desig nation. [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1427 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 01-00841 -CR- 1-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us CHARLES LVONNE SMI TH, JR., D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the N orthern District of Ge orgia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 14, 200 5) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, FAY, Cir cu it Ju dg e, an d C ORRIGAN , * District Judge.2

PE R CU RIA M: Af ter three trials, Charles Sm ith, Jr. wa s convicted of arm ed bank robbery
a n dth e u s e o f

af i r e a rm i n t h a tr o b b e ry. H e n o wap p e a l s . We a f f i rm.

Ba ck gr ound

A. The Robberies

A cc or din g to the G ove rn m en t, on the e ve nin g of 6 N ove m be r 2001 , D ef en dant C harl es S m ith , Jr
. a nd T odd G ri ff in dro ve f ro m D al ton , G eo rg ia , to A tlanta , G eo rg ia
. I n r out e, w hil e G ri ff in w ai te d inthe c ar , S m ithr obbe d a Country Cupboard conveni ence store. T he two procee ded to a BP convenience st or e, whi ch Sm it h a ls o ro bb edwhi le Griff in wait edin th e car . Fo llo w ing the c onve nie nc e sto re r obbe ri es , S m itha nd G ri ff in dro ve to a m ote l, w he re S m ithc he ck ed int o ar oom . G ri ff

in t es tif ie d th at la te r that m or

nin g

-- a ft er sun ri se - - Sm ithpr opos ed that the y r ob a bank. A ft er

G ri ff in r ef use d, Sm ithle ft
. S m ithr et

ur ne d a ppr oxi m at el y

45 m inu te s late r an d th re wse ve ra l r oll s of bil ls o n th e be d, te lli ng G ri ff in tha t he w oul d no t ge t any of the m one y

be ca use of hi s re fu sa l t o p art ic ip at e.In c on tr a st, the de fe ns e a lle g e s th at Smi th w a s d ri ve n to At lanta

by his e x-w if

e and me t G ri ff in 1 at the motel. The de fense contests Smith’s participation in the bank robbe ry . 3 Ro sa ly n D av is, ate lle r at

the P ea ch tr ee N at ion al Bank, te sti fi ed that sh ortly af te r 11 a
. m . , S m ithappr oa ch ed he r, poi nte d a

sil ve r se m iauto m at ic pis tol , a nd
as ke d he r fo r m one y . A ft er she hande d hi m

$5, 000. 00, S m ithr anout of the bank. 1 Betw een nine and twelve day s after the robberies, three w itnesses ident ified Sm ith in p hoto graphic lineups
. Rosalyn Davis, the bank teller, w as asked to view six ph otos. Of

all six persons p hoto graphed, only Sm ith was shown in front of a ci nd er b lo ckwall . Davi s i de nt ifi edSm it h i n t he li ne up an d a ga in at t ria l.

B. T he T ri al s
Sm ithw as ind ic te d ontw o c ount s of a rm ed r obbe ry , one c ount

of bank robbery , and three counts of usi ng a firearm during a viol ent crim e. T he j ury a c qu i t t e dS mi t h o f

t h e c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e r o b b e r i e s a n do f t h e t w o r e l a t e df

i r e a rms co unt s in200 2, but

the j ur y w as una ble to re ac h ave rd ic t onthe bank r obbe ry a nd
as soc ia te d gun c ount . I n January 200 3, S m ithw as r etri ed

on those c ount s. T he j ury wa s again unable to reach a ver dict. I n May 2003 , S m ith was tried f

or a third ti m e.4

At tria l, the district court perm itted testim ony about the conv enience store
ro bbe ri es . I n a ddi tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt pe rm itt ed se ve ra l of

the e y ew itn es se s to di sc us s t he ir l ev el of c ert ai nt y ab ou t t he ir i de nt ifi cat io n o f Sm it h a s t he rob be r. T he dis tr ic t c ourt pr ohi bit ed S m ithf ro m pr es en tin g th e te sti m ony of a n e xpe rt in the field of ey ew itness id entification. T he court also refused to provide an ins tr uc tio n r eg ar din g c er

ta in i ssu es of

e y ew itn es s id en tif

ic at ion
. The jury fo un d S m it h g ui lt y on bo th co un ts .
D isc uss ion

A. Collateral E stopp el

Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the G ove rn m en t’ s pr es en ta tio n of te sti m ony

a nd evidence about the conv enience store robberies - - despite his earlier acquittal --
wa s b arre db y t h e c o l l at er al es t o p p el ru l e o f t h e D o ub l e J eo p ar d y Cl au s e. We
re vie wde nov o S m ith ’ s c oll at er al e sto ppe l c la im
. U nit ed S ta te s v. G il, 142 F
. 3d 13 98 , 14 01 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ). T he doc tr ine of

c oll at er al e sto ppe l pr ovi de s th at “ w he n an is sue of

ult im at e fa ct ha s on ce be ende te rm ine d by ava lid a nd f ina l j udgm en t, that i ssu e cannot5

ag ai n be li tig at ed

be tw ee n th e sa m e part ie s ina ny f uture law sui t. ” A she v. Sw enson, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194 (1970). But, collateral e stopp el does not op erate as a per se bar against the adm issio n -- in a late r trial - - of evidence used in an ear lier tr ia l tha t r es ult ed

in ana cquitta l. D ow lin g v. U nit ed S ta te s, 110 S
. Ct
. 668 , 672 (1990). E vidence from

an ear lier trial is only

prohibit ed if it relates to facts that
we re “ necessarily

established” by

the ear lier j udgm ent. United States v. River a, 77 F.3d 1348 , 1352 (11th Cir. 1996). To asce rtain whether

an issue was a ctually

determ ined when the j ury en te re d age ne ra l ve rd ic t, “ a co urt [ m ust ] e xa m ine the r ec or d of apr ior pr oc ee din g, ta kin g in to a cc ount

the ple ad ing s, e vid en ce , c harg e, a nd o the r re le vant m atte r, a nd
co nc lud e w he the r a ratio na l j ur y c oul d have gr ound ed

it s ve rd ic t up on an is sue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose fr om consideration.” A she, 90 S
. Ct
. a t 11 95 ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed ). T he “ bur de n [ is] on the de fe ndant t o de m onstrate that the iss ue w hose r el iti ga tio n he se ek s to fo recl os e was act ua ll y

de ci de d.” Dowl in g, 1 10 S.Ct . at 6 73
. Be ca use a n a cquitta l of

ac ri m ina l c harg e doe s no t “pr ove that the de fe ndant is in no cen t [b ut ] m erel y

pro ve s t he ex is te nc e o f a rea so nabl e d ou bt as t o h is gu il t,”
we will later

allow e vidence of the pertinent prior conduct where w e re quire aIn Dowling , the Supreme Court c oncluded that the ear lier acquittal of a robber y char g e did not 2 prec lude the introduction of testimony under Rule 404( b) of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e in a later tri a l f o r b an k r o b b e r

y . T h e Co urt e xp la in e d th at - - in c o n tr a s t to th e r e a s o n a b le d o u b t standard require d for a

convictio n -- the Rule 404(b) standar d only require d for a dmissibi lity that a jury

be ab l e to “‘ re as o n ab l y co n cl u d e th at th e act o cc urr ed an d th at th e de fe n d an twa s th e a ct o r. ’” Do wl i n g, 110 S.Ct . at 672 (quotingHuddleston v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501 (1988)). 6 low er standard of pr oof
. D ow lin g, 110 S
. Ct
. a t 67 2 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. O ne Assortm ent of 89 Firear

m s, 104 S. Ct. 1099 , 1104 (1984)). 2 H er e, the e ar lie r j ur

y r en de re d age ne ra l ve rd ic t onboth c harg es on the
co nve nie nc e sto re r obbe ri es . Upon ex am ini ng the r ec or d, w e co nc lud e that the se ge ne ra l ve rd ic ts d o no t r ep re se nt f ind ing s of

tr ue inn oc en ce that pr ec lud e the adm issio n of evidence. Sm ithpr es en te d tw o di ff

er en t de fe nse s to the r obbe ry c harg es : an a lib i and a la ck of ne xus to i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . B ec au se the j ur

y r at ion al ly

c oul d have ba se d it s a cquitta l onthe G ove rn m en t’ s f ai lur e to d em onstrate ane xus to i nte rs ta te
co m m er ce , S m ith ’ s f

ac tua l i nnoc en ce of

the r obbe ri es w as not

“ ne ce ssari ly established.” Sm itha lte rn at ive ly

a rg ue s th at

his a cquitta l onthe gunc ount s r ep re se nts a determ ination of his factual innocence. H e contends that, because it w as clear that the r obbe r use d and c ar

ri ed agun , the onl y

que sti on l ef

t f or the j ur y to de te rm ine
wa s whether he com

m itted the robbery

and that his acquit tal indicates that the jury
co nc lud ed

that he did

not . S m ith ’ s c ont en tio n a t the e ar lie r tr ia l di d f oc us o nWe a lso no te tha t, e ve n if we we re to a ss um e th at th e gun-count a c qu itt a l e sta

bli sh e d th at a 3 rea so na ble

do ub t e xi s t s o n whe the r S mith c omm itt e d th e ro bb e ri e s, the e vid e nc e wa s st ill a dmi ssi ble under D owling be cause of the lowe r standa rd o f p ro o f: to admit the evidence in the trial under revie w now, the Gover

nment did not have to establish -- be y on d a re as on ab ledo ub t -- that Smi th committed the robber ies. Instead, under Rule 404(b) of t he Feder al Rules of Evidence, similar ac t evidenc e is pe rmissible if the jury can reasonably conc lude that the act occur red. See Dowling , 110 S.Ct . at 672. 7 questio ning his participation at all in the robberies, without m uch (if any ) ef

fort spent on contesting the use of a f irear m during th eir com

m issio n. But the earlier
co urt’ s in str

uc tio n onthe f

ir earm s c ount s r equir ed

the j ur y to de te rm ine that the following three acts w ere proved bey ond a reasonable doub t: 1) Sm ith comm itted the robberies, 2) during and in relation to their com m issio n, Sm ith used o r carried a fire arm , and 3) Sm ith used o r carried the f irear m knowingly
. W ithou t further evidence, w e cannot decipher w hat the j ury ’ s acquittal precisely determ ined: that Sm ith was innocent of the robberies, that S m ith did not carry a fir earm , or that S mi t h d i dn o th av e t h e p r o p e r i n t e n t . A n d , e v e n i f

t h e a c qu i t t a l o f

t h e f i r e a rms ch ar ge w as ba se d onaf

ind ing that S m ithw as inn oc en t - - unde r fe de ra l l aw- - of the a rm ed r obbe ri es f

or w hic h he w as c harg ed , thi s c onc lus ion , a s w e ha ve dis cu sse d, m ay

r ep re se nt the j ur

y ’ s de te rm inatio n of

ala ck of ne xus to i nte rs ta te
co m m er ce , r athe r than af

ind ing that he in fa ct

did not r ob. 3

B. Ey ew itness Identification Testim ony IssuesSmit h claims that the Supreme Court’ s decision in Sim mons v. Sout h Carolina, 114 S.Ct. 2187 4 (1 99 4) , s tand s f

or the pr op os iti on

tha t a tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to c or re c t any jur

y mis pe rc e pti on

re su lts in a due pr ocess violation. We, howeve r, do not rea d Simm ons this way . Simm ons stands for a mor e na rr owpro po si ti on: br ie fl y state d, that du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s a jur y to b e inf

or me d - - i n deter mining whe ther to impose a de ath s ent e nc e or lif e im pr iso nm e nt -- that a

defe ndant’s life sentenc e re nders him par ole inelig ible. 8 1
. A d mi s s i b i l i t y o f

Te s t i mo n y o n C e rt a i n t y Sm ith contend s that the dist rict court er red in perm itting ey ew itnesses D av is, S hie lds a nd R obe rt s to c om m en t onthe ir

le ve l of c er ta inty w he n te sti fy ing ab ou t t he ir i de nt ifi cat io n o f Sm it h. W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to a dm it ev ide nc e fo r cl ear ab use of dis cr et ion
. U nit ed

S ta te s v. S m ith , 122 F
. 3d 1 355, 135 7 ( 11th C ir
. 199 7)
. N o c as e law in this Circuit or the Supre m e Court has been brought to our attention th at pr ohi bit s th e adm iss ionof te sti m ony

by a n e y ew itn es s a

bout the ir le ve l of certa inty in an identification. N or wa s the testim ony precluded under the Federa l 4 Rules of E vidence. W e have never c onclud ed that testim ony about an ey ew itn es s’ s le ve l of

c er ta inty ha s ate nde nc y

to co nf use the j ur

y so tha t i t sh oul d be pr ec lud ed

pur suant t o R

ule 403 ’ s pr ohi bit ionof

inf orm at ionc re at ing “ unf

ai r prej udice, confusion of the issu es, or m isleading th e j ury .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In fa ct , in as se ssi ng the r el ia bil ity of a n un ne ce ssari ly

sug ge sti ve ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e, w e co nsi de r the le ve l of aw itn es s’ s c er

ta inty . C iko ra

v. D ugge r, 840 F. 2d 8 93, 895 ( 11th C ir
. 198 8) ( dis cu ssi ng N ei l v. Bi gge rs , 93 S
. Ct
. 375 , 382The we apon-f ocus ef fec t is a theory

about the adve rse a ffe ct on memory o f t h e p resence of a 5 wea pon. We re je c t Smith’ s c la im that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y de c lin ingto h old

a he ari ngor

oth e rw ise 6 decliningto consider whe th er t h e p ro ff ere d testimony

would assist the trier of f act. The district court’s ( albeit brief) re- consideration of the ey ewitness-ide ntification expert testimony in this t rial was not the fir st instance in which the c ourt had re viewed this testimony . And the district cour t specific ally

ref ere nced its more thor oug h ruling from Smith’s previous trial, wh ere the cour t addre ssed the topics on which Dr. L eippe planned to te stify and explained how the cour t rea ched the c on c lus ion

that su c h te sti mony

wo uld no t a ssi st t

he tr ie r o f f

a c t. 9 (1 972) ). W e not e that the e va luatio n of a n e y ew itn es s’ s te sti m ony is pr ec ise ly

the kin d of a na ly sis that i s r es er

ve d f or the j ur y . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bi llu e, 994 F
. 2d 1 5 6 2 , 1 5 6 5 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ( “Th i s c o u rtd o e s n o te v a l u a t e wi t n e s s e s ’ c r e d i b i l i t y. Such determ ination s are w ithin the exclusive provin ce of the j ury .” ). T herefor e, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n inpe rm itt ing the e y ew itn es s testim ony on this m atter. 2. E xpe rt

on E y ew itn es s I de nti fi catio n Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by e xc lud ing the te sti m ony

of D r. Mi ch ae l L ei ppe , a n e xpe rt on the a re a of

m em or y a nd p er ce pti on, w ith out
co nduc tin g an a

ppr opr ia te inquir

y . D r. L ei ppe w oul d have c om m en te d on1) the la ck of c or re la tio n be tw ee n c er

ta inty a nd a cc ur ac y ; 2) the w ea pon- fo cu s e ff

ec t; 5
a n d3 ) t h e i mp a c to f

s t r e s s o n memo ry. 6 W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e xc lud e ev ide nc e fo r ab use of dis cr et ion
. S m ith , 122 F
. 3d a t 13 57. T o de te rm ine w he the r ex pe rt te sti m ony

isIn Stein v. Rey nolds Sec., I nc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982), we c oncluded that Unit B panel 7 or en ba nc cour t decisions of the for

mer F ifth circuit ar e bindingprec edent in this Circuit. We rea ched this dec ision in S mith by ref ere ncingour r easoningin Thevis: 1) such testimony 8 would permit a witness to comment on the c redib i l i t y o f another witness; 2) the proble ms of ey ew i tn es s i d en t i fi ca t i o n co u l d b e ad dre s s ed th ro u gh cr o s s -e x am i n at i o n ; an d 3 ) aj ury co u l d we i gh the problems of e y ewitness identification throug h common-sense analy sis. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1357-59. Smith h a s p re se nte d d ata tha t mi g ht u nd e rm ine pa

rt s o f t his rat ion a le . H e sp e c if ic a lly prese nts evidence tendingt o d em o n s t ra te that the lac k of cor relation between a

witness’s level of c e rt a int y and the a c c ur a c y

of the ir ide nti fi c atio n is no t within the common sense of the jury . But a s in o ur de c isi on in S mith, we fe e l li mit e d by the pr ior -p ane l- pr e c e de nt r ule : on ly a de c isi on of thi s Court en banc or the Supreme Court ma y overr ule Thevis and Smit h. See Smit h, 122 F.3d at 1359. 10 adm iss ibl e unde r Fe de ra l R ule of E vid en ce 702 , w e m

ust de te rm ine tw o th ing s: 1 )
w he the r the te sti m ony

is sc ie nti fi c know le dge , a nd 2 ) w he the r the te sti m ony w ill
as sis t the tr ie r of

f ac t. D au be rt v. Me rr el l D owP harm ac eu tic al s, I nc . , 113 S
. Ct
. 27 86 , 27 95 -9 6 (1 99 3)
. InU nit ed S ta te s v. T he vis , 665 F
. 2d 6 16, 641 ( 5thCi r. U nit B 1982 ) (s upe rs ed ed

by statut e on o the r gr ound s) , w e co nc lud ed that a dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t
er r in e xc lud ing pr of

fe re d e xpe rt

te sti m ony

about e y ew itn es s r el ia

bil ity be ca use w e co nc lud ed

that su chte sti m ony

doe s not as sis t the j ur

y . W e re af

fi rm ed thi s 7
co nc lus ion , pos t- D au

be rt , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. S m ith , 122 F
. 3d 1 335, 135 7- 59 ( 11th Ci r. 199 7) , w he re the de fe ndant s ough t t o pr es en t the te sti m ony of a n e xpe rt about al l thr ee of

the iss ue s w hic h S m ithsou ght to pr es en t he re . T he re fo re , ba se d on Sm ith , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n ine xc lud ing the e xpe rt te sti m ony

about the se top ic s. 8By the w ay , e v e nif th e d is tr ic t c o urt e r

r e d in e xc lu d in gth is e le me n t o f D r . L e ippe’s te st i m o n y , th e e r

r o r w a s p r o b a

b l y h ar m l e s s . T h e e y e w i tn e s s i d e n t i f i c at i o n s w e r e n o tth e lin c hp in of the prose cution’s ca se. The pr osecution g ave only limit ed attention to the witness’s leve l of cer tainty in presentingits case: only a sing le question in the Gover nment’s direc t examination of eac h of the e y ewitnesses a sked whe ther they had any “doubt” that Smith was the robbe r. As one e x ample, Todd Griff in corr oborate d the ey ewitness accounts. As another , two women -- 9 L inda Gar dner ( Smit h’s ex-g irlfriend of sever al y ear s) and he r mother - - identified Sm ith when viewingthe bank surve illance video/pictur es. Ther efor e, eve n if the district court e rre d by excluding the testimony

of an e x pert who w ould have unde rmined t he eyewitnesses’ identifications, the er ror wa s h arm le ss b e c a

us e the Go ve rnme nt p re se nte d s ub sta nti a l a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e of Smit h’ s guil t. Those cour

ts that have a dmitted ex perts like Dr . L eippe have re ache d that conclusion in part beca use the e y ewitness identification play ed a muc h more sig nificant role in the prosecution’s case
. See, e.g . United States v. L ester, 254 F.Supp.2d 602, 610 (E.D. Va. 2003) (obser ving that the Fif

th, Six th and Eig hth Circuits take this approac h). 11 W e su sp ect th atev en if t he ex cl us io n was an erro r, th e err orwas h arm le ss . Ina ddi tio n to the te sti m ony of thr ee e y ew itn es se s, the G ove rn m en t pr es en te d th e t e s t i mo n y o f

s e v e r a l o t h e r

p e o p l e l i n k i n g S mi t h t o t h e r o b b e ry. 9 3. In str

uc tio n onE y ew itn es s C er ta inty W e re view the district court’ s refusal to give a defe ndant’s r equested jury ins tr uc tio ns f or abuse of dis cr et ion
. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ch ir ino s, 112 F
. 3d 1 089, 1101 ( 11th C ir
. 199 7)
. Ar ef usa l t o gi ve ar eque ste d j ur y ins tr uc tio n is a n a

buse of dis cr et ionif

: “ 1) the ins tr

uc tio n is c or

re ct ; 2) the c ourt di d no t a ddr es s th e subs tanc e of

the ins tr uc tio n init s c harg e; a nd 3 ) the f ai lur e to g ive the ins tr

uc tio n seriouslyim

paired the defendant’ s ability to present an eff

ective defense. ” U nited St at es v. S ir an g, 70 F
. 3d 5 88, 593 ( 11th C ir
. 199 5)
. “ [W ] e ex am ine w he the r the j ur y c harg es , c onsi de re d a s aw hol e, suf fi ci en tly ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y so tha t the12

j ur or s un de rs too d th e iss ue s and w er e not m isl ed
. ” Bo gle v. Mc Cl ur e, 332 F
. 3d 1347 , 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). H er e, D ef en dant r eque ste d th e j udge to pr ovi de apr etty e la bor at e (f our pa ge s lo ng) ins tr

uc tio n onthe a cc ur ac y

of e y ew itn es s id en tif

ic at ion s. T he requested instruction included a discus sion th at em phasized a variety

of fac tors that potent ially

aff ect ey ew itness id entifications, includin g: the circum stances
sur ro undi ng the ide nti fi catio n, the a ge a nd r ac e of the e y ew itn es s, str es s, the viewing of m

ug sho ts or phot o spreads or both after the cr im inal event but b efore a la te r in- pe rs on i de nti fi catio n, the le ngth of ti m e be tw ee n th e cr im ina l e ve nt and the la te r ide nti fi catio n, the la ck of c or re la tio n be tw ee n w itn es s c onf ide nc e an d
a c c u r a c y, a n dt h e c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g v i e w i n g du r i n g t h e t i me o f t h e c r i me (including the presence of a w eapon, visibilit y and distance). The r equested ins tr uc tio n w as a rg um en ta tiv e at som e poi nts : f

or e xa m ple , “ Whe n aw ea

pon is present, the w itness’[ s] attention is d raw n to the weapon and away from the fac ial
an d ph y sic al c hara ct er ist ic s of ape rp etrator ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) r ea ds l ike oppo sit ionto the e y ew itn es s id en tif ic at ion s r athe r than gu idanc e to j ur or s a bout th ei r ro le in ev al ua ti ng th e acc ur acy of te st im on y . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d gi ve a n in str uc tio n gu idi ng the e va luatio n of ey ew itness id entification which broadly addressed the subst ance of the r equested13

ch ar ge . A lth oughthe giv enins tr uc tio n m ay

not ha ve de ta ile d every factor that D ef en dant h igh lig hte d m igh t af fe ct a n id en tif

ic at ion , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str uc tio n w as suf fi ci en tly c om pr eh en siv e to a ssi st the j ur y in ev al ua tin g th e ac cura cy of the ey ew itn es s id en tif

ic at ion s. T he c ourt i nstru ct ed the j ur y on the e ff

ec t of ci rc um stanc es sur

ro undi ng the ide nti fi catio n, the r ac e of the e y ew itn es s, str es s, the le ngth of ti m e be tw ee n th e cr im ina l e ve nt and the la te r ide nti fi catio n, a nd
c o n d i t i o n s a f

f e c t i n g e ye w i t n e s s o b s e rv a t i o n du r i n g t h e t i me o f t h e c r i me (i nc lud ing vis ibi lity

a nd d ist an ce ). T his ins tr uc tio n a ddr es se d th e subs tanc e of the potenti al problem s -- both phy sical and psy cholog ical -- that De fendant requested th e tr ia l co ur t t o e xp la in m ig ht affe ctth e acc ur acy of ey ewit ne ss id en ti fic at io ns . Fo r ex am ple , a lth oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str uc tio n di d no t sp ec if

ic al ly ad dr es s th e w ea

pon- fo cu s e ff

ec t, thi s f ac tor w as e nc om

pa sse d by the ins tr uc tio n on the e ff ec t of str es s: a j ur y c aninf er - - w ith out

ins tr uc tio n - - that the pr es en ce of
a w ea pon m ay c re at e a str es sf

ul e nvi ro nm en t, w hic h ( as the y w er e pr ope rl y ins tr uc te d) m ay

a ff ec t the a cc ur ac y

of a n id en tif

ic at ion
. A s anothe r ex am ple , on the r eque ste d in str

uc tio n a bout the e ff ec t of vie w ing m

ug s hot s or

pho to s pr ea ds (o r bo th ) aft er t he cri m in al ev en t b ut be fo re a l at er i n- pe rs on id en ti fic at io n, we believe that the district court’ s instructio n to the jury to consid er the c ircum stances
sur ro undi ng the la te r ide nti fi catio n e nc om pa sse s th is c au tio n: a

w itn es s’ s pr iorSmit h improperly ch ar ac t er i z es t his Court's opinion in the ear lier Smith case as a mandate, 10 rathe r than a

sug g estion, that a trial cour t can instruct the jur

y about the consider ations impacting on th e r e l i a b i l i ty o f e ye w i tn e s s i d e n t i f

i c at i o n . In d e n yi n g a

d e f e n d an t ' s e x p e rto ne ye w i tn e s s t e s t i m o n y, we su g g e ste d in

Smith th at po ssi ble pr ob le ms w ithe y e wi tne ss te sti mony c an be
-- and in t hat c a se we re (a l th o u ghfr o mth e ap p el l a t e o p i n i o n , we d o n o tkn o w i nwh atd et ai l ) - - h i gh l i gh t edth ro u gh jury instructions. United States v. Smi th, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997). B ut, we have never mand ate d s uc h in str

uc tio ns a s p art of the law of the Cir c uit , and it w a s n ot, on that a c c ount, an a

bu se of discre tion for the district cour t in this case to deny

the re quested instruction. 14 viewing of a picture of the D efendant is a “ circum stance” that m ay aff ect the later id en ti fic at io n. W e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ef usa l t o gi ve D ef

en dant’ s in str

uc tio n w as no a buse of dis cr et ion : the j ur

y w as suf fi ci en tly ins tr uc te d and n ot m isl ed
. 10

C. Ph oto gr ap hic L ine up

W e re vie wf

or c le ar e rr or the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n th at a n id en tif

ic at ion pr oc ed ur e w as not

und uly sug ge sti ve . C iko ra

v. D ugge r, 840 F
. 2d 8 93, 895 -9 6 (1 1t h C ir. 1 98 8)
. Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the pho tog ra phi c lin eu

p w as und

uly sug ge sti ve be ca

use 1) S m ithw as the onl y

pe rs on p re se nte d inf

ro nt o f a ci nde r blo ck

ba ck gr ound ; 2) Sm ithw or e a blu e T -s hirt - - in c ontra st t o f our of the oth er six pe opl e phot ogr ap he d - - an d th e ro bbe r w as a lle ge d to ha ve w or n ablu e T -s hirt; 3) the15

officer told witness Davis that the susp ect w as in the lineup; and 4) the officer
co nduc tin g th e lin eu

p w as the le ad

de te ct ive on the c as e (and the re fo re pot en tia lly ga ve no n- ve rb al cu es ). A l i n eu p i s n o tu n du l y s u g g es t i v e mer el y b ec au s e t h e d ef en d an t ’s phot ogr ap h c anbe dis tin gui she d f ro m the oth er s. S ee Ci ck or a, 840 F
. 2d a t 89 6- 97 (d istri ct c ourt di d no t c le ar ly

e rr by a dm itt ing ide nti fi catio n r es ult ing f ro m li ne up w he re onl y

de fe ndant’ s ph oto ha d he igh t m ar kin gs i n th e ba ck gr ound

a nd the defendant was a

differ ent race than several other persons phot ographed). I n additio n, w e have concluded that a lineup was not sug gestive where the witnesses
we re told that the susp ect w as in the lineup. Id. And, here, we note that -- other than alleging the pot en tia l fo r anof fi ce r w ho know s w hic h ph oto gr ap h c ont ai ns the sus pe ct

to pr ovi de non -v er

ba l c ue s - - Sm ithha s pr es en te d no e vid en ce of sp eci fic ge st ur es or s ig na ls th atth e o ffi cer g av e th atin flu en cedth e id en ti fic at io n. Mor eo ve r, upo n our re vie w ing the a ct ua l pi ct ur es use d, w e ag re e w iththe
m agistrate j udge that th e m en in the lineup had “ subs tantial sim ilarity in facial feature s, com

plexion , f acial hair, and general body ty pe and appearance .” T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt w as c or re ct in de te rm ini ng tha t the li ne up was n ot un du ly sug ge st iv e.16

D
. L im itatio n of

Cr oss -E xa m inatio n
Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by pr ohi bit ing him

f ro m c ro ssexam ining Dawn Shields and Linda Roberts on their alleged bias (Sm ith believes that because he w as acquitted of com m itting the robberies in which they we re vic tim s - - de spi te the ir

e ar lie r te sti m ony

in tho se tr ia ls - - the y

ha d am oti ve to
en sur e he w as c onvi ct ed

in the tr ia l f

or the bank r obbe ry ). B ec au se S m ithdid not obj ec t t o th e lim itatio n, w e re vie wthe de ci sio n f or pla in e rr or . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Hawkins, 905 F. 2d 14 89, 1493 (11t h Cir. 1990 ). Th e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’s l i mi t a t i o n wa s r e a s o n ab l e . Ot h e r t h a n h i s o w n t h e o ry, Sm ith provi ded no evid ence that the cler ks’ testim ony

wa s biased. Se e U nited St at es v. G onz al ez , 71 F
. 3d 8 19, 835 -3 6 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ( lim itatio n of c ro ssex am in at io n app ro pr ia te wher e n o e vi de nc e su gg es ti ng th atwit ne ss was b ia se d)
. A nd the c ourt’ s pr ohi bit ionof S m ith ’ s qu es tio nin g a

bout thi s is sue w as e xpr es sly subject to being lifted in the event of any indication of bias: Sm ith was perm itted to c ro ss the w itn es se s onthe ir bia s if the ir te sti m ony

e ith er de viate d si gni fi cantl y from the ear lier trial or they

becam e “ vociferous.” In addition , the j ury wa s inform ed of the underly ing events th at w ouldhave cre ated the alleged bias: they kne wthat S m ithw as a lle ge dly inv olv ed in the c onve nie nc e sto re r obbe ri es a ndWe n e e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r t he Go ve rnme nt’ s r e fu sa l to fi le a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e mot ion

in 11 retribution of a

defe ndant’s exerc ise of his Six th Amendment rights i s an “unconstituti onal motive,” beca use we conclude that the district court did not clea rly err in finding tha t that was not Gover nment’s motivation here. 17 w as a cquitte d. T he re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t pl ai nly e rr in pla ci ng this

“ reasonable lim it[] ” on Sm ith’s c ross exam ination of Shields and Roberts. S ee Dela ware v . Van Ars da ll , 10 6 S .Ct. 1 43 1, 1 43 5 (1 98 6)
.
E
. D ow nw ar d D ep ar

tur e fo r Se nte nc ing

W e re j ec t S m ith ’ s c la im

that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fa ili ng t o r equir e the Governm ent to file a downw ard departure for substantial assis tance. T he district court did no t clear ly

err in finding that Sm ith was unable to provid e substanti al
as sis tanc e in the se nte nc ing of his f orm er c el lm at e af

te r Sm ithha d c al le d in to que sti on the ve ra ci ty

of “ j ai lho use sni tc he s” him se lf
. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. 11 Carl son, 87 F
. 3d 4 40, 447 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ( “ [w ] e re vie wf or c le ar e rr or the district court’ s factual f

indin gs regarding the defendant’ s subs tantial assistance.”)

Co nc lus ion For the fore goin g reasons, w e A FFI RM Sm ith’s c onvi ctions and s entence.