U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

28–972 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–69] 

SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: 

PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 7, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio, Vice Chair 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

DAN SENNOTT, Professional Staff Member 

CRAIG GREENE, Professional Staff Member 

DANIELLE STEITZ, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Coffman, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel .................................................................................... 1 

Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel ........................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Fine, Glenn A., Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Defense .................................................................................................................. 4 

Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air Force, United 

States Air Force ................................................................................................... 8 

McConville, GEN James C., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, United 

States Army .......................................................................................................... 34 

Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, United States 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 35 

Ottignon, BGen David A., USMC, Inspector General of the Marine Corps, 

United States Marine Corps ............................................................................... 9 

Quantock, LTG David E., USA, Inspector General of the Army, United States 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 6 

Shelanski, VADM Herman, USN, Naval Inspector General, United States 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 7 

Walters, Gen Glenn M., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

United States Marine Corps ............................................................................... 36 

Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, United 

States Air Force ................................................................................................... 36 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Coffman, Hon. Mike ......................................................................................... 57 

Fine, Glenn A. ................................................................................................... 59 

Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D. ................................................................................. 97 

McConville, GEN James C. ............................................................................. 107 

Moran, ADM William F. .................................................................................. 113 

Ottignon, BGen David A. ................................................................................. 103 

Quantock, LTG David E. .................................................................................. 87 

Shelanski, VADM Herman .............................................................................. 92 

Walters, Gen Glenn M. .................................................................................... 125 

Wilson, Gen Stephen W. .................................................................................. 118 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chart displayed by Ms. Speier ........................................................................ 133 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. McSally ....................................................................................................... 140 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 137 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 145 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 148 

(1) 

SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: 

PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 7, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Coffman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE COFFMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

MILITARY PERSONNEL 

Mr. COFFMAN. This subcommittee hearing is called to order. 

I want to welcome everyone to this morning’s Military Personnel 

Subcommittee hearing. The purpose of today’s hearing is to receive 

testimony from the Department of Defense and the services regarding efforts they have taken to investigate and hold senior leaders 

accountable for misconduct and to understand what programs and 

policies are in place to prevent misconduct. 

Our military enjoys the highest confidence rating by far of any 

institution in American society. This well-deserved reputation has 

been earned through the service and sacrifice of millions of brave 

men and women. One by-product of this reputation is that the military and its leaders are held to a much higher standard than almost any other institution, and I know that you wouldn’t have it 

any other way. 

Consequently, the misconduct of a few can greatly impact the 

military’s hard-earned reputation. When the misconduct involves 

flag or general officers, the negative effects are even greater. These 

incidents of senior leader misconduct, even though relatively rare, 

not only hurt the victims involved, but can have a lasting impact 

on the readiness of the unit in which the senior leader has served. 

While one incident of senior leader misconduct is too many, it is 

important to acknowledge that the vast majority of senior leaders 

serve with distinction. It is also important to acknowledge that 

some of the acts of misconduct that the military investigates and 

punishes would not be investigated, much less punished, in the civilian world. Nonetheless, military leadership must continue to ensure that all senior leaders uphold the highest standards of ethical 

conduct, and when senior leaders fall short, they must be held appropriately accountable. 

We will hear from two panels today. The first panel consists of 

the Department of Defense and services’ inspectors general. They 
2 

will discuss the reporting and investigation of senior leader misconduct, in addition to the types of cases they investigate. 

For the second panel, we are honored to have the Vice Chiefs of 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. They will discuss what happens to 

those IG [inspector general] investigations, if they are substantiated, how they hold individuals accountable, and they will provide 

an overview of their prevention programs. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about ethics 

and mentorship programs in place to prevent misconduct. I am also 

interested to hear how the services investigate misconduct allegations and hold wrongdoers accountable. Additionally, I would like 

to know what trends had developed with regard to the types of 

issues that are being reported and investigated. Finally, I look forward to hearing what additional actions can be taken to further reduce incidents of senior leader misconduct. 

I would like to make two other administrative points. First, it is 

important to note that the Department of Defense’s common definition of senior official includes an officer in the grade of O–7 and 

above, including officers who have been selected for promotion to 

O–7, or civilian member of the Senior Executive Service. For the 

purposes of today’s hearing and consistent with the jurisdiction of 

this subcommittee, the witnesses have been asked to focus on misconduct by senior military officers in the rank of O–7 select and 

above. 

I would also like to remind the members that the witnesses 

today may not be able to answer certain questions regarding specific cases if the answer would compromise an ongoing investigation or would give rise to an accusation that the military has prejudged the outcome of a pending investigation. 

Before I introduce our first panel, let me offer the ranking member, Ms. Speier, an opportunity to make her opening remarks. 

Ms. Speier. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffman can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

MILITARY PERSONNEL 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today and for your service to our 

country. You know, one of the core tenets of the armed services and 

of our country is that no one is above the law. From the most recent recruit to the most senior officer, all service members are subject to the same UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] laws and 

the same ethical code of conduct. But there is a phrase in the military that goes like this, ‘‘Different spanks for different ranks.’’ And 

as Don Christensen, the former general counsel for the Air Force 

said, and I quote, ‘‘An everyday troop is court-martialed for what 

a general officer is given a slap on the wrist.’’ 

So it is with great sorrow and anger that I have read countless 

reports of misconduct among senior leaders, including general officers and admirals. This is borne out by the data. Buried on page 

66 of an 85-page DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General 
3 

[IG] report on, quote, ‘‘Top DOD Management Challenges,’’ unquote, is a finding of a 13 percent increase in complaints alleging 

misconduct by senior officials from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 

2017, from 710 to 803. An increase in substantiated rate increase 

from 26 percent to 37 percent. The most common allegations involved personal misconduct including improper relationships, improper personnel actions, misuse of governmental resources, and 

travel violations. 

In my time on this committee, I have heard over and over the 

importance of the chain of command and how it leads to better justice outcomes, but many senior leaders who should be the essential 

core of the chain of command are not being held to the same standard as the rank and file. This corrupts fairness, justice, and morale. 

To illustrate the severity of this problem, I want to highlight five 

cases of senior leader misconduct from just the last few years. As 

you will see, these senior leaders committed serious crimes and 

rule violations, yet received only light administrative, not judicial, 

punishment. Most got no public scrutiny until journalists inquired 

about their cases. 

Army Major General John Custer had an inappropriate relationship with a woman, had his staff buy her sexy clothes, and lied to 

investigators about it. Lucky for him, General Martin Dempsey, 

then Custer’s commander, removed, and I am underscoring this, removed the substantiated account of an inappropriate relationship 

from Custer’s record. How do you do that? So the review board 

could only consider lesser charges. Custer retired at a rank and 

kept his pension. So he retired at rank and kept his pension. The 

public only knows about this incident because a whistleblower told 

USA Today. 

Second, Air Force General Arthur Lichte was alleged to have coerced sex from a subordinate in 2007 and 2009. His victim believes 

she had to reciprocate the general’s advances due to his rank and 

position. Lichte was reprimanded and demoted to major general, 

but not for command rape but for a, quote, ‘‘inappropriate sexual 

relationship.’’ 

Army Major General Ralph Baker assaulted a woman at an offbase event. For this he received a letter of reprimand and retired 

as a brigadier general. The public learned about this 9 months 

after it happened following a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] 

request. 

Army Major General David Haight’s exploits earned him the 

nickname ‘‘swinging general.’’ He had an 11-year affair and regularly swapped sexual partners, which made him a foreign intelligence threat and target. As punishment, Haight was reprimanded 

and retired as a lieutenant colonel. 

But make no mistake, not all misconduct is sexual. At West 

Point, the man in charge of teaching future leaders ethics, Superintendent Lieutenant General David Huntoon, Jr., made his staff 

work at private charity dinners, give free driving lessons, and feed 

a friend’s cat. Huntoon received a reprimand and retired at rank. 

The IG report was kept secret for more than a year and only released via FOIA as Huntoon neared retirement. 
4 

Colleagues, these are just 5 stories out of an estimated 500 since 

2013. They don’t even include criminal misconduct of the type we 

have seen in the Fat Leonard case in which 330 Navy personnel, 

including 60 current and retired admirals, are under investigation 

for accepting bribes and gifts. And these aren’t just ordinary bribes 

and gifts. Some of them included an $18,000 dinner or a $50,000 

stay in a swank hotel. Sometimes these bribes and gifts were exchanged for revealing classified information. But I picked them because they are illustrative of a deep and systematic problem in the 

armed services. 

Leaders set the standard, and when that leadership is toxic, it 

drips down to all levels of the military. Based on the DOD Inspector General’s own data, it is clear that the current system of deterrence is not working. In today’s hearing, I want to hear from all 

our panelists about what they are doing to exert sufficient oversight. In the case of the inspector general, how are they working 

to increase accountability and transparency? In the case of the vice 

chiefs, what are they doing to combat criminal behavior and corruption? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I thank the ranking member. 

We will give each witness the opportunity to present his or her 

testimony and each member an opportunity to question the witnesses for 5 minutes. We would also respectfully remind the witnesses to summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the high 

points of your written testimony in 5 minutes or less. Your written 

comments and statements will be made part of the hearing record. 

Let me welcome our first panel. Mr. Glenn A. Fine, Principal 

Deputy Inspector General, United States Department of Defense; 

Lieutenant General David E. Quantock, Inspector General of the 

United States Army; Vice Admiral Herman Shelanski, Naval Inspector General; Lieutenant General Stayce D. Harris, Inspector 

General of the Air Force; Brigadier General David A. Ottignon, Inspector General of the Marine Corps. 

With that, Mr. Fine, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. FINE. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, members 

of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the 

work of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General regarding senior official misconduct, prevention, and accountability. 

In my written statement, I describe how the DOD OIG [Office of 

Inspector General] investigates allegations of senior official misconduct and oversees military service IG investigations of these allegations. In addition, I provide statistics and trends on the number of misconduct complaints, the types of misconduct, the number 

of investigations, the timeliness of investigations, and substantiation rates for both the DOD OIG and the service IG investigations. I also provide additional statistics for a particular type of 

misconduct: allegations of retaliation and reprisal by senior officials 
5 

against whistleblowers. In my oral testimony, I would like to highlight a few key points from that statement. 

First, I believe it is important to recognize that the vast majority 

of senior officials in the DOD perform their challenging jobs with 

dedication and integrity. My experience, both as the IG of the Justice Department overseeing the DOJ [Department of Justice] and 

the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] for 11 years and from my 

experience for over 2 years performing the duties of the DOD Inspector General, is that only a very small percentage of these senior officials fail to uphold the high ideals and ethics required of 

their critical positions. However, some do commit misconduct. 

When they do, they need to be held accountable. The DOD OIG and 

the service IGs, therefore, seek to investigate allegations of misconduct in a thorough, fair, professional, and timely way. 

Second, the data I present in my written statement show that 

there was a significant increase in the number of complaints alleging misconduct by senior DOD officials from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, and since then the number of these complaints has 

been steady. During the same period, the number of allegations 

warranting investigation by the DOD OIG or service and component IGs has decreased. 

Overall, the number of senior official cases with any findings of 

substantiated misconduct rose between fiscal year 2008 and 2012 

from 40 to 85, but has declined since then to 49 in fiscal year 2017. 

However, I want to make clear our recognition that any misconduct 

by a senior official is unacceptable. 

Third, while the types of substantiated allegations against senior 

officials involve a broad range of misconduct, the allegations primarily fell within five main categories, which I describe in my written statement. Within these categories, there are several areas of 

particular concern. For example, there are a number of substantiated allegations against senior officials engaged in inappropriate 

relationships, and these cases have received substantial public attention. 

Fourth, the DOD OIG also has a criminal investigative arm, the 

Defense Criminal Investigative Service, DCIS, to handle investigations of criminal allegations. Currently, the biggest case DCIS is 

handling involves Glenn Defense Marine Asia [GDMA] and its 

owner, Leonard Francis, widely known as the Fat Leonard case. 

GDMA provided husbanding services to U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, such as refueling and resupply. Francis orchestrated a scheme 

to defraud the U.S. Navy of tens of millions of dollars by routinely 

overbilling for goods and services. Francis accomplished this criminal conduct by systematically grooming and bribing Active Duty 

military and civilian employees of the U.S. Navy with things of 

value, such as dinners, gifts, hotel expenses, money, and the services of prostitutes. 

To date, Francis and 17 former Navy and DOD officials, including a rear admiral and an SES [Senior Executive Service] member, 

have pled guilty to criminal conduct. In addition, in 2017, nine senior officials previously assigned to the Navy’s 7th Fleet were indicted for conspiracy, bribery, and false statements. That case is 

ongoing. 
6 

Finally, my written statement discusses measures the DOD OIG 

has implemented to further improve investigations of misconduct. 

For example, to standardize investigations across the DOD and to 

speed the review process, we are working to implement a standardized case management database among the DOD OIG and military 

service IGs. 

To ensure compliance with laws and regulations and to share 

best practices among the service IGs, we have begun conducting 

quality assessment reviews of the service IGs similar to peer reviews. To promote fairness, the DOD OIG provides subjects an opportunity to comment on the accuracy of our substantiated findings 

through the tentative conclusions letter process prior to completion 

of our final report. 

To promote transparency, the DOD OIG considers proactive public release of our completed substantiated reports, particularly 

those with findings of substantiated misconduct involving highlevel officials. To help address timeliness, we have also reallocated 

resources within the DOD OIG to increase the number of investigators working on misconduct and whistleblower cases. However, 

handling the increasing number and complexity of complaints requires resources, not only for the DOD OIG, but also for the service 

and component IGs. It is critical to adequately resource the DOD 

OIG, as well as the service and component IGs, particularly when 

the DOD continues to grow. 

In conclusion, the DOD OIG and the service IGs have a challenging but critically important mission to investigate allegations 

of misconduct thoroughly, fairly, professionally, and timely, and we 

will continue to seek to fulfill that important responsibility. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be glad to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fine. 

General Quantock. 

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID E. QUANTOCK, USA, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General QUANTOCK. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished 

guests of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on 

senior leader misconduct. On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, 

the Honorable Dr. Mark Esper, and our chief of staff, General 

Mark Milley, thank you for your support of our soldiers, Army civilians, families, and veterans. 

The Army holds its senior leaders to the highest standards. The 

trust and confidence of the American people, which is intrinsic to 

who we are as an Army, is rooted in our character and our credibility. We do acknowledge problems exist, and we take senior misconduct very seriously. Over the past decade, the Army Inspector 

General agency substantiated allegations against only 3 percent of 

the general officer population per year. While recent headlines on 

Army senior misconduct give the appearance of widespread misbehavior, the truth is most transgressions are technical violations 

committed by a very small minority. 
7 

The most common substantiated allegations involving general officers are misuse of government resources, failure to follow regulations, and failure to take action. Substantiated allegations for inappropriate relationships or sexual misconduct over the past decade 

involved less than 1 percent of general officers. This small fraction 

of senior leaders does not represent the honorable service and character of the entire general officer core. 

Whistleblower reprisal remains the number one allegation. The 

substantiation rate for whistleblower reprisal cases is 4 percent. A 

significant factor in the low 4 percent substantiation rate is the 

misuse of the whistleblower reprisal process. This typically occurs 

when a soldier or civilian is held accountable by a senior official 

for misconduct or poor performance, following a protected communication. The resulting claim of reprisal creates challenges for senior commanders who hold people accountable and then are faced 

with an inspector general whistleblower reprisal investigation. And 

in the last 3 years, whistleblower reprisal has basically had a sixfold increase and has been—is out of control, in my view. 

The vast majority of the 685 general officers serving are doing 

the right thing every single day. The positive trend over the past 

5 years has been a 51 percent reduction in the number of general 

officer substantiated cases from 32 in 2013 to 15 last year. This includes a decrease in substantiated allegations for official travel violations, inappropriate political activities, non-Federal entities involvement, conflicts of interest, and improper endorsements. 

In closing, the overwhelming majority of Army general officers 

abide by the letter and spirit of our laws and regulations, and utilize sound judgment in the stewardship of taxpayer resources. 

Those who do not are held accountable. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for your 

continued support of our soldiers, our civilians, families, and veterans. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Quantock can be found in 

the Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Quantock, for your testimony. 

Vice Admiral Shelanski, you are now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF VADM HERMAN SHELANSKI, USN, NAVAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES NAVY 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member 

Speier, and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you 

very much for having us here today to discuss senior leader misconduct and the opportunity to explain our senior leader investigative process. 

In the Navy, we take pride in living up to our core values of 

honor, courage, and commitment. We expect the highest ethical 

and moral behaviors of our senior leaders. Therefore, we take any 

allegations of misconduct very seriously, and where appropriate, investigate, and when substantiated, hold our people accountable 

when they do not meet our high standards. 

To be clear, there must be a violation of rule, regulation, or law. 

There is a process in place with many offices that handle this 

range of violations. Our primary role as the IG is to conduct administrative investigations, not criminal or UCMJ cases. 
8 

When we receive complaints on flag officers from our hotline, 

Congress, or by referral from the DOD, we will open investigation 

on credible allegations of misconduct against one- and two-star admirals. 

The investigation process is fair, deliberate, and thorough. Our 

investigators are highly trained and experienced professionals who 

rigidly adhere to the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 

Efficiency standards. We constantly strive through process improvements to produce ever more timely reports without sacrificing 

professional due diligence. Our investigators receive lots of oversight, from our division directors to legal review to a DOD review 

and their ultimate approval. 

At the end of our investigation, all reports go to the CNO [Chief 

of Naval Operations] and the Secretary of the Navy. If any allegation is substantiated, we submit a request to the Office of the 

VCNO [Vice Chief of Naval Operations] that appropriate corrective 

action be taken and documented. Corrective action can range from 

verbal counseling to formal disciplinary action under UCMJ. We receive a copy of the documented corrective action recorded in our 

database and provide a copy to the DOD IG. This adverse information will remain in the officer’s record for the entirety of their career. 

In the last 5 years, we have seen a steady decrease in the number of overall flag officer complaints and also a decrease in the 

number of cases substantiated. The most common categories of substantiated offenses we have seen is misuse of government vehicles 

and drivers for personal use, improper use of official travel, improper gift acceptance, and prohibited personnel practices. 

In conclusion, I believe that our investigative process is a necessary and effective tool to address questionable ethical behaviors 

by our senior leaders. Thank you for your continued support for our 

sailors, Marines, Navy families, and veterans. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Shelanski can be found in 

the Appendix on page 92.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Vice Admiral Shelanski. 

Lieutenant General Harris, you are now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN STAYCE D. HARRIS, USAF, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General HARRIS. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to testify before you today. 

And as the Air Force Inspector General, I am responsible to independently and continuously inspect, assess, investigate, and report 

to the Secretary of the Air Force on the readiness, economy, efficiency, and discipline of our force. And with the Air Force core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we 

do, I take special pride in helping ensure our airmen live up to 

those values. 

Misconduct by Air Force senior officers erodes the trust in our 

service, the trust of our airmen, and the trust of our country. And 

your Air Force is committed to the development of ethical airmen 
9 

leaders, and we are equally determined to ensure accountability 

when standards are violated. And part of my responsibility includes resolution of complaints against Air Force general officers, 

officers selected for promotion to brigadier general, and retired general officers. 

The top three categories of violations we have seen in the past 

5 years may be generally categorized as ethics violations, improper 

handling of personnel matters, and unprofessional relationships, in 

that order. And every complaint against a senior officer is diligently acted upon. 

Our cases are investigated by an independent team of investigating officers, augmented by embedded attorneys from the Office of 

the Air Force Judge Advocate General. And Air Force senior officer 

investigations are independent, thorough, impartial, objective, and 

we are careful to meet all legal requirements. This important work 

of ensuring accountability in our most senior leaders promotes the 

discipline, efficiency, and economy of our force. 

Our process in conducting senior officer investigations includes 

multiple layers of internal review, with every investigation receiving a separate and independent legal review signed by the director 

of administrative law for the Air Force. And upon completion of 

each investigation, the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General provides an oversight review, as was mentioned. Investigations with substantiated allegations are referred to the appropriate command authority to determine what disciplinary action is 

warranted. 

And, finally, my deputy and I use a variety of venues and products to promote education and awareness across our senior officer 

population. It is important to me that we not only investigate complaints against our senior officers, but that we also work to reduce 

the incidence of misconduct by these high-ranking leaders. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, members of the subcommittee, I very much appreciate the committee’s continuing support of our Air Force and your interest in our efforts to prevent 

misconduct by our senior officers. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Harris can be found in the 

Appendix on page 97.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Lieutenant General Harris. 

Brigadier General Ottignon, you are now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF BGEN DAVID A. OTTIGNON, USMC, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE 

CORPS 

General OTTIGNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And how do you say it? 

General OTTIGNON. It is pronounced Ottignon. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ottignon. I was close. 

General OTTIGNON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General OTTIGNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Speier, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee on Military Personnel. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about this important topic. 
10 

My office provides the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps an impartial and [credible] means to investigate or inquire into allegations of senior official misconduct, 

impropriety, or violation of law. I oversee a group of 25 dedicated 

professionals committed to upholding the laws that govern the 

service. 

In the past 10 years, 15 Marine Corps generals were substantiated by a thorough investigation process led by an inspector general. Most of these cases were violations of administrative processes and standards of conduct regulations. None of them were 

criminal in nature. 

I have complete confidence in the investigatory process and due 

diligence taken with each and every allegation brought forward. 

Every general officer investigation is reviewed for legal sufficiency 

and requires Department of Defense Inspector General oversight. 

The seriousness of which the Marine Corps approaches character, 

leadership, and ethics is apparent in the demanding standards that 

we expect all our leaders to uphold. 

In the last year, my office has traveled around the globe conducting training with commanding generals across the Corps and 

conducting thorough inspections to ensure that the application of 

our standards are consistent with our foundational core values of 

honor, courage, and commitment. 

On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, we thank Congress and this subcommittee for 

the opportunity to discuss such an important issue with you this 

morning and your continued support for our United States Marine 

Corps and its families. I look forward to the opportunity to answer 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Ottignon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 103.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Brigadier General Ottignon, for your 

testimony. 

We are going to limit to 5 minutes each member, but we will do 

a second round, if necessary, for the first panel. 

Some of you mentioned during your testimony that there is a 

wide scope of misconduct that you investigate. Could you please 

give some additional examples of the types of cases you investigate, 

and if you see any misconduct trends emerging? Why don’t we start 

with you, Lieutenant General Quantock. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, sir. I am just looking at the last—last 

year, we had 15 substantiations. The range of the kind of work 

that we do is late NCOERs [noncommissioned officer evaluation reporting]. We had one particular general officer that basically lied 

on his PT [physical training] test, height and weight type stuff. 

One that inappropriately approved a flyover, so misuse of government resources. The dignity and respect, how they treated subordinates, what they were substantiated for. Improperly using an IG 

investigation for adverse action at the junior levels was substantiated. 

So those are—misuse of subordinate times, subordinate—we 

have made a huge effort in trying to get after certain cases where 

general officers make technical type of mistakes with subordinates 

primarily. 
11 

You know, we all have staffs, and a lot of times our staffs try 

to do good things for us, and they try to make our life a little bit 

nicer. We have beat the hell out of that the last couple years. We 

have got an exportable training package. When I sit down with a 

general officer that are going into command, we encourage them to 

sit down. It is about 75, 80 pages of PowerPoint slides, basically 

vignettes of what has got general officers in trouble. Again, a lot 

of technical violations from use of travel, getting rental cars, all 

those kind of things that sets folks up for trouble. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What is dignity and respect? 

General QUANTOCK. Dignity and respect is publicly humiliating 

somebody. That is the genesis of dignity and respect. So—but that 

exportable training package I think is one of the leading reasons 

why in 2013 we had 32 general officers out of 685, I might add, 

down to 15 that we have in this last year. A lot of the technical 

violations have been weeded out. So we continue to work this piece 

hard, not to mention all of the efforts of the senior leadership to 

get out there and make their vision well known. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Next. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Yes, sir. So for us, over the last 3 years, a 

decrease trendwise in substantiated cases, so 10 in 2015, 4 in 2016. 

It looks like one will be substantiated for 2017. We are finishing 

that case up now. 

You know, in general, most of the cases are about gifts acceptance and solicitation. So these are the technical—I am going out 

to lunch, and I accepted a gift of lunch from a contractor that was 

more than the acceptable limit. It is also in terms of endorsing nonFederal entities, so there are certain charities that were not supposed—unless they are federally recognized. In our official capacity, 

we are not allowed to endorse them, so one of our flag officers was 

seen to endorse it inappropriately, but, of course, mistakenly did 

not know that at the time. Also, some pay and benefits, so, for instance, leave statements, so inappropriate documentation of leave. 

And so those are very technical violations in general, so nothing in 

the order of larger, you know, more—so—and specific, no sexual 

harassment or any of those type of trends, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Harris. 

General HARRIS. Thank you. The greatest majority of our violations have been ethics violations, as has been mentioned by my 

peers. Misuse of a subordinate’s time, misuse of a government vehicle, unauthorized gifts, postgovernment employment. But what is 

most important is that how we proactively, within the IG enterprise, within the inspector general enterprise, go out and educate 

our personnel, from the most junior to the most senior, on the different pitfalls and opportunities to lead the right example and to 

let them know what to look out for, and even—there is complaints 

sometimes that people don’t think that would be an issue, giving 

out a challenge coin to a contractor would be a violation, but we 

continually educate our personnel on what the pitfalls are and 

what they should do to correct them. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Where in the career track do you begin that education? 

General HARRIS. From the very beginning. 

Mr. COFFMAN. From the very beginning? 
12 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

General OTTIGNON. Sir, in the last 3 years, we have had four 

substantiations. All of those were administrative in nature, violations of Marine Corps order for fitness report evaluations, for physical fitness evaluations. One was regards to training. So our trend 

lines are, as I previously mentioned, all administrative in nature. 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Chairman, if I can add. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

Mr. FINE. Since we have oversight over all the service IGs, we 

have accumulated all the data on the types of misconduct, and 

which we described on page 10 of my testimony. It generally fell 

into five categories. First one, misconduct or ethical violations, such 

as improper accepting services from a subordinate, sexual relationships with subordinates, requiring subordinates to perform personal services for them, misusing your official position. 

The second one is improper personnel matters, which also involves unwelcome physical contact with subordinates and improper 

hiring. 

Third is misuse of government resources, such as using vehicles 

to commute improperly or misuse of government aircraft. 

And the fourth is travel violations, traveling for purely personal 

reasons. 

And the fifth is other, for such things as improper procurement, 

steering contracts. 

On page 11, I talk and we discuss the trend lines, and the trend 

lines are generally down, but they are still significant in these categories. And of particular interest, I think to the committee, is the 

inappropriate relationship category. On page 12, we talk about how 

many there are across the services, and there has been a steady 

number of them. There were 10 in 2013 substantiated findings, and 

in the subsequent years—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Fine, I am afraid I am out of time. I am going 

to have to—— 

Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to put a chart up, if we could, that shows each of 

the services. And this is for you to start, Mr. Fine. So in the Air 

Force, the total closed cases were 54; 54 were dismissed, zero were 

investigated in the Air Force. In the Army, 101; 101 dismissed, 

zero investigated. Defense agency, 111; 110 dismissed, 1 was investigated. Thirty-six in the Navy; 36 dismissed, zero investigated. 

Are you basically saying that none of these cases even deserved 

to be investigated? 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

133.] 

Mr. FINE. So that chart, Representative Speier, I think is from 

our semiannual report for a 6-month period. 

Ms. SPEIER. It is one half of the year. 

Mr. FINE. Yes, one half of the year in 2017. What we have is, 

in my testimony is a chart describing the number of cases involving 

senior official misconduct overall for the last 10 years, and there 

is a substantial number investigated. The chart that was up there 

has to do with, I think, three-star and four-stars, which are the 

highest level ones. And so this chart has to do with senior official 
13 

cases, including two-stars, one-stars, O–7 promotables, SES employees, et cetera. 

We do look at all these cases seriously. We do intake. We determine whether it warrants an investigation, and these are the ones 

that did warrant investigation against the high-level officials who 

was investigated against. But as you can see from my chart on 

page 8, there is a significant number of ones that are investigated 

and are substantiated. 

Ms. SPEIER. But I am totally confused then. It says that zero of 

these, out of 312 cases, 311 of them were dismissed. Only one was 

investigated. Are we basically—are you basically telling us that all 

of these cases were bogus? 

Mr. FINE. No. And what this chart also does—it is probably a 

confusing chart. The top part is the DOD OIG receiving those 

cases. Many of them are referred down to the service or agency and 

are investigated and closed by them. So if there is 54, for example, 

that we get, we—these are the numbers we investigate, and we 

refer them down to the Air Force, the Army, the Marine Corps, and 

the Navy, and they investigate them and have investigated many 

of them. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, it is still not making any sense to me. 

Mr. FINE. Okay. 

Ms. SPEIER. So there is 54 that you receive from the Air Force. 

Why do you use the term ‘‘dismissed’’ if you were then forwarding 

them to the Air Force IG? 

Mr. FINE. So we receive far more than those, and we refer many 

of them, 12 of them to the Air Force, for example, and of the others 

we do not—we do intake and determine they don’t require an investigation. But there are a number of them that do require investigation, as indicated by the chart below, the numbers below. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, the numbers below are the ones that are investigated by the service IGs. 

Mr. FINE. Right. 

Ms. SPEIER. You are not investigate—it looks like you are not investigating any, by this chart. I don’t want to take a lot of time on 

this. I think this chart needs to be reviewed, and I would like for 

you to come to my office. And I don’t know if Mr. Coffman would 

be inclined to hear more about this, but this is deeply troubling to 

me. 

All right. In one of the cases that I mentioned, there was a recommendation by the IG of holding someone accountable for substantiated claims, and then it went to the—in this case, General 

Dempsey, who just struck one of the substantiated claims. How 

often does that happen? 

Mr. FINE. We have a chart on page 14 that it happens sometimes. Of the allegations, of 427 allegations of substantiated misconduct, over I think it is a 5-year period, 29 of them were declined 

to take action, and about 80 of them are still pending. So in a small 

percentage of allegations they are—the service has declined to take 

action. 

Ms. SPEIER. So you are saying—did you not present your document to us until yesterday? 

Mr. FINE. We provided it, yes. 
14 

Ms. SPEIER. So I still don’t have a copy of it, unfortunately. Can 

you just go over that for me? 

Mr. FINE. Certainly. On page 12, we discuss corrective actions by 

rank of senior official, and this is over from fiscal year 2013 to 

2017, and we describe the actual discipline corrective action that 

was taken, ranging from a letter of counseling to suspension to removed from assignment. Of those, the top line is declined to take 

action. In 29 of the 427 substantiated allegations, the service declined to take action. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Would you please provide for me, in those 

29 cases where they declined to take action, the specifics. Because 

I find it unjustified to have inspector generals go through the process of determining, through investigation, conduct that is inappropriate, have that be presented to the chiefs, and then have them 

just strike it as if it doesn’t exist, as it happened in the Custer 

case. I mean, that is fraudulent, as far as I am concerned. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today. 

I want to take a couple of questions for the four service reps, give 

you a chance to think about, so I will go to Mr. Fine and ask him 

a couple while you are stewing on a couple of these questions. But 

I take—I find most commanders try their best to do the right job 

on these things, but they are imperfect. Some of them have made 

bad decisions, just as some judges have, just as some district attorneys have. We are imperfect, but I think we strive to be the very 

best we can and try to get as close as perfect as we can. 

So the first question I am going to come back to you all on will 

be if we take commanders out of the discipline and accountability 

process, what would be the impact on the mission or the impact on 

morale and unit integrity from your opinion? 

Secondly, how would you address the ranking member’s point 

that there are different spanks for different ranks? So I want to 

come back to you all on that, give you a chance to think about it. 

Mr. Fine, my data shows we have 23—or 2,327 senior leaders. 

963 of those are general officers. Roughly, if you could just give an 

average, what would you say, how many allegations are made a 

year against those 2,327 senior leaders? 

Mr. FINE. About 800. In our testimony, we discuss how many 

have been made over the last 10 years. In 2008, there was 395. 

Mr. BACON. So 395 out of 2,327? 

Mr. FINE. In 2008. Now in 2017, there is 803. 

Mr. BACON. Eight hundred? 

Mr. FINE. Yeah. 

Mr. BACON. That seems like a lot for 2,327 senior leaders. 

Mr. FINE. Those are the allegations, correct. 

Mr. BACON. Okay. Out of those allegations, how many substantiated, just to put it on record here? 

Mr. FINE. Eighty-three. 

Mr. BACON. So 83. And what would that come out as a percentage? I guess it is 34 percent I think you had of the allegations that 

were substantiated? 
15 

Mr. FINE. Well, of the cases that we actually investigate, 30 percent of them are substantiated. 

Mr. BACON. About 30 percent are substantiated. And they range 

from overdue reports to the more serious? 

Mr. FINE. Correct. 

Mr. BACON. So many of these are things that would nowhere 

would be considered criminal in the private sector. 

Mr. FINE. Most of these are—very few, a very small percentage 

are criminal. 

Mr. BACON. If you just give me your thoughts, how many would 

you say senior leaders have done something criminal, sexual assault, for example, out of this last year’s data? One or two, three 

or four? 

Mr. FINE. Very few have done criminal misconduct, except I will 

mention the GDMA case, the Francis case, which is a—— 

Mr. BACON. Right. Which is criminal, got it. 

Mr. FINE. Which is criminal. 

Mr. BACON. So we are talking less than a handful out of this 

2,300-plus senior officers have done something criminal? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. 

One other thing, one of the things that concerned me as a fivetime commander is the length of time it takes to investigate. When 

you have people under investigation for 2 years and then exonerated and their career is over, it seems to me that we have to do 

something better there. I mean, just as a person—I have never 

been investigated, thankfully, in five commands, so I have been 

blessed, thanking the Almighty, but I know some people have been 

under for 2 years and then they are exonerated, you are like, man. 

Is there anything we can do better there? 

Mr. FINE. I think there is. We do strive for timeliness. We recognize that when you are under investigation, your promotion is held 

up, sometimes you can’t retire, you can’t be moved, and it is difficult to be under the microscope, and many of them, most of them 

are cleared in the end. So we do strive for timeliness. 

With the number of investigations, the number of complaints, the 

resources, we also want to be thorough and accurate, so it is a balance there. On some of them we can handle quickly, some of them 

take longer. Having said that, all of the IGs, we and the service 

IGs, are moving to try and increase our timeliness without sacrificing quality, accuracy, and thoroughness. 

Mr. BACON. Well, thank you. 

Now I will go to our service reps. And I will go to the first question, if we take commanders out of the process here, what do you 

think the impact is on your service? 

General QUANTOCK. Sir, it would be absolutely devastating. I 

have commanded from company all the way up through three times 

as a two-star commander. Absolutely devastating if you take—you 

know, we are not Walmart. We send soldiers to do very dangerous 

things. I lost 13 soldiers as a brigade commander, over 200 Purple 

Hearts. I tell them to go out there and protect terrain, to escort 

convoys. They put their lives on the line. So some folks, you know, 

may have problems with some of the orders that I give. But we 

have to give them. 
16 

So it would be devastating. So to be able to have control over the 

carrot and the stick, for another word that you could use, carrot 

and the stick, you have got to have a lot of carrots, but you also 

have got to have the stick to hold people accountable and to uphold 

the high values that we have in the Army that are not due for— 

that are not really applicable to Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

It would be absolutely devastating. And we are, right now, the 

greatest service the world has ever seen, and we would become a 

third-world country, a third-world army if we were to remove commanders from the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

Mr. BACON. General Quantock, thank you. I will come back on 

the different spanks. 

General QUANTOCK. Okay. 

Mr. BACON. Admiral Shelanski. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Yes, sir. I will agree with General Quantock. Certainly, it is about good order and discipline. And in terms 

of being—having the UCMJ capability at the commander level is 

essential for that good order and discipline and the morale of the 

crew, because they expect also fairness and justice throughout their 

command, and they hold each other accountable. And when one of 

their shipmates is not doing the right thing, they want them to be 

held accountable, and that has got to be done quickly and efficiently. 

Mr. BACON. I saw that in the Air Force. We had a commander 

downgrade a court-martial, and he was held accountable for it. 

With that, Chairman, I will come back for my second round to 

finish these two rounds of questions for the service reps. 

So, General Harris, I will come back to you later on my second 

round with that. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. Tsongas, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I think we would all agree that the military is a rightly honored institution. We would not be the country we are without 

it. But as we have heard and is so true, it is not perfect and those 

serving are not perfect, so it is important that there is a process 

in place to look at senior leader misconduct. 

So as we engage in the oversight of this process, and I am grateful for this hearing, I think we have to be reassured that the process is not biased in favor of those senior leaders being investigated. 

So I have to say at the outset, it really concerns me that in each 

service it is a general officer who functions as an inspector general. 

It just seems to me that there is an inherent conflict there and possibly an inherent tilt in the process in favor of the general officer. 

I don’t necessarily want you all to comment on it, but I think it 

is something that we all have to take into account. But given that 

that is the fact, I am curious, who provides oversight of all your 

work and makes sure that there is no inherent bias, that it is being 

performed correctly to meet—to be sure that we are truly identifying misconduct and holding general officers responsible? So I 

would like to start with you, Mr. Fine. 

Mr. FINE. So we as the DOD OIG do provide oversight over the 

service IGs. We review their reports to make sure that they are 

thorough and complete and have done all that they should do to 
17 

track the leads, to investigate, to interview the appropriate people. 

So we do that level of oversight. 

We also have begun doing what we call quality assurance reviews, similar to a peer review, to look at their processes, their procedures in a systematic way to make sure they are following the 

rules and regulations and they are adhering to quality standards 

and are doing the right thing. So we provide that oversight. 

One of the questions that is often asked is, well, who oversees 

us. We are overseen by other IGs. The CIGIE [Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency] has a peer review 

process, and we are also regularly overseen by the GAO [Government Accountability Office]. So there is oversight over us, and we 

provide oversight over them, and that is a good thing. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Do you have the ability to refer a case back if you 

think it hasn’t been appropriately investigated? 

Mr. FINE. Yes, we do, and we do that. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And how often have you had to do that? 

Mr. FINE. I don’t have the exact numbers, but there are occasions 

when we do do that. We review the report. And there are times 

where we think they have not fully investigated or if they reached 

a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence, we refer it back 

to them for additional work. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I don’t know if each of you would like to comment 

how you do your job in a way that you feel is fairminded, given 

that you represent and come out of the service you are overseeing. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes. Yes, Congresswoman. I would just say 

a couple of things. Number one is, in my last job I was a CID [U.S. 

Army Criminal Investigation Command] commander, so when I left 

that job, I had three friends, and after this job I have no friends. 

So the fact that, you know, this is not a highly sought after—well, 

maybe some for the—highly sought after job because we make hard 

calls with the DOD IG oversight. It is a very fair process. 

Just about the investigators that do a majority of my cases are 

civilians, so they—and many of them have extensive years of experience. One of my investigators has got 18 years. Another has got 

10 years of these kinds of cases. So it is very well. 

And not only that, we have many levels of legal review of these 

cases to ensure we are doing due process both for the complainant 

and for the subject. Once an investigation is done, legal review. 

After that, it goes to my lawyer. He does the legal review. After 

that, it goes to the Office of General Counsel for their legal review. 

After I have had three legal reviews and I have read the case and 

I understand the case and I agree with the findings, I sign the 

case. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Are the findings conclusive or can you reject the 

findings? 

General QUANTOCK. I have never rejected the findings that have 

been brought to me. So after all of the scrutiny that goes on with 

these things, I can almost exclusively say I don’t think I have overturned one case that has been brought to me. I sign it, and it goes 

to DOD OIG for their oversight review. So it is a very fair and 

thorough process. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So there is only somebody higher up in the chain 

that could reject the findings or would likely reject the findings? 
18 

General QUANTOCK. After we get done with a case, it gets adjudicated for cases, and that is what happens. Once it comes down 

as substantiated, we are just calling balls and strikes. We are saying did they violate a regulation, yes or no. If the answer is yes, 

that the substantiation holds, even if it is for small technical violations, then it goes—after the DOD IG review, it goes over to the 

lawyer side of the Army, the TJAG [The Judge Advocate General 

of the United States Army]. The TJAG basically puts the case together and brings it to the adjudicator, the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army. And the Vice Chief of Staff, under advice of counsel, 

holds the person accountable, according to due process and according to the facts of the case and what he has been substantiated for. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I appreciate—we don’t have time to hear 

from everybody, but still I do think it is deeply concerning that you 

are generals in the service you are overseeing, and I do think a civilian oversight perhaps would at least eliminate the appearance—— 

General QUANTOCK. Congresswoman, we have a lot of civilian 

oversight, but our Army is made up of soldiers, okay? The vast majority of our Army is soldiers, and I believe, having been a commander a number of times, I also can look at the case and also understand, you know—because, again, we are representing the 

Army. I am the Army Inspector General. And I think from our soldier’s perspective, at least the vast majority who are soldiers and 

know the fact that the person calling the shots at the IG has been 

a former commander themselves, from the time I was a captain all 

the way up to my last position, I think it is important that that 

person is a soldier, a sailor, or an airman, Marine. 

Ms. TSONGAS. We can agree to disagree. Thank you. My time is 

up. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Abraham, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a statement first. As a Congressman, certainly, I think as 

the general public we want to know that the process is intact. And 

what I am hearing from the panel is that the process is good and 

that it is accountable and, more importantly, it is responsible for 

the actions that are found. Certainly, as a physician, I am judged 

by my peers on the physician side, so, you know, I think it is—you 

have got to have peer review, and I certainly don’t think there is 

any conflict there that—from being reviewed by your peers. 

When I have asked for private conversations with several of the 

vice chiefs behind you, I have gotten them and there have been 

very forthcoming answers to direct questions, so I appreciate the 

openness that you are affording me. 

So, again, just a statement that I like the process. I think the 

process is good, and what I am hearing is that the process is working, because we are seeing a decrease, not only in the severity of 

the accusations, but in the total number too. 

And I am going yield the rest of my time back to General Bacon 

so he can continue his dialogue. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 
19 

What would be the impact of taking the commanders out of this 

discipline process? General Harris, what would be your perspective 

from the Air Force? 

General HARRIS. Sir, I agree with my peers. It would be absolutely devastating, and it would, you know, erode the good discipline and order of our force. 

And then as far as disparity in punishments, our data that I 

have reviewed doesn’t support that. We hold our officers actually 

to a higher standard of accountability. And there is actually two 

other articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 133, which 

is conduct unbecoming, and 134, which is fraternization, which 

holds us accountable. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

General Ottignon. 

General OTTIGNON. Sir, I agree with my peers as well. I think 

removing the commander from the process would have grave implications to the good order and discipline of the organization, a fighting organization. And I agree also that the data doesn’t show that. 

I think we hold our senior leaders more accountable in the Marine 

Corps. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

Going back to General Quantock and Admiral Shelanski on the 

different spanks for different ranks, any feedback on that? 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, Congressman. I would tell you, if I had 

to look at all the cases that I have looked at in my last job as a 

CID commander and, of course, now as the IG, it is about 61⁄2

years, I would tell you it is huge, hugely swayed on the part of a 

general officer being crushed, okay, for a substantiation. And how 

is that? Well, what is the most egregious—usually the most egregious kind of offenses that we have general officers? Inappropriate 

relationships. 

Now, I have adjudicated sergeant first classes, junior soldiers for 

inappropriate relationships. They would get a letter of reprimand. 

Same thing that we would give a general officer, a letter of reprimand. However, on the general officer side, they are done. And 

the sergeant first class isn’t going to get promoted either, but he 

isn’t going to go backwards. That general officer is done, okay, and 

a lot of times he will retire at a grade a lot less. So he is effectively 

being fined, in case for retirement, hundreds of thousands if not 

millions of years when you have a major general go back to the 

rank of lieutenant colonel. 

Now, we can discount the fact that that soldier has been in combat multiple times, and that is what we would like to do sometimes 

by saying, well, we should just take his retirement away, but what 

we have done is separated him from his family multiple times, 

sometimes years at a time, and then we say the person doesn’t deserve anything? Again, a lot of times we forget about that none of 

us at this table came in the Army as generals. I spent 27 years 

coming up the chain just like everybody else, and I have been 11 

years as a general officer. I can tell you we crush general officers, 

and should they be crushed for these kind of offenses? Absolutely. 

They know since the time they were second lieutenant what is 

right and what is wrong. And when they do it, they expect the consequences, and we should hold them accountable. 
20 

Mr. BACON. I know I felt that way as a general officer in the Air 

Force. Thank you. 

Admiral Shelanski. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. So I agree. And one particular case that we 

would have that I could give you as an example. So a flag officer 

viewing pornography on a government computer on a ship. That 

type of work, should it have happened with an enlisted sailor, that 

enlisted sailor would probably be brought to mast, probably reduced in rate, withheld pending further, you know, 6 months, and 

then taken their rights away to utilize that computer. And then 

once that 6 months was up, they would be back in their job continuing as a sailor onboard the ship. 

Flag officer, removed from his position, his command, and retired 

as an O–6. Much harsher and much more deeply pressing for his 

career. 

Mr. BACON. One question I will just leave for anybody’s—if they 

want to, you know, answer the question, does anyone here think 

it would be better to bring a judge from the outside to adjudicate 

these or does anyone here think a district attorney outside of the 

military would do this better? 

General QUANTOCK. Only if you want to make the system much, 

much longer and hold people in suspended animation forever. That 

is the problem when you go to a purely jurisprudence system. We 

all have advice and advice from SJAs [Staff Judge Advocates]; we 

are not legally minded, but I get advice as a commander from 

many different individuals. So I think that would be a huge mistake. 

Also, what I have been trying this 38 years that I have been in 

the Army, I have been trying to find the perfect profession. So as 

I look around all of the professions out there, I haven’t found one. 

We are not either, but we try real hard to be that, and we hold 

people accountable, even for minor discretions or minor violations 

of Army regulations. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. 

And I thank Dr. Abraham for yielding to me, and back to the 

chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being 

here to approach a very difficult topic for everyone involved. I will 

say, and especially with what you just said, General, you know, 

they say, ‘‘To whom much is given, much is expected,’’ although I 

wouldn’t say rank is given; it is often earned, but the expectation 

is much greater. And I think that is a fair assessment. You do expect more from your officers and especially your general officers as 

you go up in rank. So I appreciate that feedback. 

Mr. Fine, you mentioned earlier about gathering data from the 

IGs. So what do you see down the road with this? Is it going to 

set maybe a tone for what type of punishment is appropriate or 

what legal actions we need to take? What do you expect to gain 

from that as that comes together? 

Mr. FINE. Well, we regularly gather that data and have, and I 

think it is important to report that for transparency to see what 

is going on, even by service and by rank and by offense. So we will 
21 

continue to do that. It provides transparency on the process, which 

is a good thing. I will mention one thing that we intend to do is 

also to look at this issue about the disparities, and we have—we 

are going to open a review and evaluation to see if there are disparities that jump out. 

Now, sometimes the disparities are because the cases are different, and that is very hard to analyze. But I think, in some ways, 

it is important to look at the overall statistics, the numbers, and 

see if there are anomalies that jump out either by rank, by service, 

by gender, by race, by all sorts of stratifications, and we intend to 

do that. I think that is a useful exercise. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So you are really looking for, I guess, best practices, if you will, when it comes to setting guidelines. I mean, every 

case is different, and so you don’t want to say this is the mandatory sentence for this, you know, because you want to take the case 

in its entirety. But are you expecting to have guidelines from this? 

Mr. FINE. No, I don’t think we are going to have guidelines. That 

is up to the services to implement corrective action. But it is important to see what is happening and to analyze that and to evaluate 

that. In terms of guidelines, I do think there ought to be standardization and guidelines for how we conduct the investigations—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. 

Mr. FINE [continuing]. And to make sure that it is relatively 

standard throughout the DOD so that if you are subject to an investigation in the Air Force, you are not going to be treated differently than if you are in the Navy. I think that is helpful, that 

is important, so that there are standardized, timely investigations, 

and we intend to look at that as well. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So are you far enough along at this point where 

you would maybe be making suggestions or just pointing out the 

differences or—— 

Mr. FINE. In terms of the standardization? 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yes. 

Mr. FINE. Yeah. I think there are some suggestions that we have 

made and we will continue to make. One, there ought to be a 

standardized case management system, a database, and we all use 

it so that we track it and record it in similar ways and we share 

information in a similar way. I think we ought to sort of consider 

formats, formats of reports to be standardized; that will speed 

things up as well. 

I think we also ought to consider—there may be some disagreement here—but sort of a tentative conclusion process to give the 

subject an opportunity to comment on the report to show if it is inaccurate or not. We do that. On the other hand, that does lengthen 

the timeline a little bit because it gives them time, and sometimes, 

as a result, you are required to do more work, and that is the 

tradeoff. But I think that is a fair process, and it gives them fairness and due process and ultimately will make the decision on 

what is the ultimate finding. 

So I think those are the kinds of things that could be useful to 

standardize. And I have had discussions with the service IGs as 

well on that. We will continue to pursue that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much. 
22 

And I want to thank you all for engaging with us on this very 

difficult and important issue. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Kelly, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

This is an important hearing. 

I want to go back kind of on the line that General Bacon had, 

or Congressman Bacon. Members of the service, especially senior 

level leaders, whether they be command sergeant majors or general 

officers, would you agree that they are more hard on people for disgracing their uniform and their rank and their awards than a civilian would be, because many times do you think civilians are in awe 

of the things that you do and, therefore, kind of give you a pass 

because of your service, and a sitting other general who has done 

the same service is less likely to be in awe of your career and the 

things you have done? Would you agree with that? 

General QUANTOCK. Well, sir, I would just say that I don’t know 

if ‘‘awe’’ is the word. I think respected. My father was a Vietnam 

vet. I will tell you the way they were treated back in those days 

was incredibly poor. But I will tell you, there is a lot of respect 

among us, but, yeah, of course, the people that understand the culture—culture is a big deal in the military, and it has evolved over 

time. I have seen huge changes for the good since 1980 until the 

present day, and we continue to change that culture for the good. 

But to make a complete statement that civilians—I mean—— 

Mr. KELLY. Not necessarily in awe, but they tend to give you the 

benefit of the doubt when maybe a peer or someone of the same 

or a higher rank would not want their uniform disgraced. 

General QUANTOCK. I would absolutely agree. The professionalism of our noncommissioned officer corps is second to none. And I 

have sat on many promotion boards with them, and they get down 

to the standard of a particular individual, get down to the—— 

Mr. KELLY. Let me rephrase. Would you as a general officer in 

your job cut someone a break, another general officer, because they 

are a general officer? Or would you be harder on them because they 

disgraced the rank that you worked so hard to earn? 

General HARRIS. Harder. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Harder. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. KELLY. And I want to go back just a second, General 

Quantock. I think we have actually been in the same places a couple of times. I looked at your bio, and I was at Taji in 2009 and 

2010, and I think you were overall, and of course, we had a facility 

there. 

I want to ask you, Lieutenant General Ed Cardon recently commented to the AP [Associated Press] that the Army is reviewing 

ways to improve the senior officer corps through pilot initiatives. 

And can you please expand on one or more of these initiatives and 

explain how they reinforce ethical behavior in general officers? 

General QUANTOCK. I will just tell you: It is a holistic study by 

the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the vice will have much more 

on this than I do. But, really, it is a study on basically the health 

of our general officer corps. Particularly with the last 15, 16 years, 

we have run this general officer corps into the ground. Not to men-
23 

tion our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our Marines. We 

have run this force into the ground. 

Many of us have been away from home years at a time. So—but 

what—we never take a day off. When I am on leave, I am attached 

to my BlackBerry and on my phone. My wife and I have these discussions many times. Okay. I am never disconnected from the 

Army. I lose leave every single year. Even though we make sure 

that our subordinates take their 30 days of leave, we never take— 

we basically—we put it over weekends; we don’t take any leave. 

So the health of the force really requires us to give those general 

officers a little bit of reprieve. So, from making them take their 

leave—— 

Mr. KELLY. Let me move on to the next question. I want just a 

little more answers on things. In my experience in the military of 

people going forward for GO [general officer] boards or general officers or senior level leaders in the military, it has been my experience, my personal experience, that I have seen far more people 

punished and prevented an IG complaint to hold up a guy who the 

promotion board goes past his MRD [mandatory removal date], and 

so he never makes general officer, or he doesn’t make O–6, or they 

don’t make O–7 or O–8. 

Has your experience been that far more senior leaders are punished by being held or flagged for negative transactions by an IG 

complaint that is not substantiated as to those who get away with 

doing something wrong and never get punished? 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, sir. And that is the elephant in the 

room. That is the whistleblower reprisal issue. When we talk about 

numbers, whistleblower reprisal has skyrocketed because of the 

misuse and misapplication of whistleblower reprisal against senior 

officials. It is off the charts. I have been investigated twice for 

whistleblower—— 

Mr. KELLY. Let me just real quick—and you guys understand. 

Junior members know—or junior members of the military know if 

they have a commander they don’t like for some reason, that if 

they file an IG complaint at the right time, it can end his career, 

even though they have done nothing wrong and nothing to substantiate it. Is that correct? 

Admiral SHELANSKI. That is correct. So we, you know, we can see 

a rise in complaints right around the time that the list comes out. 

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. Rosen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 

for being here. 

I guess, Mr. Chairman, I don’t understand why Members of Congress want to trash the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is the 

one glue that holds our military together. We can critique it. We 

can oversee it. We can hold it accountable. But, God forbid, if people in the political environment ever trash the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice and get rid of it—you think we have screwed up 

the military good now, put it in the hands, with no UCMJ, and put 

it out there where we have people with no understanding of the institution that create, Lord knows what, good order and discipline, 

decisions, battlefield decisions that commanders have to make, that 
24 

would all be eroded and gone. And we would feel good about it, and 

then we would hold our hearings and pound fists on tables and 

point bony fingers talking about what went wrong as honorable 

people sit here before us and holding them to account. 

And, yes, Mr. Chairman, I am on my high horse. 

How many of these offenses, General Quantock, were discovered 

outside of the military? 

General QUANTOCK. Sir, I can think of one where actually it was 

the press—it was an individual that decided to go to the press—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. So only one out of all of the hundreds or even thousands of accusations, they were all discovered by the institutions. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, sir. Some were anonymous complaints. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Now, where I come from, that is the hallmark of 

professionalism. You don’t see that at IBM, and God knows we 

don’t see that here in Congress. So I guess the question would be, 

why is it we think that it is a broken system? Yes, we have problems. Yes, we see oversight that Congress has to be responsible of, 

and we have civilian control of the military, and that is the great 

Republic that we all serve. 

But it is somewhat a little bit offensive to suggest that the institution is unprofessional or somehow broken because it discovers its 

own problems. In the business community, people would love to 

have those problems. Congress, gosh, we would love to have our 

own accountability where we discover the problems before the 

American public does. 

In terms of generals overseeing the military, wow, gosh, that is 

kind of like Members of Congress overseeing government. How 

could that be? The military has a better rate of accountability than 

society as a whole, certainly better than Congress, and perhaps 

even better than Hollywood, when it comes to offenses and things 

like this that we see. 

So I guess my question would be, what would be the damage that 

we see as we continue to inflate the problem, not saying ignore the 

problem—we have to take these things seriously, we have to hold 

them to account, we are doing that, we see that—but when it becomes inflated—and as was mentioned by my colleague from Mississippi, IG complaints come up, and then, you know, here come 

the investigations. And I have known many great warriors who 

were held from senior level command, were later exonerated after 

a 2-year period. They would have been able to keep men and 

women alive in battle and do great service to our Republic, but 

they never got the opportunity because, because, because. 

Could you speak to some of the other problems in your capacity 

as inspector general that, when someone is exonerated, do they 

ever get their life back? Are they ever restored, or does the ship 

just pass them by? 

General QUANTOCK. Sir, both happens. Sometimes the ship—it is 

based on timing. But sometimes the ship sails because investigations take long. I will tell you, just the other day—a couple months 

ago, I had a division commander that just came back from Afghanistan, and I won’t talk about his name. But he comes in my office, 

he said: Sir, I am getting ready to resign. I have had it. I have absolutely had it. 
25 

A disgruntled employee, a week before his change in command, 

knowing the effect of it, throws an allegation out there. Now, what 

happens is, of course, we spin up an investigation. He is flagged, 

no award at the end of a division command, despite his sacrifices 

to himself and his family. The FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command] commander was coming down there to pin an award on that 

guy, but that is off, but he still was going to a pin an award on 

the spouse. The spouse told her husband, said: I don’t want the 

damn award. Okay. 

So the families also were impacted on this because they also sacrifice. So one day we are going to wake up, if we keep this, we are 

going to wake up one day and realize, who the heck wants to serve? 

Because we put people through hell. We put families through hell. 

We put the soldiers through hell. We work them like dogs. We deploy them into combat. We bring them back, and here is your 

thanks. You are leaving without award. There is this cloud over 

your head, possibly lost your reputation. And then eventually he 

probably would get—he will get exonerated, and then he will be— 

because I have looked at the case, and there is nothing there. 

This is the whistleblower reprisal. I have been investigated twice 

for whistleblower reprisal when I came here because I held somebody accountable because they beat up a CID agent, beat up his 

weapon, pulled his weapon on his neighbor. And because he sent 

a protected communication to Congress about wanting to deploy 

and his unit said no, I got held up to 6 months. Or I downgraded 

an award from an MSM [Meritorious Service Medal] to an ARCOM 

[Army Commendation Medal]. I am on the awards board. I had no 

idea about the protected communication. Another 4 months. We do 

this to the general officer corps, not to mention to the entire Army 

all the time. The reason why the numbers are so high from DOD 

IG about the rise in complaints is because the misapplication of 

whistleblower reprisal. 

The law is good. It talks about gross waste of funds. It talks 

about intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to the members 

of the Armed Forces. It talks about grievous things, not downgrading an award. That is the problem we have. We have hijacked 

the system, and there is a cloud over the general officer corps because, right now, we are getting hammered. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the chairman. 

And the only parting comment I will say is that people are 

dragged into the IG to serve in IG capacities. They pick them from 

some of the best performing folks that are out there. They go kicking and screaming. They don’t want those assignments. They call 

all of the favors in to try to avoid them, and they still have to go. 

And so my hats are off to all of those that serve in our inspectors 

general departments within our military. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. Speier, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. I feel compelled to speak because we have an obligation as Members of Congress to do oversight. When 400 service 

members are implicated in the Fat Leonard scandal, when over 60 

admirals are potentially implicated, we have an obligation to look 

at the process. So I take great umbrage, frankly, that it is suggested somehow that we don’t have a role here. 
26 

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is not on trial here. We live 

by the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the military. I mean, 

there are elements of it that I am not particularly excited about, 

but for the most part, it is a—frankly, a victim-centered code. We 

have made some changes over the years, but what we are really 

looking at is a couple of things, from my perspective. 

Why is Congress oftentimes the last to know? We have oversight 

responsibility. You should come to us when you have got an issue 

with a senior officer and let us know so we are not reading about 

it in the newspaper. When you have a scandal like the Fat Leonard 

case in the Navy, it is incumbent on us to look at that case in particular and see, why is it no bystander, no bystander felt that they 

could come forward? 

And to Lieutenant General Quantock, whistleblower protection, I 

would argue, is not enough protection, and that is why people don’t 

come forward because they fear that there will be reprisals. There 

were too many people that were engaged in conduct unbecoming of 

officers in that case, and no one called them out. 

Now, let me now ask a question. I would like from each of you 

to know what your backlog is, quickly, if you could. 

Mr. FINE. We have a significant number of open investigations, 

and we report them and—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you have a number? 

Mr. FINE. I can get you the exact number. 

Ms. SPEIER. I just want to get numbers at this point to see 

whether or not we have got staffing issues. 

Mr. FINE. We do have staffing issues. The complexity, the number of cases that have risen, the number of cases that we have to 

do, and we take them seriously. We take each of them seriously. 

And you can only do more with less for so long, and it does affect 

the timeliness of the investigations and how long people are hung 

up. 

So I do believe that it is important to adequately resource IGs, 

both us and the service IGs. They are not the first people that they 

think of when they are growing the military. But you need to 

grow—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. I have got limited amount of time. How many 

additional staff do you think you need? 

Mr. FINE. We could use 100 more additional staff. We have 1,600 

employees. That is not that much. I think we could use a significant number more. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

Mr. FINE. I can give you more statistics and sort of basis, but we 

need significant resources, as do they. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

Lieutenant General. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, Congressman, we have 50 open senior 

official cases going on right now. I have 20 investigators. I could 

easily double that. The average case is about over 400 days. 

Whistleblower reprisal, a separate division, I have another 20 people doing that. I have 345 open cases. Average length of a case is 

391 days. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Thank you. 

Vice Admiral. 
27 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Yes, ma’am. We have over 200 cases that 

are open at this time, and we are just now finishing up and getting 

up to our 2016 cases. So there is some lag time because of the numbers of investigators. But I would have to give you a specific number later, if that is okay. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

Lieutenant General. 

General HARRIS. Congresswoman, we welcome the opportunity to 

partner with you on assessing our needs for plussing up our forces. 

I would like to take that question for the record and understand 

that our average investigation takes 187 days. 

Ms. SPEIER. So yours take about half the time as the Army. Is 

that right? Sounds like? 

General QUANTOCK. It sounds like it. 

Ms. SPEIER. I think we should probably look at that. Why is it 

one service can do it—— 

General QUANTOCK. One service is much bigger than the other 

service. The amount of service members does have an impact; but 

I am not sure, I would have to look at the numbers. 

Ms. SPEIER. Yeah, I think we should look at the numbers. 

Brigadier General. 

General OTTIGNON. Ma’am, I have 11 open cases on general officers. I have 26 whistleblower reprisal cases open. I have 300 total 

cases—just over 300 cases open. I average 233 days for a senior official investigation. And the remaining investigations are upwards 

of 300 days. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. I think we need to be sensitive to the time it 

takes for these cases. We need to up, I think, the service to the person who is charged and to those who are actually providing the 

work among your—those who are employed. At another point in 

time, I would like to know, in terms of your investigators, how 

many of your investigators are civilians? So I will take that for the 

record, if each of you could provide that to me, as compared to 

those who are in the military. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 137.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Abraham, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Just to follow up. Again, the process is good. In 

my opinion, it is working, simply because of the results that you 

all have had to this point. Moving forward, General Harris, you 

mentioned it a little bit in one of your answers. Since this is an 

open hearing, let’s let the general public know, what are the services doing proactively from that second lieutenant up to that fourstar to help prevent this from occurring over and over again? 

General HARRIS. Thank you, Congressman, for the opportunity to 

respond to this. So, proactively, two areas, prevention and training. 

So, first, training. So, from the youngest airman, whether you are 

an officer or enlisted, through every course of leadership that you 

go through, you have an ethics training, whether it be squadron officer school or airman leadership school, all the way up to the senior leader officer course, which general officers attend. 

Proactively, in the inspector general system, of course, we have 

our inspection process. And so not only are we assessing the readi-
28 

ness of our force, but we are assessing the culture of that force also 

and providing that feedback to the commander. 

Reactively, of course, the IG investigates fair, accurately, and 

thoroughly, any investigations, any complaints that we have to ensure that we are offering due process in upholding the standards 

of our service. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Other members? General. 

General OTTIGNON. Just briefly, sir. I would suggest that it begins at the beginning of boot camp. It begins at the beginning of 

officer candidate school. It is reinforced through every service 

school as they continue in their career, both enlisted and for officers. It becomes much more acute as the general officer, upon selection, annual requirements that we meet each year, as well as my 

office providing additional training each year in the field. So it is 

often, and it is more focused on the ethics piece throughout that 

year. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Admiral. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Yes, sir. Like the generals just said, from 

the beginning. So midshipmen, whether in ROTC [Reserve Officer 

Training Corps], at the Naval Academy, or officer candidate school, 

get their first taste of ethical training. That goes up all through 

their career. It is mandatory when they reach O–5 command that 

they go up to the Navy War College where they go through the 

Navy leadership and ethics class. And then, onward from there, as 

a flag officer, when they first become a flag, they have ethics training. 

I personally go to many of these classes. In fact, I either virtually 

or in person to talk about cases and where fellow commanders and 

flag officers before them have crossed the line. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. General Quantock. 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, sir. It is similar across all the services. 

The additional thing is that we put a lot of focus on the general 

officer education. Many different levels, that every time you make 

a step, you get an ethics brief, every year, you are getting an ethics 

brief. 

I would also say that we also have to really get after it at the 

battalion and brigade level, lieutenant colonel and colonel level. At 

our pre-command course, you know, we have extended it to 2 

weeks. So they get SJAs, and of course, they get me for an hour 

and a half because—and I have not missed one in my 31⁄2 years as 

the IG and 61⁄2 years when you talk about my CID time, because 

prevention is really the key. 

If we can prevent people from walking into mistakes, that is the 

key. And 992⁄3 percent of our soldiers out there want to do the right 

thing, but sometimes they walk into it. So our goal is to prevent 

that from happening. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I recognize myself. So one of the concerns is the 

length of time that it takes to go through this process. One element 

of that is certainly the resources in terms of the number of personnel we are throwing at it. But is there anything we can do procedurally to change the process to hasten it, to get, you know, it 
29 

is just—it is unfair to a lot of parties to just tie this thing up for 

so long. 

Mr. Fine, do you have any recommendations? 

Mr. FINE. I do think a uniform process could help speed things 

up, standardized databases, standardized formats, so that we know 

what we are doing and we can do that more quickly. I do think 

there ought to be sort of an assessment at the front end in the intake level whether there is sufficient indicia of credibility that it 

warrants an investigation. And then, if there is indication as the 

investigation is going along that there is a fundamental deficiency 

in the allegation, that it is not substantiated, we can close it in a 

reasonably timely way. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

Mr. FINE. So I think those are things that can be done. And I 

do think resources, as I mentioned, is significant. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Any other comments on this? 

General QUANTOCK. Yes, sir. And the point that I would make, 

if I haven’t mentioned reprisal, I would like to mention reprisal 

again. Forty percent of my senior official cases are caught up in reprisal because they basically have held somebody accountable. So 

some better guidance to DOD on how they basically interpret reprisal law so that just the significant ones fall under that and not 

everything. Downgrading an award, you know, hold somebody accountable because they beat somebody up and pulled a weapon on 

them. Somebody had—a doc who was on cocaine. Reprisal. 

I mean, it goes on and on and on, the amount of cases, because 

all I have to do is have a protected communication followed by any 

kind of unfavorable personnel action, we are off to the races on a 

whistleblower reprisal case. And, again, average time is 391 days. 

If we get some help, some guidance on that piece—I mean, again, 

it is good law. It is there for very good reasons. But if we could get 

some help in that particular area, that would help on the resource 

piece as well. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Yes, sir. We have initiated a couple of prototypes about intake analysis, and it has been very profitable in 

terms of timesaving. So we continue to look at process improvement. 

But part of the issue besides that is IT [information technology]. 

And I think, you know, as we continue to have to scan documents 

and manually input things into the computer system, it is a huge 

waste of time. 

The effort by DOD to make one type of system that we all can 

manage electronically eventually will save us a large amount of 

time and effort that right now is taken up with just antiquated systems that just eat up a lot of time. 

General HARRIS. Our timeliness factors are really based on the 

complexity of the allegation that we are investigating, the volume 

of complaints, and then the availability of witnesses, takes great 

time. But last year, we ran a process improvement event, which got 

us down to the 187 days, and of course, we are still looking to get 

it down even further. 

General OTTIGNON. I would say that the Marine Corps is very 

supportive of that law. I mean, that statute, we have great con-
30 

fidence in it. Any changes that we have made over the previous 

years obviously has a trickle-down effect to us through the Department in procedure and policy. Statute of limitations would be a 

perfect example of review of how 1 year’s worth of time, as the general has alluded to in examples, that is a pretty wide aperture that 

can provide us the complexity of a case that makes that timing go 

out for several hundred days to complete. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, certainly what we want to have is a system 

that we—apparently we do not have right now—where we can expeditious—more expeditiously discipline officers in substantiated 

cases, but not hurt their careers and not hurt the military as a 

whole on cases that are not substantiated but drag out forever. So 

we—there is really a need, I think, to figure out how we can move 

this system along faster. 

Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really appreciate it. I do want to follow up on that. While we 

do need a process to hold people accountable when they have had 

wrongdoing and we need to make sure that there are no dirtbags 

in senior leadership positions, I know way too many examples of 

very good people who are caught up in this process, whose names 

are maligned, who don’t have a chance to defend themselves until 

the investigation is nearly complete. They don’t even know what 

charges are brought against them. In the court of public opinion, 

they are already guilty. They are not exonerated publicly at all. So 

they end up—them and their families are held in shame for long 

periods of time, only to kind of disappear at the end of a long distinguished career. 

This process—I mean, I hear and I know of way too many examples of this. So, when we are talking about these processes of sorting out the frivolous complaints, commanders have to make tough 

decisions. Sometimes they have to clean up organizations. Sometimes people don’t like that. Sometimes people have to, you know, 

be held accountable below them, and we have got to be able to protect legitimate whistleblowers while also protecting due process for 

the accused. 

And, again, I have way too many examples that bring concern to 

me about this process, both at the service level and at the DOD IG 

level. So a couple of quick questions. We also I think have a culture, by the way, if any of them ask for a lawyer, they must be 

guilty. But then we have investigators that are acting like prosecutors, and they are not getting the legal advice that they need in 

order to not be trapped. So I think that is a cultural issue, not necessarily a process issue. 

So how long—if an investigation goes on and somebody is exonerated, how long does that investigation stay on file? And are they 

kept on file in order to confirm whether that person is confirmable 

to a higher rank or a new job? Can anybody answer that? 

Mr. FINE. I can answer to the extent that we accumulate the derogatory information, including substantiated findings, and are required to provide that to both to Department and the Senate when 

someone is up for promotion. We do it if there is a substantiated 

case. If it is not substantiated, that is not derogatory and—— 
31 

Ms. MCSALLY. So unsubstantiated cases are kept on file for how 

long? 

Mr. FINE. We keep the files. I mean, we don’t get rid of the files. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. FINE. But in terms of—it doesn’t go into their personnel file. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Are we saying that there is no process by which 

they are checking confirmability of any general officers with unsubstantiated cases? 

Mr. FINE. When we have a records check process and we do that 

records check and if it is not substantiated, it does not come up as 

a positive on that records check. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So it basically says nothing? 

Mr. FINE. Right. We provide, you know, negative information to 

the Department—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. All right. What about the process of an individual 

who is accused not knowing necessarily what they are accused of 

until the investigation—in great detail, again, we have heard recently of this happening—until the investigation is wrapped up. 

And then they have to defend themselves after a whole package of 

stuff has been put together, and now they are having to, like, go 

through—down all these rabbit holes to figure out how to defend 

themselves, instead of being upfront right upfront. And this is an 

example from the Air Force. 

General Harris. 

General HARRIS. We defend our process, which we believe is fair 

and accurate and thorough, and so we take the time to get the information from our witnesses and the complainant in order to gather all that together, and then, at the end, then we do absolutely 

interview the subject so that they do have their time to speak. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Do you see a concern that maybe an accused 

needs to know upfront what they are accused of so they can in parallel be preparing themselves to defend themselves because sometimes these rabbit holes go deep, and then you are having to unwind it if you are just handed this package at the end of the whole 

thing? 

General QUANTOCK. Ma’am, I would just say, you have to be very 

careful because if you start making allegations that you just—you 

can set this individual up for reprisal. We do a lot of—DOD IG does 

it. We do it. We do a credibility assessment. In fact, there is a lot 

of heavy investigative load on the front end as we try to see if— 

if this allegation is in fact credible. 

Credible determination is a big piece. Again, we work with our 

DOD IG brethren up here to make sure that we agree, okay. So 

then we will launch an investigation. But we want to get some 

facts together. Because we also don’t want to set this general officer up, ‘‘Hey, you are under investigation for this.’’ Well, if that 

person happens to be under command and it may be unsubstantiated, then any time he deals with the person who is making the 

complaint could set this person up for reprisal. So we are very careful in that respect. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I hear you, but do you understand the concern 

that I am conveying, that you guys may go through a very lengthy 

process, and then somebody is just handed the—— 
32 

General QUANTOCK. But once we determine there is credible—a 

credible allegation, that person is basically, ‘‘Hey, here is what you 

are being accused of,’’ and we read him rights. 

Admiral SHELANSKI. And that is the same with us. We have a 

script that, once it is determined to be credible and we are going 

to investigate, there is a script that we read, and you are—the complaint is as follows; the following rule and regulation has been violated. We tell them to not interview or talk to anybody. So there 

is a whole script to make sure that they understand exactly what 

is—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. I hear what you are saying. Again, the vast majority of these cases are unsubstantiated and frivolous allegations. I 

am talking about the individual who has served their country well, 

who is now being held up for retirement, who is now being moved 

with their family and wondering what their future is, and has already been tried in the court of public opinion. And in the end, it 

is unsubstantiated. But them holding on, wondering what their 

fate is for long periods of time, not getting an ability to defend 

themselves until it is all over. It may make you feel better that it 

is unsubstantiated at the end, but the process that they went 

through is not a positive one. And that is one I think that really 

we need to shine a greater light on in order to protect those that 

are accused who in the end are innocent. 

Is there any sort of way that they can be publicly exonerated? 

I know I missed the first round, but I got—Okay. All right. Thank 

you. I will wind up and come back again—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Without objection—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. If you don’t mind. I won’t be long. 

Is there a way for them to be publicly exonerated for something 

that they didn’t commit when this is all over, to at least clear people’s names? 

Mr. FINE. One thing we do is we consider our reports for proactive release. If they are substantiated and involve a high-level official, we do not wait for a FOIA request years later, but we release 

it. At the same time, if it has already received public attention, if 

somebody is out there as having been accused of something, we will 

consider that for proactive release as well, just so that the result 

of that investigation can be—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Well, there is a difference between being in the 

media and having an entire unit and everybody that has ever 

served with somebody hearing all the rumors and innuendoes and 

what is going on as far as the investigation goes. 

So is there not a way that we can—when somebody is cleared, 

that you can, regardless of whether it has been in the public eye, 

say, ‘‘This person is exonerated,’’ or if they request that? Maybe 

some people don’t want that, but—— 

General QUANTOCK. Well, I think, as long as the person agrees, 

they can go to the public affairs officer and have the—say, ‘‘Hey, 

it was not substantiated.’’ But a lot of folks, people don’t realize 

what is going on unless they have been substantiated. Here is, at 

least in my view, I have seen this for 61⁄2 years. How these things 

get into the press and how they get in there—I mean, I am not big 

into public release and public shaming; that is just not what I am 

into. 
33 

However, what I believe in is that, every 6 months, we have two 

folks that FOIA, ‘‘Give me all the substantiations for all general officers,’’ and we do. We give them a spreadsheet; ‘‘Here is all the 

substantiations for all general officers.’’ And then they pick the salacious ones, and then that makes the next headline, the next 

newspaper. That is how this works. So they all get out there. All 

the salacious ones get out there. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah, I am talking about the unsubstantiated 

ones. 

General QUANTOCK. I know exactly what you are talking about. 

I am just saying that most people, if they are not substantiated, 

don’t want it out there because they are under investigation, because most people don’t know. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I hear you. 

Can you talk about the process of what investigations are done 

by the services and which investigations are done by the DOD IG, 

really briefly? I see in your testimony it says normally three- and 

four-stars are at DOD IG level or something that is of such a high 

level of attention. 

But is there other determinations on that? And if the services actually close an investigation and unsubstantiate it, do we have 

cases where the DOD IG decides to open it up again or take it on 

after the fact? 

Mr. FINE. So, on the front end, we do the three-star and fourstar, the SES employees, Presidential appointees, intelligence-type 

investigations. And if there is a conflict or some reason why the 

service IG shouldn’t do it or can’t do it, we will do those as well. 

Otherwise, they do the investigation. When it is completed, they 

provide it to us for oversight. If we think it is thorough and has 

done all the investigative work that needs to be done, we approve 

it. If we don’t, we can send it back to them for additional work. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So is there ever cases where you then take on an 

investigation yourself after they have closed it? 

Mr. FINE. There has been occasion, yeah. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. FINE. Yeah, for good reason. Very rarely. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. FINE. For additional information or for some specific reason, 

but it has happened. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to make something really clear from my perspective. 

I think we do have a problem with different spanks for different 

ranks. As I understand it, there have been 70,000 court-martials 

in the Air Force, for instance, and not 1 general officer has ever 

been court-martialed. 

When some of my colleagues were talking about the UCMJ and 

how if—what the UCMJ does is provide for accountability where 

there wouldn’t be—where this isn’t criminal conduct. There are 

cases that have just been brought to my attention. For instance, 

Lieutenant General Ron Lewis, who misused government credit 

cards at two strip clubs, falsely claimed his credit cards had been 

stolen, fraudulently stole over a thousand dollars from a credit card 
34 

company, violated an order by going to a restricted area, and had 

an inappropriate relationship, he didn’t get prosecuted under the 

UCMJ. He didn’t have a court-martial. A junior enlisted would get 

prosecuted for that offense. 

General Kip Ward, misuse of government resources for his per- sonal gain, and his family was ordered to pay back $82,000. That 

is theft. And under normal circumstances, that would be subject to 

a court-martial. So, as we look at this issue, I think one of the 

things that I would like to see, Mr. Chairman, is that we take the 

time to make sure that everyone is being treated fairly in the military. 

I would really appreciate having from each of the services the 

number of court-martials, how many for enlisted, how many for officers, so we can just take a look at that as well. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 137.] 

And let me also point out to you that yesterday we passed a very 

strong sexual harassment bill in the House. There have been a 

number of Members who have resigned or are retiring as a result 

of sexual harassment, not sexual assault, here. And I think that, 

as we look at the military, we are going to expect the same level 

of responsibility for conduct that we are now expecting of Members 

of Congress. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We will now take a brief recess in order to set the 

witness table for the second panel. We will take a 5-minute recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. I wish now to welcome our esteemed second panel. 

We would like to respectfully remind the second panel to summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the high points of your written 

testimony in 5 minutes or less. Your written comments and statements will be made part of the record. 

Our second panel consists of General James C. McConville, Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Bill Moran, Vice Chief of Naval 

Operations; General Stephen W. Wilson, Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force; General Glenn M. Walters, Assistant Commandant of 

the Marine Corps. 

With that, General McConville, you may now make your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES C. McCONVILLE, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General MCCONVILLE. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Speier, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

The United States military is one of the most trusted institutions 

in the country, and we value that bond of trust, and we recognize 

that every single day we need to wake up and earn that trust. 

While senior misconduct in the Army is down 51 percent, we know 

that one act of misconduct breaks that trust of the America people. 

Senior misconduct in the United States Army has no place. Our 

senior officers are developed through decades of formal and informal training on ethics, Army values, leadership, and character. 
35 

And we provide additional training for those leaders who have been 

selected to serve as general officers. The vast majority of our senior 

officers uphold our demanding moral and ethical standards just as 

we, their soldiers, and the American people expect them to. 

We are not a perfect institution, but we strive to be one. Senior 

officers who fail to meet the Army standards are held accountable. 

I, along with the other Army leaders, am committed to upholding 

the standards of our profession and ensuring all our senior officers 

do the same. 

I appreciate your time and attention this morning, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General McConville can be found in 

the Appendix on page 107.] 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY 

Admiral MORAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, thank 

you for the opportunity to be here to speak to the subcommittee 

members, the American public, but most importantly this morning, 

to talk to our sailors. 

The foundation of our joint forces—this is going to sound like a 

broken record and just demonstrates how much we believe in the 

values of our institution. The foundation of the joint force is trust. 

When senior leaders fail, trust at the institution level is put at 

risk, which can have a profound impact on every aspect of developing and employing this force. 

So we all take this topic extremely seriously. And while we all 

seem to be trending in the right direction, as Jim just articulated, 

every single one of these matters. At the end of the day, we are 

an institution comprised of human beings who are indeed fallible. 

So, to get after this, we have taken deliberate steps to train and 

develop our enlisted and officer corps throughout their careers, to 

preclude moral and ethical failures. And when they do fail, we address them in ways to preserve the larger trust in the institution. 

Being transparent and accountable is part of this effort. Our goal 

is, by the time senior leaders are produced, they have a solid foundation formed through years of experience where the principles of 

ethical behavior and moral decision making and proper professional conduct are not only taught but reinforced and tested. 

As you have heard from our inspector general, we not only routinely track the data, we look for trends. When we see evidence, we 

explore and derive lessons learned to be better leaders. And while 

we have ethical guidelines and even rules to limit the consequences 

of poor decision making, the rules alone are not what you and the 

American public expect from us. You expect us to live up to higher 

standards of professional behavior. 

Transparency along these lines is central to our efforts to 

strengthen trust within our ranks, within the institution, with the 

American public, and I believe it strengthens our relationship with 

Congress. 

So thank you for the opportunity to be transparent today, to 

speak candidly and directly about this critical topic, because it is 

the foundation of our profession. Thank you very much. 
36 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in the 

Appendix on page 113.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General WILSON. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to testify before you today. On behalf of our Secretary of the 

Air Force and our chief of staff and the 670,000 total force airmen 

around the globe, it is an honor to be here. It is honor to be here 

with my vice chiefs. 

Late last summer, on the eve of our 70th birthday as a Nation— 

a service, I had the privilege to stand a few miles from here on the 

turf of the Nationals Ballpark. Forty-six of America’s sons and 

daughters were in front of me, the backdrop of the Capitol behind 

them. They were about to enter the United States Air Force. 

In that moment, I thought about what we owe those patriotic volunteers in return for their selfless service and their selflessness. 

The word that came to mind was trust. I think all of us, all of us 

vice chiefs, view maintaining trust and confidence with the American people and with our force as the essential element of our past 

and future mission success. It is for that reason that we employ a 

deliberate and career-long continuum of learning, not only in operations and leadership, but in law and ethical standards for all airmen and certainly for our senior officers. 

Despite those efforts, at times, senior officers do break bonds of 

trust by faltering in judgment and/or character. And in those instances, we leverage a robust system of investigation and accountability. Complaints are investigated by independent teams of professionals. Disposition is done with objectivity, steeped in process 

and law. 

I know I can speak for my fellow chiefs here: Even one case of 

senior officer misconduct is too many. Our goal is for all airmen to 

do what is right at all times, regardless of the circumstances, and 

no matter the rank or the position. If they fall short of that goal, 

we will hold them accountable for their actions. 

Thank you for your continued leadership and your partnership as 

we seek to achieve that goal and, by extension, maintain the trust 

of all airmen and the American people. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 118.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

General WALTERS. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, 

and distinguished members of the House Armed Services subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and 

report to you on this very important issue, the moral and ethical 

conduct of our Marine general officers. 

We know that our Nation’s citizens expect the very best from 

their Marines. They expect operational excellence. They trust that 

their Marines are women and men of the highest character, both 
37 

on the battlefield and in every aspect of their lives. We Marines expect the same from ourselves. We readily accept this responsibility. 

Our core values of honor, courage, and commitment guide our 

moral and ethical conduct of every Marine. All Marines are 

custodians of these core values. Our senior leaders set the example 

for every Marine to emulate. They understand this responsibility, 

and they spend their lives upholding these values. They understand that winning our Nation’s battles requires a foundation of 

character within every Marine, and it starts with them. 

Marines learn these sacred values early and often. We believe 

that through our continuum of training throughout an officer’s career and oversight and education provided by our inspection programs, we build ethical decision makers. At every level of officer 

training and education, we continually and consistently emphasize 

ethical leadership as the foundation of leading Marines. 

Over the last 10 years, the Marines have averaged one and a half 

cases per year of substantiated general officer misconduct. In nearly half of these cases, the mistakes have been administrative in nature. While we take pride in the moral conduct of our generals, we 

acknowledge that there is always room to improve. Like every improving and learning organization, we remain proactive to evolving 

our education and training and programs to ensure the disciplined 

moral conduct of every Marine, especially our general officers. 

On behalf of our Commandant, General Robert Neller, we thank 

the Congress and this subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss 

this important issue. We appreciate your continued support to ensure the joint force remains the very best military our Nation requires and expects. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Walters can be found in the 

Appendix on page 125.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me ask this question, and I would appreciate 

an answer from the Army, Navy, then the Air Force, and then the 

Marine Corps. Many of us are familiar with the consequences of a 

court-martial, a conviction. But less familiar with some of the other 

administrative and nonjudicial actions that can be taken against 

service members. 

Could you explain the other options available to you when disposing of senior leader misconduct cases and the consequences 

thereof? 

General McConville. 

General MCCONVILLE. Yes, sir, I could. You know, what is at our 

disposal if we don’t go to a court-martial is we could do a memorandum of concern, a memorandum of reprimand, but what really 

hurts an officer is a general officer memorandum of reprimand that 

we put in their official file. And that goes in their official file. It 

basically ends their career as they go forward. And as they go to 

retire, that is seen by the board that adjudicates what rank they 

will retire at. So, basically, you could lose one, two, three stars, depending on what rank you retire at, which is hundreds of thousands of dollars, for some type of misconduct at that level. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. I was going to mention the retirement 

grade determination process that all of us go through, for any flag 

officer, senior leader, who has had a substantiated allegation, that 

what we term becomes adverse information to their record. We 
38 

must do a board, and we all do that, we carry out that process. A 

retirement grade determination for one- and two-stars is ultimately 

signed off by senior leaders in the Navy. All of our services with 

the Secretary level. And for a three- or four-star retirement, grade 

determination must be approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me fully understand this. So that—you give 

some sort of a letter of admonition or whatever that is there. So 

it is a career killer. So that person is not going to get promoted. 

They may be able to finish out their tour of duty or—at some level, 

I suppose, be able to finish their career. So then they go to retirement, and then they are reviewed by a board to determine whether 

or not they are going to be reduced in rank in retirement? Am I 

clear on that? 

Admiral MORAN. If it’s adverse information, yes, sir. I would 

add—I won’t speak for the rest of the services here—but for the 

Navy, if a senior officer is found with substantiated allegations that 

are serious, they are not asked—they will not stay for the rest of 

their tour. They are often relieved of their command, relieved of 

their duties, and asked to retire, and then we go through the retirement grade determination. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So somebody that you were going to allow to finish their—it was a letter of admonition. It is a career killer, but 

you are going to let them finish their tour of duty. 

Admiral MORAN. Not necessarily. If it is serious enough for a letter of admonition, they are not going to continue. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General Wilson. 

General WILSON. We have the same process. Ours would be letter of reprimand, or an Article 15 type of instance, and the same 

things apply. We would determine whether or not they should still 

serve in that job. In most cases, for a senior officer, if they have 

an Article 15 or letter of reprimand, then are going to be removed 

from that job immediately, and they will go through an officer 

grade determination to follow. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So, effectively, if somebody got a letter of admonition, forced to retire, reduced in rank in that retirement, it is literally the equivalent of a fine of hundreds of thousands of dollars, 

am I correct? 

General WILSON. That is correct. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Walters. 

General WALTERS. Sir, we follow the same process. The one example I could give you, albeit is 10 years old, we had a selected 

two-star. He had a substantiated finding on him. He was retired 

as an O–6. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Wow. 

General WALTERS. So he didn’t get a second star. He retired as 

an O–6. I actually did the calculation last night, and if you compare his O–6 retirement to an O–8 retirement, what he really lost 

in compensation over a 30-year retirement is $1.9 million. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you all for your presentations, for your conversations yesterday. 
39 

I guess this question could be asked of you as well. Could you 

inform us by letter of how many court-martials there have been of 

general officers? The chairman just talked about, you know, the potential loss of rank and loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars 

over one’s lifetime in retirement, although they still keep their retirement. 

I am more interested in the value of a security clearance because 

that is worth a lot of money—a whole lot more money than 

$200,000, frankly. And in some cases, these cases that have come 

before us where they have lied and done things that would question their moral turpitude, drunkenness, under normal circumstances, someone could in fact lose their security clearance. But I 

wonder how many do lose their security clearance. 

Does anyone have any thoughts on that? And if you don’t, if you 

could also provide that to us for the record. Of these cases that— 

we have seen so much prominence, and we can provide them to you 

if you don’t know them off the top of your head—I would be curious 

to know how many actually lose their security clearance because 

that is more valuable, I think, than many other things. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 138.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Admiral, you talked about transparency in your 

opening remarks, and I think that that is really important from the 

congressional oversight perspective. The DOD IG does disclose substantiated cases, but to my knowledge, there isn’t any means by 

which each of your services would disclose to Congress, for instance, substantiated cases. Could each of you inform us as to 

whether or not you would be supportive of that? 

General MCCONVILLE. As far as the Army, if this committee 

wants those cases, absolutely. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, ma’am. 

General WILSON. Yes, ma’am. 

General WALTERS. No problem, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

Admiral, the Fat Leonard case has come up a number of times, 

and it is probably the most egregious case in the history, certainly 

of the Navy, if not the military in general. Because so many people 

were involved and so many people corrupted by this individual, I 

am stunned that there weren’t any bystanders that spoke up. 

First question, how did it actually—there were a number of cases 

that were investigated by NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service] because there was bid rigging or overcharging for fuel or 

the like that he was engaged in, but many of those cases were dismissed. Have you done kind of a postmortem on that to look at 

where the holes were within the chain of command in terms of 

identifying the issues and addressing them? 

Admiral MORAN. Ma’am, I hope you will respect this comment. 

It is an ongoing Federal investigation by the Department of Justice 

and the U.S. Attorney. I am very uncomfortable answering questions that could prejudice the case in any way, and so answering 

some of that—what you just asked—could potentially cause us 

problems. And when it is done, and we are hopefully getting to the 

very end of this now, when it is done and all the files are turned 
40 

over to us, we will do that. And there is a process in place to make 

sure that we evaluate every single case that comes to the Navy. 

Whether they are handled by the Department of Justice or not, 

they come to us for final resolution, and we cannot talk publicly 

about that until the Department of Justice is complete with their 

investigation. 

Ms. SPEIER. No, I appreciate that. And I am not asking you to 

do that, but from a policy standpoint, are there any new policies 

that you recognize would be helpful in preventing cases like this 

from, you know, exploding into scandals that are of proportions 

that it is hard to even comprehend? 

Admiral MORAN. Most of the issues revolve around the contracting for services in overseas ports, so we have taken a very strong 

turn on the process by which we do that. We put layers of oversight 

into how those contracts are issued and who is issuing them. And 

that sort of training in our supply corps and in our general support 

corps has been very strong over the last 5 years, and we think that 

largely has helped us drive down the number of misconduct cases 

that have resulted outside the scope of the GDMA case. 

Ms. SPEIER. One last question. Bystanders, do you think bystanders have a duty to report? Question for each of you. 

General MCCONVILLE. Absolutely. 

Admiral MORAN. In every single case. We talk a lot about this 

in sexual harassment training, sexual assault, but all what we 

would call behaviors that are destructive in nature. Oftentimes, it 

can be quelled by a bystander, and we try to teach that value to 

everyone. 

General WILSON. Completely agree. 

General WALTERS. Yes, ma’am, we teach, see something, say 

something. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate all of you being here and your leadership. I would 

like to just go back to a question I asked from the previous panel 

about the different spanks for different ranks. Do you think we are 

holding people equally accountable, in your view, whether it is a 

midlevel, senior NCO [noncommissioned officer] to a senior officer? 

Thank you. 

General MCCONVILLE. I do. My previous—I was commanding 

general of the 101st Airborne Division for 3 years, had general 

court-martial authority, handled a lot of the cases at the lower 

level, and now as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for the last 

71⁄2 months. I believe we hold everyone appropriately accountable, 

and when we look at senior officers, we expect a higher standard 

from them, and when they don’t meet the standards, we hold them 

accountable. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

Admiral Moran. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. Both Jim and I served as prior ‘‘1s,’’ 

which are personnel commands, and in every disciplinary case, 

every single one that reaches the level of where we are trying to 

determine if someone should be retired early or retired without pay 
41 

or so on and so forth or released from Active Duty, we see every 

one of those packages, and as vice chiefs we see them again. 

And so I think we get to see, across the board, a pretty balanced 

view of senior and junior cases. And I think we all also believe that 

if we do not do this in a fair way, we are going to be held accountable by our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines, so I think we 

are very conscious of doing this in a correct way. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Wilson. 

General WILSON. Congressman Bacon, I completely agree with 

my counterparts here that we hold all of our airmen to one standard. And I would also add, though, that we hold our senior officers 

to an exceptionally high standard, that we know that we will be 

judged by that. And so in my time as the vice chief, I have seen 

that we are not going to walk by any problem, that we are going 

to hold any senior officer who does any misconduct accountable for 

that. We are going to investigate it, then hold them accountable. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

General Walters. 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. I agree with all my counterparts 

here. I will just add one thing, is to remember that our senior officers, one shot and you are adjudicated, one shot and you are down, 

perhaps, whereas on some of the junior ranks, we try to give them 

a second chance. Not—it is not a zero defect mentality. I would say 

it is almost a zero defect mentality the higher up you go. 

Mr. BACON. I know I appreciated second chances when I was 18 

and 19. 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. Me too. 

Mr. BACON. I want to just sort of pose a rough hypothetical and 

whoever wants to speak up on it. I think part of the issue is if you 

have someone who has served honorably for 30 years, say they are 

a one- or two-star at that point, and you are 31 and 32 as a threestar, maybe involved in an unprofessional relationship or whatever 

it may be, and then you have to determine at retirement, do you 

go back to the two-star or one-star, versus someone, say, at the 8- 

year point and they do something similar, how hard is that, from 

your perspective, to determine is going back rank to the 30-year 

point or should it even be more serious, depending on the crime or 

action taken? How hard is that when you are making these determinations, I guess? 

Because my point being is sometimes you go back to the last 

rank honorably served, but yet if it is a junior enlisted or something that maybe they suffer a career-ending decision there. So I 

just—I would just be curious for your insights. 

General WALTERS. Perhaps I could illuminate a little bit, sir. The 

grade determination is a process that is in place for all of us, but 

the reminder is if—I don’t care if it is a junior Marine or a senior 

Marine, if the action is criminal, then there is no rank involved. 

I can name that one in the last 5 years where it was a senior officer, an O–6, and he is zero. 

Mr. BACON. And he would retire with no rank? 

General WALTERS. He gets no retirement, he is in jail, and he is 

zero. He has got no rank at all. 

Mr. BACON. Any other comments? 
42 

General MCCONVILLE. I will follow along with the comments. I 

agree. It is a difference. We have had two court-martials, and one 

I won’t talk about right now, but that have been adjudicated over 

the last 10 years, and both officers were of criminal-type nature, 

and we will court-martial them if they warrant that. But when it 

looks at—you know, we weigh every single case on its merits. We 

look at what the soldier or the officer has done over the many 

years, and we weigh all that, and we put it together, and we try 

to do the right thing when it comes to making a decision on their 

future. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on my previous line of questioning. How long 

are unsubstantiated reports kept in each of your services? Do you 

know? 

Admiral MORAN. Maybe I will start. Are we talking just senior 

officers, ma’am? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

Admiral MORAN. Yeah. So we have other terms when we talk 

about investigations where they are substantiations and then there 

are unsubstantiated but reportable information. Reportable meaning that it wasn’t adverse, but it is still required by the Senate for 

confirmation. So it is a little bit different from—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. And what is an example of something that 

is unsubstantiated but reportable? 

Admiral MORAN. Well, let’s say they were—someone was accused 

of something. Boy, so many of these are fresh in my mind from a 

topic I am not at liberty to talk about. But if it was you were alleged to have gone to a dinner with a contractor and accepted that 

dinner, and it was unsubstantiated that it was accepted by you but 

it was alleged to be that you had—you did attend a dinner with 

a contractor, that can be reportable, but not—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So there are people that are going through an entire investigative process, they are cleared, but yet in a nomination, 

even though they are cleared, it is reportable to the Senate for confirmation? 

Admiral MORAN. The Senate is—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. The allegation? 

Admiral MORAN. The Senate is entitled to any information on an 

officer being considered for promotion to the rank of O–7 and 

above. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. That was kind of my line of questioning in 

the last session, but it seemed like all the panelists said that unsubstantiated claims are never taken into account for jobs or rank. 

And so now I am hearing that they are, unsubstantiated claims are 

taken into account. 

Admiral MORAN. They have to be accounted for. That doesn’t 

mean that will prevent them from being promoted. It just means 

we have to—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So within the services—I don’t know if each of you 

can answer—is there anywhere informally or formally in your proc-
43 

ess of considering someone for a new job or rank where you actually look at unsubstantiated investigations as part of that process? 

General MCCONVILLE. Well, one of the things that we look at is 

titling. When we look at vetting an officer, we look at all the databases that come up to see where that—and I will give you an example. And, you know, this did not hold up the officer, but the officer 

was titled because his dog got loose in the neighborhoods. The MPs 

[military police] came by. They titled him for having a loose dog in 

the neighborhood, and he was, you know—actually, he was, you 

know, substantiated for having the dog loose in the neighborhood. 

So—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. I am talking about where people are cleared and 

are they somehow in any informal or formal process, are people 

looking at the files of their cleared allegations and cleared investigation as to whether they are going to offer them for a new job 

or promotion? Do you see what I am trying to get to the core of 

here? 

General WILSON. We don’t do that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thanks, General Wilson. 

General Walters. 

General WALTERS. No, I mean, we are required to report all the 

information in a confirmation to the Senate. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So all information includes unsubstantiated 

claims? 

General WALTERS. You have to report whether they were investigated in some cases, and these are the rules that are set. We 

don’t have a big stack of all the—in my office of all the unsubstantiated. I don’t have any of those. That is really the legal review, 

and they know what parameters that the Senate requires that goes 

in with a confirmation package. I sign off on those. And it is usually a paragraph at the bottom that says something along the lines 

of we looked at OGD–278, we have looked at this, and no substantiations, but there was an entry in here, and that is all it will be. 

And then it will be up to the Senate to say tell me more, if they 

are interested. 

Admiral MORAN. Congresswoman, you will remember a nonpunitive letter in your days where that is between the commander and 

the individual, not to be for anyone else. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

Admiral MORAN. That is required—a nonpunitive letter for a flag 

officer or a nominee for flag is required by the Senate to be reported. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. But are you saying it is the current law, 

like we have in the law, like that if—I am talking about IG investigations that are closed and somebody has been exonerated, that 

still the—even though they are innocent, just because they were accused, that has to be reported to the Senate? 

Admiral MORAN. No, ma’am, that is not what I am saying. I am 

saying that if something was issued to an officer that is up for promotion to flag, unlike for the rest of the service, anyone else with 

a nonpunitive, that is no one else’s business. Those are still required to be brought forward. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. So it still goes back to my question is, is 

there anywhere in the process within the services that—I know we 
44 

have heard from General Wilson—that unsubstantiated investigations are looked at formally or informally by the services whether 

you are considering somebody for a new job or promotion? 

Admiral MORAN. In a promotion boards, if it is not adverse information, it is not examined during the promotion board. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I am not talking about a promotion board. I am 

talking about as you all sit around talking about who is going to 

be put into this next job or considered for the next star—— 

General WALTERS. Generally speaking, is we are looking at a 

slate is I guess what you are talking about, is we do a slate. We 

do slates continuing through the year because things change and 

demand signals on people change. I can’t remember anybody—well, 

it is only two of us, the Commandant and I, saying, well, there is 

an unsubstantiated claim. That never comes up. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. I am over my time. 

General WALTERS. Substantiated, sure. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I don’t know if you guys get what I am trying to 

get at, but accused doesn’t mean guilty, and I just want to make 

sure that that is being taken into consideration. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. I have a question, something that I 

think I am seeing a rise in, and it is not at the same level of some 

of the cases we have been talking about today. But you have, not 

general officers, but officers that have the responsibility of making 

sure that their troops are doing the things they are supposed to do. 

And I have become aware of a couple cases where the lower ranking person, either officer or enlisted, wants to resist that, and all 

the leader is doing is saying, listen, you have got to be in line, you 

have got to get your job done. Then they go, the person not doing 

their job, go and accuse some kind of bias, that this leader has 

some kind of bias. And what I am seeing is these leaders, then, 

they are now the accused of something just because they were trying to make sure someone did their job. They make this claim that 

some kind of bias, and now that leader is tied up in knots distracted from doing the job they are supposed to do every day because they have to defend themselves, and we are losing good people, because they get to the point where it is like I want out. I don’t 

need this harassment when all I am trying to do is do what is 

right. And you are all shaking your heads like I am familiar with 

this type of antics taking place. 

How do we—I am not saying that there can’t be leaders that are 

out of line. Don’t get me wrong. But how do we defend the people 

that are getting tied up in knots and kept from doing their job in 

leadership because somebody who is not doing their job decides 

they are going to take that route? And are you seeing a rise in this 

type of—— 

General MCCONVILLE. Well, I think I can speak for our service 

is very concerned about those type issues. We want commanders 

not to be looking over their shoulders when they are making decisions. On the other hand, we want to make sure that, you know, 

our soldiers have access, you know, if they see something wrong, 

to come forward, and it really becomes trying to find that sweet 

spot in between. And we have to watch that as we go forward. And 
45 

you heard IG talk about that kind of concern about how maybe 

some people are taking advantage, and we just have to watch that, 

and we have to come back. 

And there are things we can do when we look at some of the 

cases. Some of them may be triage upfront. We take a look at it. 

We—you know, and there is risk in that because the best thing to 

do is do a 4- or 500-day investigation, you will be absolutely sure 

that you have no issues probably at the end. 

On the other hand, you may hold up someone at retirement or 

something like that, and I am not sure that is fair either. So we 

are trying to find the best way to make this fair for both involved. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I would like to see some focus on speeding up 

that process, because I am seeing some good people get dragged 

through the mud for absolutely no good reason whatsoever just because you told someone they need to get their OER [officer evaluation report] done. I mean, that is a little bit ridiculous, and then 

they start saying you are picking on me. So, obviously, I am speaking from a real experience, and I would love to hear from more of 

you. 

General WALTERS. Sir, I think what we are talking—we have a 

process, and we want whistleblowers to have the option to come 

forward and tell us when wrong things are being done. But that 

process right now, the reprisal process is broad ranging. We have 

a thing called request mast. Administrative errors, any young Marine can go all the way up the chain of command to get whatever 

he believes or she believes is an error corrected. But what I think 

we are seeing a trend instead of using that request mast is they 

have got to go talk to the commander, then the commander’s commander, and up the chain. Instead of doing that, they just pick up 

the phone and make a complaint on a hotline for an administrative 

error. They didn’t get the award they think, they did not think 

their fitness report was accurate, or they did not get the leave they 

wanted, or they got declined on leave. 

So these are administrative in nature, and we have the request 

mast process to adjudicate those and accommodate those and allows leaders to fix things when they are broken. As soon as they 

pick up the phone for those kinds of issues, it goes into a different 

process, which as you pointed out, can take too long. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. By the way, it is not me involved with one of 

those. I was an outside observer. 

Go ahead. 

General WILSON. I really think we are a little bit out of balance 

on the whistleblower reprisal piece. About 96 percent of the cases 

are not substantiated, so it would tell you that we are spending a 

lot of time and yet it is not in balance. And to your point, that has 

a chilling effect, not only on the commanders, but on the force 

when they can’t—when you were trying to execute good order and 

discipline and you feel this cloud above you. 

And we completely agree that if somebody is going to be investigated, it should be done in a timely manner. If they are found 

guilty, then let’s move on with that. If not, they should be also on 

the innocent side remove that quickly. It is taking way too long. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 
46 

Admiral MORAN. I agree. Timeliness is the issue here, to your 

point, sir. And when we can get better at that, I think it will help 

resolve a lot of this. But we are spending the same amount of time 

on very few cases that are ultimately substantiated. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you 

for being here today. 

I guess a lot of the statistics that we see amalgamated together 

include military misconduct, what would be clearly viewed as potential misconduct, but may not be translatable in the civilian 

world. But it also includes a wide array of tools that are used to 

address that misconduct, and all of that gets rolled up into this statistical analysis. 

And so I guess my question would be, what percent of the cases 

that we see—and some of the statistics I have looked at it is like, 

okay, so maybe 10 percent of the cases warrant further investigation, so 90 percent kind of thrown out. Of the 10 percent that are 

there, roughly 30 percent of those end up being substantiated. And 

those are rough figures but, you know, seems to be some consistency there. So we are still talking small percentages. But even 

among that portion, not all of those are for like the big headline 

cases that we see. A lot of them could be, you know, you moved a 

boat with your household goods when you shouldn’t have or something. 

Would you speak to that? What percent of the cases would never 

translate into offenses in civilian employment? 

Admiral MORAN. Well, I will start, I guess. It is really hard to 

say. Since I graduated from high school, I have had a uniform on, 

so I don’t really know. I will try to get that answer for you and put 

it in writing, but I wish I could tell you. All I know is the standards we have—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I mean, there are some things, just like with 

a sailor, I mean, you know, he is swabbing the deck or a soldier 

buffing the floors or whatever over something that would never— 

they would never have anything entered in any record or file, there 

would never be any offense. And I know that also can apply to general officers on certain standards of conduct that the military expects and demands certainly of our senior leaders, but yet if they 

were in the corporate world, this would not be anything that would 

translate, and yet that is still part of the statistical body. And that 

is what I am trying to get at, whoever would like to address that. 

General MCCONVILLE. You know, we have had things from officer 

evaluation reports being late because the commander was waiting 

on a discipline issue before he actually wrote the OER. So, technically, he was substantiated for late OER because he was just 

waiting for this thing to resolve. Of course, you know, it didn’t ruin 

his career, but he did go through a process which delayed him, and 

it runs all the way to an inappropriate relationship. 

And even on the civilian side, if you had an inappropriate relationship, inappropriate consensual relationship, we hold people 

very accountable for those type things. If you went to a gentleman’s 

club, you know, on the civilian, but we hold people very account-
47 

able for those type things, and I think we should have a high standard in the military. 

Mr. RUSSELL. General Wilson. 

General WILSON. Over the last 5 years, we have had 77 cases. 

As we looked at that, about 60 percent of them I am going to call 

an error in judgment in administrative procedures. About 25 percent of those involve personnel matters, and those that involve 

some type of sexual harassment or inappropriate relationship was 

under 15 percent. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

General Walters. 

General WALTERS. Sir, I am looking at—so in the last 10 years, 

we have had 15 in our general officers. I was looking at them, most 

of them are admin. They wouldn’t be taken—held accountable out 

in the government. I had one TAD [temporary additional duty] 

where he got extra money on his TD [temporary duty] claim. I 

guess that is theft, and that could be chargeable out in the civilian 

world. We took care of it. I think it was 10 bucks. And we made 

him cut a check, and then we reprimanded him. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I appreciate that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, that is part of what I am just trying to establish is that a lot of the statistics, you know, are rolled into 

where it looks like a greater problem of misconduct. 

And then my final question for Admiral Moran would be, we 

have heard mentioned in both panels today the Fat Leonard case 

and some things like that, but when a case comes up like that that 

has translated over to the Justice Department, is the military limited in how it can even comment or even defend or maybe portray 

the other side of the story while it is in the Justice Department 

and outside of the Department of Defense? 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir, we absolutely are. So I look forward to 

the day when I can come back to this committee and testify about 

what we have learned from that and about the things we have put 

in place to address it. And that is much where I was going with 

Congresswoman McSally’s question. I am very focused on that 

right now, and it is hard to talk about it. 

And some of those cases where they go through a justice review 

and end up in a Navy review and are ultimately unsubstantiated 

after years of investigation are really tough to account for, but Congress now expects us, Senate expects us to address that, even 

though they were unsubstantiated, just so they know we have 

looked thoroughly at it. That was my point. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I think that is important to note, Mr. Chairman, because many times what might be the appearance of that 

they are trying to hide or harbor information, the reality is when 

it translates from Department of Defense over to Department of 

Justice, they are prohibited from providing perhaps very illuminating or alternative views, but yet they can’t, and so I think that is 

very important to establish in the hearing today. 

And with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. In conversations with one of you, I guess it was over 

someone being reprimanded for endorsement, it came up that general officers could have outside employment. And then we checked 
48 

the UCMJ and found out there is no prohibition for general officers 

to have outside employment, which I think is pretty stunning. 

Would you approve of us passing an amendment that would prohibit outside employment? 

General MCCONVILLE. I certainly would. I don’t know what general officer has time to have outside employment. I would like to 

know who the person was. 

Ms. SPEIER. That is what I was saying. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, I want his job. 

General MCCONVILLE. If he is in the Army, I will get a new job 

for him. 

Admiral MORAN. Ma’am, we will go back and look at the statutes, but I want to believe that we are prohibited from outside employment. We are not prohibited from serving on certain organizations that are for the benefit of the military services or volunteer 

organizations as a board member or a contributor to that. But generally speaking, we have been prohibited for as long as I can remember. 

General WILSON. I agree with my colleagues. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

General WALTERS. No, ma’am, I only experienced it once. I was 

invited to be a member of a board for a heroes flight, and my counsel said you can’t. And it was gratis, so—I didn’t have the time 

anyway. 

Ms. SPEIER. General Wilson, I am going to ask you just to write 

me a memo on this, but to have 70,000 court-martials in the Air 

Force and never once a court-martial of an officer suggests that 

maybe there is something to that, so I would just like you to write 

me a memo to give me some of your thoughts on that. 

The UCMJ also has a statute of limitations that in many cases 

is less than it would be in the civilian world. For instance, for bribery, UCMJ has a 5-year statute of limitations. In the general society, it can be 7 to 10 years. Would you look at the statute of limitations for, you know, various forms of conduct in the military and 

give us your recommendations as to which ones should be increased. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 139.] 

Ms. SPEIER. And then, finally, General Walters, this was in the 

paper today, in case you haven’t seen it. 

General WALTERS. Is that USA Today, ma’am? 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes. It is ‘‘Marine Corps brushed off sex charges.’’ 

And what is stunning about this particular case is that you have 

two women who have been sexually harassed by the same person, 

and nothing happened. And when the one survivor of the sexual 

harassment went to her superior, they said no one will believe you. 

And if you have heard anything from the Members of Congress 

over the last few months is we believe the women. So I hope that 

this becomes an anomaly as we continue to evolve in terms of the 

issue of sexual harassment. I think we have a huge problem. We 

have a huge problem in our academies, and I think we have a huge 

problem in our services. That isn’t even getting to the issue of sexual assault. That is the issue of sexual harassment, and I think we 

have got to do something dramatic to shift the culture. 
49 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

So as we have talked about in both panels, we have got probably 

an issue with reprisal whistleblower maybe being overly utilized 

and legitimate cases obviously need to be addressed and people 

need to be held accountable, but the system is being bogged down 

with a lot of other cases. And in some cases, as we all know, people, maybe it is their situational awareness is low and their perception of reality is such that they are reporting what they believe to 

be wrongdoing that you all unsubstantiate. But in some cases 

somebody may be fraudulently claiming wrongdoing of someone 

above them and you will investigate that. 

Again, assuming the person has been exonerated, has there ever 

been examples of going back and the accused, you know, being 

looked at for false claims or fraudulent claims or lying to investigators or anything like that in those cases? 

No examples of that at all? 

General WILSON. I am not aware of any. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is there a process even to take a look at that, that 

somewhere along the line—— 

General WALTERS. I will put that under the heading of you don’t 

want to put anything out there that will preclude someone from 

coming forward in the future. Good one. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Totally agree. However, if somebody has brought 

together a false allegation—— 

General WALTERS. If they truly believed in their allegation, although it proved to be false, I still don’t think—and it turned out 

not to be true, I don’t think there is—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. My bet would be that would be the vast majority 

of cases, but there may be a rare case within the process that you 

need to take a look at whether, you know—their own conduct is the 

issue. Is there any sort of process there to even take a look at that, 

whether somebody lied or has a fraudulent claim or anything like 

that? Everybody deserves due process. 

Admiral MORAN. I am told there is a process, but can we get 

back to you with a written response to that to give you more detail 

behind it? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Sure. Great. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.] 

Ms. MCSALLY. And I don’t know if you all can answer this versus 

the IGs on the first panel, but what sort of training do the investigators go through? And is there any sort of review to ensure that 

they don’t take a prosecutorial mindset of, you know, rewarding 

getting some kills versus fact finding and just sort of oversight of 

the investigator selection and processes? 

Admiral MORAN. I think that is another one we can get back to 

you on, Congresswoman, but there have been perceptions of that in 

the past, and I know that I have personally had discussions with 

the gent sitting behind me in our IG chair, and when we see that, 

he normally addresses it in his command, and I trust that he will 

take appropriate action if there is any evidence of that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Any other comments on that? 
50 

General MCCONVILLE. No, I agree. I think it is, you know, same 

thing with our IG. That is why we have a lot of checks and balances in the system, both in the legal side and the command side. 

At least from where we sit, it is not arbitrary; it is how these decisions are made, and that is why they take some time because they 

are reviewed at every single level to make sure we don’t have 

things like that happening. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Anyone else? 

General WILSON. I just think all the IGs would say that they 

spend a lot of time on making sure their investigators are trained 

right and trained appropriately. There are probably cases where 

that has happened, overzealous investigators, before, but I know all 

of us are emphasizing with our IGs the importance of the training 

in doing it right. 

Ms. MCSALLY. General Walters. 

General WALTERS. Always have to be on the lookout for that, 

ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. 

Would you all support—I mentioned on the first panel, if someone who is exonerated wanted there to be a public statement made 

that they were exonerated, would you support a process that you 

all did that, not them, but you all did that? 

General MCCONVILLE. I would be glad to do it. 

Admiral MORAN. Same. 

General WILSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is that something—— 

General WALTERS. No problem. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. We have to do or is that something 

you could do within your own procedures, to allow that option if 

they want you to make a statement that they have been cleared? 

General WALTERS. Let’s look at the procedures, ma’am. And my 

sense is, much like the IGs told you, that once it is over, most 

members who are exonerated just want it to be done. They don’t 

want to bring it up again. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But if somebody would want it to be publicly—— 

General WALTERS. I don’t see why we would not accommodate 

that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Can you all get back to me as to whether that is 

internal or whether that is something we need to do? Great. 

Thanks. 

I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 141.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Russell, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just one comment on the outside employment. Unless something 

has changed, officers in all the services are prohibited from doing 

outside employment. The exception probably back to the time we 

have been wearing tricorn hats was they could write for publication 

and they could, if you had some particular person whose wartime 

memoirs or experiences were needing to be captured or published, 

you know, I think of people like General Marshall and others people wanted to know, and they were allowed to publish their memoirs or do things of that nature. I am not sure that, Mr. Chairman, 
51 

a bill would be needed. I think all of that is currently in place, and 

then we also don’t want to put prohibitions on our Guard and Reserve flag officers. My goodness, they wouldn’t be able to eat and 

feed their families. If any of you care to comment on it, that is fine. 

But, General Walters, you did not have a chance to reply to, you 

know, we are accustomed in Congress to often getting headlines 

that we don’t deserve or that maybe we do, but would you care to 

comment on the headline that was presented earlier? 

General WALTERS. No, sir. I mean, it was brought to our attention on Monday night. I know the reporter asked for some information. We couldn’t turn the FOIA information, the redacted PII [personally identifiable information] fast enough for him before he published. We have our lawyers looking into it, and they are actually 

with the complainant right now working out the mitigation plan. 

So we are looking deep into it. I don’t know all the facts yet, but 

I will find all the facts. 

Ms. SPEIER. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Of course. 

Ms. SPEIER. This is a case that dates back to 2013 and 2017? 

General WALTERS. Yes, ma’am. I think 2013 was in the actions— 

what I was briefed in last night, 2013 were the actions. The complaint came in and I think—I believe, I don’t know, but I believe 

that mitigation was put in place, but the mitigation broke down, 

and now we have to go look at mitigation again. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, there was a second—there was second woman 

who then came forward, so there is—— 

General WALTERS. Right. And that one never reported, but now 

she has, so we have to look at it. 

One of the problems is getting people to report and having trust 

in the system. And we have seen the increase of reporting, and we 

have established, through the task force, I will take this opportunity to offer a full brief on all we have done since last year. 

Ms. SPEIER. I don’t want to take the gentleman’s time. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And reclaiming the time, and I thank the 

gentlelady. 

And it is important we establish those trust and that we do those 

things. And I think, Mr. Chairman, you know, with your leadership, we have seen from our service academy superintendents and 

commandants that have come and provided us testimony that 

many times there is a very good process. And when, you know, 

mention was made on some of that, that there being a big problem, 

I would disagree. I think our hearings here have substantiated 

that, while there are issues that certainly must swiftly be dealt 

with, when compared to collegiate America, my goodness, you 

know, colleges would love to have the problems that our academies 

have in terms of virtually nil in statistics. That doesn’t mean that 

things that happen there, they have to be swiftly dealt with to the 

fullest extent of the uniform code and also law and criminal cases, 

but I think that those hearings have been very, very helpful. 

And thank you for your response, General Walters, on that. And 

being a true conservative, I will even give back some time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I wish to thank all the witnesses for their testimony this morning. Senior leader misconduct is an extraordinarily 
52 

important issue, and I want to thank the witnesses for their candor. 

There being no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Mr. FINE. There are 76 civilian investigators and 1 military who conduct senior 

official and whistleblower reprisal investigations at the DOD OIG. Of the 76 civilian 

investigators, 63 have prior military experience. [See page 27.] 

General QUANTOCK. We are authorized 20 investigators for senior officials, 9 are 

Civilian and 11 are Military. This is investigators only, it does not include those in 

leadership positions or those who conduct complaint intake analysis. [See page 27.] 

Admiral SHELANSKI. All of the NAVINSGEN investigators are civilian. [See page 

27.] 

General HARRIS. The Air Force senior official investigations office has 3 civilian 

investigators (GS–15s) and 8 military investigators (colonels). [See page 27.] 

General OTTIGNON. GMC rates 3 civilian senior official investigators, currently 2 

are assigned. Hiring actions are underway for 2 additional civilian investigators.

[See page 27.] 

General QUANTOCK. In FY17, the Army tried 531 courts-martial. Of that number, 

36 accused personnel were officers and 495 were enlisted Soldiers. [See page 34.] 

Admiral SHELANSKI. See attached chart for Navy Courts-Martial summary. [See 

page 34.] 

General HARRIS. The chart below shows the number of court-martials—breaking 

out enlisted and officer—for the last five years. [See page 34.] 

Enlisted Officer Total 

2013 709 32 741 

2014 525 31 556 

2015 509 38 547 

2016 469 24 493 

2017 464 24 488 

General OTTIGNON. Disposition of corrective actions (court-martials) records are 

maintained by the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant. [See page 34.] 
138 

Second panel 

General MCCONVILLE. Since 1999, the Army has preferred courts-martial charges 

against four general officers. Three courts-martial were tried to completion, the 

fourth is ongoing. The security clearance status for these officers is as listed: 

James Grazioplene: Does not have an active security clearance. Jeffrey Sinclair: 

Does not have an active security clearance. 

David R. Hale: Does not have an active security clearance. 

Roger Duff: Does not have an active security clearance. 

Over the last 5 years, the Army substantiated misconduct in 113 investigations 

involving 121 general officers (GOs). Total number of substantiated allegations was 

174. Of the 121 GOs substantiated for misconduct between FY13 and FY17: 

1—was prosecuted at a General Court-Martial and 1 is the defendant in an ongoing General Court-Martial. 

2—received Article 15s. 

32—received Memorandums of Reprimand from the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army (VCSA) or another commander. 

35—received Memorandums of Concern from the VCSA or equivalent written 

counseling from another commander or the Deputy Judge Advocate General (DJAG). 

34—received Verbal Counseling from the VCSA, another commander, or DJAG. 

1—retired GO had a master’s degree previously awarded by the Army War College revoked. 

5—cases were not referred for Army disciplinary action because they involved 

minor technical infractions investigated after the officer retired or reflected misconduct in a civilian employment capacity for a Reserve officer and were referred 

to the proper channel for resolution. In 5 cases, the VCSA directed no action after 

reviewing the investigative file and receiving legal advice. 

5—cases are still pending disposition. [See page 39.] 

Admiral MORAN. In a review of court-martial records going back as far as 2007, 

the Navy has no record of a court-martial of any flag officer. In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted a flag officer in federal court for misconduct committed while on active duty, and in 2017 the DOJ indicted a retired flag officer for 

offenses allegedly committed while on active duty. In these cases, DOJ involvement 

precluded the Navy from court-martialing these officers. 

In the past five years, there have been 24 substantiated misconduct investigations 

against flag officers. Of these cases, 11 were a result of the Glenn Defense Marine 

Asia investigation. The accountability actions taken against the flag officers included relief of command, administrative counseling, Secretarial letters of censure, 

and non-judicial punishment. Two officers investigated for allegations of misconduct 

related to GDMA had their local access to classified material suspended. Of note, 

a Commander’s decision whether to suspend local access to classified materials for 

a service member under their command is not part of the accountability process. 

Rather, this is a separate determination as to whether the adverse or derogatory 

information affects the standards used for clearance eligibility. 

General WILSON. A search of the Air Force’s current database, which goes back 

through 1997, reveals no courts-martial involving a general officer and no clearances 

revoked. [See page 39.] 

In the past 5 years, Air Force Inspector General Investigations substantiated 77 

military senior officials’ allegations. Command action in those cases included: Article 

15—1 Letter of Reprimand—21 Letter of Admonishment—11 Letter of Counselling—24 Alternative Disposition (verbal counselling or no action)—14 ‘‘Other’’—3 

Pending—3 [See page 39.] 

General WALTERS. There have been no general officers court-martialed in the Marine Corps in the last five years. 

There have been nine* misconduct allegations substantiated against general officers, and one against an SES in the last five years. [* This number does not include 

2017 contempt finding in Military Commissions case]. 

In each case, the senior official was counseled and/or received a non-punitive letter of caution (NPLOC). One officer who had been selected for major general was 

eventually removed from the promotion list after allegations were substantiated 

against him and his selection was reviewed by a Promotion Review Board (PRB). 

The PRB determined that, in light of the substantiated allegations, the officer was 

no longer qualified for promotion. 

The Marine Corps reviews on-going and completed misconduct investigations prior 

to forwarding a general officer’s nomination and when determining an appropriate 

retirement grade recommendation. 

No general officer has had their security clearance revoked. [See page 39.] 

General MCCONVILLE. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any changes 

at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) recently studied this issue 
139 

as part of a ‘‘comprehensive and holistic review’’ that examined all punitive articles 

and recommended extending the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10 years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years 

or the length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when DNA 

evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress adopted these recommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recency and completeness of the MJRG 

review, the accompanying appellate issues each change generates, and the potential 

for due process violations, we are not requesting any changes at this time. [See 

page 48.] 

Admiral MORAN. This issue was recently considered by the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) should 

be modified and the group’s recommendations were incorporated into the Military 

Justice Act of 2016 (MJA16). 

The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG, including a 

comparison with federal law, found that the statute of limitations provisions under 

the UCMJ are largely in step with federal counterparts for common law crimes. The 

three recommended substantive changes that were included into MJA16 as changes 

to the statutes of limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows: 1) 

Child Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of limitations applicable to child 

abuse offenses from the current five years or the life of the child, whichever is 

longer, to ten years or the life of the child, whichever is longer, thereby aligning 

with 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period in the Title 

18 provision from five years to ten years). 

2) Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted members; (2) the length of the appointment, in the case 

of officers; or (3) five years, whichever is longer. 

3) Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute of limitations 

until a period of time following the implication of an identified person by DNA testing that is equal to the otherwise applicable limitations period, thereby aligning 

with 18 U.S.C. § 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault; rape 

and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing movement in time 

of war; and any other offense punishable by death may be tried and punished at 

any time without limitation. 

The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years; however, Article 

43(d)–(g) provide several additional exceptions to the statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of circumstances unique to the military justice system 

including for offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from 

territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend him, or is in 

the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and when prosecution is considered 

to be detrimental to the prosecution of war or inimical to the national security.

[See page 48.] 

General WILSON. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a five-year 

statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also provided for an increased 

statute of limitations for some of the most serious crimes to include murder, sexual 

assault, and sexual abuse of a child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and 

federal civilian jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to prosecute instances of 

misconduct within the military. 

Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal allegations are resolved in a timely 

fashion, ensures the availability of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, 

and enables a fair process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, 

the adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 

the availability of administrative actions, we do not recommend any modification to 

the statute of limitations at this time. [See page 48.] 

General WALTERS. The Marine Corps is part of the Joint Service Committee (JSC) 

on Military Justice. The JSC process continuously evaluates whether changes to the 

UCMJ are warranted. The JSC was also part of the recent Military Justice Review 

Group’s comprehensive revision of the Manual for Court-Martial which resulted in 

Military Justice Act of 2016. The MJA of 2016 included some revisions to the length 

of the statutes of limitations under Art. 43, Uniform Code of Military Justice. There 

are no additional recommended changes at this time. [See page 48.] 
140 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY 

General MCCONVILLE. We take sworn and recorded testimony. Each complainant, 

witness and subject are advised that they are required to provide truthful testimony. If it is determined that an individual provided a false official statement during an IG investigation, then the matter could be referred to the appropriate command/organization for resolution. It could also be documented as a substantiated 

finding in the IG database. However, it is rare for us to find that an individual provided false statements during an IG investigation. [See page 49.] 

Admiral MORAN. Yes. If the claim is false, the complainant’s veracity in filing the 

complaint could be reviewed and addressed by appropriate authorities at their discretion. ‘‘Appropriate authorities’’ is a direct reference to the complainant’s chain of 

command. A commander or supervisor could/would be the appropriate authority to 

address an allegation of misconduct on the part of a service member or civilian (e.g., 

knowingly filing a false IG complaint). [See page 49.] 

General WILSON. Should a report submitted to any investigative agency uncover 

misconduct, whether by the subject of the investigation or by the person making the 

report, the Air Force maintains avenues to appropriately respond to any misconduct. 

This might include criminal prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 

if the evidence supports such action. 

Integrity is one of the Air Force’s core values and any lapse in integrity, to include 

fabricating allegations of wrongdoing to utilize the investigative process in a malicious manner, is taken seriously by all levels of command. This would include knowingly making false official statements or false claims to an investigator. [See page 

49.] 

General WALTERS. When a service member, in the process of making a claim of 

reprisal or some other allegations, is suspected of making a false official statement, 

which is a criminal offense under Article 107 UCMJ, the command or military law 

enforcement will investigate the matter in order to provide the cognizant commander relevant information to decide on how the alleged misconduct will be addressed. [See page 49.] 

General MCCONVILLE. All Army Inspectors General undergo a highly structured, 

fully accredited training program based on the adult learning model. The Army’s 

Training and Doctrine Command and the American Council on Education are the 

accrediting authorities for both the Army IG Basic and Advanced Courses. Specifically for investigations, the Basic Course provides 28.5 hours of hands-on, scenariodriven instruction, and the Advanced Course provides 7 hours of advanced criticalthinking and writing instruction. In a learner-centric environment that leverages 

state-of-the-art, interactive simulation and other technologies, students learn both 

policy and doctrinal aspects of IG investigations through a combination of large- and 

small-group instruction facilitated by hands-on practical exercises based upon actual 

cases. The instructors then assess student knowledge and application skills through 

a combination of knowledge-based tests and application-based graded homework exercises. IG investigators continue to enhance their skills and techniques through 

their local IG office provided training and external training opportunities, such as 

the Department of Defense IG Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations course. 

In addition to the above training, all investigators assigned to conduct senior official investigations participate in a week-long Investigator Development Program. 

This training focuses specifically on those processes and procedures unique to senior 

official investigations. It consists of 9 training blocks, each taught by an experienced 

senior official investigator. Also, all new investigators are assigned a civilian mentor 

who works with his/her mentee until the new investigator has demonstrated proficiency in all tasks regarding senior official investigations. Our extensive review 

process, which includes peer reviews, multiple legal reviews, and several leadership 

reviews, ensures that all investigations are thorough, accurate, and unbiased, and 

that the conclusions are supported by a preponderance of credible evidence. [See 

page 49.] 

Admiral MORAN. Investigators go through Basic and Advanced Hotline training 

and Military Whistle Blower Reprisal Courses. The tenet that ‘‘we serve as impartial fact-finders for the directing authority, and are in no position to pass judgment 

or execute punishment,’’ is reinforced through the training, during practical exercises of interviewing and report writing. Instructors, mentors, and leaders evaluate 

these techniques throughout the courses and also provide checks and balances, as 

an ongoing measure, from the Naval Inspector General Headquarters, through quality assurance checks and oversight of inquiries and reports of investigation that are 

within the purview of the Naval Inspector General. [See page 49.] 

General WILSON. Air Force senior official investigating officers come from a variety of backgrounds. Nearly all are graduated senior-level (colonel) commanders with 
141 

20+ year careers in the Air Force or other military service. These investigating officers are chosen selectively for their past performance, judgement, and maturity. The 

training they receive includes interview training, investigating writing training, 

courses presented by the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 

and an extensive internal ‘‘block training’’ process. Central to the training is the 

Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ‘‘Quality Standards for 

Investigations.’’ These standards and associated training explicitly focus on ensuring 

investigations are independent, fair, thorough, accurate, objective, impartial, ethical, 

unbiased, and accomplished with due professional care. All Air Force senior official 

cases are investigated using a ‘‘team concept’’ with an Investigating Officer and an 

imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each investigation from start to finish. The 

investigations are overseen by the Director of Senior Official Inquiries. And, each 

investigation receives a separate and fully independent legal review by the Director 

of Administrative Law for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole focus and desired outcome is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough, and objective investigation without regard for the specific finding on any individual allegation. [See page 

49.] 

General WALTERS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] [See page 

49.] 

General MCCONVILLE. In accordance with our procedures, we try to maintain the 

confidentiality of IG investigations to the maximum extent possible. Each individual 

who provides information or testimony in support of an IG investigation is told to 

not discuss the matters with anyone other than the IG. Additionally, most of our 

investigations are not ‘‘sensitive’’ or ‘‘newsworthy’’ and only involve a few personnel. 

In the typical case, we do not see the need for a public exoneration. In the rare instances when a senior official investigation becomes widely known and has adversely impacted the organization, as well as the credibility of the senior official, 

we would certainly support a formal statement issued via public affairs channels 

that enables the Army to publicly acknowledge that the senior official was cleared 

of any wrongdoing. [See page 50.] 

Admiral MORAN. No. NAVIG does not support publically acknowledging cases that 

are not substantiated. This protects the subject from unwanted and unwarranted attention that may cause a negative perception about them based on false allegations 

and may be damaging to their career. [See page 50.] 

General WILSON. The result of any investigation is always available for official 

purposes internally within the Air Force and is generally releasable to the subject 

of that investigation subject to legal requirements. However, the Air Force currently 

does not provide a public statement when any Airman, to include a senior leader, 

is exonerated of an allegation. Such statements are generally not permitted under 

the Privacy Act. However, if the subject of the investigation permits the Air Force 

to release information that SAF/IG did not substantiate an allegation against him/ 

her, they could sign a Privacy Act release authorizing the AF to release such information. [See page 50.] 

General WALTERS. When a servicemember is no longer the subject of an investigation, and will be the subject of no criminal or administrative action, it may be because that person has been exonerated or it has been determined that there is simply not sufficient evidence to proceed. In either case, there is no formal process for 

publically and specifically addressing the fact that a servicemember is no longer a 

suspect of criminal misconduct during or following an investigation. Rather, the 

commander has the prerogative to address the matter directly with the accused or 

through their counsel. [See page 50.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 7, 2018 

(145) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you need? 

Mr. FINE. Whistleblower Reprisal Case Backlog 

The largest backlog exists in whistleblower reprisal cases. As of March 6, 2018, 

there were 279 open whistleblower reprisal cases at the DOD OIG. The 279 open 

cases are composed of 78 investigations, 122 intakes, 50 Alternative Dispute Resolution cases, and 29 cases from the Military Services and the DOD Component IGs 

that the OIG is providing oversight review. Of the 78 investigations, 75 (96%) are 

over 180 days old and 67 (86%) are over 1 year old. 

From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of reprisal complaints received by the 

DOD OIG increased from 1,059 to 1,808 (71%) and the number of intakes dismissed 

increased from 495 to 892 (140%). Because DOD OIG investigators had to respond 

to the dramatic increase in incoming complaints, they closed fewer investigations 

(decrease from 47 to 37). 

Included in the increase in caseload is a significant increase in the number of 

cases where sexual assault victims have alleged that reprisal actions were taken 

against them. As of March 6, 2018, the DOD OIG had 84 open sexual assault related reprisal cases. The 84 open cases are composed of 30 investigations and 54 

intakes. 

The DOD OIG has implemented several initiatives to attempt to address the large 

increase in workloads. 

• In FY 2013, we deployed the Defense-Case Activity Tracking System (D–CATS) 

enabling a paperless environment for data and documentation and the seamless 

transmittal of cases within the DOD OIG. 

• In FY 2014, we created the Oversight Branch with investigators dedicated to 

performing oversight reviews of reprisal cases referred to the Military Service 

and DOD Component IGs. 

• In FY 2016, we streamlined the oversight process, eliminating a backlog of over 

200 cases, and improving the time to complete oversight reviews from 70 days 

to 10 days. 

• In FY 2016, we initiated reviews of the investigative operations of the Military 

Service IGs to identify areas for improved efficiency and to share best practices. 

• In FY 2017, we established an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) capacity, 

with a team a personnel who have completed 108 ADR cases and 18 settlements. 

Resources Needed 

At the start of FY 2018, I reallocated 21 FTEs from other DOD OIG components 

to the Administrative Investigations (AI) Whistleblower Reprisal Directorate (WRI) 

and DOD Hotline in an attempt to improve the timeliness of the intakes and investigations conducted by the DOD OIG. The DOD OIG has been aggressively recruiting and onboarding staff to fill those FTEs, with 11 of 21 (52%) onboard. 

However, more resources are needed. First, we need an increase of 21 FTES for 

the DOD OIG end strength in order to backfill the 21 FTEs in the other DOD OIG 

components from whom I reallocated resources to the whistleblower reprisal and 

Hotline units. This is necessary to prevent the other DOD OIG components from 

suffering due to personnel loss, in execution of their important missions. 

Second, we need 10 FTEs to perform the process reviews of the Military Service 

IGs. In FY 2016 and FY 2017, the DOD OIG conducted process reviews of the Naval 

IG and the Air Force IG. We recently initiated a review of the Army IG. These reviews, which are similar to Federal IG peer reviews, are in-depth systemic assessments of investigative operations. They require a team of 10 full time investigators 

from 6–8 months to complete. We intend to conduct reviews of each Military Service 

IG at least once every 3 years. 

Senior Official Cases 

As of March 6, 2018, there were 35 open senior official cases at the DOD OIG. 

The 35 open DOD OIG cases were composed of 12 investigations, 13 intakes, and 
146 

10 cases from the Military Services and the DOD Component IGs where the OIG 

is providing oversight review. Of the 12 open DOD OIG investigations, 4 (33%) were 

over 180 days old and 1 (8%) was over 1 year old. 

From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of senior official complaints the DOD OIG 

received increased from 703 to 803 (14%). At the same time, the average number 

of days the DOD OIG took to complete senior official investigations increased from 

267 days in FY 2013 to 472 days in FY 2017. 

There are two primary reasons for the DOD OIG taking more time to complete 

investigations in the past several years. First, is the increasing complexity of the 

cases that occurred while the number of investigators assigned to conduct investigations remained the same. The complexity of investigations is measured by the number of allegations and issues addressed, the number of witnesses interviewed, the 

number of documents collected, and the number of pages in the final report. 

Second, the DOD OIG investigation into allegations involving intelligence reporting at U.S. CENTCOM was one of the largest investigations ever to be conducted 

by the DOD OIG. The investigation team addressed 25 allegations, conducted 150 

interviews, collected 15 terabytes of data representing over 17 million classified documents, and produced two reports of 190 (unclassified) and 542 pages (classified). 

This case was conducted by 30 personnel and took 18 months to complete. 

While the U.S. CENTCOM was an unusually complex case, there have been an 

increasing number of other more complex cases and special reviews that the office 

has completed in FY 2016 and FY 2017 at the request of the Secretary of Defense. 

Resources Needed 

We believe we need an additional 12 investigators for the ISO Directorate to conduct senior official investigations and special reviews. This would provide us the investigative capability to more expeditiously handle the increasing number of more 

complex investigations and special reviews. 

Finally, the resources outlined above are only for our Administrative Investigations component. The DOD OIG also needs additional resources to conduct audits, 

evaluations, and criminal investigations; which I can discuss further if requested. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns of behavior far 

enough back in the career to assist the board in making the correct determination? 

If not, how should this be corrected? 

Mr. FINE. Yes, from our perspective, it appears that the DOD has appropriate systems in place to record and review adverse information. For career actions requiring 

Senate confirmation, the checks of investigative records for adverse and reportable 

information is required by DOD Instruction (DODI) 1320.04, ‘‘Military Officer Actions Requiring Presidential, Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness Approval or Senate Confirmation.’’ 

However, we are concerned about a recent policy change regarding procedures for 

investigating issues or allegations presented to Army IGs and for closing cases in 

the Army Inspector General Action Request System (IGARS) database. A new Army 

policy directs that Army IGs will not close out issues or allegations in IGARS as 

‘‘substantiated’’ or ‘‘not substantiated’’ when those cases were received by IGs and 

referred to commands for investigation. Instead, Army IGs are now instructed to 

record the form of action taken by the command (i.e., commander’s inquiry, AR 15– 

6) and close the case as ‘‘Assistance.’’ The policy also covers complaints referred to 

an IG by the DOD Hotline. This new policy is contrary to the DOD Hotline policy 

that requires findings be stated as ‘‘substantiated or not substantiated only,’’ and 

is inconsistent with DODI 1320.04 which requires DOD to inform the President and 

Senate of adverse or reportable information. In addition, we are concerned by the 

characterization of certain adverse information in the Army IGARS by referring to 

them as ‘‘assistance’’ cases because it may impact the DOD’s ability to provide accurate information to the President and the Senate about substantiated cases. We 

have raised our concerns with the Army and the Department as to how this change 

will affect the Army’s and the Department’s ability to document and review patterns 

of adverse behavior. 

Ms. SPEIER. Provide number of senior leader misconduct cases that allegations 

were substantiated, with action recommended and the Service did not take action. 

What was the substantiated allegation in each case? What was the rationale for not 

acting? 

Mr. FINE. From FY 2013 to FY 2017, there were 24 cases substantiated by the 

DOD OIG and the Military Service and DOD Component IGs where Military Service 

or DOD Senior Management Officials declined to take action. 

The rationale provided by the Services or the DOD for not taking action included 

that they disagreed with the investigation conclusions, they considered the subject’s 
147 

otherwise exemplary career, or that the subject was no longer in the Military or 

Federal Service. 

Ms. SPEIER. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you need? 

General QUANTOCK. Our current investigations backlog is approximately 10 cases. 

We base this backlog against our goal of completing 60% of our senior official investigations in less than 180 days. The 180 day metric is based on historical case processing timelines. Over the last 5 years, the average case processing time for senior 

official investigations was 246 days, with a median of 192 days. Note: We start our 

case processing timeline based on the date we received the complaint, which is different than some of the other services. In order to meet our case processing timeline 

goals for senior official investigations, we estimate that we need approximately 2– 

3 additional investigators. An updated manpower analysis is currently in progress. 

Ms. SPEIER. When was LTG Quantock first made aware of complaints and/or allegations against Mr. Joseph F. Guzowski related to treating Army IG employees with 

dignity and respect? What actions did he take upon being made aware of those complaints and/or allegations? On what dates has LTG Quantock discussed these complaints and the resulting CID and DOD IG investigations with Mr. Guzwoski? What 

was the content of those conversations? What comments has LTG Quantock made 

to Mr. Guzowski about the nature of allegations and/or complaints, the investigations, or their disposition? 

General QUANTOCK. LTG Quantock learned of each allegation separately. Regarding the 2012 allegation that Mr. Guzowski gave an unwanted kiss to an IG employee, LTG Quantock was made aware in August 2015. Regarding the December 

2016 inappropriate touching allegation, LTG Quantock was made aware in early 

January 2017. Upon learning of each allegation, LTG Quantock took immediate action. Once informed in August 2015 of the 2012 allegation, LTG Quantock immediately notified the Senior Official Investigations Division, which referred the matter to the appropriate agency to address the complaint—the Department of Defense 

Inspector General (DOD IG). LTG Quantock also immediately referred the 2016 allegation to the Senior Official Investigations Division, which then notified the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) and the DOD IG. CID investigated and determined there was no probable cause to believe Mr. Guzowski committed the offense 

of sexual battery. DOD IG pursued its own investigation. LTG Quantock discussed 

the DOD IG investigation findings with Mr. Guzowski only after the release of DOD 

IG’s final report. At that time, LTG Quantock informed Mr. Guzowski that he would 

be temporarily detailed to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, 

pending review and appropriate action regarding the substantiated findings. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns of behavior far 

enough back in the career to assist the board in making the correct determination? 

If not, how should this be corrected? 

General QUANTOCK. The primary purpose of an investigation is to determine if 

there is a senior official impropriety. In the course of an investigation, we obtain 

evidence that is relevant to the allegations under investigation. Based on the nature 

of the allegation, we may identify instances of impropriety that occurred in prior 

years during the course of the investigation. This evidence of past impropriety 

would be documented in the DAIG report of investigation, and could be used by a 

board to inform/support its grade determination decision. Over the years, there have 

been a few cases where our investigations identified misconduct that occurred several years prior. In those instances, the senior official was ultimately reduced in 

grade based on this information. 

Ms. SPEIER. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you need? 

Admiral SHELANSKI. Currently the Naval Inspector General has a backlog of 73 

Reprisal Investigations, 60 Hotline Investigations and 4 Senior Official Investigations that do not meet DODIG’s completion timeline. An average Reprisal case takes 

136 days, a Hotline case takes 79 and a Senior Official case takes 215. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns of behavior far 

enough back in the career to assist the board in making the correct determination? 

If not, how should this be corrected? 

Admiral SHELANSKI. This question requires trend analysis, a process for which we 

are not currently resourced. NAVINSGEN’s role in a retirement grade decision for 

a Flag Officer is to query our data base to see if there has been any misconduct 

reported or documented against the Flag Officer. These record queries are also done 

for Flag Officer promotions. 

Ms. SPEIER. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you need? 
148 

General HARRIS. Air Force senior official investigations currently has 16 open investigations and 12 complaints in intake. In CY 2017 the average case duration for 

an Air Force senior official investigation was 187 days. We are currently assessing 

our requirements to improve timeliness through additional efficiencies and manpower, if necessary. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns of behavior far 

enough back in the career to assist the board in making the correct determination? 

If not, how should this be corrected? 

General HARRIS. Air Force Inspector General senior official investigations address 

specific complaints that include credible evidence of a violation of law, instruction, 

regulation, or policy. However, we also consider each complaint in its broader context and review whether there have been any previous instances of misconduct or 

trends over an officer’s career. Previous performance or misconduct issues would be 

included in the officer’s record and reflected in that record as an officer meets a promotion board. Any substantiated allegations of a violation by an officer, past or 

present, are included in the officer’s record meeting a promotion board in a Senior 

Officer Unfavorable Information File (SOUIF). As such, senior official investigations 

themselves provide one piece of information that may assist in decision making. Any 

individual investigation’s results must be combined with an officer’s official record 

to get a comprehensive picture of the officer’s career, performance, and potential. 

Ms. SPEIER. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you need? 

General OTTIGNON. Currently, the Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC) 

has: 

1. Open cases: 

a. Senior Official Investigation 8 

b. Senior Official (Preliminary Inquiry) 3 

c. Whistleblower Reprisal 25 

d. Hotline Investigations 292 

e. Total IGMC Cases open 328 as of 12 March 2018 

2. The average days it takes to receive, analyze, investigate and close investigations (Averages) 

a. 2014 186 days 

b. 2015 220 days 

c. 2016 280 days 

d. 2017 330 days as of 12 March 2018 

3. The IGMC office has conducted an internal look at requirements to be in compliance with the Department standards. At the minimum, the IGMC office requires 

an additional investigator (GS–14), an additional supervisor (GS–15) for senior official investigations and 4 paralegal administrative clerks (GS–9). 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns of behavior far 

enough back in the career to assist the board in making the correct determination? 

If not, how should this be corrected? 

General OTTIGNON. Yes. The statutory board process for promotions adheres to a 

process in which a member’s complete record is reviewed and weighed. Adverse material is considered during this process to include IG investigation reports of misconduct that may have occurred. Moreover, the Marine Corps conducts reviews 

every 90 days to ensure nominees or selected members for promotion have not since 

had misconduct 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. How many civilian and military investigators serve in your office? 

How many contractors? What level of prior investigative experience do they have? 

How many investigators would you need to be fully staffed? 

Mr. FINE. There are 77 investigators at the DOD OIG Administrative Investigations office, which conducts senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations 

(76 civilians and 1 active duty military). The investigators possess an average of 14 

years of investigative, audit, or legal experience. 

As noted above, we believe we need an additional 43 FTEs to conduct senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations and reviews of investigative operations of the Military Service IGs. The DOD OIG also needs additional resources 

to conduct audits, evaluations, and criminal investigations; which I can discuss further if requested. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How many civilian and military investigators serve in your office? 

How many contractors? What level of prior investigative experience do they have? 

How many investigators would you need to be fully staffed? 
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General QUANTOCK. Our current authorizations for investigators who conduct senior official investigations are as follows: Military—11 (COL–LTC) Civilian—9 (GS14) 

We do not have any contractors who serve as investigators. Note that this does not 

include those in leadership positions, nor does it include those who conduct complaint intake analysis. Our civilian investigators have extensive investigative experience. Typically, a new civilian hire has at least 3–5 years of investigative experience. Currently, the average investigative experience for our assigned civilians is 

approximately 10 years. Our military investigators initially have little investigative 

experience. However, each investigator receives extensive training in order to become a qualified investigator of senior officials. In order to reduce current case backlog to meet our established goals, we will need approximately 2–3 additional investigators. An updated manpower analysis is currently in progress. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How many civilian and military investigators serve in your office? 

How many contractors? What level of prior investigative experience do they have? 

How many investigators would you need to be fully staffed? 

Admiral SHELANSKI. At NAVINSGEN Headquarters, we currently have four senior official investigators, four Hotline investigators, five Reprisal investigators, one 

Congressional investigator, and two supervisors, who also conduct investigations in 

addition to their supervisory role. The investigators are all civilian GS employees. 

Almost all have prior investigative experience, ranging from prior military service 

to a former police officer investigator. To be fully staffed, under current staffing levels, we would require a total of 16 additional investigators at NAVIG HQ and 24 

additional investigators throughout the enterprise. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How many civilian and military investigators serve in your office? 

How many contractors? What level of prior investigative experience do they have? 

How many investigators would you need to be fully staffed? 

General HARRIS. The Air Force senior official investigations office has three civilian investigators and eight military colonel investigators, and zero contractors. Air 

Force senior official investigating officers come from a variety of backgrounds. These 

investigating officers are chosen selectively for their past performance, judgement, 

and maturity. Nearly all are graduated senior-level (colonel) commanders with 20+ 

year careers in the Air Force or other military service. The training they receive includes interview training, investigating writing training, courses presented by the 

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, and an extensive internal 

‘‘block training’’ process. Central to the training is the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ‘‘Quality Standards for Investigations.’’ These standards and associated training explicitly focus on ensuring investigations are independent, fair, thorough, accurate, objective, impartial, ethical, unbiased, and accomplished with due professional care. All Air Force senior official cases are investigated using a ‘‘team concept’’ with an Investigating Officer and an imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each investigation from start to finish. The investigations 

are overseen by the Director of Senior Official Inquiries. And, each investigation receives a separate and fully independent legal review by the Director of Administrative Law for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole focus and desired outcome 

is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough, and objective investigation without regard for a specific finding on any individual allegation. The Air Force senior official 

investigating office is currently fully staffed, although we are currently exploring options to improve timeliness through efficiencies and additional manpower. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How many civilian and military investigators serve in your office? 

How many contractors? What level of prior investigative experience do they have? 

How many investigators would you need to be fully staffed? 

General OTTIGNON. IGMC investigative branch has structure for 3 civilian investigators (GS–14). Currently there are 2 civilian investigators serving. Hiring actions 

are underway for the vacancy. Navy IG recently shifted an additional civilian investigator to IGMC for a total of 4 civilian investors. Hiring actions are underway for 

this vacancy as well. Civilian investigators have an average of 3 years prior IG investigations experience. 

There are no military investigators assigned to IGMC investigations branch. 

Second panel 

Ms. TSONGAS. For which felonies should the statute of limitations be increased? 

General MCCONVILLE. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any changes 

at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) recently studied this issue 

as part of a ‘‘comprehensive and holistic review’’ that examined all punitive articles 

and recommended extending the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10 years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years 

or the length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when DNA 

evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress adopted these rec-
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ommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recent and comprehensive MJRG review, the accompanying appellate issues each change generates, and the potential 

for due process violations, we would not recommend any changes at this time. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Which general officers have requested outside employment in the 

past five years? Which of these cases were approved and which were denied? 

General MCCONVILLE. Under the Joint Ethics Regulation, active duty general officers, like all service members, must receive prior written approval before engaging 

in a business activity or compensated outside employment with a prohibited source. 

The approval authority may disapprove outside employment if he/she determines 

that it will create a conflict of interest with the officer’s official duties, detract from 

readiness, or pose a security risk. The decision to approve or deny requests for outside employment submitted by active duty general officers is made at the local level. 

The Army does not centrally track this information. However, we are reviewing the 

need and feasibility of a system that would provide Headquarters Department of the 

Army visibility over active duty general officers engaged in outside employment. 

Ms. TSONGAS. For which felonies should the statute of limitations be increased? 

Admiral MORAN. This issue was recently considered by the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) should 

be modified and the group’s recommendations were incorporated into the Military 

Justice Act of 2016 (MJA16). 

The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG, including a 

comparison with federal law, found that the statute of limitations provisions under 

the UCMJ are largely in step with federal counterparts for common law crimes. The 

three recommended substantive changes that were included into MJA16 as changes 

to the statutes of limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows: 

1) Child Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of limitations applicable to 

child abuse offenses from the current five years or the life of the child, whichever is longer, to ten years or the life of the child, whichever is longer, thereby 

aligning with 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period 

in the Title 18 provision from five years to ten years). 

2) Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted members; (2) the length of the appointment, 

in the case of officers; or (3) five years, whichever is longer. 

3) Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute of limitations 

until a period of time following the implication of an identified person by DNA 

testing that is equal to the otherwise applicable limitations period, thereby 

aligning with 18 U.S.C. § 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault; rape and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing movement in time of war; and any other offense punishable by death may 

be tried and punished at any time without limitation. 

The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years; however, Article 

43(d)-(g) provide several additional exceptions to the statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of circumstances unique to the military justice system 

including for offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from 

territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend him, or is in 

the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and when prosecution is considered 

to be detrimental to the prosecution of war or inimical to the national security. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Which general officers have requested outside employment in the 

past five years? Which of these cases were approved and which were denied? 

Admiral MORAN. The following retired Navy flag officers requested, and were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel under delegated authority, to accept compensated civilian employment from a foreign government. The Chief of Naval Personnel has not rejected any request in the past five years. Since law requires approval of both the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Department of State would 

need to confirm which officer’s requests were ultimately approved. 

Year Name of Person Foreign Government Approved To Receive Payment for Employment 

2014 Landay, William United Kingdom 

2015 Bowman, Frank Saudi Arabia, Egypt 

2015 Creevy, Lawrence Canada 
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Year Name of Person Foreign Government Approved To Receive Payment for Employment 

201 Eccles, Thomas Australia 

2015 Gaini, Anthony United Kingdom 

2015 Hall, Thomas Iceland 

2015 Harnitchek, Mark Afghanistan 

2015 Johnson, Stephen Australia 

2015 Sullivan, Paul Australia 

2016 Eccles, Thomas Australia 

2016 Gale, David Australia 

2016 Hilarides, William Australia 

2016 Locklear, Samuel Taiwan 

2016 Sullivan, Paul Australia 

2016 Donald, Kirkland Australia 

2017 Eccles, Thomas Australia 

2017 Hilarides, William Italy 

2017 Johnson, Stephen Australia 

2018 Branch, Ted Australia and Canada 

2018 Donald, Kirkland Australia 

1 RADM David Gale was approved to work for the Government of Australia in August 2016 

while still on active duty and his approved retirement date was October 1, 2016. 

Ms. TSONGAS. For which felonies should the statute of limitations be increased? 

General WILSON. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a five-year 

statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also provided for an increased 

statute of limitations for some of the most serious crimes to include murder, sexual 

assault, and sexual abuse of a child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and 

federal civilian jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to prosecute instances of 

misconduct within the military. 

Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal allegations are resolved in a timely 

fashion, ensures the availability of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, 

and enables a fair process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, 

the adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 

the availability of administrative actions, we do not recommend any modification to 

the statute of limitations at this time. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Which general officers have requested outside employment in the 

past five years? Which of these cases were approved and which were denied? 

General WILSON. Air Force records available indicate that the following general 

officers requested, and were approved, for outside employment while on terminal 

leave: 

Gen Larry Spencer—President, Air Force Association—approved 

Lt Gen Robert Otto—Member, Oak Ridge National Lab Global Security Directorate’s Strategic Advisory Group—approved 

Maj Gen James Martin, Jr.—Partner (non-equity), Kearney and Company—approved 

Maj Gen Scott Vander Hamm—Director of Strategic Initiatives, Innovative Defense technologies—approved 

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