# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 13, 2017

Decided July 12, 2017

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 16

‐ 4173

ADRIAN PINTEA, et al.,

Plaintiffs

‐ Appellants

,

v

.

MATTHEW ERIC GURVEY, et al.,

Defendants

‐ Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:16

‐ cv

‐ 05990

Thomas M. Durkin,

J udge

.

O R D E R

Adrian and Marinela Pintea are first

‐ generation immigrants of Romanian origin

who owned their primary residence in Chicago and a smaller rental property nearby.

At some point they defaulted on their mortgage and both properties fell into

foreclosure. As is the case for many immigrants, the Pinteas sought legal help in the

community and were quickly directed to Joseph Varan, a Romanian

‐ speaking realtor.

After explaining their situation, Varan directed the two to defendant Matthew Gurvey,

an attorney. According to the complaint, Gurvey recommended an arrangement NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp

. P. 32.1No. 16

‐ 4173 Page 2

whereby the Pinteas would transfer title to the mortgaged property in order to stay

foreclosure proceedings, and they would pay Gurvey a monthly fee.

The parties agree that the Pinteas transferred the properties to Gurvey, that they

paid a few months’ fees, and that they then became dissatisfied and demanded that

Gurvey terminate the arrangement. While unclear in the record, at oral argument

plaintiffs’ counsel made clear that the rental property was returned to the Pinteas, and

that they reside there now. Plaintiffs’ counsel was unclear, but by implication conceded

at oral argument that the primary residence was also returned to the Pinteas, but was

eventually lost at foreclosure.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in district court on June 8, 2016, and were (contrary to

representations at oral argument) granted leave to amend their complaint, which was

filed on September 28, 2016. The amended complaint alleged state law attorney

malpractice and breach of contract, as well as two federal causes of action: violation of

the Fair Housing Act under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604, and 3605, and violations of the

“Civil Rights Act of 866” [sic], 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. In essence, the plaintiffs

alleged that Varan and Gurvey sought to defraud them because they were Romanian,

and Romanians are allegedly easy marks. The case was dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) on November 22, 2016. As noted by the district judge: “[A]ll Plaintiffs’

allegations show [are possible Illinois state law claims...] not a federal discrimination

case under either the Fair Housing Act or §§ 1981 or 1982.” Pintea v. Varan

, No. 16

‐ cv

‐

05990, slip op. at 24 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2016). Because we agree with the district court’s

reasoning, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ federal law claims with prejudice

and the state law claims without prejudice.

In its opinion, the district court found numerous independent bases for

dismissing the suit against both the realtor, Varan, and the lawyer, Gurvey. We need

only choose one, and it is fatal to all of the federal discrimination claims. As properly

noted by the district court, we “need not accept a conclusory allegation of motive or

intent at face value in this case because other more specific facts alleged in the

complaint show that Plaintiffs’ claim is really that their victimization was not because of

an animus against their country of origin but instead because of Defendants’ belief that

their country of origin made them susceptible to being victimized

... There is simply no

plausible reason to believe that, assuming Defendants are guilty of the scheme to

defraud alleged, they would forgo victimizing non

‐ Romanians who were similarly

susceptible to their fraudulent scheme. An ‘equal opportunity’ victimizer, whatever else

he may be charged with, is not subject to liability for discrimination.”, slip op. at 22–23.No. 16

‐ 4173 Page 3

Reviewing the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the Pinteas, we find that dismissal of their federal law claims

was proper. Even at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel was left with the bare allegation

of “animus” towards Eastern Europeans (a broader class than was argued below) with

no factual support. We can point to no fact in the record which suggests anything

approaching actionable discrimination. Plaintiffs, having four bites at the apple (a

complaint, an amended complaint, a reply to a motion to dismiss, and an appeal),

continue to try to convert a state law fraud claim into a federal discrimination case

based purely upon say

‐ so.

Finally, while defense counsel has requested sanctions under Rule 38 or 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927, we decline to issue them. The defendants are understandably upset at the

alleged misrepresentations included in the complaint, but the appropriate court for

sifting through that inquiry is the district court. Indeed, in the judgment below, the

district court explicitly noted, for example, that plaintiffs’ counsel alleged both that

Varan failed to return the Pinteas’ property and that he did, in fact, return it: such a

material falsehood could give rise to sanctions, but if the district judge declined to

impose them, we will also decline.

Defense counsel alleges that plaintiffs’ counsel has numerous filings making

similar allegations against other defendants, and plaintiffs’ counsel does have an online

presence which suggests as much. However, this is the first of her cases before this

court. The appeal of the dismissal is frivolous and potentially sanctionable, and a

finding of subjective bad faith is not necessary to ordering sanctions under either Rule

38 or § 1927. At this point we are not inclined to award sanctions, but we simply take

this opportunity to put counsel for the Pinteas, Kelli Dudley, on notice. Quite apart

from the legal consequences, allegations of racial discrimination today carry with them

a host of social disabilities imposed on the accused. These allegations should not be

made lightly—especially with no factual basis.

AFFIRMED.