United States Senate 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Rob Portman, Chairman 

Tom Carper, Ranking Member 

CHINA’S IMPACT ON 

THE U.S. EDUCATION SYSTEM 

STAFF REPORT 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 
i 

CHINA’S IMPACT ON 

THE U.S. EDUCATION SYSTEM 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... 1

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 5

III. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 11

A. China’s Confucius Institutes .......................................................................... 11

B. The U.S. Department of Education ................................................................ 27

C. The U.S. State Department ............................................................................ 29

IV. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES .............................................................................. 33

A. Confucius Institute Formation at U.S. Schools ............................................. 33

B. Confucius Institute Board of Directors .......................................................... 36

C. Hanban’s Confucius Institute Contracts ....................................................... 38

D. Hanban’s Hiring Process for Chinese Directors and Teachers ..................... 43

E. Hanban’s Approval of Confucius Institute Funding and Events .................. 49

V. CONFUCIUS CLASSROOMS ........................................................................... 59

A. The Growth of Confucius Classrooms ............................................................ 59

B. Confucius Classroom Application Process ..................................................... 63

C. Confucius Classroom Operations ................................................................... 64

VI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S VISA REVIEWS OF U.S. CONFUCIUS 

INSTITUTES ............................................................................................................... 65

A. State Department Guidance Concerning Confucius Institutes .................... 65

B. State Department Field Site Reviews of Confucius Institutes ..................... 66

C. The State Department Issued Four Letters of Concern to U.S. Schools’ 

Confucius Institutes ................................................................................................. 67

D. The State Department’s 2019 Plans to Review U.S. Confucius Institutes .. 70

VII. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPORTS FAIL TO PROVIDE AN 

ACCURATE PICTURE OF CHINA’S SPENDING ON U.S. CONFUCIUS 

INSTITUTES ............................................................................................................... 70

A. Department of Education Reporting Requirements ..................................... 71
ii 

B. U.S. Schools’ Reporting of Confucius Institute Gifts .................................... 73

C. U.S. Schools Failed to Properly Report Confucius Institute Gifts to the 

Department of Education ......................................................................................... 75

D. Hanban Spent More than $2 Billion on Confucius Institutes Worldwide ... 76

VIII. CHINESE INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. SCHOOLS IN CHINA ................... 77

A. Chinese Obstructionism Led the State Department to Create the ACC 

Program in China ..................................................................................................... 78

B. The State Department Does Not Exert the Same Control over American 

Cultural Centers as the Chinese Government Exerts over Confucius Institutes . 80

C. Despite Receiving Funding, Seven American Cultural Centers Never 

Opened ...................................................................................................................... 81

D. The State Department Stopped Funding All American Cultural Centers .. 84

E. The State Department Inspector General Found that the American Cultural 

Center Program was “Largely Ineffective” in its Mission Due to Chinese 

Interference............................................................................................................... 88

F. The State Department Documented More than 80 Instances of Chinese 

Interference with Public Diplomacy Projects .......................................................... 89
1 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

When China sought to market itself to students around the world, it looked to 

its past. Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher, is synonymous with morality, 

justice, and honesty. The Chinese government capitalized on this rich legacy and 

began establishing Confucius Institutes on college campuses around the world in 

2004, including the first in the United States at the University of Maryland. Today, 

there are more than 100 Confucius Institutes in the United States, the most of any 

country. 

The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and provides Chinese 

teachers to teach language classes to students and non-student community 

members. In addition to Chinese language classes, Confucius Institutes host 

cultural events, including Chinese New Year celebrations, cooking classes, 

speakers, and dance and music performances. These selective events depict China 

as approachable and compassionate; rarely are events critical or controversial. The 

Chinese government also funds and provides language instructors for Confucius 

Classrooms, which offer classes for kindergarten through 12th grade students. 

Confucius Classrooms are currently in 519 elementary, middle, and high schools in 

the United States. Continued expansion of the program is a priority for China. 

Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise 

academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and 

speakers. Some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws 

will apply. The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government 

pledging they will not damage the national interests of China. Such limitations 

attempt to export China’s censorship of political debate and prevent discussion of 

potentially politically sensitive topics. Indeed, U.S. school officials told the 

Subcommittee that Confucius Institutes were not the place to discuss controversial 

topics like the independence of Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. 

As one U.S. school administrator explained to the Subcommittee, when something is 

“funded by the Chinese government, you know what you’re getting.” 

Confucius Institutes exist as one part of China’s broader, long-term strategy. 

Through Confucius Institutes, the Chinese government is attempting to change the 

impression in the United States and around the world that China is an economic 

and security threat. Confucius Institutes’ soft power encourages complacency 

towards China’s pervasive, long-term initiatives against both government critics at 

home and businesses and academic institutions abroad. Those long-term initiatives 

include its Made in China 2025 plan, a push to lead the world in certain advanced 

technology manufacturing. The Thousand Talents program is another state-run 

initiative designed to recruit Chinese researchers in the United States to return to 

China for significant financial gain—bringing with them the knowledge gained at 

U.S. universities and companies. 
2 

Contracting with the Chinese Government. The Chinese government runs the 

Confucius Institute program out of the Ministry of Education’s Office of Chinese 

Language Council International, known as “Hanban.” Each U.S. school signs a 

contract with Hanban establishing the terms of hosting a Confucius Institute. 

Contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee generally contain provisions that state 

both Chinese and U.S. laws apply; limit public disclosure of the contract; and 

terminate the contract if the U.S. school take actions that “severely harm the image 

or reputation” of the Confucius Institute. 

The Chinese director and teachers at each Confucius Institute also sign 

contracts with Hanban. The contract with Hanban makes clear a Chinese director 

or teacher will be terminated if they “violate Chinese laws;” “engage in activities 

detrimental to national interests;” or “participate in illegal organizations.” In fact, 

the contract states the Chinese director and teachers must “conscientiously 

safeguard national interests” and report to the Chinese Embassy within one month 

of arrival in the United States. 

Resources Provided by Hanban. U.S. schools that contract with Hanban 

receive substantial funding and resources to establish the Confucius Institute on 

campus. At the outset, Hanban typically provides a U.S. school between $100,000 

and $200,000 in start-up costs, around 3,000 books, and other materials. Hanban 

also selects and provides a Chinese director and teachers at no cost to the U.S. 

school. While school officials have the opportunity to interview candidates for these 

positions, there is little-to-no transparency into how the Chinese government selects 

the individuals that schools must choose from. Nor did U.S. school officials 

interviewed by the Subcommittee know if candidates would meet the school’s hiring 

standards. Hanban requires director and teacher candidates to pass English 

proficiency tests and undergo a psychological exam to determine adaptability to 

living and teaching in the United States. Beyond that, U.S. schools’ understanding 

of the selection process was limited, at best. 

Expansion to Kindergarten through 12th Grade. China did not stop at 

expanding at university and college campuses. The next phase of Confucius 

Institutes involved funding teachers for Confucius Classrooms in K−12 grade 

school. There are currently 519 Confucius Classrooms operating in the United 

States with expansion of this program a top priority for China. In the United 

States, a Confucius Institute receives funding and instructors directly from Hanban 

and passes it to the K−12 grade school to support affiliated Confucius Classrooms. 

The Cost of Confucius Institutes. The investment by China in U.S. Confucius 

Institutes is substantial. Since 2006, the Subcommittee determined China directly 

provided over $158 million in funding to U.S. schools for Confucius Institutes. A 

number of U.S. schools, however, failed to properly report this funding as required 

by law. The Department of Education requires all postsecondary schools to report 
3 

foreign gifts of $250,000 or more from a single source within a calendar year of 

receiving them. Despite that legal requirement, nearly 70 percent of U.S. schools 

that received more than $250,000 from Hanban failed to properly report that 

amount to the Department of Education. 

The Department of Education last issued guidance to U.S. schools on foreign 

gift reporting requirements in 2004, the same year the first Confucius Institute 

opened in the United States. As China opened over 100 additional Confucius 

Institutes in the United States over the last 15 years, the Department of Education 

remained silent. 

Visa Failures. The State Department is responsible for issuing visas to any 

Chinese director or teacher entering the United States to work at a Confucius 

Institute. Some U.S. schools have struggled to comply with the requirements of the 

Exchange Visitor Visa (or “J-1”). In 2018, the State Department revoked 32 J-1 

Professor and Research Scholar visas for Confucius Institute teachers who were not 

conducting research, but instead were teaching at K−12 schools. The State 

Department also found evidence that one Confucius Institute Chinese director 

improperly coached the teachers to discuss their research during interviews with 

State Department investigators. 

 

In 2019, the State Department plans to double the number of Confucius 

Institutes field reviews it completed in 2018 – from two to four. 

China’s Lack of Reciprocity. In response to the growing popularity of 

Confucius Institutes in the United States, the State Department initiated a public 

diplomacy program in China. Since 2010, the State Department has provided $5.1 

million in grant funding for 29 “American Cultural Centers” or ACCs in China. 

Through the ACC program, a U.S. school partners with a Chinese school, much like 

a Confucius Institute. The U.S. school then uses the grant funds to create a space 

on the campus of the Chinese partner school to “enable Chinese audiences to better 

understand the United States, its culture, society, government, language, law, 

economic center, and values.” ACCs are notably different from Confucius Institutes, 

however, as the State Department does not pay or vet instructors or directors; 

provide books or materials; or veto proposed events. Even so, the Chinese 

government stifled the establishment of the ACC program from the start. 

In all, the State Department provided 29 U.S. schools with grant funds to 

establish ACCs with a partner Chinese schools. For some U.S schools, roadblocks to 

opening their ACCs appeared immediately. For example, after extensive 

negotiations, one Chinese school refused to open a proposed ACC, stating it didn’t 

see a need to move forward. An official from the U.S. school seeking to open the 

ACC, however, believed China’s Ministry of Education told the partner school not to 

proceed with the contract. This official wrote in an email to his colleagues, “This is 
4 

a typical Chinese political euphemism. Obviously, [the Chinese University] was 

instructed by [the Ministry of Education] not to proceed with our proposal.” The 

U.S. school returned the grant funds to the State Department. 

The ACCs that did open found they needed permission from their Chinese 

host schools to hold most cultural events. One Chinese host school refused to allow 

its ACC to host a play about the life of Muhammad Ali. Another denied approval 

for a lecture series on policy issues facing Americans. One U.S. school official who 

staffed an ACC told the Subcommittee that members of the local Communist Party 

often participated in the approval process. Another U.S. school official left the ACC 

after two sessions of extensive questioning by Chinese police officers regarding her 

involvement with the ACC and the State Department. When the U.S. school official 

returned to the United States, a colleague told her that Chinese police interrogation 

of school officials was common and that she was now just “part of the club.” 

In all, the State Department documented over 80 instances in the past four 

years where the Chinese government directly interfered with U.S. diplomacy efforts 

in China. Interference with State Department officials or events took a number of 

forms. One example involved a Chinese official telling a U.S. official an ACC no 

longer existed; the U.S. official easily confirmed the continued existence of the ACC 

through its U.S. partner school. One U.S. official was told she applied too late to 

attend the opening of an ACC after submitting the request a month before. In other 

instances, the Chinese school canceled approved events, sometimes as late as the 

night before. 

In December 2017, the State Department Inspector General found the ACC 

mission was largely ineffective. In October 2018, the State Department ended all 

ACC program grant funding in order to conduct an internal assessment of the 

program. There are currently no plans for future ACC grants. 

The Need for Transparency and Reciprocity. Schools in the United States—

from kindergarten to college—have provided a level of access to the Chinese 

government that the Chinese government has refused to provide to the United 

States. That level of access can stifle academic freedom and provide students and 

others exposed to Confucius Institute programming with an incomplete picture of 

Chinese government actions and policies that run counter to U.S. interests at home 

and abroad. Absent full transparency regarding how Confucius Institutes operate 

and full reciprocity for U.S. cultural outreach efforts on college campuses in China, 

Confucius Institutes should not continue in the United States. 
5 

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Findings of Fact 

1) In the last 15 years, the Chinese government has opened over 100 

Confucius Institutes on college and university campuses in the 

United States. While there are currently more than 500 Confucius 

Institutes worldwide, the United States has more Confucius Institutes than 

any other country. Recently, ten U.S. colleges and universities have decided 

to close Confucius Institutes. 

2) The Chinese government also funds teachers for Confucius 

Classrooms in the United States, which teach Chinese language and 

culture in kindergarten through 12th grade schools. There are over 

1,000 Confucius Classrooms worldwide and more than 500 in the United 

States. Expanding the Confucius Classroom program is a priority for the 

Chinese government. A document obtained by the Subcommittee details a 

sophisticated plan to expand Confucius Classrooms by seeking the “top-down 

policy support from the state government, legislative and educational 

institutions, with a particular emphasis on access to the support from school 

district superintendents and principals.” 

3) U.S. government officials have expressed concerns about Confucius 

Institutes. FBI Director Chris Wray testified that the FBI is “watching 

warily” Confucius Institutes and “in certain instances have developed 

appropriate investigative steps.” Bill Priestap, the FBI’s Assistant Director 

for the Counterintelligence Division, testified that Confucius Institutes “are 

not strictly a cultural institute [and that] they’re ultimately beholden to the 

Chinese government.” 

4) The Chinese government controls nearly every aspect of Confucius 

Institutes at U.S. schools. Confucius Institutes report to the Chinese 

government’s Ministry of Education Office of Chinese Language Council 

International, known as “Hanban.” Confucius Institutes are funded, 

controlled, and mostly staffed by Hanban to present Chinese-government 

approved programming to students at U.S. schools. Hanban approves each 

Confucius Institutes’ annual budget and has veto authority over events and 

speakers. 

5) Hanban provides no information to U.S. schools on how candidates 

for Chinese director and teacher positions at Confucius Institutes 

are screened or selected in China. U.S. Schools told the Subcommittee 

they did not know how Hanban selects the candidates they must choose when 

filling the Chinese director and teacher positions at Confucius Institutes, but 

were generally aware of an English proficiency test and psychological exam. 
6 

Nor did U.S. schools know if the Chinese directors and teachers would meet 

the U.S. schools’ hiring standards. 

6) Chinese directors and teachers at Confucius Institutes pledge to 

protect Chinese national interests. The Subcommittee obtained a 

contract between Chinese teachers and Hanban that requires Chinese 

instructors at U.S. schools to “conscientiously safeguard national interests” 

and terminates if the Chinese instructors “violate Chinese law” or “engage in 

activities detrimental to national interests.” 

7) Some U.S. schools’ contracts with Hanban include non-disclosure 

provisions and require adherence to both U.S. and Chinese law. 

Some contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee included provisions that 

prevent public disclosure of the contract and a provision that both Chinese 

and U.S. law applies at the Confucius Institute at the U.S. school. When one 

U.S. school refused to include a provision requiring adherence to Chinese law, 

Hanban officials cancelled the entire contract. 

8) Some Hanban contracts include a clause requiring a U.S. school to 

pay back Hanban funds for early termination of the Confucius 

Institute. This provision creates a disincentive for the U.S. school to 

terminate an agreement early if the school decides it no longer wants to host 

a Confucius Institute. The typical length of a contract between a U.S. school 

and Hanban is five years. 

9) U.S. school officials’ impressions of Hanban’s control of Confucius 

Institutes varied. Some U.S. school officials, administrators, and 

instructors told the Subcommittee that they had concerns about the Chinese 

government’s control and influence over Confucius Institute planning and 

programming. Government Accountability Office investigators interviewed 

several U.S. school officials who “expressed concerns that hosting a Confucius 

Institute could limit events or activities critical of China—including events at 

the Confucius Institute and elsewhere on campus.” Other U.S. school 

administrators and American directors reported they had no concerns about 

academic freedom or undue Chinese influence. 

10) The State Department does not collect information on the Exchange 

Visa Program (or “J-1 visa”) related to Confucius Institutes or 

Hanban. The State Department told the Subcommittee that when a Chinese 

national applies for a J-1 visa, the Department does not record if that 

individual is associated with a Confucius Institute. As such, the State 

Department does not know the number of Chinese nationals in the United 

States associated with the Confucius Institute program. This gap affects the 

State Department’s ability to effectively ensure proper visa use. 
7 

11) Since 2017, the State Department issued four Letters of Concern to 

U.S. schools for inappropriately using J-1 visas related to Confucius 

Institutes. The State Department revoked 32 visas for Confucius Institute 

exchange visitors following reviews at two of the schools that received letters. 

At both of these schools, Chinese nationals asserted they were in the United 

States conducting research when they were actually teaching at K−12 

schools. When State Department officials interviewed officials and staff at 

one school, they found evidence of efforts to deceive them and determined the 

Confucius Institute’s Chinese co-director “conducted rehearsal interviews 

with the exchange visitors to practice discussing their research topics in 

advance of [State’s] review.” 

12) The State Department conducted two field site reviews of Confucius 

Institutes in 2018 in response to visa violations discovered during a 

field site review. The State Department also issued a reminder to U.S. 

school sponsors to review guidance on the proper use of J-1 visas for 

Confucius Institutes. The State Department plans to conduct four field site 

reviews in 2019. 

13) Since 2006, Hanban has provided more than $158 million to more 

than 100 U.S. schools for Confucius Institutes. Those U.S. schools 

provided the Subcommittee with financial data detailing all payments 

received from Hanban. Hanban states it spent more than $2 billion on 

Confucius Institutes worldwide from 2008 to 2016; starting in 2017, it no 

longer reports spending on the program. 

14) U.S. schools failed to comply with statutory requirements to report 

foreign gifts to the Department of Education. Current law requires all 

post-secondary schools to biannually report funding provided by a foreign 

entity valued at more than $250,000. Nearly seventy percent of U.S. schools 

with a Confucius Institute that received more than $250,000 in one year 

failed to properly report that information to the Department of Education. 

15) The Department of Education does not conduct regular oversight of 

U.S. schools’ compliance with required foreign gift reporting. The 

Department of Education maintains a database detailing the reporting of 

foreign gifts provided to U.S. schools, but relies solely on the U.S. schools to 

self-report gifts. 

16) The Department of Education has failed to update U.S. school 

reporting requirements. The Department of Education has not issued 

guidance on foreign gift reporting by post-secondary schools since 2004. As a 

result, U.S. schools told the Subcommittee the reporting requirements were 
8 

unclear and confusing. They also said the Department of Education website 

used to receive gift reports was dated and difficult to use. 

17) The State Department created the American Cultural Center (“ACC”) 

program in 2010 to partner U.S. schools with a Chinese school. The 

State Department awarded $5.1 million in grant funds through the program 

for U.S. schools to create a space on the campus of a Chinese partner school. 

The ACC would host events and lectures to promote American culture. 

18) The Chinese government fails to provide appropriate reciprocity for 

U.S. officials and educators in China. The State Department has 

documented at least 80 examples of Chinese interference with American 

public diplomacy efforts from January 2016 to July 2018. Chinese officials 

routinely cancelled events at ACCs that involved U.S. embassy officials. In 

other instances, the host Chinese school would not allow State Department 

officials to attend events at the ACC, even when they applied for admission 

weeks in advance. 

19) The State Department Inspector General found that the American 

Cultural Center Program was “largely ineffective” in its mission due 

to Chinese interference. The State Department responded that “[t]he 

Embassy agrees that there are concerns related to the stability of specific 

Centers due to active interference by the Chinese government as well as 

limitations in visiting individual centers.” 

20) The Chinese government prevented at least seven American Cultural 

Centers from ever opening. The U.S. schools cited “politics” and having to 

secure the permission of either the Chinese Communist Party or local 

provincial government as reasons for failing to open an American Cultural 

Center. 

21) One U.S. school official told the Subcommittee that Chinese police 

officials detained and questioned her about her involvement with 

the American Cultural Center program. She further explained that 

when she later told a colleague about the questioning, her colleague was not 

surprised and told her the Chinese police routinely question Americans in 

this manner. The colleague concluded that she was now “part of the club.” 

22) U.S. schools operating in China may self-censor events and 

programming as part of the State Department’s American Cultural 

Center program. For example, one U.S. school told the Subcommittee that 

they would never even propose to hold an event on Tibet or Taiwan. That 

same U.S. school said they successfully hosted programs in China, but that 

the school did not want to “promote American culture too much.” 
9 

Recommendations 

1) Congress should require all U.S. schools to publish any contracts 

with foreign governments, including all Confucius Institute 

contracts, online for students and faculty to review. Those contracts 

should have clear and irrefutable provisions protecting academic freedom at 

the school and avoid provisions that would apply the law of a foreign country 

on a U.S. campus. 

2) U.S. schools should ensure that Hanban does not exercise line-item 

veto authority when approving annual Confucius Institute budgets. 

U.S. schools must ensure that any foreign-government-funded activities or 

research do not hinder academic freedom or present one-sided, selective 

positions to American students. Confucius Institute events and activities 

should also include disclaimers about the sources of funding. 

3) U.S. schools should ensure that Hanban’s vetting, screening, and 

interview processes are aligned with their own hiring procedures 

and protocols. The process of selecting directors and teachers should be 

fully transparent to U.S. schools. U.S. schools should also attempt to recruit 

Chinese language instructors outside of Hanban’s purview. 

4) Congress and state and local education officials should study the 

need and demand for Chinese language education programming in 

the United States and consider additional investments where 

necessary. U.S. schools and state and local boards of education should not 

outsource Chinese language teaching to Hanban. 

5) The Department of Justice should determine if Confucius Institutes 

engage in activity to influence the U.S. government or public on 

behalf of foreign principals. The Department of Justice should then 

assess whether any Confucius Institute or its employees should register 

under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) for work on behalf of the 

Chinese government. 

6) The State Department should review all active Confucius Institutes 

and Confucius Classrooms for compliance with visa regulations, 

standards, and practices. The State Department should collect foreign 

visa information for J-1 researchers and teachers associated with Confucius 

Institutes in the United States. 

7) U.S. schools must comply with the law and properly report foreign 

gifts to the Department of Education. U.S. schools that failed to properly 
10 

report any foreign gifts should submit corrected and updated reporting as 

soon as practicable to the Department of Education. 

8) The Department of Education should update its guidance requiring 

U.S. schools to report any funds provided by an institution owned or 

controlled by a foreign source, especially a foreign government. The 

Department should also update and modernize its website so U.S. schools can 

easily upload foreign gift information. The Department of Education and the 

Department of Justice should conduct oversight and pursue appropriate 

action against any U.S. schools that willfully fail to comply with reporting 

requirements. 

9) The State Department should demand reciprocal and fair treatment 

of its diplomats and employees in China. This should include routine 

access to all U.S. taxpayer-funded sites, projects, and events. The State 

Department should also complete its own internal review of the effectiveness 

of the American Cultural Center program. 

10) The State Department should remain in close contact with grantees 

in foreign countries and develop a formal system to collect 

information about interference, harassment, or questioning by 

foreign authorities. The State Department should use that information to 

assess both the safety of grantees working in foreign countries and the 

effectiveness of their programs. 

11) U.S. schools should continue to partner with Chinese universities. 

Partnering with foreign universities offers students unique international 

learning experiences and enhance research opportunities. U.S. schools, 

however, should never, under any circumstances, compromise academic 

freedom. U.S. schools operating in China should inform students about 

China’s internet censorship and other relevant constraints. 

12) U.S. schools should demand that Hanban be fully transparent about 

Confucius Institute hiring practices and provide reciprocity to U.S. 

school programs at Chinese schools. Given the concerns regarding 

academic freedom and broader U.S. interests related to China, U.S. schools 

should be fully aware of any drawbacks associated with hosting Confucius 

Institutes. Absent full transparency regarding how Confucius Institutes 

operate and full reciprocity for U.S. cultural outreach efforts on college 

campuses in China, Confucius Institutes should not continue in the United 

States. 
11 

III. BACKGROUND 

A. China’s Confucius Institutes 

Confucius Institutes are enterprises that engage in the teaching of Chinese 

language and culture at universities and colleges around the world.1 Confucius 

Institutes are designed, funded, and mostly staffed by the Office of Chinese 

Language Council International, known as Hanban.2 The Chinese government bills 

them as opportunities for cultural exchange and Chinese language education—an 

appealing prospect for U.S. schools trying to meet demand for language instruction. 

In the United States, Confucius Institutes are partnerships between Hanban and 

U.S. colleges or universities (“U.S. schools”). Confucius Institutes generally offer 

Chinese language courses, cultural events, scholarships, and China-related research 

opportunities. 

As shown here, there are approximately 525 Confucius Institutes 

worldwide—118 in Asia, 54 in Africa, 161 in the Americas, 173 in Europe, and 19 in 

Oceania.3 With few exceptions, Confucius Institutes now have a significant 

presence in nearly every region of the world. 

 

 

1 About Confucius Institute/Classroom, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 3 (2019). 

3 About Confucius Institute/Classroom, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 
12 

The United States is now home to more Confucius Institutes than any other 

country.4 As of January 2019, as shown below and compiled by the Government 

Accountability Office, there are roughly 110 Confucius Institutes located in 44 of the 

50 states.5

6

 According to 2017 data, there are 46,200 native Chinese and indigenous 

teachers working at Confucius Institutes around the world, and 1.7 million students 

who participate in Confucius Institute programs.7 An additional 621,000 

individuals partake in Confucius Institute programming online.8 Despite its 

already substantial presence, China intends to open more than 1,000 Confucius 

Institutes around the world by 2020.9

 

4 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 67 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 

5 About Confucius Institute/Classroom, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 

6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 4 (2019). 

7 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 16 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 

8 Id. 9 Anthony Warren, Teaching Mandarin to the World, HANBAN (Nov. 8, 2016), 

http://english.hanban.org/article/2016-11/08/content_663604.htm. 
13 

1. China’s Office of Chinese Language Council International known 

as Hanban 

Confucius Institutes are designed, funded, and mostly staffed by the Office of 

Chinese Language Council International—known as “Hanban.”10 While Hanban 

describes itself as a “non-governmental and non-profit organization,” its own 

documents indicate that it reports directly to the Chinese government’s Ministry of 

Education.11 For example, as shown below in an archived screenshot of the 

“Organizational structure” from Hanban’s website, Hanban reports directly to 

China’s Ministry of Education.12

Members of twelve state ministries and commissions, including the General 

Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the State Press and 

Publications Administration, sit on Hanban’s governing council.13 

 

10 Confucius institute to open in Gomel university on 20 December, HANBAN (Dec. 12, 2017), 

english.hanban.org/article/2017-12/12/content_711210.htm. 

11 About Hanban, HANBAN, http://www.hanban.ca/hanban.php?lang=en 

[https://web.archive.org/web/20180225052755/http://www.hanban.ca/hanban.php?lang=en]. Hanban, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm. 12 Id. 13 The full list includes the General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the 

Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affaires Office of the State Council, the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the 

Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (China Radio 

International), the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council Information 
14 

Established in 1987, Hanban’s goals, according to its website, are to (1) 

provide Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide, 

and (2) contribute to the development of multiculturalism and global understanding 

by supporting Chinese language programs at educational institutes of various types 

and levels in other countries.14 According to Hanban’s 2017 annual report, “The 

Confucius Institutes worldwide have held 220,000 cultural activities with 100 

million viewers.”15 The same report states that Confucius Institutes “have become a 

vital force for international cooperation under the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative.”16 

China’s Belt and Road initiative “aims to strengthen infrastructure, trade, and 

investment links between China and some 65 other countries.”17

Hanban launched the first Confucius Institute in 2004 in Seoul, South 

Korea.18 Later that year, Hanban opened the first U.S. Confucius Institute at the 

University of Maryland.19 While Confucius Institutes are not Hanban’s only 

project, they quickly became its most well-known. Hanban’s other projects include 

the Chinese Bridge Chinese Proficiency Competition (“Chinese Bridge”), an annual 

international contest where students compete against each other based on their 

knowledge of Chinese language and culture.20 According to Hanban, 160,000 

students from 127 countries have participated in Chinese Bridge competitions.21

In the United States, Confucius Institutes are loosely supported by Confucius 

Institute U.S. Center (“CIUS”) in Washington D.C.—which describes itself as a nonprofit educational institution that promotes “global education, Chinese language 

 

Office and the State Language Work Committee. About Hanban, HANBAN, 

http://www.hanban.ca/hanban.php?lang=en 

[https://web.archive.org/web/20180225052755/http://www.hanban.ca/hanban.php?lang=en]. See also 

Wayne State University, Hanban (2019), http://www.clas.wayne.edu/ci/Hanban. 14 Hanban, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm. 

15 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 4 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 

16 Id. 17 Caroline Freund & Michele Ruta, Belt and Road Initiative, WORLD BANK (Mar. 29, 2018), 

https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative. Securing 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Dimensions and Implications: Hearing on “China’s Belt and Road 

Initiative: Five Years Later” Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n (2018) (testimony of 

Dr. Joel Wuthnow, Research Fellow, Inst. for Nat’l Strategic Studies, U.S. Nat’l Def. Univ.). 

18 D.D. Guttenplan, Critics Worry About Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-ofchinese-institutes-on-us-campuses.html. 

19 Frequently Asked Questions, U. MD., https://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institutemaryland/frequently-asked-questions. 

20 About “Chinese Bridge”, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_8080.htm. 21 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 7 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 
15 

instruction, and cross-cultural understanding.”22 According to CIUS, it provides 

school districts that wish to develop a Chinese language curriculum with resources 

and support.23 It also provides professional development opportunities to U.S. 

Confucius Institutes.24 Hanban opened CIUS in 2013 during an event attended by 

Chinese Vice President Liu Yandong and Minister of Education Yuan Guiren.25 

While Hanban designates CIUS as its “Overseas Representative” in the 

United States, as shown in the publicly available screenshot above, CIUS told the 

Subcommittee that “CIUS is not the headquarters for the [Confucius Institutes].”26 

In fact, in a letter to Subcommittee staff, CIUS stated it does not have authority 

over any of the individual Confucius Institutes in the United States: 

 “CIUS is not involved in funding, managing or supervising how 

each college or university operates its own [Confucius 

Institute].”27

 

22 Discovering New Horizons: 2017 Annual Report, CONFUCIUS INST. U.S. CTR. (Jan. 2018), 

http://www.ciuscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CIUS-2017-Annual-Report.pdf. 

23 About Us, CONFUCIUS INST. U.S. CTR., http://www.ciuscenter.org/about-us/. 24 Id. 25 China Inaugurates Confucius Institute U.S. Center in Washington, EMBASSY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 

CHINA FED. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC NEPAL (Nov. 20, 2013), 

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cenp/eng/zgwj/t1101523.htm. 

26 Contact Us, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7704.htm. Letter from Qing Gao, Executive 

Director, CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE U.S. CENTER (Sept. 12, 2018). 

27 Letter from Qing Gao, Executive Director, CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE U.S. CENTER (Sept. 12, 2018). 
16 

 “It is critical to note that CIUS has no contractual relationship 

with, or any control over, any individual [Confucius Institute] or 

any university that hosts one.”28

 “What CIUS does not do is to provide financial support to or 

supervise any CIs or place any conditions on what the CIs may or 

may not do. CIUS is also not a central repository for all the work 

done by or information about individual [Confucius Institutes].”29

2. Hanban’s Contracts and Implementation Agreements with U.S. 

Schools 

Confucius Institutes are hosted by private and public universities located on 

U.S. school campuses.30 Each U.S. school customarily provides its own resources, a 

physical space for the Confucius Institute, an American Director, and 

administrative support.31 Hanban typically provides its funding, a Chinese 

Director, Chinese teachers, and course materials.32 Confucius Institutes typically 

receive between $100,000 to $200,000 in start-up funding.33 After that, Confucius 

Institutes usually receive similar amounts in annual funding from Hanban, but in 

some instances are given significantly more.34

To establish a Confucius Institute, a potential host school must first submit 

an application and sign an agreement with Hanban and a Chinese partner school.35 

While the management of Confucius Institutes varies from school to school, the 

 

28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Confucius Institutes in the United States, CONFUCIUS INST. U.S. CTR. (Apr. 2018), 

http://www.ciuscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Confucius-Institutes-in-the-United-States1.pdf; James Bradshaw & Colin Freeze, McMaster closing Confucius Institute over hiring issues, 

GLOBE & MAIL (May 11, 2018), 

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing-confucius-instituteover-hiring-issues/article8372894/. 

31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 7-8 (2019). 

32 D.D. Guttenplan, Critics Worry About Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-ofchinese-institutes-on-us-campuses.html; James Bradshaw & Colin Freeze, McMaster closing 

Confucius Institute over hiring issues, GLOBE & MAIL (May 11, 2018), 

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing-confucius-instituteover-hiring-issues/article8372894/. 

33 Rachelle Peterson, Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher 

Education, NAT. ASSOC. SCHOLARS 68 (Apr. 2017) [hereinafter PETERSON REPORT] 

34 PETERSON REPORT at 70. 

35 What are the features of the Confucius Institute’s operation?, HANBAN (July 2, 2010), 

http://english.hanban.org/article/2010-07/02/content_153909.htm. 
17 

agreement outlines the obligations of each party, the management structure, and 

the scope of activities to be conducted by the Confucius Institute.36 Generally, 

Hanban then provides guidelines, finances, and staff for the Confucius Institute, 

which is managed by a board of directors consisting of members from the U.S. 

school and the partner Chinese school.37 These agreements are typically valid for 

five years with options to renew for an additional five years.38

Confucius Institute operations vary dramatically between schools in the 

United States.39 For example, some Confucius Institutes are part of a specific 

academic department or administrative office, while others report to leadership 

offices outside of specific departments, such as the President’s office.40 Confucius 

Institutes course offerings also vary greatly.41 While nearly all Confucius Institutes 

offer Chinese language classes, some are for course credit and others focus 

primarily on non-credit classes for community members.42 Confucius Institutes also 

offer events promoting Chinese culture, such as dumpling making, Tai Chi, and 

celebrations of the Chinese New Year and other Chinese holidays.43

The Chinese government primarily relies on Hanban’s Constitution and the 

By-Laws of the Confucius Institute (“Constitution”) to regulate, monitor, and control 

Confucius Institutes in the United States and around the world.44

 

36 See Agreement for Establishment of a Confucius Institute at University of California, Los Angeles 

(UCLA) in Collaboration with the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), UCLA

CONFUCIUS INST. (Dec. 20, 2006), 

http://www.confucius.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/hanbanagreement_dec_2006_signed.pdf. 

37 PETERSON REPORT at 29. 

38 PETERSON REPORT at 45. 

39 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 6 (2019). 

40 Id. 41 Id. at 14. 42 Id. at 14, 24. 

43 See, e.g., Classes, CONFUCIUS INST. MASON, https://confucius.gmu.edu/classes-training/classes. 44 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, HANBAN, 

http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 
18 

The Constitution lays out procedures regarding application processes, 

funding, and administration and forbids Confucius Institutes from “contraven[ing] 

... the laws and regulations of China.”45 The Constitution also provides that 

Hanban can pursue legal action for any violation of the Agreement or the 

Constitution that “tarnishes the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.”46

3. Confucius Classrooms 

In addition to supporting U.S. Confucius Institutes, Hanban also supports 

U.S. Confucius Classrooms.47 Confucius Classrooms are centers for Chinese culture 

and language that are established at both public and private K−12 schools.48 

According to Hanban, Confucius Institutes provide funding for Confucius 

Classrooms as well as teaching materials, resources, and in some cases, personnel.49 

Some Confucius Classroom programs are designed to advance a school’s existing 

Chinese program with additional funding and resources, while others assist schools 

that wish to start a Chinese language program from scratch.50

Like Confucius Institutes, Hanban has expanded Confucius Classrooms over 

the last several years, reaching large numbers of schoolchildren worldwide. 

According to Hanban’s own statistics, by 2017, Hanban had established 1,113 

Confucius Classrooms around the world, as the chart shows below.51 

 

45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 3 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 

48 Confucius Classrooms, U. MD., https://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institutemaryland/confucius-classrooms. 

49 See, e.g., Confucius Classroom Celebrates Chinese Language and Culture Learning in Portage, 

CONFUCIUS INST. W. MICH. U. (July 20, 2012), http://www.wmuconfucius.org/content/confuciusclassroom-celebrates-chinese-language-and-culture-learning-portage; Confucius Classroom, U. KY., 

http://international.uky.edu/ukci/k12/partners/confucius_classroom. 

50 Confucius Classroom, U. WIS. PLATTEVILLE, https://campus.uwplatt.edu/confucius-classroom. 

51 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 3 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 
19 

This rapid growth can be explained in part by the Confucius Classroom 

model. A single Confucius Institute may have multiple active Confucius 

Classrooms that all depend upon that Confucius Institute for assistance, funding, 

guidance, and mentorship.52 According to its website, Hanban generally awards 

$10,000 dollars to each Confucius Classroom that is distributed via the parent 

Confucius Institute.53 Schools also can receive up to $20,000 in Chinese language 

materials and equipment.54 Through Confucius Classrooms, some U.S. students 

have attended Hanban summer camps in China and visited their Classroom’s 

Chinese partner school.55 U.S. school administrators have also received sponsored 

trips to China and educational exchanges with Chinese schools.56

 

52 Confucius Classrooms, U. MD., https://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institutemaryland/confucius-classrooms. 

53 Jeffrey Gil, Why the NSW government is reviewing its Confucius Classrooms program, 

CONVERSATION (May 17, 2018), http://theconversation.com/why-the-nsw-government-is-reviewingits-confucius-classrooms-program-96783. 

54 Confucius Classroom Important Information, U. CENT. ARK., https://uca.edu/confucius/frequentlyasked-questions-about-confucius-classroom. Confucius Classroom Q & A, U. TEX. DALL., 

https://www.utdallas.edu/ah/confucius/docs/Confucius-Classroom.pdf. 

55 Kenneth King, Confucius Institutes are a win-win proposition, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 30, 2018), 

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/culture/confucius-institute/; Confucius 

Classroom Q & A, U. TEX. DALL., https://www.utdallas.edu/ah/confucius/docs/ConfuciusClassroom.pdf. 

56 Confucius Classroom Important Information, U. CENT. ARK., https://uca.edu/confucius/frequentlyasked-questions-about-confucius-classroom. Confucius Classroom Q & A, U. TEX. DALL., 

https://www.utdallas.edu/ah/confucius/docs/Confucius-Classroom.pdf. 
20 

4. Chinese Officials’ Descriptions of Confucius Institutes and 

Confucius Classrooms 

While Hanban maintains that Confucius Institutes serve “to enhance 

understanding of Chinese language and culture among foreigners, develop friendly 

relations between China and other countries, foster the development of 

multiculturalism and contribute to the building of a harmonious world,” some 

Chinese government officials have expressed different motives. For example, 

government officials have said that Confucius Institutes are among the tools China 

uses to improve its reputation in the world through “soft power.”57 And the State 

Department has also labeled Confucius Institutes as “China’s most prominent softpower platforms.”58 “Soft power” is characterized as “the ability to affect others to 

obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or 

payment.”59 In other words, “soft power” is an “attempt to persuade people toward 

a compliant attitude, rather than coerce conformity.”60

Over the past several years, some Chinese officials have publicly 

acknowledged and discussed motivations for Confucius Institutes. First, Li 

Changchun, a former member of the Chinese government, explained in a 2011 

speech that, “The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our 

culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft 

power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of 

teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.”61 Two years 

earlier, Li Changchun commented, “that Confucius Institutes are an important part 

of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”62

Second, in 2010, former Minister of Propaganda Liu Yunshan reportedly 

described foreign activity goals in the People’s Daily, the biggest newspaper group 

in China: 

 

57 See Ethan Epstein, How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2018), 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327. 

58 CDP-2018-00005-00002. 

59 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 94, 

94 (2008). 

60 PETERSON REPORT at 12. See also THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, COMPARING GLOBAL 

INFLUENCE: CHINA'S AND U.S. DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN AID, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPING 

WORLD 19 (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.crs.gov/reports/pdf/RL34620. (According to the Congressional 

Research Service, Confucius Institutes “represent a new component in China’s strategy to merge its 

economic influence with efforts to promote an understanding of its view of the world.”). 

61 Ethan Epstein, How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2018), 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327. 

62 Id.
21 

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create 

a favorable international environment for us . . . With regard to key 

issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively 

carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, 

Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to 

proactively take our culture abroad ... [w]e should do well in 

establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius 

Institutes.63

Finally, comments by Xu Lin, the Director General of the Confucius Institute 

Headquarters, indicate that he sees Confucius Institutes as a way to disseminate 

China’s views on sensitive issues. In a 2014 interview, Xu Lin said that when 

Confucius Institute teachers return to China she asks them whether students have 

inquired about the Taiwanese relationship with China and what answer they gave 

in response.64 She later stated, “Every mainland teacher we send . . . will say 

Taiwan belongs to China. We should have one China. No hesitation.”65

5. Recent Testimony and Subsequent Confucius Institutes Closures 

Over the last several years, members of Congress, U.S. government officials, 

and academics have raised a number of concerns about Confucius Institutes, 

including about academic freedom, contractual agreements, transparency, hiring 

practices, and self-censorship. The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, and Foreign Relations Committees all held broad 

hearings that discussed China at which Senators heard from experts on U.S.-China 

relations, academic freedom advocates, and law enforcement officials. Additionally, 

members of Congress from several states issued public letters to U.S. schools with 

Confucius Institutes urging them to reconsider their arrangement with Hanban.66

In a December 2018 Senate committee hearing titled, “China’s NonTraditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy 

 

63 Id. 64 William Hanks, BBC News 22 December 2014 How open is China’s global Confucius Institute 

programme, YOUTUBE (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxi9rBjwAUI. 

65 John Sudworth, Confucius institute: The hard side of China’s soft power, BBC (Dec. 22, 2014), 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30567743. 

66 See, e.g., Rubio Warns of Beijing’s Growing Influence, Urges Florida Schools to Terminate 

Confucius Institute Agreements, MARCO RUBIO: U.S. SENATOR FOR FLORIDA (Feb. 5, 2018), 

https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/rubio-warns-of-beijing-s-growing-influenceurges-florida-schools-to-terminate-confucius-institute-agreements; McCaul, Cuellar Send Letter to 

Texas Universities Hosting Confucius Institutes, CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL MCCAUL (Apr. 5, 2018), 

https://mccaul.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/mccaul-cuellar-send-letter-to-texasuniversities-hosting-confucius. 
22 

Responses,” Bill Priestap, the FBI’s Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence 

Division, stated: 

The Confucius Institutes, in my mind, are not strictly a cultural 

institute. The Confucius Institutes are a Chinese government-funded 

cultural institute. That means they’re ultimately beholden to the 

Chinese government. And there have been instances around the world 

in which those institutes have, say, quashed free speech, in particular, 

in regards to issues involving Tibet.67

Mr. Priestap also stated that “there have been instances where [Confucius 

Institutes] appear to have quashed free speech.”68 At an earlier Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence hearing, FBI Director Christopher Wray articulated 

concerns in his testimony. Director Wray said the FBI is “watching warily” and 

that Confucius Institutes are: 

[J]ust one of many tools that [the Chinese] take advantage of. We have 

seen some decrease recently in their own enthusiasm and commitment 

to that particular program, but it is something that we’re watching 

warily and in certain instances have developed appropriate 

investigative steps.”69 

He then discussed higher education more broadly: 

And I think the level of naïveté on the part of the academic sector about 

this creates its own issues. They’re exploiting the very open research 

and development environment that we have, which we all revere, but 

they’re taking advantage of it. So one of the things we’re trying to do is 

view the China threat as not just a whole-of-government threat but a 

whole-of-society threat on their end, and I think it’s going to take a 

whole-of-society response by us. So it’s not just the intelligence 

community, but it’s raising awareness within our academic sector, 

within our private sector, as part of the defense.70

 

67 China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy 

Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Dec. 12, 2018) (testimony of Bill 

Priestap, Assistant Dir. for the Counterintelligence Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigations). 

68 Id. 69 Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th 

Cong. (Feb. 13, 2018) (testimony of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigations). 

70 Id. 
23 

More recently, in the 116th Congress, Robert Ashley, the Director of the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, addressed Confucius Institutes at a Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence open hearing.71 Director Ashley stated: 

Even last year we talked about the Confucius Institutes. That word gets 

out. Since 2014, thirteen universities have closed down the Confucius 

Institutes. US-wide, I think the number is about one hundred. But 

again, in my previous comment, in terms that this is a global 

issue. While we’ve closed down about thirteen in the U.S., there’s been 

about a 23% increase globally in Asia, Europe, and other places. And 

there’s probably about 320-plus Institutes that exist globally. So the 

education is getting out from a US standpoint and its trending the right 

way slowly, but again it is a global problem and we are as weak as the 

relationships with some of those partners that are subject to influence.72

In addition to hearing testimony, several members of Congress wrote to U.S. 

schools in their states expressing concern over the hosting of Confucius Institutes. 

For example, Senator Marco Rubio wrote in a February 2018 letter sent to all 

Florida universities operating Confucius Institutes that “[g]iven China’s aggressive 

campaign to ‘infiltrate’ American classrooms, stifle free inquiry, and subvert free 

expression both at home and abroad, I respectfully urge you to consider terminating 

your Confucius Institute agreement.”73 Florida schools have hosted at least five 

Confucius Institutes in various geographical regions of the state, among the most in 

the nation.74 

Hanban has also opened several Confucius Institutes in Texas.75 In March 

2018, Congressmen Michael McCaul and Henry Cuellar sent a letter to Texas 

schools, citing “China’s subversive behavior and malicious intent to suppress our 

American values of free expression, speech and debate” as grounds for encouraging 

 

71 Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th 

Cong. (Jan. 29, 2019) (testimony of Robert Ashley, Dir. Defense Intelligence Agency). 

72 Id. 

73 Rubio Warns of Beijing’s Growing Influence, Urges Florida Schools to Terminate Confucius 

Institute Agreements, MARCO RUBIO: U.S. SENATOR FOR FLORIDA (Feb. 5, 2018), 

https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/rubio-warns-of-beijing-s-growing-influenceurges-florida-schools-to-terminate-confucius-institute-agreements. 

74 Rachelle Peterson, Confucius Institutes in the US that are Closing, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS (Jan. 

2019), https://www.nas.org/images/documents/Confucius_Institutes_that_closed_-

_updated_January_4%2C_2019.pdf; Rachelle Peterson, Confucius Institutes in the United States, 

NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS (Jan. 2019), 

https://www.nas.org/images/documents/Confucius_Institutes_in_the_US_UPDATED_January_4%2C

_2019.pdf. 

75 Id. 
24 

the closures of Confucius Institutes.76 Finally, Congressman Seth Moulton urged 

two Massachusetts colleges to disassociate with Confucius Institutes.77 According 

to a news report, he also sent letters to 38 other colleges in Massachusetts without 

Confucius Institutes “discouraging them from ever opening one.”78

Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley also expressed his concern over the 

Department of Justice’s lack of enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 

(“FARA”) requirements with respect to Confucius Institutes. In an October 2018 

letter to the Attorney General, Senator Grassley wrote: 

[T]he Confucius Institute’s activities appear to mirror the opinions of 

the Chinese government. Together with the state funding and other 

indicia of agency the activities of the Institutes show that they are 

inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and 

public opinion. This type of activity falls squarely within the scope of 

FARA’s reporting obligations.79 

Congress passed limited legislation sought to address some of these concerns, 

most notably in the John McCain 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (the 

“NDAA”). The NDAA, enacted in August 2018, prohibits the Department of 

Defense from (1) obligating funds for Chinese language instruction provided by a 

Confucius Institute, or (2) obligating or expending funds to support a Chinese 

language program at an institution of higher education that hosts a Confucius 

Institute.80 The law allows the Department of Defense to waive the second set of 

restrictions after making certain certifications to the appropriate congressional 

committees.81

Two North American think tanks specializing in post-secondary issues 

recommended changes to Confucius Institutes and their operations. First, a June 

2014 report by the American Association of University Professors urged universities 

 

76 Letter from Rep. McCaul & Rep. Cuellar to Presidents of Tex. Colls., Univs., & Other Educ. Insts. 

(Mar. 23, 2018), 

https://mccaul.house.gov/sites/mccaul.house.gov/files/Confucius%20Institute%20Letter%20to%20Tex

as%20Colleges%2C%20Universities%2C%20and%20Other%20Educational%20Institutions.pdf. 

77 Laura Krantz, Seth Moulton rips Chinese institute, wants it off college campuses, BOSTON GLOBE 

(Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/03/09/moulton-wants-local-colleges-cut-tieswith-chinese-institute/2l5Y9Oa1WgG3SuapqGCaNP/story.html.

78 Id. 79 Letter from Sen. Grassley to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of the United States (Sept. 19, 2018), 

https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/constituents/2018-09-

19%20CEG%20to%20DOJ%20(Confucius%20Institute)%20(002).pdf. 

80 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 § 

1091 (2018). 

81 Id. 
25 

to end their involvement with Confucius Institutes unless (1) the contracts could be 

renegotiated to give universities unilateral control over all academic matters; (2) 

Confucius Institute teachers would be given the same academic freedom rights 

afforded other faculty members; and (3) and the contract is made available to all 

members of the school community.82

Second, in December 2013, the Canadian Association of University Teachers 

(“CAUT”) called on Canadian universities to close their Confucius Institutes.83 

CAUT, which represents close to 70,000 academic professionals in Canada, passed a 

resolution asking Canadian universities and colleges with Confucius Institutes to 

shut down the institutes on their campuses, and those currently negotiating to get 

an institute to discontinue those discussions.84 The CAUT Executive Director 

stated that “Confucius Institutes are essentially political arms of the Chinese 

government” and “restrict the free discussion of topics Chinese authorities deem 

controversial and should have no place on our campuses.”85

Over the past five years, more than a dozen U.S. schools closed their 

Confucius Institutes or refused to extend their contract with Hanban. The first 

notable closure was the University of Chicago, which announced in September 2014 

that it would not be renewing its contract, citing statements made by Xu Lin, the 

Hanban’s Director General as the reason for the split.86 According to a news report, 

Chicago officials cited the following line as problematic: “Many people have 

experienced the inflexibility and toughness of Xu Lin.”87 Earlier that year, more 

than 100 professors at the school signed a petition requesting the closure of its 

Confucius Institute, mentioning the school’s lack of control over the hiring and 

training of Confucius Institute teachers.88 

 

82 On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.

PROFESSORS (June 2014), https://www.aaup.org/file/Confucius_Institutes_0.pdf. 

83 Omid Ghoreishi, Canada’s Association of University Teachers Calls on Universities to Close 

Confucius Institutes, EPOCH TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.theepochtimes.com/canadasassociation-of-university-teachers-calls-on-universities-to-close-confucius-institutes_426346.html. 

84 Id. 85 Id. 86 Te-Ping Chen, Thanks, But No Thanks, University of Chicago Tells Confucius Institute, WALL ST.

J. (Sept. 26, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/26/thanks-but-no-thanks-universityof-chicago-tells-confucius-institute/. 

87 Elizabeth Redden, Chicago to Close Confucius Institute, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 26, 2014), 

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/26/chicago-severs-ties-chinese-government-fundedconfucius-institute. 

88 Te-Ping Chen, Thanks, But No Thanks, University of Chicago Tells Confucius Institute, WALL ST.

J. (Sept. 26, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/26/thanks-but-no-thanks-universityof-chicago-tells-confucius-institute/. 
26 

Also in 2014, Pennsylvania State University decided to end its relationship 

with Hanban.89 The dean of the school’s College of the Liberal Arts remarked in a 

written statement that “several of our goals are not consistent with those of 

[Hanban].”90 Later, in 2018, Texas A&M University decided to close its Institute 

after Congressmen Cuellar and McCaul sent their public letter urging them to close 

their Confucius Institutes, calling them “a threat to our nation’s security.”91 Also in 

2018, the University of North Florida and the University of West Florida announced 

the closure of their Confucius Institutes.92 The timeline below shows all of the U.S. 

schools that have closed their Confucius Institutes as of the publication of this 

report.93 

Finally, criticism of Confucius Institutes is not limited to the United States. 

Issues of academic freedom and employment discrimination have raised concerns 

internationally. In 2014, several news agencies reported that a European 

Association for Chinese Studies conference in Portugal was partially funded by 

Hanban.94 The reports asserted that upon arriving at the conference, Xu Lin 

ordered her associates to remove the conference materials from the venue and 

 

89 Douglas Belkin, Penn State Latest School to Drop China’s Confucius Institute, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 

2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/penn-state-latest-school-to-drop-chinas-confucius-institute1412196655. 

90 Id. 

91 Elizabeth Redden, Closing a Confucius Institute, at Congressmen’s Request, INSIDE HIGHER ED

(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/09/texas-am-cuts-ties-confuciusinstitutes-response-congressmens-concerns. 

92 2nd Florida University Cuts Ties With Confucius Institute, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 15, 

2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/florida/articles/2018-08-15/2nd-florida-universitycuts-ties-with-confucius-institute. 

93 No U.S. schools closed a Confucius Institute in 2015. Documents on file with the Subcommittee. 

94 See Beijing’s Propaganda Lessons, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2014), 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-propaganda-lessons-1407430440; Elizabeth Redden, 

Censorship at China Studies Meeting, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 6, 2014), 

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/08/06/accounts-confucius-institute-ordered-censorshipchinese-studies-conference. 
27 

returned them two days later with pages missing.95 The missing pages included 

information relating to the Taiwan National Central Library as well as an 

advertisement for Chiang Ching-kuo, a Taiwan-based foundation that had 

cosponsored the conference.96 In response, the president of the association ordered 

that the pages be reprinted.97

B. The U.S. Department of Education 

The U.S. Department of Education plays an important role in publishing 

information on foreign funding provided to U.S. schools. All U.S. colleges and 

universities that offer bachelor’s degrees or higher and participate in Title IV 

student assistance programs must file a report with the Department of Education 

listing all foreign gifts received if the value from a single source exceeds $250,000 

within a given calendar year.98 A gift is defined in the statute as any giving of 

money or property.99 These transparency reports must include information 

concerning the following three items: 

1. The foreign source of such gifts or financing, such as “Giftor Name” 

“Country of Giftor” “Foreign gift Amount” and “Gift Type.” 

2. Any contracts with such a foreign entity. 

3. Any ownership interests in or control over the institution by a foreign 

entity.100

As defined by federal law, a contract is any agreement for the “acquisition by 

purchase, lease, or barter of property or services for the direct benefit or use of 

either of the parties.”101 Current federal law defines foreign sources as one of four 

types of entities: (1) a foreign government or agency of a foreign government; (2) a 

 

95 Beijing’s Propaganda Lessons, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijingspropaganda-lessons-1407430440. 

96 Elizabeth Redden, Censorship at China Studies Meeting, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 6, 2014), 

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/08/06/accounts-confucius-institute-ordered-censorshipchinese-studies-conference. 

97 Beijing’s Propaganda Lessons, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijingspropaganda-lessons-1407430440. 

98 Title IV student assistance of the Higher Education Act constitutes the legal framework for the 

current federal aid infrastructure for higher education in the United States. U.S. Dep’t of Education, 

Foreign Gift and Contract Report, Federal Student Aid (2016), 

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/foreign-gifts. 

99 “Public Law 89-329: Higher Education Act of 1965.” (79 Stat. 1965). 

100 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Foreign Gift and Contract Report, Federal Student Aid (2016), 

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/foreign-gifts. 

101 “Public Law 89-329: Higher Education Act of 1965.” (79 Stat. 1965; Date: 
28 

legal entity created solely under the laws of one or more foreign states; (3) a noncitizen or non-national of the United States; or (4) an agent acting on behalf of a 

foreign entity.102

A U.S. school is required to disclose such gifts if it: (1) has legal 

authorization to provide post-secondary (collegiate) education; (2) provides either (a) 

a bachelor’s or advanced degree or (b) at least two years’ worth of full credit towards 

a bachelor’s degree; (3) is nationally accredited; and (4) currently receives any 

financial aid from the federal government, either directly or indirectly.103

The Department of Education requires biannual reporting of gift information, 

with a deadline of either January 31 or July 31, whichever is closer from the date of 

receiving the a foreign gift was received.104 January reports cover the period from 

July 1 to December 31 of the previous year, and July reports are meant to cover the 

period from January 1 to July 31 of the same year.105 The Department of Education 

publishes a spreadsheet on its website that details all foreign gifts reported by U.S. 

schools from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2018.106

U.S. schools that fail to disclose such gifts can be subjected to civil action in 

Federal District Court by the Department of Justice at the request of the Secretary 

of Education.107 If found guilty of willful negligence in reporting of foreign gifts, the 

school bears the responsibility of reimbursing the U.S. Treasury for obtaining 

compliance.108

In October 2004, the Department of Education sent a formal notification to 

U.S. schools detailing the requirements regarding reporting gifts from and contracts 

coming from foreign sources.109 The letter outlined the procedures for reporting 

such figures, and the aforementioned penalties incurred should such a report fail to 

be produced.110 The Department of Education warned that, “Institutions are 

encouraged to carefully review the full text of section 117 of the [Higher Education 

Act] in order to ensure their compliance with the provision.”111 The Department has 

 

102 Id. 

103 Id. 

104 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Dear Colleague Letter, DCL ID GEN-04-11, Reporting Gifts, Contracts, 

and Relationships by Institutions (Oct. 4, 2004). 

105 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Foreign Gift and Contract Report, Federal Student Aid (2016), 

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/foreign-gifts. 

106 Id.

107 Id. 108 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Dear Colleague Letter, DCL ID GEN-04-11, Reporting Gifts, Contracts, 

and Relationships by Institutions, Question 4 (Oct. 4, 2004). 

109 Id. 110 Id. 111 Id. 
29 

not updated this information or sent any additional reminders or guidance in the 

past 15 years. 

C. The U.S. State Department 

The State Department, the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, “develops 

strategies for its functional bureaus,” which implement foreign public diplomacy 

programs.”112 Public diplomacy efforts are key to the State Department successfully 

accomplishing its mission in foreign countries.113 According to the State 

Department, the mission of American public diplomacy is to: 

[S]upport the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, 

advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing 

and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the 

relationship between the people and Government of the United States 

and citizens of the rest of the world.’114

As currently structured, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and 

Public Affairs is responsible for implementing public diplomacy efforts at the State 

Department.115 Six bureaus, offices, and one unit constitute the Public Diplomacy 

components: 

1. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (“ECA”) 

2. Bureau of International Information Programs (“IIP”) 

3. Bureau of Public Affairs (“PA”) 

4. Global Engagement Center (“GEC”) 

5. Office of Policy, Planning and Resources (“R/PPR”) 

6. Expo Unit (“EXPO”)116

ECA “designs and implements educational, professional, and cultural 

exchange and other programs that create and sustain the mutual understanding 

with other countries necessary to advancing United States foreign policy goals,” 

including “American Spaces” and “American Cultural Centers” that provide 

education programs on media literacy, English language skills, and 

 

112 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-499, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: BETTER GUIDANCE FOR

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT COULD HELP AGENCIES ALIGN THEIR EFFORTS 4 (July 2018). 

113 See U.S. State Dep’t, Diplomacy: The U.S. Department of State at Work (June 2008), https://2009-

2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm. 114 U.S. State Dep’t, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (June 6, 2018), 

https://www.state.gov/r/. 

115 Id. 116 Id. 
30 

entrepreneurship, among other topics.117 According to the State Department, 

“[w]hile the Bureau of Public Affairs manages news of the day primarily for U.S. 

audiences and the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs builds long-term 

relationships through exchanges, IIP advances U.S. foreign policy goals directly 

with foreign audiences in support of U.S. embassies, consulates and missions 

abroad.”118

1. The State Department’s Public Diplomacy Efforts in China 

The People’s Republic of China “is the world’s most populous country (1.4 

billion people) and second largest economy and source of outward foreign 

investment.”119 According to the State Department Inspector General, the United 

States and China have “extensive economic relations, with areas of cooperation and 

disagreement.”120 Mission China, a term used referring to the U.S. embassy in 

Beijing and consulates general in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and 

Wuhan, develops goals and plans to engage with Chinese citizens.121 Mission 

China’s Integrated Country Strategy (“ICS”) has three goals: 

1. Increase U.S. prosperity through greater trade and investment and 

China’s expanded participation in global and regional economic 

institutions. 

2. Promote U.S. national security through greater cooperation with China 

within the current rules-based international system to address 

transnational, global, and regional challenges. 

3. Promote improved responsiveness of the Chinese government to the 

fundamental rights and desires of its own people with implications for 

human rights, public health, and the environment.122

“Despite Chinese Government-imposed barriers to public engagement, the 

State Department’s Public Affairs Section (“PAS”) used a full range of programs and 

 

117 U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (June 6, 2018), 

https://www.state.gov/r/eca/index.htm. State Dep’t Inspector General, ISP-I-18-04, Inspection of 

Embassy Beijing and Constituent Posts, China 1 (Dec. 2017). See also State Dep’t, Bureau of 

International Information Programs (June 6, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/iip/. 

118 Id. 119 State Dep’t Inspector General, ISP-I-18-04, Inspection of Embassy Beijing and Constituent Posts, 

China 1 (Dec. 2017). 

120 Id. 121 Id. at 1-2. 122 Id. 
31 

tools to advance ICS goals, with an emphasis on trade and investment, security 

cooperation, human rights, public health, and the environment.”123 One of those 

public diplomacy efforts was the “American Cultural Center” programming, which 

is discussed later in this report. Since 2010, PAS disbursed more than $5 million 

“in grants to support 29 of these centers at Chinese universities.”124 The State 

Department Inspector General found that the grants were “ineffective as an 

outreach tool.”125

2. The State Department’s Visa Oversight Responsibilities 

The U.S. government issues thousands of visas annually to non-Americans 

that allow them to live in the United States for varying lengths of time. The State 

Department, along with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal 

partners, has an oversight role of sponsors involved with non-immigrant visas. 

According to a 2012 Government Accountability Office review, “The Department of 

State’s visa issuance process is the first line of defense against fraudulent or 

unlawful entry into the United States. The State Department issues millions of 

visas annually for both temporary visitors (non-immigrant visas) and permanent 

immigrants (immigrant visas).”126

The Exchange Visitor Program (“EVP”), a non-immigrant visa category also 

known as a J-Visa, is for individuals approved to “participate in work-and studybased exchange visitor programs.”127 The EVP is administered by the ECA and was 

introduced under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (P. L. 

87-256). According to the State Department, the EVP “fosters global understanding 

through educational and cultural exchanges.”128

The State Department’s Office of Private Sector Exchange is responsible for 

maintaining the integrity of the EVP by administering nationwide designated 

sponsor review programs.129 This office designates U.S. Federal, public, and private 

organizations to conduct educational and cultural exchange programs in 13 

“different categories through which qualified foreign nationals can come to the 

United States to study, teach, conduct research, work, and train.”130 

 

123 Id. at 7. 124 Id. at 9. 

125 Id. at OIG Highlights. 126 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-888, STATE COULD ENHANCE VISA FRAUD PREVENTION 

BY STRATEGICALLY USING RESOURCES AND TRAINING 1 (Sept. 2012). 

127 U.S. State Dep’t, Exchange Visitor Program: Common Questions for Participants (Jan. 9, 2019), 

https://j1visa.state.gov/participants/common-questions/ 

128 Id. 129 U.S. State Dep’t, Exchange Visitor Program: About Us (Jan. 9, 2019), 

https://j1visa.state.gov/about-us/ 

130 Id. 
32 

The State Department officers in Washington, D.C. are required to conduct 

regulatory examinations of designated sponsors in the program categories.131 

According to the State Department, reviews are led by officers and “may include 

staff from two other offices of the Department of State, Bureau of Educational and 

Cultural Affairs Directorate for Private Sector Exchange (“ECA/EC”): the Office of 

Designation and the Office of Private Sector Exchange Administration.”132 

Designated sponsors may be selected for reviews for a number of reasons, “including 

for a routine program evaluation, follow-up on a serious exchange visitor complaint 

or a series of complaints, or in connection with a review of a particular Exchange 

Visitor Program category.”133

Chinese nationals seeking entry to the United States to work at a Confucius 

Institute or in a Confucius Classroom would generally need to obtain one of five 

types of J-1 visas. The most common exchange visitor here is Exchange Visitor 

Visa–Research Scholar. Research Scholars are foreign nationals “who enter the 

United States for the primary purpose of conducting research, observing or 

consulting in connection with research projects at research institutions, corporate 

research facilities, museums, libraries, post-secondary accredited academic 

institutions, or similar types of institutions.”134 Additionally, a research scholar 

may teach or lecture, but only if his or her sponsor allows it.135 Professors are 

foreign nationals “who enter the United State for the primary purpose of teaching, 

lecturing, observing or consulting at accredited post-secondary academic 

institutions, museums, libraries or similar types of institutions.”136 Additionally, a 

professor may also conduct research, but only if his or her sponsor allows it.137 

Alternatively, those coming into the United States on a Teacher Exchange 

Visa come with the purpose of teaching full-time in an “accredited primary, 

including pre-kindergarten, or secondary (“K−12”) public or private school.”138 To 

qualify for this visa, an applicant must either be a current teacher in their home 

country who meets the qualifications for teaching and has been teaching for at least 

 

131 U.S. State Dep’t, Compliance Reviews and Sanction Actions (Aug. 16, 2018), 

https://j1visa.state.gov/sponsors/current/regulations-compliance/compliance-reviews-and-sanctionactions/ 

132 Id. 133 Id. 134 U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Research Scholar Program,

https://j1visa.state.gov/programs/research-scholar/. 

135 A sponsor is “a legal entity designated by the Secretary of State to conduct an exchange visitor 

program.” 22 CFR § 62.2Id. 136 U.S. State Dep’t, Professors Program, https://j1visa.state.gov/programs/professor. 

137 A sponsor is “a legal entity designated by the Secretary of State to conduct an exchange visitor 

program.” 22 CFR § 62.2 

138 Id. at Teacher; see also 22 CFR § 62.24. 
33 

two years.139 If they are not currently a teacher in their home country, they must 

otherwise meet the eligibility qualifications and: 1) have completed an advanced 

degree within the past 12 months; or (2) have two years of full-time teaching 

experience within the past eight years.140 Additionally, the applicant must possess 

a bachelor’s degree in education or in the subject he or she intends to teach, and he 

or she must comply with the teaching eligibility requirements of the state in which 

he or she will be teaching.141 

IV. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES 

Confucius Institutes are funded, controlled, and mostly staffed by Hanban to 

present Chinese government approved programming and events to students at U.S. 

schools. As detailed in this section, Hanban controls nearly every aspect of a 

Confucius Institute’s operation in the United States. 

China’s influence starts when a U.S. school seeks to establish a contract with 

Hanban to obtain teachers, instructors, or advisors from a Chinese school. That 

contract, filled with provisions governing the relationship between the U.S. school, 

the Chinese-partner school, and Hanban, can include non-disclosure language that 

frustrates the transparency associated with academic freedom on U.S. school 

campuses. Hanban then provides significant funding for Confucius Institutes, 

dispatches vetted and approved Chinese directors and teachers to the U.S. school, 

and has veto authority over Confucius Institute programming. There is no other 

comparable arrangement with a foreign government in U.S. higher education. 

The Subcommittee reviewed the agreements or contracts of fifteen U.S. 

schools, their Chinese school partners, and Hanban. The Subcommittee also visited 

with or interviewed Confucius Institute officials to learn more about the Confucius 

Institute’s founding; how Chinese instructors and directors are selected; and how 

Confucius Institutes operate. This section examines those topics. 

A. Confucius Institute Formation at U.S. Schools 

A Confucius Institute is generally born out of a contractual relationship 

between Hanban, a U.S. school, and a Chinese school.142 The U.S. and Chinese 

schools typically sign a memorandum of understanding or an implementation 

agreement. The U.S. school then signs a separate agreement directly with Hanban. 

As discussed below, these contracts often cede control of events and content to 

Hanban, which funds Confucius Institute programming and plays a significant role 

 

139 Id. 140 Id. 141 22 CFR § 62.24 (d). 142 Documents and Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee. 
34 

in hiring instructors and directors. Through its funding authority, Hanban has 

influence and exerts control over activities conducted at U.S. schools. 

According to numerous interviews conducted by the Subcommittee, most 

Confucius Institute agreements require that the U.S. school provide a venue, a 

director—typically a U.S. school employee—and administrative support staff.143 

The Chinese partner school provides one faculty member to serve as the Chinese 

director and teachers to serve as Chinese language instructors.144 The Chinese 

partner school allows its employees to take the leave necessary to serve at U.S. 

Confucius Institutes.145 

Hanban also provides start-up funding, usually between $100,000 and 

$200,000, but this amount can vary considerably.146 At many Confucius Institutes, 

Hanban also provides supplementary annual funding, in addition to paying the 

salaries of the Chinese director and instructors.147 Finally, Hanban usually 

provides teaching materials and about 3,000 books for each Confucius Institute.148

In addition to the memorandum of understanding and implementation 

agreements, the relationship between the U.S. school and Hanban is also governed 

by the Confucius Institute Constitution which is “applicable to all Confucius 

Institutes worldwide.”149 According to the Constitution, and consistent with the 

implementation agreement, Confucius Institutes are intended to serve as “nonprofit educational institutions.”150 Hanban’s Constitution furthermore states that 

the role of the Confucius Institute is to promote Chinese language and culture while 

engaging in “cultural exchange between China and other countries.”151

 

143 Documents and Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee. 144 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 23, 2018, July 17, 2018, Nov. 29, 2018). 

145 Id. 146 PETERSON REPORT at 68. 

147 Id. 148 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 17, 2018, July 26, 2018, July 27, 2018). 

149 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

150 Id. 151 Id.
35 

While Hanban’s Constitution is the organizing document for Confucius 

Institutes worldwide, individual agreements establish each Confucius Institute and 

ultimately bind the U.S. school, the Chinese school, and Hanban together. 

Essentially, all agreements provide for the same general purpose and scope of 

activities—that is, to provide Hanban-approved Chinese language instruction, train 

teachers to teach Chinese in primary and secondary schools, administer the Chinese 

Proficiency Test (“HSK”), and to promote Chinese language and culture by, among 

other things, sponsoring Chinese cultural events, speakers and competitions.152

Although some Confucius Institute instructors or directors participate in 

credit-bearing courses, many reviewed by the Subcommittee offer non-credit 

language instruction and teacher training to non-student community members. 

Nine of the fifteen Confucius Institutes reviewed by the Subcommittee, had 

instructors or directors involved in credit-bearing courses.153 And according to 

Hanban’s own reporting, as of 2017, 85 percent of its Confucius Institutes around 

the world are involved “in the universities’ credit systems.”154 Confucius Institutes 

 

152 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 26, 2018, July 27, 2018, Oct. 29, 2018, July 17, 

2018). 

153 Documents and Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

154 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 16 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 
36 

also offer Chinese culture activities such as dumpling-making, paper-cutting, Tai 

Chi, and various holiday celebrations such as the Chinese New Year.155

Most Confucius Institutes operate as separate ventures within their 

respective universities. Nevertheless, some agreements provide for increased 

collaboration between a U.S. school and a Confucius Institute. For example, the 

agreement between Hanban and one U.S. school calls for the establishment of: 

[A] named Confucius Institute Directorship of Chinese Language 

Pedagogy, who shall oversee planning for Chinese language teaching 

programs at [U.S. school] and provide training courses for the Chinese 

language lecturers and graduates majoring in Chinese language [at the 

U.S. school].156

In addition, the agreement states that, “[t]he Confucius Institute at [the U.S. 

school] will develop ‘Confucius Institute Research Projects’ related to the study of 

modern China and Chinese culture,” and that the Confucius Institute “will provide 

support for programs related to language study at [the School of Arts & 

Sciences].”157

B. Confucius Institute Board of Directors 

Hanban’s typical implementation agreement details the management 

structure of Confucius Institutes, to include a Confucius Institute Board of 

Directors (the “Board”).158 Confucius Institutes generally have a Board that acts as 

the “supreme collective management body” and is “responsible for overall 

management” of the Confucius Institute.159 According to Hanban’s Constitution, 

the Board is “responsible for assessing and approving the Confucius Institutes’ 

development plans, annual plans, annual reports, project implementation schemes, 

budget proposals, [and] final financial accounts.”160 The Board can appoint and 

dismiss both the American and Chinese directors.161 When a Board is comprised of 

equal members from the U.S. and Chinese schools, control and direction of the 

 

155 See, e.g., 2018 Events, CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT MASON, https://confucius.gmu.edu/eventsnews/2018-events; Past Adult Events, CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT MARYLAND, 

https://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institute-maryland/past-adult-events; Past Events, 

GW CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE, https://confucius.columbian.gwu.edu/past-events. 

156 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018). 

157 Id. 158 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

159 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 23, 2018). 

160 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

161 Id. 
37 

Confucius Institute is shared equally. Even when the board composition favors the 

U.S. school by one member, Hanban—through the Chinese board members and 

control over important funding decisions—still wields significant influence over all 

Confucius Institute operations. 

The Constitution itself does not require a certain number of Board members 

or suggest the balance between the U.S. and Chinese schools. It does, however, 

require that the Board “consist of members from both sides” to be determined 

through “consultation.”162 This arrangement, at a minimum, assures Chinese 

representation on the board and secures some measure of control and oversight for 

Hanban which already controls funding and, to a large extent, its hiring and 

programming. 

Typically, the duties of the Board include formulating and amending the 

policies of the Institute; writing development plans for the Institute; decisionmaking on significant issues including teaching, research and management; 

fundraising; appointment and removal of the directors of the Institute, subject to 

the approval of the respective home institution of the director in question; 

examining and approving an annual budget proposal and final financial accounts.163 

In addition, the Constitution requires that the Board report directly to Hanban: 

The Board shall provide Hanban with copies of approved annual budget 

proposals and financial reports. The Directors shall provide the Board 

with a summary of financial accounts of Hanban funds spent and annual 

budget proposals for funds requested from Hanban. The Board shall 

provide Hanban with copies of approved annual budget proposals and 

financial reports.164 

In practice, the roles and responsibilities of the Boards varied at the 

U.S. schools interviewed by the Subcommittee. One U.S. school told the 

Subcommittee that it reviewed applications for Confucius Institute 

instructors and directors.165 A second U.S. school told the Subcommittee that 

it rarely convened the Board, but intended to have more frequent meetings in 

the future.166 Finally, a third U.S. school said its Board only meets at the 

annual Confucius Institute Conference in China.167

 

162 Id. 163 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 19, 2018, Oct. 29, 2018, July 18, 2018, Nov. 29, 

2018). 

164 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 19, 2018, July 25, 2018). 

165 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 

166 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 24, 2018). 

167 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 
38 

C. Hanban’s Confucius Institute Contracts 

Confucius Institutes are created by agreements between the U.S. school, 

Hanban, and the Chinese-partner school. The contracts establish Confucius 

Institutes and include provisions that govern the related financial arrangements, 

budgeting processes, and legal obligations of the parties. Hanban relies on its own 

templates as a starting point for negotiations with the U.S. schools.168 Through 

these contracts, Hanban maintains significant leverage over the funding and 

curriculum of Confucius Institutes in the United States. 

1. Adherence to Both Chinese and U.S. Law 

Nine of the fifteen contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee contain language 

similar to that in the template on Hanban’s website, which sets forth the governing 

laws for each Confucius Institute.169 Specifically, one provision of the template 

reads, “Confucius Institute activities will be conducted generally in accordance with 

the Confucius Institute Constitution and ... the laws and regulations of both 

countries.”170 Similarly, the Constitution sets forth, “The Confucius Institutes shall 

abide by the laws and regulations of the countries in which they are located, respect 

local cultural and educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not 

contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China.”171 

For example, one U.S. school’s contract with Hanban requires that “[t]he 

Institute activities must be in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws, and 

also respect the cultural customs, shall not contravene concerning the laws and 

regulations, both in the United States and China.”172 A different U.S. school’s 

contract with Hanban stipulates that Confucius Institute’s activities “will be 

conducted generally in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws, the 

regulations, policies, and practices of [the U.S. school], cultural customs in the 

United States and China, and the law and regulations of both countries (the 

‘Standards’).”173 That same contract, however, continues with this important 

caveat: 

[R]ecognizing that the Confucius Institute at the [U.S. school] will be 

based on [the U.S. school’s] campus, the parties agree that federal, state, 

 

168 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 10 (2019). 

169 Documents and Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

170 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018, July 18, 2018). 

171 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

172 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 18, 2018). 

173 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018). 
39 

and local laws of the United States, as well as [the U.S. school’s] 

regulations, policies, and practices (including principles of academic 

freedom and non-discrimination), will prevail in the event any 

inconsistency or conflict among these Standards.174

This provision, explicitly referring to the U.S. school’s principles of academic 

freedom, is an exception—and certainly not the norm. 

While it is easy for U.S. school officials to dismiss the notion that Chinese law 

would apply on their campuses, the issue is more complicated when it comes to 

Chinese teachers and directors vetted and reviewed by Hanban. The U.S. schools, 

as discussed in more detail later in the report, have little to no visibility into the 

hiring process or the contractual specifics governing the relationships between 

Hanban, the Chinese schools, and the visiting Chinese staff.175

Despite any skepticism to the contrary, it is clear that Hanban and its 

officials take these governing law provisions very seriously. In at least one 

example, a U.S. school system could not agree to the governing law clause due to 

provision in state law, and Hanban refused to move forward with the proposal. For 

nearly a year, according to documents reviewed by the Subcommittee, that U.S. 

school system sought to partner with Hanban to form a centralized Chinese 

language center that could coordinate K−12 Chinese language instruction in that 

state.176 State law, however, prevented that U.S. school from “accepting litigation 

in a jurisdiction other than the” state it operated in.177 The U.S. school then wrote 

to Hanban explaining, “Therefore, [the U.S. school] and school system, as State 

agencies, cannot agree to a clause subjecting them to either the substantive law or 

the jurisdiction of another state or foreign entity.”178 The U.S. school subsequently 

proposed more generic language that it felt would allow them to comply with state 

law. 

The compromise was not enough, however, and Hanban withdrew its 

proposal.179 Hanban’s Executive Deputy Director General wrote a letter detailing 

why Hanban could not continue with the proposal. The letter stated: 

It is understood that both our organizations are committed to the growth 

of the Chinese language learners in [the state]. I understand that the 

[State]/China proposal that you submitted has undergone deep 

 

174 Id. 175 See Subhead 3 of this Report: U.S. School Officials have Little to No Visibility into Hanban’s 

Application or Vetting Processes in China. 176 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

177 Id. 178 Id. 179 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 
40 

discussion for some time because both sides are committed to this 

partnership. However, I also understand that both sides must adhere 

to their governmental policies in each respective country. 

... 

[ ] The MOU agreements that are signed have to follow the Constitution 

and By-laws of the Confucius Institute, which was the template shared 

for the agreement to be signed and approved. The [State]/China 

Proposal altered some of this language which does not follow the 

Constitution and By-laws of the Confucius Institute.180

In the end, according to an official from that U.S. school in an 

interview with the Subcommittee, the school did not have the legal authority 

to enter into the agreement that Hanban needed.181 The program was never 

established.182

2. Non-Disclosure and Confidentiality Clauses 

There is also a troublesome lack of transparency concerning the contracts 

between U.S. schools and Hanban. Six of the fifteen contracts reviewed by the 

Subcommittee contained clauses limiting public disclosure of the agreement.183 

Additionally, none of the contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee were publicly 

available online at the time of the request. Students, faculty, and other interested 

parties likely would not have been able to obtain Hanban’s contracts. 

The non-disclosure provisions varied by contract. For example, the contract 

between Hanban and one U.S. school for a Model Confucius Institute stated, “The 

parties to this Agreement will treat this Agreement as confidential and will not, 

without prior written consent, publish, release or disclose the terms of this 

agreement to [a] third party.”184 Another U.S. school’s contract with Hanban 

contained an “Other Terms” provision that limited even the university’s ability to 

issue press releases concerning the agreement with Hanban, as shown on the next 

page: 185 

 

180 Id. 181 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 

182 Id. 183 Documents on file with the Subcommittee. 

184 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 26, 2018). 

185 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018). 
41 

Even if agreements did not include explicit blanket confidentiality provisions, 

they often included some protection against disclosure. At least one contract 

contained broad language that forbade the disclosure of any information related to a 

party’s “business methods, financial information, future plans, personnel data . . . or 

information designated as ‘confidential’ by a disclosing party, including but not 

limited to the financial terms of the [agreement].”186

3. Termination Provisions 

All 15 agreements between U.S. schools and Hanban reviewed by the 

Subcommittee include some version of a termination provision warning that a 

university action that “severely harms the image and reputation” of the Confucius 

Institute could result in termination of the agreement and Hanban funding.187 

Some schools have a similar provision that allows either party to terminate if one 

party severely harms the image of the other party.188 All are consistent with the 

Confucius Institute Constitution holds that, “all Confucius Institutes shall . . . 

uphold and defend the reputation of the Confucius Institutes” and “accept both the 

supervision from and assessments made by [Hanban].”189 The Constitution further 

allows Hanban to “pursue legal action . . . and invoke punitive consequences” for 

any violation of the Constitution or for taking any action that “damages or tarnishes 

the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.”190

In some cases, contract provisions obligated the U.S. school to repay Hanban 

if the school terminated the agreement before completion date.191 This strongly 

disincentives the U.S. school from terminating an agreement early. In at least one 

recent case, a U.S. school recognized this repayment dilemma while negotiating 

 

186 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 19, 2018). 

187 Documents on file with the Subcommittee. 

188 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018, July 25, 2018). 

189 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

190 Id. 191 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 27, 2018). 
42 

with Hanban. A U.S. school official reviewing Hanban’s contract for the creation 

and construction of a Model Confucius Institute wrote the following in an email to 

other officials, “I left in the early termination penalty—it’s ultimately a business 

call—but we need to be aware that once this deal starts up, the cost of ‘divorce’ is 

going to be high (unless we can trigger the ‘embarrass the University’ termination 

clause).”192 The final version of that contract included a detailed termination 

provision, as shown below: 193

4. Hanban Reviews and Approves Contracts between U.S and 

Chinese Schools 

One other way Hanban maintains leverage over the relationship between the 

U.S. school and their Chinese counterpart is to retain final approval of the 

agreements. The implementation agreements or MOUs between U.S. and Chinese 

schools formalize the relationship between the two institutions and provide details 

about hiring of instructors and directors and the parties’ roles and responsibilities. 

In some cases, these relationships existed before Hanban’s involvement, but in 

other cases, Hanban initiated communications between the two schools.194

The agreements between the schools are subject to Hanban review and 

approval. For example, in one U.S. school’s contract with Hanban, Hanban “will 

 

192 Id. 193 Id. The U.S. school ultimately signed the contract, but terminated the project before it started. 

Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Feb. 22, 2019). 

194 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019, Jan. 29, 2019, Oct. 22, 2018). 
43 

authorize and appoint the Chinese institution.”195 Furthermore, the contract 

requires that the U.S. and Chinese schools sign supplementary agreements, which 

“should be reviewed by the Headquarters prior to signing.”196 Other agreements 

include language such as, “The Institute must accept [Hanban’s] periodical 

evaluation of the Institute, including its educational and cultural programs”197 or 

“The Institute must accept the assessment of [Hanban] on the teaching quality.”198 

Hanban, of course, also retains tangible control of the Confucius Institutes by 

directly providing Chinese director and teacher salaries and living expenses. 

Lastly, Hanban also has the power to ultimately reject applications to establish 

Confucius Institute programs.199

D. Hanban’s Hiring Process for Chinese Directors and Teachers 

While both the American and Chinese directors generally serve at the 

pleasure of the Board, the American director is almost always a faculty member or 

administrator working at the U.S. school.200 Confucius Institutes’ Chinese 

directors, teachers, and visiting scholars, on the other hand, have no previous 

connection to the U.S. school and are vetted, selected, and paid by Hanban and/or 

the Chinese school. The U.S. schools reviewed by the Subcommittee had little to no 

knowledge about Hanban’s interviewing, hiring, and training processes that take 

place in China before the selected individuals arrive in the United States. 

1. Confucius Institute Directors 

Confucius Institutes are typically run by two directors—an American director 

or as Hanban calls the position, the “foreign director,” and a Chinese director 

selected by Hanban. In some cases these two directors have equal authority and 

operate essentially as co-directors. For example, one U.S. school’s agreement with 

Hanban states that the Confucius Institute “will have two Co-Directors, one 

appointed by the University, and one by [Hanban], in consultation with the Board” 

and those co-directors, “shall exercise directorial authority over the affairs of the 

Institute by making decisions jointly.”201 The agreements between Hanban and 

three other U.S. schools reviewed by the Subcommittee require that the contracting 

parties appoint one director respectively without distinction.202 This arrangement 

cedes equal control of the day-to-day operations to Hanban, who hires and pays the 

Chinese director. 

 

195 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018). 

196 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018, July 25, 2018). 

197 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 18, 2018). 

198 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 26, 2018, July 23, 2018). 

199 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

200 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019, Jan. 29, 2019, Oct. 22, 2018). 

201 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 

202 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 17, 2018, July 26, 2018, July 27, 2018). 
44 

Some American directors, who are typically faculty members, deans, or viceprovosts, have other responsibilities at their school beyond simply overseeing a 

Confucius Institute. These additional duties can allow the Chinese director to 

assume control of the Confucius Institute’s day-to-day operations. For instance, at 

one U.S. school the Subcommittee visited, the American director has a myriad of 

responsibilities outside of her role as the Confucius Institute’s director. These 

responsibilities include travel abroad, administrative duties, and teaching classes 

on campus.203 Therefore, most days, the Chinese director is left in charge of the 

day-to-day operations.204 That Chinese director, as was the case at most Confucius 

Institutes the Subcommittee visited, is also responsible for most of the 

communications with Hanban.205

At some schools, the American director acts as the chief director and the 

Chinese director serves as his or her deputy. For example, the agreement between 

one U.S. school and Hanban makes clear that the U.S. school appoints a director 

and Hanban appoints an associate director.206 A different agreement establishes a 

similar hierarchy that makes clear that the Vice President for Arts and Sciences 

will act as the director and that the “Chinese partner institution will nominate a 

Chinese Collaborating Director.”207 

These distinctions between directors notwithstanding, both are appointed by, 

and serve at the pleasure of, the Board. According to the Constitution, the 

American director assumes “the main responsibility for the Institutes’ daily 

operation and administration.”208 The Chinese director is responsible for reporting 

to Hanban and supervising the other Chinese staff.209 Roles vary from school to 

school depending on staffing and circumstances of the specific Confucius Institute, 

but most agreements reflect the notion that the “day-to-day management of the 

Institute shall be the responsibility of the Institute’s Director and Associate 

Director.”210

 

203 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 

204 Id. 205 Id. 206 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018). 

207 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 25, 2018). 

208 Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, 

HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm. 

209 Id. 210 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018). 
45 

2. Hanban’s Application Process and Selection Criteria 

According to Chinese directors and instructors interviewed by the 

Subcommittee, potential Confucius Institute directors and teachers apply for 

positions posted on Hanban’s website.211 Those Chinese directors and instructors 

described a process in which they responded to an opening for a specific role at a 

U.S. Confucius Institute posted on Hanban’s website.212 The applicants then 

consulted with their school employer and applied for the position through Hanban’s 

website.213

Hanban develops criteria for Chinese applicants. Some of Hanban’s 

qualification requirements for prospective Confucius Institute teachers are posted 

online. In addition to required credentials such as proficiency in Chinese and 

English, Chinese teachers who want to teach at a Confucius Institute in the United 

States must “have Chinese nationality” and “have strong senses of mission, glory, 

and responsibility and be conscientious and meticulous in work.”214

Hanban’s website previously contained additional requirements for Chinese 

applicants including, “[N]o record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal 

organizations.”215 The screen shot below was taken from an archived portion of 

Hanban’s webpage that details Chinese applicants “Basic Qualifications”:216 

After a Canadian documentary on Confucius Institutes shed light on this 

provision, however, Hanban appears to have removed it from its English-language 

 

211 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 212 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 8, 2019, Oct. 22, 2018). 

213 Id. 214 Government Sponsored Teacher Program, HANBAN, http://english.hanban.org/node_7973.htm. 

215 Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program, HANBAN, 

http://english.hanban.org/volunteers/node_9806.htm. 

216 Id. 
46 

website.217 While, the provision regarding Falun Gong was removed from Hanban’s 

website, the intent to exclude applicants based on religious or political affiliation 

remains. For example, the Chinese language application on the current Hanban 

application website for volunteer teachers contains new criteria requiring that an 

applicant have “moral integrity, no record of participation in cults and other illegal 

organizations, no criminal record.”218 While the explicit reference to “Falun Gong” 

was removed amidst charges of religious discrimination, the vague references to 

“illegal organization records,” and “cults” remain. 

Hanban also establishes criteria for Chinese directors. Hanban’s website 

states that Chinese directors: 

Should be between 35 and 55 years old, healthy, familiar with the 

country to which they are appointed, proficient in the local language, 

comfortable using computer software and the internet, and ‘passionate 

about Chinese language teaching and Confucius Institute 

undertakings.’219 

Hanban also states that directors should have a “sound comprehension of 

current Chinese national issues” and “strong ability to conduct public relations and 

deal effectively with emergencies.”220 Potential directors are also told “the nominee 

must abide by laws and regulations of China and the destination country.”221

Once applicants are selected after submitting applications through Hanban’s 

website, they are then put through a series of in-person interviews in China. 

According to Chinese directors and instructors interviewed by the Subcommittee, all 

applicants are required to sit for a screening test organized by Hanban.222 The test 

includes a written examination and an interview. The written portion includes 

questions on Chinese language teaching; Chinese language teaching methodology; 

classroom management; Chinese culture and cross-cultural communication; 

professional ethics; and professional development issues.223 The interview includes, 

a discussion, among other things, of candidates’ professional knowledge, teaching 

 

217 See In The Name Of Confucius (Mark Media 2017). 

218 “International Overseas Volunteer Chinese Language Teachers Program” Guidelines, HANBAN, 

http://res.chinese.cn/hanban/zhiyuanzhe/haiwaizhiyuanzhe/shixingbanfa.docx. (Translation 

provided to the Subcommittee). 

219 PETERSON REPORT at 36 (citing “If You Want to Apply for Position as Chinese Director of Confucius 

Institute,” Hanban News (Apr. 3, 2014). 

220 Guide for Confucius Institute Deans, HANBAN, /http://english.hanban.org/node_7877.htm. 221 If you want to apply for position as a Chinese director of Confucius Institute, HANBAN (Apr. 3,

2014) http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-04/03/content_530853.htm. 222 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (July 23, 2018, Nov. 13, 2018, Oct. 22, 2018). 

223 Id
47 

skills, cross-cultural competence, foreign language competence, and a psychological 

evaluation.224

Several of the Chinese teachers interviewed by the Subcommittee described 

what they called a “psychological interview” used to determine whether or not the 

applicant could withstand the “culture shock” associated with living and teaching in 

the United States.225 This “psychological exam” is taken on a computer and 

contains a series of questions, including sometimes asking the applicant to draw a 

picture, apparently designed to gauge competency.226

In 2009, during the early stages of Hanban’s Confucius Institute program, 

several U.S. Confucius Institute directors expressed concerns regarding Chinese 

instructors and directors leaving unexpectedly. In one email chain obtained by the 

Subcommittee, a Confucius Institute director wrote: 

I don’t think that someone fresh from China should be sent alone into a 

US classroom to teach. Ideally, a group of people would receive at least 

3 months training and an ‘acclimatization’ opportunity to advance, and 

then someone would be SELECTED from this group to teach. The rest 

might prove to be inappropriate.227

A Hanban official responded to that email chain, “I understand the problems 

with teachers you have been discussing. Hanban is very very concerned about that 

too. We have been trying hard to think about ways to solve it and with that, we 

desperately need assistance with our Confucius Institute.”228

3. U.S. School Officials have Little to No Visibility into Hanban’s 

Application or Vetting Processes in China 

U.S. schools have little to no visibility into Hanban’s application or vetting 

processes in China despite the fact that the applicant is going to be working on the 

U.S. school campus for two or more years. The entire pool of applicants presented 

to U.S. schools has already been reviewed, interviewed, and chosen by Hanban 

officials.229 The U.S. schools do not have a complete understanding of Hanban’s 

interview process.230 This is concerning because Hanban could use processes that 

 

224 Id. 225 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019, Jan. 29, 2019, Oct. 22, 2018). 

226 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 

227 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018) (emphasis in original). 

228 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

229 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 29, 2019, Jan. 28, 2019, Sept. 24, 2018, 

Nov. 13, 2018). 

230 Id. 
48 

are not in line with hiring or selection processes at U.S. schools. As one Confucius 

Institute American director explained to the Subcommittee, “There’s a lot we don’t 

understand” about how teachers are selected and presented.231 

Since the initial pool or group of applicants is screened and selected by 

Hanban, applicants could be screened out for reasons unknown to the school. One 

U.S. school official stated that he “couldn’t tell [the Subcommittee] how the group is 

selected.”232 Additionally, GAO investigators also spoke with U.S. school officials 

who “expressed concerns with the Confucius Institute teacher selection process 

whereby Hanban or the Chinese partner school accepts initial applications from 

potential Confucius Institute teachers and proposes candidates to the U.S. 

school.”233

Finally, none of the officials at U.S. schools visited or interviewed by the 

Subcommittee received contracts or agreements between Hanban or the Chinese 

school and their Chinese instructors and directors. Those U.S. officials, therefore, 

are not in a position to understand if Hanban’s hiring procedures or practices are 

consistent with their own teacher hiring. They also are unable able to determine if 

those contracts included any references to “good moral character” or participation in 

any “illegal organizations” like Hanban’s online volunteer teacher application. 

Although no school visited by the Subcommittee reviewed these contracts 

prior to the formation of their Confucius Institute, the Subcommittee did obtain one 

2018 contract from a Chinese instructor.234 This agreement documented the 

instructor’s obligations to both Hanban and the Chinese school. In the English 

version of the contract provided to the Subcommittee, there are several references to 

questionable vetting and monitoring practices employed by the Chinese 

government: 

 The contract states that the Chinese instructor should “report to 

the overseas work unit and/or Chinese Embassy/Consulate 

within one month of arrival.”235

 

231 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 

232 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 24, 2018). 

233 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 24 (2019). 

234 The Subcommittee was unable to obtain older versions of Hanban’s contract. Several Chinese 

instructors and directors referenced older contracts, but stated the contracts were not in the United 

States. 

235 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 
49 

 The contract states that the Chinese instructor “should 

conscientiously safeguard national interests.”236

 The contract states that the Chinese instructor must not 

“participate in illegal organizations,” but at the same time 

“should respect the culture and customs of the overseas country 

s/he is dispatched to and foster friendship with local people.”237

 The contract requires that the Chinese school that the Chinese 

instructor is affiliated with must maintain the Chinese 

instructor’s “personal profiles, archival information as well as 

party affiliation.”238

 The contract terminates if the Chinese instructors “violate 

Chinese laws” or “engage in activities detrimental to national 

interests; participate in illegal organizations and engage in 

activities against local religions and customs, hence causing bad 

influences.”239

 The contract also terminates if Chinese instructors “refuse to 

follow the rules and regulations of the overseas work unit, 

Chinese Embassy, and Consulates and Confucius Institute 

Headquarters/Hanban.”240

 The contract states that the Chinese instructor “agrees to abide 

by the relevant regulations regarding overseas dispatched 

teachers by Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban, which 

may not be listed in the full Agreement.”241

E. Hanban’s Approval of Confucius Institute Funding and Events 

Hanban approves all Confucius Institute funding and events through the 

contracts and budget approval process. With this control, Hanban maintains the 

ability to veto programming, speakers, and events held at Confucius Institutes in 

the United States. Some of the officials at U.S. schools visited by the Subcommittee 

expressed concern that Hanban has this power and can influence a range of 

activities. Other U.S. school officials the Subcommittee interviewed, however, did 

not express those same concerns. This section details Hanban’s budget approval 

 

236 Id. 237 Id. 238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Id. 241 Id. 
50 

process, provides some examples of Hanban’s challenging approval process, and also 

details Hanban’s requests for statistics and media reporting of Confucius Institute 

activity in the United States. 

1. Hanban Approves All Confucius Institute Spending 

i. Annual Budget and Ad Hoc Events 

Hanban reviews and approves each Confucius Institute’s annual budget 

which details that year’s speakers, events, topics and more.242 According to 

interviews with the Subcommittee, each Confucius Institute typically submits a 

proposed budget for the upcoming year in February.243 As it works to approve that 

budget proposal, Hanban will distribute roughly fifty percent of the previous year’s 

budget allocation so the Confucius Institute can hold events and programming in 

the first few months of the year. Hanban can also approve ad hoc events that were 

not submitted in the annual budget proposal.244 Hanban then approves the budget 

and distributes the rest of the funds later in the year—usually around July or 

August.245

In some cases, Hanban appeared to request more information about cultural 

activities and lectures before approving funding. For example, one Hanban official 

wrote a reminder to roughly 20 Confucius Institute directors that more information 

was needed before approvin the release of funds.246 The official explained that for 

events in the “cultural lecture type of program” it is necessary to “please report the 

name of the speaker, [provide] a brief introduction, and an outline of the lecture 

before the date of the lecture. Otherwise it will be difficult to approve the funding 

for these events.”247 

In 2013, Hanban also sought to create a database of pre-approved speakers 

and foreign experts that could speak at Confucius Institutes around the world.248 

According to documents reviewed by the Subcommittee, Hanban’s official in charge 

of “Confucius Institute affairs in Australia and America” sent a form to U.S. 

Confucius Institute directors soliciting input for a database of approved speakers.249 

The Hanban official asked the directors to complete and send back a form titled 

“Recommendation Form for the Experts Selected to Make Cultural Lecture 

 

242 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 29, 2019). 

243 Id. 244 Id. 245 Id. 246 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

247 Id. 248 Id. 249 Id. 
51 

Tours.”250 Hanban planned to review the forms and, as per the email excerpt below, 

create a database of Hanban approved presenters.251 

In interviews with the Subcommittee, other Confucius Institute American 

directors indicated that while Hanban did not veto programming or proposed 

events, they often quibbled over the amount of funding requested for a particular 

program or event.252 For example, one Confucius Institute director told the 

Subcommittee that Hanban accepted “90 percent” of the U.S. school’s submissions 

over the past five years.253 For the other 10 percent, Hanban objected only to the 

amount of funding requested, and not the programming or event topic itself.254 In 

those cases, Hanban ultimately funded the programs, but with less funding than 

originally requested.255

Hanban also sought information concerning the availability of television 

channels at Confucius Institutes in the United States. In one example from 2011, 

as shown here, a Hanban official asked roughly 50 Confucius Institute directors if 

China Central TV (“CCTV”) was available: 

256

 

250 Id. 251 Id. 252 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 29, 2019, Jan. 28, 2019, Nov. 14, 2018). 

253 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019). 

254 Id. 255 Id. 256 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 
52 

CCTV was the national television station of the People’s Republic of China in 

2011.257 According to filings with the Department of Justice, “CCTV falls under the 

supervision of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television which is in 

turn subordinate to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.”258 CCTV 

International was later rebranded as China Global Television Network (“CGTN”) at 

the end of 2016 and “now oversees all new foreign language channels and digital 

content.”259 On February 1, 2019, CGTN America registered with the Department 

of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.260

ii. Examples of Hanban’s Approval or U.S. Schools’ 

Concerns 

Some U.S. school officials, administrators, and instructors told the 

Subcommittee and other government investigators that they had concerns about the 

Chinese government’s control and influence over Confucius Institute planning and 

programming. The Subcommittee also interviewed several Chinese directors and 

instructors who explained that they did not have concerns about academic freedom. 

The following items come from the Subcommittee’s interviews and review of 

documents: 

 One U.S. school administrator explained that when something is 

“funded by the Chinese government, you know what you’re getting.”261

 One U.S. school administrator told the Subcommittee that while their 

Confucius Institute hosted a wide range of events, they still had to “get 

permission” from Hanban for all events.262

 One Confucius Institute Chinese instructor told the Subcommittee that 

Hanban trained her to “just tell the truth” when it came to discussing 

politically sensitive issues.263

 

257 Filing by Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide, Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the 

Foreign Agents Registration Act (Jan. 25, 2012), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5807-Exhibit-AB20120125-11.pdf. 

258 Id. 259 2017 Annual Report, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic And Security Review 

Commission 475 (2017), 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf 

260 Filing by CGTN America, Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 

Registration Act (Feb. 1, 2019), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6633-Exhibit-AB-20190201-1.pdf. 

261 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 24, 2018). 

262 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 

263 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 8, 2019). 
53 

 In an internal email, a U.S. school administrator wrote that she did a 

“look up” of a potential Confucius Institute speaker’s work and it 

“doesn’t seem particularly inflammatory.”264 A different U.S. school 

administrator told the Subcommittee that vetting speakers was not 

part of the academic process, that the email was written by the 

development office, and that the speaker did present at the Confucius 

Institute.265

 Several Confucius Institute American and Chinese directors and 

instructors told the Subcommittee that if a student brought up 

politically sensitive topics, such as Taiwan or Tibet, as language 

instructors they would not address them.266

 One U.S. school official told the Subcommittee that Chinese instructors 

and directors “wouldn’t talk about” politically sensitive issues because 

they just teach Chinese language courses.267

 One U.S. school recommended replacing teachers hired by Hanban and 

the Confucius Institute with language teachers hired directly by the 

school’s East Asian languages department. The school explained that 

this recommendation was in reaction to “campus discomfort with the 

language teaching element” of the Confucius Institute because using 

“‘outsourced’ teachers is often more trouble than it is worth.”268 The 

school also recommended making clear that Hanban would not have 

“line item veto in approving the annual” Confucius Institute budget.269

 One U.S. school official, at a world-renowned U.S. institution, 

explained to the Subcommittee that Hanban made a particularly large 

gift because it wanted be “associated with a topflight American 

university.”270

 Several Chinese embassy officials visited one U.S. school after the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office sent a request for information 

concerning Confucius Institutes, according to one U.S. school 

 

264 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 30, 2018). 

265 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 25, 2019). 

266 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018, Jan. 8, 2019, Sept. 24, 2018). 

267 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 24, 2018). 

268 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 18, 2018). 

269 Id. 270 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 25, 2019). 
54 

administrator. The embassy officials wanted to know if that U.S. 

school received the request and if they intended to comply with it.271

 A U.S. school conducted an internal review that found “a political 

science professor who taught in China expressed deep concern about 

visiting faculty having been given a manual of dos and don’t and 

having a HANBAN class monitor assigned to observe each class 

session.”272 That internal review, however, concluded that “it appears 

HANBAN exerts little, if any political influence on [the U.S. school’s] 

programming and activities ...”273

 One U.S. school “slow-rolled” the construction of a Model Confucius 

Institute building because Hanban “tried to exert too much control” 

over the project. That same school eventually signed the contract once 

they were satisfied with the terms, but recently cancelled the project 

given the “current political environment.”274

 One State Board of Education office wrote an email to the Confucius 

Classrooms in the state, “For those schools who’ve recently been 

awarded Confucius Classroom funds, please note that they may not be 

used to support attendance at, or sponsoring of Shen Yun 

performances.”275 According to the State Department, Shen Yun is “a 

Falun Gong-related performing arts show.276

At the request of several members of Congress, the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (“GAO”) reviewed Confucius Institutes around the United 

States and also reported incidents of concern regarding academic freedom.277 GAO 

investigators interviewed several school officials, researchers, and others who 

“expressed concerns that hosting a Confucius Institute could limit events or 

activities critical of China—including events at the Confucius Institute and 

elsewhere on campus.”278

GAO then listed several case studies and examples, as quoted below: 

 

271 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 22, 2018). 

272 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 26, 2018) (emphasis in original). 

273 Id. 274 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Feb. 22, 2019). 

275 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Apr. 17, 2018) (emphasis in original). 

276 State Dep’t, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, July-December, 2010 International 

Religious Freedom Report 4 (Sept. 13, 2011). 

277 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 10 (2019). 

278 Id. at 23. 
55 

 Several researchers stated that a school with a Confucius 

Institute could choose to avoid hosting events on certain topics 

elsewhere on campus, such as Taiwan, governance of Tibet, or the 

Tiananmen Square protests, so as to not offend its Chinese 

partners or out of consideration for the terms of the agreement.279

 One researcher referenced an incident at one school where the 

Confucius Institute Chinese director allegedly removed literature 

about Taiwan from another professor’s door.280

 Another researcher cited a reported incident at an academic 

conference where a Hanban representative tried to remove 

information on Taiwan from the program provided to conference 

attendees.281

 Several [U.S. school officials interviewed by GAO] expressed 

concern or uncertainty about whether a Confucius Institute 

would sponsor a research project or organize an event on a topic 

that could include criticism of China.282

 According to an official at a school that closed its Confucius 

Institute, Hanban refused to fund a faculty research proposal in 

environmental studies as it did not align with Hanban’s vision of 

Confucius Institutes as an organizer and funder of Chinese 

cultural events, and Hanban wanted to limit institute activities 

to student events.283

Other U.S. school administrators and American Confucius Institute directors 

told both the Subcommittee and GAO that they either had no concerns about 

academic freedom or undue Chinese influence or that they had taken some 

measures meant to address such concerns. In fact, most of the U.S. administrators 

interviewed by the Subcommittee stated that they did not have concerns about 

Confucius Institute operations at their institution.284 One U.S. official said she was 

“stunned by the criticisms” of Confucius Institutes when asked to respond to recent 

 

279 Id. 280 Id. 281 Id. 282 Id.

283 Id.

284 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019, Jan. 29, 2019, Jan. 8, 2019, Nov. 

13, 2018). 
56 

controversies in the news.285 Another U.S. school official explained to the 

Subcommittee that having a Confucius Institute on campus was a “great 

experience.”286 That same official said she spoke with students and teachers and 

did not find any “political dogma.”287

Several U.S. school administrators also indicated that the Dalai Lama visited 

their schools while they had a Confucius Institute. While the visits were not hosted 

by Confucius Institutes, according to those officials, Hanban did not object to the 

Dalai Lama’s visits.288 One U.S. school administrator told the Subcommittee that 

she was not aware of problems with academic freedom in the contract with Hanban 

or in practice during Confucius Institute operations.289

GAO also reported similar findings. According to its review, “Officials at 

several case study schools also noted that the funding provided for Confucius 

Institutes was a small proportion of a larger budget related to Asian studies and/or 

Chinese languages, and as a result did not have the ability to exert undue 

influence.”290 GAO also reported, “Officials from multiple case study schools noted 

that U.S. school faculty members make all decisions regarding conference themes 

guest speakers, and topics for events at their institute.” Finally, GAO wrote, 

“Officials at some case study schools offered examples of events and activities their 

Confucius Institute had sponsored that addressed topics that could be considered 

critical of China.”291

2. Hanban Requested Confucius Institute Directors Provide Reports 

and Media Impact Analysis 

According to documents reviewed by the Subcommittee, Hanban also 

requested that Confucius Institute directors provide detailed reports after events 

and at the end of the year.292 Those reports and self-assessments provided Hanban 

with detailed information about the operations, programming, and classes hosted by 

Confucius Institutes. For example, in one self-assessment reviewed by the 

Subcommittee, Hanban sought a substantial amount of information from the U.S. 

school. 

 

285 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 28, 2019). 

286 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 29, 2019). 

287 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 24, 2018). 

288 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 29, 2019, Jan. 28, 2019). 

289 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 25, 2019). 

290 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-278, AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. UNIVERSITIES AND 

CHINA ARE SIMILAR, BUT INSTITUTE OPERATIONS VARY 27 (2019). 

291 Id. at 23-24. (Those events, according to GAO, involved discussions of intellectual property in 

China and events on territorial disputes in the South China Sea.). 

292 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 
57 

For these self-assessments, Hanban asked about the number of 

programs/classes, the number of enrolled students, the number of cultural festivals, 

performances, exhibitions, and seminars or lectures, among other items.293 Hanban 

then asked about “Community Engagement” by asking the Confucius Institute to 

“Please describe the extent to which you leverage resources within your local 

community to support your programs.”294 Under that heading, Hanban asked about 

the number of Confucius Classrooms and the number of students in “Affiliated 

Confucius Classrooms.”295 The questionnaire also asked the school to: 

Please describe, in 100 words or less, your target audience: is it local, 

regional, national, global? If known, please generally describe your 

target audience’s demographics (e.g., urban v. rural; heritage speakers; 

English language learners, etc.).296

Finally, Hanban asked about what it called “Sustainability.” Under that 

section, Hanban asked the Confucius Institute to provide information about the 

infrastructure and human resources.297 

More generally, Hanban also sought information from time to time 

concerning the activities of the year so far. In one case, in the middle of the year, a 

Hanban official simply wanted to know the number of courses or activities that the 

Chinese director started and also the number of students enrolled.298

In some cases, Hanban was interested in knowing about the positive impact 

of an event on the local media. For example, one Hanban questionnaire wanted to 

“fully ascertain the effect” of the Confucius Institute’s programming.299 According 

to Hanban, the intention of the questionnaire was to “better fulfill the various needs 

of Confucius Institutes” and “increase the influence of the Confucius Institutes.”300 

The questionnaire included a “Media Reports” section that listed certain categories, 

as quoted below: 

 Considerable attention from local newspapers 

 Consideration attention from local radio stations 

 Consideration attention from local TV stations 

 

293 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

294 Id. 295 Id. 296 Id. 297 Id. 298 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 

299 Id. 300 Id. 
58 

 Consideration attention from local websites 

 Not much media coverage 

 A few negative reports301

Hanban was not only concerned about a Confucius Institute’s positive media 

coverage, but was also interested in potentially negative media coverage. For 

example, in mid-2011, Hanban issued a directive via email to various Confucius 

Institute directors and instructors. According to an English translation of the 

directive, Hanban wrote: 

Given the complexity of the current situation, it is recommended that 

all Chinese Confucius Institute directors or teachers should not accept 

media interviews without authorization. If necessary, it is important to 

report to Headquarters, and after receiving approval from 

Headquarters, interviews can be accepted.302 

Some Confucius Institute directors and instructors were also cognizant of the 

increased scrutiny facing their organizations. For example, in mid-2014, a 

Confucius Institute American director wrote in an email to Hanban that, “[P]eople 

who understand both cultures probably are the best ones” for giving Hanban 

advice.303 That director continued, “The importance of building a reputable image 

overseas that is suitable to other cultures will be the key to success in the long 

term.”304 A day later, the official wrote, “But [Confucius Institutes are] in a special 

stage, more [Confucius Institutes] may be close [sic] if no important actions are 

taken.”305

Four years later, as news coverage of Confucius Institutes increased, one 

American Confucius Institute director attempted to organize other Confucius 

Institutes in an effort to increase collaboration. In February 2018, that director 

wrote: 

With the current political climate and with many Congressman 

investigation [sic] I think this regional conference is important and we 

planned to have special session for how [the conference] can work 

together to better support the [Confucius Institute] public image.”306 

 

301 Id. 302 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018) (Translation provided to the 

Subcommittee). 

303 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

304 Id. 305 Id. 306 Id. 
59 

Two days later, the same director wrote, “In this current political 

climate with many inquiries into our [Confucius Institutes] it is important for 

some of the discussions to be US driven and to have some actions [sic] plans 

for how to deal with the media and how to have [Confucius Institutes] work 

together.”307 At this point, in February 2018, the Subcommittee had not 

started its investigation, but at least one member of Congress had already 

sent letters requesting information from various Confucius Institutes around 

the United States.308

V. CONFUCIUS CLASSROOMS 

In addition to Confucius Institutes at post-secondary U.S. schools, Hanban 

also funds Confucius Classrooms in elementary, middle, and high schools around 

the globe.309 According to the 2017 Confucius Institute Annual Development 

Report, Hanban supports 1,113 Confucius Classrooms, 519 of which operate in the 

United States.310 Confucius Institutes can serve as intermediaries for Hanban to 

K−12 schools and provide funding for Confucius Classrooms in addition to teaching 

materials, resources, and in some cases, personnel to teach Chinese language and 

culture.311 Confucius Classrooms typically either work to advance a school’s 

existing Chinese program with additional funding and resources or assist schools 

seeking to start a Chinese language program.312 Consequently, Hanban can have 

an influential role in elementary and secondary school Chinese language 

curriculums. 

A. The Growth of Confucius Classrooms 

Similar to the Confucius Institute model, Hanban expanded Confucius 

Classrooms quickly, reaching large numbers of schoolchildren worldwide.313 By 

2017, Hanban had established 1,113 Confucius Classrooms around the world, 

 

307 Id. 308 Letter from Rep. Chris Smith (July 20, 2017). 

309 Brendan Smialowski, How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms, POLITICO, (January 16, 2019), 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327. 

310 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 61, 67 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 

311 Confucius Institute at Western Michigan University, Confucius Classroom Celebrates Chinese 

Language and Culture Learning in Portage, Western Michigan University, (July 20, 2018), 

http://www.wmuconfucius.org/content/confucius-classroom-celebrates-chinese-language-and-culturelearning-portage; University of Kentucky International Center, Confucius Classroom, University of 

Kentucky, (January 15, 2019), http://international.uky.edu/ukci/k12/partners/confucius_classroom. 

312 University of Wisconsin Platteville Confucius Institute, Confucius Classroom, (January 15, 2019), 

https://www.uwplatt.edu/confucius/confucius-classroom. 

313 Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2017, HANBAN 3 (2017), 

http://www.hanban.org/report/2017.pdf. 
60 

surpassing the number of Confucius Institutes.314 The chart below shows the 

worldwide growth of Confucius Classrooms.315 

This rapid growth can be attributed to both Hanban’s desires to expand the 

program and also the Confucius Classroom model itself. Hanban officials expressed 

a desire to rapidly expand Confucius Classrooms. Hanban’s Division of 

Development and Planning sought information as early as 2009 regarding 

Confucius Institutes “helping local schools to establish Confucius Classrooms.”316 A 

Hanban official solicited information from U.S. Confucius Institutes by asking staff 

to, “Please let us know a rough number of CCs that you are going to set up within 

2009.” Madam Xu Lin, counselor of the State Council of China and member of the 

12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 

discussed establishing Confucius Classrooms in the United States at the 2008 

Confucius Institute annual meeting.317 Furthermore, one Hanban official wrote a 

U.S. Confucius Institute Chinese director, “Developing more Confucius Classrooms 

is exactly what we have been trying to do. Please keep on working towards this. It 

will be very rewarding for our efforts.”318 

A separate Hanban email in 2009 sought information concerning Chinese 

language studies from Chinese directors at Confucius Institutes around the United 

States. The Hanban official wanted to know, as shown below, “How many K−12 

schools in your states are now offering Chinese?”319

 

314 Id. 315 See Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2008-2017. 316 Documents on file with Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

317 Id. 318 Id. 319 Id. 
61 

Later in 2011, Hanban held a U.S. Confucius Classroom Conference in San 

Francisco. A U.S. school provided minutes and records from that conference to the 

Subcommittee.320 According to those minutes, about 200 representatives from 150 

operating Confucius Classrooms and 30 Confucius Institutes attended the 

conference.321 The minutes detail Hanban’s plan for expanding Confucius 

Classrooms throughout the United States. For example, the minutes state: 

The participants agreed that, establishing CCs affiliated to CIs, is 

beneficial to building up the Chinese instruction pipeline through K−12 

and universities and will help to optimize the integration of Chinese 

educational resources within the university, therefore, should be the 

most important way of developing CCs in the future.322

The minutes then detail how Hanban planned to “integrate the CCs into the 

[United States’] official K−12 education” system: 

First, to seek the top-down policy support from the state government, 

legislative and educational institutions, with a particular emphasis on 

access to the support from school district superintendents and 

principals; second, to seek the recognition and support from parents and 

local community, as well as to inspire local demand and enthusiasm for 

Chinese language and culture learning, through various cultural 

activities and display of achievements of classroom instruction; third, to 

integrate the instruction of Chinese language and culture into 

curriculum of major subjects teaching taught in U.S. K−12 schools, such 

as the ‘world culture’ and other courses; fourth, to create an effective 

 

320 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 30, 2018). 

321 Id. 322 Id. 
62 

communication mechanism with the local teach unions and the 

education administrators, as to create good environment for the living, 

cultural orientation and professional development for both the guest and 

local Chinese teachers, as well as promote the sustainable development 

of the Confucius Classrooms.323

Additionally, under the heading titled, “Developing the U.S. Confucius 

Classrooms in a rapid and effective way,” the minutes state “[g]iven the prosperous 

development of the Chinese language instruction in U.S. K−12 schools and the 

rising demand for Chinese learning, the conference suggested that, in the coming 

period, the established of Confucius Classrooms in the United States should be 

actively continued, under the premise of voluntary.”324 Finally, the minutes 

indicate that Hanban sought to “formulate the instruction standard” for all 

Confucius Classrooms. The minutes state: 

In the meantime of accelerating the development, the CCs should also 

formulate the instruction standard and evaluation index system, strive 

to improve the quality through promoting Chinese language test, 

strengthening community links, recruiting qualified teaching personnel 

and other initiatives. The Headquarters will continue to foster the 

cooperation with the State Department of Education and local 

universities, as to widen the certification and professional development 

channels for the K−12 Chinese language teachers. Special attentions 

should be paid to support the exchange programs of students and 

teachers, which will help to stimulate the students’ enthusiasm for 

learning Chinese, and to enhance the students’ awareness and 

understanding of Chinese language, culture and society.”325

The growth can also be attributed to the fact that a single Confucius Institute 

can have multiple active Confucius Classrooms that all depend upon it for 

assistance and mentorship.326 For instance, the University of Maryland publicly 

lists ten subordinate Confucius Classrooms operating in a mix of public and private 

schools around Maryland.327 Through Confucius Classrooms, some students have 

had the opportunity to attend Hanban summer camps in China and visit their 

Classroom’s Chinese partner school or university.328 Hanban provided pre-

 

323 Id. 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 University of Maryland, Confucius Institute of Maryland, Confucius Classrooms (Jan. 15, 2019), 

https://globalmaryland.umd.edu/offices/confucius-institute-maryland/confucius-classrooms. 

327 Id.

328 See University of Texas at Dallas, Confucius Institute, Confucius Classroom Q&A (Jan. 15, 2019), 

https://www.utdallas.edu/ah/confucius/docs/Confucius-Classroom.pdf. 
63 

secondary school administrators with sponsored trips to China and educational 

exchanges with Chinese schools.329

B. Confucius Classroom Application Process 

Hanban’s website states that schools wishing to have a Confucius Classroom 

must be an educational institution recognized and accredited by the country’s 

government, possess a demand from local citizens and students for learning Chinese 

language and culture in the locality of the institute, and have the capacity for 

providing Confucius Classrooms an appropriate working space, as well as personnel 

and support in funding.330 Pre-secondary schools seeking a Confucius Classroom 

engage with and will seek an agreement with a Confucius Institute based at a local 

school. Those pre-secondary schools must also seek Hanban’s approval to receive 

funds and open a Confucius Classroom or receive an instructor from Hanban.331

After receiving Hanban’s approval, the school signs an agreement with a host 

Confucius Institute.332 The standard agreement contains the Confucius Classroom’s 

scope of activities, such as operating Chinese teaching programs, training local 

Chinese language instructors, organizing exchange programs, and conducting 

Chinese language and culture activities.333 Similar to the contracts between 

Hanban and U.S. schools, some agreements between Confucius Institutes and K−12 

schools establishing a Confucius Classroom are based on templates provided by 

Hanban that are not substantially altered. For example, one such agreement, 

shown below, relied on Hanban’s template agreement, and still listed uniform 

identifiers such as “[school name]” and “[country]” in the text with the applicable 

school names handwritten onto the signed contract: 334

 

329 University of Central Arkansas Confucius Institute, Confucius Classrooms Important Information 

(Jan. 15, 2019), https://uca.edu/confucius/frequently-asked-questions-about-confucius-classroom. 

University of Texas at Dallas, Confucius Institute, Confucius Classroom Q&A (Jan. 15, 2019), 

https://www.utdallas.edu/ah/confucius/docs/Confucius-Classroom.pdf. 

330 Confucius Institute Application Procedure, Confucius Classrooms, HANBAN, 

http://english.hanban.org/node_7879.htm. 

331 Id. 332 Documents on file with Subcommittee (July 27, 2018). 

333 Id. 334 Id. 
64 

Another agreement template published online calls the Classroom a “project” 

of the Confucius Institute and notes that the Confucius Institute will be 

“responsible for the management of the Confucius Classroom, including developing 

annual activity plans, budgets and final accounts for the Confucius Classroom and 

submitting to the Headquarters for approval.”335

C. Confucius Classroom Operations 

Confucius Institutes may assist in the management and operation of 

affiliated local Confucius Classrooms. This can involve developing annual work 

plans, budgets, and final accountings—all of which is sent to Hanban for approval 

before funding is allocated.336 While Hanban provides start-up funding for 

Confucius Classrooms, the pre-secondary school is expected to jointly contribute to 

the project fund as well.337 Unlike Confucius Institutes, however, Confucius 

Classrooms typically do not have Boards of Directors. 338 The principal or vice 

principal is often responsible for overseeing the Confucius Classroom.339 Below are 

two examples of how Confucius Classrooms may be organized and operated in the 

United States. 

First, while many of the Confucius Classroom agreements contain nearly 

identical language, some U.S. schools inserted provisions that grant them more 

autonomy from their Confucius Institute partner. For instance, one Confucius 

Classroom contract retained final authority as to which activities it wishes to 

undertake in its Confucius Classroom.340 The contract also asserts that the 

“Classroom will be wholly run and operated” by the local school and that the 

 

335 Wayne State University, Confucius Institute, Confucius Classroom Grant Information (Jan. 15, 

2019), http://www.clas.wayne.edu/ci/Confucius-Classrooms. 

336 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 27, 2018, Oct. 29, 2018). 

337 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 27, 2018, July 26, 2018, July, 19, 2018). 

338 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 27, 2018). 

339 Id. 340 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 19, 2018). 
65 

Confucius Classroom “retains authority over its business decisions.”341 But such 

provisions are rare amidst the boilerplate language that makes up the majority of 

the contracts. 

Second, a Confucius Institute that is one of the largest recipients of funds 

from Hanban focuses almost solely on managing a large number of Confucius 

Classrooms.342 That Confucius Institute, in effect, serves as a clearing house for 

Hanban’s Confucius Classrooms rather than as an on-campus center supplementing 

the U.S. school and community Chinese language and culture learning.343 A U.S. 

school official working at that Confucius Institute informed the Subcommittee that 

the Confucius Classroom program started with 11 instructors from China and it 

now boasts 51 instructors spread across the state.344 In fact, the U.S. school 

informed the Subcommittee that they place instructors in the language department 

the same way they place instructors at their affiliated K−12 Confucius Classrooms, 

essentially treating the Confucius Institute the same as any Confucius 

Classroom.345

VI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S VISA REVIEWS OF U.S. 

CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES 

The State Department conducts program field site reviews as a part of its 

regular monitoring activities of Exchange Visitor Program sponsors.346 The State 

Department also provides guidance to U.S. schools on how to ensure their exchange 

visitor programs—including those connected with Confucius Institutes—comply 

with visa regulations. As part of its reviews, since 2017, the State Department has 

issued four Letters of Concern detailing instances of inappropriate visa use by U.S. 

schools related to Confucius Institutes. This section details the State Department’s 

guidance, its field site reviews, and its four Letters of Concern all relating to 

Confucius Institutes at U.S. schools. 

A. State Department Guidance Concerning Confucius Institutes 

In May 2012, the State Department issued “Guidance Directive 2012-06 

Exchange Visitor Program - Confucius Institutes” to explain procedures for 

formalizing the visa status of Chinese language teachers in the United States.347 

Among other things, the State Department’s 2012 directive outlined the differences 

 

341 Id.

342 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 20, 2018). 

343 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 7, 2018). 

344 Id. 345 Id. 346 See Background Section. 

347 U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Guidance Directive 2012-06, 

Exchange Visitor Program – Confucius Institutes (May 17, 2012, revised May 25, 2012). 
66 

between the Teacher and Research Scholar designations.348 It further stated that 

U.S. school sponsors whose J-1 Professor and Research Scholars were teaching in 

public and private K−12 should contact the State Department.349 

The Exchange Visitor Program categories have many distinctions.350 For 

example, the “Professor” category is reserved for “bona fide exchange visitor 

exchange programs, which offer foreign nationals the opportunity to engage in 

research, teaching, lecturing, observing, or consulting research institutions, 

corporate research facilities, museums, libraries, post-secondary accredited 

institutions, or similar types of institutions.”351 The “Teacher” category is reserved 

for “primary and secondary schools (K−12).”352 

The State Department indicated it would work with sponsors to ensure 

exchange visitors were sponsored in the proper category with the appropriately 

designated sponsor.353 The guidance also emphasized the importance of ensuring 

that the “site of activity for each exchange participant’s record” in the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”) so that each exchange visitor’s 

“record reflects the actual location where the participants are placed.”354 This 

included the exchange visitor’s initial placement, as well as any subsequent changes 

of location.355

B. State Department Field Site Reviews of Confucius Institutes 

In March 2017, State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural 

Affairs (“ECA”) officials conducting regular monitoring activities of a U.S. school’s 

Confucius Institute received information indicating that some exchange visitors 

may be inappropriately using their J-1 Research Scholar visa.356 Notably, however, 

the State Department does not collect information on the number of J-1 visas 

related to Confucius institutes or Hanban.357 Additionally, the field review revealed 

that nine J-1 Research Scholars were teaching at pre-school and secondary schools, 

a possible violation of the terms of their visas.358 Following this review, the State 

Department contacted similar U.S. school sponsors to confirm that other J-1 

 

348 Id. 349 Id. 350 Id. 351 Id. 352 Id. 353 Id. 354 Id. 355 Id. 356 See CDP-2018-00005-00069-72. 

357 CDP-2018-00005-00170. 

358 CDP-2018-00005-00069. 
67 

exchange visitors’ Confucius Institute activities are in accordance with federal 

regulations.359

As a result of these concerns, ECA contacted additional schools in 2018 to 

confirm that J-1 exchange visitors’ Confucius Institute activities were in accordance 

with the exchange visitor category regulations. The State Department contacted 

U.S. schools hosting Confucius Institutes in Delaware, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, 

Illinois, Georgia, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.360 During the visits, ECA staff 

discovered that some Confucius Institutes were unclear about the proper uses of 

visas for Confucius Institute exchange visitors and required clarification.361 As a 

result, the State Department conducted a field review at one additional U.S. 

school.362

C. The State Department Issued Four Letters of Concern to U.S. 

Schools’ Confucius Institutes 

Since 2017, the State Department’s Office of Private Sector Exchange 

Program Administration (“OPA”) issued four Letters of Concern as a record of its 

reviews of Confucius Institute exchange visitor programs.363 The Letters of Concern 

detail OPA’s observations and make recommendations to help the U.S. schools 

identify areas for program correction or improvement. In two cases, the State 

Department revoked visas for Confucius Institute exchange visitors, as detailed 

below.364

First Letter of Concern. On May 11, 2017, the State Department issued its 

Letter of Concern to a U.S. school that it deemed could be non-compliant with J-1 

visa requirements. Specifically, the State Department found that Confucius 

Institute exchange visitors at the school were on J-1 Research Scholar visas, but 

were primarily teaching at pre-schools and secondary schools.365 The Letter of 

Concern states, “[The Confucius Institute exchange visitors] are sponsored as 

Research Scholars, however the primary activity of several [Confucius Institute 

exchange visitors] was not research, rather they were teaching students aged 3-17 

at preschools and secondary schools.”366 In addition, those exchange visitors were 

often unaccompanied in the classroom, a situation that the State Department 

believed “could possibly put the health, safety, and welfare of students at risk.”367

 

359 State Department production (Aug. 14, 2018). 

360 Id. 361 Id. 362 State Department production (Feb. 7, 2019). 

363 Id. State Department production (Aug. 14, 2018). 

364 Id. 365 CDP-2018-00005-00155. 

366 Id. 367 Id. 
68 

The State Department also found allegations of “fraudulent paperwork and 

coaching” prior to the review.368 According to the field site review, an anonymous 

individual told the State Department that the exchange visitors’ research topics 

“were devised by the [Confucius Institute] co-director ... as a deliberate attempt to 

deceive the [State] Department regarding the exchange visitors’ activities.”369 The 

State Department found additional evidence that the Confucius Institute’s Chinese 

co-director “conducted rehearsal interviews with the exchange visitors to practice 

discussing their research topics in advance of ECA’s review.”370

After its review, the State Department revoked 13 J-1 visas in response to its 

findings, but allowed the school to maintain its authorization to sponsor J-1 visa 

holders.371 It also recommended that the school: Review its Confucius Institute 

research objectives; discuss its Confucius Institute activities in future reports to the 

department; review its Confucius Institute’s advertising material so that its 

activities are clear to exchange visitors, prospective exchange visitors, and host 

employers; and, finally, to take steps to ensure all exchange visitors are in the 

appropriate visa categories.372 School officials informed the Subcommittee that it 

no longer places exchange visitors in preschool or secondary schools and instituted a 

policy restricting all current exchange visitors from working off school property 

without permission from the school.373 The U.S. school also requires monthly 

reports from its exchange visitors on their research and other activities.374

 

Second and Third Letters of Concern. On June 29, 2018, the State 

Department issued two separate Letters of Concern to two separate U.S. schools 

after finding that Confucius Institute exchange visitors with a J-1 Professor visa 

were performing duties inconsistent with the sponsors’ designation.375 Specifically, 

at both U.S. schools, the State Department found the Confucius Institute exchange 

visitors were performing administrative tasks and not teaching, lecturing, or 

consulting as required under the terms of the visa. The State Department 

recommended that both U.S. schools “ensure that the primary activity of exchange 

visitors sponsored under the Professor category is teaching, lecturing, observing, or 

consulting at post-secondary accredited academic institutions.”376 The first school 

changed the professor’s title, aligned the professor’s duties with the requirements of 

 

368 CDP-2018-00005-00070. 

369 Id. 370 Id. 371 CDP-2018-00005-00069. 

372 CDP-2018-00005-00156-158. 

373 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 8, 2019). 

374 Id. 375 CDP-2018-00005-00109. CDP-2018-00005-00159. 

376 CDP-2018-00005-00110. CDP-2018-00005-00160. 
69 

their visa, and hired someone to perform the administrative tasks the professor was 

handling.377 The second school eliminated the position the professor was filling 

after the professor’s tenure ended; the professor returned to China shortly after the 

school received the letter.378

Fourth Letter of Concern. On August 22, 2018, the State Department 

issued its fourth Letter of Concern related to potential visa violations, describing 

how J-1 Research Scholars at another U.S. school were primarily teaching at K−12 

schools in a Confucius Classroom.379 The State Department found that “Although 

the exchange visitors may be conducting research, it is also evident that they are 

teaching.”380 Additionally, as the lead American instructors at the K−12 schools did 

not speak Mandarin, the State Department wrote, “So even when a Lead Teacher is 

present in the classroom, he/she cannot evaluate the information the [Confucius 

Institute] exchange visitors are teaching to the minors and must temporarily place 

the students’ learning experience completely in the hand of the [Confucius Institute] 

exchange visitors.”381 The State Department indicated that it thought “some 

Confucius Institutes may deliberately seek to circumvent the Teacher category 

because of its stricter qualifications, including the required minimum number of 

years of previous teaching experience and/or degrees in education or in an academic 

subject matter that the exchange visitor will teach.”382

As such, the State Department required the U.S. school remove the 

researchers from their K−12 teaching positions; ensure that any researchers 

remaining in K−12 schools or local boards of education are performing research and 

not teaching; enhance its monitoring of all Confucius Institute exchange visitors to 

ensure that the activities they engage in are consistent with the requirements of 

their visa.383 Following its letter, the State Department prudentially revoked 19 

visa and confirmed that the U.S. school had removed the exchange visitors from the 

K−12 classrooms and confirmed their departure from the United States.384

 

377 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Feb. 7, 2019). 

378 Id. 379 CDP-2018-00005-00555. 

380 CDP-2018-00005-00556. 

381 Id. 382 CDP-2018-00005-00563. 

383 CDP-2018-00005-00556. 

384 CDP-2018-00005-00562. Email from State Dep’t, Legislative Affairs (Feb. 21, 2019). 
70 

D. The State Department’s 2019 Plans to Review U.S. Confucius 

Institutes 

In 2019, the State Department plans to conduct a total of four reviews 

regarding Confucius Institutes and U.S. schools’ visas.385 According to the State 

Department, this is double the number of reviews it completed in 2018.386

VII. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPORTS FAIL TO PROVIDE 

AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF CHINA’S SPENDING ON U.S. 

CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES 

Spending data published by the Department of Education fails to provide an 

accurate or complete picture of China’s overall spending on Confucius Institutes in 

the United States. Federal law requires educational institutions that participate in 

Title IV student assistance programs to submit foreign financial disclosure reports 

to the Department of Education.387 Those reports must document all gifts and 

contracts in excess of $250,000 from any foreign source.388 The Subcommittee’s 

investigation demonstrates that nearly 70 percent of U.S. schools that received 

more than $250,000 from Hanban failed to properly report that information to the 

Department of Education. Foreign government spending on U.S. schools is 

effectively a black hole, as there is a lack of reporting detailing the various sources 

of foreign government funding.

The reports that U.S. schools did file provide an incomplete picture of 

Hanban’s overall spending in the United States. From January 2012 to June 2018, 

fifteen U.S. schools reported receiving $15,472,725 directly from Hanban.389 To get 

a more comprehensive understanding of Hanban’s spending in the United States, 

the Subcommittee requested financial records from 100 U.S. schools that have 

either had or have a Confucius Institute. According to those records, during that 

same time, Hanban directly contributed $113,428,509 to U.S schools—more than 

seven times the amount U.S. schools actually reported.390 In total, since 2006, 

 

385 Production from the State Department (Feb. 7, 2019). Interview with State Department officials 

(Feb. 11, 2019). 

386 Id. 387 Title IV student assistance programs and provisions can provide federal financial aid to assist 

students in gaining access to and financing higher education. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1011f. 

388 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Foreign Schools Gift and Contracts Report with Date Range 01/01/2012 

to 06/30/2018, Presecondary Education Participation System 10/12/2018. [Hereinafter FOREIGN GIFT 

REPORT]. The FOREIGN GIFT REPORT only provide foreign gift reports from January 1, 2012 to June 

30, 2018. 

389 FOREIGN GIFT REPORT. 390 Documents on file with the Subcommittee. 
71 

Hanban contributed roughly $158,429,866 to U.S. schools to fund Confucius 

Institutes.391

Moreover, this total is only a fraction of what Hanban spent administering 

the program globally. According to Hanban’s annual reports, it spent more than $2 

billion worldwide over the lifespan of the Confucius Institute program from 2008 to 

2016.392 Under current federal law, however, the U.S. government publishes very 

little information detailing China’s spending with U.S. schools.

A. Department of Education Reporting Requirements 

Federal law requires all two-year and four-year post-secondary schools to 

report foreign sources of funding in excess of $250,000 per year.393 Those same 

schools must also disclose all contracts with or gifts from the same foreign source 

that, alone or combined, have a value of $250,000 or more within a calendar year.394 

A foreign source, defined by the Department of Education, is a foreign government, 

including an agency of a foreign government; a legal entity created solely under the 

laws of a foreign state or states; an individual who is not a citizen or national of the 

United States; or an agent acting on behalf of a foreign source.395 A gift is 

considered any gift of money or property.396 A contract is any agreement for the 

 

391 Id. 392 See Confucius Institute Annual Development Reports from 2008-2017. 

393 20 U.S.C.A. § 1011f. See also U.S. Dep’t of Education, Consumer Information and School 

Reporting, 2-180 (June 2017), 

https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1718FSAHbkVol2Ch6.pdf. 

394 Id. 395 Id. 396 20 U.S.C.A. § 1011f(h)(3). 
72 

“acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services for the direct 

benefit or use of either of the parties.”397

A U.S. school—and “each campus of a multi-campus school”—must report 

this information if it: 

 Is legally authorized to provide a program beyond the 

secondary level within a state. 

 Provides a program that awards a bachelor’s degree or a 

more advanced degree, or provides at least a two-year 

program acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor’s 

degree. 

 Is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency. 

 Is extended any federal financial aid (directly or indirectly 

through another entity or person) or receives support from 

the extension of any such federal assistance to the school’s 

subunits.398

A U.S. school must report this information by January 31 or July 31—

whichever is sooner—after the date of receipt of the gifts, date of the contract, or 

date of ownership or control.399 The January 31 report should cover the period July 

1–December 31 of the previous year, and the July 31 report should cover January 

1–June 30 of the same year.400

If a school fails to comply with the requirements of this law in a timely 

manner, the Justice Department is authorized to initiate a civil action in federal 

district court to ensure compliance at the request of the Secretary of Education.401 

Following a determination that a school knowingly or willfully failed to comply, a 

school must reimburse the U.S. government for the cost of obtaining compliance.402 

The Justice Department told the Subcommittee that it had no records showing the 

Secretary of Education ever referred a case.403

 

397 20 U.S.C.A. § 1011f(h)(1). 

398 20 U.S.C.A. § 1011f(h)(4). 

399 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Consumer Information and School Reporting, 2-180 (June 2017), 

https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1718FSAHbkVol2Ch6.pdf. 

400 Id. 401 Id. at 2-181. 

402 Id. 403 Email from Dep’t of Justice, Attorney Adviser, Office of Legislative Affairs (Feb. 22, 2019). 
73 

In 2004, the last time the Department of Education issued any guidance on 

foreign gift reporting, the Department posted a letter to “remind[s] institutions of 

the statutory requirement that they report gifts received from or contracts entered 

into with foreign sources, and ownership or control of institutions by foreign 

entities.”404 Specifically, the guidance clarifies the appropriate steps a U.S. school 

must take when reporting figures. For example, the Department provided 

additional information on the conditions of reporting, contents of reports, and 

potential penalties if a school did not report gifts received. This letter also included 

a “Questions & Answers” section to provide details about the reporting 

requirements and the process developed by the Department to collect all relevant 

information.405

B. U.S. Schools’ Reporting of Confucius Institute Gifts 

The Department of Education publishes the foreign gift data it receives from 

universities in a spreadsheet it calls the “Foreign Gift and Contract Report.”406 This 

spreadsheet contains all the contracts and gifts reported to the Department of 

Education from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2018.407 According to the available 

data, roughly 149 U.S. colleges reported over 18,388 separate foreign gifts or 

contracts during that time.408 Of those 18,388 individual reports over the same time 

period, approximately 1,297 indicate China as the “country of giftor.”409 And of 

those 1,297 reports attributable to China, fifteen U.S. institutions reported 90 

separate gifts specifically linked to the “Confucius Institute Headquarters” or 

Hanban.410 Those 90 gifts attributed to Confucius Institutes from January 2012 

through June 2018 totaled $15,472,725.411

Some publicly available examples of Confucius Institute reporting include:412 

 The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign reported a $252,253 

“monetary gift” from Hanban on April 4, 2016. 

 Bryant University reported receiving $951,349 in “monetary gifts” 

from December 2001 to January 2017 from Hanban. 

 

404 U.S. Dep’t of Education, Federal Student Aid, Reporting of Foreign Gifts, Contracts, and 

Relationships by Institutions, GEN-04-11 (Oct. 4, 2004), https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/GEN0411.html. 

405 Id. 406 FOREIGN GIFT REPORT. 407 Id. 408 Id. 409 Id. 410 Id. 411 Id. 412 Id. 
74 

 The University of New Hampshire reported a $264,280 “monetary 

gift” from Hanban on August 1, 2016. 

 Emory University reported a $140,767 “contract” with Hanban on 

April 8, 2013. Emory also reported a $219,483 “contract” with 

Hanban on August 1, 2012. 

 The George Washington University reported $1,388,744 in contracts 

with Hanban. 

In the aggregate, however, the publicly reported figures submitted to the 

Department of Education only provide a fraction of China’s overall spending on 

Confucius Institutes. While U.S. schools reported gifts or contracts worth 

$15,472,725 from January 2012 to June 2018, Hanban is estimated to have spent 

approximately $113,428,509 in the United States during that same time period.413 

The chart below shows the difference between the information reported by U.S. 

schools to the Department of Education and the actual total amount Hanban 

contributed to U.S. schools.414

The discrepancies between the amounts reported by U.S. schools and the 

amount Hanban actually gave them is attributable to both the $250,000 threshold 

and U.S. schools’ failure to properly report. The Subcommittee found that over half 

of Hanban’s annual payments since 2012 were under the $250,000 reporting 

requirement threshold.415 As such, these schools are not currently obligated to 

report any funds received for a given year to the U.S. government. The more 

 

413 See FOREIGN GIFT REPORT. 414 Documents on file with the Subcommittee. FOREIGN GIFT REPORT. 415 Documents on file with the Subcommittee. 
75 

concerning issue, however, as detailed below, is that 69 percent of U.S. schools 

failed to properly report information to the Department of Education as required. 

C. U.S. Schools Failed to Properly Report Confucius Institute Gifts to 

the Department of Education 

U.S. schools routinely failed to report Confucius Institute funding to the 

Department of Education as required by law. According to information reviewed by 

the Subcommittee, 33 of 48—69 percent—of U.S. schools required to file reports 

with the Department of Education failed to report Hanban gifts, contracts, or 

contributions in excess of $250,000.416 From 2012 to 2018, U.S. schools should have 

reported $51,526,181 to the Department of Education.417 But according to the 

Department of Education Foreign Schools Gift and Contract Report, U.S. schools 

failed to report $36,089,456 that they were required to by law.418

The Subcommittee also learned that some U.S. schools failed to report gifts 

made by Hanban and other foreign donors when they were made to the schools’ 

Confucius Institute non-profit foundation and endowment. Below are three 

examples of U.S. schools failing to report, what they failed to report, and the 

reasons for their failure. In all three cases, the schools told the Subcommittee they 

plan to refile correct reports. 

First, one U.S. school improperly reported funds received from Hanban over 

the past several years. This school received more than $400,000 in 2014 and 

$1,000,000 in 2015, but failed to report either contribution.419 School officials later 

informed the Subcommittee that it did not have a designated office to file foreign 

gift reports and that it was in fact not aware of the reporting requirements.420 

Those officials informed the Subcommittee that it intends to submit filings to the 

Department of Education reporting Hanban’s gifts and contracts.421

Second, another U.S. school did report receiving more than $1.1 million from 

Hanban, but the school received more than $1.5 million from Hanban. In an 

interview with the Subcommittee, school officials explained that the school’s 

financial aid office and the Department of Education had differing interpretations of 

a “contract” and an “agreement.”422 The officials indicated that it was an accounting 

 

416 Id. 417 Id. The U.S. Department of Education does not keep electronic records before January 2012. 

Email from Legislative Affairs Specialist, U.S. Department of Education (Jan. 9, 2019). 

418 Id. FOREIGN GIFT REPORT. 419 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (July 27, 2018). 

420 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 13, 2018). 421 Id. 422 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 6, 2018). 
76 

issue that characterized their relationship with the Confucius Institute as an 

“agreement” rather than a “contract,” creating discrepancies in what funds needed 

to be reported.423 Those officials also informed the Subcommittee that they recently 

performed an audit of these contracts and submitted updated information to the 

Department of Education.424

Third, according to the Department of Education’s records, a third U.S. 

school filed one foreign funding report noting that the Confucius Institute supplied 

a contract worth more than $500,000.425 Documents reviewed by the Subcommittee, 

however, indicate several annual gifts or contracts in excess of the $250,000 

reporting threshold, as shown below.426 Those officials subsequently explained to 

the Subcommittee that the school incorrectly reported the amount of foreign gifts to 

the Department of Education and that it would file an amended report.427 The third 

U.S. school also failed to properly report Hanban contributions to the school’s 

foundation. Hanban contributed $280,297 in 2016 and $270,079 in 2017 to the U.S. 

school’s foundation fund.428 The Department of Education, however, told the 

Subcommittee that contributions made by a foreign entity to a foundation controlled 

by the school must still be reported.429

D. Hanban Spent More than $2 Billion on Confucius Institutes 

Worldwide 

Hanban’s own reports do provide some spending data on Confucius Institutes 

and Classrooms worldwide. Hanban publishes an annual report that details the 

total international spending for Confucius Institutes around the world. Though 

these reports lack granular spending data on specific Institutes or Classrooms and 

their locations, they do provide a more complete picture of Hanban’s overall budget. 

While not segmented by country, their annual reports include information on 

salaries and housing costs for Confucius Institute instructors and directors that are 

typically not captured in Hanban’s gifts directly to schools. 

Year Global Hanban Spending 

2008 $120,018,000 

2009 $179,816,000 

2010 $137,761,000 

2011 $164,103,000 

 

423 Id. 424 Id. 425 Id. 426 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 3, 2018, July 23, 2018). 

427 Id. 428 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 3, 2018). 

429 Email from Legislative Affairs Specialist, U.S. Dep’t of Education (Oct. 16, 2018). 
77 

2012 $196,330,000 

2013 $291,000,000 

2014 $300,000,000 

2015 $310,854,000 

2016 $314,116,000 

2017 N/A 

2018 N/A 

TOTAL: $2,001,634,000 

As shown above, according to these annual reports, Hanban spent over $2 

billion on Confucius Institutes worldwide. Hanban did not publish spending data 

for 2017 and 2018.430

VIII. CHINESE INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. SCHOOLS IN CHINA 

While China plays a role in Chinese language and cultural education in the 

United States through its Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, it 

routinely and systematically works to thwart efforts by the U.S. State Department 

and U.S. schools to promote American culture in China. Chinese pressure has been 

particularly effective in prohibiting the successful administration of the U.S. State 

Department’s American Cultural Center (“ACC”) program. In 2010, the State 

Department provided funding for a network of ACCs that aimed to provide 

community spaces on Chinese campuses for “interactions that enable Chinese 

audiences to better understand the United States, its culture, society, government, 

language, law, economic system, and values.”431 The ACC program was hindered 

from the start—7 of 29 ACCs never opened despite receiving funding and the State 

Department stopped funding the program altogether in 2018. 

Chinese interference extends beyond the obstruction of the ACC program. 

The Chinese government, including individuals from the Ministry of Education and 

local provincial government officials, routinely restricted the movement of U.S. 

diplomats seeking to attend and speak at conferences and public events. China has 

even prevented U.S. diplomats from visiting ACCs. Chinese interference resulted in 

the cancellation of several significant public diplomacy conferences and events 

outright, often just days before an event was to take place. The State Department 

documented at least 80 examples of Chinese interference in American public 

diplomacy efforts from January 2016 to the date of this report.432 Put simply, as the 

State Department stated in an internal memo, “Our American Cultural Centers do 

 

430 Hanban Annual Reports. Hanban did not publish spending data for 2017 or 2018. 

431 U.S. State Dep’t, EAPBJ-16-GR-002-EAP-051616, Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy Beijing, 

New American Cultural Centers and Cultural Programming in the People’s Republic of China, 2

(July 2016). 

432 CDP-2018-00005-00019−00045. 
78 

not enjoy reciprocal access at universities in China.”433 One of the most significant 

reports of interference, detailed further in this section, resulted in the detention and 

questioning of an American citizen by Chinese police. 

A. Chinese Obstructionism Led the State Department to Create the ACC 

Program in China 

The State Department initially launched the ACC program to counter 

China’s efforts to block the expansion of a similarly named but different program 

called “American Spaces.” In 2010, American Spaces were the largest and most 

formal public diplomacy platforms outside the United States—“often stand-alone 

facilities, which combine a library, Internet stations, meeting spaces and often 

English language classrooms.”434 By 2011, China had established more than 71 

Confucius Institutes in the United States, while at the same time, prevented the 

State Department from opening more than five American Spaces in China outside 

of the U.S. embassy or consulates.435 At that time, the five American Spaces were 

located in Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Shanghai.436 According to 

a 2011 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Staff Report, “The 

Chinese government has been resistant to any further opening of U.S. public 

diplomacy facilities, claiming that each country has six diplomatic facilities in the 

other’s country and that this is a matter of strict reciprocity.”437

Gary Locke, at his nomination hearing to be U.S. ambassador to China, 

indicated that he shared the Committee’s concerns involving “the obstacles [State] 

faced in establishing [American Spaces] in China.”438 He also admitted that those 

barriers “effectively prevented” the expansion of public diplomacy efforts in 

China.439

In an attempt to find alternatives to Chinese disruption of American Spaces, 

the State Department launched the ACC program. ACCs, as the State Department 

detailed in a submission to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2010, 

were the next choice: 

 

433 CDP-2018-00005-00002. 

434 U.S. Senate, Comm. on Foreign Relations, Another U.S. Deficit—China and America—Diplomacy 

in the Age of the Internet, 7 (Feb. 15, 2011) (minority staff report). 

435 Id. 436 Id. 437 Id. at 8. 

438 Nominations of the 112th Congress—First Session: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Comm. of the U.S. Senate, 112th Con. 112-399, 241 (May 26, 2011) (Questions for the record, Gary 

Locke, U.S. Amb. to China).

439 Id. 
79 

There are, however, alternative methods of creating places for Chinese 

audiences to learn about the United States and several options are being 

vigorously pursued. Recently, a number of U.S. universities such as 

Arizona State University, New York University, and University of 

Southern California, have entered into partnerships with Chinese 

universities to establish university-sponsored American Cultural 

Centers on Chinese campuses. This is an encouraging trend. The 

Department hopes to see the establishment of additional American 

Cultural Centers in China.440

In order to “vigorously pursue” the expansion of the ACC program, the State 

Department needed to solicit funding applications from U.S. colleges and 

universities. The 2011 Request for Application (“RFA”)—the State Department’s 

formal document soliciting applications—stated that the “U.S.-China relationship is 

one of the United States’ most important bilateral relationships.”441 The RFA 

continued, “A great deal of work remains to be done in fostering mutual 

understanding between the peoples of the two nations. The Chinese government’s 

creation in the United States of multiple university-based ‘Confucius Institutes’ has 

increased the level and quality of the study of Chinese language and culture in the 

U.S.”442 The State Department then sought out American colleges willing to open 

an ACC. 

The typical ACC grant provided a one-time award of $100,000, after which 

the grantees could request supplementary funds.443 Since the program’s origination 

in 2010, the State Department disbursed $5.1 million in grants to support 29 ACCs 

between U.S. educational institutions and Chinese universities.444

In comparison, since 2006, China spent more than $158 million on Confucius 

Institutes located in the United States.445 As of this report, there are roughly 100 

U.S. Confucius Institutes—the State Department, on the other hand, stopped 

funding ACCs in China.446 In October 2018, the State Department ceased all ACC 

 

440 Id. 441 U.S. State Dep’t, EAPBJ-11-AW-001-EAP-070611, Public Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy Beijing, 

American Cultural Centers and Cultural Programming in the People’s Republic of China, 3 (Aug. 

2011). 

442 Id. 443 Id. 444 U.S. Dep’t of State, ISP-I-18-04, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of Embassy Beijing and 

Constituent Posts, China, 9 (Dec. 2017). 

445 See Section VI. Spending Data Published by the Department of Education Fails to Provide 

Accurate Confucius Institutes Spending. 

446 PETERSON REPORT at 24. 
80 

funding while it undertook a review of the effectiveness of the program.447 The 

chart on the next page shows the disparity between the number of Chinese 

government-funded Confucius Institutes in the United States and the number of 

State Department-funded ACCs in China.448

B. The State Department Does Not Exert the Same Control over 

American Cultural Centers as the Chinese Government Exerts over 

Confucius Institutes 

There are two material differences between Confucius Institutes and ACCs. 

These differences are important as the State Department lacks the level of control 

Hanban wields over its Confucius Institutes. ACC grants were typically one-time 

awards to get the ACC off the ground and fund the renovation of a room or space on 

a Chinese school campus.449 Hanban, on the other hand, provides fee-for-service 

and annual funding for Confucius Institutes. After the grant period ended, U.S. 

schools were no longer required to submit progress or status reports to the State 

Department.450

The State Department also took a “hands off” approach with programming at 

ACCs and did not significantly control the direction of events or speakers.451 

According to Lisa Heller, the Senior Cultural Affairs and later the Public Affairs 

 

447 Briefing with Lisa Heller, U.S. State Dep’t, Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy, Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sept. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Heller Interview (Sept. 13, 2018)]. 

448 CDP-2018-00005-00007−00018; See Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2008-2017. 449 Heller Interview (Sept. 13, 2018). 

450 Id. 451 Id. 
81 

Officer in Beijing from 2012-2016, Confucius Institutes and ACCs were materially 

different.452 For example, unlike Hanban and the Confucius Institutes, the State 

Department did not pay the salaries of the visiting professors, did not vet or 

approve the professors, and, importantly, did not approve the ACC programming.453 

Moreover, in contrast to Hanban, the State Department did not prohibit certain 

topics or issues for discussion.454 Finally, the State Department did not routinely 

purchase textbooks, materials, or videos for ACCs. Those items and other teaching 

materials were usually purchased directly by the U.S. school.455

C. Despite Receiving Funding, Seven American Cultural Centers Never 

Opened 

Despite receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from the State 

Department, at least seven ACCs sponsored by U.S. schools were unable to ever 

open due to Chinese interference. This section examines three U.S. schools that 

received the grant funding, but were unable to open due to intentional delays and 

local government pressure. The map on the following page shows the locations of 

the ACCs that were supposed to have opened and never did (red dots) and also the 

now-closed ACCs (yellow dots).456

 

452 Id. 453 Id. 454 Id. 455 Id. 456 CDP-2018-00005-00007−00018. 
82 

First, the State Department notified a U.S. school that it was selected for the 

ACC grant in 2014.457 The U.S. school planned to spend the $99,999 it received to 

promote American films and music at its partner school in China.458 The initial 

efforts to negotiate the terms of the arrangement between the schools were 

successful—the Chinese school even reserved a space in a prominent campus 

building and arranged a signing ceremony. It became clear, however, that China’s 

Ministry of Education put forth insurmountable roadblocks that ultimately killed 

the arrangement altogether. 

While several Chinese school officials were on their way to the United States, 

in part to sign the agreement, the U.S. school received an urgent message from 

Chinese school officials with proposed revisions to the agreement.459 Those U.S. 

schools officials scrambled over the weekend to work out an agreement and preserve 

the signing ceremony, but identified major concerns with the Chinese school’s 

proposals. Among the concerns the official had were there was a restriction that the 

ACC could only provide “Chinese appropriate material,” there was a lack of 

certainty regarding U.S. Embassy access to the ACC, and there was a requirement 

that the final agreement be approved by China’s Ministry of Education.460

Eventually, Chinese school officials told U.S. school officials that it was no 

longer interested in hosting the ACC. One Chinese school official wrote, “Presently, 

we have quite a few centers at our university. Truth be told, it is a little 

disappointing that some centers haven’t made progress in joint research or student 

education.” That same official concluded the email, “[the Chinese school] doesn’t see 

there is a need of setting up another center at this point of time.”461 At least one 

U.S. school official, however, believed China’s Ministry of Education told the 

partner school not to proceed with the contract. This official wrote in an email to 

his colleagues, “This is a typical Chinese political euphemism. Obviously, [the 

Chinese school] was instructed by [the Ministry of Education] not to proceed with 

our proposal.”462 As a result, the U.S. school did not spend any of the grant funding 

and returned it all to the State Department in 2015.463

Second, the State Department awarded a U.S. school $99,717 in mid-2014.464 

Despite the U.S. school’s best efforts, including a faculty trip to China, the 

 

457 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2018). 

458 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Jan. 8, 2019). 

459 Id. 460 Id. 461 Id. 462 Id. 463 CDP-2018-00005-00011. 

464 CDP-2018-00005-00014. 
83 

university was not able to open an ACC on its Chinese partner school’s campus.465 

According to university officials, Chinese interference started almost 

immediately.466 For example, after the State Department awarded the grant, two 

university faculty members traveled to China with “the intent of finalizing the 

plans for setting up the American Cultural Center.”467 At the first joint planning 

meeting, Chinese school officials informed them “that the Center would have to be 

put ‘on hold.’ They gave no explanation.”468 Chinese school officials also “disinvited 

the local Department of State delegation to this meeting.”469

After months without any significant progress, U.S. school officials “made 

numerous attempts to contact [the Chinese school] regarding the ACC. Any 

inquiries we made as to when we could possibly start the Center were met with ‘It 

is still on hold.’”470 The final status report submitted by the university to the State 

Department described the final shutdown of the ACC efforts: 

The dismaying news that the plans had been scuttled, then, was 

delivered to us at the very last minute. It seems that 

miscommunications between officials at [the Chinese school] and the 

provincial government had led to the delays and finally to the decision 

to withdraw their invitation to us to locate an ACC on their campus.471

The U.S. school’s then-department chair involved with this grant explained to 

the Subcommittee that after all of the delays, it was clear the ACC was never going 

to work.472 That same official told the Subcommittee that “the bottom line is that it 

was politics.”473 Eventually, the U.S. school simply stopped trying to open the ACC 

and eventually returned the unused funds to the State Department.474

Third, in 2014, the State Department awarded the U.S. school $100,000 to 

open an ACC on Chinese school’s campus in northeast China. According to U.S. 

school officials, there were difficulties from the start in trying to open and establish 

the ACC.475 For example, Chinese school officials did not provide timely responses 

and there was a lack of communication between the two schools. After months of 

 

465 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 29, 2018). 

466 Id. 467 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 17, 2018). 

468 Id. 469 Id. 470 Id. 471 Id. 472 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Sept. 4, 2018). 

473 Id. 474 Id. 475 Id. 
84 

negotiation and delays, U.S. school officials simply made the determination that the 

project was not going to move forward.476 

Those same officials speculated that something political was going on behind 

the scenes and that the Chinese school officials “got cold feet,” suddenly no longer 

feeling comfortable with establishing the ACC on campus.477 U.S. school officials 

reported that the U.S. and Chinese schools had a great relationship both before and 

after the failure to launch the ACC.478 The only program between the two schools 

that was unable to get off the ground was the ACC program—which coincidentally 

was also the only program that included funding from the U.S. government.479

D. The State Department Stopped Funding All American Cultural 

Centers 

Some American colleges and universities were able to launch their respective 

ACCs and conduct programming for several years. The programming, however, was 

limited to cultural activities with a focus on the arts. And, even under those limits, 

the American colleges even had difficulty getting approval for benign events such as 

hosting a jazz band. In many cases, the Chinese university would simply delay 

approving a proposed event or speaker without ever giving official justification or 

rationale. In at least one case detailed to the Subcommittee, the approval of the 

local Chinese communist party was needed before cultural events could take place 

on a Chinese campus. This section details the obstruction and interference of three 

ACCs after opening. 

First, a U.S. school used its $100,000 grant from the State Department to 

create an ACC at its Chinese partner school, with which it has had a 30-year 

relationship. The ACC, housed at the foreign language building, included a lounge, 

kitchen, and resource library, complete with a large selection of American 

cookbooks.480 There were complications in getting permission to approve events and 

speakers for the several years the U.S. school sponsored the ACC in China.481 For 

example, the Chinese school turned down the opportunity to host a gathering of 

Directors from all ACCs and representatives from international offices of 

participating universities. According to a status report submitted to the State 

Department, “This would have been a great opportunity to showcase the 

longstanding partnership between [the U.S. and Chinese schools], as well as the 

 

476 Id. 477 Id. 478 Id. 479 Id. 480 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 14, 2018). 

481 Id. 
85 

progress on the ACC space. However, we were told getting permission from the 

Chinese government in a timely fashion [ ] was not possible.”482

In addition to approval complications, one particular program was cancelled 

entirely. In 2015, the U.S. school planned to host a one-man show about the life 

and times of Muhammad Ali. The Chinese school did not grant permission and the 

event did not happen. A U.S. school official responsible for the ACC grant wrote to 

the State Department, “It was disappointing that [the Chinese school] could not 

host us but totally understandable. It is a nuanced political climate we operate in 

and I will reach out to them one more time in case they can host us.”483 Finally, 

according to a U.S. school official who worked directly on the ACC grant, the 

programs were successful, but officials were careful not to “promote American 

culture too much.”484 That same official indicated they could never do a program on 

Tibet or Taiwan as they wouldn’t even think of proposing something like that.485

Second, the State Department awarded a different U.S. school $98,661 in 

2016 to open an ACC at its Chinese partner school.486 This U.S. school also had a 

Confucius Institute at its U.S. campus.487 According to U.S. administrators, the 

U.S. constructed its ACC in a large room on campus.488 A plaque outside the ACC 

read, “The Sino-American Cultural Exchange Center.”489 The U.S. school planned 

to film various lectures in the United States and then show those lectures to 

students at the ACC. The lecture series “focused on problems and challenges in 

American society,” including “capitalism in the United States,” “gun control and gun 

rights,” and finally “issues relating to gender and sexuality.”490 Additional lectures 

that were planned but never filmed included topics on globalization and health 

care.491 While most of the lectures were filmed, they were never shown on the 

Chinese partner’s campus as the school never gave permission.492

The U.S. school also had difficulty arranging visits from the U.S. embassy 

staff, including Ambassador Terry Branstad, to the ACC.493 In 2018, U.S. school 

officials told the State Department, “The most significant issue we are facing at this 

time is the inability to arrange a successful visit to the Sino-American Cultural 

 

482 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 2, 2018). 

483 Id. 484 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Aug. 14, 2018). 

485 Id. 486 CDP-2018-00005-00007−8. 

487 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 31, 2018). 

488 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 31, 2018). 

489 Id. 490 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018). 

491 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 31, 2018). 

492 Id. 493 Id. 
86 

Exchange Center for U.S. Embassy staff. We have received conflicting information 

from our partner regarding the status of the space allocated for the Center.”494 

When Ambassador Branstad tried to visit the ACC, the U.S. school was not able to 

secure the proper permission and nearly shut down the ACC altogether. China’s 

Ministry of Education even questioned the Chinese partner school’s officials and 

indicated that they did not follow proper procedures as the ACC was funded by the 

U.S. government.495 U.S. school officials further described the trouble with the ACC 

in a May 2018 email to the State Department: 

[The Chinese school] will have to keep the center quiet for a period of 

time and remove the plaque from the center temporarily. Therefore, the 

backup plan I discussed with them is to keep the center [functioning] as 

a resource room with all the lectures and books we provided available 

for students and faculty there. However, this will also not be done right 

away in order to avoid unnecessary attention at this sensitive time 

period.496

A State Department official replied back, “Since it appears that [the Chinese 

school] is putting the center on hiatus until this ‘sensitive time’ concludes, we would 

like to hold further disbursements pending a reopening of the space as well as a 

realistic grant monitoring plan.”497 As of this report, the ACC remained closed. 

Third, a different U.S. school obtained an ACC grant from the State 

Department in 2011.498 The U.S. school successfully established the ACC as part of 

the on-going affiliation with its Chinese partner school.499 For several years, the 

ACC sponsored fruitful events, hosting a range of speakers, musicians, and other 

cultural activities.500 All that changed, however, in late 2015, when the Chinese 

police interrogated a U.S. school’s dean about her involvement with the ACC and 

the U.S. State Department.501

The dean joined the U.S. school in 2012 and was dean of the Chinese campus 

and executive director for the school’s programs throughout China.502 The dean told 

the Subcommittee that while her program was able to accomplish a lot with the 

State Department grant, it was difficult to get approval for certain events and 

 

494 Documents on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 29, 2018). 

495 Id. 496 CDP-2018-00005-00055. 

497 CDP-2018-00005-00054. 

498 CDP-2018-00005-00274. 

499 Id. 500 Interview Records on file with the Subcommittee (Oct. 16, 2018). 

501 Id. 502 Id. 
87 

activities.503 She indicated that the Chinese school’s approval process was difficult 

to navigate and that it even stopped certain programming because permission took 

so long to obtain.504 Members of the local Chinese Communist Party also 

participated in the approval process.505 For example, the dean said that there was a 

weekly planning meeting with U.S. school, the Chinese school, and the “party chair” 

assigned to the Chinese school.506

In fall of 2015, more than four years after launching the ACC, the dean was 

at her home in China when she received an urgent phone call from a Chinese school 

official instructing her to come to an administration building on campus right 

away.507 According to the dean, she arrived at the administration building and was 

led into a small conference room where she was greeted by four uniformed Chinese 

police officials.508 The police officials had placed their badges on the table for the 

dean to see when she entered the room.509 One of the police officials instructed the 

dean’s administrative assistant and translator to leave the room, but she 

objected.510 After several minutes of debate, the police officials let the 

administrative assistant stay in the room to translate the questioning.511

The police officials then proceeded to ask the dean a series of questions 

concerning both her personal and her U.S. school’s involvement with the ACC 

program.512 The questions focused on funding, paperwork, administrative 

hierarchy, and any involvement of the State Department.513 The dean said this all 

caught her off guard, as the meeting and questioning were unexpected.514 She also 

told the Subcommittee that before she went into the room, she sent a concerned text 

to her husband explaining that she was going to answer questions from the 

police.515 Towards the end of the meeting, the police officials asked for specific 

answers to a series of questions.516 The police told her that they would follow-up 

soon and instructed her not to discuss the meeting with anyone.517

 

503 Id. 504 Id. 505 Id. 506 Id. 507 Id. 508 Id. 509 Id. 510 Id. 511 Id. 512 Id. 513 Id. 514 Id. 515 Id. 516 Id. 517 Id. 
88 

After the interrogation, the dean sent an email to U.S. school officials asking 

for paperwork, funding requests, and other answers to the police officials’ 

questions.518 Roughly a week after the first meeting, the police returned and 

demanded to see her correspondence with her U.S. school to ensure that she 

actually did follow-up on their requests.519 The dean told the Subcommittee that 

she later told an American colleague also working in China about her experience.520 

Her colleague was not surprised about the questioning as the police routinely 

interrogate American officials in this manner.521 Now, the colleague concluded, she 

was just “part of the club.”522

E. The State Department Inspector General Found that the American 

Cultural Center Program was “Largely Ineffective” in its Mission 

Due to Chinese Interference 

In December 2017, the State Department Inspector General (“IG”) found that 

“Mission China’s American Cultural Center program is largely ineffective in 

achieving its stated goal of promoting a greater understanding of U.S. culture and 

policies through outreach to Chinese students and the general public.”523 The IG 

report covered a wide range of public diplomacy issues the embassy encountered 

and specifically identified Chinese interference and obstruction as a limiting factor 

when determining the ACC program’s effectiveness. 

For example, the State Department’s grant or funding evaluation process 

cites the importance of being able to monitor or track the grant’s success through 

visitations or other on-site assessments. The IG found, “In an environment where 

access to university campuses and officials is subject to host government approval, 

mission personnel consistently reported difficulty visiting these centers, whose 

activities or even existence in some cases could not be verified.”524 As a result of the 

restrictions on visiting the ACCs, the IG continued, “mission personnel were often 

unable to monitor progress towards a grant’s goals and objectives” as required by 

State Department policy.525

The State Department responded to the IG’s report stating that it “does not 

agree that the American Cultural Center program has been ‘largely ineffective’ ... 

 

518 Id. 519 Id. 520 Id. 521 Id. 522 Id. 523 U.S. Dep’t of State, ISP-I-18-04, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of Embassy Beijing and 

Constituent Posts, China, 9 (Dec. 2017). 

524 Id. 525 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 

but agrees that there are concerns related to the stability of specific Centers due to 

active interference by the Chinese government as well as limitations in visiting 

individual centers.”526 Notwithstanding that comment, the State Department did 

not fund any new cultural centers and will base additional funding of cultural 

centers in FY 2018 on the results of a more formal evaluation of the program.527 

F. The State Department Documented More than 80 Instances of 

Chinese Interference with Public Diplomacy Projects 

As Chinese interference increased over the last several years, the State 

Department started keeping detailed records. These records detail more than 80 

specific instances of Chinese government interference with American public 

diplomacy efforts throughout China. While the types of interference and 

obstruction varied, there were two main types of interference reported by the State 

Department in internal reports reviewed by the Subcommittee and in interviews 

with Subcommittee staff. First, Chinese officials actively prevented U.S. diplomats 

and other embassy officials from being able to visit ACCs or other educational 

programs sponsored by the U.S. government. Second, Chinese officials routinely 

cancelled events that were either hosted by, or involved the participation of, the 

U.S. embassy in Beijing. 

China’s actions appear to contradict the important diplomatic principle of 

reciprocity that is recognized in international tradition and law. Generally, 

reciprocity involves one state offering the citizens of another state certain privileges 

on the condition that its citizens enjoy similar privileges in the other state.528 In the 

spirit of this tradition, the U.S. government does not systematically and routinely 

deny Chinese diplomats travel or shutdown public diplomacy events. In short, 

given the well-established diplomatic norm of reciprocity, U.S. diplomats should be 

allowed to travel or attend events in China the same way Chinese diplomats are 

free to do so in the United States. 

1. Chinese Officials Prevented U.S. Diplomats from Visiting 

American Cultural Centers and Attending Other Public 

Diplomacy Events in China 

Over the last several years, China routinely prevented U.S. diplomats from 

visiting ACCs and attending other public diplomacy events that focused on cultural 

 

526 Id. at 36. 

527 Id. at 25. 

528 Young-Joon Mok, The Principle of Reciprocity in the United Nations Convention on the 

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, 21 Case. W. Res. J. Int’l L. 123, 

125 (1989). 
90 

exchanges. Limiting access to facilities funded in whole or in part by the United 

States prevents the State Department from determining the effectiveness of its 

programs. The State Department IG also cited the fact that the embassy staff was 

“unable to monitor” the success of the grant as one reason that the program as a 

whole was ineffective.529 Chinese authorities failed to provide adequate reasons for 

the denied visits in more than 12 of the examples the State Department recorded. 

Detailed below are examples taken from internal State Department documents and 

interviews with State Department officials and U.S. educational administrators of 

specific instances of interference over the past several years. 

 In March 2018, a Chinese Foreign Affairs Officer (“FAO”) refused to 

allow a State Department official to visit an ACC. The FAO told the 

State Department that the particular ACC was “no longer in existence.” 

The State Department checked with the American director of the ACC 

who indicated that the center was still active and that “lectures and 

other programs that are scheduled under the terms of the grant and 

their proposal are proceeding without difficulty.” Even though the State 

Department official indicated that he had “an obligation to visit as part 

of our grant monitoring responsibilities,” the visit was never 

arranged.530

 In April 2018, a State Department official was not permitted to attend 

a workshop at a Chinese school. According to the State Department, the 

only explanation was that the week before the school’s hosting the ACC 

shut down its Confucius Institute in the United States.531

 In October 2017, a State Department official was scheduled to meet with 

an ACC’s American director. When the American director brought the 

official to the ACC, the night staff “claimed not to have the keys.” After 

several calls and the appearance of higher ranking school officials, “the 

keys were ‘discovered’ on the night watchman’s key ring.”532

 In April 2018, a Chinese school representative wrote that it was “too late 

to get the approval from the Chinese government for [U.S. government 

staff] to attend the opening [of an ACC].” The U.S. request was made 

more than one month before the opening event. The same Chinese 

school representative stated that, “[The Chinese school] thinks it is 

 

529 U.S. Dep’t of State, ISP-I-18-04, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of Embassy Beijing and 

Constituent Posts, China 9 (Dec. 2017). 

530 CDP-2018-00005-00059. 

531 CDP-2018-00005-00019. 

532 CDP-2018-00005-00025. 
91 

better to fly under the radar given the current relationship between the 

two countries.”533

 In January 2018, Chinese school officials prohibited U.S. 

representatives from attending a film screening on a U.S. president at 

an ACC. A few days before the screening, the Chinese school officials 

informed the State Department that they would not be able to attend 

the viewings and “cited a rule prohibiting U.S. government officials from 

accessing university campuses” to show films or conduct 

lectures/presentations.534

 In December 2017, the Chinese director of an ACC invited U.S. officials 

to serve as judges for a cultural knowledge competition, but the next day 

disinvited the officials.535

 In May 2016, a new ACC opened, but was not able to operate effectively 

or collaborate with the U.S. Consulate. Following the opening 

ceremony, the Chinese school hosting the ACC was told that they must 

file a formal request with a party official if any U.S. State Department 

wanted to visit the school.536

2. Chinese Universities Regularly Cancelled Events After Granting 

Approval 

Over the past several years, the State Department was forced to cancel 

dozens of events, speakers, and other activities after obtaining approval and 

undertaking significant preparations. Detailed below are examples taken from 

internal State Department documents and interviews with State Department 

officials and U.S. educational administrators of events or activities cancelled in the 

days or weeks leading up to them. 

 In May 2017, a Chinese school did not allow a Fulbright Alumni 

Conference to take place on the school campus. The State Department 

then planned to hold the conference at a local hotel. Three days before 

the event, the hotel informed the State Department that another event 

was planned for the same time, so it needed to cancel. Upon further 

inquiry, the hotel staff admitted that they were told not to allow the 

conference. So, just two days prior to the conference, the State 

 

533 CDP-2018-00005-00047. 

534 CDP-2018-00005-00020. 

535 CDP-2018-00005-00022 

536 CDP-2018-00005-00037. 
92 

Department moved the conference to a private museum and received 

permission. The night before the conference, while the State 

Department was still arranging furniture at the venue, the museum 

cancelled the event.537

 In October 2017, a U.S. District Judge planned to visit China and engage 

with local legal officials, professional, researchers, professors, and 

students. Two events were planned—a presentation co-hosted with a 

local law firm and an afternoon discussion with law students at a 

Chinese school. The Chinese FAO cancelled the discussion the night 

before the event.538

 In October 2017, a Chinese school, which previously had agreed to host 

an event with a speaker on corporate social responsibility, announced 

days before the event that it was “too sensitive” and cancelled.539

 In June 2017, a Chinese school’s international department invited a 

State Department official to give a commencement speech. But two days 

before the event, the school called to say that they could only invite the 

U.S. official to attend the graduation ceremony.540

 In March 2017, a State Department official was scheduled to speak to 

students at a Chinese school on U.S.-China Economic Relations. The 

lecture was cancelled the week before when the professor making the 

arrangements said that the academic exchange committee deemed it 

“too sensitive of a time to have a visit from U.S. Embassy personnel.” 

The Chinese professor added that, “with the National People's Congress 

underway here it seems like everyone is very on their toes.”541

 In March 2017, a Chinese school was initially very receptive to the 

opportunity to host the U.S. Consular General, and the Chinese school 

president approved of the event. A few weeks later, however, one official 

warned the school not to cooperate at all with the U.S. Consulate 

because it is a “very sensitive time in China right now.” The event was 

subsequently cancelled.542

 

537 CDP-2018-00005-00028. 

538 CDP-2018-00005-00023. 

539 CDP-2018-00005-00030. 

540 CDP-2018-00005-00026. 

541 CDP-2018-00005-00030. 

542 CDP-2018-00005-00031. 
93 

 In October 2016, a Chinese school official cancelled a presentation on 

the U.S election process after receiving instructions from superiors. 

That official apologized to the State Department and explained that the 

cancellation was attributed to the current “sensitive environment.” The 

official added that “similar activities have all been cancelled on the 

campus.”543

 In September 2016, a Chinese school professor reached out to the State 

Department about having a former ambassador speak to a group of 

students about the U.S. election. The event was scheduled, but 

cancelled days later. Following the cancellation, the Chinese professor 

informed the State Department that individuals from “National 

Security Bureau” and “Provincial FAO” asked the school to cancel the 

event.544

 

543 CDP-2018-00005-00033. 

544 CDP-2018-00005-00035.