R A G I N G 

WATERS

R A G I N G 

WATERS

C h i n a , I n d i a , B a n g l a d e s h , 

and Brahmaputra River Politics

N I L A N T H I S A M A R A N A Y A K E , S A T U L I M A Y E , 

AND JOEL WUTHNOW

Quantico, Virginia

MCUP MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS 

2018

A joint publication of CNA

and Marine Corps University Press
DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine Corps University, 

the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Government. The information 

contained in this book was accurate at the time of printing. Every effort has been made to 

secure copyright permission on excerpts and illustrations reproduced in this volume. Please 

contact the editors to rectify inadvertent errors or omissions.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Samaranayake, Nilanthi, author. | Limaye, Satu P., author. | Wuthnow, 

 Joel, author. | Marine Corps University (U.S.). Press, publisher.

Title: Raging waters : China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River 

 politics / Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu Limaye, and Joel Wuthnow.

Other titles: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River politics

Description: First edition. | Quantico, Virginia : Marine Corps University 

 Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018033391 | ISBN 9781732003002 (paperback)

Subjects: LCSH: Water security--Brahmaputra River. | Water-supply--Political 

 aspects--Brahmaputra River. | Water resources development--Political 

 aspects--Brahmaputra River. | Brahmaputra River Watershed--Political 

 aspects. | Water rights (International law)

Classification: LCC HD1698.A1 S26 2018 | DDC 333.91/62095492--dc23 | SUDOC D 

 214.513:B 73

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018033391

MCUP MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS 

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First edition published 2018

ISBN: 978-1-7320030-0-2

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www.cna.org
Maps vii

Foreword ix

Preface xiii

Acknowledgments xvii

Introduction 1

1. Water Power, Water Worries: China’s Goals and Challenges 

as the Brahmaputra’s Uppermost Riparian 13

 by Joel Wuthnow

2. Upstream, Downstream: Reflections on India’s Riparian 

Relationships on the Brahmaputra 38

 by Satu Limaye

3. Bangladesh: The Strongest Advocate of Basin-Wide Management 71

 by Nilanthi Samaranayake

Conclusion 100

Appendix 103

Glossary 115

Contributors 117

Index 119

CONTENTS

v

LIST OF MAPS

Map 0.1 The Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basins. 4

Map 0.2 The Brahmaputra River. 6

Map 1.1 China’s current and planned dams on the Yarlung/Brahmaputra. 16

Map 1.2 Current and planned routes of the South–North 

Water Diversion Project. 18

Map 2.1 India’s middle riparian position on the Brahmaputra River. 41

Map 2.2 The Brahmaputra River basin has fewer dams than other 

major South Asia river basins. 51

Map 2.3 India’s river-linking project, which includes the linking 

of the Brahmaputra River. 67

Map 3.1 The Brahmaputra River basin in Bangladesh. 75

Map 3.2 Brahmaputra in Bangladesh: the subnational view, by 

divisions and districts. 77

Map 3.3 The Ganges River, Farakka Barrage, the Brahmaputra 

River basin, the Meghna River basin, and southwestern 

Bangladesh. 90

vii

FOREWORD

Throughout my career as an academic and government analyst I was 

drawn to complex challenges: first, as a “multidisciplinary” PhD studying 

at the crossroads between international relations, geography, and history; 

second, as an academic working in a military environment; and last, as 

a researcher interested in environmental security, and more specifically, 

water scarcity. 

Water scarcity is a difficult but important subject to address. My lectures on the topic usually begin with a complex diagram mapping the large 

number of issue areas that illustrates how vitally important water is to 

every facet of human existence. However, another message becomes apparent to students: water scarcity is an expansive topic and therefore theoretically problematic. From the start complications arise due to the pervasive 

nature of water. Water underwrites human life, so how can we begin to 

discuss it in isolation from other variables? Does water scarcity cause conflict or does conflict cause water scarcity? Is water scarcity due to a lack of 

availability or to ineffective allocation? Are the problems solved by building more infrastructure or does the spread of infrastructure lead to more 

water exploitation? Unfortunately, the best answer to most of these questions is: “it depends.” Water scarcity is subject to a wide variation of conditions, depending on the uniqueness of each geographical area. 

Case studies, such as those used in Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics, are vitally important to understanding the broader impacts across a basin, but the ubiquitous nature of water 

confounds research efforts. What level of analysis is appropriate to study a 

river system? One possibility is to analyze subnational dynamics, which are 

ix
x | Foreword

helpful to understand specific impacts of water scarcity that may lead to 

internal displacement, violence, and economic hardships. Another option 

is to consider state-level impact—these help explain national policies, relations with neighboring rivals, and the potential for regional conflict over 

water resources. Neither of these levels of analysis used in isolation can 

provide a holistic picture of a complete river. This book takes a methodological approach that accounts for all levels of analysis. 

This volume fills an important niche in the literature. The Tibetan 

Plateau is known as the water cooler for Asia and forms the headwaters 

for many major river systems, such as the Yangtze, Yellow, Ganges, Indus, 

and Brahmaputra among others. Most of these rivers are well studied 

except for the Brahmaputra. This is in part because the Brahmaputra is frequently discussed in combination with two other rivers, the Ganges and the 

Meghna Rivers. Together they combine to form the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna (GBM) river basin. There is a need to address the Brahmaputra 

due to China’s upstream development activity, which amounts to less water 

for India and Bangladesh, and because the Brahmaputra lacks a bilateral 

or multilateral agreement. The authors use original research that serves to 

increase the relevance of the book. Many authors tend to avoid the detailed 

layers associated with the domestic level of analysis and thus the potential 

problems associated with it. Domestic sources can be difficult to research for 

a variety of reasons, including their availability and the inability to generate 

accurate translations. The authors put forth a great deal of effort to include 

original sources from the region that are interspersed with interviews. These 

provide a rich baseline to understand the multiple causes of water scarcity in the region and highlight the interstate dilemmas over water-sharing 

agreements. 

The contribution of this book is considerable, not only to the student of 

water scarcity but also to a regionalist who constantly seeks to understand 

the complex interactions of economic, political, social, and environmental 

factors that influence security. Equitable water distribution of the Brahmaputra River plays an important role in Chinese, Indian, and Bangladeshi 

relations. China’s strategy is to develop the remote areas around the river 
through damming projects, which will provide energy and water for agriculture. This strategy is no different than Turkey’s well-known Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), or the U.S. development of the Colorado River 

beginning in the 1930s. Such massive development will result in less water 

for the middle riparian (India) and lowest riparian (Bangladesh). All three 

states are considered water scarce, so can they forge an agreement regarding the Brahmaputra? The authors explain that there is no bilateral or multilateral accord in place and that the obstacles to such an agreement are due 

to domestic politics, national objectives, and regional dynamics. In short, 

Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics helps 

to reduce the level of complexity surrounding the topic of water politics, 

and it sheds light on an under-researched but increasingly important area 

of Asia.

Matthew R. Slater

Foreword | xi

PREFACE

xiii

The availability of water resources provided by the Brahmaputra River, 

which originates in China and runs through India and Bangladesh, raises 

serious concerns for regional stability. China and India are actively constructing dams and considering water diversion plans, while Bangladesh 

faces human security pressures that will be magnified by upstream river 

practices. A pioneering 2012 Intelligence Community Assessment by the U.S. 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, entitled Global Water Security, 

identified the Brahmaputra basin as having “inadequate” river basin management capacity. Of the seven river basins studied—Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, 

Mekong, Jordan, Indus, Brahmaputra, and Amu Darya—the Brahmaputra 

ranked lowest in river basin management capacity. The report forecasted 

that the basin will see ongoing discord among riparian nations concerning 

river development projects through 2040, as well as reduced food security 

and hydropower potential.1

Unlike the Indus or Ganges Rivers, there is no bilateral or multilateral accord for water management of the Brahmaputra River. Current 

cooperation in this basin only entails some dialogue and limited sharing 

of hydrological data for the purpose of flood forecasting. Moreover, the 

basin is home to three of the most populous nations in the world—two of 

which (China and India) fought a war in 1962 over still-contested territory 

through which the Brahmaputra flows. In fact, a troop standoff between 

India and China over the territory claimed by Bhutan and China appears to 

1 Global Water Security (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012).
xiv | Preface

have resulted in Beijing halting hydrological data sharing with New Delhi 

in the summer of 2017.2

 Meanwhile, Bangladesh and northeast India continue to experience severe flooding and damage in the Brahmaputra basin. 

Both events illustrate the ongoing potential for political-military instability 

and human security crises in this region regarding water resources. 

This book aims to provide greater understanding of the equities and 

drivers fueling water insecurity and resource competition in the Brahmaputra River basin. Further, it contributes to the burgeoning field of Asian 

water security analysis with the study of a river basin that has received 

little scholarly attention compared with the Indus and Ganges Rivers, integrating the study of water issues with the difficult international and subnational relations of the Brahmaputra basin region. To this end, we consider 

the following research questions.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS FOR UNDERSTANDING 

BRAHMAPUTRA SECURITY AND STAKEHOLDERS

What are the security implications of water resource competition in the 

Brahmaputra River basin? How do they vary at the subnational level (i.e., 

domestic), the bilateral level (i.e., India-Bangladesh, India-China, Bangladesh-China), and the basin-wide level (i.e., multilateral)?

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 

FOR BRAHMAPUTRA STAKEHOLDERS

What policies and foundational work could stakeholders pursue to mitigate water insecurity and advance their cooperation in the Brahmaputra River basin? How can policy makers in Bangladesh, India, and China 

address the lack of basin-wide management in the Brahmaputra to avoid 

future political-military and human security crises?

Drawing on original research conducted in India, China, and Bangladesh, we offer recommendations for key stakeholders to consider at the 

2 Joel Wuthnow, “Did China Use Water as a Weapon in the Doklam Standoff?,” War on the Rocks

(blog), 4 October 2017.
Preface | xv

subnational, bilateral, and basin-wide levels. We hope to lay the foundation for policy makers in the three capitals to take steps to manage water 

resource competition. They can then focus on shared interests and solutions that address underlying long-term water needs and economic development of the Brahmaputra basin, thereby strengthening regional security.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which sponsored the CNA study upon which this book is based. 

The 2016 study is entitled Water Resource Competition in the Brahmaputra 

River Basin: China, India, and Bangladesh by Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu 

Limaye, and Joel Wuthnow.

We are grateful to our think tank partners in the region—the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) in Dhaka, the Center for Policy Research 

(CPR) in New Delhi, and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing—for their willingness to support our 

field research and for hosting round table discussions. We are also grateful 

to the experts we consulted who kindly took the time to answer our many 

questions. 

xvii

INTRODUCTION

1

Events in the past decade—and especially during the past year—highlight 

the need for policy makers and scholars of Asia and water security to pay 

more attention to the stability of the Brahmaputra River basin. Originating in China, and flowing through India and Bangladesh, the river runs 

through three of the most populated countries in the world.1 China and 

India are major geopolitical players and fought a war in 1962 over territory that they still dispute and through which the Brahmaputra runs. In 

the summer of 2017, military forces of both countries engaged in a lengthy 

standoff due to a border dispute involving a third country—Bhutan. While 

the standoff was not directly tied to Brahmaputra basin resources, the conflict resulted in Beijing halting data sharing to New Delhi for flood forecasting purposes. This is an important cooperative measure, considering 

no water management agreement has been achieved in the basin. 

Furthermore, China’s attempt in September 2016 to block a tributary 

of the Brahmaputra in Tibet for hydroelectric dam construction alerted 

policy makers and experts in both India and Bangladesh to the potential 

for Beijing to wield undue influence on the two downstream riparian nations.2

 Meanwhile, Bangladesh faced another bout of severe flooding in the 

summer of 2017, thereby highlighting the ongoing pressures faced by the 

country due to this river, which is also at the mercy of activities by the two 

1

 Bhutan is the fourth country in the basin, although it is not considered a riparian nation because 

the Brahmaputra does not directly flow through it.

2

 Satu Limaye, Joel Wuthnow, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, “China and India’s Slow-Moving Path 

to ‘Water Wars’,” National Interest, 1 November 2016.
2 | Raging Waters

upper riparian countries, India and China. Flooding also took place on the 

Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra that enters Bangladesh from 

India and for which New Delhi still has not concluded a water-sharing 

agreement sought by Dhaka.

Even prior to 2018, voices from both China and India have increasingly 

stirred discussion for the last decade about the potential for conflict and the 

threats to human security as a result of water resource competition in the 

Brahmaputra basin. Most prominent has been Indian author Brahma Chellaney, whose 2011 book, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, raised alarms about 

China’s dam-building efforts on the Brahmaputra.3

 Chellaney’s analysis 

was, in part, inspired by the controversy over a People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) officer’s 2005 book, Xizang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo (Tibet’s Waters Will 

Save China).4

 Li Ling argues that upper riparian China should divert the 

Brahmaputra for internal use, despite the consequences for lower riparian 

states India and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, as the lowest riparian, has long been concerned about activities by its northern neighbors that 

negatively affect its citizens and resources. Interestingly, India is both a 

lower riparian in this basin with accompanying threat perceptions—similar 

to Bangladesh—and an upper riparian—similar to China.

Regarding the scope of the book, we are focusing on the Brahmaputra River basin, rather than addressing the wider GBM basin. Observers have often included the Brahmaputra as part of the wider 

GBM basin in their definition. This may reflect the fact that water security studies have focused on the Ganges as the primary unit of analysis and few have concentrated on the Brahmaputra itself. However, 

the Brahmaputra riparian countries entail arguably greater politicalmilitary and human security threats, given the sizable populations and 

complex historical and contemporary relations between China, India, and 

3

 Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 

Press, 2013). The Brahmaputra is known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, the Jamuna in Bangladesh, and the Siang in parts of India. For consistency, this book uses the term Brahmaputra to 

identify the river throughout the basin.

4

 Li Ling, Xizang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo [Tibet’s Waters Will Save China] (Taiwan: Huawen Press, 

2005).
Introduction | 3

Bangladesh. We also think there is legitimacy in keeping the focus on the 

Brahmaputra because a greater number of potential stakeholders could be 

involved if we used a GBM definition. Consequently, it would be very difficult to bring them all together to find solutions. For example, the United 

Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) writes: “In planning 

and management terms, it is simply impossible to consider the GBM river 

system as one system because of its sheer size, complexities and multinational character.”5

 Furthermore, the World Bank’s South Asia Water Initiative 

(SAWI) subdivides its South Asia project work, and one of its components 

is a separate Brahmaputra initiative.6 Therefore, we feel that it is more manageable to examine the subject at this level and that it is consistent with the 

view of expert institutions. 

A second issue of analytical scope involves the case of Bhutan. The 

region known as the “Third Pole” divides its water resources between 

several countries.7

 The Brahmaputra basin encompasses not only China, 

India, and Bangladesh but also Bhutan. While Bhutan has interests in the 

welfare of the Brahmaputra basin, we are not studying the country as part 

of this book due to reasons of geography, population size, and politicalmilitary independence and standing. First, the Brahmaputra does not directly traverse territory in Bhutan as it does through Bangladesh, India, 

and China. While technically in the Brahmaputra basin, the country is not 

a riparian nation. Second, China, India, and Bangladesh represent 3 of the 

10 most populous nations in the world. Their current and potential threats 

affect millions of citizens and have broader security implications. Bhutan 

has a population of about 750,000, compared with roughly 170 million 

5

 “Transboundary Water Issues,” in Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in Figures: AQUASTAT 

Survey—2011, ed. Karen Frenken (Rome: FAO, 2012), 123. 6

 “Brahmaputra Focus Area Strategy,” South Asia Water Initiative, http://www.worldbank.org

/en/programs/sawi#4

7

 “About: What Is the Third Pole?,” TheThirdPole.net. The term Third Pole refers to “the region 

that encompasses the Himalaya-Hindu Kush mountain range and the Tibetan Plateau [and] is 

widely known as the Third Pole because its ice fields contain the largest reserve of fresh water 

outside the polar regions.” 
in Bangladesh, 1.2 billion in India, and 1.3 billion in China.8

 As a result, 

Bhutan carries with it comparatively less threat potential than the risk 

factors that we assess from the three major countries in the basin. Finally, 

Bhutan is not the geopolitical player that the other three basin countries 

are. Though Bhutan is a sovereign country, it has largely been under 

India’s sphere of influence and heavily reliant on New Delhi for military 

8

 “Country Comparison: Population,” in The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).

4 | Raging Waters

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin,”

 in Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in Figures, AQUASTAT Survey—2011 

Map 0.1. The Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basins.
protection.9

 As a result of these three factors, we assigned equal analytical 

weight (and project resources) to field research in China, India, and Bangladesh; as such, we determined that Bhutan did not warrant the same level 

of attention. 

We hope that readers will find this book useful primarily for three 

reasons. First, it contributes to the burgeoning field of Asian water security 

analysis with a study of a river basin that has received little scholarly attention. A reader may wonder why this book focuses on the Brahmaputra 

River when, at least in South Asia, the Indus and Ganges basins have dominated the current study of river systems. For the Indus, the India-Pakistan 

conflict has elevated the importance of understanding the full spectrum of 

threats in the region, including water insecurity. The Ganges basin also has 

been a critical area of importance, given the hundreds of millions of people 

who depend on that river (see map 0.1). 

By contrast, the Brahmaputra basin has been comparatively underexamined, despite the complex geopolitics involved and potential threats to 

regional stability. Covering an expanse of 580,000 square kilometers across 

four countries, the Brahmaputra basin comprises China, India, Bangladesh, 

and Bhutan, which, according to the World Bank, occupy 50 percent, 34 

percent, 8 percent, and 8 percent of the basin, respectively.10 The river is 

the fifth largest in the world by flow, yet there is no water-sharing agreement or management accord in the basin.11 Minimal information sharing 

about water flows has taken place between the countries for floodprevention purposes only. As a frame of reference, basin agreements have 

been achieved on other important transboundary rivers, such as the Nile 

9

 Teresita C. Schaffer, “India Next Door, China Over the Horizon: The View from South Asia,” 

in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers—China and India, ed. Ashley Tellis, 

Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 307. 

10 “Brahmaputra Focus Area Strategy,” South Asia Water Initiative, http://www.worldbank.org

/en/programs/sawi#4. For a similar estimate, see “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin,” in 

Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in Figures, 111. 11 Patrick A. Ray et al., “Room for Improvement: Hydroclimatic Challenges to Poverty-reducing 

Development of the Brahmaputra River Basin,” Environmental Science & Policy, no. 54 (December 2015): 64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.06.015. 

Introduction | 5
Basin Initiative, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River.12 Moreover, the 

river is a coveted source of water for 130 million people, serves a variety of 

purposes such as agriculture, fisheries, and navigation, and it is a potential 

12 Himalayan Solutions: Co-operation and Security in River Basins (Mumbai, India: Strategic Foresight Group, 2011), 28–29. 

6 | Raging Waters

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from Demis Web Map Server 

Map 0.2. The Brahmaputra River. 
source of much-needed hydroelectric power to fuel growing economies in 

the region. Given the river’s importance and the fact its major stakeholders 

have not yet achieved a basin-wide agreement regarding the river’s management, the Brahmaputra warrants greater analytical attention (see map 0.2). 

Second, the book’s particular contributions include integrating the 

study of a diverse set of issues related to water, international relations, and 

subnational politics in the Brahmaputra basin—subjects that are not often 

analyzed together. In recent years, interest in Brahmaputra security among 

journalists and academics has largely emerged due to a focus on the bilateral or national implications of problems in the basin. Important foundational research regarding this basin has focused on various subcomponents 

of Brahmaputra security.13 This includes India-China security dynamics regarding their dam-building activities; India-Bangladesh discord over water 

sharing of the Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra; and water security within Bangladesh.14 At the other end of the spectrum, there have been 

several studies of water security in Asia broadly, but based on the reality 

that many of Asia’s major rivers systems originate in China. 

13 Important foundational research, conducted in South Asian countries as well as in Europe, covers aspects of the wider Brahmaputra River basin. Products include a study of perceptions about 

water security in South Asia by Chatham House, in partnership with Bangladesh Enterprise 

Institute (BEI), Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in India, and other regional institutions. 

See Gareth Price et al., Attitudes to Water in South Asia (London: Chatham House, 2014). The 

Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) in Mumbai conducted a comprehensive study about potential outcomes for Himalayan water security, such as desertification, food insecurity, pollution, 

and dam diversions. See The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia (Mumbai: 

Strategic Foresight Group, 2010). A study by Norway’s Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 

analyzed water scarcity in Bangladesh and considered the potential for multilateral cooperation 

mechanisms. See Åshild Kolås et al., Water Scarcity in Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict 

and Cooperation (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2013). 14 For India-China analysis, see Zhang Hongzhou, “China-India: Revisiting the ‘Water Wars’ 

Narrative,” Diplomat, 30 June 2015; Li Zhifei, “ZhongYin lingtu zhengduan zhong de shui ziyuan anquan wenti” [Water Security Issues in Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes], Nanya Yanjiu Jikan

[South Asian Studies Quarterly], no. 4 (2013): 29–34; and Water Security for India: The External 

Dynamics (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2010). For India-Bangladesh 

analysis, see Sagar Prasai and Mandakini D. Surie, Political Economy Analysis of the Teesta River 

Basin (New Delhi: Asia Foundation, 2013); and Rivers of Peace: Restructuring India Bangladesh 

Relations (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2013). For Bangladesh, see Ayreen Khan, “Water 

Security: The Threat Facing Bangladesh,” BIPSS Issue Brief, February 2007.

Introduction | 7
Building on these efforts, we examine the universe of Brahmaputra stakeholders and study them cohesively. Specifically, we will focus on 

three sets of stakeholders. First, we will address the national stakeholders in each capital who interact bilaterally with their counterparts in New 

Delhi, Dhaka, and Beijing. In addition to these high-level parties, farmers 

and local officials also played a role. Second, we delve into the interests of 

the various subnational stakeholders of the region, sometimes at odds with 

the leaders in their national capitals. These people live in such places as 

Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and West Bengal in India; Tibet in China; and 

Rangpur, Mymensingh, and Rajshahi in Bangladesh. Third, we investigate 

the possibility of multilateral activities and agreements that would serve the 

various stakeholders across the Brahmaputra basin. By adopting this approach and aforementioned scope, Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh 

and Brahmaputra River Politics fills a gap in the literature by transcending 

the analytical limits of state-centric or multibasin paradigms through attention to the Brahmaputra at the basin-wide (i.e., beyond solely bilateral relations) level and at the subnational (i.e., domestic) level, in addition to the 

bilateral level, all in one assessment. 

Third, the book aims to provide a common platform for interested 

parties—policy makers without training in hydrology and scientists without 

a background in the study of international relations—to consider the water 

challenges faced by Bangladesh, India, and China along the entire Brahmaputra against the backdrop of their bilateral relations. We hope this book 

will inform policy communities in China, India, and Bangladesh—as well 

as water resource specialists and academics internationally—about the interconnected aspects of the political-military situation in the Brahmaputra 

River basin and the potential for national water, energy, and infrastructure 

policies that could exacerbate interstate tensions and subnational human 

security conditions in the region. 

To provide practical benefit after this comprehensive consideration, 

we present policy options for promoting water security and stability in 

the Brahmaputra region. These recommendations aim to expand dialogue 

that leads to greater coordination and future institution building—ideally, 

8 | Raging Waters
the development of bilateral or multilateral water-sharing treaties for the 

Brahmaputra River. Given the potential threats to stability in the region if 

China, India, and Bangladesh continue ignoring the situation, this research 

lays a foundation for policy makers in all three countries to discuss steps 

toward a regional solution for long-term water needs in the Brahmaputra 

basin. Such an understanding will help strengthen overall security and the 

relationships between the riparian neighbors. 

Readers of this book will benefit from insights shared during semistructured discussions CNA conducted in the three countries being studied. 

During a span of two months, we met with a wide range of subject matter 

experts who spoke candidly about the challenges (both physical and political) they see in the Brahmaputra basin. Consequently, we aim to protect the 

identity of the individuals who kindly shared their knowledge. To this end, 

we limit information about them in our footnotes, only showing the location of the discussion.

Raging Waters analyzes the three major countries of the Brahmaputra River basin: China, India, and Bangladesh. Each chapter looks at the 

issues facing the country at the domestic, bilateral, and basin-wide levels. 

The structure is parallel across the chapters for ease of reading. The first 

chapter, “Water Power, Water Worries: China’s Goals and Challenges as 

the Brahmaputra’s Uppermost Riparian,” by Joel Wuthnow, draws on 

Chinese-language sources and field research to understand, from China’s 

perspective, the subnational issues involved as well as the bilateral relationships with India and Bangladesh over security in the Brahmaputra 

basin. Through this comprehensive analysis, the chapter concludes that 

while China has shown little willingness to address Brahmaputra issues at 

a multilateral level, opportunities may exist for China to modestly expand 

cooperation at both a bilateral and multilateral level. 

In chapter 2, “Upstream, Downstream: Reflections on India’s Riparian Relationships on the Brahmaputra,” Satu Limaye examines this middle 

riparian nation’s unique quandaries, seeing itself as a victim of China’s 

water activities, yet seeking to maximize national water resources in a 

way that does not sufficiently consider or mitigate harmful impacts on its 

Introduction | 9
downstream neighbor, Bangladesh. In addition, the subnational element of 

water security also is unique regarding center-state relations between New 

Delhi and India’s northeast. Drawing on numerous in-country interviews 

with experts and other sources, this chapter concludes that multilateral 

cooperation on the Brahmaputra River does not elicit much support from 

India at present and is not likely to do so for the foreseeable future. 

Chapter 3, “Bangladesh: The Strongest Advocate of Basin-Wide Management,” by Nilanthi Samaranayake, finds that Dhaka has the most incentive and space to pursue bilateral and multilateral cooperative approaches 

with New Delhi and Beijing for the development and management of the 

Brahmaputra basin. While the country is most at risk from the cumulative 

impacts of India’s and China’s self-interested river management, analysis 

of in-country interviews with experts and officials reveal that Bangladesh’s 

most immediate threats stem from internal challenges. 

The appendix concludes with recommendations for how the countries 

can work together as well as improve their national policies so they can 

foster greater water security in the basin. We include recommendations for 

how the international community (i.e., international financial institutions 

and extraregional countries, such as the United Kingdom, United States, 

etc.) can lend assistance, which helps advance Brahmaputra River basin 

security.

This book represents a first attempt to examine the Brahmaputra River 

basin and its major country stakeholders as the core subject of analysis. 

Using a three-tiered framework—subnational, bilateral, and multilateral—

we sought to connect the dots of previous analyses that have studied segments of Brahmaputra basin security. However, this topic would benefit 

from greater study in two respects. First, this project did not seek to 

conduct a scientific study of water availability or climate change impacts in 

the Brahmaputra basin. Hydrological studies have been conducted on the 

Brahmaputra, although they are arguably too few and are not focused on 

the Brahmaputra River but entail the wider GBM basin definition. Notably, 

a foundational scientific study of the entire Brahmaputra basin was conducted by a team of researchers led by Patrick A. Ray and funded by the 

10 | Raging Waters
World Bank in 2015.15 As the authors of this book, we are not hydrological 

scientists but rather study political-military security issues. Throughout the 

process of conducting research, we found how important it was to be able 

to unify both physical and political analysis, and we communicate these 

findings to policy makers who make decisions that affect the long-term security of the Brahmaputra River basin. As a result, we hope future research 

on the Brahmaputra River basin produces technical water assessments 

made by hydrological experts. 

Second, our project resources enabled field research conducted in the 

national capitals of the three countries being studied. For future work, we 

hope researchers will be able to conduct field research with local experts 

(e.g., farmers, officials, and protestors) based in the subnational locations 

in all of the three countries where the Brahmaputra travels. These locations 

include the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese autonomous 

region of Tibet, and the Bangladeshi division of Rangpur. 

Greater scientific study and projections about the health of the Brahmaputra, especially regarding potential dam-building activities and water 

diversion plans, combined with interviews of local stakeholders in each of 

the three countries, will enhance understanding of the equities and challenges over Brahmaputra resources and the possibilities for greater cooperation across the basin.

15 For the most recent hydrological analysis that is specific to the Brahmaputra and spans the 

entire basin, see Ray et al., “Room for Improvement,” 64–80.

Introduction | 11

CHAPTER 1

13

In September 2016, China announced that it would temporarily divert the 

Xiabuqu, a tributary of the Brahmaputra located on the Tibetan Plateau, to 

begin the construction of two major hydroelectric dams. The purpose of 

the dams, according to Chinese state media, was to increase electricity production and to contribute to a rising standard of living in the Tibet Autonomous Region, one of China’s 34 provincial-level administrative units and 

one of its most impoverished. The announcement, however, immediately 

sparked concerns among Indian analysts who suspected Beijing of harboring ulterior geopolitical motives and asserted that the diversion could 

have negative environmental consequences, including reducing the flow of 

water into India. China responded by reaffirming its benign intentions and 

denying that the diversion would result in a significant loss of water for its 

downstream neighbor.1

The episode was a microcosm of the larger dilemma China faces with 

the Brahmaputra. On the one hand, the river offers potential hydropower 

resources that can provide electricity for Tibet and its neighboring provinces. Building hydroelectric dams along the river also plays a role in Beijing’s 

broader efforts to develop clean energy resources. China has already built 

one hydroelectric dam on the Brahmaputra and plans to construct several 

more. On the other hand, the Brahmaputra also has created two types of 

challenges for Sino-Indian relations. First, Beijing has had to reassure New 

1

 For details, see Limaye, Wuthnow, and Samaranayake, “China and India’s Slow-Moving Path 

to ‘Water Wars’.” 

WATER POWER, WATER WORRIES: CHINA’S GOALS AND 

CHALLENGES AS THE BRAHMAPUTRA’S UPPERMOST RIPARIAN

JOEL WUTHNOW
Delhi that its dam-building activities are nonthreatening, responding to 

concerns by some in India that China could use these facilities to disrupt 

the flow of water in a future Sino-Indian conflict. Second, China is concerned that Indian dam-building activities downstream could firm up New 

Delhi’s “actual control” over Arunachal Pradesh, or what China regards as 

“southern Tibet.” This could complicate border negotiations and further 

reduce Beijing’s hopes of recovering this territory. 

China has focused its diplomatic efforts related to the Brahmaputra at 

a bilateral level, including signing agreements to provide India with river 

flow data during the flood season. Yet, due to the border dispute and compounded by mutual distrust in Sino-Indian relations, cooperation between 

the two sides has been limited. Meanwhile, China has shown little willingness to address Brahmaputra issues at a multilateral level, involving both 

India and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for China 

to modestly expand cooperation at both a bilateral and multilateral level. 

Specific actions could include expanded hydrological data sharing and environmental cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi and a nonofficial 

dialogue on shared river challenges involving all three riparians. 

CHINA’S DOMESTIC USES OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA 

As of 2018, China’s development activities on the Brahmaputra are limited 

to a series of planned hydroelectric dams, which are being built primarily 

to raise the standard of living in Tibet but also will support the Chinese 

government’s broader emphasis on clean energy. By contrast, China has 

announced no plans to attempt to divert the course of the river to satisfy 

domestic demands, although there are those who advocate for just such a 

plan. While diversion plans have been discussed intermittently in China 

for decades, serious cost and feasibility issues make their implementation 

unlikely.

In the last 20 years, China has devoted significant effort to improving water resources in western China. Spearheaded by China’s Ministry 

of Water Resources, this investment has led to improved access to safe 

drinking water for 2.39 million people and has brought electricity to some 

14 | Raging Waters
360,000 Tibetan herdsmen, according to People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

data. This effort has included a total of $4.87 billion spent on water resource 

infrastructure in Tibet through 2014. Moreover, China’s five-year economic 

plan for 2011–15 places the main emphasis for water resource development 

in China on the southwestern Mekong region and on the Tibetan Plateau, 

with a focus on building new water pumping and power storage facilities.2

Chinese sources frequently argue that the purpose of hydroelectric 

dam construction in Tibet is to develop an underutilized resource to meet 

local energy needs. A state media report noted, for example, that Tibet’s 

per capita electricity consumption in 2014 was less than one-third of the 

national average, yet the region possesses a full 30 percent of the nation’s 

water resources, capable of producing more than 200 million kilowatt 

hours of electricity.3

 According to Chinese economist Liu Peng, the Brahmaputra has the lowest hydropower utilization rate of all of China’s large 

rivers but also has the greatest potential for development. Liu argues that 

seizing this opportunity would help meet Tibet’s energy needs.4

 Likewise, 

at the opening ceremony of the Zangmu Dam in the Tibet Autonomous 

Region, an official from the state electric grid boasted that the new dam 

would help “solve Tibet’s power shortage, especially in winter.”5

Hydropower development in Tibet is part of a broader effort to economically develop western China. A key element of this effort is the campaign to xibu da kaifa (open up the west), which was launched in 2000 to 

encourage economic progress in that historically impoverished part of the 

country. The program also was likely meant to support the migration of 

ethnic majority Han citizens into minority-dominated areas, such as Tibet 

2

 “China Invests 30 Billion Yuan on Tibet Water Infrastructure,” Xinhua, 23 August 2014; and 

“The Outline of the 12th Five-Year Program for National Economic and Social Development of 

the People’s Republic of China,” Xinhua, 16 March 2011. 3

 “China Invests 30 Billion Yuan on Tibet Water Infrastructure.” 

4

 Liu Peng, “ZhongYin zai kuajie heliu shang de liyi: suqiu yu xianghu yilai” [Chinese and Indian 

Interests in Transboundary Rivers: Demands and Interdependence], Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian 

Studies], no. 4 (2013): 33– 45. 5

 “China Focus: Major Hydroplant Begins Operations in Power Thirsty Tibet,” Xinhua, 24 November 2014.

Chapter 1 | 15
and Xinjiang, and to develop natural resources and minerals in these areas 

to facilitate national economic growth.6

Aside from economic advantages, China’s drive to develop hydropower resources in Tibet supports a national emphasis on clean energy development. China’s national energy policy states that more than half of the 

contributions to the goal of raising non-fossil fuel energy consumption to 

15 percent by 2020 will come from hydropower.7

 To meet this goal, the plan 

mandates that China accelerate construction of hydropower stations on 

key rivers, such as the Brahmaputra. Similarly, a State Council official has 

6

 For an introduction to the program, see David S. G. Goodman, “The Campaign to ‘Open Up 

the West’: National, Provincial, and Local-Level Perspectives,” China Quarterly 178 (2004): 317–

34; Elizabeth C. Economy, “Asia’s Water Security Crisis: China, India, and the United States,” 

in Strategic Asia 2008 –09: Challenges and Choices, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew 

Marble (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008); and “Who Is Chinese? The Upper Han,” Economist, 19 November 2016. 7 China’s Energy Policy 2012 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2012). 

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from Ananth Krishnan, “China Gives Go-ahead for Three New Brahmaputra 

Dams,” Hindu, 30 January 2013 

Map 1.1. China’s current and planned dams on the Yarlung/Brahmaputra.

16 | Raging Waters
stated that a main reason for increased dam building in Tibet is that these 

facilities will help reduce carbon emissions by providing clean energy.8

To achieve these goals—stated or unstated—China is making gradual

progress and has announced plans to construct four dams along the Brahmaputra in Tibet. Only one of these facilities is currently operational—the 

Zangmu Dam, which is situated in Gyaca County, roughly 100 miles southeast of Lhasa. The Zangmu Dam opened in November 2014, and it became 

fully operational in October 2015. The dam has a total installed capacity 

of 510,000 kilowatt hours, raising Tibet’s overall power generation capacity 

by roughly 25 percent. According to China’s state energy plan for 2011–15, 

there are also plans to construct hydroelectric dams along the river at the 

nearby towns of Jiacha, Jiexu, and Dagu (see map 1.1).9

A more controversial use of the Brahmaputra lies in the possibility, despite no announced plans, that China may seek to divert the river 

to meet domestic needs, especially for irrigation. China currently faces 

serious water-scarcity challenges at a national level. Overall, China holds 

20 percent of the world’s population but only 7 percent of its fresh water 

resources. Moreover, China’s limited water resources are unevenly distributed: northern China possesses only an estimated 14 percent of the country’s fresh water but 60 percent of its farmland and 45 percent of its total 

population. In addition, 70 percent of northern Chinese villages have been 

described as short of water, with the per capita water endowment of some 

areas less than one-tenth of the world average. This situation has been ex8 China’s Energy Policy 2012; and “Hydro-Power Dam Stirs Debate,” Global Times, 18 November 

2010.

9

 “China Focus: Major Hydroplant Begins Operations in Power Thirsty Tibet”; and 12th Five 

Year Plan Energy Development Plan (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2013). In 

addition, Chinese engineers have explored the possibility of constructing a massive 38-gigawatt 

hydroelectric dam farther downstream at Motuo, but this has not been officially endorsed and 

does not appear in the 12th five-year energy plan. For details, see Jonathan Watts, “Chinese 

Engineers Propose World’s Biggest Hydro-electric Project in Tibet,” Guardian, 24 May 2013.

Chapter 1 | 17
acerbated by such factors as weak pollution controls, poor conservation 

efforts, and inefficient irrigation methods.10

To correct these imbalances, China has embarked on a massive water 

transfer project known as the Nanshui Beidiao Gongcheng (South–North 

Water Diversion Project). Begun in 2002, the project consists of three 

planned routes: the eastern, central, and western. The eastern and central 

routes focus on diverting water from southern China’s Yangtze and Han 

Rivers, respectively, to the Yellow River in the north. These two routes have 

already been completed and are currently supplying water to northern 

10 Zhang Hongzhou, “Confronting China’s Water Insecurity,” RSIS Commentary, 30 April 2014; 

Sebastian Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers: The 

Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” Journal of Contemporary 

China 23, no. 85 (2014): 21–43, https://doi.org/10.10801/10670564.2013.809975; Peter 

MacKenzie and Marcus King, Climate Change in China: Socioeconomic and Security Implications

(Arlington, VA: CNA, 2010), 3; and Kenneth Pomeranz, “Asia’s Unstable Water Tower: The Politics, Economics, and Ecology of Himalayan Water Projects,” Asia Policy, no. 16 (July 2013): 5.

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from Wang Yizhi, “China’s South–North Water Diversion Project,” China 

Central Television, 18 September 2012

Map 1.2. Current and planned routes of the South–North Water Diversion Project.

18 | Raging Waters
cities, such as Beijing and Tianjin. According to China’s official plans, the 

western route, still in its early planning stages, will concentrate on diverting the headwaters of three tributaries of the Yangtze (the Tongtian, Yalong, 

and Dadu Rivers, which are all domestic rivers on the Tibetan Plateau) to 

the Yellow River by 2050 (see map 1.2).11

During the past three decades, various Chinese scholars have proposed 

diverting the Brahmaputra as a remedy above and beyond the official 

South–North Water Diversion Project. The best-known plan, put forward 

by a senior researcher at the Yellow River Water Conservancy Commission in 1990, envisions diverting the river via a series of canals and dams 

through Sichuan Province and into the Yellow River. Other plans have been 

proposed and studied by scholars at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the 

Changjiang (Yangtze River) Water Resources Commission, and elsewhere. 

One plan, offered by a former Chinese PLA officer, gained significant attention within China and internationally. Notions of diverting Tibetan rivers 

to alleviate the water needs of northern China entered the Chinese popular 

imagination with the publication of the book Xizang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo 

(Tibet’s Waters Will Save China) by officer Li Ling in 2005. Li argues that 

waters from four rivers, including the Brahmaputra, could be diverted to 

the Yellow River. Li’s ideas have gained international attention—Indian 

scholar Brahma Chellaney cites it as evidence that China harbors plans to 

divert the river despite official assurances that it has no such plans.12 Other 

Chinese scholars, though, pan the book as “bravado” and “folk theory.”13

11 For more details, see Susan Chan Shifflett et al., China’s Water-Energy-Food Roadmap: A Global Choke Point Report (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

2015), 19–21; Kiki Zhao, “Water from China’s South–North Transfer Project Flows to Beijing,” 

Sinosphere (blog), New York Times, 25 December 2014; and Carla Freeman, Quenching the Dragon’s Thirst: The South–North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China? (Washington, 

DC: China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011).

12 Chellaney, Water, 154. 13 Zhang Jincui, “Yindu yingpai xuezhe de Zhongguo guan: dui Bulama Qielani jiaoshou de gean 

yanjiu” [An Indian Hawk’s China Outlook: The Case Study of Professor Brahma Chellaney],

Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 2 (2012): 66 –79; 

and Liu Peng, “ZhongYin zai kuajie heliu shang de liyi: suqiu yu xianghu yilai” [Chinese and 

Indian Interests in Transboundary Rivers: Demands and Interdependence], Nanya Yanjiu [South 

Asian Studies], no. 4 (2013): 33– 45.

Chapter 1 | 19
Although none of these proposals have been officially endorsed, some 

Chinese and foreign scholars contend that China’s water shortages may 

become so severe that the government will have no choice but to attempt to 

tap into the Brahmaputra. For instance, water scarcity, combined with the 

effects of climate change and desertification, may become so intense that a 

more radical scheme to divert the Brahmaputra will be needed. Similarly, a 

failure of the South–North Water Diversion Project to alleviate water shortages in northern China could make a plan to divert the Brahmaputra “very 

tempting” for PRC authorities.14

Plans to divert rivers from western China present several shortcomings, and there has been some internal and external opposition. First, from 

a cost perspective, interbasin water transfers are among the most expensive ways to increase water availability. Methods such as increasing irrigation efficiency, shallow groundwater pumping, and even intrabasin water 

transfers tend to be more cost-effective. Indeed, China is already moving 

ahead with various water-conservation measures, such as building fewer 

water-intensive coal plants.15

Second, diverting water from the Tibetan Plateau also raises serious 

feasibility concerns. The director of the PRC State Council’s office responsible for the South–North Water Diversion Project has described a “significant gap” between preliminary work done on the western route and the 

“actual requirements” of the project.16 CNA interviews conducted in 2015 

also indicated that Chinese experts have concerns about the western route 

based on technical grounds, including the view that the Tibetan Plateau is 

too geologically unstable to support such a massive endeavor. Moreover, 

14 Pomeranz, “Asia’s Unstable Water Tower,” 6; see also Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers,” 21–43. 15 Charting Our Water Future: Economic Frameworks to Inform Decision-making (Washington, 

DC: 2030 Water Resources Group, 2009), 77; and Renee Cho, “How China Is Dealing with 

Its Water Crisis,” State of the Planet (blog), Earth Institute, Columbia University, 5 May 2011. 16 Liu, “ZhongYin zai kuajie heliu shang de liyi” [Chinese and Indian Interests in Transboundary 

Rivers], 33 – 45

20 | Raging Waters
given its potentially disruptive effects, plans for the western route are 

likely to encounter resistance on social and ecological grounds.17

Compared to the western route of the official South–North Water Diversion Project, Chinese experts tend to be even more dismissive of proposals to divert waters from the upper Brahmaputra. CNA interviews suggest 

that the Chinese government has given no serious consideration to these 

proposals in recent years. In fact, a study commissioned by the Ministry 

of Water Resources in 2000 reportedly concluded that such plans would be 

neither necessary nor feasible.18 Former minister of water resources Wang 

Shucheng stated on at least two occasions that plans to divert the Brahmaputra were not feasible.19 Thus, while China may eventually give some 

consideration to such ideas, there is no evidence to suggest that this is 

likely in the near future.

One of the potential obstacles to the fulfillment of these plans is opposition by local citizens and civil society groups, especially environmental 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The record of China’s efforts to 

build dams is checkered with cases of domestic opposition. For instance, 

plans to build 13 dams along the Nu River in Yunnan Province were halted 

in 2004 following an environmental campaign.20 Likewise, activism by such 

groups as the NGO Green Watershed has led local authorities to set up resettlement funds for displaced residents along the Mekong.21

17 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015; and Zhang Hongzhou, “China-India Water Disputes: Two 

Major Misperceptions Revisited,” RSIS Commentary, 19 January 2015. 18 Zhang, “China-India.”

19 Zhang Ke, “Diversion Debate,” China Dialogue, 13 June 2011. 20 The Nu/Salween River is one of the region’s last free-flowing rivers. It originates in the Tibetan 

Plateau area as the Nu and flows through China, becoming the Salween in Burma and Thailand 

before it empties into the Andaman Sea. “Brahmaputra: Towards Unity,” TheThirdPole.net, 10 

February 2014. The plans to build the dams, however, were revived in 2013.

21 Selina Ho, “River Politics: China’s Policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 85 (2014): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.10

80/10670564.2013.809974; and Pichamon Yeophantong, “China’s Lancang Dam Cascade and 

Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who’s Got the Power?,” Asian Survey 54, no. 4 

(July/August 2014): 700– 24, https//doi.org/10.1525/AS.2014.54.4.700.

Chapter 1 | 21
Considering China’s larger, long-term goals for the region, it is doubtful that domestic opposition will play a significant role in halting or 

slowing the speed of dam construction along the Brahmaputra. One reason 

is that, given the social controls present in Tibet, it is unlikely civil society 

groups will have the political space needed to operate as they do in other 

parts of the country. In addition, Chinese sources suggest that the population along the Brahmaputra is so scant that any local opposition will be 

negligible. For instance, a researcher with China’s Ministry of Water Resources has argued that relocation programs for displaced residents will be 

facilitated by the small size of the population. Nevertheless, he added that 

local officials should proactively communicate with local residents to help 

them see that the construction projects are “for their own benefit.”22

DIPLOMATIC OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Although driven primarily by domestic economic and developmental 

goals, China’s dam construction on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra has created significant friction in Sino-Indian relations. Indian analysts 

worry not only about the safety of Chinese dams but also about the possibility of Chinese diversion schemes. For instance, a temporary diversion 

of one tributary of the Brahmaputra, announced by the Chinese government in September 2016, was expected to marginally reduce water and 

silt flow into India.23 This would stress Indian water resources and raise 

the chance of conflict between the two states. Beijing has tried, with only 

limited success, to reassure New Delhi that its dam construction will not 

have adverse consequences for India. Another source of friction emanates 

from Chinese concerns about India’s development of the river, especially in 

the disputed border area of Arunachal Pradesh. In particular, Chinese government analysts are concerned that Indian construction activities farther 

downstream will firm up New Delhi’s “actual control” over Arunachal 

Pradesh and thereby complicate border negotiations between the two 

22 “Brahmaputra: Towards Unity”; and “Hydro-Power Dam Stirs Debate.” 

23 Limaye, Wuthnow, and Samaranayake, “China and India’s Slow-Moving Path to ‘Water Wars’.”

22 | Raging Waters
countries.24 Despite these challenges, there may be opportunities for at 

least a limited expansion in Sino-Indian cooperation related to Brahmaputra issues.

MUTUAL DISTRUST IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Relations between China and India have been strained for more than 50 

years, just as with so many other nations that have shared borders, and 

the issue of the Brahmaputra River’s waters are one example of these 

larger disputes. India is, indeed, concerned about Chinese upstream activities, which reflect a deeper problem of mutual distrust in Sino-Indian 

relations. This situation is driven by such factors as the ongoing border 

dispute, Chinese concerns over Indian ambitions and relations with the 

United States, Indian concerns regarding China’s rapid military modernization and ties with Pakistan, and lingering resentments stemming from 

the 1962 China-India border conflict.25 This mistrust is not one-sided, and 

India’s official position about Chinese activities on the Brahmaputra has 

been close to that adopted by the United States in its arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the 1980s: “Trust but verify.”26 Specifically, 

New Delhi asserts that it accepts Chinese statements but will continue to 

monitor China’s upstream activities and convey concerns through diplomatic channels when necessary. In addition, PRC public diplomacy has not 

deterred Indian analysts, such as Brahma Chellaney, from circulating the 

argument that China harbors ulterior motives in its dam-building efforts. 

Thus, China still faces a trust gap with India on these issues. While Chinese 

interviewees contended that Sino-Indian relations have made progress 

under the recent efforts of President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Naren24 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015.

25 For more on what is also known as the Sino-Indian War, see Ivan Lidarev, “History’s Hostage: 

China, India, and the War of 1962,” Diplomat, 21 August 2012. 26 Liu, “ZhongYin guanxi zouxiang chengshu ji qi yuanyin tanxi” [An Exploration of the Maturation of Sino-Indian Relations and Its Causes], 49–55.

Chapter 1 | 23
dra Modi, most concurred that distrust remains a central problem for the 

two countries.27

Observers have been able to express limited optimism because, during 

the past decade, China has attempted to reduce two major Indian concerns 

with respect to the Brahmaputra: flooding that could be prevented with 

access to Chinese data and potential Chinese development activities along 

the river. Many of the concerns about flooding developed as a result of a 

major flood that took place in June 2000. In this incident, a natural dam that 

had formed due to a landslide on a tributary of the Brahmaputra in Tibet 

broke. As a result, 3– 4 billion cubic meters of water poured into Arunachal 

Pradesh and Assam, killing 30 Indian nationals and leaving 50,000 homeless. Some Indian observers asserted that China withheld hydrological data 

that could have prevented the disaster; this led to friction in Sino-Indian 

relations.28

In response to Indian concerns about flooding, China and India have 

established a series of agreements to share hydrological data. In April 2002, 

China agreed to provide India with hydrological data from three monitoring stations on the Brahmaputra between June 1 and October 15 of each 

year, corresponding to the annual flood season. During a visit by thenChinese President Hu Jintao to India in November 2006, the two countries 

agreed to establish an expert-level group to discuss hydrological data and 

emergency response measures. Then, in October 2013, China extended the 

data-sharing period from 15 May to 15 October. Data supplied by China 

have been used by India’s Central Water Commission to inform flood 

forecasts.29

27 “Hydropower Station on Brahmaputra: India to Monitor Situation,” Times of India, 15 October 2015; Murray Scot Tanner, Kerry B. Dumbaugh, and Ian M. Easton, Distracted Antagonists, 

Wary Partners: China and India Assess Their Security Relations (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2011), 

5–9; CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015; see also Lan Jianxue, Sino-Indian Relations in the New Era: 

Current Status, Development Trend and Policy Recommendations (Beijing: China Institute of International Studies, 2015).

28 Wang Yan, “The River Wild,” News China, January 2012. 29 “India-China Cooperation,” Government of India, Ministry of Water Resources, River Development, and Ganga Rejuvenation, updated 29 June 2017.

24 | Raging Waters
Chinese willingness to share hydrological data has been well received 

by India. This is evident in a series of joint statements made during China–

India summits. For instance, in a joint statement following Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Indian officials thanked 

China for providing flood season data, and the two sides agreed to continue cooperation in data sharing and in emergency response. The joint 

statement following Indian prime minister Modi’s visit to China in May 

2015 contained a nearly identical statement.30 Thus, China appears to have 

gained at least some diplomatic goodwill as a result of its overtures. 

China has also sought, amid the climate of mistrust, to assuage Indian 

concerns about Chinese development activities along the river. Indian analysts have suggested that China may seek to use its dams on the Brahmaputra to disrupt the flow of water into India in the event of a conflict or 

to use its control over water resources as a form of diplomatic leverage. 

Some Indian observers also speculate that China could attempt to store 

river water (or even divert the river), which would result in reduced river 

flow to India at a time when water sources are increasingly stressed due to 

population growth and global climate change effects.31

Nevertheless, China has sought to quell Indian concerns through official rhetoric and media commentary. In particular, Chinese sources have 

repeatedly asserted that China plans to build only “run of the river” dams 

that cannot be used to reduce or stop the flow of the river into Indiancontrolled territory.32 Moreover, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman has stated that China’s planned dams will not pose flood risks or 

ecological challenges to downstream areas.33 China has also responded to 

30 “Joint Statement between India and China during Prime Minister’s Visit to China,” Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 15 May 2015; see also “Joint Statement between the 

Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building Closer Developmental Partnership,” Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 2014.

31 Vijai K. Nair, “The Chinese Threat: An Indian Perspective,” China Brief 1, no. 9 (2001); and 

Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Hydro-Hegemony,” New York Times, 7 February 2013. 32 Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers.”

33 Transcript of Regular News Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry on 24 November 2014, Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24 November 2014.

Chapter 1 | 25
Indian speculation about potential river diversion schemes. For instance, 

a PLA Daily article denies any diversion plans and claims that China took 

Indian interests into account when it chose not to include the Brahmaputra 

in the South–North Water Diversion Project.34 Yet, despite all these efforts, 

China’s public rhetoric has largely failed to assuage Indian concerns. While 

Indian officials have not publicly rejected Chinese pledges that Tibetan 

dam building will not harm Indian interests, they remain wary.

CHINESE CONCERNS REGARDING INDIAN 

HYDROPOWER ACTIVITIES 

While Indian officials may doubt Chinese sincerity about its intentions, the 

Chinese have their own concerns about the disputed territory of Arunachal 

Pradesh and what that means for its stated and unstated designs for the 

region. At present, the river is largely undeveloped as it flows through the 

northeastern Indian state. India’s Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, however, announced plans to build 

dams in that section of the river to control flooding and to increase electricity production. The ministry also contends that dam construction is necessary for securing water usage rights under international practice.35 This 

appears to be a step forward in firming up India’s claims to Arunachal 

Pradesh, which China regards as its own territory under the name “southern Tibet.”

Arunachal Pradesh is one of two major areas of dispute along the 

Sino-Indian border. The other is Aksai Chin, which lies farther to the 

west, and has been effectively controlled by China since 1951. Arunachal 

Pradesh was the main theater of the 1962 China-India border conflict, in 

which Chinese forces advanced into Indian-controlled territory and then 

withdrew, pending negotiations. At the core of China’s contention is the 

view that Beijing has sovereignty over lands formerly held by the Tibetan 

34 Sun Peisong, “China-India Friendship Is Basis for New Order in Future of Asia,” PLA Daily 

(Beijing), 22 October 2013. 35 “India Plans to Build Big Dams over Brahmaputra, Says Uma Bharti,” Economic Times, 4 June 

2015.

26 | Raging Waters
kingdom, including Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. India rejects these 

claims and argues that these lands belong to India as part of a 1914 treaty.36

Indian infrastructure development along the Brahmaputra is of particular concern for China because it could grant India leverage in border 

negotiations and significantly reduce the chance of China ever being able 

to enforce its sovereignty claims south of the Line of Actual Control.37 Li 

Zhifei, an expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), who 

has extensively studied this issue, writes that India has used several means 

to strengthen its “actual control” over Arunachal Pradesh, including an increasing military presence, migration of citizens into the region, and development of water resources on rivers, such as the Brahmaputra. Li also 

argues that India is seeking to build dams in Arunachal to gain an “advantageous” position in border talks with China.38 Building dams, in particular, is useful for India because it allows New Delhi to argue that it has 

established water user rights, regardless of China’s sovereignty assertions.39

In addition to sovereignty concerns, Chinese observers make claims 

about environmental risks to China to oppose Indian downstream construction. One Chinese claim, albeit made without a clear scientific explanation, is that Indian industrial activity in Arunachal Pradesh could 

increase sedimentation of the river, which might raise the risks of flooding 

in parts of Tibet.40 Other Chinese sources assert that rising Indian carbon 

emissions connected to greater industrial activity in the region could contribute to glacial melt in the Himalayas and threaten the long-term flow 

36 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 79 –109. 37 The Line of Actual Control is a 4,057-kilometer boundary between China and India that is as 

disputed as water rights between the countries. “Crossing the Line of Actual Control,” Stratfor, 

12 September 2017.

38 Li Zhifei, “ZhongYin lingtu zhengduan zhong de shui ziyuan anquan wenti” [Water Security 

Issues in Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes], Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], 

no. 4 (2013): 29–34. 39 Prime Minister of India, “Onboard Media Interaction with PM on Return from BRICS Summit,” press release, 28 March 2013. 

40 Lan, “Shui ziyuan anquan hezuo yu ZhongYin guanxi de hudong” [Water Security Cooperation and China-India Interactions], 37– 43.

Chapter 1 | 27
of the river.41 These arguments may reflect genuine ecological concerns but 

also may be designed in part to provide an additional basis for opposing 

Indian development in the disputed region. 

China has taken some steps to oppose India’s development of hydroelectric dams in Arunachal Pradesh. One tactic that China has used in 

recent years is to leverage its influence in international institutions, such 

as the Asian Development Bank, to deny India funding for infrastructure 

projects in the disputed area. It is possible that China also will seek to use 

its leading position in the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for a similar purpose. Moreover, CASS’s Li Zhifei argues 

that China should continue to press these institutions to reject Indian requests for financial assistance. Given Indian domestic resources and New 

Delhi’s impetus to develop the northeastern part of the country, it is questionable whether China will have the necessary power or influence to successfully oppose the future development of dams.42

OUTLOOK FOR CHINA-INDIA COOPERATION

Two factors will likely limit a future expansion of China-India cooperation 

related to the Brahmaputra. First is the ongoing border dispute. Contested 

ownership of Arunachal Pradesh means that Beijing and New Delhi will 

probably be unable to reach a major accord on transboundary river rights 

and obligations, such as a water-sharing treaty. As of 2015, there are no signs 

that this dispute is set to abate in the near to medium term.43

A second significant obstacle to cooperation—mutual distrust—in regard 

to the Brahmaputra must be considered. A 2014 water management game 

41 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015. For background on potential climate change effects on the 

river, see Walter W. Immerzeel, Ludovicus P. H. van Beek, and Marc F. P. Bierkens, “Climate 

Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers,” Science, no. 328 (2010): 1382 –85, http://doi

.org/10.1126/science.1183188.

42 Sudha Ramachandran, “Chinese Antics Have India Fuming,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), 5 May 

2009; and Li Zhifei, “ZhongYin lingtu zhengduan zhong de shui ziyuan anquan wenti” [Water 

Security Issues in Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes], 29–34.

43 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India-China Talks Fail to Make Progress on Border Dispute,” DefenseNews, 17 November 2015.

28 | Raging Waters
conducted by CNA observed that mutual mistrust between riparian nations, 

driven by such factors as border disputes and terrorist actions, reduced the 

willingness of all three states to share information and support other types of 

cooperation.44 While China and India watchers have seen this at the official 

level, it is even more pronounced within civil society in both countries. Indian 

analysts, such as Brahma Chellaney and R. N. Bhaskar, may continue to question Chinese intentions regarding dam building on the upper Brahmaputra. 

Meanwhile, Chinese observers will likely doubt the motives of their Indian 

interlocutors, whom many in China regard as biased and sensationalist. One 

scholar even penned an extensive review of the writings of Chellaney with 

respect to China, critiquing Chellaney’s assertions about China’s intentions 

to use water as a weapon as biased and unsubstantiated.45These sentiments 

could limit the prospects for productive engagements between scholars on 

both sides.

Nevertheless, there may still be opportunities for a modest expansion 

of Sino-Indian cooperation on Brahmaputra issues, most likely on narrow, 

technical subjects that can be separated from the border dispute. This interpretation is supported by scholars such as Lan Jianxue of the China Institute 

of International Studies, who argues that Sino-Indian cooperation is most 

likely on topics considered as “low politics,” such as on economic, humanitarian, and cultural endeavors. Topics within the realm of “high politics” 

(e.g., the border dispute) will remain contentious.46 Specifically, China may 

be receptive to cooperation in areas of disaster management, environmen44 Catherine M. Trentacoste et al., Bone Dry and Flooding Soon: A Regional Water Game, Final 

Report (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2014), 17–19. 

45 Li Zhifei, “ZhongYin lingtu zhengduan zhong de shui ziyuan anquan wenti” [Water Security 

Issues in Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes], 29–34; Lan, “Shui ziyuan anquan hezuo yu Zhong

Yin guanxi de hudong” [Water Security Cooperation and China-India Interactions], 37–43; Li 

Li, “Nontraditional Security and China’s Relations with South Asia,” in Ecological and Nontraditional Security Challenges in South Asia, ed. Farooq Sobhan, Dennis Pirages, Stacy D. VanDeveer, 

Li Li (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011) 33–36; and Zhang Jincui, “Yindu 

yingpai xuezhe de Zhongguo guan” [An Indian Hawk’s China Outlook], 66–79. 46 See Lan, Sino-Indian Relations in the New Era, 30–31. “Track 2” refers to engagements between nongovernmental scholars, often based at think tanks and research institutes. This is contrasted with “Track 1,” which are meetings between government officials. 

Chapter 1 | 29
tal protection, and river safety, or on scientific topics, such as the effects of 

climate change on long-term river flow. These topics allow for some flexibility and opportunity as some may be discussed at an official level, including 

discussions between the water resource ministries of both states. Moreover, 

nonstate stakeholders may be useful in deliberations with humanitarian and 

environmental nongovernmental organizations engaging topics at the Track 2 

level, or perhaps involving specialists from Chinese and Indian governmentfunded research institutes.47

Several drivers could promote enhanced cooperation on these issues. 

First, a positive overall direction in China-India relations could remove obstacles and set the stage for cooperation on transboundary river issues.48

This would require a political consensus by Chinese and Indian leaders to 

prioritize mutually beneficial economic and diplomatic cooperation over the 

boundary dispute, which could be symbolized by regular summits and ministerial meetings. Second, China may be able to draw on its own initiatives 

related to the Brahmaputra to portray itself as a responsible upper riparian. 

For Beijing, modestly enhancing outreach on water security challenges could 

be a relatively low cost way to foster diplomatic goodwill with New Delhi. 

Third, additional progress may be facilitated if initiatives are proposed and 

encouraged by the Indian side. This would address the argument of some 

Chinese analysts that Beijing has been proactive in sharing hydrological data 

and that the onus is now on India to reciprocate.49

China could take several steps, both unilaterally and in concert with 

India, to reduce mistrust and achieve mutual benefits on Brahmaputra issues. 

First, China could invite Indian (and Bangladeshi) observers to perform site 

visits as a way to reassure its neighbors of its dam safety standards. Second, 

Beijing and New Delhi could share information on dam construction plans 

and goals so that both sides have greater clarity about each other’s intentions 

and to avoid surprises, such as the September 2016 diversion announcement 

47 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015.

48 Liu, “ZhongYin guanxi zouxiang chengshu ji qi yuanyin tanxi” [An Exploration of the Maturation of Sino-Indian Relations and Its Causes], 49 –55. 49 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015.

30 | Raging Waters
that took many in India off guard. Third, the two sides could increase cooperation in areas such as data sharing, flood control, disaster management, 

and biodiversity protection. None of this will resolve the underlying border 

dispute or eliminate mutual mistrust but could serve to reduce tensions while 

providing important public goods. 

WATER SECURITY AND 

CHINA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Compared to those with India, China’s interactions with Bangladesh related 

to the Brahmaputra have been relatively free of controversy, which is unsurprising since the two countries do not share a border. Beijing’s cooperation 

with Dhaka has proceeded on several fronts. In 2008, China agreed to share 

hydrological data on the Brahmaputra with Bangladesh. At a summit held 

in 2010, China and Bangladesh agreed to improve cooperation on waterresource management, hydrological data sharing, flood control, and disaster 

reduction. China also agreed to assist Bangladesh with riverbed dredging 

and personnel training. Another memorandum of understanding (MOU) was 

signed in March 2015 on the sharing of rainfall data in the river’s catchment 

area in China, which would help inform Bangladeshi flood forecasting.50

Sino-Bangladeshi cooperation on Brahmaputra issues is consistent with 

a broader expansion of the bilateral relationship in recent years. As of 2015, 

Beijing is Dhaka’s largest trade partner, and Bangladesh plays an important role in China’s vision of creating a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” 

stretching from Asia to Europe and part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 

(BRI).51 China is also vying with India for influence in Bangladesh. In recent 

50 “China Assures Preferential Treatment for Bangladeshi Products: Three Agreements Signed 

at Summit Talks,” Bangladesh Economic News, 24 September 2008; Joint Statement Between the 

People’s Republic of China and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 

People’s Republic of China, 22 March 2010; and Abu Bakar Siddique, “China to Give Brahmaputra Flow Data to Bangladesh,” TheThirdPole.net, 20 May 2015.

51 ASMG Kibria, “Bangladesh Juggles Chinese, Japanese Interest,” Diplomat, 5 January 2015; 

and Capt David L. O. Hayward, “The Dragon’s Pearls: China’s Road to Hegemony in the Indian Ocean,” Marine Corps University Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 46–82, https://doi.org

/10.21140/mcuj.2016070103. 

Chapter 1 | 31
years, both Beijing and New Delhi have reached out to Dhaka with various 

economic proposals and incentives.52 In this context, Chinese willingness 

to share hydrological information and provide assistance in river dredging 

may simply be designed to cultivate diplomatic goodwill with Bangladesh. 

Moreover, Beijing has sought to reassure Dhaka (as well as New Delhi) that 

it has no plans to divert the Brahmaputra. 

As the demands for water become a three-way discussion between the 

major stakeholders, China is able to use Bangladesh’s practical needs as an 

arguing point that is useful in distracting from Chinese designs on the regions 

for their own benefit. Thus, the perceived threats that Bangladesh faces 

from Indian development activities upstream have become a counterpoint 

to India’s concerns about Chinese dam building in Tibet. Various Chinese 

analysts have highlighted India’s water diversion plans as a challenge that 

could have severe economic and ecological effects on India’s downstream 

neighbor.53 For instance, in a CNA interview in Beijing in 2015, one Chinese 

expert argued that potential Indian diversion plans could harm Bangladeshi 

interests, and that Bangladesh “has a right to say something” as a threatened 

downstream riparian nation. The subtext of these comments appears to be 

that India may be applying a double standard in critiquing China’s upstream 

development initiatives. 

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 

IN THE BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN 

China has centered its diplomatic outreach on Brahmaputra issues at a bilateral level. It has signed hydrological data-sharing agreements with both India 

and Bangladesh, but it has not engaged the two countries in a multilateral 

setting, which is consistent with a larger pattern of bilateralism in China’s 

water diplomacy. However, there are signs that Beijing could be willing to 

expand cooperation with both New Delhi and Dhaka at a basin-wide level. 

52 See “India’s Modi Hopes to Tamp Down China’s Influence in Bangladesh,” VOA News, 27 

May 2015.

53 Jonathan Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute,” Journal of International Affairs

64, no. 2 (2011): 19–35.

32 | Raging Waters
LIMITED MULTILATERALISM

In general, China’s water diplomacy has focused on achieving bilateral agreements with neighboring states. Aside from its agreements with India and 

Bangladesh, China has signed accords on boundary and cross-border rivers 

with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, North Korea, and others. 

These agreements are diverse in scope, covering such issues as water navigation, hydrological projects, environmental protection, emergency notification, 

and data sharing. Many are more substantial than the limited China–India 

pacts on the Brahmaputra, largely because China has no border disputes 

with these other countries. 

By contrast, China has avoided multilateral diplomacy as a way to solve 

shared water challenges. China was one of three states (the others being 

Turkey and Burundi) that voted against the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention, which outlines principles for cooperation related to international waterways, such as transboundary rivers, and procedures for dispute 

resolution. The reasons China’s UN representative gave for his country’s opposition to the treaty include inadequate protection of state sovereignty and 

an “imbalance” between the rights and duties of upper and lower riparians. 

China also has declined to participate in the World Commission on Dams, 

which provides guidelines for dam construction.54

In addition, China has been reluctant to participate in multilateral water 

agreements at a regional level. This is illustrated by China’s approach to the 

Mekong River Commission (MRC), which was established in 1995 to govern 

activities among Mekong River states. Although China has been a dialogue 

partner of the commission since 1996, it has not sought full membership, 

largely due to the concern that doing so would impose restrictions on its 

upstream dam-building plans.55 Rather, as Selina Ho, an expert on Chinese 

54 Huipeng Chen, Alistair Rieu-Clark, and Patricia Wouters, “Exploring China’s Transboundary 

Water Treaty Practice Through the Prism of the UN Watercourses Convention,” Water International 38, no. 2 (2013): 217–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2013.782134; United 

Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational 

Uses of International Watercourses,” press release, 21 May 1997; and Ho, “River Politics,” 8.

55 Ho, “River Politics,” 8; and Beth Walker, “China and India Ignore UN Watercourses Convention,” Chinadialogue (blog), 18 August 2014. 

Chapter 1 | 33
transboundary river issues argues, China has opted to seek agreements with 

Mekong states on a bilateral basis.56 Nevertheless, China has adopted limited 

multilateral cooperation with the MRC, which is discussed in greater detail 

in the following section. 

China’s preference for bilateral diplomacy on Brahmaputra issues is 

consistent with this larger pattern. This preference may be underscored by 

two factors. The first factor is the absence of existing institutions relevant 

to discussions among all three riparians. The South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation (SAARC), for instance, does not include China, while 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) does not include Bangladesh. The second factor is the deeper problem of mutual distrust, not only 

in China-India relations but also in India-Bangladesh relations, which some 

PRC analysts argue would undermine any plans to promote cooperation 

on a basin-wide scale.57 In effect, Beijing may have concluded that it is more 

practical and effective to work with New Delhi and Dhaka separately than 

to work with them together. 

POSSIBLE COOPERATION 

There are several reasons why China may revisit its current preference for 

bilateralism on Brahmaputra issues. First, at a broad level, China has participated in, and even shaped, multilateral regimes and institutions since 

the 1990s.58 This is evident, for example, in China’s role in organizing the 

Six Party Talks on North Korea and in its participation in the Association of 

56 Ho, “River Politics,” 8.

57 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015.

58 Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li, and Lingling Qi, “Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s 

Multilateral Diplomacy,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 17, no. 3 (September 2012): 269–90; 

Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, 

and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 102–22; and Hongying Wang, 

“Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization,” Asian Survey 40, no. 3 

(May–June 2000): 475 –91. 

34 | Raging Waters
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.59 China has also sought 

to play a more prominent role in SAARC, which includes both India and 

Bangladesh. Thus, if anything, China’s bilateral approach to water diplomacy 

is increasingly out of step with its confidence that multilateralism in other 

policy arenas can support Chinese interests. 

Second, there is a precedent for Chinese participation in water diplomacy at a basin-wide level. Namely, China signed an agreement with the 

MRC in 2002 to supply hydrological data from 15 June to 15 October of 

each year, a period corresponding to the monsoon season. That agreement 

was expanded in 2008 and again in 2013. China has also cooperated with 

the MRC through technical exchanges in areas such as river navigation 

and hydropower development. In December 2014, China’s vice minister of 

water resources stated that Beijing hoped to strengthen cooperation with 

the MRC, such as in conducting a joint scientific study on water flow fluctuations in the river basin.60 In October 2016, an editorial in China’s semiofficial Global Times praised multilateral cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong 

River basin and argued that it could become a useful guide for tripartite 

cooperation for the Brahmaputra riparians.61

Third, the barriers to basin-wide cooperation on the Brahmaputra are 

likely not insurmountable. For one thing, the lack of an existing mechanism does not necessarily rule out cooperation. In other contexts, China 

has established new bodies to address transnational challenges when one 

did not currently exist. For instance, China helped establish the SCO to 

address terrorism and other challenges in Central Asia. China also may be 

receptive to the possibility that existing bodies, such as the Bangladesh–

China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Forum for Regional Cooperation could be 

expanded to address water issues. In addition, mutual distrust has not pre59 The Six Party Talks, held between 2003 and 2009, involved discussions between China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and the United States regarding North Korea’s nuclear 

program. The ASEAN Regional Forum, launched in 1994, is a venue for discussions between 

ASEAN member states and others, including China, the United States, and the European Union. 

60 Zhang, “China-India: Revisiting the ‘Water Wars’ Narrative.” 

61 Hu Weijia, “No Need for Concern in India over China’s Blockage of Brahmaputra River Tributary,” Global Times (Beijing), 10 October 2016.

Chapter 1 | 35
vented China from engaging in productive bilateral talks with India, and 

there is no reason why it would preclude similar discussions at a multilateral level. The key appears to be whether cooperation can be insulated 

from higher-level political tensions and focus instead on shared technical 

or humanitarian issues.62

China has several incentives to cooperate with other Brahmaputra riparian nations in a multilateral context. China’s reputation would benefit 

if they took a leading role in proposing basin-wide cooperation.63 As it has 

with other regional initiatives, such as the AIIB, China could argue that 

it is engaging proactively as a responsible regional stakeholder.64 Additionally, basin-wide cooperation could help reduce a source of friction on 

China’s western periphery at a time when it faces increasing challenges 

in its eastern maritime region and in its relations with the United States 

and others. Finally, at a practical level, a basin-wide approach could yield 

a more holistic understanding of the river system and insights into how to 

address flooding and other challenges.65 Thus, while a major multilateral 

accord may not be possible, China will likely be willing to explore lowerlevel cooperation with its downstream neighbors. 

A starting point would be the establishment of an annual Track 2 dialogue with participation from university and think tank scholars from 

China, India, and Bangladesh. While there are many promising topics for 

discussion, one possibility would be to limit the initial focus to technical 

and scientific subjects, such as the effects of climate change on river flow 

and potential mitigation strategies. Such talks could also involve input 

from international specialists on a case-by-case basis. Over time, these 

62 CNA interviews, Beijing, 2015.

63 Lan, “Shui ziyuan anquan hezuo yu ZhongYin guanxi de hudong” [Water Security Cooperation and China-India Interactions], 37– 43; and “Brahmaputra: Towards Unity,” 20–21. 64 “Brahmaputra: Towards Unity,” 20–21. 65 CASS’s Li Zhifei even argues that basin-wide cooperation would reduce the chances that outside powers, such as the United States, would be able to interfere in regional affairs. Li Zhifei, 

“Shui ziyuan waijiao: Zhongguo zhoubian anquan goujian xin yiti” [Water Resource Diplomacy: 

A New Topic in Constructing China’s Peripheral Security] Xueshu Tansuo [Academic Exploration], no. 4 (2013): 28–33. 

36 | Raging Waters
Track 2 interactions might form the basis for cooperation at the Track 1 

level. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, managing the Brahmaputra has been a dilemma for the river’s uppermost riparian. Chinese officials and analysts see the river as a key to 

the development of Tibet and as part of a larger shift toward greater reliance on clean energy sources. Yet Beijing has had to reassure New Delhi of 

its positive intentions while also expressing its own concerns about India’s 

construction activities in Arunachal Pradesh. As this chapter has shown, 

the chances of a full water-sharing treaty between the two states is low 

due to mistrust and the underlying border dispute. However, opportunities might exist for expanded practical cooperation both at a bilateral and 

a multilateral level, such as increased data sharing and dialogue between 

the riparian countries. This will not eliminate mistrust but could reduce the 

risk of conflict while providing concrete benefits to those who live along 

the river. This cooperation will be needed, especially as China and India 

continue with their large-scale dam activities in the coming years. 

Chapter 1 | 37
CHAPTER 2

38

UPSTREAM, DOWNSTREAM: REFLECTIONS ON INDIA’S 

RIPARIAN RELATIONSHIPS ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA

SATU LIMAYE

In 2005, Li Ling, an officer in China’s 2d Artillery Corps, published Xizang 

Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo (Tibet’s Waters Will Save China), in which he argued 

for diverting the Brahmaputra River to meet the country’s domestic water 

shortages elsewhere. India was alarmed. The specter of the Brahmaputra 

River’s water being diverted from flowing into undeveloped northeast 

India led to public outcry, parliamentary questions, and government responses.1

 The episode also highlighted a new area of discord and distrust 

in Sino-Indian relations at the start of the twenty-first century, just as both 

countries achieved much faster rates of economic growth and aspirations 

for more robust international roles. 

The Brahmaputra dispute also has deeper roots in distrustful relations originating in the breakdown of bilateral relations in the late 1950s, 

the brief border war in October 1962 that ended in a humiliating defeat 

for India, and the continuing close cooperation between China and India’s 

antagonistic neighbor, Pakistan. The May–June 2017 standoff between the 

Indian Army and the PLA on the Doklam plateau—though not directly 

connected to the Brahmaputra River dispute—illustrates the contested 

state of Sino-Indian relations across the northern border where the two 

countries meet.2

 The link between territory and sovereignty and the Brah1 Construction of Dam on Brahmaputra by India, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 23 November 2006. 

2 For more on the incident, see Franz-Stefan Gady, “Amid China-India Border Standoff: China 

Holds Military Exercise in Tibet,” Diplomat, 18 July 2017.
maputra issue appears to have grown more acute in recent months. China’s 

Global Times, for example, reported that the Brahmaputra river water data 

sharing cutoff began at least as early as 20 August due to India’s lack of 

respect for China’s sovereignty in the context of the Doklam dispute.3

 An 

Indian government spokesman confirmed the lack of data.4

Given this background, India’s focus on the Brahmaputra River is 

framed almost entirely with reference to China. However, the reality is that 

India is physically a middle riparian country—between upstream China and 

downstream Bangladesh. India’s physical position as the middle riparian creates complexity in its interests, attitudes, and decisions regarding 

how to handle international cooperation with both its two Brahmaputra 

neighbors. This challenge is further complicated by two other factors. The 

first is the public versus government debate in India in which the Indian 

government persistently presents a sober and cautious assessment of the 

threats posed by China regarding access to Brahmaputra river waters, 

which is contrasted with the more strident and shrill concerns expressed 

by the media and some analysts. The second factor is the strong influence 

of center-state relations between the national government in New Delhi 

and elected governments in the northeastern states as well as the lack of 

consensus among the latter. India’s middle riparian quandaries thus refers 

to different interests and concerns vis-à-vis its two shared riparians—

upstream China and downstream Bangladesh—as well as the domestic 

discord that constrains how New Delhi handles matters regarding the 

Brahmaputra River.

For India, the Brahmaputra River is of great political significance 

because it is a transboundary river that originates in China. However, a 

deep political distrust continues to shadow this new area of India-China 

relations. Three drivers shape India’s policies concerning the Brahmaputra 

River as they relate to China: China’s plans to dam and possibly divert the 

3 Zhao Yusha, “China Has to Halt River Data Sharing as India Infringes on Sovereignty: Expert,” 

Global Times (Beijing), 20 August 2017. 4 Shri Raveesh Kumar, Transcript of Weekly Media Briefing by Official Spokesperson (August 18, 

2017), Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 23 August 2017. 

Chapter 2 | 39
river; New Delhi’s desire to uphold user rights on the river and consolidate 

its existing hold on disputed territory; and India’s need to manage flooding and soil erosion in its northeastern states as well as produce electricity 

through dam construction. 

Relations with Bangladesh regarding the Brahmaputra River tend to 

be an afterthought in India, primarily because of the salience of concerns 

about China, but also because there are more contested riparian issues, not 

to mention political and security problems in India-Bangladesh relations. 

Still, India has opportunities with both China and Bangladesh to further 

modest cooperation by fully and finally implementing existing agreements 

and being more transparent about its own plans for dam building and 

river-linking projects. India’s interest in a multilateral approach may yet be 

a bridge too far, but New Delhi could pursue ecological and environmental 

initiatives on issues ranging from pollution to glaciers that could be introduced into bilateral and eventually trilateral cooperation.

INDIA AND THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER BASIN 

India is the middle riparian country, between China and Bangladesh, on 

the Brahmaputra River (map 2.1). The river’s unruly, braided physical 

flow through the three countries parallels a tricky political configuration. 

The river originates in troubled Tibet, a recurring source of India-China 

discord since the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959.5 It flows through land 

that is still contested by China and India following a 1962 border conflict. 

The river serves as both a socioeconomic resource and occasional threat to 

livelihoods in India’s isolated northeast region, which is increasingly being 

integrated into “mainland” India. And finally the Brahmaputra becomes a 

critical lifeline for Bangladesh, whose India-centric historical origins and 

land, as well as riparian connections, create fraught relations. 

Measured by population and territory, India is physically implicated in the Brahmaputra basin only marginally, certainly compared to the 

5 C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian analyst, argues that Tibet is key to overall India-China relations. Cited in Ellen Bork, “Caught in the Middle: India, China and Tibet,” World Affairs (May/

June 2015). 

40 | Raging Waters
impact of other major river systems in India. Only an estimated 3 percent 

of India’s population resides in the Brahmaputra basin. (China is roughly 

1 percent and Bangladesh an estimated 70 percent.) About 6 percent of 

India’s national territory lies within the Brahmaputra basin—China represents 3 percent and Bangladesh 27 percent.6

 The region of India through 

6 Author’s estimate calculated using multiple sources, mainly “Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 

River Basin,” 111–13; and National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 51, https://

doi.org/10.17226/13449. 

Chapter 2 | 41

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from “Disputed Area of Kashmir,” Library of Congress, Geography and Map 

Division; and “China-India Border: Eastern Sector,” University of Texas, Austin

Map 2.1. India’s middle riparian position on the Brahmaputra River. 
which the river flows is neither highly industrialized nor a major area of 

agricultural productivity, though agriculture is among the main sources of 

livelihood for the citizens who live there. 

But the Brahmaputra River holds great political significance for India 

because it is a transboundary river that originates in China, runs through 

Tibet, flows into disputed territory in India’s isolated and underdeveloped 

northeast, and continues into Bangladesh, with which India has critical but 

difficult riparian relations. 

India’s middle riparian position provides it with a whole-of-basin perspective. But its discrete, distinct interests and troubled relations with its 

upper- and lower-riparian neighbors—as well as with India’s northeastern 

states through which the river flows—pull India’s concerns, drivers, and 

cooperative and competitive activities in complex, inconsistent directions, 

shaping India’s intense debate and mixed policies regarding the Brahmaputra River. 

Thus, to understand why India has this whole-of-basin perspective, 

with all of the concomitant benefits and challenges, we must first examine 

Sino-Indian relations, India’s internal dimensions, and, finally, interactions 

between Bangladesh and India regarding the river. This north-south geographical, analytical approach accurately captures not only the physical 

flow of the river but also the relative hierarchical primacy of China, India’s 

northeast, and Bangladesh to India’s Brahmaputra River policies.7

 

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS REGARDING 

THE BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER 

During the past decade, India and China have steadily increased their dialogue and water-related, information-sharing agreements on the Brahmaputra and other shared rivers. However, a deep political distrust continues 

to shadow this new area of India-China relations. Unless the border/ter7 Author’s phrase created to emphasize that the hierarchy of India’s interests regarding the Brahmaputra River mirrors the natural flow of the river from north to south, from China, to northeastern Indian states, and finally Bangladesh.

42 | Raging Waters
ritorial dispute is resolved, India and China will have difficulty reaching a 

water-sharing agreement. 

In India’s open society, with its freewheeling press and robust democracy, various stakeholders have the freedom to take sides on national issues, and this is no less true in relation to debates over relations with 

China regarding the Brahmaputra River. Indian scholars, policy analysts, 

retired government officials, members of the media, and some in parliament (mostly representatives from the northeastern states of Arunachal 

Pradesh and Assam) express the most acute concerns and worst-case assessments about China’s activities. While these voices mostly highlight 

concerns about China’s plans to dam and divert the river, for example, 

India’s government tends to publicly downplay concerns about whether 

India will have an adequate quantity and quality of water and focuses on 

emerging cooperation with China.8 India’s government and civil society 

are more closely aligned in expressing worries about China’s transparency on upper-riparian activities. In other words, distrust of China is shared 

broadly in India, even as intense debates persist about China’s activities 

and intentions as well as their implications for India. 

The parallel development and current coexistence of India’s vigorous debate about threats from China on the one hand, and incremental 

and limited dialogue and hydrological information sharing between the 

two governments on the other, have resulted in even Indian interlocutors 

debating whether conflict or cooperation is the dominant or counternarrative in India-China relations regarding the Brahmaputra River. India’s 

debate about the China factor regarding the Brahmaputra reflects some8 A search of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website on 27 October 2015 returned 

approximately 100 references to the Brahmaputra River. Except for government statements, articles, and other documents included in these search findings, a high percentage of Lok Sabha 

(lower house of parliament) and Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament) questions come from 

representatives of the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. Moreover, a small, 

representative sampling of the voluminous writings that focus on India’s views of China’s potential threats include: Chellaney, Water; Simon Denyer, “Chinese Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in 

India,” Washington Post, 7 February 2013; Archana Chaudhary, “India Plans Dam on TsangpoBrahmaputra to Check Floods and China,” Bloomberg, 4 June 2015; and R. N. Bhaskar, “What 

Chinese Dam Means to India,” DNA (Mumbai), 27 November 2014.

Chapter 2 | 43
thing of a divide between technical experts and international relations or 

political experts. Technical experts tend to see both Indian and Chinese 

plans for dams and other activities on the Brahmaputra as problematic, 

whereas India’s political experts tend to focus on the problematic features 

of China’s activities for India. This is not surprising, but in the swirling, 

cacophonous debate within India, the technical versus political divide 

adds to the complexity of the government’s policy challenges toward the 

Brahmaputra River. As a result, Indian officials have prioritized alleviating 

domestic concerns by confirming that China does not have plans to divert 

water, highlighting that much of the water flow originates in India’s territory, and seeking hydrological data that would help the government better 

plan flood control in the flood-prone northeastern states. 

Despite the government’s restrained approach, the generally poor 

state of Sino-Indian relations and the fact that the Brahmaputra River 

runs through disputed territory continue to drive India’s anxieties. IndiaChina relations, 56 years after a brief October 1962 border war that ended 

in India’s defeat, now mix competition and cooperation, but remain mired 

in historical animosity, distrust, and serious unresolved issues. China 

claims at least part of the area where the Brahmaputra River enters into 

what India regards as the state of Arunachal Pradesh but China considers 

“southern Tibet.”9 And as recent tensions over the Doklam plateau show, 

Sino-Indian tensions across their frontier persist.

Three additional drivers most influence India’s policies regarding the 

Brahmaputra River: China’s plans to dam and possibly divert the river; 

New Delhi’s desire to uphold user rights on the river and consolidate its 

existing hold on territory; and India’s need to manage flooding and soil 

erosion in its northeastern states.

9 One example is the ongoing controversy over China and India’s dueling depictions of the territory in maps and on passports. Other sources include Bork, “Caught in the Middle”; and CNA 

interviews, Beijing, 2015. 

44 | Raging Waters
INDIA’S PRIMARY CONCERNS ARE 

CHINA’S DIVERSION AND DAM PLANS

By far, India’s most intensely debated concern is China’s damming and 

possible diversion of the river to meet the needs of northern and western 

regions of China that are more populous, agricultural, industrial, or urban 

than remote, underpopulated southern Tibet.10

India’s debate about China’s upper riparian activities took off in 

2005 following publication of Li Ling’s book Xizang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo (Tibet’s Waters Will Save China). The book suggests various options 

for diversion of river waters in the amount of 200.6 billion cubic meters 

(BCM), of which the Brahmaputra would account for the overwhelming 

share at 118.8 BCM. Reportedly, soon after the book was published, India 

pursued numerous cross ministry and cross agency studies to investigate 

and respond to Chinese activities.11

After constructing China’s first major dam, Zangmu, on the upper 

reaches of the Brahmaputra in 2010 (operational in November 2015), Indian 

officials in the Ministry of External Affairs issued a key statement in June 

2011 reflecting the Indian government perspective. Officials stated that, 

despite recent reports about China’s building of the Zangmu Dam, they 

have ascertained from our own sources [presumably a reference to 

work by India’s NRSA and NTRO] that this is a run of the river 

hydro-electric project, which does not store water and will not 

adversely impact the downstream areas in India. Therefore I [Ex10 For China’s perspectives on the Brahmaputra, see the China chapter for this project by Joel 

Wuthnow.

11 The contemplated amount of diversion is taken from information provided during CNA interviews, New Delhi, 2015. Reportedly, the government of India convened the first interministerial 

committee of secretaries, or COS, meeting in October 2006 to investigate the issue of diversion 

of water by China. Subsequently, at least two meetings were held, though it seems likely that they 

met several times. India also initiated efforts by the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) 

and National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) to gauge China’s activities. The Central 

Water Commission also undertook studies around this time “to compute the potential of water 

generated on the Indian side and updated [an] earlier assessment.” A media account of India’s 

approach is by Utpal Bhaskar, “India Firms up Its Strategy on Brahmaputra Water Diversion,” 

LiveMint, 20 November 2013. 

Chapter 2 | 45
ternal Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna] believe there is no cause 

for immediate alarm. I would like to share with you the fact that 

a large proportion of the catchment of the Brahmaputra is within 

Indian territory.12

The Indian government’s assertion of adequate water flows has been much 

debated and contested. A 1996 World Bank report asserts that the Brahmaputra River and its 52 major tributaries have a total catchment area 

of 580,000 square kilometers: 33.6 percent of that lies within India; 50.5 

percent in China; 8.1 percent in Bangladesh; and 7.8 percent in Bhutan.13

The debate in India focuses on where most of the water flow comes from. 

Estimates vary, but at least some in India argue that 

significantly, only 40 percent of the water comes from the Chinese 

catchment area. Some policymakers [sic] in Delhi believe that the 

precipitation in China contributes only 7 percent to the flow. It is 

the Brahmaputra’s tributaries in Arunachal Pradesh, along with 

the rains in India that contribute to the rest of the river’s water 

supply. That could explain the absence of any shrill reaction from 

officials in New Delhi.14

China’s expanding dam construction continues to split Indian assessments 

between the government and civil society critics, and even creates fissures between Indians who see China’s dams as the main problem versus 

those who see all dams on the Brahmaputra River as a problem. Prominent 

experts such as Brahma Chellaney dismiss the government’s assurances 

and argue that China’s dam building is expanding, moving closer to India’s 

border, and providing China with “its growing capacity to serve as the up12 “Reports of Construction of a Dam on Brahmaputra River by China,” Government of India, 

Ministry of External Affairs, 14 June 2011.

13 Development and Growth in Northeast India: The Natural Resources, Water, and Environment 

Nexus (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 33. 14 See Bhaskar, “What Chinese Dam on Brahmaputra Means to India.”

46 | Raging Waters
stream controller by re-engineering transboundary flows through dams.”15

Others, such as former secretary of water resources Ramaswamy R. Iyer, 

argue that, for technical hydrological reasons, even China’s run-of-theriver projects are “a matter of utmost concern to lower riparian countries.”16

Meanwhile, India continues to pursue incremental and limited riverine 

cooperation with China—even though it is unable to influence China to 

cease dam construction. India is also faced with considerable constraints to 

move forward with its own dam-building plans, beset by discord with the 

state governments in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. 

INDIA’S USER RIGHTS AND DISPUTED TERRITORY 

Another priority for India regarding China has been one of upholding its 

riparian rights by declaration and actions such as dam building. A Technical Expert Group (TEG) headed at the joint secretary level in the Ministry 

of Power reportedly was established in 2008 based on the recommendations of an earlier COS meeting held on 21 October 2008. The TEG would 

include representatives of the Ministry of Water Resources; Department 

of Road Transport and Highways; Ministry of Environment, Forests and 

Climate Change; Ministry of External Affairs (MEA); and the Arunachal 

Pradesh state government “to draw up an Action Plan for establishing 

India’s user rights on Brahmaputra and its tributaries coming from China.” 

The TEG’s first recommendation was that “in order to establish the ‘First 

User’ Rights, the first priority would be to complete Lower Subansiri 

15 Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Freshwater Grab, ” Japan Times, 2 November 2015. 16 See Sudha Ramachandran, “Water Wars: China, India and the Great Dam Rush,” Diplomat, 

3 April 2015. Iyer goes on to say that China’s run-of-the-river hydroelectric project “spells death 

for the river” because the turbines operate intermittently in these projects, “which means that 

the waters are held back in pondage and released when the turbines need to operate, resulting 

in huge diurnal variations — from 0 percent to 400 percent in a day—in downstream flows. No 

aquatic life or riparian population can cope with that order of diurnal variation.” In Iyer’s final 

book, Living Rivers, Dying Rivers, released by India’s vice president Hamid Ansari, he offered a 

“pox on both houses” critique: “In particular, the most well known of them, the Brahmaputra, 

is now the victim of project planning by both China and India, with Bangladesh also involved 

in the controversy as the anxious lower riparian. . . . One shudders to think of . . . the consequences 

of interventions in this river by the state, whether Chinese or India,” emphasis added. Cited in R. 

Umamaheshwari, “A Visionary on Water Issues,” Hindu, 14 September 2015.

Chapter 2 | 47
[District] . . . the Lower Siang [District] . . . and Demwe Lower [dams].” 

A second recommendation “would be for State Government of Arunachal 

Pradesh to expeditiously allot at least one major project in these basins as 

close to the international border as possible, and get them implemented 

promptly, in order to quickly and more firmly establish ‘Existing User’ 

rights.”17

During the past decade, India’s officials have repeatedly invoked 

India’s riparian rights and linked dam building to asserting these rights. 

For example, Minister of State for External Affairs Shri E. Ahmad stated 

in parliament that India “is a lower riparian state with considerable established user rights to the water of the River.” In mid-June 2015, India’s additional secretary in the Ministry of Water Resources, Amarjit Singh, tied 

India’s dam building directly to establishing India’s riparian rights, saying, 

“Once we have a storage dam, we get the right for that quantum of water 

as a riparian state under the international practices. If you have a storage 

dam in India on an international river, it gives us [the] right for that much 

water.” Indian media have picked up government statements that dam 

building is motivated by the desire to establish user rights on the river—

disregarding the fact that India already has user rights as a lower riparian 

on the transboundary river.18

India’s anxiety about asserting its riparian rights on the Brahmaputra 

River does not appear to stem from a legal or political challenge to these 

rights by China; there is no evidence that Beijing has challenged these 

rights, and official statements between the two countries repeatedly reference that China will respect these rights. More likely, its anxiety comes from 

the objective of consolidating India’s rights to the territory where the transboundary Brahmaputra flows rather than to the waters of the river per se. 

India believes this is a prudent course of action given the disputed territory 

17 Information provided during CNA interviews, New Delhi, 2015.

18 “Q.1898 Construction of Dam on Brahmaputra by China,” Government of India, Ministry 

of External Affairs, 14 March 2013; “Govt Plans to Build Big Dams over Brahmaputra: Uma 

Bharti,”LiveMint, 4 June 2015; and Chaudhary, “India Plans Dam on Tsangpo-Brahmaputra to 

Check Floods and China.”

48 | Raging Waters
through which the river flows and China’s international efforts to challenge India’s claims to the territory. In March 2009, China moved to oppose 

a nearly $3 billion Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan to India because 

it included funding for a $60 million flood management and hydrological 

program in Arunachal Pradesh. Not surprisingly, some Chinese certainly 

see India’s goal as one of consolidating its hold over disputed territory.19

Dam building has been an extremely slow and limited process in India, 

largely due to political and civic opposition to dam construction, but also 

because of financial and technical constraints. This situation stands in 

stark contrast to the robust dam building on China’s portion of the upper 

Brahmaputra River. India has plans to build several dams to consolidate 

its hold on territory and further establish riparian rights, control flood and 

soil erosion, develop hydroelectric power, and contribute to the overall development of the northeast region. The precise number of planned dams 

is not easy to nail down. During interviews by CNA analysts done in New 

Delhi, the number cited ranged in the mid-hundreds. 

Few believe, however, that even a fraction of these dams will be built. 

Recently, Himanshu Thakkar from the South Asia Network on Dams, 

Rivers and People pointed to the disapproval of locals and the difficulties 

of construction. He noted that the “big projects are difficult to build, and 

dangerous to manage in mountains that are on highly silt laden rivers, in 

a region rich in biodiversity and prone to earthquakes and flooding. The 

lives and livelihoods of so many millions are dependent on these resources. Most of the dams will never be built.”20 Moreover, outside groups put 

up roadblocks as well. In 2013, Brahma Chellaney wrote: “Plans for large 

water projects in India usually run into stiff opposition from influential 

NGOs, so that it has become virtually impossible to build a large dam, 

blighting the promise of hydropower.”21

19 See National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers, 89; Girish Shirodkar, “Playing Chinese 

Checkers with India’s Hydro Sector,” New Spotlight, 20 July 2012; and for China’s perspectives 

on the Brahmaputra, see the China chapter for this project by Joel Wuthnow.

20 Keith Schneider, “Big India Dam, Unfinished and Silent, Could be a Tomb for Giant Hydroelectric Projects,” Circle of Blue, 6 April 2015. 21 Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Growing Water Insecurity,” Defense Dossier, no. 7 (May 2013): 17.

Chapter 2 | 49
Despite the plans and construction on the Brahmaputra, the U.S. National Research Council concluded that “the Brahmaputra is the least 

dammed of the major rivers in the region. In contrast, both the Ganges 

and the Indus are highly dammed.”22 This assessment takes into account 

China’s dams. There are a limited number of dams in the Brahmaputra 

River basin compared to South Asia’s other major river basins (map 2.2).

MANAGING FLOODING AND SOIL EROSION 

Political and territorial issues aside, India needs to address practical issues 

concerning the river, and environmental and sustainability problems combined serve as one of the factors driving Indian policy about the Brahmaputra. Soil erosion is a major feature in the northeast India catchment 

area. According to the Brahmaputra Board of India’s Ministry of Water Resources, “Due to heavy deposition of silt, the river has frequently changed 

its course. Excessive silt deposition has also given rise to [a] braiding and 

meandering pattern in the alignment of the river system.”23 High siltation 

arises from many factors, including landslides due to heavy rainfall in the 

area, earthquakes, and manmade actions, such as changes in cultivation 

patterns and exploitation of forest resources in the hills above the valley 

through which the river runs. Northeast India specialists often highlight 

the fact that adapting to floods and soil erosion is a major struggle for the 

residents of the region. 

However, flooding is the driver that directly initiated India’s cooperative outreach to China, resulting in the current ongoing dialogue and limited 

hydrological data-sharing agreements. India’s concerns about flooding in its 

northeastern states date from the early 2000s. In 2000, in response to a parliamentary question, Ajit Kumar Panja, then minister of state for external affairs, 

replied, “Following the recent flash flood in Arunachal Pradesh in June 2000, 

the matter was taken up with the Chinese Government. They conveyed that 

there was no dam on the Chinese side on the river Brahmaputra and attrib22 National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers, 61. 23 “Master Plans—River System,” Brahmaputra Board, Ministry of Water Resources.

50 | Raging Waters
uted the occurrence of floods on the Indian side to natural causes.”24 India’s 

government seems to have concurred that the flood was a natural disaster. 

Information provided during interviews in New Delhi referred to an incident 

in which NTRO monitoring revealed “some water blockage . . . at Great Bend 

[Shuomatan Point] in the Brahmaputra river basin possibly due to a natural 

landslide.”25Either by virtue of the facts, or just to keep the communications 

24 For a media report at the time, see Nitin Gogoi, “Army Suspects Chinese Hand Behind Flash 

Floods in N-E,” Rediff, 23 August 2000; and “Q. 2104—Breach of Dams Constructed by Chinese Authorities,” Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 10 August 2000. 

25 CNA interviews, New Delhi, 2015.

Chapter 2 | 51

Courtesy of Pete McPhail, based on data from National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers, 61; South Asia Water 

Initiative; and Water Resources Information System of India 

Map 2.2. The Brahmaputra River basin has fewer dams than other major South Asia river 

basins. 
viable, Indian officials have been willing to accept China’s word regarding 

the cause of the 2000 flood.

But the importance of flood management, whether because of China’s 

activities (intentional or unintentional) or natural causes, remains a driver 

of India’s approach with China and the northeastern states. India-China 

bilateral discussions on cooperation about the river began in the early 

2000s as a result of these flooding concerns—well before any Chinese dams 

had been constructed on the upper portions of the Brahmaputra and well 

before debates erupted in India about China’s plans to divert the river 

waters. 

At a press briefing during the January 2002 visit of China’s Premier 

Zhu Rongji, India’s government reiterated that flood control and disaster 

prevention were driving efforts at bilateral cooperation and mechanisms 

with China. Following a major flood in India’s northeast in June 2000, the 

Memorandum of Understanding upon Provision of Hydrological Information of 

the Brahmaputra/Yalung Tsangbo River in Flood Season by China to India was 

signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008.26 According to the MOU, the two 

countries agreed to share data for the benefit of China’s downstream 

neighbors. Sharing information on the flow of water both in flood and 

nonflood seasons is critical downstream in the event of a sudden shortage or surplus of water. In response to a question about China diverting 

the river, an Indian official said, “I believe that these reports have been 

denied by the Chinese side. There is a level of mutual confidence inherent 

to this agreement.”27 Since this statement, India’s government has continued to link hydrological data sharing by China with flood control and disaster mitigation, and it has acknowledged publicly that the data provided 

by China has been helpful to this end. Hydrological data sharing between 

26 India-China Co-Operation, Government of India, Ministry of Water Resources. 27 “Summary of Press Briefing by the Official Spokesperson,” Government of India, Ministry of 

External Affairs, 14 January 2002. See also Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry 

of Water Resources, the Republic of India and the Ministry of Water Resources, the People’s Republic 

of China on Strengthening Cooperation on Trans-border Rivers, Government of India, Ministry of 

External Affairs, 23 October 2013, hereafter 2013 MOU.

52 | Raging Waters
China and India has gone hand in hand with a more unilateral Indian approach to controlling floods: dam building.28

Despite India’s intention to build its own dams to manage water flows, 

the number of dams actually being built still appears to be extremely 

limited. According to India’s Water Resources Information System (WRIS), 

as of March 2015, only 16 dams have been constructed in the Brahmaputra 

basin, and some of these have yet to be completed.29 Given the delays in 

completing dams as agreed upon (e.g., the dam on the Subansiri River), the 

depth of antidam movements in the northeast and broadly in India—with 

considerable support from international antidam NGOs—and the lack of 

adequate financing, it is unclear just how many dams India will actually 

complete on their portion of the Brahmaputra River and its tributaries.

Thus, the need to control flooding and soil erosion—along with the 

threat of China’s dams and possible water diversion and India’s need to 

establish user rights and consolidate a hold on territory—appears to be a 

key driver of India’s activities in dealing with China regarding the Brahmaputra River. 

INDIA-CHINA COOPERATION 

Since the early 2000s, India-China relations concerning the Brahmaputra 

River have included new elements: dialogue and cooperation. Due to mistrust and disagreements over territorial boundaries, progress in relations 

has been limited. Nonetheless, the progress made encourages some hope 

for further cooperation. Under the 2002 MOU, China agreed to provide 

hydrological information, including water level, discharge, and rainfall 

amount from three stations (Nugesha, Yangcun, and Nuxia in Tibet) during 

28 See, for example, In Response to Questions on a News Report on the Brahmaputra River Project in 

China, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 23 October 2006; and Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, Government of India, Ministry 

of External Affairs, 21 November 2006. The 2006 India-China joint declaration noted that “the 

on-going provision of hydrological data for the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo and the Sutlej/

Langqen Tsangpo Rivers by the Chinese side to the Indian side has proved valuable in flood forecasting and mitigation,” emphasis added. See “Govt Plans to Build Big Dams over Brahmaputra.” 29 “Dams in Brahmaputra Basin,” India-WRIS, 27 March 2015. 

Chapter 2 | 53
the 1 June–15 October monsoon season.30 India acknowledged that this 

information “was utilized in the formulation of flood forecasts by [the] 

Central Water Commission.”31 A 2005 MOU (renewed in 2010) expanded 

the data sharing to include the Sutlej River in India’s northwest.32 Therefore, the MOUs provide a vehicle to facilitate communication about the 

river.

Beyond the discussions surrounding the MOUs, China and India 

created new opportunities for specialists to work together. A 2006 joint 

declaration signed during the November visit of China’s then-president 

Hu Jintao to India established an expert-level mechanism to discuss 

“emergency management” as well as “other issues regarding transboundary rivers.”33 Without providing specifics about how these mechanisms 

would be implemented, this declaration promised ongoing hydrological 

data sharing on the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and Sutlej (Langqen 

Zangbo) and referenced the need to reach similar agreements on the 

Parlung Zangbo and Lohit/Zayu Qu rivers. India’s acknowledgment that 

the data provided by China has been valuable for flood forecasting and 

mitigation may be designed to reassure India’s domestic skeptics about the 

utility of this information but also to provide reassurance in India-China 

relations, suggesting that the utility of the agreements is as much political 

as practical in addressing flood forecasting.

Indian critics have dismissed data-sharing cooperation as useless at 

worst and limited at best, whereby “information had been exchanged but is 

not actionable because the data provides only volume of water figures and 

not from where or what time.” Others claim that “we need regular infor30 For a map of Chinese monitoring stations on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Nugesha, Yangcun and 

Nuxia), see figure 1 in He Chen, “Assessment of Hydrological Alterations from 1961 to 2000 

in the Yarlung Zangbo River, Tibet,” Ecohydrology & Hydrobiology 12, no. 2 (2012): 93–103, 

https://doi.org/10.2478/v10104-012-0009-z.

31 A detailed list and explanation of the cooperative mechanism as of 19 September 2014 is 

available at Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, Central 

Water Commission. 

32 Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. 33 Joint Statement by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. 

54 | Raging Waters
mation, not on [an] annualized basis.” Another felt India needs knowledge 

about “what spots the data comes from.” Some critics dismissed water data 

sharing as useless in the absence of a water-sharing agreement.34

In any case, further cooperation on hydrological data sharing has been 

incremental and marginal. During Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s May 2013 

visit to India, the two sides agreed that China would provide data twice 

a day. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in October 2013 

led to the more grandiosely titled Memorandum of Understanding between the 

Ministry of Water Resources, the Republic of India and the Ministry of Water Resources, the People’s Republic of China on Strengthening Cooperation on Transborder Rivers.

35 But the only substantive new element was that China agreed 

to provide data starting on 15 May instead of 1 June—an extra two weeks 

of data coverage.36

India’s press accounts have emphasized what Prime Minister Singh 

did not achieve in terms of cooperation—i.e., providing at least some 

insight into what would constitute more substantive cooperation from the 

perspective of India. Singh reportedly “sought a joint mechanism with 

China for better transparency on 39 project sites that Beijing has apparently 

identified on tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), including 

seven on the main river.” Moreover, “New Delhi had pressed for a joint 

mechanism because in the absence of a river water–sharing treaty between 

the two countries, such a mechanism will allow India to seek specific information about the upstream projects in China, their construction schedule, 

the likely impact on people, environment and downstream river flows.”37

Other media reports claimed that Prime Minister Singh sought a water 

34 CNA interviews, New Delhi, 2015.

35 2013 MOU.

36 List of Documents Signed during the State Visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India (May 

19–22, 2013), Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 20 May 2013; and 2013 

Implementation Plan: Provision of Hydrological Information on the Yarlung Zangbu/Brahmaputra 

River in Flood Season by China to India, Embassy of India, Beijing, China, 30 June 2014. 37 Wasbir Hussain, “MOU on the Brahmaputra River,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 

#4149, 24 October 2013. 

Chapter 2 | 55
commission or intergovernmental dialogue to deal with water issues.38 In 

the absence of reliable public information on what New Delhi proposed to 

Beijing through diplomatic channels, it seems clear that the government 

of India was keen to advance up the cooperation ladder but did not get 

very far, suggesting an ongoing gap between India and China on river 

management. 

As evidence of the cooperation eked out between India and China, it 

was not until 2014, during the visit of India’s vice president Hamid Ansari 

to China, that the two countries signed the Implementation Plan: Provision 

of Hydrological Information on the Yarlung Zangbu/Brahmaputra River in Flood 

Season by China to India.

39 This document is fascinating in several respects. 

Mainly, the agreement addresses issues about types of data and mechanisms for communicating information. First, it lays out in great detail the 

precise nature of information to be shared (to the decimal point), the mechanisms by which information is to be shared (including specific emails 

of respective officials), and related details of hydrological information 

sharing. Second, almost parenthetically, the document states: “The Chinese 

side also agrees to provide hydrological information if water levels of 

above-mentioned stations are close to or reach warning water levels in 

non-flood season.” This appears to be the first publicly available mention 

of nonflood season (when water flow can fall too low) data sharing in an official document of the two countries. The clause about providing information in the case of stations reaching “warning water levels” also appears to 

address the vague references in the 2006 joint declaration to “emergency 

management.”40

Third, the document lays out the terms and mode of payment, which 

is unusual, as the best publically available information indicates China 

does not charge Bangladesh to provide similar data. The cost to India for 

China’s provision of the data is approximately 850,000 Yuan per year—or 

38 See, for example, “China Less Than Enthusiastic to Indian Proposal on Water Issue,” Economic 

Times, 20 August 2013. 39 Implementation Plan.

40 Implementation Plan.

56 | Raging Waters
less than $134,000 per year at current exchange rates. A fourth interesting 

element of the implementation plan document is its articulation of Indian

obligations beyond payment. Much of India’s public and media narrative 

on river water issues with China has focused on the need for transparency from Beijing. This document notes that the “Indian side will provide 

the Chinese side information regarding data utilization in flood forecasting and mitigation” and that the “Indian side will also inform the Chinese 

side [of] the information of the hydrological station which lies on the mainstream of the Yarlung Zangbu/Brahmaputra River and is close to China’s 

Nuxia station. The information includes [the] station’s name, latitude and 

longitude, [and] type of data being observed.”41 The mutual transparency 

inherent in this implementation plan is intriguing because it both makes 

obligations mutual and runs counter to India’s domestic debate, which 

focuses mostly on what China must do. 

Finally, in an element that has received almost no media or public attention, the implementation plan permits the parties “after mutual consultation through diplomatic channels” to “dispatch hydrological experts to 

each other’s country to conduct study tour[s] according to the principle of 

reciprocity.” The purpose of this element is “to ensure normal provision 

of hydrological information.”42 All things considered, the implementation 

plan suggests a clear and established framework for data sharing on the 

Brahmaputra River. It is, however, not clear how the implementation plan 

is being executed. For example, there is no evidence that the data have in 

fact been shared per the agreement or that any study tours of hydrological 

experts have taken place. And, of course, hydrological data sharing does 

nothing to address transparency on such issues as mutual dam building, 

alleged Chinese interest in diverting the waters, or water sharing of the 

Brahmaputra River. These “big-ticket” items of riverine cooperation remain 

off the table for now, and there is little to suggest that they will be picked 

41 Implementation Plan.

42 Implementation Plan.

Chapter 2 | 57
up for action any time soon. Thus, while there is progress in cooperation, 

they are just baby steps.

Indeed, India-China cooperation on the Brahmaputra River seems to 

have reached its limit for the time being. Prime Minister Modi’s May 2015 

visit to China brought no new announcements for cooperation, though he 

specifically called for “tangible progress” on the issue and described it as 

an “irritant.”43 One can only speculate as to why no new agreements were 

signed (in contrast to the preceding decade, when several small steps were 

taken), but it seems likely that this first visit was seen by China as a “get 

to know you” event and Prime Minister Modi went to China emphasizing 

economic issues, including attracting investment to bolster his new “Make 

in India” manufacturing campaign.44 A broader interpretation may be that 

cooperation on the Brahmaputra River, because it overlaps with the contested territorial issue, will be a painstaking and drawn-out process similar 

to India-China negotiations on the border and the territorial dispute itself.

The assessment of a Chinese specialist on the issue seems reasonable: 

“Since China still has border disputes with Bhutan and India, it is understandable that there would not be any substantial negotiations on the 

use and protection of transboundary waters before more vital and urgent 

border disputes are resolved.”45 For both China and India, then, the territorial dispute through which the river literally runs remains inextricably tied 

up with sharing information, not to mention the water of the river. 

43 “Prime Minister’s Media Statement during His Visit to China (May 15, 2015),” Government 

of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 15 May 2015. 

44 For more on this policy, see “National Manufacturing,” Government of India, Make in India.

45 Chen Huiping, “The 1997 UNWC and China’s Treaty Practice on Transboundary Waters” 

(paper presented at the United Nations Watercourses Convention Global Symposium, University 

of Dundee, 10–14 June 2012), 21. This paper also draws on research from Patricia Wouters and 

Chen Huiping, “China’s ‘Soft-Path’ to Transboundary Water Cooperation Examined in the Light 

of Two UN Global Water Conventions—Exploring the ‘Chinese Way’,” Journal of Water Law 22, 

no. 6 (2011): 229–47. 

58 | Raging Waters
THE SUBNATIONAL FACTOR 

India’s perspectives and policies on the Brahmaputra River are also influenced by northeast India’s increasing institutionalization in India’s government structure, its higher political profile, and its growing role in India’s 

international relations. Furthermore, India seeks to build dams to produce 

electricity as well as manage the flooding and soil erosion that affect livelihoods and development in its northeastern states. To date, however, India 

has built very few of its planned dams on the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. The growing weight of the northeast India subnational factor has 

fused with concerns about China’s upstream activities and the salience of 

transboundary rivers in India-China relations. 

Though the Brahmaputra River flows through only two of eight northeast Indian states—one of which is disputed territory with China—its 

drainage and catchment areas affect a wider portion of the region, including Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, West Bengal, Nagaland, and 

Sikkim.46 The Brahmaputra River is thus a socioeconomic resource but occasionally also a source of destructive floods, and is an isolated and underdeveloped Indian region. The region is essentially an “island” separate 

from India (Indian interlocutors often speak of India as the “mainland” 

versus the northeast) because it is connected to peninsular India only by 

the narrow Siliguri Corridor or “Chicken’s Neck” and surrounded by 

Bangladesh or Myanmar.47 Integrating the isolated northeast region into 

India’s mainland is part of the larger state- and nation-building project. 

Even as India’s government deals with differences regarding the Brahma46 The drainage area is spread across Arunachal Pradesh (42 percent), Assam (33 percent), 

Meghalaya (6 percent), and Nagaland (6 percent). See Shirodkar, “Playing Chinese Checkers”; 

and “River Info: Brahmaputra River System,” India-WRIS, 14 January 2016. 

47 Ankit Panda, “Geography’s Curse: India’s Vulnerable ‘Chicken Neck’,” Diplomat, 8 November 

2013.

Chapter 2 | 59
putra River with China, it has kept the northeast dimension of the issue in 

mind.48

The Department of Development of the North Eastern Region (NER) 

was established in 2001 and upgraded to a full ministry in 2004, “underscoring [India’s] complete commitment to ensure development with equity 

for the NER to unleash the potential of its human and natural resources.”49

A part of this development involves the construction of dams as discussed 

above. Politically, the northeast has received more attention in the past 

decade because India’s third-longest serving prime minister, Manmohan Singh (2004–14), had his upper house parliamentary constituency in 

Assam. In cooperation with the World Bank, Prime Minister Singh initiated 

an important study on the region’s water resources, which was released 

in 2007. Furthermore, Prime Minister Singh emphasized the need to make 

northeast India a key part of the country’s expanded ties to Southeast Asia 

as part of a Look East Policy. Prime Minister Modi continued this emphasis on developing India’s northeast and linking development to ties with 

Southeast Asia.50

A key challenge for the central government of India is balancing the 

northeast region’s persistent questioning of New Delhi’s attention and response to China’s activities, while addressing criticisms about the central 

government’s dam building and other initiatives for the region.51 Some 

Indian and Chinese analysts suggest that northeast Indian state governments exaggerate the dangers posed by China’s plans on the upper Brahmaputra, while simultaneously complaining about India’s approaches to 

handling flooding, drought, and erosion problems in the region because 

48 In June 2011, India’s external affairs minister, S. M. Krishna, stated, “It is important that the 

States of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam of India harness and utilize the waters of the Brahmaputra. This is the really important issue.” See Reports of Construction of a Dam on Brahmaputra River 

by China, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 14 June 2011. 49 Background, Government of India, Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region. 50 Development and Growth in Northeast India; see, for example, Edmund Downie, “Narendra 

Modi’s Northeast India Outreach,” Diplomat, 14 December 2014; and Elizabeth Roche, “PM 

Modi Seeks Singapore’s Investment to Develop the Northeast,” LiveMint, 9 February 2015. 51 For an informed view of northeast Indian perspectives, see Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, “Dams on 

the Brahmaputra: Concerns in Northeast India,” IPCS.org, #3245, 28 September 2010.

60 | Raging Waters
they seek to manipulate the central government to increase their leverage 

for project funding.52 Last year, Assam’s chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, of the 

Indian National Congress—a party in opposition to the central government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—complained about India’s 

plans to build a new dam on the middle part of the Siang even as Indian 

officials explained that the purpose of the dam was to prevent flooding in 

Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.53

The lack of consensus between the two main Brahmaputra-bearing 

Indian states—Arunachal Pradesh and Assam—also complicates matters. 

Indeed, one Indian analyst explained that there is anxiety between 

Arunachal Pradesh, the upper riparian state, and Assam, the lower riparian state, due to their relative positions on the river. The latter worries primarily that the contemplated dam construction in Arunachal Pradesh will 

interrupt river flow downstream in Assam and that the seismic vulnerability of the state will lead to dam breakage and population displacement, 

among other dangers. More than one interlocutor in India reported that the 

water ministries of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam do not share river water 

data with each other, “so why complain about the PRC [People’s Republic of China] not giving data when even state ministries don’t talk.”54 In 

the mid-2000s, as part of India’s policy of increasing the region’s political 

institutionalization, a proposal called for establishing a Northeast Water 

Resources Authority to overcome state-level resistance to information 

sharing and cooperation. But, according to one leading Indian water expert 

and former government official, B. G. Verghese of the Centre for Policy Re52 For Chinese perceptions, see Liu Qin, “Indian Critics of Tibet’s First Dam ‘Exaggerating’ 

Dangers: Chinese Experts Stress Cooperation over Competition as Solution to Water Disputes,” 

ChinaFile, 4 December 2014. 53 “Assam Opposes Centre Plan to Build Mega Dam on Siang River,” Times of India (Mumbai), 

5 June 2015. 

54 See B. G. Verghese, Water Resources in the Northeast: Development Options in a Cooperative 

Framework, Background Paper No. 1 (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2006). This was 

the first in a series of papers done to support the eventual study entitled Development and Growth 

in Northeast India: The Natural Resources, Water, and Environment Nexus (Washington, DC: 

World Bank, 2007).

Chapter 2 | 61
search, Arunachal Pradesh preferred to deal bilaterally with lower riparian 

Assam.55

Apart from the two key state governments, citizen groups and various 

local and international NGOs have been highly critical of dam-building 

projects in the region for a range of environmental, cultural, and economic 

reasons. Jabin T. Jacob, director of the Institute for Chinese Studies, highlights the inadequate local labor supply, which would require the influx 

of labor from elsewhere in India and thereby add stress to a region “that 

is already the site of various forms of political instability, including ethnic 

insurgencies.”56

Despite the dissonance between New Delhi and the northeast states, 

and their persistent need to work on center-state alignment, there is almost 

no evidence that northeast India is making new, non-India–centric alignments to influence outcomes. Northeast Indian states are not seeking or 

cutting deals even with neighboring Bangladesh, much less with China—

though interactions between northeast Indian states and Bangladeshi 

officials do take place. The paucity of direct links between India’s northeastern states and either China or Bangladesh means that multilateral cooperation on the Brahmaputra basin must be driven by national capitals 

rather than regional ones—though, at least in the Indian case, there must 

be some mechanism to involve or inform state-level governments about 

such efforts.

Northeast India’s place in the dynamics of the Brahmaputra River 

remains both central and marginal. Physically, northeast India is where the 

55 See Verghese, Water Resources in the Northeast; and Development and Growth in Northeast India. 56 For example, research scholar Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman writes: “The huge number of big and 

small dams in Arunachal Pradesh has the potential to damage the rich biodiversity and ecosystem of the state considered to be one of the global biodiversity hotspots, result in huge displacement of people in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, increase the risks of flash floods and 

environmental disasters in a particularly active seismic zone, and induce conditions for further 

conflict situations in the region. Many of these effects have already been seen, with some projects 

almost near completion, and the damage done in the past five years is starkly noticeable in the 

state.” Rahman, “Dams on the Brahmaputra”; and Jabin T. Jacob, Political Economy of Infrastructure Development in the Sino-Indian Border Areas, China-India Brief No. 22 (Singapore: Centre 

on Asia and Globalization, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 2014). 

62 | Raging Waters
Brahmaputra River flows. Politically, northeast India is where the Brahmaputra River flows through contested terrain with China. And yet, while 

Delhi has included the key state governments in shaping its approaches to 

national policy, the role of the northeastern states is far less significant to 

driving India’s Brahmaputra River policies than bilateral India-China relations and, to some extent, even India-Bangladesh relations. It is to the latter 

relationship that this chapter now turns.

INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS 

The physical, historical, and political interdependence of India and Bangladesh shapes bilateral relations, including those regarding the Brahmaputra 

River. India’s northeastern states surround Bangladesh for approximately 

2,500 miles, broken only by a stretch of roughly 200 miles along the southeast corner where Bangladesh and Burma share a border. If Bangladesh is 

“encircled” by India, India is “separated” by Bangladesh. India’s northeastern states are essentially separated from peninsular India by Bangladesh—

except for the narrow Siliguri Corridor. Historically, Bangladesh actually 

emerged from what is today India. It was first partitioned from the province of Bengal by the British in 1905 (reunited in 1911) and then split off as 

East Pakistan in 1947 at the time of British India’s partitioning into independent India and Pakistan. Finally, East Pakistan became today’s Bangladesh, when it was separated through secession from Pakistan and military 

intervention from India during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, also known 

as the Bangladesh War of Independence.57Against this background, India’s 

relations with Bangladesh concerning the Brahmaputra are a subset of 

wider riparian relations conducted through the Joint Rivers Commission 

and specific agreements on the Ganges and Teesta Rivers.

This intricate linkage carries over into riverine relations. Most of Bangladesh’s 57 major rivers originate in or flow through India. Upon entering Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra, for example, becomes the Jamuna River, 

57 This section is drawn from Nilanthi Samaranayake et al., U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing?: 

The Potential for Coordinated Capacity-Building in the Indian Ocean (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 

2013), 7–27.

Chapter 2 | 63
which joins with the Ganges River (called Padma in Bangladesh), which 

in turn joins the Meghna River to flow into the Bay of Bengal. The intricate riverine relations between India and Bangladesh are similar to those 

between China and India on the Brahmaputra. However, India-Bangladesh 

relations are quite different and focus on three elements: cooperation on the 

Ganges River, waiting for implementation of an agreement on the Teesta 

River, and implications of India’s river-linking project for Bangladesh. 

COOPERATION ON THE GANGES RIVER 

A 1996 water-sharing agreement on the Ganges River is seen in India as 

an example of their accommodative and cooperative behavior on riverine 

issues. Bangladeshis see India as less generous, often noting its use of the 

Farakka Barrage to divert water from the Ganges to flush the silt-heavy 

Hooghly River in Kolkata.58 The Ganges River Treaty clearly does not solve 

all of the difficulties faced by lower riparian Bangladesh, but it is one of 

just three water-sharing agreements on major rivers in South Asia.59

WAITING ON THE TEESTA RIVER 

A second India-Bangladesh water-sharing agreement on the Teesta River 

was reached in 2011 and awaits political approval for implementation. 

India’s West Bengal chief minister has held up implementation due to 

political sensitivities in the state; India’s constitution identifies water as a 

state-level issue, and therefore a chief minister is able to exercise such a 

role. Prime Minister Modi’s June 2015 visit to Dhaka did nothing to move 

forward implementation of the Teesta Agreement. Both in India and in 

Bangladesh, however, optimism surges with the knowledge that the Teesta 

58 See Brahma Chellaney, “India Must Treat Water as a Strategic Resource, Fight China’s Throttlehold,” Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 28 November 2015; and Madeleine Lovell, “India, Bangladesh and the Farakka Barrage,” Future Directions International, 10 May 2016. For Bangladesh’s 

perspectives on the Brahmaputra, see the Bangladesh chapter for this project by Nilanthi Samaranayake.

59 Treaty between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the 

Republic of India on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, BD-IN, 12 December 1996, 

hereafter 1996 water treaty.

64 | Raging Waters
agreement will go forward in due course—though this might require 

further political alignment between New Delhi, Dhaka, and Kolkata (formerly Calcutta). Such political alignments—between the central government in New Delhi and the state of West Bengal (which includes Kolkata), 

and between these two jurisdictions and Dhaka, Bangladesh—are unpredictable and not necessarily decisive. For example, the Teesta agreement 

did not move forward during either Prime Minister Singh’s or Prime Minister Modi’s visits due to opposition from the state government in India’s 

West Bengal state. However, politics between New Delhi, the state of West 

Bengal, and Dhaka were sufficiently aligned by the time of Prime Minister Modi’s June 2015 visit to Bangladesh to allow for final ratification and 

implementation of an India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement.60 In the 

absence of political alignments among the three key jurisdictions, the political prospects for settling outstanding riverine issues between New Delhi 

and Dhaka are not favorable.61

IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA’S RIVER-LINKING PROJECT 

FOR BANGLADESH 

India’s plan for a river-linking project (RLP) is a significant factor in 

India-Bangladesh relations regarding the Brahmaputra River. Variations of 

this project have been on the drawing board for centuries, since the days of 

British colonial rule. Two recent events brought new attention to the project: 

the 2012 Indian Supreme Court ruling calling for an acceleration of the plan’s 

implementation, and the 2014 return to power of a BJP government regarded 

as favorable to the RLP project’s implementation.62

While the RLP overwhelmingly deals with interlinking rivers within

India, there are implications for transboundary flows. The precise impact 

on transboundary water flows appears to be a subject of significant debate 

60 India and Bangladesh: Land Boundary Agreement (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 

Government of India, 2015).

61 For the current status of this water-sharing agreement, see Jayanta Basu, “India-Bangladesh 

Teesta Deal: River Has only One-sixteenth of Water Needed,” Business Standard, 30 May 2017. 62 For a recent overview, see G. Seetharaman, “Testing the Waters,” Economic Times Magazine 

Special Report, 4–10 October 2015.

Chapter 2 | 65
and rests in part on the technical as well as political decisions made in any 

implementation of such a project (map 2.3). 

A technical study by the International Water Management Institute 

examines “the scope for linking the existing bilateral agreement between 

India and Bangladesh on sharing water from the Ganges River to an additional provision allowing for mutually beneficial water transfers from the 

Brahmaputra River.”63 Others are highly critical of such a project, saying 

that the “project will alter the natural flow of rivers, cause water-logging, 

hamper transportation of silt, affect fisheries, submerge forests and reduce 

water flow in transboundary rivers in downstream Bangladesh.” From a 

legal standpoint, the critics contend that “by diverting water from the 

Ganga, India would break its formal promises to Bangladesh under the 

1996 Ganga Water Treaty.” In that treaty, Indian officials promised “that 

no water would be diverted away from the Ganga above the barrage at 

Farakka,” which is only a few kilometers from the India-Bangladesh 

border.64

Whatever the impacts might be, the prospect for implementing the 

RLP in the near term in a way that would affect Bangladesh is widely 

regarded, both in India and in Bangladesh, as unrealistic for a host of technical, financial, and political reasons. Concerns about the RLP in IndiaBangladesh relations are trumped by differences over the existing Ganges 

water-sharing agreement and implementing the completed Teesta agreement, as well as managing overall India-Bangladesh riverine relations 

through the Joint Rivers Commission.

Beyond these three priorities, India-Bangladesh cooperation is limited. 

Each recognizes its dependence on the other; India knows that transit 

rights through Bangladesh will boost development in India’s northeast, 

and Bangladesh appreciates India’s upper-riparian position. Such mutual 

63 Anik Bhaduri and Edward Barbier, Linking Rivers in the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin: 

Exploring the Transboundary Effects (Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute, 2008).

64 Juhi Chaudhary, “India Renews ‘Disastrous’ River-Linking Project,” TheThirdPole.net, 20 

November 2014. 

66 | Raging Waters
Chapter 2 | 67

Courtesy of Pete McPhail, based on data from “Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Ganga Link,” India-WRIS; and Upali A. Amarasinghe and Bharat R. Sharma, ed., Strategic Analysis of the National River-Linking Project (NRLP) of India: Proceedings of the 

Workshop on Analyses of Hydrological, Social and Ecological Issues of the NRLP (New Delhi: International Water Management Institute, 2008)

Map 2.3. India’s river-linking project, which includes the linking of the Brahmaputra River. 
dependence, however, has led to only limited cooperation beyond directly bilateral issues and approaches. Based on interviews in India, interest 

in multilateralizing cooperation that would include Bangladesh appears 

very low. There is little evidence from interviews in India or Bangladesh, 

for example, that India is using cooperation with Bangladesh to pressure 

China. Bangladesh has its own concerns about China’s planned activities 

on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra and is engaged in discussions directly with Beijing on these issues.65

CONCLUSION: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 

IN THE BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN 

India’s relations with China primarily shape its policies toward management of the Brahmaputra basin. India’s domestic politics, specifically the 

public versus government debate and relations between the central government in New Delhi and the northeast state capitals through which the 

river runs, also influence India’s management of basin issues. Bangladesh 

remains a comparatively minor factor in India’s handling of Brahmaputra issues, even though river issues form a central aspect of the IndiaBangladesh relationship. 

India’s specific concerns, such as issues with China, northeast India, 

and Bangladesh, are quite discrete and distinct. This complex set of interests creates quandaries for India, which sits between China and Bangladesh on the river. Hence, India pursues a variegated and limited set of 

cooperative activities regarding the basin. 

India, however, does have opportunities with both China and Bangladesh to further modest cooperation by fully and finally implementing existing agreements and being more transparent about its own dam-building 

and RLP plans. In fact, because of the relatively measured and longer-term 

physical impacts of the river on India’s population, industry, and agriculture, India has more space to experiment with innovative approaches to 

cooperation with its upper- and lower-riparian neighbors.

65 For Bangladesh’s perspectives on the Brahmaputra, see the Bangladesh chapter for this project 

by Nilanthi Samaranayake.

68 | Raging Waters
India’s current emphasis on bilateral approaches to China and Bangladesh regarding the Brahmaputra does not rule out future multilateral 

cooperation, but India’s middle-riparian position prevents effective multilateralism as a means to pursue its interests. India should introduce 

elements of ecosystem management and ecological protection into discussions of cooperation with China along the lines of the efforts between India 

and Bangladesh. There also may be room for the three countries to develop 

common research on preserving and monitoring Himalayan glaciers as 

part of the region’s common heritage. 

India currently takes a bilateral approach to the Brahmaputra River for 

several reasons. First, India mostly favors bilateral diplomacy with its neighbors, especially on sensitive issues. Second, India’s main interlocutor and 

challenge on the Brahmaputra River—China—also emphasizes bilateral diplomacy. Third, India, as a middle-riparian country, has different concerns 

and interests regarding upper-riparian China and lower riparian Bangladesh that are likely better addressed bilaterally. It is unclear what benefits India would accrue from multilateralizing Brahmaputra River issues. 

Indeed, some Indians feel that a multilateral setting would allow Bangladesh to gain China’s support for criticisms of India’s river policies. Fourth, 

India already has bilateral water-sharing and hydrological informationsharing agreements with South Asian riverine neighbors and with China. 

Indeed, one former Indian government official recounted that India used 

the example of India-Pakistan riverine cooperation to make the case to 

China in the early 2000s to share hydrological data regarding the Brahmaputra River.66

India’s current emphasis on bilateral approaches to Brahmaputra 

issues does not rule out future multilateral cooperation. India is a member 

of numerous organizations and arrangements that bring together countries 

with shared river waters, including the widest such organization relevant 

to the region—the SAARC. Improved relations across South Asia over time 

could theoretically create a mechanism along the lines of the MRC. But this 

66 CNA interviews, New Delhi, 2015.

Chapter 2 | 69
seems like a distant prospect indeed, given the current poor state of intraSouth Asia relations. An additional constraint is that the membership of 

these organizations and arrangements are not consistent with the three key 

Brahmaputra riparian states—China, India, and Bangladesh. 

The closest organization in terms of membership and relevance to Brahmaputra River management is the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation. 

While Myanmar is not a Brahmaputra riparian, BCIM could theoretically 

address water issues. However, India remains quite cautious regarding 

BCIM and appears to want that organization to focus on land transportation connections for now rather than expand its agenda. There was little 

enthusiasm among Indian interlocutors to bring the Brahmaputra River 

issue to BCIM. In the absence of a Brahmaputra-specific arrangement, India 

and other riparian nations could create a trilateral, Brahmaputra Riveronly-organization. But such a major initiative seems some distance away 

because India does not seem interested. Multilateral cooperation on the 

Brahmaputra River does not elicit much support from India at the current 

time and is not likely to do so for the foreseeable future. 

70 | Raging Waters
CHAPTER 3

71

BANGLADESH: THE STRONGEST ADVOCATE 

OF BASIN-WIDE MANAGEMENT

NILANTHI SAMARANAYAKE

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2017, Bangladesh faced another year of severe monsoonseason flooding. The most recent result of this frequent occurrence included 

damage to crops, railway tracks, and the homes of roughly 30,000 people. 

In particular, several of the country’s districts saw flooding due to India’s 

release of water at the barrage for the Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra River, that enters Bangladesh from India. As the lowest riparian geographically in the Brahmaputra basin, Bangladesh bears the brunt of extreme 

conditions in the basin from flooding to droughts. Because Bangladesh receives the majority of its river water from outside its borders—mostly from 

India—the country feels especially vulnerable, which heightens its overall 

threat perceptions. Many observers had hoped that progress would have 

been made by the time of this writing on the signing of a first-ever treaty in 

the Brahmaputra basin for the Teesta River under the Modi administration. 

Prime Minister Modi’s indications of working toward signing the Teesta 

River accord included his public statements and discussions with the chief 

minister of India’s West Bengal state, through which the Teesta runs before 

it enters Bangladesh. However, New Delhi has not yet signed this greatly 

sought treaty by Dhaka.

Without question, Bangladesh faces its greatest potential threat on the 

Brahmaputra River from activities by the two upper riparians—China and 

India. The country is at risk from the cumulative impacts of India’s and 

China’s self-interested river management, which shows little concern for 
the downstream ecosystem. India’s planned RLP, the failed 2011 Teesta 

River accord and uses of this Brahmaputra tributary not favorable to Bangladesh, and India’s consumption of Ganges River resources and the resulting lower dry-season flows and salinity intrusion are all regarded 

by Bangladesh as a cautionary precedent for what may happen with the 

Brahmaputra. While Dhaka’s fraught relations with New Delhi raise more 

complex and proximate concerns, China’s dam building and lack of transparency also worry Bangladesh. Dhaka will need to address persistent bilateral water-sharing issues with its upper riparians, notwithstanding such 

mitigating factors as India and China sharing seasonal water flow and rainfall data to aid Bangladesh’s flood forecasting as well as the reinvigoration 

of relations between India and Bangladesh under the Modi administration. 

Given its difficult geographic position and capacity constraints, Bangladesh has a strong moral case upon which it can promote cooperative 

approaches for multilateral management and development of the Brahmaputra basin. Dhaka policy makers also can pursue this effort with New 

Delhi counterparts who may have more political space than the previous 

administration to pursue cooperation in the Brahmaputra River basin. This 

effort includes the 2016 election of a chief minister of the same party as 

Modi, the BJP, in the important Assam state, through which the Brahmaputra passes before it enters Bangladesh. Experts in both countries are also 

optimistic that the Teesta agreement will be signed at some point during 

the Modi administration. Within these conditions, Dhaka can call for action 

on the Brahmaputra from its bilateral relationships with China and India in 

a way that these countries cannot do with each other. Venues for cooperative water discussions include meetings of the BCIM Forum for Regional 

Cooperation and the Joint Study Group of the BCIM Economic Corridor. 

In addition to its moral authority in the Brahmaputra, Dhaka can appeal 

to its neighbors’ economic interests because multilateral cooperation can 

help produce much-needed regional economic integration with beneficial 

results for all three countries. Because Bangladesh faces the greatest threat 

from the poor practices of upstream countries, it has the most to gain from 

improved river management and can serve as a catalyst for regional water 

72 | Raging Waters
cooperation that could lay the foundation for an eventual “Brahmaputra 

Basin Commission.” 

Notably, however, while Bangladesh faces its greatest potential threat 

on the Brahmaputra River from upper-riparian activities, its most immediate threats stem from internal challenges. Factors such as climate change, 

plus the country’s capacity constraints and dense population, exacerbate 

the effects of Brahmaputra riverbank erosion, flooding, and diminished 

dry season water flow and groundwater availability. 

This chapter will consider the Brahmaputra basin from Bangladesh’s 

perspective. It will begin with a domestic-level analysis by seeking to understand the predominant perceptions of internal challenges and threats in 

Bangladesh. The chapter will then move to a bilateral-level analysis with 

an examination of Bangladesh’s perceptions of external threats from India 

and China. Finally, it will close by considering the potential opportunities 

for multilateral cooperation that exist despite current obstacles.

THE BRAHMAPUTRA IN BANGLADESH

Water is aptly characterized as “Bangladesh’s blessing and curse.”1 Bangladesh gets too much water during the rainy season (June to October), 

resulting in flooding, and it gets too little water during the dry season (November to May), resulting in drought. Flooding and drought contribute 

to riverbank erosion, agricultural disruption, and migration. To give outsiders a sense of the landscape in Bangladesh, one water expert remarks 

that “the whole ecosystem of Bangladesh is water-based.” The confluence 

of three major rivers (Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Meghna) occurs in Bangladesh. Roughly 90 percent of the river catchment for the country comes 

from outside its borders.

Although only 8 percent of the 580,000-square-kilometer basin area of 

the Brahmaputra is in Bangladesh, it serves as Bangladesh’s largest water 

1 “Bangladesh,” InternationalRivers.org; and CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

Chapter 3 | 73
system, followed by the Ganges, then the Meghna.2

 The Brahmaputra provides approximately 65 percent of the country’s river water annually. Upon 

entering Bangladesh from India’s Assam state, the Brahmaputra is called 

the Jamuna and travels along the boundaries of Rangpur, Mymensingh, 

Dhaka, and Rajshahi divisions (map 3.1). 

After it leaves India, the Brahmaputra runs for nearly 250 kilometers (or about 150 miles) through Bangladesh, before connecting with the 

Ganges River, which empties into the Bay of Bengal through the Meghna 

River.3

 The Teesta River—which is a tributary of the Brahmaputra and the 

cause of a heated political dispute between Bangladesh and India—crosses 

the northern Rangpur division before it merges with the Brahmaputra. The 

Teesta River is significant because a water-sharing agreement was drafted 

but not signed in 2011, which would have been only the second watersharing agreement between the two countries.

THE PRIMACY OF BANGLADESH’S 

INTERNAL CHALLENGES

While Bangladesh’s greatest potential threat on the Brahmaputra River comes 

from activities by upper riparians India and China, the country’s most immediate threats stem from internal challenges. Overall, Bangladesh is now 

more focused on the Ganges basin than on the Brahmaputra basin, due to 

India’s consumption of water resources from the Ganges River and the downstream impacts that are evident in southwestern Bangladesh.4

 Nevertheless, 

the Brahmaputra is still an important source of concern, given the implications for the management of this resource that is Bangladesh’s largest source 

for water. While much public discussion analyzes Dhaka’s perceptions of 

2 “Brahmaputra Focus Area Strategy: 2013–2017,” South Asia Water Initiative, 2015, http://

www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sawi#4. The Brahmaputra is known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh. For consistency, this chapter uses the term Brahmaputra to identify the river throughout the 

basin. In India, the administrative level beneath national governance is the state, and in China it 

is the province. In Bangladesh, this level is called the division.

3

 The Ganges is known as the Padma in Bangladesh. For consistency, this chapter uses the term 

Ganges to identify the river throughout the basin. 4 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015; and Price et al., Attitudes to Water in South Asia, 22, 24, 51.

74 | Raging Waters
threats emanating from India and China on the Brahmaputra, internal challenges raise the most immediate problems for Dhaka to address. They include 

issues of erosion, flooding, and diminished resources during the dry season. 

The country’s capacity constraints, dense population, and high dependence 

on external water sources exacerbate the effects of Brahmaputra riverbank 

erosion, flooding, and diminished dry season water flow and groundwater 

availability. 

Chapter 3 | 75

Courtesy of Pete McPhail 

Map 3.1. The Brahmaputra River basin in Bangladesh. 
The Brahmaputra River, like many rivers, has moved over time, and in 

this case, the river’s path has been changed by dramatic forces and enduring actions such as erosion. Bangladeshi water experts view the Brahmaputra as a young river that “has yet to take its shape.”5 There is a separate 

segment of the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh known as the Old Brahmaputra that was created when the river changed its course in the late eighteenth 

or early nineteenth century, likely due to an earthquake. Today, riverbank 

erosion is particularly stark along the Brahmaputra and is a modern reminder of the river’s past and continually changing geography.6

Riverbank erosion not only changes the size and course of the river 

but hurts surrounding communities that are negatively affected by it. This 

process commonly occurs in the rainy season due to high water flows. In 

particular, land in the Kurigram and Gaibandha districts on the west bank 

and in Jamalpur on the east bank of the Brahmaputra is being lost as riverbanks collapse (map 3.2). Floods exacerbate this problem, having a significant impact on human security; for example, erosion renders an estimated 

10,000 –20,000 families homeless in Bangladesh every year. Many have had 

to rebuild their homes, in some cases multiple times, due to erosion.7

 Damaging people’s homes, land, and livelihoods in Bangladesh, riverbank 

erosion on the Brahmaputra provokes local protest and disrupts families 

by forcing men to migrate to find work elsewhere in the country and thus 

5 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

6 Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Bangladesh, DA Pam 550-175 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1975), 62. A study by Bangladesh’s Center for Environmental and 

Geographic Information Services found the effect of riverbank erosion increased the Brahmaputra’s width from 8.5 kilometers (km) in 1973 to 12.2 km in 2009. A measurement in October 

2015 found that the river was roughly 15 km wide at the time. See Abu Bakar Siddique, “Historic 

Chilmari Port Disappears,” Dhaka (Bangladesh) Tribune, 19 October 2013; and CNA interviews, 

Dhaka, 2015. 

7 Quamrul lslam Siddique, “Integrated Water Resource Management in the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna River Basins in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges” (conference paper, Policy 

Priorities for Sustainable Mountain Development, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Nepal, 18 –20 September 2006); Abu Bakar Siddique, “Bangladesh to Tame 

Brahmaputra with Concrete Embankments,” TheThirdPole.net, 2 June 2015; and Abu Bakar 

Siddique, “Brahmaputra Erosion Hits People’s Livelihood Hard,” Dhaka (Bangladesh) Tribune, 

25 October 2013.

76 | Raging Waters
also disrupts local culture. Many go to Dhaka—the most densely populated city in the world—thereby intensifying national challenges.8

Riverbank erosion is caused by flooding, which in turn can cause additional problems. Bangladesh’s inability to accurately forecast heavy floods 

8 See the following Kurigram story for a picture of a human chain protesting insufficient official 

attention to the preservation of Chilmari Port. Abdul Wahed, “Human Chain Held to Protect 

Chilmari Port from Erosion in Kurigram,” Kurigram News (blog), 2 October 2010.

Chapter 3 | 77

Courtesy of CNA, adapted by Pete McPhail 

Map 3.2. Brahmaputra in Bangladesh: the subnational view, by divisions and districts. 
beyond three days in advance and its lack of water storage capacity have 

damaged or destroyed people’s livelihoods and property. Reduced sanitation and educational resources are secondary impacts of flooding, especially in the chars (river islands). The Brahmaputra is the major cause of flood 

disasters in Bangladesh. In 2007, it reportedly overflowed its banks twice, 

killing 600 people and destroying crops in roughly 39 of Bangladesh’s 64 

districts.9

 As devastating as floods can be, they are not necessarily unwelcome in Bangladesh. Flooding provides much-needed replenishment of the 

soil—a process that benefits agriculture—but the poor infrastructure and 

forecasting turn the benefits of flooding into major liabilities.

In contrast to the problems brought by floodwaters in the wet seasons, 

Bangladeshis rely heavily on the Brahmaputra because of the problems that 

emerge during the dry seasons. Bangladesh, as a whole, sees wide pendulum swings from flooding to drought—all in the course of a year. The 

Brahmaputra is Bangladesh’s largest source of water and provides about 

75 percent of its total water resources in the dry season. After the Brahmaputra enters Bangladesh at Bahadurabad, the average monthly flow of the 

river during the rainy season (June to October) is 1.3 million cubic feet per 

second (cusecs). By contrast, during the dry season (November to May), 

the average monthly minimum flow is 157,000 cusecs; yet, Bangladesh requires about 210,000 cusecs from the Brahmaputra to meet its national flow 

requirements.10 Thus, Bangladesh needs nearly all of the river’s water in 

the dry season to fulfill its national water resource requirements, such as 

irrigation and flushing out salinity. 

A critical requirement for the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh is pushing 

back the salinity that creeps up from the Bay of Bengal coastline. Essentially, decreases in Brahmaputra flow directly translate into increases in salinity. Whereas the Ganges increasingly fails to provide enough water to 

repel saltwater intrusion in southwest Bangladesh, at present, the southeast coastline of Bangladesh is protected due to freshwater supply from 

9 Bangladesh: Precarious Lives of River Island Dwellers (Geneva: IRIN Association, 2008). 10 CNA is grateful to a government official for kindly providing this data, 2016. 

78 | Raging Waters
the Brahmaputra. Yet Bangladesh sees the impact of the diminished flow 

of the Ganges on the salinity of the southwest coastline and worries about 

the negative implications of diminished flows of the Brahmaputra for the 

south-central and southeast coast.11

During the dry season, the Brahmaputra provides less water for domestic use, thereby hampering the ability of farmers to produce crops due 

to declines in groundwater. Rice is a water-dependent crop, and Boro rice is 

cultivated in the dry season, with 80 percent of it grown using groundwater irrigation. In terms of agriculture, the Brahmaputra is the main source 

of groundwater for Bangladesh during the dry season. Northwest Bangladesh already has a problem with declining groundwater levels because the 

Brahmaputra water is being extracted by tube wells at a rate faster than 

it is being recharged.12 Despite adaptation activities by NGOs, farmers are 

not taking significant action to shift their crops away from rice cultivation, and they remain vulnerable to reduced groundwater availability in 

the dry season, which increases the threat of food insecurity for Bangladeshi citizens.13 NGOs such as the Flood Hazard Research Centre (FHRC) 

have long been active in Bangladesh. Their representatives, including environmental scientists, try to help farmers adapt to the diminishing availability of groundwater by encouraging the growth of maize and sunflower, 

which consume one-fifth of the water and reap higher profits than rice, for 

example. National government policy does not appear to be incentivizing 

farmers to effect meaningful change in agricultural and irrigation practices. 

Fisheries also depend mostly on groundwater in the dry season, but 

fishermen are seeing diminishing availability of this resource. A factor compounding this problem is the amount of arsenic that naturally occurs in the 

soil throughout Bangladesh; it is contaminating the dwindling supplies of 

11 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

12 Bangladesh: “Invisible Hazard” of Groundwater Depletion (Geneva: IRIN Association, 2011). 13 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015; and National Research Council, Himalayan Glaciers, 73.

Chapter 3 | 79
groundwater and reducing water quality.14 Another factor that hurts freshwater fish stocks in the low land and flood plains of the Brahmaputra basin 

is farmers’ use of pesticides. Thus, because of naturally occurring and introduced toxic substances, as well as diminishing groundwater availability, Bangladeshi fishermen find it difficult to pursue their vocations and 

provide fresh food for domestic consumption and foreign export.

LOCAL CHALLENGES

Several factors exacerbate Bangladesh’s difficult domestic situation. These 

factors are not specific to the Brahmaputra itself, but they form the context 

of vulnerability in Bangladesh’s policy outlook. One set of stressors is Bangladesh’s overall capacity constraints, which is important because it determines the country’s ability to address national challenges. Another factor 

is the large population, which is a major stressor because it adds human 

pressures on the availability of water resources. Finally, a primary stressor 

comes from Bangladesh’s adverse environmental conditions, such as lowlying geography, which tend to exacerbate the effects of the country’s propensity to incur natural disasters. The country and its city centers are in the 

midst of dramatic changes due to rising economic and population growth, 

climate change, and the country’s own capacity limitations.

Of the three riparian countries discussed in this book, Bangladesh is 

the most densely populated. In fact, it is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Notwithstanding successful policies that have 

managed high rates of population growth since independence, Bangladesh’s population of nearly 160 million people makes it the eighth most 

populated country in the world. More than 15 million people live in the 

capital, Dhaka, which is the densest urban area in the world with approxi14 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015; and Sara V. Flanagan, Richard B. Johnston, and Yan Zheng, 

“Arsenic in Tube Well Water in Bangladesh: Health and Economic Impacts and Implications for 

Arsenic Mitigation,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 90, no. 11 (2012): https://doi

.org/10.2471.BLT.11101253.

80 | Raging Waters
mately 112,700 people per square mile.15 Clearly, rising populations require 

considerable water resources, especially in the context of environmental 

pressures. While a constellation of factors motivate people to migrate, Bangladesh has seen internal migration of many citizens to Dhaka and elsewhere in the country. Fishermen and farmers have lost their livelihoods 

due to water stress and salinity intrusion impacts in the southwestern part 

of the country (i.e., the Ganges basin) forcing them into the cities for wage 

work.16 They often become day laborers and rickshaw drivers. Challenges regarding Brahmaputra water flows are likely to continue exacerbating 

overall population and migration trends in Bangladesh.

In addition to human pressures on resources, Bangladesh faces adverse 

environmental conditions. The country is prone to natural disasters, and 

climate change renders Bangladesh vulnerable due to its low-lying geography. Bangladesh is one of the “20 countries and regions most at risk” 

because of global climate change, and it is the only Asian country on the 

poorest segment of this list, according to the Intergovernmental Panel 

on Climate Change (IPCC), the top international authority on climate 

change.17 Adding to these environmental impacts, the IPCC finds with 

“very high confidence” that climate change produces socioeconomic consequences; specifically, it tends to “further entrench poverty.”18 The IPCC 

also projects that as many as 27 million Bangladeshi citizens could be at 

risk from sea level rise due to climate change by 2050. While sea level rise 

is generally considered a serious threat facing Bangladesh, especially in the 

Ganges River basin and coastal areas, its impact will be magnified if the 

15 “Country Comparison: Population,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: CIA, 2017). 

Dhaka has a population of 15,669,000 and a density (people per square mile) of 112,700. Shane 

Croucher, “UN World Population Day 2015: These Are the 10 Most Densely Populated Cities 

on the Planet,” International Business Times, 11 July 2015. 16 David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, “Conflict Basins: Powderkegs to Peacepipes,” SAIS Review of 

International Affairs 35, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2015): 145, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2015.0009; 

and CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015. 

17 IPCC, “Livelihoods and Poverty,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 810. 

18 IPCC, Climate Change 2014, 810.

Chapter 3 | 81
Brahmaputra’s flows are reduced in the dry season and cannot help flush 

out salinity intrusion.19 Thus, factors not directly related to the Brahmaputra are nevertheless exacerbating Bangladesh’s challenges on the Brahmaputra River. 

From internal social issues, such as population migration within the 

country to global threats such as climate change, Bangladesh faces obstacles that will impede its ability to address water-sharing challenges in 

the Brahmaputra basin. Despite a strong economic growth rate of roughly 

6 percent annually, Bangladesh has the lowest gross domestic product 

(GDP) of the three riparian countries in this study. Although the World 

Bank elevated Bangladesh from a low-income to a lower-middle income 

country in mid-2015, it lacks sufficient water-management facilities (e.g., 

water storage in the dry season) and bureaucratic coherence to address 

its water problems. Considering how often floods occur and the country’s 

flat terrain, Bangladesh needs better storage capacity solutions for excess 

water so that it can use the resource in the dry season. Even with regard 

to devising government policy on river resources, interagency coordination 

is reportedly difficult to achieve between such organizations as the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Shipping, the Bangladesh Inland 

Water Transport Authority, and the Power Division. These obstacles are not 

insurmountable, but Dhaka policy makers will need to navigate them in 

the pursuit of more effective management of Brahmaputra River resources 

within Bangladesh.

BANGLADESH’S COMPLEX BILATERAL 

RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA AND IMPLICATIONS 

FOR THE BRAHMAPUTRA

At present, India represents the greatest threat to Bangladesh’s water security 

due to its proposed RLP. But while this threat has neither materialized on 

the Brahmaputra nor is it imminent (particularly if Bangladesh can maintain 

the current upswing in bilateral ties and develop stronger multilateral nego19 Susmita Dasgupta et al., River Salinity and Climate Change: Evidence from Coastal Bangladesh, 

WPS6817 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014), 4–5. 

82 | Raging Waters
tiations in the future), any reductions in water quality and flow from India 

will affect Bangladesh, especially in the dry season, and with cumulative 

effects on the smaller nation. Last in line for the river’s water, Bangladesh 

has the most to use as its primary user and views the two upper riparians—

especially India—as problematic for its own water security, although the 

current upswing in bilateral relations with India under the Modi administration has mitigated some of Bangladesh’s immediate fears. Sharing a history 

and a border with India has resulted in difficult bilateral ties due to disputes 

over territory, border crossings, and insurgencies. Bangladesh is surrounded 

by India on three sides, and its leaders perceive the nation to be vulnerable on 

water security in addition to other issues. Of the 57 rivers that enter Bangladesh, 54 come from India, leaving only 3 entering from Myanmar. There is a 

water-sharing agreement on only one—the Ganges River. A much-anticipated 

agreement on the Teesta and Feni rivers failed to be concluded at the last 

minute in 2011 due to domestic politics in India, leaving a bad impression 

among leaders in Dhaka and the wider Bangladeshi public. This outcome reinforced Bangladeshis’ view of India as an overbearing “big brother” in terms 

of its overall disposition and water management practices.20 Furthermore, the 

bilateral Joint Rivers Commission (JRC)—the only mechanism through which 

data sharing can be negotiated—has been criticized by one regional expert 

as being “in effect, two parallel national river commissions, instead of one 

joint commission.”21 Essentially, the JRC is seen as ineffective rather being 

an integrated commission comprised of Indians and Bangladeshis working 

together to devise solutions to water challenges.

Beyond water disagreements, Bangladesh has had a complex relationship with India, believing that India exerts excessive influence on Dhaka’s 

policies due to its dominance in the region.22 As a result, the politicization of 

issues involving India has a long history in Bangladesh. There is a common 

20 For more discussion of this sentiment, see Jaideep Mazumdar, “Why India Has to Re-Calibrate 

Its Neighbourhood Foreign Policy,” Swarajya, 21 January 2018. 21 Sundeep Waslekar, “India-Bangladesh Round Table on Blue Peace in the Eastern Himalayas, 

July 2013” (conference paper, Strategic Foresight Group, Mumbai, 1–2 July 2013).

22 Nilanthi Samaranayake, The Long Littoral Project: Bay of Bengal—A Maritime Perspective on 

Indo-Pacific Security (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2012), 29.

Chapter 3 | 83
view that India represents the greatest threat to Bangladesh—more so than 

China—given Bangladesh’s geography in relation to India. Particularly before 

the Modi administration entered office, Dhaka felt that India’s Border Security Force was being heavy-handed toward Bangladeshi citizens when 

policing the porous border.

Difficult bilateral relations have often been exacerbated by polarized 

domestic politics in Bangladesh, which are often depicted through a lens 

of either pro-India leadership (i.e., Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League) or 

anti-India leadership (i.e., Khaleda Zia, former prime minister and current opposition leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party). In addition, even those 

whose disposition may not necessarily be anti-India harbor doubt about New 

Delhi’s ability to influence the water policies of Indian states—the result of 

which works against Bangladesh’s interests. 

The strongest evidence to support this view is that in 2011 Indian prime 

minister Manmohan Singh went to Bangladesh to sign the proposed Teesta 

water-sharing agreement but was unable to do so because he had failed to 

secure support from West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee. This event 

subsequently hurt bilateral relations, including greater economic cooperation. 

At the time, Dhaka linked the Teesta pact with progress on giving New Delhi 

long-sought full transit rights across Bangladesh so that India can access its 

landlocked northeastern states. 

Against this larger context, coupled with the importance of water resources as an issue in Bangladesh, a lack of effective water cooperation was 

a major hindrance to improving bilateral relations in the final years of the 

Singh administration. Under Modi, the relationship has been reset to some 

degree; progress has been seen in areas outside water management, such as 

the conclusion of a historic land boundary agreement and progress in power 

cooperation. Still, Bangladesh has concerns about India’s current management of water resources in view of downstream impacts and future plans. 

Specifically, three issues have largely contributed to Bangladesh’s perceptions 

of India as a threat: India’s RLP, the failed Teesta agreement and uses of the 

river that are not favorable to Bangladesh, and India’s withdrawals from the 

Ganges River basin. 

84 | Raging Waters
THREAT PERCEPTIONS 

The prospect of India diverting rivers, specifically through its RLP, is what 

Bangladesh sees as the greatest potential threat to its own water security 

in the Brahmaputra. The RLP would increase India’s internal water security by connecting rivers with surplus river flow to those with deficit flow 

to guarantee optimal movement of water within India. Bangladesh is far 

more concerned about the RLP than it is about the possibility of water diversion by China.23 Specifically, Bangladeshi leaders fear that India’s diversion of the Manas and Sankosh rivers in the Brahmaputra would mean the 

removal of resources from the basin to the Ganges basin. A strong consensus of scientists, NGO experts, and officials in Bangladesh believe that this 

project, if achieved, would be catastrophic to the country’s water supply, 

the biodiversity of its already fragile ecosystem, and agriculture and fish 

stocks, while raising the potential for drought.

Even though India does not have immediate plans to implement the 

RLP in the Brahmaputra basin, the logistics of completing the RLP remain 

daunting given the sheer engineering feat that would be required to divert 

rivers on such a wide geographic scale. In the words of one Bangladeshi 

water expert, India’s RLP represents a “Herculean task.”24 In addition to 

the sheer logistical challenge, domestic water politics in India are difficult 

because even states within India are at odds with each other. Thus, gaining 

support from all stakeholders within India would delay the full implementation of this project, therefore limiting the potential of immediate risk to 

Bangladesh’s water security. 

Despite the low likelihood of India carrying out the RLP in the Brahmaputra in the near future, the salience of this threat in Bangladesh is real. 

First, Bangladesh’s often difficult relationship with India heightens this 

baseline sense of concern. Second, Dhaka believes that India has previously 

acted against Bangladesh’s interests with regard to water supplied through 

23 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

24 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

Chapter 3 | 85
Indian barrages in the Ganges and Teesta rivers and may do so again under 

the RLP (see map 2.3).25

As of 2018, India has made little progress on this effort. In fact, the previous Indian National Congress Party government let the RLP stall because 

it was proposed under the previous BJP government. Bangladesh, however, 

sees the current BJP government as being more determined to pursue this 

project. In fact, some modest movement of the RLP under the Modi administration has occurred, albeit outside the Brahmaputra basin. In September 

2015, the Godavari and the Krishna rivers were finally linked in Andhra 

Pradesh. Rivers in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh are the next targets 

of the RLP. As a result, Bangladesh’s concerns are high, and most respondents believe that India will eventually carry out the RLP. 

Unlike the Indian RLP, which represents a potential threat, management of the Teesta River in India is of current concern to Bangladesh. The 

Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, begins in India’s Sikkim state, 

traverses West Bengal state, then flows across Rangpur division in Bangladesh and into the Brahmaputra. Out of the rivers that Bangladesh shares 

with India, the Teesta ranks high in importance due to its role in supplying 

water for rice grown by farmers. As noted earlier, Indian prime minister 

Singh could not sign the proposed Teesta water-sharing agreement during 

a visit to Dhaka in 2011, because he failed to secure support from West 

Bengal chief minister Banerjee. If signed and implemented, this would be 

only the second river water-sharing agreement between the countries. 

Bangladesh sees West Bengal withholding large amounts of Teesta 

water through its Gazaldoba Barrage during the dry season for agricultural purposes. As a result, northwest Bangladesh has seen the detrimental impacts of reduced river flow on agriculture, fisheries, and boat travel 

in the Teesta region. Last year, Bangladesh received roughly 300 cusecs on 

the Teesta in the dry season, compared with 5,500 cusecs only a few years 

before. Observers claim that the area looks like a desert, with homes once 

25 For India’s perspectives on the RLP, see the India chapter by Satu Limaye; and CNA interviews, 

Dhaka, 2015. 

86 | Raging Waters
on the banks of the Teesta now on a sandbar.26 For Teesta River stakeholders in Lalmonirhat District in Rangpur, the diminished flow of water in the 

dry season is already a major problem for farmers, who fault government 

agencies for the situation. Moreover, the reduced river flow has human security impacts on the role of women in Bangladeshi society and people’s 

livelihoods in the dry season. Water carriers in Bangladesh tend to be 

female; when water is not readily available, girls will drop out of school to 

perform the task of bringing back water to the family. Even Sugata Bose, 

an Indian member of parliament from West Bengal’s Jadavpur Constituency, acknowledges that the fundamental problem with the Teesta River is 

“a shortage of water . . . [and] having to share what is, in fact, a very scarce 

resource.”27 Such a contest for Teesta resources on both sides of the border 

illustrates the need to finalize an equitable water-sharing accord. 

Bangladesh’s experiences with India outside the Brahmaputra—i.e., 

India’s use of water resources in the Ganges River basin—magnify its 

threat perceptions about what India could eventually do inside the Brahmaputra basin. The water treaty that the two countries reached in 1996 for the 

Ganges River basin was a major breakthrough for bilateral relations as their 

first water-sharing accord. Dhaka was greatly concerned about West Bengal’s use of water for desilting the Hooghly River, which had an adverse 

impact on agriculture in Bangladesh. Given the importance of water for 

both countries, the treaty helped address a difficult situation at the time.28

26 Ataur Rahman, “Ensuring Proper River Flow is Essential to Ensure Better Functioning of the 

Blue Economy,” Market Pulse, no. 102 (July 2015): 44; CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015; and 

Shariful Islam, “Water Scarcity and Conflict: A Bangladesh Perspective,” Daily Star Forum 5, no. 

6 (June 2011).

27 Åshild Kolås and Farzana Jahan, “Stakeholder Mapping and Analysis,” in Water Scarcity in 

Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and Cooperation, ed. Åshild Kolås et al. (Oslo: Peace 

Research Institute Oslo, 2013), 67. Water scarcity impacts gender advancement opportunities 

because females tend to be water carriers in Bangladesh. Paul Faeth and Erika Weinthal, “How 

Access to Clean Water Prevents Conflict,” Solutions Journal 3, no. 1 (January 2012); and “FPRC 

Interview with Prof. Sugata Bose (Part-2),” interview by Mahendra Gaur, Diplomatically Speaking, video, 15:02, 3 January 2016. 28 1996 water treaty.

Chapter 3 | 87
Despite the Ganges accord, India’s consumption of shared river resources continues to cause deep concern in Bangladesh, with many faulting 

India for not living up to its treaty obligations. India’s West Bengal state 

is seen as consuming the potential Ganges augmentation flows for itself, 

thereby not providing all the water it should under the treaty. Article VIII 

states the need to cooperate on finding a solution to the problem of augmenting dry season flows; yet, 20 years later, there has been little progress 

on this front. On balance, the goodwill created by the treaty persists, and 

the consensus view is that the monitoring regime of scientists from both 

countries is working well. Because of the agreements laid out in Article IX’s 

clause about the principles of equity, fairness, and causing no harm, Bangladesh sees India’s current actions as acting against the spirit of the treaty 

by providing less water through the Farakka Barrage in the dry season, increasing the likelihood of droughts across the border.29

In the years since signing the treaty in 1996, Bangladesh views the 

absence of flow guarantees and an arbitration clause as major shortcomings of the agreement. As discussed earlier, southwestern Bangladesh is 

facing a significant problem of salinity intrusion. Insufficient water levels 

from India do not allow the Ganges in Bangladesh to flush out the salinity 

that creeps in from the Bay of Bengal. Impacts are already being seen with 

threats to drinking water in Gopalganj, for example.30With no flow guarantee or arbitration clauses and doubts about New Delhi’s ability to restrain 

29 1996 water treaty; Kolås and Jahan, Water Scarcity in Bangladesh, 66–67; CNA interviews, 

Dhaka, 2015; Abu Bakar Siddique, “China to Give Brahmaputra Flow Data to Bangladesh,” 

TheThirdPole.net, 20 May 2015; Mir Sajjad Hossain, “Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India, 1996 and Its Prospects for Sub-regional Cooperation” (presentation, Mekong 

River Commission Summit, April 2014), 44; and A. N. M. Muniruzzaman, “Water and Disaster 

Management in South Asia: Threats to Peace and Security,” South Asia Journal, no. 12 (Winter 

2015): 5–18. 30 Hossain, “Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India, 1996,” 44. A study by Bangladesh’s Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) and the World Bank finds that freshwater supplies in 

coastal districts could drop significantly by 2050, affecting between 3–5 million people. Pantho 

Rahaman, “Rising Salinity Threatens Bangladesh’s Coastal Communities: Experts,” Reuters, 13 

October 2015; and Mashura Shammi et al., “Investigation of Salinity Occurrences in KumarMadhumati River of Gopalganj District, Bangladesh,” Journal of Nature Science and Sustainable 

Technology 6, no. 4 (2012): 311–12. 

88 | Raging Waters
state water use activities, renewing the 30-year agreement that expires in 

2026 will be difficult unless such fundamental issues are addressed. When 

discussing the future of the Brahmaputra, experts in Bangladesh thus see 

an unsettling precedent in the Ganges basin (map 3.3). 

MITIGATING FACTORS

For all of Bangladesh’s concerns, two factors mitigate its anxieties about 

current and potential threats from India: water cooperation with India and 

improved political relations. As discussed above, Bangladesh and India 

signed their only treaty on water sharing in 1996 over the Ganges. Even 

before this agreement, the two countries founded the JRC in 1972, soon 

after Bangladesh became independent. In more recent years, Bangladeshi 

and Indian representatives continue to meet and exchange information 

through the JRC. For example, the latest discussions about proportions of 

water resources sought in the Teesta River have occurred during the commission’s meetings. Notwithstanding aforementioned criticisms of the 

JRC’s effectiveness as a dialogue mechanism, an official in the Bangladeshi 

government emphasizes that there has been “a tremendous amount of 

goodwill between the countries” on the discussion of water issues.31 In fact, 

in November 2015, India’s water resources minister, Uma Bharati, hosted 

Bangladesh’s minister of water resources, Anisul Islam Mahmud, who 

invited her to the next round of the JRC in Dhaka. During their meeting, 

Bharati stated that New Delhi actively seeks to finalize the Teesta accord, 

including by reaching out to West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee.32

Regarding the Brahmaputra, one saving grace is that India does not 

use much of the water flow compared with use of the Ganges. Also, India 

cooperates on sharing flood forecasting data, which it provides to Bangladesh without charge. It shares water-level and rainfall data on the Brahmaputra from a few stations in its territory, and since 2010 it has agreed 

31 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

32 “New Delhi Reassures Dhaka over Teesta Water-sharing Deal,” bdnews24.com, 16 November 

2015.

Chapter 3 | 89
to share data twice a day during the monsoon season (June to October).33

While this is a positive step, this data-sharing arrangement is simple; India 

notifies Bangladesh how much rain has fallen in particular catchment areas 

so that Bangladesh can calculate the time before the water will arrive. As 

a result, Bangladesh can now forecast floods accurately up to three (sometimes even five) days in advance. While data sharing can be expanded, 

these interactions on water resources are beneficial to bilateral relations. 

33 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015. There is some question about whether data are only provided 

once a day and from April to October, based on varying interview responses. 

90 | Raging Waters

Adapted by Pete McPhail, based on data from Siddique, “Integrated Water Resource Management in the Ganges, 

Brahmaputra, and Meghna River Basins in South Asia” 

Map 3.3. The Ganges River basin, Farakka Barrage, the Brahmaputra River basin, the Meghna 

River basin, and southwestern Bangladesh.
Progress in bilateral relations, especially under the Modi administration, helps mitigate some of Bangladesh’s larger threat perceptions with 

regard to India. For example, in July 2014, the two countries saw their 

long-standing maritime boundary dispute resolved through the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Then, Modi’s visit to Bangladesh 

in June 2015 and the historic signing of the Land Boundary Accord, which 

had been delayed for decades, finally resolved the unsettled land border 

dispute. India is also trying to cultivate deeper, positive ties with Bangladesh through efforts such as selling electricity from Indian power plants 

and approving an additional $2 billion U.S. dollars of development financing in 2016. On the Bangladeshi side, the Sheikh Hasina administration is 

generally seen as favorable to working with India on common security interests, such as counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation.

As a result of these developments in bilateral relations, optimism 

remains high in Dhaka that the two neighbors will finally sign the Teesta 

accord. Bangladeshi and Indian experts hoped that the agreement would 

have been concluded by late 2016, after the West Bengal elections so that 

the agreement does not become a lightning rod during Banerjee’s reelection 

campaign.34 Furthermore, Bangladesh has been reassured that New Delhi is 

working with Banerjee to seek her concurrence on the accord. The momentum following the election of the Modi administration in 2014 is still strong 

even though the agreement has not been signed as of this writing. Finalization of the Teesta accord would be a notable indicator of how lasting this 

renewed foundation will be for closer Bangladesh-India ties.

BANGLADESH-CHINA: THE VIEW FROM BANGLADESH

While the geographical locations of both India and China have the ability 

to disrupt the flow of the Brahmaputra before it gets to Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s bilateral relations with China are not as fraught as those with India. 

This situation is not surprising because India is Bangladesh’s neighbor with 

territory surrounding much of its smaller neighbor and is the dominant 

34 CNA interviews, Dhaka and New Delhi, 2015. 

Chapter 3 | 91
power in the region. Because China does not have this geographic proximity 

and presence, Bangladesh’s relations with China are comparatively more positive. In fact, these ties give Dhaka more economic and military options than 

relying solely on New Delhi.35 For example, China is Bangladesh’s largest 

supplier of military equipment and sold Bangladesh its first-ever submarines 

in 2016. New Delhi policy makers were not pleased with this development 

and are concerned more broadly about China’s rising ties with South Asian 

neighbors. Yet India, by contrast, has not supplied Dhaka with military equipment since the early years after independence in 1971, according to data from 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).36

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Bangladesh sees China as less of a direct threat to water security than India 

because most of the Brahmaputra is sourced farther south, within Indian 

borders. Nevertheless, poor management of upstream water resources 

without regard to the ecosystem or potential diversion activities by China 

are seen in Bangladesh as harmful to the entire Brahmaputra basin. A recurring theme among experts and officials in Dhaka is that Bangladesh 

could face a worst-case scenario through the cumulative effect of India’s 

current and feared activities and potential diversions, in addition to the potential harm caused by irresponsible upstream practices in China.37 Any reductions in the flow or quality of water coming from India and China will 

adversely affect Bangladesh, especially in the dry season.

Officially, Beijing continues to assure Dhaka that it has no plans to 

divert the Brahmaputra. Bangladeshi officials asked their Chinese counterparts about this issue as recently as March 2015, and they were reassured that the dams are for the purpose of producing electricity. Moreover, 

35 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “China’s Relations with the Smaller Countries of South Asia,” China 

and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st Century Policy, vol. 1, ed. Donovan C. Chau 

and Thomas M. Kane (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014), 226–27. 36 “Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons,” “Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for Year 

Range 1971 to 2014,” and “Trend Indicator Value Tables (TIV) of Arms Exports to Bangladesh, 

1971–2014,” SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, generated on 24 January 2016.

37 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015. 

92 | Raging Waters
China is a cooperative partner with Bangladesh in the Brahmaputra even 

though the countries do not share a border. Although this approach seems 

to satisfy Bangladesh at the present time, China’s activities elsewhere, such 

as assertiveness in the South China Sea, call into question its verbal commitments to stability. Beyond assurances, Bangladesh wants China to be 

more transparent about its long-term intentions and plans in the basin; 

lack of clarity causes distrust.38 Interestingly, a strong consensus of strategic 

experts, water scientists, and officials in Bangladesh do not doubt China’s 

ability to construct storage dams or divert water to other Chinese rivers, 

despite the technical difficulties associated with doing so (examined elsewhere in this book). 

WATER COOPERATION WITH CHINA

While not a neighboring riparian, China shares flood-warning data with 

Bangladesh, as it does with India. Beijing charges New Delhi for this information, yet it does not charge Dhaka as a humanitarian gesture to a 

friendly country often stricken by disaster. Beijing agreed to share data in 

2005 to reduce the potential threat from natural disasters in Bangladesh. In 

keeping with China’s ostensible efforts to provide humanitarian assistance 

to Bangladesh, China also agreed to help Bangladesh dredge its riverbeds 

and provide capacity building in this area.39

In March 2015, Bangladesh updated cooperation with China through 

an MOU on data sharing on the Brahmaputra. China agreed to provide 

38 Siddique, “China to Give Brahmaputra Flow Data to Bangladesh.” The implications of insufficient trust were seen in CNA’s 2014 simulation on water security in South Asia. See Trentacoste 

et al., Bone Dry and Flooding Soon, 17–18. 39 Excerpt from the 2010 joint statement: “The two sides agreed to carry out sustainable cooperation on hydrological data sharing and flood control of river Yarluzangbu/Brahmaputra, in 

view of its necessity to the disaster reduction in Bangladesh. The two sides agreed to strengthen 

cooperation on water resources management, hydrological data sharing, flood control and disaster reduction, based on the exchange of letters between the Ministries of Water Resources of the 

two countries in 2005. At the request of the Bangladesh side, the Chinese side agreed to provide 

assistance for dredging of riverbeds and for capacity building through training of personnel.” See 

“Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,” 22 March 2010.

Chapter 3 | 93
water flow data from three measuring stations in Tibet once a day, via 

email, during the monsoon season months from June to October.40 China 

also agreed to provide rainfall data. These data are shared exclusively 

for the purpose of flood forecasting, because the underlying intent is disaster prevention.41 This MOU mirrors China’s cooperation with India for 

the same purpose, which emerged after a flooding tragedy took place on 

the Brahmaputra in 2000 as discussed previously in the China and India 

chapters.

Although Bangladesh believed that China would begin the data 

sharing in June 2015, the data sharing had not begun at the time of our 

field research. A Bangladeshi official minimized the March 2015 MOU by 

reasserting that it is only an “understanding” with China rather than an 

“agreement.”42 From time to time, Bangladesh gets data from China but 

not as systematically as was sought in the MOU. Bangladesh is optimistic, 

however, that this process will be regularized soon. Nevertheless, this gray 

area in the understanding of the MOU demonstrates the need to go beyond 

MOU-level cooperation to formal agreements that would guarantee Bangladesh consistent access to Chinese water data. 

BANGLADESH’S SUPPORT OF MULTILATERAL 

COOPERATION IN THE BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN

Of the three basin stakeholders, Bangladesh is the most interested in pursuing basin-wide cooperation. This is not surprising, as Bangladesh has 

the most to lose, given its lowest position in the basin and the large extent 

to which rivers shape the country’s topography. As one of the leaders in 

creating the SAARC, Bangladesh is a strong proponent of multilateral 

approaches. 

40 Siddique, “China to Give Brahmaputra Flow Data to Bangladesh”; and CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

41 Siddique, “China to Give Brahmaputra Flow Data to Bangladesh”; and CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

42 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

94 | Raging Waters
Water experts in Bangladesh generally advocate integrated river basin 

management (IRBM), a school of thought that has gained support in water 

security studies. The U.S. Water Partnership, launched by then-Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton in 2012, features a definition of IRBM on its H2infO 

web portal from the Nature Conservancy: “The collaborative process of integrating the conservation, management, and development of water, land, 

and related resources across sectors within a given river basin. The purpose 

is to improve economic and social benefits derived from water resources 

in an equitable manner while preserving and, where necessary, restoring 

freshwater ecosystems.”43 The Danube, for example, is cited as a river basin 

where stakeholders have committed to supporting the principles of IRBM. 

Bangladeshi experts and officials consistently report their desire to encourage this approach to basin management, given the Brahmaputra countries’ 

own challenges and threat perceptions. 

Bangladesh sees water cooperation as opening up greater possibilities 

for regional integration, such as through increased river navigation with 

India and hydroelectric power generation with India and China.44 Bangladesh believes that its geographic location is key to achieving what is often 

referred in the region to as connectivity, meaning connecting mainland India 

with its landlocked northeastern states as well as promoting interactions 

between China and South Asia and between South Asia and Southeast 

Asia. As a result, a retired Bangladeshi official envisages the Brahmaputra 

as a “river of cooperation” to contrast the benefits of working together in 

the Brahmaputra with the more frequently heard narrative of river conflict 

and water wars.45

Regarding India, Bangladesh believes that trade and transportation 

opportunities can help improve Indian mainland connectivity to the coun43 “River Management,” H2infO.us; and 15 Years of Managing the Danube Basin (Vienna: International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 2007).

44 Tariq A. Karim, “Towards South Asian Regional Economic Integration: A Bangladeshi Perspective,” Huffington Post, 30 September 2015. River navigation between Assam, India, and Bangladesh has a deep history, declining after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, which affected East 

Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

45 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

Chapter 3 | 95
try’s northeast. Currently, most movement of goods and people occurs 

between a few land corridors. Modi’s June 2015 summit to Bangladesh 

freed up another avenue by getting coastal shipping access to Chittagong 

and Mongla ports, whereas previously Indian ships needed to travel to 

Singapore or Colombo and transship goods instead of sailing directly to 

neighboring Bangladesh. Moreover, the possibility for transit from Kolkata 

to Guwahati through Bangladesh on the Brahmaputra is seen as presenting a mutually beneficial opportunity for cooperation. Bangladesh believes 

that it not only has the moral authority, as lowest riparian, but the diplomatic justification to promote basin-wide cooperation with India on the 

Brahmaputra.46 Under the 2011 framework agreement between India and 

Bangladesh, India agreed under Article 2 to “common basin management 

of common rivers for mutual benefit.” Because the two countries agreed to 

“provide necessary assistance to each other to enhance navigability and accessibility of river routes and ports,” Bangladesh thinks it can draw on this 

bilateral agreement to encourage cooperation in the Brahmaputra basin.47

Like India, China prefers to work bilaterally. Bangladesh and China 

signed a 2010 joint statement whereby they “agreed to enhance transport 

links.”48 Road and rail transit were the two methods discussed, given the 

obvious continental distance, yet the full spectrum of connectivity entails 

navigation along the Brahmaputra. Opportunities for cooperating on hydropower generation also are worth exploring. For example, the two countries might draw on China’s dam-building expertise to help Bangladesh 

address its need to store monsoon water for use in the dry season. Although this idea was not specifically suggested by Bangladeshi interview 

46 Trentacoste et al., Bone Dry and Flooding Soon; and CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015. 47 See Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development between India and Bangladesh, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 6 September 2011. Article 2 full text: “To enhance 

cooperation in sharing of the waters of common rivers, both Parties will explore the possibilities 

of common basin management of common rivers for mutual benefit. The Parties will cooperate 

in flood forecasting and control. They will cooperate and provide necessary assistance to each 

other to enhance navigability and accessibility of river routes and ports.”

48 Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 22 

March 2010. Excerpt: “The two sides agreed to enhance transport links and, in this connection, 

to continue to discuss the possibility of building road and rail links between the two countries.” 

96 | Raging Waters
respondents, they often expressed admiration for China’s engineering and 

construction capabilities and may support such an idea if it were pursued 

cooperatively.49

Given the openings for basin-wide cooperation that Bangladesh feels 

it has with India and China separately, the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation offers an existing multilateral framework that Bangladesh could 

use to encourage the two upper riparians in the Brahmaputra basin to cooperate with each other. Bangladesh participates in various multilateral 

organizations and frameworks such as BCIM, SAARC, and the BangladeshBhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative. They are all oriented toward development and regional integration. Bangladeshi interview respondents 

did not suggest BCIM as a framework for Brahmaputra cooperation, but 

this venue holds the most promise because—unlike SAARC and BBIN—

Bangladesh, India, and China are all equal members. 

Started by China in 1999 as the Kunming Initiative, named after the 

capital of China’s southwestern Yunnan Province, to pursue regional connectivity and development, the Track 2 BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation has progressed to gain Track 1 support for a BCIM Economic 

Corridor. The Joint Study Group (JSG) of the BCIM Economic Corridor is 

exploring the possibilities for regional integration, even listing the prospect for “cooperative undertakings” on “water resources [that] may be 

conserved, developed and tapped beneficially” and on “climate change 

challenges” in the minutes of the JSG’s first meeting in 2013.50 The JSG 

meetings have taken place so far in Bangladesh and China, and the most 

recent meeting took place in Kolkata, India, in April 2017. Despite India’s 

and China’s preference to work bilaterally, New Delhi remains formally 

committed to the BCIM Economic Corridor while Beijing continues to be 

an active proponent of BCIM.51 Following discussions about China’s BRI, 

49 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

50 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Joint Study Group of BCIM Economic Corridor, Consulate 

General of India, Guangzhou, 18–19 December 2013. 51 Patricia Uberoi, “Problems and Prospects of the BCIM Economic Corridor,” China Report 52, 

no. 1 (2016): 30–31, https://doi.org/10.1177.00094455613868.

Chapter 3 | 97
and how Beijing has subsumed BCIM under BRI, New Delhi appears to 

have leaned back from making active progress on BCIM. However, the fact 

that the JSG concluded their long-awaited meeting in April 2017 (originally 

intended for 2016) indicates that New Delhi maintains a commitment to the 

body and the prospect for the Economic Corridor—despite Beijing inadvertently decreasing BCIM’s appeal for India. As a result, BCIM remains a 

venue in which Bangladesh should pursue water resource cooperation and 

connectivity efforts for the Brahmaputra basin. At the next JSG meeting to 

be held in Myanmar, Dhaka could use the opportunity to raise this issue. 

The interactions arising from Bangladesh’s bilateral efforts to encourage India and China to work for basin-wide development and cooperation 

in the Brahmaputra could lay the foundation for what Bangladeshi experts 

envision as a Brahmaputra Basin Organization, a Brahmaputra Commission, or a Brahmaputra River Basin Authority. This formal body would be 

the most ambitious means of managing and developing the Brahmaputra 

basin. It would involve including all riparians as equal parties, require 

regular interaction and communication, and specify a dispute-settlement 

mechanism. Dhaka policy makers and diplomats can draw on the model 

of the Permanent Indus Commission, the body created to implement the 

1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan.52 Before the situation in the Brahmaputra worsens, Dhaka, as the lowest of the three riparian 

capitals in the Brahmaputra basin, could launch a serious effort to encourage New Delhi and Beijing to consider forming a Brahmaputra Basin 

Commission. 

Because two of the basin riparians are nuclear powers and have a border 

dispute, the creation of a formal commission could be a confidence-building 

measure that preserves communication and insulates water interactions from 

political-military crises. The Permanent Indus Commission between India 

and Pakistan is seen as having such utility, despite the multiple conflicts that 

52 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015; and Himalayan Solutions: Co-operation and Security in River 

Basins (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2011), 30 –33.

98 | Raging Waters
have broken out since the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960.53 Creating 

such an organization to facilitate basin-wide water sharing and development 

in the Brahmaputra would probably take at least a decade. Yet, Bangladesh 

is the most eager of the riparians to see basin-wide cooperation materialize 

in the Brahmaputra and believes it has the diplomatic justification and moral 

authority to encourage this course of action if it chooses.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh clearly faces both internal and external challenges with regard 

to its national interests in the Brahmaputra basin. Threats to the country 

from India and China are well understood and will only grow in importance as these upper riparians build dams and alter the upstream ecology 

with adverse consequences for Bangladesh. Dhaka needs to address these 

challenges, certainly, but must also be proactive about addressing internal 

challenges. At present, Bangladesh’s shortages from the Ganges River, as 

well as the Teesta River tributary of the Brahmaputra, capture the lion’s 

share of public and official attention regarding the country’s water security challenges. However, the Brahmaputra River basin needs to be more 

closely monitored to ensure that Bangladesh will be able to successfully manage the various issues (e.g., floods and droughts) associated with 

this river, which provides the country with its greatest source of water. 

Through concerted outreach to China and India to encourage discussion in 

multilateral venues, such as BCIM, and progress made at the bilateral level, 

Bangladesh may be able to lay the foundation for an eventual Brahmaputra 

Basin Commission.

53 Treaty between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan Concerning the 

Most Complete and Satisfactory Utilisation of the Waters of the Indus System of Rivers, IN-PK, 

19 September 1960; and Jessica Troell and Erika Weinthal, “Harnessing Water Management for 

More Effective Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned,” in Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. 

Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama (London: Earthscan, 2014), 436.

Chapter 3 | 99
CONCLUSION

100

While the key Brahmaputra River basin stakeholders—China, India, and 

Bangladesh—have taken modest steps at the bilateral level to cooperate in 

the Brahmaputra basin (e.g., limited water data sharing and government 

dialogues between technical experts), clearly they are not ready to sign a 

trilateral or even bilateral water-sharing agreement or basin-development 

accord for the foreseeable future. Fostering water security is a long-game 

effort, so this is not necessarily a surprising or pessimistic finding. The fact 

that neither interstate relations nor the water security situation in the basin 

is in crisis allows China, India, and Bangladesh to proceed with cooperation at a measured rather than crisis-management pace. 

Yet circumstances in the basin continue to change, as do threat perceptions between riparians. Since the publication of our report, upon which 

this book is based, some developments affecting the security of the Brahmaputra basin have taken place. This includes China’s announced diversion of a tributary on a temporary basis for dam construction and its 

halting of hydrological data supplied to India for flood-forecasting purposes after the bilateral standoff involving Bhutan.1

 Meanwhile, Bangladesh 

again suffered severe flooding, including of the Teesta River sources shared 

with India. Neither country has concluded the Teesta accord as was expected by this point. 

1

 For further reading about the diversion, see Limaye, Wuthnow, and Samaranayake, “China and 

India’s Slow-Moving Path to ‘Water Wars’.” 
Indeed, seen from a structural vantage point, the intensity of implications for population, territory, and industrial and agricultural development 

increase the farther south one moves from the origins of the Brahmaputra 

River in southern Tibet to the Bay of Bengal. The portions of the Brahmaputra that run through China and India are among the least populated, developed, industrialized, and farmed areas of their vast countries. It is really 

only in Bangladesh that the combination of population density and industrial as well as agricultural activity depends the most upon the Brahmaputra, and even in Bangladesh’s case, the implications of river management 

on the Ganges and Teesta may be more immediately relevant than what is 

happening regarding the Brahmaputra. If the physical relevance of the river 

is greatest for Bangladesh, the political relevance is sharpest for China and 

India.

Over time, there are steps that India, China, and Bangladesh could take 

at the subnational, bilateral, and multilateral levels to lay the groundwork 

for the three countries to work together to advance security in the Brahmaputra River basin. Beginning cooperative efforts on water resources (e.g., 

through bilateral accords, trilateral consultations, and even a multilateral MOU) could pave the way for a new entity—possibly a Brahmaputra 

Basin Commission—through which a water management and development accord could be designed and implemented. The appendix presents 

practical recommendations for how all three countries can begin to work 

together bilaterally and multilaterally, as well as improve their domestic 

management of Brahmaputra resources. These policy options are organized by country within these three levels of analysis for ease of reading. 

A final section acknowledges the important role for the international community (i.e., international financial institutions and extraregional countries 

with capacity-building arms) to play.

Advocating cooperation solely for the narrow aims of water-sharing 

rights does not appeal to upper riparians. More promising is an appeal 

to the shared interests of these countries for the development of the river 

basin and greater regional economic integration. This connectivity could 

facilitate the expansion of transport and infrastructure options, such as 

Conclusion | 101
river navigation networks and joint hydropower projects. Instead of a river 

of contention or uncertainty, the Brahmaputra could become a river of cooperation for its stakeholders as the region continues to develop and grow. 

For future researchers of the Brahmaputra River basin, there is much 

ground to cover. The literature begs for more contributions from both the 

scientific and security studies communities. Regarding the latter, an issue 

we faced during our work was that we continually had to approach our 

work on the Brahmaputra region in an integrated manner. For the study 

of the international relations of Asia, analysts often divide themselves into 

scholars of East Asia or South Asia due to the sheer size of the continent, 

yet the geography and security dynamics of the Brahmaputra basin do not 

lend themselves to this type of distinction. Going forward, analysts will 

need to approach this complex basin with greater attention to the bilateral 

and subnational linkages between the actors in this Asian subregion. More 

scientific study of the Brahmaputra basin is required to develop a deeper 

understanding of the long-term implications of current environmental conditions, such as recurring flooding. Most importantly, these scientific findings and implications need to be effectively communicated to nonscientist, 

government officials working on developing policy in each of the Brahmaputra basin countries. 

102 | Raging Waters
APPENDIX

RECOMMENDATIONS: DOMESTIC LEVEL

CHINA

China should expand access to information regarding its dam construction 

plans on the Brahmaputra. There are a number of steps China can take, both 

on its own and in cooperation with India and Bangladesh, to improve trust 

and help to address common challenges related to the Brahmaputra. Despite 

China’s assurances that its planned hydroelectric dams on the Brahmaputra 

will pose no risks to downstream countries, the Chinese government has 

placed relatively little information about these facilities in the public domain. 

The data available are somewhat difficult to locate and are often not published in English.1

 China should consider ways in which it can further reduce 

misperceptions about the goals behind its dam-building activities, such as 

releasing more detailed information about the planned dams or inviting 

specialists from downstream countries to visit the sites. It is also reasonable 

for China to expect that its co-riparians will similarly offer increased public 

access to data on their own development plans should collaboration activities be offered. 

1 For instance, China’s 12th five-year energy plan merely states the names of planned hydroelectric dams, without providing timelines, technical details, or other relevant information. See 12th 

Five Year Plan Energy Development Plan. 

103
INDIA

The government of India should continue efforts to enhance coordinated hydrological data sharing between the center of India, New Delhi, and northeast 

India state governments. This option should also be available between the 

state governments in order to monitor upstream and downstream impacts 

on the Brahmaputra River. Further, the Indian government should consider 

how to improve consultation with northeast Indian state governments on the 

implementation of major dam-construction projects in the region. This would 

be important given center-state and civil society differences that constrain 

completion of projects. 

India’s central government and northeast Indian state governments 

should also cooperate on the production of a clear, updated, and comprehensive report on India-China relations regarding the Brahmaputra River.

This report could incorporate northeast Indian views of concerns posed by 

China’s actions as well as how recent dialogue and hydrological information 

sharing addresses these concerns.

The Indian government and the state governments of the northeast 

should consider how they might better cooperate on ecosystem management 

and ecological protection initiatives. India could develop these initiatives 

with China and Bangladesh.

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh should include more stakeholders in its national water-management 

policies as they apply to the Brahmaputra basin, yet aim for coordination. 

First, Dhaka should make a greater attempt to bring in all relevant domestic 

stakeholders—such as those living along the banks of the Brahmaputra—

when making policies for this basin. Seeking community-based participation will be key to improving the effectiveness of water-management policy 

subnationally.2

 Dhaka recognizes that Bangladesh needs to encourage greater 

adaptation to agriculture that uses less water resources; policy makers should 

create more incentives for farmers to achieve this outcome. Dhaka also should 

2

 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015. 

104 | Raging Waters
explore more options for the storage of excess monsoon rainwater and more 

sustainable use of groundwater in the dry season. Finally, Dhaka should 

increase coordination of stakeholders, especially between all Brahmaputrarelevant government organizations, such as the Ministry of Water Resources; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Environment and Forest; Ministry 

of Shipping; the Inland Water Transport Authority; the Ministry of Local 

Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives; the Local Government 

Engineering Department; and the Power Division. The issues related to the 

Brahmaputra are varied and require the participation of multiple ministries. 

Connecting all interagency stakeholders will be an important step in thinking strategically about the river basin and the potential crises that could 

emerge if Dhaka continues to give most of its attention to the Ganges basin 

and focus on the day-to-day problems of the Brahmaputra basin rather than 

the bigger picture. 

Bangladesh should seek assistance from the international community 

to conduct evidence-based assessments of human security impacts in the 

Brahmaputra basin. For example, in-country observers often assert that Bangladeshi citizens are forced to migrate due to Brahmaputra erosion or that 

millions of citizens will be affected by sea level rise impacting the country. 

The International Organization for Migration concluded that insufficient 

data-collection efforts have prevented a complete, evidence-based assessment of permanent and cross-border migration in Bangladesh, especially as 

a result of climate change.3

Bangladesh is already heavily invested in tools that will directly help 

improve its ability to address water issues, such as flood-forecasting capabilities. Yet, Dhaka could use assistance with the collection of evidence that 

systematically documents the human security problems that Bangladesh faces 

on the Brahmaputra, including how they may be exacerbated by climate 

change. Extraregional countries that have previously funded efforts covering 

the Brahmaputra basin (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) or 

international financial institutions would be ideal sponsors of these impor3 Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh (Dhaka: International Organization for Migration, 2010), 19, 29.

Appendix | 105
tant studies. Dhaka would find the results of this analysis useful for more 

informed domestic planning in this basin, as well as for making a more convincing argument to upper riparians India and China about the importance 

of sustainable, basin-wide practices in the Brahmaputra.

RECOMMENDATIONS: BILATERAL LEVEL

CHINA

China should consider hydropower as a potential area of cooperation with 

India. China and India are both considering plans to expand hydropower 

development along the Brahmaputra. Although this has become a source of 

tension on both sides, there may also be ways in which such development 

can be mutually beneficial.

At a minimum, the two sides should exchange information on how hydropower supports their respective development strategies and what their 

long-term intentions are with regard to development of the Brahmaputra. 

China and India should also explore the feasibility of cooperative activities, 

such as joint hydropower development and cross-border electricity trade.4

These discussions could occur on an ad hoc basis or on the sidelines of existing development forums, such as the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation 

or the Trans-Himalayan Development Forum. A Track 2 initiative involves 

nongovernment officials such as academics and think tank experts. For this 

particular Track 2 initiative, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations sponsored it, with partner institutions from Bangladesh, 

India, and other South Asian countries.5

China should consider ways to enhance sharing of hydrological data 

with India. China currently provides India with hydrological data on the 

Brahmaputra during the flood season. To improve flood forecasting, China 

should consider offering real-time, year-round river flow data to India. Mean4

 Michael Pollitt, “Power Pools: How Cross-Border Trade in Electricity Can Help Meet Development Goals,” Trade Post (blog), World Bank, 1 October 2014. 5

 Li Xinyi, “Conference Opens on Himalayan Issues,” China Daily (Beijing), 24 August 2015.

106 | Raging Waters
while, as a gesture of goodwill, India should consider offering reciprocal 

hydrological data to China. 

China should expand humanitarian and ecological cooperation related to 

the Brahmaputra with India. There appears to be room for China and India 

to expand cooperation in the management of humanitarian and ecological 

issues related to the Brahmaputra. While such cooperation will not eliminate 

underlying tensions, it might improve trust at a low level while addressing practical challenges. To this end, the Chinese and Indian water resource 

ministries should hold a regular dialogue on river management. This might 

include working groups on such topics as pollution control, biodiversity 

protection, dam safety, flood prevention, and emergency response.6

 These 

discussions also might cover lessons learned from other river basins, which 

could involve contributions from third-party specialists. Where possible, 

these working groups should make recommendations to their respective 

governments on steps that can be taken unilaterally or bilaterally to reduce 

risks and improve safety. 

INDIA

India should move ahead with China on the exchange of hydrological information sharing for the Yarlung Tsangpo and Lohit/Zayu Qu rivers as called 

for in the 2006 joint declaration between the two countries. To date, exchange 

of hydrological information on these two additional rivers does not appear 

to have taken place.

India’s government should consider issuing a clear, updated, and comprehensive report on India-China relations regarding the Brahmaputra River. 

Such a report could dispel misunderstanding, incomplete information, and 

speculation on the current state of India-China riverine relations.

India should clarify its plan for the construction of dams on the Brahmaputra River and its tributaries. When asked how many dams it plans to build, 

India gives only a range of figures. As it seeks clarification on China’s plans 

6

 China and India have already agreed to conduct working-level groups on hydrological data and 

emergency measures, but it is unclear whether or how often these groups actually meet. 

Appendix | 107
for dam construction and their potential impacts, India should be willing to 

provide reciprocal information about its own plans.

India should move expeditiously to provide China with information as 

called for under the bilateral Implementation Plan: Provision of Hydrological 

Information on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River in Flood Season by China 

to India.

7

 India should provide China with information about its monitoring 

site on the Brahmaputra River as called for under the agreement.

India’s central government should continue to try and implement the 

Teesta River agreement with Bangladesh as quickly as possible by working 

closely with the West Bengal state government. While the alignment of central 

and state governments must result from elections and not from political engineering, pressing for implementation of the Teesta deal would go a considerable way toward building on recent progress in India-Bangladesh relations.

India’s government should clarify plans for the RLP as they apply to 

impacts on Bangladesh. Though there is little prospect for the RLP being 

implemented in the near term, India should consider providing further information to Bangladesh on plans for this initiative in light of the recent 

Supreme Court ruling and the intentions of the new BJP-led government.

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh should seek water-flow and rainfall data from India and China 

year-round, not only in monsoon season, and request site visits to dams and 

barrages in both upper riparians. The current purpose of the data sharing 

is to enable flood forecasting to avert disasters downstream. However, Bangladesh would benefit from dry-season and historical data from India and 

China as well, because this information would enhance Dhaka’s planning 

and forecasting ability in general. Dhaka should request site visits to dams 

and barrages upstream on the Brahmaputra and its tributaries to encourage 

transparency and increase technical capacity for scientists in Bangladesh who 

seek to expand their understanding of sedimentation and its effects. They also 

want to better understand the positive use of dams and barrages to control 

7 Implementation Plan. 

108 | Raging Waters
sedimentation. Given the sensitivities of water data and infrastructure, agreeing to such requests for data sharing and site visits would be a gesture of 

goodwill by India and China, which they can then highlight to enhance their 

own international reputations.

Bangladesh should seek greater cooperation with India on river navigation in the Brahmaputra. Due to their shared interest in increasing regional 

integration and connectivity, Bangladesh and India agreed to a joint goal of 

basin-wide management and development in their 2011 framework agreement.8

 Dhaka could elevate requests relating to the Brahmaputra basin—regarding its development and navigability in particular—from the JRC to the 

foreign minister level, given that the framework agreement was signed by 

both heads of government.9

Bangladesh should continue to seek to finalize the Teesta water-sharing 

accord with India. Many expect that the chances for the accord’s conclusion are improving. Nevertheless, assuming that the Modi administration 

does eventually sign the accord, disputes may emerge as they have over the 

Ganges treaty. Dhaka and New Delhi should work to ensure that these disputes do not fester and potentially damage the wider bilateral relationship; 

including a dispute resolution mechanism also would be helpful. 

Bangladesh should formalize its 2015 MOU with China to ensure the consistent provision of water data and to encourage Beijing to improve transparency with India for the benefit of other multilateral issues. From time to time, 

Bangladesh gets water-flow and rainfall data from China but not as consistently as was agreed to in the 2015 MOU. In addition to formalizing the MOU, 

Dhaka should encourage Beijing to participate in multilateral dialogues with 

8 Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development between India and Bangladesh. 9 India’s Ministry of External Affairs (i.e., foreign ministry) also has displayed interest in river 

transit through its funding of the Kaladan multimodal transport project, which ironically began 

as a way to avoid Bangladeshi territory when connecting the Indian mainland to the northeast. 

Under this project, people and goods could transit between Kolkata in West Bengal state across 

the Bay of Bengal to Sittwe, Myanmar, and then use the Kaladan River to transit into India’s state 

of Mizoram. See Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhary and Pratnashree Basu, Proximity to Connectivity: 

India and Its Eastern and Southeastern Neighbours, Part 2, India-Myanmar Connectivity: Possibilities and Challenges (Kolkata: Observer Research Foundation, 2015).

Appendix | 109
India. At present, China assures Bangladesh of its goodwill regarding water 

security, but Bangladesh could impress upon China that BCIM—an idea that 

began in China and is still actively supported by Beijing—will have a greater 

chance of success when India gains more confidence in China’s intentions 

in the region. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: BASIN-WIDE LEVEL

CHINA 

China should convene a Track 2 dialogue with India and Bangladesh to 

discuss shared water challenges.

Despite the lack of institutionalized cooperation at a basin-wide level, 

there may be avenues for increased engagement among all three riparians. 

A starting point would be the establishment of an annual Track 2 dialogue 

with participation from university and think tank scholars from China, India, 

and Bangladesh. While there are many promising topics for discussion, one 

possibility would be to limit the focus initially to technical and scientific 

subjects, such as the effects of climate change on river flow and potential 

mitigation strategies. Such talks could also involve input from international 

specialists on a case-by-case basis. Over time, these Track 2 interactions might 

form the basis for cooperation at the Track 1 level. As policy makers become 

interested in the findings of Track 2 dialogues, they may request to turn these 

interactions into Track 1.5 dialogues. These types of interactions are a hybrid 

of Track 1, which are government-to-government discussions, and Track 2, 

which are meetings outside official lanes (e.g., between academics and think 

tank experts). Technical and scientific interactions through Track 1.5 channels could lay the groundwork for the establishment of Track 1 meetings 

between diplomats. 

INDIA

India should introduce the elements of ecosystem management and ecological protection into discussions of cooperation with China, along the 

lines of the efforts between India and Bangladesh. Over time, India, China, 

110 | Raging Waters
and Bangladesh should consider how these efforts could be linked across 

the basin.

India should also consider how existing basin-wide mechanisms, such 

as the BCIM forum, could facilitate development of common research and 

action on preserving and monitoring Himalayan glaciers as part of the region’s common heritage. India apparently has been successful in citing IndiaPakistan and India-Bangladesh riparian cooperation in pursuing dialogue 

and data sharing with China. As confidence and habits of cooperation are 

developed, opportunities for multilateral discussions should be explored, 

including through official and unofficial dialogues.

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh should encourage dialogue with India and China on basin-wide 

management of the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh understands that a paradigm 

shift will be needed regarding perceptions of water resources in the Brahmaputra basin. The traditional, zero-sum view of water as a scarce resource 

that nations consume internally—and should therefore withhold from neighbors—is gradually losing credibility in other basins, such as the Danube 

and Rhine. Instead, “non-consumptive views” are emerging where water is 

seen as a shared resource that is worth investment for developmental and 

connectivity benefits to the entire region.10 Dhaka wants to promote this line 

of thinking in the Brahmaputra basin and to encourage discussion of nonconsumptive uses of water resources, such as the potential for greater river 

navigation and downriver trade, in a region that is not well integrated.11 Furthermore, discussion that emphasizes shared interests, such as biodiversity of 

the river, will minimize the current mind-set focused on solely consumptive 

uses of Brahmaputra resources.

10 CNA interviews, Dhaka, 2015.

11 South Asia is among the least-integrated regions in the world. The World Bank estimates that 

only 5 percent of trade in South Asia is within the region, with most trade flowing externally. This 

stands in contrast to the 25 percent of intraregional trade that flows within ASEAN. “South Asia 

Regional Integration: One South Asia,” World Bank, April 2015.

Appendix | 111
Bangladesh should assemble representatives from India and China on the 

sidelines of meetings of the Track 2 BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation 

and the Joint Study Group of the Track 1 BCIM Economic Corridor to discuss 

Brahmaputra cooperation.12 Because BCIM’s focus is improving connectivity 

and regional economic relations, the subject of Brahmaputra water resources 

is a natural topic for BCIM to address formally or informally at meetings. 

Dhaka should utilize the capabilities of its active think tank community 

to analyze specific aspects of basin-wide management of the Brahmaputra 

with upper-riparian counterparts. Bangladesh could expand dialogues on 

the Brahmaputra by relying on its think tanks to arrange meetings with 

counterparts in China and India. Think tanks in Dhaka include the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute—which is CNA’s partner in Dhaka for this 

research—as well as the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies 

and the Centre for Policy Dialogue. These organizations can organize 

confidence-building dialogues and technical meetings that focus on pollution, 

erosion, sedimentation, flood prevention, and flood-forecasting ability. Bangladesh should seek participation by subnational stakeholders in each of the 

three countries. The state of Assam in India, for example, is also concerned 

about sedimentation and riverbank erosion on the Brahmaputra. 

In addition to technical analysis, Dhaka’s think tanks can work with 

counterparts in India and China to study the lessons learned from other 

river basins that could be applied to the Brahmaputra. For example, water 

experts in Bangladesh view Switzerland’s International Commission for the 

Protection of the Rhine as a positive model of the type of organization to 

which Brahmaputra stakeholders should aspire.

These kinds of regular interactions with focused discussions will lay the 

foundation for a new entity—a Brahmaputra Basin Commission—through 

which a water-management accord could be implemented in the coming 

decades.

12 Myanmar is the other member of BCIM and shares three rivers with Bangladesh. Including 

Myanmar in these meetings could therefore be an option to help its neighbors resolve water resource tensions, even if its inclusion would be outside the scope of Brahmaputra basin cooperation.

112 | Raging Waters
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community should be alert to the long-term security implications of discord between Brahmaputra riparians and, alternatively, to the 

potential cooperation that could advance economic integration in the region. 

International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and Asian 

Development Bank, and extraregional countries with capacity-building arms, 

such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands, have 

an important role to play. They can encourage China, India, and Bangladesh 

to work together in the Brahmaputra to promote economic development 

on water issues as well as political-military stability in how water-related 

disagreements are addressed in the basin. For example, the World Bank was 

critical to achieving the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan in 

1960, because it recognized the importance of such an accord in promoting 

stability and interactions between governments that are often hostile to each 

other. Furthermore, such efforts by the international community can also 

promote the economic integration that South Asia so badly needs, as well 

as connectivity between subregions such as the BCIM Economic Corridor 

linking China and Myanmar to India and Bangladesh. 

First, multilateral development banks—the World Bank, ADB, and Asian 

Infrastructure Investment Bank—should take advantage of opportunities 

to advance the physical and economic connectivity that is evident in the 

Brahmaputra basin, such as efforts to reinvigorate river navigation networks. 

Second, IFIs and extraregional countries should invest more in both technical 

dialogues between scientists and regional capacity-building on Brahmaputra 

hydrology to develop norms of information sharing, especially when focusing on the improvement of flood-forecasting capabilities.13 Whereas think 

tanks in Bangladesh, India, and China can serve as effective conveners for 

policy makers through Track 1.5 or 2 confidence-building dialogues about 

13 For example, the joint World Bank-UK-Australia-Norway partnership, called the South Asia 

Water Initiative, and its predecessor, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, have been useful in catalyzing 

discussion between Brahmaputra stakeholders, especially for the development of a hydrological 

database and modeling platforms to inform scientists in the region.

Appendix | 113
diplomatic challenges in the Brahmaputra basin, IFIs and extraregional countries can support progress on scientific capabilities in the Brahmaputra.14

For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is an important provider 

of technical assistance on water security around the world and could give 

greater attention to the Brahmaputra basin. Multilateral development banks 

and extraregional countries can suggest creative solutions to the pressing 

problem of ensuring sufficient access to river flow in the dry season, possibly 

through storage of monsoon rainwater throughout the basin. 

Finally, the most important recommendation for IFIs and extraregional 

countries is to conduct scientific studies on projections for future dry- and 

wet-season flows in the Brahmaputra and the impacts of stressors to the 

basin, such as climate change and sedimentation. Experts writing about the 

region have noted the difficulty in coming to clear, evidence-based conclusions about the full impacts of trends in the Brahmaputra given the dearth 

of scientific assessments. Forging progress from all Brahmaputra countries 

on basin management will require consensus on basic hydrological facts, a 

significant contrast to the current situation of claims by each riparian and 

little transparency on how countries come to their conclusions. 

These recommendations will be quite costly to implement, but IFIs and 

extraregional countries with capacity-building arms are well positioned to 

conduct such efforts in the Brahmaputra. They can advance stability in a 

highly populated region that is often characterized by bilateral disputes and 

internal challenges.

14 While not limited to the Brahmaputra, the International Union for Conservation of Nature 

launched a Track 3 dialogue called “Ecosystems for Life,” which brought together Bangladeshi 

and Indian experts from civil society to workshops in Bangkok. Track 3 diplomacy emphasizes 

grassroots, people-to-people interactions. The Netherlands government funded the initiative. See 

Randal Glaholt, Julian Gosalves, and Donald Macintosh, Ecosystems for Life: A Bangladesh-India 

Initiative (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2014).

114 | Raging Waters
GLOSSARY

ADB Asian Development Bank

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BBIN Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal

BCIM Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

BEI Bangladesh Enterprise Institute

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

CPR Center for Policy Research (India)

cusec cubic feet per second

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)

GBM Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna

GDP gross domestic product

IFI international financial institutions

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IRBM integrated river basin management

JRC Joint Rivers Commission

JSG Joint Study Group of the BCIM Economic Corridor

MEA Ministry of External Affairs (India)

MOU memorandum of understanding

MRC Mekong River Commission

115
NGO nongovernmental organization

NTRO National Technical Research Organization (India)

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

RLP river-linking project

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAWI South Asia Water Initiative

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

UN United Nations

116 | Raging Waters
CONTRIBUTORS

117

Nilanthi Samaranayake is an analyst at CNA in the Center for Strategic 

Studies. Her research focuses on South Asia and Indian Ocean security. 

She has authored book chapters on the smaller countries of South Asia and 

their relations with China; the U.S.-China-India strategic triangle in the 

Indian Ocean region; and island states in the Indian Ocean. Prior to joining 

CNA, Samaranayake completed a fellowship at the National Bureau of 

Asian Research (NBR) and analyzed public opinion for a decade at Pew 

Research Center. Samaranayake holds an MSc in international relations 

from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Satu Limaye is a senior advisor at CNA in the Center for Strategic Studies. 

His recent work at CNA includes Indian Navy interests in the Indo-Pacific, 

U.S.-India maritime security cooperation in South Asia, and implications of 

climate change on Asia-Pacific international relations. He is also director of 

the East-West Center in Washington, DC, where he directs the Asia Matters 

for America initiative and edits the Asia-Pacific Bulletin. Previously, he was 

director of research and publications at the Asia Pacific Center for Security 

Studies. Limaye is a graduate of Georgetown University and received his 

doctorate from Oxford University (Magdalen College).

Joel Wuthnow is a research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Previously, he was a China 
analyst at CNA and a postdoctoral fellow in the China and the World 

Program at Princeton University. His publications include a book, Chinese 

Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto (2013), and articles 

in journals such as the China Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Joint Force 

Quarterly, Asia Policy, Asian Security, and the Chinese Journal of International Politics, as well as book chapters. He received a PhD in political science 

from Columbia University.

118 | Raging Waters
INDEX

21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 31

Andhra Pradesh, 86

Arunachal Pradesh, India, 8, 11, 43, 46, 

48, 49, 61; and bilateral deals with 

Assam, 62; and the Brahmaputra 

River, 47, 59; construction activities in, 37; as a disputed territory, 

14, 22, 26, 28, 44; flooding in, 24, 

50. See also India; India, northeastern states of

Asian Development Bank, 28, 49, 113. 

See also international financial institutions; multilateral development banks

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 

28, 113

Assam, India, 8, 43, 47, 60; and bilateral 

deals with Arunachal Pradesh, 62; 

and the Brahmaputra River, 59, 72, 

74; concerns about sedimentation 

and riverbank erosion on the Brahmaputra, 112; flooding in, 24; and 

opposition to dam construction, 

61. See also India; India, northeastern states of

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), 34–35

Awami League, 84

Banerjee, Mamata, 84, 86, 89, 91

Bangladesh, 59; China-Bangladeshi relations, 31, 91, 92, 96; concern about 

India’s management of the Teesta 

River, 7, 86; concerns about India’s 

consumption of resources from the 

Ganges basin, 74, 84, 85, 87; declining groundwater levels in, 79; and 

diminished flow of the Ganges, 79; 

dry season of, 72, 73, 78, 79, 86, 87; 

flooding in, 1, 2, 71, 73, 78, 100; implications of India’s river-linking 

project on, 64, 65, 72, 82, 84, 85, 86; 

inability to accurately forecast heavy 

floods, 77; India-Bangladeshi relations, 40, 42, 63, 64, 68, 72, 83, 84, 85, 

88, 89, 91, 95, 96, 108; Indian watersharing agreement on the Ganges 

River with, 64, 66, 83, 88, 89; interactions with northeast Indian states, 

62, 63; interest in pursuing basinwide cooperation with China and 

119

Editor’s note: all page numbers in italics are figures, maps, or photographs.
India, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 111; 

internal challenges of, 10, 73, 80, 81, 

82; investment in flood-forecasting 

capabilities, 105; involvement in the 

Joint Study Group, 97, 98; and the 

Joint Rivers Commission, 66, 89, 109; 

as a lower riparian, 32, 39, 69, 83; as a 

member of SAARC, 35, 97; perceived 

threats from Indian development upstream, 32; policy recommendations 

for water management, 104, 105; 

population of, 3–4; and the potential for transboundary water flows 

between India and Bangladesh, 66; 

proposed water-sharing agreement 

on the Teesta River, 64–65, 66, 72, 

73, 84, 91, 108, 109; Rajshahi, Bangladesh, 8; Rangpur, Bangladesh, 

11; relations with China and India, 

2–3, 8, 9–10; sharing of hydrological 

data with, 31, 32, 56, 72, 89, 93–94, 

108, 109; signing of the Land Boundary Accord with India, 91; signing 

of memorandum of understanding 

with China, 31; and the Teesta River, 

71; water security within, 7

Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal 

(BBIN) initiative, 97

Bangladesh, and the Brahmaputra River: 

and the Brahmaputra River basin, 

1, 3, 5, 41, 42, 74, 75, 77, 90; and the 

Brahmaputra’s role in pushing back 

salinity from the Bay of Bengal, 78; 

and catchment area of the Brahmaputra River, 46; China as a cooperative partner on the Brahmaputra, 

93; China’s unwillingness to deal 

with Brahmaputra issues at the 

multilateral level with India and 

Bangladesh, 14; and concerns about 

China’s upstream practices on the 

Brahmaputra, 72, 92; dependence 

upon the Brahmaputra, 101; India’s 

bilateral approach to the Brahmaputra with Bangladesh, 69; riverbank 

erosion of the Brahmaputra, 76; 

threats from activities by upper riparian nations on the Brahmaputra, 

71, 74

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 

Forum for Regional Cooperation 

(BCIM), 35, 70, 72, 97, 98, 99, 106, 

110, 111, 112; BCIM Economic Corridor, 72, 97, 112, 113

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 112

Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 84

basin-wide level cooperation, 7, 8, 32, 

34, 35, 36, 71, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 109, 

110, 111, 112

Bay of Bengal, 64, 74, 78, 88, 101 

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 31, 98

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 61, 65, 72, 

86, 108

Bhutan, 1, 3, 4, 5, 46, 58, 97, 100

bilateral level, 8, 14, 32, 73, 99, 100, 106

Brahmaputra Basin Commission, 73, 

98, 99, 101, 112

Brahmaputra Board of India’s Ministry 

of Water Resources, 50 

Brahmaputra River, 6, 41, 77; basin of, 

3, 4, 5, 9, 41, 75, 90; Bangladesh’s 

support of multilateral cooperation on, 94, 95, 98, 99, 111; basinwide cooperation on, 35, 96, 97, 99, 

111, 112; bilateral relations regarding, 8, 14, 32, 34, 69, 100; catchment 

area of, 46; Chinese-Bangladesh 

relations regarding, 68; dam construction on, 1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 

17, 22, 25, 29, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 

53, 100, 103, 104, 107; difficulty of 

multilateral cooperation on, 10, 32, 

120 | Raging Waters
62, 68, 70; disputes between upper 

and lower riparians of, 2; flooding 

of, 24, 52, 53, 59, 71, 73, 75, 77, 94; 

hydrological data sharing, 1, 24, 

31, 39, 54, 57, 89, 93–94, 100, 106, 

108; India-Bangladesh relations 

regarding, 63, 64, 65, 109; IndiaChina relations regarding, 42, 43, 

44, 53–54, 58, 69, 104, 106, 107, 108; 

Indian infrastructure development 

on, 27, 37; and India’s river-linking 

project (RLP), 67, 72, 82, 85; lack 

of basin-wide agreements, 7, 28; 

plans to divert, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 

38, 39–40, 45, 85, 92, 100; political 

significance of, 39, 42, 59, 63, 101; 

pollution of, 80; soil erosion on, 50, 

53, 73, 75, 76, 112; tributaries of, 46, 

55, 71, 72, 74, 86, 99, 105; water resource competition of, 2

Central Water Commission (India), 24, 

54

Chellaney, Brahma, 2, 19, 23, 29, 46, 49

China: Bangladesh-China relations, 68,

71, 72, 74, 75, 85, 92, 93; basinwide cooperation, 35; bilateral 

relationship with Bangladesh, 72, 

91, 92–93, 109; bilateral talks and 

agreements with India, 36, 47, 50, 

52–56; border disputes with India 

regarding “southern Tibet,” 44, 

47–48, 58, 59, 63; and the Brahmaputra river basin, 41, 46, 101; construction of dams, 37, 39, 43, 44, 45, 

46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 72, 100, 103, 

107–8; cutoff of hydrological data 

sharing with India, 39; hydrological data sharing with Bangladesh, 

72, 93, 94, 106, 109; hydrological 

data sharing with India, 42, 50, 

52–53, 54, 55, 57, 106, 107; IndiaChina relations, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 

48, 49, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 68, 

104, 107; involvement in SAARC, 

35; and the Joint Rivers Commission, 97; Kunming Initiative, 97; 

lack of water-sharing agreement 

with India, 43; and the Mekong 

River Commission, 35; multilateral 

approaches to the Brahmaputra, 

36; origination of Brahmaputra in, 

39, 42, 47; plans for water diversion, 44, 45, 52, 92, 100; political 

importance of the Brahmaputra, 

101; preference on working bilaterally with India and Bangladesh, 

96, 97, 100; as an upper riparian, 

39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 59, 69, 71, 92, 106; 

Zangmu Dam, 15, 17, 45

China-India Border Conflict (1962), 23, 

26, 40, 44 

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, 106

China’s 2d Artillery Corps, 38

climate change, 10, 20, 25, 30, 36, 73, 80, 

81, 82, 97, 105, 110, 114

Dalai Lama, 40

dams, 1, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26; on the Brahmaputra, 2, 7, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 

26; China’s current and planned 

dams on the Yarlung/Brahmaputra, 16; Zangmu Dam, 15, 17, 45

Danube River: and the International 

Commission for the Protection of 

the Danube River, 6 

Doklam plateau: tensions between 

China and India over, 38, 44

drought, 60, 71, 73, 78, 85, 88

dry season, 72, 73, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 

86–88, 92, 96, 105, 108, 114 

Index | 121
erosion, 40, 44, 49, 50, 53, 59, 60, 73, 75, 

76, 77, 105, 112 

Farakka Barrage, 64, 88, 90

flood forecasting, 54, 57, 72, 89, 94, 100, 

105, 108, 112, 113

flooding, 1, 2, 24, 26, 27, 36, 40, 44, 49, 

50, 52, 53, 59, 60, 61, 71, 73, 75, 77, 

78, 94, 100, 102 

Ganges River, 64, 66, 72, 74, 81, 83, 84, 

87, 90, 99

Ganges River Treaty, 64, 66. See also 

Bangladesh; India

Gazaldoba Barrage, 86

Gogoi, Tarun, 61 

Green Watershed, 21

groundwater, 73 

Hasina, Sheikh, 84, 91

Hooghly River, 64, 87

Hu Jintao, 24, 54

human security, 2, 8, 76, 87, 105

hydrological data sharing, 1, 14, 24, 25, 

31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 

57, 83, 90, 93, 94, 100, 104, 108, 109, 

111

hydropower, 13, 15, 16, 26, 35, 49, 96, 

102, 106

Implementation Plan: Provision of Hydrological Information on the Yarlung 

Zangbu/Brahmaputra River in Flood 

Season by China to India, 56, 57, 108 

India, 4, 51, 67; Bangladesh-India relations, 7, 9, 32, 34, 40, 42, 63, 64, 65, 

68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 83, 84, 85, 86, 

88, 89, 91; barrages in the Ganges 

and Teesta Rivers, 86; Bhutan-Indian relations, 4; bilateral agreements 

and talks with Bangladesh, 64, 65, 

66, 72, 82, 87, 89, 91, 96; bilateral 

agreements and talks with China, 

24, 25, 29, 33, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 

57, 58, 72, 94; border conflict with 

China, 23, 26, 27, 42–43, 44, 48–49, 

63; and the Brahmaputra basin, 1, 

3, 5. 40, 41, 46, 51, 59, 101; ChinaIndia relations, 1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 22, 23, 

28, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 53, 54, 

55, 59, 68; Chinese concerns about 

Indian construction in disputed 

territories, 26, 27, 28, 37; competition with China over influence on 

Bangladesh, 31, 91; concern over 

Chinese dam construction, 13–14, 

22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 32, 39, 45, 46, 53; 

concerns about Chinese water diversion, 25–26, 29–30, 38, 45, 52, 

53; construction of dams, 7, 14, 22, 

27, 37, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 59, 60, 

61, 68; Doklam plateau standoff 

with China, 38, 39; emphasis on 

bilateral approaches, 69; establishment of riparian rights, 48; and the 

Farakka Barrage, 88, 90; flooding 

in, 24, 50, 51, 52; halting of hydrological data supplied by China, 

100; implications of river-linking 

projects on Bangladesh, 64, 65, 66; 

India-Pakistan conflict, 5; and the 

Joint Rivers Commission, 66, 83, 

89; lack of support for multilateral 

cooperation on the Brahmaputra, 

10; as a lower riparian, 2, 48; management of flooding and erosion, 

50, 60; as a middle riparian, 39, 40, 

41, 42, 69; participation in SAARC, 

35, 69; political importance of the 

Brahmaputra, 39, 42, 101; population of, 3; resolution of boundary 

122 | Raging Waters
dispute with Bangladesh, 91; and 

river-linking projects, 65, 67, 68, 72, 

83, 84, 85, 86; sharing hydrological 

data with Bangladesh, 89; sharing 

hydrological data with China, 14, 

24, 25, 32, 42, 43, 50, 52, 53–54, 55, 

56, 57, 93; and the Siliguri Corridor, 

59, 63; as an upper riparian, 2, 66, 

71, 74, 83; war with China in 1962, 

1; water diversion plans of, 32, 40, 

85, 92. See also India, northeastern 

states of; specific northeastern states

India, northeastern states of, 39, 40, 42, 

43, 44, 50, 52, 59, 62, 63, 84, 95. See 

also Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; 

Meghalaya; Nagaland; Sikkim; Siliguri Corridor; West Bengal

Indian National Congress, 61, 86

Indus River, 4, 5, 50; Permanent Indus 

Commission, 98; the Indus Waters 

Treaty, 98, 99, 113

Indus Waters Treaty, 98, 99, 113

integrated river basin management 

(IRBM), 95

international community, 10, 101, 105, 

113

international financial institutions, 10, 

101, 105, 113. See also Asian Development Bank; World Bank

Jamuna River, 63. See also Brahmaputra 

River

Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), 63, 66, 

83, 89, 109

Kolkata, India, 64, 65, 96, 97

Krishna, S. M., 46

Kunming Initiative, 97

Land Boundary Accord, 91

Li Keqiang, 55

Li Ling, 2, 19, 38, 45

Line of Actual Control, 27

Lohit/Zayu Qu River, 54, 107

Look East Policy (India), 60

lower riparian, 2, 33, 42, 47, 48, 61, 62, 64, 

68, 69. See also Bangladesh

Madhya Pradesh, 86

Meghalaya, India, 59. See also India, 

northeastern states of

Mekong River, 33, 35

Mekong River Commission, 33

memoranda of understanding: 31, 52, 53, 

54, 93–94, 101, 109. See also specific 

memoranda of understanding

Memorandum of Understanding between 

the Ministry of Water Resources, the 

Republic of India and the Ministry of 

Water Resources, the People’s Republic 

of China on Strengthening Cooperation 

on Trans-border Rivers, 55

Memorandum of Understanding upon Provision of Hydrological Information 

of the Brahmaputra/Yalung Tsangbo 

River in Flood Season by China to 

India, 52

middle riparian, 9, 39, 40, 69. See also 

India

Ministry of Environment, Forests and 

Climate Change (India), 47

Ministry of External Affairs (India), 45, 

47

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China), 25 

Ministry of Power (India), 47

Ministry of Water Resources (Bangladesh), 82, 105

Ministry of Water Resources (China), 14, 

21, 22, 55

Ministry of Water Resources (India), 26, 

47, 48, 50, 55

Index | 123
Modi, Narendra Damodardas, 24, 25, 

58, 60, 64, 65, 71, 72, 83, 84, 86, 91, 

96, 109

multilateral development banks, 113, 

114. See also Asian Development 

Bank; international financial institutions; World Bank

Myanmar, 35, 59, 70, 83, 98, 113

Nagaland, India, 59. See also India, 

northeastern states of

National Congress Party (India), 86

National Research Council (United 

States), 50

natural disasters, 80, 81, 93. See also 

droughts; erosion; flooding

northeast India, 38, 60, 62, 68, 104; and 

the Brahmaputra River, 59, 62, 63; 

Department of Development of the 

North Eastern Region, 60; flooding 

in, 50; Northeast Water Resources 

Authority, 61; soil erosion in, 50

Padma River, 64. See also Ganges River

People’s Liberation Army, 2

Rangpur division, Bangladesh, 8, 11, 74, 

86, 87 

River-Linking Project (RLP), 40, 64, 65, 

66, 67, 68, 72, 82, 84, 85, 86, 108

river navigation, 35, 95, 102, 109, 111, 113

salinity, 72, 78, 79, 81, 82, 88 

scientific studies, 10, 11, 35, 102

sedimentation, 27, 108, 109, 112, 114 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 34 

Sheikh Hasina, 84, 91 

Sikkim, India, 59, 86. See also India, 

northeastern states of

Siliguri Corridor, 59, 63. See also India, 

northeastern states of 

Singh, Manmohan, 55, 60, 65, 84, 86 

Sino-Indian relations, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24, 

38, 42, 44

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers 

and People, 49

South Asia Water Initiative, 3

South Asian Association for Regional 

Cooperation (SAARC)

South–North Water Diversion Project, 

34, 35, 69, 94, 97

“southern Tibet”: China’s claims on, 14, 

26, 44, 45, 101. See also Arunachal 

Pradesh; India, northeastern states 

of

State Council (China), 16, 20 

Subansiri River, 47–48, 53

subnational level, and dealing with multilateral and bilateral issues at the, 

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 59, 101, 102, 104, 112

Sutlej (Langqen Zangbo) River, 54

Teesta River: Bangladeshi dependence 

on, 101; diminished flow of water, 

86–87; flooding in Bangladesh due 

to, 2, 71, 100; India-Bangladesh 

discord over water sharing of, 7; 

India’s barrages on, 85–86; potential agreements on, 63, 64, 65, 66, 

71, 72, 74, 83, 84, 89, 91, 108, 109; 

as a tributary of the Brahmaputra 

River, 74, 86, 99

Tibet, 1, 2, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 

22, 24, 26–27, 32, 37, 40, 42, 45, 53, 

94, 101

Tibet’s Waters Will Save China, 2, 19, 20, 

38, 45. See also Li Ling

Track 1 diplomacy, 37, 97, 110, 112

Track 1.5 diplomacy, 110, 113

Track 2 diplomacy, 30, 36, 37, 97, 106, 

110, 112, 113

124 | Raging Waters
United Nations (UN): Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 3; UN 

Watercourses Convention, 33

upper riparian, 2, 30, 43, 45, 61, 66, 69, 

71, 72, 73, 74, 83, 97, 99, 101, 106, 

108, 112. See also China; India

U.S. Water Partnership, 95 

Uttar Pradesh, India, 86

Water Resources Information System 

(India), 53

water security, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 30, 31, 82, 

83, 85, 92, 99, 100, 110, 114

water-sharing agreement(s), 2, 5, 43, 55, 

64, 66, 74, 83, 84, 86, 100

West Bengal, India, 8, 59, 64, 65, 71, 84, 

86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 108. See also India, 

northeastern states of

World Bank, 113. See also international 

financial institutions; multilateral 

development banks

World Commission on Dams, 33

Xi Jinping, 23, 25 

Yangtze River, 18, 19

Yarlung Zangbo/Tsangpo River, 16, 54, 

55, 56, 57, 107, 108. See also Brahmaputra River 

Yellow River, 18, 19

Yellow River Water Conservancy Commission, 19

Zangmu Dam, 15, 17, 45. See also China 

Zhu Rongji, 52

Index | 125